Climate change worries and fertility intentions.

Insights from three

EU countries.
Elena Bastianelli, Bocconi University

elena.bastianelli@unibocconi.it

Objective: This study investigates the relationship between climate change concern and
fertility intentions in Finland, Estonia, and Sweden.

Background: Climate change concern is said to influence fertility intentions either by

prompting individuals to reduce their intended fertility to alleviate the pressure on the planet
or by fostering uncertainty about the future and a sense of guilt associated with bringing a child
into a world perceived as doomed. Yet, it remains unclear whether climate change concern is
associated with fertility intentions on a broader population level or if its relevance is limited to
a specific subset of activist individuals.

Method: The analysis relies on data from the 2021 Gender and Generation Survey.
Multinomial logistic regressions are employed to assess the likelihood of both positive and
negative fertility intentions. Furthermore, for individuals expressing positive intentions, OLS
regressions are used to estimate the intended number of children. Interactions between climate
change concern and age and education are considered to address potential heterogeneity in
effects.

Results: Those very worried about climate change are more likely to intend to remain childless,
and less likely to intend to have children, while there is no association between climate worries
and the total intended number of children. Results seems especially driven by the 18-24 and
25-34 age groups, while no clear pattern emerges across educational levels.

Conclusion: This study highlights, for the first time in the European context and on a
representative sample, that climate change concern is negatively associated to fertility
intentions.

1
Acknowledgements

The author acknowledges the financial support provided by: (i) European Union's Horizon
2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. ID: 101094741 - FutuRes
project “Towards a Resilient Future of Europe” PI: Arnstein Aassve; and (ii) the University of
Florence NextGenerationEU project “Uncertainty and the Family Life Course - UnFamiLiC”,
CUP B55F21007810001 Decreto Rettorale 1401/2022 (Prot. n. 0261768).

2
 1. Introduction

In recent years, several media outlets have been sharing narratives and anecdotal accounts

indicating that within Western societies, a segment of individuals—including activists,

prominent public figures, and celebrities—are increasingly questioning their fertility

intentions, even choosing to remain child-free, in light of their growing concern about climate

change (Helm et al., 2021).

The debate linking climate change concern and fertility intentions reports two main arguments.

The first pertains to the ecological impact of future generations. As each additional child

contributes to environmental harm, individuals particularly concerned about climate change

may contemplate remaining childless or adjust their intended number of children to alleviate

pressure on the planet. Conversely, the second argument involves anxieties about an uncertain

future and a sense of guilt associated with bringing a child into a world perceived as bleak or

imperiled (Arnocky et al., 2012; Helm et al., 2021; Schneider-Mayerson & Leong, 2020).

It remains unclear, however, whether these mechanisms truly influence fertility desires and

intentions at the broader population level or if they are confined to a limited subset of more

activist individuals. The existing scientific evidence on this matter primarily targets specific

population subsets, such as university students, with a predominant focus on North America.

Furthermore, the findings are varied and contingent on the specific context and demographic

group under examination (Arnocky et al., 2012; de Rose & Testa, 2015; Rackin et al., 2023).

Thus, this study contributes to the limited and divergent body of literature on the relationship

between climate change concern and fertility intentions in Western societies, analyzing three

European countries: Sweden, Finland, and Estonia. In the European context, the effects of

climate change are becoming progressively more pronounced, exerting mounting pressure on

the environment, and heightening public worries (Ayalon & Roy, 2023). Climate change

3
mitigation has become a focal point in the European agenda, garnering increasing attention in

public discourse. Simultaneously, fertility decline is a matter of major concern, as most EU

countries have for long been marked by alarming low fertility rates. Thus, exploring the

potential correlation between these two major issues within the European context is of

particular interest. As intentions are usually a good predictor of actual behaviors (Régnier-

Loilier & Vignoli, 2011), by examining the connections between climate change concern and

fertility intentions, this study contributes in grasping the reasons behind variations in fertility

desires, and potentially, fertility levels.

The empirical analysis uses data from the recently collected Round II of the nationally

representative Gender and Generation Survey of 2021. It focuses on childless individuals in

reproductive age, and employs multinomial logistic regressions to grasp both positive and

negative fertility intentions, in the attempt to understand whether climate change concern is a

potential determinant of life time childlessness. In addition, for those with positive intentions,

it looks at the intended number of children, employing OLS regressions. Given differences in

both climate concern and fertility preferences across different population subgroups (Lewis et

al., 2019; McCright, 2010; Neyer et al., 2022), the study also accounts for heterogeneity in the

relationship between climate concern and fertility intentions across age and education.

2. Background

2.1 Linking climate change concern to fertility intentions

Theories about fertility decision-making emphasize that fertility intentions and choices are

influenced by values, beliefs, and schemas about families and other life domains (Johnson-

Hanks et al., 2011; Lesthaeghe, 2014). Concerns about climate change may be one belief

intertwined with fertility desires (Rackin et al., 2023). Indeed, over the past decade, there has

4
been a notable surge in interest and awareness regarding climate change and its detrimental

effects on both the planet and its inhabitants (Ayalon & Roy, 2023). The consequences of

climate change are poised to escalate in the future, primarily affecting upcoming generations,

including those who have not yet been born (Ojala & Bengtsson, 2019). Hence, climate change

concern is inherently future-oriented, and therefore, it has the potential to influence fertility

intentions.

Delving into the existing literature on the link between climate concern and fertility

preferences, two main mechanism emerges (Arnocky et al., 2012; Helm et al., 2021; Schneider-

Mayerson & Leong, 2020). The first centers on the potential impact of future generations on

the planet. It is widely recognized that both overpopulation and excessive consumption exert a

significant adverse influence on global warming (Gerlagh et al., 2023; Murtaugh & Schlax,

2009), with each additional child exacerbating the strain on the environment. Thus, viewed

from this perspective, individuals may opt to forgo having children altogether or choose to limit

the number of offspring they intend to have, in an effort to alleviate the burden on the planet.

The second argument, conversely, revolves around the uncertainty about the future. Indeed,

climate worry is forward-looking and intertwined with feelings of uncertainty (Ojala et al.,

2021). Research has consistently shown that uncertainty and negative perceptions of the future

can negatively impact fertility desires (Vignoli, Bazzani, et al., 2020; Vignoli et al., 2022;

Vignoli, Guetto, et al., 2020). Furthermore, the act of bringing a child into a world perceived

as bleak or endangered may elicit a sense of responsibility and guilt (Arnocky et al., 2012;

Helm et al., 2021).

Not everyone is equally worried about the environment, and especially not equally likely to

engage in climate action (Bouman et al., 2020; Lewis et al., 2019; Whitmarsh et al., 2022), thus

these mechanisms could be at play only for specific population subgroups. For instance, young

and highly educated people, have been found to be particularly concerned about the

5
environment, and more prone to be activists (Lewis et al., 2019; McCright et al., 2016). Thus,

worries about environmental issues may be linked to a decreased desire for children,

particularly among younger cohorts entering adulthood, and highly educated.

2.2 Does climate concern really influence fertility intentions? Empirical evidence.

As the public discourse on climate change and its impact on fertility gained prominence, it

garnered the attention of the scientific community. However, while existing research offers

interesting insights on the topic, it generally focuses on either small non-representative

samples, or relatively old data, and mainly concerns north America. Furthermore, evidence is

still limited and findings are mixed.

A study conducted on Canadian students highlights that young adults residing in Thunder Bay,

Canada, who express worry about the natural environment and believe that pollution has

negatively impacted their physical and mental well-being, tend to hold less favourable views

towards having children, and desire to have fewer children over their lifetime (Arnocky et al.,

2012). Consistently, a more recent study on a sample of 200 Canadian undergraduates found

similar results (Davis et al., 2019). Schneider-Mayerson and Leong (2020), conducted an

explorative survey on a sample of 607 individuals aged between 27 and 45 in the United States,

employing both quantitative and qualitative methods. The findings indicated that 59.8% of

respondents reported being “very” or “extremely concerned” about the environmental impact

of procreation, while 96.5% of respondents were “very” or “extremely concerned” about the

well-being of their existing, expected, or hypothetical children in a climate-changed world.

This heightened concern primarily stemmed from a prevailing pessimism about the future in

the context of climate change. Furthermore, the study observed that younger participants

displayed greater “eco-reproductive concerns” compared to their older counterparts

(Schneider-Mayerson & Leong, 2020). Following, Fu et al. (2023) conducted a parallel

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exploratory survey in China, involving 173 young, educated, climate-concerned Chinese

individuals. Their research revealed that a significant number of young Chinese participants

reported concerns regarding reproductive issues related to climate change. Interestingly,

Chinese respondents exhibited lower levels of such reproductive concerns and held more

optimistic perspectives about the future compared to the similar group in the United States.

Despite expressing worries about the well-being of their potential children in a climate-altered

future, the respondents did not accord climate change a high priority when weighing it against

other factors influencing their reproductive choices (Fu et al., 2023).

Finally, a more recent study (Rackin et al., 2023) examined the relationship between the

number of desired children and agreement that the government should deal with environmental

problems even if it means paying more taxes, among adolescent in the USA in the period 2005-

2019. The findings revealed that individuals who supported government intervention in

environmental matters reported lower average fertility desires than those who did not. This

association was primarily influenced by a reduced desire for larger families (defined as four or

more children), as opposed to families of conventional size (2–3 children). Moreover, the

associations between environmental attitudes and childbearing preferences appeared to have

strengthened over time (Rackin et al., 2023).

The only study in my knowledge focusing on Europe, and on a large population (about 8000

individuals aged 20-45 years old), was conducted by de Rose and Testa (2015). Their analysis

on the 2011 Eurobarometer data, including 27 European countries, considered the relationship

on whether the respondents consider climate change as either one of the biggest problems for

the future, or the biggest problem for the future, and the intended number of children. In

contrast with the expectations, they uncovered a null to a positive relationship between climate

concern and the intended number of children (de Rose & Testa, 2015). Nevertheless, as the

7
awareness and concern about climate change has increased over the past decade, the

relationship might have changed.

2.3 Fertility trends and climate change concern in the EU: the case of Finland, Estonia,

and Sweden

A fair green transition and low birth rates are two of the main current challenges in the

European Union (European Commission, 2023; Keilman, 2008). Thus, understanding whether

there is an actual link between these two major issues in the European context is of particular

interest. Finland, Estonia and Sweden are the only EU countries in my knowledge for which

exist recent representative surveys including information on both climate concern and fertility

intentions 1. Nonetheless they represent an interesting comparison as they differ in both climate

concern and fertility trends, and embody peculiar features in the European context.

As shown in the left panel of Figure 1, in Estonia fertility rates have been fluctuating over the

past two decades. Following the "lowest low" (Kohler et al., 2002) level around the year 2000,

attributed to the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the "postponement transition"

(Sobotka, 2011), rates experienced a significant recovery. This rebound, however, was

tempered by the impact of the Great Recession. Currently, fertility rates in Estonia have

reached a level comparable to that of Sweden. Finland and Sweden also represent interesting

cases: they were among the countries with higher fertility rates up to 2010, and since then,

fertility rates have been constantly declining. The decline has been especially drastic in Finland,

where the total fertility rate reached “lowest low” (Kohler et al., 2002) levels. Such fertility

declines in Finland and Sweden, have prompted an increasing interest in researchers and are

still largely unexplained as those countries were not much affected by the economic crisis, and

1
The Italian survey Family, Social Subjects and the Life Cycle of 2016 also include this information, however,
as the data was collected in 2016, it was not comparable to the more recent GGS surveys of 2021-22, and it was
not adequate to study this contemporary issue.

8
are recognized for the higher level of gender equality, and progressive policies at place for

work-family balance (Hellstrand et al., 2021). Some recent evidence has shown that this

fertility decline is partly driven by a shift in fertility ideals (Golovina et al., 2023), and it is

mainly attributable to changes in childbearing intentions among childless couples, and that it

occurred across all socio-economic groups and spatial units (Hellstrand et al., 2021, 2022;

Neyer et al., 2022).

The right panel of Figure 1 reports the share of individuals who declared to be very worried

about climate change in the European Social Survey of 2020. While climate concern is

relatively low in the three countries compared to other EU countries, in Finland the percentage

reporting to be very worried about climate change is 34.2%, in Sweden is about 32%, and it is

much lower in Estonia, which is one of the counties with the lower concern about climate

change in the EU (about 25%).

Figure 1. Total fertility rates and share of very worried about climate change in a sample

of EU countries

Source: own elaboration OECD data, and European Social Survey data of 2020.

9
 3. Data and methods

The empirical analysis relies on data from the nationally representative 2021 Gender and

Generation Survey (Round II). It focuses on childless individuals aged 18 to 40, resulting in a

final sample size of 1731 for Finland, 2653 for Estonia, and 2193 for Sweden. The choice of

only including childless individuals is grounded in several considerations. As fertility decline

has been found to be mostly driven by childless individuals (Hellstrand et al., 2021, 2022;

Mynarska & Rytel, 2020), this strategic choice allows to explore whether climate concern plays

a role in driving lifelong childlessness. Furthermore, evidence has shown that parents are more

concerned about climate change (Ekholm & Olofsson, 2017), thus, focusing solely on childless

individual renders the sample more homogenous, mitigating potential biases stemming from

previous fertility choices. Nevertheless, for a robustness check the analysis has been also

conducted on the entire sample, controlling for the number of children, and results are fairly

similar (available upon request).

The dependent variables gauge lifetime fertility intentions, assessing whether respondents plan

to have children in the future and, if so, the desired number of children. Two variables in the

dataset capture fertility intentions: the first inquiries about the intention to have children in the

next three years, and the subsequent question is framed as follows: "Supposing you do not have

a child during the next three years, do you intend to have any children at all?" Both variables

are coded as Definitely not, Probably not, Unsure, Probably yes, and Definitely yes. The new

variable capturing general fertility intentions aligns with the one assessing intentions in the

next three years. However, if respondents answered Definitely not, Probably not, or Unsure to

the first question and Probably yes or Definitely yes to the second question (indicating no

intention for the next three years but a future intention), their responses were recoded

accordingly. Missing values, constituting less than 2% for Finland and Estonia and

approximately 15% in Sweden, have been coded as Unsure. The number of intended children

10
is only asked to those who answered positively to fertility intentions (sample size is 867 in

Finland, 1662 in Estonia, and 1526 in Sweden), and ranges from 1 to 5. The main independent

variable reports whether respondents consider climate change worrying. In the datasets

responses were coded as very worrying, somewhat worrying, not particularly worrying, and

not at all worrying. The analysis initially utilized this categorization, but due to minimal

differences between the categories of somewhat to not at all worrying, they were combined

into one category. This resulted in a dichotomous variable indicating whether respondents

consider climate change not or somewhat worrying or very worrying. Missing values in this

variable are minimal for Sweden (0.27%), while they account for about 10% of the sample in

Finland and 9% in Estonia. Thus, missing values have been imputed in the modal category (i.e.

not/somewhat worried) and the models are controlled for the imputation.

Methodologically, the analysis employs multinomial logistic regressions to assess the relative

probability of both positive and negative intentions to have children. Subsequently, for those

with positive intentions, an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression is conducted to estimate

the number of desired children. Additionally, interactions between climate change concern and

age, as well as education, are introduced in subsequent steps to address potential heterogeneity

in the effects. All models control for several variables that have been found to influence fertility

intentions. These include demographic characteristics, such as age, defined as 18-24, 25-34,

and 35-40, gender, and type of partnership (single, non-cohabiting partner, cohabiting partner);

socio-economic background, i.e. education, distinguishing whether the respond has completed

tertiary education or not; occupation, coded as employed, unemployed, inactive, or in

education, and parents’ education (tertiary or not); and health conditions (good, fair, bad)

(Fahlén & Oláh, 2018; Gatta et al., 2022). Furthermore, the models account for other values

and personal traits that may simultaneity affect climate concern and fertility intentions, namely,

religiosity (self-reported 0 to 10) and risk aversion (0-5 scale) (Bein et al., 2021; Bellani &

11
Arpino, 2022). Descriptive statistics for all variables can be found in Table 1. Consistently with

current fertility rates, GGS data show that fertility intentions are higher in Sweden, followed

by Estonia, and much lower in Finland. Likewise, in line with the ESS 2020 data displayed in

Figure 1, GGS data reports that climate concern is higher in Finland, closely followed by

Sweden, and much lower in Estonia.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics

FINLAND ESTONIA SWEDEN
mean sd mean sd mean sd
Intentions to have children
Definitely not 0.25 0.43 0.14 0.34 0.15 0.36
Probably not 0.14 0.35 0.11 0.31 0.06 0.24
Unsure 0.09 0.29 0.06 0.24 0.16 0.36
Probably yes 0.30 0.46 0.44 0.50 0.36 0.48
Definitely yes 0.21 0.41 0.25 0.43 0.28 0.45
Climate change is worrying
Not/somewhat worrying 0.63 0.48 0.73 0.44 0.65 0.48
Very worrying 0.37 0.48 0.27 0.44 0.35 0.48
Total number of intended children 1.81 1.03 1.77 0.94 2.03 0.77
Age
18-24 0.35 0.48 0.31 0.46 0.38 0.49
25-34 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.50
35-40 0.17 0.37 0.21 0.41 0.13 0.34
Female 0.58 0.49 0.53 0.50 0.52 0.50
Partnership status
Single 0.43 0.49 0.46 0.50 0.46 0.50
Non-cohabiting partner 0.17 0.37 0.11 0.31 0.15 0.36
Cohabiting partner 0.41 0.49 0.43 0.50 0.38 0.49
Tertiary educated 0.46 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.38 0.49
Employment status
Employed 0.54 0.50 0.70 0.46 0.56 0.50
Unemployed 0.06 0.24 0.04 0.20 0.06 0.24
Education/training 0.33 0.47 0.21 0.41 0.34 0.47
Other 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.23 0.04 0.18
Tertiary educated parents 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.53 0.50
Health status
Good 0.75 0.44 0.74 0.44 0.67 0.47
Fair 0.21 0.41 0.22 0.41 0.24 0.43
Bad 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.20 0.09 0.29
Religiosity (0-10) 2.37 2.61 2.05 2.40 1.90 2.59
Risk aversion scale (0-5) 2.49 0.95 2.71 1.14 2.67 1.01
Observations N= 1731 N= 2653 N= 2193

12
 4. Results

4.1 Climate change worries and fertility intentions

The analysis, first, looks at the relationship between climate change concern and fertility

intentions (definitely not, probably not, unsure, probably yes, definitely yes) in the three

countries, employing multinomial logistic regressions. Figure 2 displays the predicted

probabilities estimated by the models, controlling for the all set of independent variables (tables

with the full models are reported in the Appendix A1). Examining negative fertility intentions,

i.e. the probability of probably not intending or definitely not intending to have children, no

significant differences across those with different climate concern are found in the probability

of probably not wanting a child. However, for all three countries, those who consider climate

change very worrying display significantly higher probability of definitely not intending

children at all (continuous gray line). The association is particularly strong in Finland where

the probability of definitely not wanting children in life is about 11 percentage points higher

for those very concerned about climate change. Even though the analysis highlights an

association rather than a causal relationship, these results provide evidence that climate concern

is related to the desire of remain childless.

When considering positive childbearing intentions (i.e. the probability of probably intending

or definitely intending to have a child), results lead to the same direction: Those very worried

about climate change are significantly less likely to definitely intending to have children in all

three countries (continuous black line). In Finland and Sweden the probability of definitely

intending to a have a child is about 5 p.p. lower for those very concerned about climate change,

while in Estonia the difference is about 4 p.p.. Furthermore, in Finland and Estonia those very

worried about climate change are also significantly less likely to probably intending to have

child (black dashed line).

13
Figure 2. Climate change concern and fertility intentions: predicted probabilities from

multinomial logistic regression

Note: Controlled for age group, gender, type of partnership, education, occupation, parents’ education, health
conditions, and religiosity. Full tables in Appendix A1.

14
4.2 Heterogeneity across age and education

In order to account for possible heterogeneity of the effects across age and education, two

interactions of climate concern, first with age, and then with education, are added to the model.

To simplify the reading and interpretation of the interactions, here are only considered two

outcomes separately: definitely not wanting a child, and definitely wanting a child. Results for

the relationship between climate concern and fertility intentions by age are displayed

graphically in Figure 3, while tables with the full models are reported in the Appendix A2.

Figure 3 shows the predicted probabilities estimated from two separate logistic regressions on

the likelihood of definitely not intending to have children (first row), and definitely intending

to have children (second row), respectively. All models are controlled for all independent

variables listed in Table 1. Overall, in line with the expectations, it seems that the relationship

between climate concern and fertility intentions is driven by younger age groups, although with

some cross-country differences. In Finland and Estonia, the association between climate

concern and fertility intentions is driven by the younger age group: only for those in the 18-24

age group climate concern is significantly associated with higher probabilities of definitely not

intending to have children, and lower probabilities of definitely intending to have children. By

contrast in Sweden, the association appears to be guided by the 25-34 age group. Only those

very worried about climate change in this age group have both significantly higher probability

of definitely not intending to have a child, and a lower probability of definitely intending to

have one.

15
Figure 3. Climate concern and fertility intentions by age

Note: Predicted probabilities estimated from two separate logistic regressions on the likelihood of definitely not

wanting a child (first row), and definitely wanting a child (secondo row). All models are controlled for age group,

gender, type of partnership, education, occupation, parents’ education, health conditions, and religiosity.

Accounting for differences across educational levels (Figure 4), results are somewhat mixed,

and again present cross-country differences. Surprisingly, in all three countries, the association

between climate concern and definitely not intending to have children is statistically precise

only for non-tertiary educated. Looking instead at positive fertility intentions results are mixed:

in Finland, the association with climate concern is again driven by non-tertiary educated, in

Estonia by tertiary educated, and in Sweden, it is significant for both tertiary and non-tertiary

educated. Thus, no clear conclusions can be drawn on the role of education in this relationship.

One explanation for these mixed findings could be that, although the models control for age,

results may be bias by the fact that those in the youngest age group may have not finished

16
tertiary education yet. However, the interaction has been re-estimated using parental education

instead of own education, and results are qualitatively the same.

Figure 4. Climate concern and fertility intentions by education

Note: Predicted probabilities estimated from two separate logistic regressions on the likelihood of definitely not

wanting a child (first row), and definitely wanting a child (secondo row). All models are controlled for age group,

gender, type of partnership, education, occupation, parents’ education, health conditions, and religiosity.

4.3 Total intended number of children

Previous studies have indicated that climate change concern may also influence fertility

intensions by reducing individuals’ planned number of children (Helm et al., 2021; Rackin et

al., 2023). Thus, for those with positive fertility intentions the analysis also looked at the total

intended number of children by means of OLS regressions. While the association appears

negative for all three countries (i.e. climate concern is associate with a reduced number of

17
intended children), no statistically significant effect is found, even when considering the

interactions with age and education (results from these analyses are not reported in the paper

but are available upon request). Thus, while recent evidence on the United States have found

that environmental attitudes are related to a decreased desire for large families (Rackin et al.,

2023), it seems that, in the contexts analyzed in this study, climate concern is related to the

intentions of having of not having children at all rather than to family size.

5. Conclusions

This study investigates the relationship between climate change concern and fertility intentions

in three European countries. Fertility intentions generally serve as a reliable indicator of actual

behavior (Régnier-Loilier & Vignoli, 2011; Schoen et al., 1999). While they may not always

precisely mirror eventual fertility outcomes, the examination of fertility intentions offers

valuable insights into evolving societal norms regarding preferences for fertility. It also

facilitates the comprehension of the intricate interplay between fertility desires and other belief

systems (Rackin et al., 2023).

The findings from this study offer new evidence indicating that a high level of concern about

climate change is associated with a reduced desire for children and significantly increased

intentions of remaining childless. Accounting for heterogeneity across age, the results

emphasize that the adverse impact of climate concern on future fertility intentions is more

pronounced among younger cohorts (18-24) in Finland and Estonia, while it predominantly

affects the 25-34 age group in Sweden. Reduced fertility intentions and a heightened desire for

remaining childless in younger cohorts are of particular concern, as they may correspond to

prolonged low fertility patterns in the next decades. Patterns across educational levels are not

homogeneous. It appears that individuals without tertiary education are more inclined to

18
definitely not intend to have children due to their concern about climate change. However,

when accounting for positive fertility intentions, the role of education varies across countries.

As a result, no clear conclusion can be drawn regarding the role of education in the relationship

between climate concern and fertility intentions in these three countries. Finally, regarding the

number of intended children, no statistically significant effect was identified. In contrast to

recent findings in the United States, which suggested that environmental attitudes are

associated with a reduced desire for large families (Rackin et al., 2023), it seems that in Finland,

Estonia, and Sweden, climate concern is more closely linked to the intentions of either having

or not having children altogether rather than influencing family size.

This study contributes to the literature linking climate concern to fertility intentions, providing

evidence for the first time from three EU countries, based on a representative sample.

Additionally, it adds to the broader literature connecting new sources of uncertainty to fertility

decline (Comolli, 2023; Neyer et al., 2022; Vignoli et al., 2022), and sheds light on motives

for childlessness (Mynarska & Rytel, 2020), considering the role of environmental concerns.

Clearly, this study has its limitations. Firstly, despite finding a significant association between

climate concern and fertility intentions, it does not imply a causal relationship. Those most

concerned about climate change are also less likely to intend to have children and more likely

to desire to remain childless. Yet, although the analysis accounts for other values and personal

traits that may influence both climate concern and fertility intentions, such as religiosity and

risk aversion, there may be other unobserved individual characteristics that simultaneously

make individuals more likely to be worried about climate change and less likely to have

children. Furthermore, while the analysis covers three different European countries and

highlights some divergences, we cannot explain cross-country patterns due to the need for data

from more countries. Nevertheless, despite these limitations, this analysis offers novel and

robust evidence linking climate concerns to diminished fertility intentions.

19
Climate change mitigation and fertility decline stand out as two major contemporary challenges

in the European Union. Recognizing their potential interdependence, addressing both issues

necessitates a multi-faceted and cohesive policy approach. While climate concern can

positively drive individuals to participate in environmentally friendly actions, it may

concurrently diminish fertility desires. Therefore, achieving a balanced and sustainable

approach requires acknowledging the association between climate concern and fertility.

Encompassing effective measures to mitigate global warming and reduce climate concern, may

potentially have a positive impact on fertility.

20
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Bein, C., Gauthier, A. H., & Mynarska, M. (2021). Religiosity and Fertility Intentions: Can the Gender Regime
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Bouman, T., Verschoor, M., Albers, C. J., Böhm, G., Fisher, S. D., Poortinga, W., Whitmarsh, L., & Steg, L.
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 7. Appendix

Appendix A1. Multinomial logistic regression on fertility intentions (odd ratios)

Table A1.1. Finland

VARIABLES Definitely not Probably not Unsure Probably yes Definitely yes
Climate change is
(Ref. Not/ somewhat
worrying)
Very worrying 0.18 -0.59** -0.39* -0.55**
(0.238) (0.300) (0.234) (0.253)
Age (Ref. 18-24)
25-34 0.05 0.42 -0.62** -0.89***
(0.302) (0.434) (0.302) (0.341)
34-40 0.02 0.41 -1.97*** -2.18***
(0.393) (0.506) (0.423) (0.458)

Female 0.39* -0.09 -0.05 0.25

(0.226) (0.269) (0.224) (0.237)
Partnership status (Ref.
Single)
Non-cohabiting partner 0.12 -0.11 0.67** 0.88**
(0.302) (0.366) (0.290) (0.344)
Cohabiting partner 0.33 0.63* 1.27*** 1.99***
(0.268) (0.323) (0.265) (0.284)

Tertiary educated -0.84*** 0.11 -0.03 -0.15

(0.239) (0.286) (0.240) (0.263)

Tertiary educated parent 0.34 -0.31 0.52** 0.78***

(0.223) (0.292) (0.208) (0.231)
Employment status (Ref.
Employed)
Unemployed 0.74* 0.39 -1.00** -0.97
(0.384) (0.489) (0.458) (0.674)
Education/training 0.47 0.04 -0.05 0.17
(0.323) (0.474) (0.318) (0.339)
Inactive/other 0.92** 0.34 -0.64 -0.19
(0.406) (0.518) (0.437) (0.540)
Health status (Ref. Good)
Fair -0.17 -0.27 -0.52** -0.19
(0.256) (0.375) (0.257) (0.290)
Bad -0.75 -1.44** -1.00 -1.26*
(0.463) (0.694) (0.640) (0.656)

Religiosity -0.11** 0.04 0.04 0.01

(0.050) (0.057) (0.041) (0.044)

Risk aversion -0.07 0.07 0.09 0.10

(0.116) (0.133) (0.101) (0.127)

Observations 1,726 1,726 1,726 1,726 1,726

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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Table A1.2. Estonia

VARIABLES Definitely not Probably not Unsure Probably yes Definitely yes
Climate change is
(Ref. Not/ somewhat
worrying)
Very worrying 0.102 0.001 -0.320* -0.404**
(0.202) (0.245) (0.169) (0.185)
Age (Ref. 18-24)
25-34 -1.052*** 0.009 -0.737*** -1.398***
(0.291) (0.438) (0.256) (0.270)
34-40 -1.246*** -0.163 -1.907*** -2.286***
(0.305) (0.455) (0.278) (0.298)

Female -0.088 -0.339 -0.522*** -0.314*

(0.193) (0.217) (0.158) (0.172)
Partnership status (Ref.
Single)
Non-cohabiting partner 0.635* 1.582*** 1.093*** 1.589***
(0.347) (0.379) (0.301) (0.314)
Cohabiting partner -0.112 0.491** 0.768*** 1.345***
(0.201) (0.242) (0.164) (0.178)

Tertiary educated -0.202 -0.173 0.165 0.188

(0.204) (0.236) (0.165) (0.182)

Tertiary educated parent 0.016 -0.080 -0.049 -0.015

(0.188) (0.229) (0.158) (0.171)
Employment status (Ref.
Employed)
Unemployed 0.807* -2.097** -0.081 0.123
(0.417) (1.066) (0.402) (0.435)
Education/training 0.225 -0.158 0.178 0.213
(0.307) (0.453) (0.262) (0.278)
Inactive/other 0.122 0.038 -0.154 -0.301
(0.375) (0.486) (0.331) (0.363)
Health status (Ref.
Good)
Fair -0.121 -0.003 -0.448** -0.972***
(0.207) (0.251) (0.177) (0.204)
Bad 0.251 -0.357 -0.835** -0.642*
(0.343) (0.561) (0.338) (0.377)

Religiosity -0.093** 0.031 0.073** 0.131***

(0.045) (0.046) (0.033) (0.036)

Risk aversion -0.061 0.014 0.073 0.133*

(0.081) (0.097) (0.066) (0.073)

Observations 2,635 2,635 2,635 2,635 2,635

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

25
Table A1.3. Sweden

VARIABLES Definitely not Probably not Unsure Probably yes Definitely yes
Climate change is
(Ref. Not/ somewhat
worrying)
Very worrying 0.504** 0.192 0.263 -0.016
(0.242) (0.240) (0.223) (0.231)
Age (Ref. 18-24)
25-34 0.020 -0.067 -0.238 -0.958***
(0.325) (0.326) (0.302) (0.315)
34-40 -0.112 -0.031 -1.593*** -2.283***
(0.374) (0.372) (0.367) (0.387)

Female 0.186 0.112 0.231 0.449**

(0.232) (0.226) (0.211) (0.219)
Partnership status (Ref.
Single)
Non-cohabiting partner -0.383 -0.524 0.452 1.069***
(0.367) (0.375) (0.328) (0.336)
Cohabiting partner -0.055 0.529** 0.620** 1.509***
(0.269) (0.254) (0.242) (0.257)

Tertiary educated -0.478* -0.210 0.044 -0.013

(0.265) (0.250) (0.235) (0.248)

Tertiary educated parent -0.113 -0.118 0.020 0.111

(0.231) (0.230) (0.215) (0.224)
Employment status (Ref.
Employed)
Unemployed 1.022** 0.411 0.078 0.307
(0.451) (0.468) (0.450) (0.466)
Education/training 0.845*** 0.399 0.462 0.610*
(0.321) (0.325) (0.304) (0.312)
Inactive/other 0.071 -0.173 -0.927** -1.128*
(0.464) (0.482) (0.457) (0.600)
Health status (Ref. Good)
Fair -0.017 -0.308 -0.491** -0.790***
(0.251) (0.255) (0.235) (0.244)
Bad 0.096 0.101 -0.135 -0.677*
(0.360) (0.355) (0.340) (0.375)

Religiosity -0.055 0.081* 0.051 0.037

(0.049) (0.045) (0.043) (0.045)

Risk aversion -0.188* -0.108 -0.033 -0.124

(0.111) (0.111) (0.102) (0.108)

Observations 2,193 2,193 2,193 2,193 2,193

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

26
Appendix A2. Interactions

Table A2.1 Definitely not intending to have children: Interaction with age

VARIABLES Finland Estonia Sweden

Climate change is
(Ref. Not/ somewhat worrying*18-24)
Very worrying*18-24 0.804*** 0.505** 0.009
(0.268) (0.233) (0.206)
Age (Ref. 18-24* Not/ somewhat worrying)
25-34 * Not/ somewhat worrying 0.560** -0.231 0.138
(0.263) (0.215) (0.212)
34-40 * Not/ somewhat worrying 1.165*** 0.323 0.974***
(0.316) (0.230) (0.268)

Very worrying*25-34 -0.419 -0.204 0.707**

(0.355) (0.328) (0.294)
Very worrying*35-40 -0.545 -0.376 0.187
(0.436) (0.375) (0.401)

Observations 1,726 2,635 2,193

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A2.2 Definitely intending to have children: Interaction with age

VARIABLES Finland Estonia Sweden

Climate change is
(Ref. Not/ somewhat worrying*18-24)
Very worrying*18-24 -0.627** -0.321* -0.183
(0.261) (0.188) (0.169)
Age (Ref. 18-24* Not/ somewhat worrying)
25-34 * Not/ somewhat worrying -0.863*** -0.770*** -0.758***
(0.265) (0.158) (0.170)
34-40 * Not/ somewhat worrying -1.516*** -0.963*** -1.518***
(0.352) (0.188) (0.271)

Very worrying*25-34 0.551 0.143 -0.220

(0.358) (0.249) (0.236)
Very worrying*35-40 -0.002 0.282 -0.135
(0.528) (0.351) (0.418)

Observations 1,726 2,635 2,193

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

27
Table A2.3 Definitely not intending to have children: Interaction with education

VARIABLES Finland Sweden Sweden

Climate change is
(Ref. Not/ somewhat worrying*No
tertiary)
Very worrying* No tertiary 0.622*** 0.374** 0.369**
(0.199) (0.190) (0.175)

Tertiary * Not/ somewhat worrying -0.596*** -0.298* -0.422**

(0.213) (0.181) (0.204)

Very worried * Tertiary -0.400 -0.031 -0.046

(0.288) (0.282) (0.291)

Observations 1,726 2,635 2,193

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A2.4 Definitely intending to have children: Interaction with education

VARIABLES Finland Estonia Sweden

Climate change is
(Ref. Not/ somewhat worrying*No
tertiary)
Very worrying* No tertiary -0.478** -0.136 -0.267*
(0.242) (0.160) (0.144)

Tertiary * Not/ somewhat worrying -0.007 0.189 0.117

(0.205) (0.129) (0.161)

Very worried * Tertiary 0.289 -0.255 -0.089

(0.310) (0.227) (0.234)

Observations 1,726 2,635 2,193

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

28