Cook y O'Brien (2014) - Knowledge Activation, Integration, and Validation During Narrative Text Comprehension

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Knowledge Activation, Integration, and Validation During Narrative Text

Comprehension
Article in Discourse Processes · January 2014

DOI: 10.1080/0163853X.2013.855107
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Discourse Processes
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Knowledge Activation, Integration, and Validation

During Narrative Text Comprehension
Anne E. Cook & Edward J. O'Brien
To cite this article: Anne E. Cook & Edward J. O'Brien (2014) Knowledge Activation, Integration,
and Validation During Narrative Text Comprehension, Discourse Processes, 51:1-2, 26-49, DOI:
10.1080/0163853X.2013.855107
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Discourse Processes, 51:26–49, 2014
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DOI: 10.1080/0163853X.2013.855107
Knowledge Activation, Integration, and

Validation During Narrative Text
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Comprehension
Anne E. Cook
Educational Psychology Department
University of Utah
Edward J. O’Brien
Department of Psychology
University of New Hampshire
Previous text comprehension studies using the contradiction paradigm primarily tested
assumptions of the activation mechanism involved in reading. However, the nature of the
contradiction in such studies relied on validation of information in readers’ general world
knowledge. We directly tested this validation process by varying the strength of the
relation between information presented in a narrative and information in general world
knowledge. In Experiment 1, we found that the strength and timing of the inconsistency
effect depended on the strength of this relation. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated that
this was due to differences in the rates at which readers activated, integrated, and
validated information in the high- and low-related conditions. The results are explained
within the context of a view of reading that incorporates resonance (R), integration (I),
and validation (Val) processes during reading—the RI-Val view of comprehension.
INTRODUCTION
Comprehension of text involves a complex set of processes that must take place
for the reader to develop a coherent understanding of the intended message.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Anne E. Cook, Educational

Psychology Department, 1705 Campus Center Drive, Rm. 327, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT
84112, USA. E-mail: anne.cook@utah.edu
26
VALIDATION DURING READING 27
During typical reading of narrative text, information is continually activated from

memory and integrated with the evolving discourse model. Many studies of
comprehension have focused on either the mechanism responsible for memory
activation or the processes involved in integration. However, critical to gaining
a complete understanding of the comprehension is the examination of the
overlapping and dependent nature of these two component processes. Although
activation and integration are often treated experimentally as separate,
consecutive, stages of comprehension, current theories of comprehension assume
that these components are continuous and overlapping (e.g., Kintsch, 1988, 1998;
Long & Lea, 2005: Rizzella & O’Brien, 1996, 2002; Sanford & Garrod, 1989; for
a review, see Rapp & van den Broek, 2005). Within these views, as soon as
information becomes activated it is integrated with information in working
memory. Meanwhile, the activation mechanism continues to cycle, and new
information is continually made available. The focus of this article is on the role
of reader knowledge in memory activation and how that in turn influences
integration and subsequent validation against general world knowledge (e.g.,
Isberner & Richter, this issue; Singer, 2006, 2013; Singer & Doering, this issue).
Within the memory-based text processing view (e.g., Gerrig & O’Brien,
2005), researchers have assumed that information is activated from memory via a
low-level retrieval process (e.g., resonance; Myers & O’Brien, 1998; O’Brien &
Myers, 1999). Substantial research has provided evidence for three critical
characteristics of this activation process; it is passive, dumb, and unrestricted.
It is passive in that it occurs without conscious or strategic effort on the part of the
reader. It is dumb because information resonates (and is activated) simply on the
basis of featural overlap, without regard to whether it is relevant or appropriate
with respect to the current discourse model. Finally, the activation mechanism is
unrestricted: The signal has the potential to contact related information from
either the episodic representation of the text or general world knowledge.
Much of the research that has provided evidence for this passive retrieval
mechanism has been based on the contradiction paradigm developed by O’Brien
and colleagues (e.g., Albrecht & O’Brien, 1993; Cook, Halleran, & O’Brien,
1998; Guéraud, Harmon, & Peracchi, 2005; Hakala & O’Brien, 1995; Kendeou,
Smith, & O’Brien, 2013; Myers, O’Brien, Albrecht, & Mason, 1994; O’Brien &
Albrecht, 1992; O’Brien, Cook, & Guéraud, 2010; O’Brien, Cook, & Peracchi,
2004; O’Brien, Rizzella, Albrecht, & Halleran, 1998). In this paradigm, passages
describe characteristics of a protagonist that are either consistent or inconsistent
with respect to a subsequent action described in a target sentence. For example,
a protagonist, Mary, may be described as either a junk food junkie (consistent
condition) or a health nut and vegetarian (inconsistent condition). When the
reader later learns in the target sentence that Mary ordered a cheeseburger and
fries, this information signals related content in memory via the passive retrieval
mechanism, which may resonate and become activated in response. This content,
28 COOK AND O’BRIEN
once reactivated, may be integrated with the information in working memory.

In the inconsistent condition, readers have a difficult time reconciling Mary’s
vegetarian lifestyle with her cheeseburger order and as a result experience a
slowdown in reading time compared with the consistent condition, otherwise
referred to as the inconsistency effect. Moreover, this occurs regardless of
whether the activated content is relevant, current, or true. Isberner and Richter
(2013) developed a clever Stroop-like paradigm for testing participants’
sensitivities to inconsistent information, while avoiding participant controlled
responses, and found results similar to those obtained with the contradiction
paradigm; inconsistent or implausible events resulted in slower response
latencies than consistent or plausible events.
Cook and Guéraud (2005) pointed out that the types of contradictions
represented in these studies are not due to inconsistencies in the surface structure
of the text (e.g., Mary eats meat. Mary does not eat meat.). Instead, the critical
portions of the text (i.e., Mary is a vegetarian and Mary ordered a cheeseburger)
are each related to information stored in general world knowledge (Vegetarians
do not eat meat and Cheeseburgers contain meat). When readers encoded that
Mary is a vegetarian, the information from general world knowledge that
vegetarians do not eat meat may be activated and integrated into the discourse
representation. When the target sentence (Mary ordered a cheeseburger) is later
encoded, it would also lead to the activation of “meat,” either from general world
knowledge or the episodic representation of the text, and this may in turn activate
the previously encoded information about Mary’s eating habits (does not eat
meat). The inconsistency effect, therefore, is the result of readers’ attempts to
integrate the activated information with the target sentence. The degree of
processing difficulty experienced is determined by the degree to which the target
and the activated information overlap in general world knowledge. In other
words, the inconsistency effect must be mediated by, and validated against,
general world knowledge (e.g., Isberner & Richter, this issue; Singer, 2006, 2013;
Singer & Doering, this issue).
Although most studies using the contradiction paradigm have implicitly
adopted the assumption that the inconsistency effect relies on information
contained in general world knowledge (i.e., validation), it has never been directly
tested. The goal of this study was to address this gap. If inconsistency effects such
as those demonstrated by O’Brien and colleagues are in fact mediated by, and
validated against, general world knowledge, then the size of the effect should
depend on the underlying strength of the relation between the action described in
the target sentence and the information in general world knowledge that connects
the target sentence events to the protagonist characteristics. More generally,
we wanted to demonstrate that integration processes do not rely solely on
activation processes and that they must take into account the role of validation
against general world knowledge (Singer, 2006, 2013; Singer & Doering, this
issue; Singer & Halldorson, 1996). We argue that activation, integration, and
validation are passive parallel asynchronous processes, with activation preceding
integration, and integration preceding validation.
To examine this issue, we modified passages used by Albrecht and O’Brien
(1993). Consider the first example in the Appendix. After a brief introduction,
each passage described protagonist characteristics (e.g., Mary is a junk food
junkie or Mary is a vegetarian). These characteristics were backgrounded by
several sentences, and then two target sentences were presented. These sentences
were locally coherent with respect to the immediately preceding content, but they
were either consistent or inconsistent with the previously described characteristics
of the protagonist. In addition, the target sentence was either high-related (e.g.,
Mary decided to order a cheeseburger) or low-related (e.g., Mary decided to
order a tuna salad) with respect to the relevant information in general world
knowledge (e.g., meat) that connected the target sentence to the protagonist
characteristic (e.g., vegetarian). The high- and low-related target sentences
always differed by only a few words, and they were controlled for length across
the two conditions. If the inconsistency effect is mediated by a validation process
that involves general world knowledge, then the protagonist characteristics
should be activated and made available for integration faster when the action
described in the target sentence is highly related to the critical contents in general
world knowledge than when it is low-related. That is, we expect the inconsistency
effect to be stronger when readers learn that Mary ordered a cheeseburger (high-
related target) than when they learn she ordered a tuna salad (low-related target).
In the low-related target sentence condition, because the relation between the tuna
salad and meat is not as strong, it may take additional time for the inconsistency to
become evident based on a convergence of activation within general world
knowledge. If correct, then the inconsistency effect for the low-related condition
should be delayed relative to the high-related condition; it may not become fully
apparent until readers reach the second target sentence.
These hypotheses were tested in three experiments. Experiment 1 used
passages such as those described in the previous paragraph and examined reading
times for the target sentences as a function of consistency and target sentence
relatedness. In Experiments 2 and 3, we used verification probes to assess the
availability of the protagonist characteristics after each of the target sentences.
EXPERIMENT 1
Passages described characteristics of a protagonist that were either consistent or

inconsistent with respect to an action described in a subsequent target sentence.
However, the degree of inconsistency depended on information actually
contained in readers’ general world knowledge (i.e., vegetarians don’t eat meat).
The information in the target sentence was either highly related to the critical
information in general world knowledge (Mary ordered a cheeseburger) or it was
low-related (Mary ordered a tuna salad). Reading times were measured for this
target sentence and for a second target sentence. Based on previous research,
reading times were expected to be slower in the inconsistent condition than in the
consistent condition (i.e., the inconsistency effect). More important, the size of the
inconsistency effect, and the timing of it, was predicted to depend on the degree to
which the target sentence related to the critical information in general world
knowledge (i.e., the rate at which the relation between the conflicting information
in the text was validated against general world knowledge). Assuming that it
takes longer for “meat” to be activated, integrated, and subsequently validated in
the low-related condition than in the high-related condition, the inconsistency
effect should be stronger for the high-related condition than for the low-related
condition on the first target sentence, but this pattern should be reversed for the
second target sentence.
Method
Participants. Forty University of Utah undergraduates enrolled in
Introductory Educational Psychology participated in exchange for partial course
credit.
Materials. Twenty narrative passages similar to the first example presented

in the Appendix were modified from Albrecht and O’Brien’s (1993) materials for
use in this experiment. Each passage began with a brief introductory section. This
was followed by a description of protagonist characteristics that were either
consistent or inconsistent with respect to an event described in a subsequent
target sentence. The mean lengths of the consistent and inconsistent protagonist
characteristic descriptions were 45.05 (SD ¼ 2.37) and 44.60 (SD ¼ 3.15) words,
respectively. A background section (M ¼ 66.05 words, SD ¼ 2.19) immediately
followed. The first target sentence then described an event that had either high or
low semantic overlap with the events in the character description section as well
as with general world knowledge, and this was followed by a second target
sentence. These sentences ranged from 35 to 45 characters in length, with means
of 39.3 for both the first sentence (SD ¼ 1.87) and the second target sentence
(SD ¼ 2.39). A brief closing section concluded the passage, and this was
followed by a “yes” or “no” comprehension question designed to ensure that
participants were reading carefully. There were equal numbers of “yes” and “no”
comprehension questions.
Four materials sets were constructed; each set contained five passages in each
of the four conditions: consistent/high-related target, consistent/low-related
target, inconsistent/high-related target, and inconsistent/low-related target.
Across the four sets, each passage occurred once in each of the four conditions.
Each set also contained 20 filler passages that were included to mask the purpose
of the experiment.
Rating study. To ensure that the two target sentence conditions differed
with respect to their overlap with the protagonist characteristics, a rating study
was conducted. Twenty-two University of Utah undergraduates not involved in
other studies reported here participated in exchange for partial course credit.
Participants read passages, in their entirety, in the inconsistent character

description condition up to the end of the background section on a computer
monitor. The passage was erased from the screen, and they were then presented
with the first target sentence in either the high-related or low-related condition and
asked to press a key to rate the likelihood of occurrence (from 1 ¼ extremely
unlikely to occur to 5 ¼ extremely likely to occur) of the event described in the
sentence. Two materials sets were created, such that within each set each
condition appeared an equal number of times and across the two sets each passage
appeared in each condition. Across all passages, events in the target sentence were
rated as less likely to occur in the high-related condition (M ¼ 1.65, SD ¼ .50)
than in the low-related condition (M ¼ 2.61, SD ¼ .63), t(19) ¼ 6.13, d ¼ 1.69.
Latent Semantic Analysis study. We also compared the underlying

relation between the inconsistent protagonist characteristic and the high-related
and low-related target sentences via Latent Semantic Analysis (Landauer, Foltz,
& Laham, 1998). Using the One-to-Many Comparison method on the Latent
Semantic Analysis website (http://lsa.colorado.edu), with the General Knowl-
edge up to First Year of College corpus and the document to document setting,
we compared the critical protagonist characteristic (e.g., Mary was a strict
vegetarian) with both the high-related and the low-related target sentences. The
cosine between the inconsistent characteristic and the high-related target
sentence (M¼ .33, SD ¼ .19) was significantly larger than the cosine between the
inconsistent characteristic and the low-related target sentence (M ¼ .30,
SD ¼ .20), t(19) ¼ 2.14, d ¼ .15. This provides further evidence for the
differences in the underlying relation between the critical protagonist
characteristic and the action in the target sentence in the high- and low-related
conditions.
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four

materials sets. Each participant was run individually in a session that lasted
approximately 1 h. All materials were presented on a Pentium computer.
Participants were instructed to rest their right thumbs on a line-advance key, their
right index fingers on a “yes” key, and their left index fingers on a “no” key. Each
trial began with the word “READY” in the middle of the screen. When
participants were ready to read a passage, they pressed the line-advance key.
Texts were presented one line at a time. Each press of the key erased the current
line and presented the next line. Comprehension time was measured as the time
between key presses. Each participant was instructed to read at a comfortable,
normal reading pace. Following the last line of the passage, the cue
“QUESTION” appeared in the middle of the screen for 2,000 ms. This was
followed by a comprehension question to which participants responded by
pressing either the “yes” or the “no” key. For those trials in which participants
made errors on the comprehension question, the word “ERROR” appeared in the
middle of the screen for 750 ms. Before beginning the experimental passages,
participants read three practice passages to ensure they were familiarized with
and understood the procedure.
Results and Discussion

Overall, accuracy rates on comprehension questions were high (. 85%), and
more importantly, there were no differences as a function of experimental
condition, all F , 1. Reading times were recorded for both the first and second
target sentences. Any reading times that were greater than three standard
deviations from a participant’s mean in a condition or an item’s mean in a
condition were discarded. This resulted in the loss of less than 5% of the data.
F1 and t1 indicate analyses based on participants variability and F2 and t2 indicate
analyses based on items variability. All contrasts were significant at the p , .05
level, unless otherwise indicated.
Mean reading times for Experiment 1 are presented in Table 1. The reading
time data were analyzed with a repeated-measures ANOVA with three variables:
sentence (first vs. second), consistency (consistent vs. inconsistent), and
relatedness (high vs. low). Because we were most concerned with whether the
size of the inconsistency effect (i.e., the difference between the consistent and
inconsistent conditions) would differ for the high- and low-related target sentence
conditions and whether this pattern would differ across the two target sentences,
the three-way interaction was the most critical effect. This interaction was
TABLE 1
Mean Reading Times in Milliseconds for Experiment 1 as a Function of Sentence,
Consistency, and Target Sentence Relatedness
High-Related Target Sentence Low-Related Target Sentence
Consistent Inconsistent Consistent Inconsistent
First target sentence 2,155 2,350 2,160 2,262

Second target sentence 1,949 1,971 1,891 2,091
significant; F1(1, 36) ¼ 22.48, MSE ¼ 1,023,410, partial h2 ¼ .38; F2(1, 16) ¼
11.67, MSE ¼ 49.198, partial h2 ¼ .42. Planned comparisons revealed that
reading times on the first target sentence in the high-related condition were longer
in the inconsistent condition than in the consistent condition, t1(39) ¼ 4.36,
d ¼ .64, t2(19) ¼ 3.3, d ¼ .93; however, in the low-related condition, reading
times in the consistent condition and inconsistent condition did not differ reliably,
t1(39) ¼ 1.59, p ¼ .12, t2(19) ¼ 1.14, p ¼ .27. For the second target sentence,
the opposite pattern was observed. In the low-related condition, reading times
were now longer in the inconsistent condition than in the consistent condition,
t1(39) ¼ 4.18, d ¼ .40, t2(19) ¼ 2.01, p ¼ .06, d ¼ .60; however, in the high-
related condition, reading times in the consistent condition and the inconsistent
condition did not differ reliably, all t , 1.
These findings are consistent with the view that the integration of
information activated during reading is mediated by and validated against
general world knowledge. In both the high- and low-related conditions, reading
was disrupted in the inconsistent condition. However, in the high-related
condition, the disruption in reading time in the inconsistent condition occurred
rapidly, on the first target sentence, whereas in the low-related condition,
reading times were not disrupted until the second target sentence. In the high-
related condition, the preexisting relation between “being a vegetarian” and
“eating a cheeseburger” is strong, and these two pieces of information should
converge on “meat” in general world knowledge quickly. Thus, the process of
validating those two pieces of information against general world knowledge
occurred relatively early—on the first target sentence. In contrast, in the low-
related condition, the preexisting strength between “being a vegetarian” and
“eating tuna fish” is markedly weaker. Thus, the reader likely had time to begin
integration of the first sentence with the narrative discourse before the two
pieces of information converged on general world knowledge and initiated the
validation process. Once the validation process occurred, the inconsistency
became evident, but not until readers had moved on to the second target
sentence.
EXPERIMENTS 2 AND 3
The pattern of slowdowns in reading in the inconsistent conditions in

Experiment 1 depended on the strength of underlying relation between the
described characteristic of the protagonist and the target sentence in general
world knowledge and the activation of that relation. However, such slowdowns
in reading are only an indirect measure of that activation. The goal of
Experiments 2 and 3 was to provide a more direct assessment of the availability
of this information immediately after reading either the first target sentence or
the second target sentence in the high- and low-related conditions. Presumably,
in the high-related condition, availability should be evident immediately after
reading the first target sentence in the inconsistent condition. In contrast, in the
low-related condition, no evidence of availability should be presented
immediately after reading the first target sentence in the inconsistent condition.
In the low-related condition, evidence of availability should become evident
when tested immediately after the second target sentence.
The inconsistent versions of the high- and low-related passages from
Experiment 1 were used, and passages were terminated either immediately after
the background section (in both Experiments 2 and 3) or immediately after one of
the two target sentences (first target sentence in Experiment 2 and second target
sentence in Experiment 3). Within each experiment, this resulted in three
conditions: After-Background, After-High-Related Target, and After-Low-
Related Target. Participants were asked to verify a probe that reflected the
critical protagonist characteristics (e.g., Mary was a strict vegetarian).
Based on previous research, the protagonist characteristics are not expected
to be active immediately after the background section (Myers et al., 1994).
Thus, the relation between the protagonist’s characteristic and the protagonist’s
actions (which resides in general world knowledge) cannot be available
immediately before reading the target sentence. The rate at which this relation
becomes available should depend on the strength of the relation between the
protagonist’s characteristic and the target action in general world knowledge.
Therefore, the relation between the protagonist’s characteristics and actions
should be available more quickly after the high-related target sentence than
after the low-related target sentence. Based on the reading time pattern
established in Experiment 1, the relation between the protagonist’s
characteristics and actions in the target sentence should be available
immediately upon reading the first target sentence in the high-related
condition. In contrast, the reading times in Experiment 1 suggest that evidence
of the reactivation of the protagonist’s characteristics may take longer to
become active in the low-related condition. If correct, any indication of
activation in that condition may not be observed until after the second target
sentence has been presented (Experiment 3).
One interesting complication with presenting verification probes in these
passage contexts is that the probe is inconsistent with the contents of the
immediately preceding target sentence. Determining the truth of the probe
may actually be harder (i.e., take longer) when the contents of the probe and
the inconsistent target sentence, and the relation between them from general
world knowledge, are active in memory, because their relation puts them in
direct conflict with each other. Thus, in Experiment 2, verification times on
the probe may actually be slower in the After-High-Related condition than in
either the After-Background or After-Low-Related conditions. In contrast, in
Experiment 3, verification times should be slower in both the After-High-

Related and After-Low-Related conditions than in the After-Background
condition.
Method
Participants. Sixty-six University of Utah undergraduates enrolled in
Introductory Educational Psychology courses participated in exchange for
partial course credit: 36 participated in Experiment 2 and 30 participated in

Experiment 3.
Materials. Eighteen passages for Experiment 1 were used in these

experiments. Passages were presented only in the high- and low-related inconsistent
character description conditions. In Experiment 2, passages were terminated either
immediately after the background section or immediately after the first target
sentence. In Experiment 3, passages were terminated either immediately after the
background section or after the second target sentence. A verification probe that
reflected the critical protagonist characteristic (e.g., Mary was a strict vegetarian)
was then presented, followed by the comprehension question.
For each experiment, three materials sets were created such that within each
set an equal number of passages appeared in each of the three conditions:
After Background, After High-Related target, and After Low-Related target.
Across the three sets, each passage occurred once in each condition. Each
set also contained 18 filler passages that did not contain any inconsistent
information; the filler passages were included to balance the number of correct
“yes” and “no” verification responses and to mask the purpose of the
experiments.
Procedure. The procedure for reading the passages in both Experiments 2

and 3 was the same as in Experiment 1. However, following the last line of the
passage, a cue “XXX” appeared for 500 ms. The cue was then replaced by the
verification probe. Participants were asked to respond as quickly and as
accurately as possible whether the probe was true or false by pressing “yes” for
true or “no” for false. For those trials in which participants responded incorrectly,
the word “ERROR” appeared in the middle of the screen for 500 ms. This was
then followed by the presentation of the comprehension question.
Results and Discussion

Mean verification time and accuracy rates for both Experiments 2 and 3 appear in
Table 2. The same cut-off procedures were used as in Experiment 1, which
resulted in the loss of less than 5% of the data. Comprehension question rates
TABLE 2
Mean Response Times in Milliseconds (and Accuracy Rates) for Experiments 2 and 3 as a
Function of Probe Position
After After After

Background High-Related Low-Related
Response Response Response

Time Accuracy Time Accuracy Time Accuracy
After first target sentence 2,558 (.93) 2,764 (.85) 2,533 (.91)
(Experiment 2)
After second target 2,095 (.90) 2,315 (.82) 2,255 (.89)
sentence (Experiment 3)
were quite high (. 90% in both Experiments 2 and 3), and there were no
differences in comprehension accuracy as a function of experimental condition in
either Experiment 2 or 3, all F , 1.
Experiment 2. The main effect of probe position was significant, F1(2,

66) ¼ 7.02, MSE ¼ 82,525, partial h2 ¼ .18; F2(2, 30) ¼ 3.61, MSE ¼ 48,727,
partial h2 ¼ 19. Planned comparisons confirmed that participants took longer to
verify the probe when it was presented immediately after target sentence in the
high-related condition (After-High-Related) than in the low-related condition
(After-Low-Related), t1(35) ¼ 2.95, d ¼ .43, t2(17) ¼ 2.02, p ¼ .06, d ¼ .39.
Verification times were also slower in the After-High-Related condition than in
the After-Background condition, t1(35) ¼ 3.62, d ¼ .40, t2(17) ¼ 2.12, d ¼ .38.
The difference between the After-Background and After-Low Related conditions
was not significant, all t , 1.
Probe position also significantly affected verification accuracy, F1(2,
66) ¼ 3.22, MSE ¼ .02, partial h2 ¼ .09, F2(2, 30) ¼ 3.72, MSE ¼ .01, partial
h2 ¼ .20. Participants made more errors when the probe appeared immediately
after the high-related target sentence than when it appeared after the low-related
target sentence, t1(35) ¼ 2.39, d ¼ .38, t2(17) ¼ 2.79, d ¼ .54, or immediately
after the background, t1(35) ¼ 1.99, p ¼ .054,, d ¼ .50, t2(17) ¼ 2.2, d ¼ .66.
There were no differences in verification accuracy rates between the After-
Background and After-Low-Related conditions, all t , 1.
Experiment 3. The main effect of probe position was significant, F1(2,

54) ¼ 5.4, MSE ¼ 71,569, partial h2 ¼ .17; F2(2, 30) ¼ 5.52, MSE ¼ 29,960,
partial h2 ¼ .27. As in Experiment 2, probe verification times were slower in the
After-High-Related condition than in the After-Background condition,
t1(29) ¼ 2.6, d ¼ .38, t2(17) ¼ 2.85, d ¼ .49. Most important, in contrast to
Experiment 2, verification times were now slower in the After-Low-Related

condition than in the After-Background condition, t1(29) ¼ 3.0, d ¼ .29,
t2(17) ¼ 1.24, p ¼ .23, d ¼ .23. The difference between the After-High-Related
and After-Low-Related conditions did not approach significance, all t # 1.
Probe position also significantly affected verification accuracy, F1(2,
54) ¼ 3.29, MSE ¼ .02, partial h2 ¼ . 11, F2(2, 30) ¼ 3.66, MSE ¼ .01, partial
h2 ¼ . 20. As in Experiment 2, participants made more errors when the probe
appeared immediately after the high-related target sentence than when it
appeared immediately after the background, t1(29) ¼ 2.44, d ¼ .56, t2(17) ¼
2.96, d ¼ .57, or after the low-related target sentence (although only marginal
when based on participants variability), t1(29) ¼ 1.83, p ¼ .078, d ¼ .45,
t2(17) ¼ 2.32, d ¼ .52. There were no differences in verification accuracy rates
between the After-Background and After-Low-Related condition, all t , 1.
Combined, the results of Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrate that the strength of
the relation between the target sentence and the protagonist characteristic
influenced the rate at which this information became available. Verification times
and accuracy rates in the After-High-Related condition differed from the After-
Background and After-Low-Related conditions, and there was no difference
between the latter two conditions in Experiment 2. It took longer for the relation
between the target sentence and the critical characteristic to become available in
the low-related condition. This did not occur until readers had already moved on
to the second target sentence (Experiment 3); then, verification times and
accuracy rates for both the After-High-Related and After-Low-Related
conditions differed from those in the After-Background condition. Although
increases in availability are typically associated with faster response times, we
argued that in the present experiments, readers were actually slower (and less
accurate) to verify a probe that was active in memory because they may also have
been attempting to reconcile it with the immediately preceding text—the
inconsistent target sentence (see, for example, Long, Seely, & Oppy, 1999).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The findings reported here replicate and extend previous research using the
contradiction paradigm developed by O’Brien and colleagues (e.g., Albrecht &
O’Brien, 1993; Cook et al., 1998; Guéraud et al., 2005; Hakala & O’Brien, 1995;
Kendeou et al., 2013; Myers et al., 1994; O’Brien & Albrecht, 1992; O’Brien
et al., 1998, 2004, 2010; see also Isberner & Richter, 2013). More importantly,
they highlight that the disruption to reading that defines the inconsistency effect is
a product of validation, the process through which readers attempt to compare
currently active information against their general world knowledge (Singer,
2006, 2013; Singer & Doering, this issue). The passages used in this study (and
previous studies) contained inconsistencies between protagonist characteristics

and a subsequent action that relied on information stored in general world
knowledge (Cook & Guéraud, 2005). In the present study, we varied the degree to
which the action carried out by the protagonist in the target sentence overlapped
with the critical information in general world knowledge. We predicted that the
size of the inconsistency effect should depend on the degree to which the contents
of the target sentence overlapped with the critical information in general world
knowledge. When the relation was high, the inconsistent information was quickly
available (Experiment 2) and had an immediate impact on comprehension

(Experiment 1). In contrast, when the overlap was low, it took additional time for
the inconsistent relation to become available (Experiment 3) and its impact on
comprehension was correspondingly delayed (Experiment 1). These results
provide the first direct evidence that the inconsistency effect is mediated by the
validation of the two pieces of information against information in general world
knowledge.
Assuming that a low-level automatic memory retrieval mechanism (e.g.,
resonance; Myers & O’Brien, 1998; O’Brien & Myers, 1999) operates during
reading, any incoming information results in a signal to all information in long-
term memory. Thus, when readers encoded the protagonist characteristic (e.g.,
Mary is a vegetarian), it likely reactivated information from general world
knowledge regarding vegetarians (They do not eat meat), and this may have been
integrated into the evolving discourse representation (see Kintsch, 1988, 1998).
When readers later encountered the target sentence (e.g., Mary ordered a
cheeseburger and fries), that information likewise sent a signal to all of memory,
and related information resonated in response. In the high-related condition,
“cheeseburger” led to activation of “meat,” which led to activation of
“vegetarian,” via connections established general world knowledge and/or the
discourse representation. Given the strong connections between “cheeseburger”
and “meat” and between “meat” and “vegetarian,” the protagonist characteristic
was quickly reactivated and available for integration. Thus, the impact of the
conflicting information became evident on the first target sentence. In the low-
related condition, the relation in general world knowledge between “tuna salad”
and “meat” is weaker; as a result it would have taken several more “activation
cycles” (and therefore more time) for “tuna salad” to activate “meat” and for
“meat” to activate “vegetarian.” The result of this delayed activation was that the
conflicting nature of the information did not become evident until the second
target sentence.
This explanation fits well within a more nuanced view of the resonance model.
Earlier descriptions of the model (Myers & O’Brien, 1998; O’Brien & Myers,
1999) listed factors that influenced the resonance process: featural overlap,
elaboration, distance, and causality. Each of these factors affects the
interconnectedness of the underlying representation, such that that the strength
of the network that connects incoming text with previously presented text
determines the strength and speed of reactivation of that previous information
(see Kendeou et al., 2013). Within the present study context, the underlying
representation that connected “vegetarian” to “meat” was held constant, but the
relation between the target sentence and that underlying representation was
varied. There were likely stronger connections and more of them between that
representation and the target sentence when Mary ordered a “cheeseburger”
(high-related condition) versus a “tuna salad” (low-related condition). Thus,
“cheeseburger” activated “vegetarian” faster via the underlying semantic

relations between them than did “tuna salad.” Previous studies using the
contradiction paradigm have mostly reported reading time data, and the focus of
those studies was on the nature of the activation mechanism (i.e., that is was
passive, activating anything related independent of whether it was outdated).
As noted earlier, they largely ignored the role that validation played in
subsequent processing. And by definition, the conflict between the described
characteristic of the protagonist and the action carried out in the target sentence is
not an inherent part of the narrative representation; it is the relation between these
two pieces of information in general world knowledge that produces the conflict
and the disruption in reading.
We propose a view of reading in which any activated information has
the potential to influence subsequent integration and/or validation processes,
provided that activation levels exceed a minimum threshold. Following Cook
and Myers (2004), we assume that as soon as information is activated, it is linked
with the contents of working memory; it is only after this linkage has been
formed that it can be validated against general world knowledge and earlier
portions of the narrative representation. We adopted the resonance model (Myers
& O’Brien, 1998; O’Brien & Myers, 1999) to represent the passive activation
stage (R). And, although the linkage and verification stages proposed by Cook
and Myers have typically been lumped together in descriptions of “integration”
in many two-stage activation-integration descriptions of comprehension
(Kintsch, 1988, 1998; Long & Lea, 2005; Rizzella & O’Brien, 1996, 2002;
Sanford & Garrod, 1989), we contend here that the linking of activated
information to contents in working memory constitutes the integration stage (I)
and that the verification of those linkages against general world knowledge consti-
tutes a subsequent validation stage (Val) (see Isberner & Richter, this issue; Singer,
2006, 2013; Singer & Doering, this issue). Thus, we present a RI-Val view of
comprehension in which resonance, integration, and validation stages of
processing are viewed as parallel asynchronous processes that once started, run
to completion.
Within the RI-Val view of comprehension, the encoding of new information
results in the initiation of the resonance signal, which activates related
information from all of memory. When sufficient information reaches some
minimum threshold, the process of integration (i.e., linking the activated

information with the contents of working memory) begins. That is, there must be
some minimum amount of information active in memory for the integration
process to have something on which to operate. The activation process continues
to make additional information available even after integration has begun. Thus,
activation and integration are operating in parallel, but the onset of the activation
process precedes the onset of the integration process. Similarly, validation cannot
begin until the integration process provides some linkages that can then be
validated. Thus, some degree of integration must precede the onset of the
validation process, which assesses the output of the integration process against
both earlier portions of the narrative, general world knowledge, and the relation
between the two. Even after the validation process has begun, the activation
process continues to make additional information available, and the integration
process continues to operate on the available information. At this point all three
processes (activation, integration, and validation) are operating in parallel,
but the onset of these processes is asynchronous with activation initiating
before integration, and integration initiating before validation. All three
processes are assumed to be passive, outside the control of the reader, and
therefore run to completion independent of whether the reader makes use of all
the information provided by each of the three processes. Depending on the
readers’ standard of coherence (van den Broek, Risden, & Husbye-Hartman,
1995), the amount of information that contributes to the final level of
comprehension will depend on how long the reader waits for each of the three
processes to run to completion. If the reader’s standards of coherence are high, all
three processes should run to completion and comprehension will be maximized.
A lower standard of coherence would result in comprehension that may be
missing key information from the activation or integration stages or may miss
incorrect information because attention was shifted before the validation process
ran to completion.
Given that any content activated via the resonance process has the potential to
influence subsequent integration and validation stages, two key issues to consider
are when the influence will occur and, if it does, how much of an impact it will
have. Information that is reactivated quickly will influence integration and
validation phases earlier than information that takes longer for activation levels to
build above threshold. This is regardless of whether the activated content comes
from a reader’s general world knowledge or the previously read passage context.
In many cases, information reactivated from general world knowledge will have
a stronger and earlier influence than information reactivated from previous
portions of the passage context, simply because the links to general world
knowledge are strong and thus quickly activated (Garrod & Terras, 2000; Sanford
& Garrod, 1989). In contrast, when contextual information is strong, it may
interact with or even override general world knowledge to drive initial processing
(e.g., Colbert-Getz & Cook, 2013; Cook & Myers, 2004; Leinenger & Rayner,
2013; Myers, Cook, Kambe, Mason, & O’Brien, 2000; Nieuwland & van
Berkum, 2006; Rizzella & O’Brien, 2002; Sereno, Brewer, & O’Donnell, 2003;
Wiley & Rayner, 2000).
How much of an impact activated information will have on subsequent
processes depends on the amount and nature of information activated. Given that
much more information is activated during reading than is presumably integrated
or validated (Kintsch, 1998), we assume that activation levels must exceed a
minimum threshold for activated content to move into and influence the
subsequent integration and validation phases. Even when considering only
information above this threshold, information at higher levels of activation would
have a stronger influence on subsequent processing than information at lower
levels of activation. For example, elaborated content is more likely to be
reactivated and influence integration than unelaborated content. This has been
demonstrated in studies investigating lexical access processes (Colbert-Getz &
Cook, 2013), anaphoric references (O’Brien, 1987; O’Brien, Albrecht, Hakala, &
Rizzella, 1995; O’Brien, Plewes, & Albrecht, 1990), bridging inferences (Myers
et al., 2000), and those based on the contradiction paradigm (Guéraud et al., 2005;
O’Brien et al., 1998, 2004, 2010).
Large amounts of activated information may facilitate the formation of early
linkages (i.e., integration) between activated information and the contents of
working memory. The proportion and degree to which that activated content
overlaps with information already available in memory, as determined via
validation, dictates the influence on comprehension. For example, O’Brien et al.
(1998, 2004, 2010) found that when the inconsistent protagonist characteristic
(e.g., vegetarian) was qualified by a single statement (e.g., Mary used to be a
vegetarian, but she isn’t anymore), the inconsistent information was still
activated, but its influence on comprehension was smaller than when there was no
qualification statement. That is, the ratio of inconsistent to consistent protagonist
information was reduced in the qualified condition, so the impact of the
inconsistent information on validation was also reduced. When the qualification
was elaborated (Guéraud et al., 2005), the inconsistent information was still
activated but it no longer influenced comprehension. Again, as the amount of
activated content that was inconsistent with the target sentence decreased relative
to the amount of activated consistent information, so did the relative influence of
the inconsistent information on comprehension.
The quality of reactivated content can also affect the degree to which it
influences subsequent processing. O’Brien et al. (1998, 2004, 2010) found that
adding a one-sentence qualification to the inconsistent character description to
outdate it (Mary isn’t a vegetarian anymore) reduced processing difficulty but
did not eliminate it. More important, Kendeou et al. (2013) showed that
changing that qualification from a simple elaboration to ever increasing amounts
of causal explanation (She started eating meat because she wasn’t getting
enough vitamins) was sufficient to first eliminate any disruption in
comprehension and ultimately to eliminate any measurable activation of the
outdated information. Kendeou et al. argued that the refutation along with
the causal explanation drew more activation away from the inconsistent
characteristic such that inconsistent characteristic (vegetarian) did not receive
sufficient activation to impact integration and validation processes (see also
Albrecht & O’Brien, 1995; Rapp & Kendeou, 2007, 2009).
It should be noted that even though the validation process runs to completion,
that does not guarantee it will be flawless. Depending on the reader’s standard of
coherence (van den Broek et al., 1995) and the amount of information available
from the activation and integration processes, the reader may have attained
sufficient information to reach a desired level of comprehension and moved on
before the validation process makes available information that could alter the
reader’s understanding. The shallow processing literature provides numerous
examples of instances in which activated information should, but does not, aid in
the detection of an anomaly (for a review, see Sanford, 2002). Readers routinely
mistakenly acknowledge that Moses took two animals of each kind on the Biblical
Ark (Erickson & Mattson, 1981), or they fail to notice the anomaly in phrases like
“surviving dead” (Barton & Sanford, 1993; Bohan & Sanford, 2008; Sanford,
Leuthold, Bohan, & Sanford, 2011) or “tranquilizing stimulants” (Daneman,
Hannon, & Burton, 2006; Hannon & Daneman, 2004). According to the
explanation offered in the previous paragraph, the amount of activated information
that conceptually overlaps with incoming text may outweigh any activated
information that would reveal the anomaly, such that the latter information does
not reach a threshold necessary for it to influence the integration or validation
processes. The standard of coherence that determines whether validation is
sufficient to continue on in the text may depend on factors such as readers’ goals
(Sparks & Rapp, 2011), their granularity of focus (Sanford & Garrod, 2005),
individual differences variables (Hannon & Daneman, 2004; Kendeou & van den
Broek, 2007; Knoeferle, Urbach, & Kutas, 2011; Singer & Doering, this issue),
task variables (Blanc, Kendeou, van den Broek, & Brouillet, 2008; Isberner &
Richter, this issue; Rapp, Hinze, Kohlhepp, & Ryskin, in press; Singer &
Halldorson, 1996), plausibility of story contexts (Hinze, Slaten, Horton, Jenkins, &
Rapp, in press; Rapp, Hinze, Slaten, & Horton, this issue), or even readers’ moods
and preferences (Bohn-Gettler, & Rapp, 2011; Mensink & Rapp, 2011).
Validation may serve as the evaluative “pruning” mechanism that is assumed in
many of the two-stage activation–integration models that dominate the discourse
comprehension literature (e.g., Gerrig & O’Brien, 2005; Glucksberg & McCloskey,
1981; Kintsch, 1998; Long & Lea, 2005; Rizzella & O’Brien, 1996; Sanford &
Garrod, 1989). Within these models, activated information that is related to
incoming content is attended to and evaluated with respect to the ongoing story
(Cook et al., 2012), the preceding text (Garrod & Terras, 2000), or general world
knowledge (Cook & Myers, 2004; Isberner & Richter, this issue; Rapp, 2008;
Richter, Schroeder, & Wohrmann, 2009). If it is deemed irrelevant it may be
disregarded and thus have no immediate impact on comprehension (e.g., Cook,
Halleran, & O’Brien, 1998; Long & Chong, 2001), and it may not be encoded into
the discourse representation in memory (Cook et al., 2012). Our RI-Val view simply
divides the linking and evaluation components of integration assumed in these two-
stage models into parallel but asynchronous integration and validation processes.
Finally, the manipulations used in this study relied on general facts stored in
readers’ world knowledge (e.g., vegetarians do not eat meat). However, several
studies have demonstrated that a variety of different types of semantic information
may be activated and influence processing during reading (see Cook & Gueraud,
2005). This includes, but is certainly not limited to, characteristics of individual
concepts beyond word meaning, such as number of features (Cook, Colbert-Getz,
& Kircher, 2013), tangibility (Juhasz, Yap, Dicke, Taylor, & Gullick, 2011),
concreteness (Schwanenflugel & Stowe, 1989), typicality (Duffy & Rayner, 1990;
Garrod & Sanford, 1977), familiarity (Williams & Morris, 2004), and number of
associates (Duñabeitia, Aviles, & Carreiras, 2008). Semantic information may also
be activated as a result of converging signals from individual concepts and the
surrounding context. For example, contextual manipulations can influence which
features of a word are activated (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1988) or whether readers
reinstate a previously mentioned antecedent or activate one from general world
knowledge (O’Brien & Albrecht, 1991). Readers may also activate related
scenario- or script-relevant knowledge during reading (Albrecht & O’Brien, 1991;
Bower, Black, & Turner, 1979; Cook & Myers, 2004; Garrod & Terras, 2000;
Rizzella & O’Brien, 2002; Sanford, Filik, Emmott, & Morrow, 2008). Information
about the plausibility of events has also been shown to be quickly made available
during reading (Rayner, Warren, Juhasz, & Liversedge, 2004), as well as
information about possibility of events (Ferguson & Sanford, 2008; Warren &
McConnell, 2007; Warren, McConnell, & Rayner, 2008) and their truthfulness
(Gerrig, 1989; Isberner & Richter, this issue; Rapp, 2008; Richter et al., 2009). In
short, there is abundant evidence that readers access information from general
world knowledge during reading and that they use this knowledge to validate
linkages between incoming text and activated information.
In conclusion, we contend that the empirical and theoretical discourse
comprehension literature supports the notion of parallel, asynchronous phases of
resonance, integration, and validation during reading, as described in our RI-Val
view of reading comprehension. The three components, as we have described
them, cannot all start immediately; instead, the activation component (resonance)
must begin before the other two processes can begin to operate because activation
provides the necessary product on which integration and validation must operate.
Further, validation cannot begin until the integration process has created some
linkages. It is not the activated information that is validated; it is the linkages

between concepts/ideas that are validated. We provided evidence here and cited
other studies demonstrating that reader knowledge plays a critical role in
comprehension. The degree to which comprehension is disrupted or facilitated,
however, depends on the degree to which activated and integrated information can
be validated against readers’ general world knowledge. Future studies should
delve into the factors that drive this validation process and determine its limitations
(see, for example, Butler, Dennis, & Marsh, 2012; Fazio, Barger, Rajaram,
Ornstein, & Marsh, 2013; Marsh, Butler, & Umanath, 2012; Marsh & Fazio, 2006).
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APPENDIX
Sample Passage 1
Introduction
Today Mary was meeting a friend for lunch. She arrived early at the restaurant and
decided to get a table. After she sat down, she started looking at the menu.
Consistent Elaboration
This was Mary’s favorite restaurant because it had fantastic meat dishes. She enjoyed
eating anything that was quick and easy to fix. In fact, she ate at McDonald’s at least 3
times a week. She never worried about her diet and saw no reason to limit what she ate.
Inconsistent Elaboration
This was her favorite restaurant because it had fantastic health food. She, a health nut,
had been a strict vegetarian for 10 years. Her favorite food was cauliflower. She was so
serious about her diet that she refused to eat anything which was fried or cooked in grease.
Background
After about ten minutes, Mary’s friend arrived. It had been a few months since they
had seen each other. Because of this they had a lot to talk about and chatted for over a half
hour. Finally, Mary signaled the waiter to come take their orders. Mary checked the menu
one more time. She had a hard time figuring out what to have for lunch.
Target Sentences
High-Related: Mary decided to order a cheeseburger.
Low-Related: Mary decided to order a tuna salad.
She handed the menu back to the waiter.
Closing
Her friend didn’t have as much trouble deciding what she wanted. She ordered and
they began to chat again. They didn’t realize there was so much for them to catch up on.
Probe for Experiments 2 and 3:
Mary was a strict vegetarian.
Sample Passage 2
Introduction
Kelly was on vacation with some friends. She needed a break from work and school, so
she was determined to have fun and to spend some time shopping, relaxing, and eating
good food.
Consistent Elaboration
Kelly loved to go to ethnic restaurants. She loved to try all sorts of different foods. The
different spices and smells enticed her. Kelly felt that when she ate ethnic dishes, she was
enriching her mind by exposing herself to new experiences and different cultures.
Inconsistent Elaboration
Kelly only liked “American” food, though. She preferred bland foods and traditional
dishes like meat and potatoes. She absolutely hated eating ethnic food. She thought the
flavors and smells of most ethnic foods were disgusting.
Background
Kelly and her friends were spending the day shopping at the most exclusive stores in
the city. Kelly had bought a designer purse and some shoes to match. She couldn’t wait to
see how they went with the clothes she had at home. Kelly’s shopping bags were getting
heavy, though, and she and her friends were getting really hungry. They talked about
where they should eat dinner.

Target Sentences
High-Related: Kelly suggested they go out for sushi.
Low-Related: Kelly suggested they go out for tacos.
She hoped that her friends would agree.
Closing
They all finally agreed on a restaurant. When they got to the place, though, it was
really busy, and they had to wait at the bar for a while.
Probe for Experiments 2 and 3:
Kelly disliked ethnic foods.
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Knowledge Activation, Integration, and Validation During Narrative Text

Article in Discourse Processes · January 2014

Anne E Cook Edward J O'Brien

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ISSN: 0163-853X (Print) 1532-6950 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/hdsp20

Knowledge Activation, Integration, and Validation

Anne E. Cook & Edward J. O'Brien

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163853X.2013.855107

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Knowledge Activation, Integration, and

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Anne E. Cook, Educational

During typical reading of narrative text, information is continually activated from

once reactivated, may be integrated with the information in working memory.

Passages described characteristics of a protagonist that were either consistent or

Materials. Twenty narrative passages similar to the first example presented

Participants read passages, in their entirety, in the inconsistent character

Latent Semantic Analysis study. We also compared the underlying

Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four

Results and Discussion

High-Related Target Sentence Low-Related Target Sentence

Consistent Inconsistent Consistent Inconsistent

First target sentence 2,155 2,350 2,160 2,262

The pattern of slowdowns in reading in the inconsistent conditions in

Experiment 3, verification times should be slower in both the After-High-

partial course credit: 36 participated in Experiment 2 and 30 participated in

Materials. Eighteen passages for Experiment 1 were used in these

Procedure. The procedure for reading the passages in both Experiments 2

Results and Discussion

After After After

Response Response Response

Experiment 2. The main effect of probe position was significant, F1(2,

Experiment 3. The main effect of probe position was significant, F1(2,

Experiment 2, verification times were now slower in the After-Low-Related

previous studies) contained inconsistencies between protagonist characteristics

available (Experiment 2) and had an immediate impact on comprehension

“cheeseburger” activated “vegetarian” faster via the underlying semantic

minimum threshold, the process of integration (i.e., linking the activated

linkages. It is not the activated information that is validated; it is the linkages

movement investigation. Journal of Memory and Language, 58, 609–626.

fictional stories. Memory & Cognition, 34, 1140–1149.

where they should eat dinner.

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