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 CONSTITUTIONALISM,
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND ISLAM
AFTER THE ARAB SPRING
CONSTITUTIONALISM,
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
ISLAM AFTER THE
ARAB SPRING

Edited by
Rainer Grote
and

Tilmann J. Röder

Assistant Editor

Ali M. El-​Haj

1
 1
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Library of Congress Cataloging-​in-​Publication Data

Names: Grote, Rainer, editor. | Röder, Tilmann J., editor. | El-Haj, Ali M., editor.
Title: Constitutionalism, human rights, and Islam after the Arab spring /
edited by Rainer Grote and Tilmann J. Röder; assistant editor Ali M. El-Haj.
Description: New York : Oxford University Press, 2016. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2016018915 | ISBN 9780190627645 ((hardback) : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Constitutional law—Arab countries. | Constitutional law (Islamic law) |
Human rights—Arab countries. | Arab Spring, 2010–
Classification: LCC KMC524 .C675 2016 | DDC 342/.14927—dc23 LC record available at
https://lccn.loc.gov/2016018915

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 Contents

Preface (Grote/Röder/El-​Haj) xxxi

Editors’ Note on the Transliteration xxxiii

Introduction (Grote/Röder) 3

Prologue: Constitutional Debates in the Arab Spring (Grote/Röder) 9

PART 1: POWER AND LEGITIMACY

1.1 The Legitimacy of Constitution-​Making Processes in the Arab World:

An Islamic Perspective (An-​Na’im) 29

1.2 Legitimacy of Constitution-​making Processes: Reflections from the

Perspective of International Law (Wolfrum) 43

1.3 Regimes’ Legitimacy Crises in International Law: Libya, Syria, and Their
Competing Representatives (d’Aspremont) 55

1.4 The Process of Institutional Transformation in Tunisia after the

Revolution (M’rad) 71

1.5 Religious Authorities and Constitutional Reform: The Case of Al-​A zhar
in Egypt (Hefny) 89

1.6 The Arab Spring and Constitutional Reforms in Jordan: A Historical

and Legal Appraisal (Al-​Khasawneh) 123

1.7 Winter Is Coming: Authoritarian Constitutionalism under Strain

in the Gulf (Parolin) 149

1.8 Constitutional Reform in Oman: Rights Granted under Reserve (Al-​A zri) 173

v
vi Contents

PART 2: WHAT BASIS FOR STATEHOOD:

RELIGION OR CITIZENSHIP?

2.1 Al-​Dawlah al-​Madanīyah: A Concept to Reconcile Islam and Modern

Statehood? (El-​Daghili) 189

2.2 Islam and the Constitutional State: Are They in Contradiction?

(Horchani) 199

2.3 State and Religion in the Aftermath of the Arab Uprisings ( Jebnoun) 207

2.4 The Relationship between Constitutions, Politics, and Islam:

A Comparative Analysis of the North African Countries (Dupret) 233

2.5 Contesting Islamic Constitutionalism after the Arab Spring: Islam

in Egypt’s Post-​Mubārak Constitutions (Brown/Lombardi) 245

2.6 The Caliphate State: A Basis of Modern Statehood? (Khan) 261

PART 3: WHAT KIND OF GOVERNMENT:

CIVILIAN OR MILITARY?

3.1 State Control over the Military or Military Control over the State?
A Comparison of Selected Arab Constitutions (Röder) 283

3.2 Changes in Civil-​Military Relationships after the Arab Spring

(Droz-​Vincent) 323

3.3 The Changing Role of the Military in Mauritania (Babana) 355

3.4 The Grip of the Army on Algeria’s Political System (Benchikh) 369

3.5 The Role of the Army in a Multicommunity Society: The Case

of Lebanon (Messarra) 389

PART 4: THE FRAGILE BASIS OF DEMOCRACY

AND DEVELOPMENT

4.1 The Anatomy of the Arab Spring (2011–2015) (Bassiouni) 401

4.2 The Difficult Path toward Democracy: New Electoral Systems in Egypt,
Libya, and Tunisia (Debbeche) 425

4.3 Centralized or Decentralized State Structures? Tendencies in the Arab

Transition States (Philippe) 461

4.4 The Legal Status of the Kurds in Iraq and Syria (Bammarny) 475
 Contents vii

4.5 The Separation and Distribution of Powers under the New Moroccan
Constitution (Biagi) 495

4.6 The Quest for a New Economic Order in Egypt’s Constitutional

Transformation (Bälz/Schoeller-Schletter) 513

PART 5: LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND THE RIGHTS

OF MINORITIES

5.1 International Human Rights Law as a Framework for Emerging

Constitutions in Arab Countries (Mahmoudi) 535

5.2 Civil and Political Rights as a Precondition for Democratic Participation

(Al-​Midani) 545

5.3 Citizenship Rights in Selected Arab Constitutions (Al-​Awadhi) 559

5.4 Linguistic and Cultural Rights in the Arab Constitutions: From Arabism
to Linguistic and Cultural Diversity (Karimi) 577

5.5 Tunisia after the Arab Spring: Women’s Rights at Risk?

(Gallala-​Arndt) 599

5.6 Reflections on Women’s Rights in Yemen: Opportunities and Challenges

(Alawi) 615

5.7 Religious Minorities under Pressure: The Situation in Egypt, Iraq, and
Syria (Faraj) 639

5.8 Rights of Religious Minorities in Sudan (Ibrahim Abdelgabar) 653

PART 6: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS:

NEW GUARDIANS OF THE CONSTITUTIONS?

6.1 Constitutional Review in Arab Countries: Dawn of a New Era? (Grote) 677

6.2 Morocco’s Constitutional Court after the 2011 Reforms (Bernoussi) 691

6.3 The Mauritanian Constitutional Court after the Military Coup

of 2008 (Bouboutt) 707

6.4 Constitutional Reform and the Rise of Constitutional Adjudication

in Jordan: Background, Issues, and Controversies (Hammouri) 723

6.5 An International Constitutional Court: Bulwark against the Erosion

of Constitutional Democracy (Ben Achour) 741
viii Contents

PART 7: INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES

AND INTERACTIONS

7.1 The Relationship between International Law and National Law in

New and Amended Arab Constitutions (El-​Haj) 763

7.2 Turkish Constitutionalism: A Model for Reforms in Arab

Countries? (Bâli) 795

7.3 The Arab Spring and the Development of Islamic Constitutionalism

in Iran (Banisadr/Rezaei) 817

7.4 Lessons from the Iraqi Constitution-​making Process (Hamoudi) 845

7.5 Impulses from the Arab Spring on the Palestinian State-​Building Process
(Khalil) 861

7.6 The European Union and the Constitution-​making Processes in the Arab
World: Observer or Actor? (Tohidipur) 879

Epilogue: The Constitutional Legacy of the Arab Spring (Grote/Röder) 907

List of Contributors 919

Index 929
 Detailed Contents

Preface (Grote/Röder/El-​Haj) xxxi

Editors’ Note on the Transliteration xxxiii

Introduction (Grote/Röder) 3

Prologue: Constitutional Debates in the Arab Spring (Grote/Röder) 9

PART 1: POWER AND LEGITIMACY

1.1 The Legitimacy of Constitution-​Making Processes in the Arab World:

An Islamic Perspective (An-​Na’im) 29
I. Introduction 29
II. Constitutions and Constitutionalism 31
III. Islamic Legitimacy of Constitution-​making in the Arab World 35
IV. The Secular State as Framework for Mediation of Paradox 38

1.2 Legitimacy of Constitution-​making Processes: Reflections from the

Perspective of International Law (Wolfrum) 43
I. Introduction: Sovereignty of States—​A Limitation to Any Attempt
to Influence the Procedure of Constitution-​making as Well as the
Content of a New Constitution 43
II. Human Rights and Other International Standards as Potential
Limitations for Constitution-​making 47
A. Introduction 47
B. Standards Concerning the Procedure of Constitution-​making 48
1. In General 48
2. Preparation of the First Draft of a Constitution 50

ix
x Detailed Contents

3. Adoption of the Constitution 51

4. International Standards Concerning the Content of Constitutions 51
III. Conclusions 53

1.3 Regimes’ Legitimacy Crises in International Law: Libya, Syria, and Their
Competing Representatives (d’Aspremont) 55
I. Introduction 55
II. External Legitimacy and Representation from an International
Legal Perspective 56
III. Manifestations and Sanctions of Governmental Illegitimacy 58
A. Recognition as a Government vs. Recognition as a Legitimate
Representative 59
B. Mechanical Accreditation vs. Legitimacy-​Appraisals in
Multilateral Fora 64
IV. Concluding Remarks: Diversification vs. Legalization 67

1.4 The Process of Institutional Transformation in Tunisia after the

Revolution (M’rad) 71
I. Introduction 71
II. Difficulties Confronting Tunisian Institutional and Democratic
Change 73
A. Difficulties Linked to the Revolution 73
B. The Risks of an Islamist-​majority Government 74
III. The Political, Constitutional, and Democratic Changes Stemming
from the Transitional Process 77
A. The Emergence of an Independent Civil Society 77
B. Multiplication and Structuring of Parties after the
Revolution 79
C. The Constitution of January 27, 2014 80
1. The Process of Adoption of the New Constitution 80
2. The 2014 Constitution Viewed from the Perspective of
Constitutional History 82
3. Form and Contents of the New Constitution 82
4. Appraisement and Criticism 84
IV. Conclusion: The End of the Transitional Process through the
Parliamentary and Presidential Elections at the End of 2014 85
A. The Parliamentary Elections 85
B. The Presidential Elections 86

1.5 Religious Authorities and Constitutional Reform: The Case of Al-​A zhar
in Egypt (Hefny) 89
I. Introduction 89
II. Evolution of Al-​Azhar’s Relation toward the Sovereign Power 90
 Detailed Contents xi

III. Islamic Principles on Statehood: Lacking Textual Provisions and

Consequences 94
A. Islam and the Concepts of Nation-​State and Constitutionalism 94
B. Jurisprudents and Scholars Integrating Themselves within
Power 96
IV. Evolution and Influence of Al-​Azhar’s Constitutional Ideologies 97
A. Comparing Al-​Azhar’s Constitutional Visions: The 1979
Draft Constitution and Its 2011 “Document on the Future
of Egypt” 97
B. Explaining Al-​Azhar’s Ideological Shift 102
C. The Impact of the 2011 Al-​Azhar Document on the Constitutions
of 2012 and 2014 103
V. Conclusion 106
Annexes 107
A. Al-​Azhar Declaration on the Future of Egypt (2011) 107
B. Al-​Azhar Statement on Basic Freedoms (2012) 109
C. Al-​Azhar Draft Constitution of 1979 113

1.6 The Arab Spring and Constitutional Reforms in Jordan: A Historical

and Legal Appraisal (Al-​Khasawneh) 123
I. Introduction 123
II. A Brief Historical Review of Jordan’s Constitutions 124
A. The Constitution of 1928 124
B. The Constitution of 1947 126
C. The Constitution of 1952 127
III. Political, Social, and Ideological Developments since the Inception of
the Emirate 129
A. Political Developments 130
B. Economic and Social Developments 131
C. Ideological Developments 132
D. The Election of 1989 133
IV. The Constitutional Amendments of 2011 137
A. The Constitutional Court 138
B. The Independent Electoral Commission 139
C. Provisional Laws 140
D. The Dissolution of Parliament 140
E. Infringement of the Rights of Jordanians (Arts. 7 and 8) 141
F. The State Security Court 142
G. The Provision of Art. 128 142
H. Arts. 34, 35, and 36 on the Rights of the King 143
V. Developments after the Constitutional Amendments 143
VI. The Constitutional Amendment of 2014 146
VII. Conclusion 146
xii Detailed Contents

1.7 Winter Is Coming: Authoritarian Constitutionalism under Strain

in the Gulf (Parolin) 149
I. Not Just Ornaments 151
II. The Parliamentary Conundrum 152
A. The First Generation: The Constitutions of Independence
(1960s–​1970s) 155
1. Kuwait (1961) 157
2. Qatar (1970 and 1972) 158
3. The United Arab Emirates (1971) 159
4. Bahrain (1973) 161
B. The Second Generation: Codifying Practice (1990s) 162
1. Saudi Arabia (1992) 163
2. Oman (1996) 164
C. The Third Generation: The Conservative Convergence (2000s) 165
1. Bahrain (2002) 165
2. Qatar (2004) 167
D. Uprisings and the Quick Fix: Elections and/​or Constitutional
Amendments? (2011) 168
1. The Omani Amendments 168
2. The Kuwaiti Elections 168
3. The Bahraini Amendments 169
III. Winter Is Coming 171

1.8 Constitutional Reform in Oman: Rights Granted under Reserve (Al-​A zri) 173
I. Introduction 173
II. The GCC and Oman’s Constitutions: A Very Brief Outlook 174
III. Historical Background 175
IV. Early Omani “Constitutional Monarchy” 177
V. Oman’s 1996 Basic Statute of the State 178
VI. The Constitutional Amendments of 2011 and a Constitutional
Monarchy 183
VII. Conclusion 186

PART 2: WHAT BASIS FOR STATEHOOD:

RELIGION OR CITIZENSHIP?

2.1 Al-​Dawlah al-​Madanīyah: A Concept to Reconcile Islam and Modern

Statehood? (El-​Daghili) 189
I. Origins and Development of the Notion of Al-​Dawlah Al-​Madanīyah 189
II. Al-​Dawlah Al-​Madanīyah in Context of the Arab Spring 191
III. Constitutional Relevance of Al-​Dawlah Al-​Madanīyah 193
IV. Conclusion 197
 Detailed Contents xiii

2.2 Islam and the Constitutional State: Are They in Contradiction?

(Horchani) 199
I. Introduction 199
II. The Achievements: Tunisia as the “Exception”? 200
III. The Obstacles to the Establishment of a Constitutional State 203
A. Revival of Art. 1 of the Constitution 203
B. What Protections Are There for a Democratic and Constitutional
State? 204
1. The Civil Nature of the State 204
2. Islam’s Position in the Constitutional and Legal System 204
3. Freedom of Religion and Belief and the Separation of Religion
and Politics 205
4. The Place of the International Conventions 206
IV. Conclusion 206

2.3 State and Religion in the Aftermath of the Arab Uprisings ( Jebnoun) 207
I. The “Arab Spring”: Europe as a Model for Change 210
II. Structural Crisis of the Arab Political and Economic Power 212
III. Democracy and the Relationship between State and Religion 216
IV. In Search of a Role Model 224
V. Conclusion 229

2.4 The Relationship between Constitutions, Politics, and Islam:

A Comparative Analysis of the North African Countries (Dupret) 233
I. Introduction 233
II. Implosion, Eclipse, and Come-​Back in Politics 234
III. An Essential Reference, a Diversified Content 237
IV. Reference to Islam and the Devolution of Power in Religious
Matters 238
A. Egypt 239
B. Tunisia 241
C. Morocco 242
V. Conclusion: Sharīʿah as an Ideology 244

2.5 Contesting Islamic Constitutionalism after the Arab Spring: Islam

in Egypt’s Post-​Mubārak Constitutions (Brown/Lombardi) 245
I. Background: Classical and Modern Islamic Legal Theory 246
A. Islamic Law before Modern Times: The Formation of a Sunni
Consensus and Elaboration of Traditional Sunni Law 247
B. Modernity and the Collapse of the Sunni Consensus 249
1. Neotraditionalist 249
2. Salafī 250
xiv Detailed Contents

3. Modernist 250
4. Secularist 251
II. Islamic Law in Egypt’s Constitutions before the Arab Spring 252
A. Religious Reticence in Egypt’s First National Constitutions
1923–​1971 252
B. The Evolution of Provisions Governing Islam in Egypt’s 1971
Constitution 253
III. Contesting Islam after the Fall of Mubārak 255
A. State and Islam in the 2012 Constitution 255
B. State and Islam in the 2014 Constitution 258
IV. Back to the Future? 259

2.6 The Caliphate State: A Basis of Modern Statehood? (Khan) 261

I. Introduction 261
II. The Precursor to the Caliphate 265
III. Essential Characteristics of the Classical (Premodern) Khilāfah or
Imāmah 270
IV. The Islamic State: Legitimate Governance and Rule in Islamic Law 274
V. Principles of Governance in an Islamic State 278
VI. Conclusion: Can the Islamic Model of Statehood Offer Anything of
Value to Modern States that Espouse the Centrality of Islam in the
Public Realm of the State? 279

PART 3: WHAT KIND OF GOVERNMENT:

CIVILIAN OR MILITARY?

3.1 State Control over the Military or Military Control over the State?
A Comparison of Selected Arab Constitutions (Röder) 283
I. Introduction 283
II. Tunisia: From Authoritarian to Democratic Control of the Armed Forces 286
A. The Military and Its Constitutional Status before the Revolution 286
B. Military Support for the Revolution and the Drafting of a New
Constitution 287
C. The Military and Its Constitutional Status after the Revolution 289
III. Egypt: Triumph of the Military over the Civil State 290
A. The Military and Its Constitutional Status before the Uprising 290
B. The SCAF as Ruler and Pouvoir Constituant 291
C. The 2012 Constitution and the Coup against President Mursī 294
D. 2014: Another Constitution for the Deepest of All Arab States 297
IV. Syria: Staunch Support for the Regime 298
A. The Military and Its Constitutional Status before the Arab Spring 298
B. Civil-​Military Relations during the Uprising and the Civil War 300
C. The 2012 Constitution and Syria’s Military 302
 Detailed Contents xv

V. Yemen: Progressive Constitution-​Making vs. Military Disintegration

and Ḥūthī Rebellion 304
A. The Military and Its Constitutional Status before the
Uprising 304
B. President Ṣāliḥ’s Ouster and the National Dialogue
Conference 305
C. Theory and Reality: The 2015 Draft Constitution and
the Ḥūthī Rebellion 309
VI. Libya: Total Loss of Control 312
A. The Military and Its Constitutional (Non-​)Status before the
Revolution 312
B. From Uprising into the Civil War 314
C. Constitution-​making: Killed in Action 317
D. The Libyan National Army and Its Constitutional (Non-​)Status as
of 2015 319
VII. Conclusion and Outlook 319

3.2 Changes in Civil-​Military Relationships after the Arab Spring

(Droz-​Vincent) 323
I. Introduction: Change in Motion? 323
II. What Is the Military in the Middle East?: From Constitutional
Considerations to the Role of the Military in Authoritarian
Settings 324
III. Time of Change in 2011: Mass Mobilizations as an Essential “Stress
Test” for Armies 328
IV. Transitional Settings and the Military: Tunisia, Egypt, and
Beyond 333
A. The Tunisian Case—​The Military as a Safeguard of the Transition
Process 334
B. The Egyptian Case—​The Military Elephant in the Porcelain Shop
of Egyptian Politics 335
C. The Yemeni Case—​Incoherent Military Structures,
Fragmentation, and Instability 337
D. The Libyan Case—​Weak Military, Localism and
Competing Militias 339
E. The Syrian Case: The End of the Syrian Military? 340
V. How To Reassemble The Pieces Together? Transitions In Institutional
Terms 340
A. From the Specific Tunisian Case to Protecting the
Military’s Prerogatives Elsewhere 341
B. The Case of Egypt: From Apparent Extrication to
Military Tutelage 342
C. The Military and Egyptian Constitutions 343
D. Reinstating a Monopoly on “Legitimate Violence”
or Falling into the Traps of Civil War in Libya and
Yemen? 344
xvi Detailed Contents

E. Hijacking Transition in Egypt: A Return to Military-​led

Government or the End of Any Prospects for Democratic Control
of the Armed Forces? 349
VI. Conclusion 352

3.3 The Changing Role of the Military in Mauritania (Babana) 355

I. Introduction 355
II. The Implication of the Conflict between the Al-​Bidān and the
Black-​African Population 356
III. The Military and Their Role in Confronting Crises 358
A. The Military and the Western Sahara Crisis 358
B. The Military and Environmental Crises 361
IV. The Power of the Military in the Context of Government 361
A. The Impact of Military Coups d’État in Mauritania 362
B. External Factors Influencing the Military’s Role in Government,
Leading to Internal Reform 363
V. Conclusion 367

3.4 The Grip of the Army on Algeria’s Political System (Benchikh) 369
I. Introduction 369
II. The Circumstances Leading to the Army’s Grip on the Algerian
Political System 370
A. The Army’s Role in the Nationalist Movement and during the
Fight for Independence 370
B. The Frontier Army Marches towards the Control of Power after
Independence 374
III. How the Political System Works 376
A. The Army’s Grip on the System of Government 377
B. The Army’s Grip on the Multiparty Political System: The
Cosmetic Democracy 380
IV. Conclusion 386

3.5 The Role of the Army in a Multicommunity Society: The Case

of Lebanon (Messarra) 389
I. Introduction 389
II. Political Attitudes toward the Army 391
A. Contrition 391
B. Mistrust 391
C. Frustration among Military Personnel 392
III. The Six Schools and Their Common Denominator 392
A. Demoralization of the Army 392
B. Concern for the Unity of the Army 393
 Detailed Contents xvii

C. The Army Subordinate to the Politicians 393

D. The Army as Broom 394
E. The Army as Militia 394
F. The Army as Taxi 394
IV. The Army, Protector of Sovereignty 394

PART 4: THE FRAGILE BASIS OF DEMOCRACY

AND DEVELOPMENT

4.1 The Anatomy of the Arab Spring (2011–​2015) (Bassiouni) 401

I. Introduction 401
II. Historical Context 405
III. Evolution of the Arab Identity 407
IV. Nationalism and the Rise of Islamism 411
V. Identity and Violence 414
VI. Economic Failure 416
VII. Geopolitical Factors, Exceptionalism, and Double Standards 418
VIII. Assessing the “Arab Spring” Outcomes 420

4.2 The Difficult Path toward Democracy: New Electoral Systems in Egypt,
Libya, and Tunisia (Debbeche) 425
I. Introduction 425
II. Conquering Democracy: The Challenge of Organizing Free, Fair, and
Transparent Elections 427
A. A Credible Electoral Process Overseen by an Independent
Electoral Authority 427
B. Competitive Elections 432
III. Expressing Democracy: The Test of Choosing a Voting System 436
A. A Resounding Rejection of the Strict Majority Option 436
1. Tunisia 437
2. Egypt 438
3. Libya 439
B. The Goal of Proportionality, Variously Expressed 439
1. Tunisia 440
2. Egypt 441
3. Libya 443
IV. Consolidating Democracy: The Ultimate Test of Exercising Power 446
A. Majorities Put to the Test by the Exercise of Transitional Power 446
1. Tunisia 446
2. Libya 448
3. Egypt 449
xviii Detailed Contents

B. Majorities Face the Test of the Exercise of Constituent Power 451

1. The Elaboration of Constitutions: A Process “Peppered” with
Uncertainties 451
2. Constitutional Debates Characterized by Points of
Tension 455

4.3 Centralized or Decentralized State Structures? Tendencies in the Arab

Transition States (Philippe) 461
I. Introduction 461
II. The Limited Attention Paid to the Issue of Decentralization 462
III. Centralization or Decentralization: The Possible Combinations 463
A. Transition 468
B. The Role Played by Subnational Structures 469
C. Boundaries 469
D. Trust 470
E. Rights and Freedoms 471
F. Capacity Building of Subnational Structures 472
IV. Conclusion 473

4.4 The Legal Status of the Kurds in Iraq and Syria (Bammarny) 475
I. The Kurds as a People and as a Minority 475
II. Status of Ethnic and Religious Minorities under Islamic Law 477
III. The Legal Status of Kurds and Kurdish Territory in Iraq 480
A. The Mūṣul Question 480
B. Recognition of the Kurds during the British Mandate 481
C. Obligations of the Iraqi State under the League of Nations 482
D. The Legal Status of Kurds in the Republic of Iraq 484
E. The Legal Status of the Kurds after the 2003 Occupation of Iraq
by the US-​led Coalition 485
IV. Unresolved Issues between Baghdad and Arbīl 487
A. Federal and Regional Competencies 487
B. Oil and Gas Issues 488
C. Kirkūk and Other Disputed Areas 489
V. The Legal Status of Kurds in Syria 490
VI. Closing Words 493

4.5 The Separation and Distribution of Powers under the New Moroccan
Constitution (Biagi) 495
I. Introduction 495
II. The Distribution of Powers before the 2011 Constitution 497
III. The Reform of the “Old” Art. 19: The End of the “Confusion” Between
Temporal Power and Spiritual Power? 498
 Detailed Contents xix

IV. Separation of Powers and the Form of Government: Toward the

Establishment of a Parliamentary Monarchy? 501
A. The Strengthening of the Government’s Powers 502
B. The King Reigns and Governs 503
C. An “Ultimate Leader” and a “Second-​in-​Command” 505
V. The Legislative Power: The Parliament, the Government, and a
(Lame) King-​Legislator 506
VI. Judicial Power, Constitutional Justice, and the King’s
“Interference” 508
VII. Concluding Remarks 510

4.6 The Quest for a New Economic Order in Egypt’s Constitutional

Transformation (Bälz/Schoeller-​Schletter) 513
I. The Arab Spring and the Quest for a New Economic Order 513
II. The Economic Paradox of the 1971 Constitution 514
III. Neoliberal Reform and Constitutional Justice 516
IV. The Economic Debates in the Constitutional Process 518
A. The Economic Demands 518
B. Competing Ideologies 519
V. Economic Principles in the Constitutions of 2012 and 2014 521
A. General Principles 521
B. Property 524
C. Taxation 526
D. Industrial Relations 527
E. Economic Rights 530
VI. Conclusion 531

PART 5: LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND THE RIGHTS

OF MINORITIES

5.1 International Human Rights Law as a Framework for Emerging

Constitutions in Arab Countries (Mahmoudi) 535
I. Introduction 535
II. Human Rights in the Existing Constitutions of Arab
Countries 536
III. The Effect of Islam on the Human Rights Provisions of the
Constitutions of Arab States 538
A. Equality of Rights 539
B. Gender Equality 540
C. Religious Equality 541
D. Penal Law 542
IV. Conclusion 543
xx Detailed Contents

5.2 Civil and Political Rights as a Precondition for Democratic

Participation (Al-​Midani) 545
I. Preface 545
II. Introduction 545
III. Part I: Nature of Civil and Political Rights 547
A. Research Topic I: Nature of Civil and Political Rights 548
B. Research Topic II: Enforcement Mechanism of Civil and Political
Rights 550
1. Requirement I: Enforcement Mechanism of Civil and Political
Rights at the International Level 550
2. Requirement II: Enforcement Mechanism of Civil and
Political Rights at the Regional Level 550
a. European Convention on Human Rights 550
b. American Convention on Human Rights 551
c. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 551
d. Arab Charter on Human Rights 551
IV. Part II: Enforcement of Civil and Political Rights Contributes to
Democratic Participation 551
A. Research Topic I: Arab States and How They Honor Civil and
Political Rights 552
1. Requirement I: Arab States’ Participation in the Preparation of
the Two International Covenants on Human Rights 552
2. Requirement II Arab States’ Commitment to Honoring Civil
and Political Rights 553
B. Research Topic II: Guaranteeing Civil and Political Rights and
Democratic Participation 553
1. Requirement I: Democracy 553
a. Concept of “Democracy” 553
b. Democracy Enforcement Forms 554
c. Key Areas for Promoting Enforcement of
Democracy 555
2. Requirement II: Activation of Democratic Participation
through Enforcement of Political Rights 556
V. Conclusion 557

5.3 Citizenship Rights in Selected Arab Constitutions (Al-​Awadhi) 559

I. Introduction 559
II. Significance and Relevance of Citizenship Rights 560
III. Citizenship Rights on the Arab Peninsula 561
A. The Right to Citizenship and the Prohibition of Nationality
Abrogation and Deportation 561
B. The Acquisition of Citizenship 562
C. Results and Comparison between the Arab Spring Countries 567
IV. Civil Rights on the Arab Peninsula 569
A. Civil Rights of Citizens in the GCC States 569
 Detailed Contents xxi

B. Civil Rights of Non-​Citizens in the GCC States 570

C. Results and Comparison 573
V. Conclusions and Outlook 574

5.4 Linguistic and Cultural Rights in the Arab Constitutions: From Arabism
to Linguistic and Cultural Diversity (Karimi) 577
I. Introduction: Cultural and Linguistic Rights in Arab Constitutions
and in the Arab Spring 578
II. Linguistic and Cultural Rights in the Maghreb Constitutions 579
A. Cultural and Linguistic Rights in the Moroccan
Constitution 580
1. From Governmental Recognition to Constitutional
Recognition 580
2. Formalizing Tamazight in the 2011 Constitution 583
B. The Algerian Constitution and Consideration of Tamazight as a
National Language 584
C. Constitutionalizing Tamazight in Libya and Tunisia 587
1. Libyan Constitution between Denial of, and Hesitation
toward, Recognition 587
2. Tamazight and Formulation of a Draft Constitution after the
Revolution 588
3. The Tunisian Constitution: The Possibility of Recognizing
Amazigh Cultural and Linguistic Rights as a Component of
Amazigh Identity 590
III. Cultural and Linguistic Rights in the Constitutions of Arab
Levant States 591
A. The Iraqi Constitution 592
1. Iraqi Experience and Constitutional Recognition of Kurds’
Linguistic Rights 592
2. The Iraqi Constitution of October 15, 2005 593
B. New Constitutional Experience in Syria and Jordan 595
1. The Jordanian Constitution: The Same Status as Before 595
2. New Constitutional Experience in Syria and the Prospects for
Non-​Arab Linguistic and Cultural Rights 596
IV. Conclusion 597

5.5 Tunisia after the Arab Spring: Women’s Rights at Risk?

(Gallala-​Arndt) 599
I. The Privileged Status of Women before the Arab Spring 600
A. Family and Inheritance Law 601
B. The Constitution of 1959 603
C. Tunisia and CEDAW 603
II. Impact of the Revolution 605
A. During the First Transitional Period 605
1. The Withdrawal of the Reservations to CEDAW 606
2. Gender Parity in Electoral Law 606
xxii Detailed Contents

B. During the Second Transitional Period 608

1. The Attitude of the Islamist Party outside the Constitution
Drafting 608
2. The Constitution Drafting Process 609
a. The Status of Islam 609
b. The Status of Women 611
c. The Adoption of the Constitution 612
III. Conclusion 614

5.6 Reflections on Women’s Rights in Yemen: Opportunities and Challenges

(Alawi) 615
I. Introduction 615
II. Historical Background of the Status of Yemeni Women 617
III. The Effectiveness of the Feminist Movement in Seeking the
Advancement of Women and Sponsoring Their Problems 618
A. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women 618
B. CEDAW and Yemeni Reservations 619
C. Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Yemeni
Constitution 619
D. Yemeni Women’s Participation in the Revolutionary Movement
and the Harvest of Change 620
E. Equality in the Yemeni Constitution and Demands for Achieving
Gender Equality 621
F. Women Participation in the National Dialogue Conference 622
G. Major Challenges that Lie in the Way of Securing Women’s
Entitlements in the Coming Period 624
H. The Position of the Political Establishment (Official and
Party-​wise) on Women’s Issues 625
IV. Constitutionalizing Women’s Rights 626
A. Women’s Quota System for Their Representation 628
V. The Discourse of the Islamic Movement on Women in Yemen 629
A. The Problematic Nature of the Islamic Discourse on Women,
between Extremism and Centrism 630
B. The Islamic Parties and Their Approach of Duplicity in Dealing
with Women’s Issues 633
C. The Position on Women’s Labor 636
D. The Position on Women’s Political Participation 637
VI. Conclusion 637

5.7 Religious Minorities under Pressure: The Situation in Egypt, Iraq,

and Syria (Faraj) 639
I. Introduction 639
II. Religious Minorities and National Laws 641
A. Egypt 641
B. Syria 643
C. Iraq 645
 Detailed Contents xxiii

III. International Legal Mechanisms and the Protection of Minorities 647

IV. Conclusion 650

5.8 Rights of Religious Minorities in Sudan (Ibrahim Abdelgabar) 653

I. Introduction 653
II. Background and Context 654
III. The Treatment of Religious Minorities in Sudan in Historical
Perspective 656
IV. Protection of Religious Minorities in the Sudanese Law 659
A. Definition and Recognition of Minorities 659
1. Definition of Minorities under International Law 659
2. Definition of Minorities under the Sudanese Constitution of
2005 660
B. Protection of the Rights of Religious Minorities under
Sudanese Constitutions and Laws 660
1. Recognition and Protection of the Rights of Religious
Minorities in the Old Sudanese Constitutions and the Interim
National Constitution 660
a. Recognition and Protection of the Rights of
Religious Minorities in the Old Sudanese
Constitutions 1953–​1998 660
b. Recognition of the Rights of Religious Minorities under
the Interim National Constitution 2005 662
2. Recognition of Religious Rights under Sudanese Laws 664
a. Recognition of Rights of Religious Minorities under the
Criminal Law 664
b. Recognition of the Rights of Religious Minorities under
the Civil Law 666
V. The Implementation of Religious, Cultural, Civil, Political, and
Socio-​Economic Rights of Religious Minorities in Practice 668
A. The Special Commission for the Protection of the Rights of
Non-​Muslims in Khartoum 668
B. Protection of the Rights of Religious Minorities in Practice 670
VI. New Developments in Sudan: Secession of South Sudan 672

PART 6: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS:

NEW GUARDIANS OF THE CONSTITUTIONS?
6.1 Constitutional Review in Arab Countries: Dawn of a New Era? (Grote) 677
I. Introduction: Constitutional Review Prior to the Arab Spring 677
II. Reforms of Constitutional Review in the Wake of the Arab
Spring 679
A. An Embattled Institution: The Egypt Constitutional Court
from 2011 to 2014 680
1. The Court’s Role in the Immediate Aftermath of the Fall
of the Mubārak Regime 680
2. Growing Confrontation with the Islamists 680
xxiv Detailed Contents

3. The Denouement: Restoration of the Court’s Role after the

Fall of the Brotherhood 683
B. Taking Constitutional Review Seriously: The Case of Tunisia 684
C. Reforms from Above: Morocco and Jordan 686
1. Morocco 686
2. Jordan 688
III. Conclusions 690

6.2 Morocco’s Constitutional Court after the 2011 Reforms (Bernoussi) 691
I. Preface 691
II. A Spirit 695
A. The Distribution of Power 696
B. The Promotion of Positivism 697
C. Reconciliations 697
D. The Deliberative Imperative 698
E. References to Religion and Identity 698
III. Engineering the Mechano-​Institutional Space 699
A. A Fertile Framework 699
B. A New Statute 701
C. New Competencies 702
D. A New Procedure 703
E. The Interpretations 704
IV. Conclusion 705

6.3 The Mauritanian Constitutional Court after the Military Coup

of 2008 (Bouboutt) 707
I. Introduction 707
II. Regulation of Relations between the Political Actors 709
A. The Disagreement between Government and Parliament
in 2008 709
B. Amendments of the Rules of Procedures of the National Assembly 710
C. Comments on the Rules of Procedure—Decisions of the
Constitutional Council 711
III. The Constitutional Arrangements for the Interim Head of State 712
A. Plans for New Elections in 2009 712
B. The Decision of the Constitutional Court on the Resignation
of General Ūld ʿAbd al-​ʿAzīz 713
C. Article 40 as an Alternative Solution? 713
IV. Oversight of the Presidential Elections to Overcome the Crisis 716
A. The Dakar Framework Agreement 716
B. The Decision of the Constitutional Court about Decree
on Convocation of the Electorate 717
C. The Elections of 2009 718
V. Conclusion 720
 Detailed Contents xxv

6.4 Constitutional Reform and the Rise of Constitutional Adjudication

in Jordan: Background, Issues, and Controversies (Hammouri) 723
I. The Backgrounds of the Reforms 723
II. The Driving Forces behind the Reform Process 725
III. The Substance of the Reforms 726
A. Prohibition of Torture (Art. 8.2) 726
B. Protection of the Essence of Rights and Freedoms (Art. 128) 726
C. Establishment of a Constitutional Court (Arts. 58–​61) 727
D. Judicial Power (Art. 98) 729
E. Reform of the State Security Court (Art. 101) 729
F. Provisional Laws (Art. 94) 730
G. Dissolution of House of Representatives (Art. 74) 732
H. The Constitutional Amendment of August 2014 734
1. Art. 67 734
2. Art. 127 735
IV. Important Issues Ignored in the Reform Process 735
A. The Senate as a Government-​controlling Body 735
B. Democratic Legitimization—​The Elections 736
C. The Prime Ministers and Their Governments 737
D. The National Integrity Charter and the Dismissal of Judges 739
V. Conclusion 739

6.5 An International Constitutional Court: Bulwark against the Erosion of

Constitutional Democracy (Ben Achour) 741
I. Introduction 741
II. The Law of Democracy: Its Legitimacy and Superiority 742
A. The Theoretical Superiority of Democratic Law 743
B. The Practical Superiority of the Law of Democracy 745
III. International Constitutional Law 746
A. The Internationalization of Constitutional Law 747
B. The Constitutionalization of International Law 752
C. International Constitutional Law and International Protection of
Human Rights 755
IV. The International Constitutional Court 756
A. Its Political Objective 756
B. Its Composition 757
C. Its Role and Submissions 757
D. Its Powers 758
E. The Proceedings 758
F. The Applicable Law 758
V. Conclusion 759
xxvi Detailed Contents

PART 7: INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES

AND INTERACTIONS
7.1 The Relationship between International Law and National Law in New
and Amended Arab Constitutions (El-​Haj) 763
I. Introduction 763
II. Theoretical Underpinnings 765
A. Monism 765
B. Dualism 766
C. Criticism—​Legal Pluralism 766
D. Distinguishing Key Terms: Domestic Validity, Direct
Applicability, Invocability, Direct Effect, and Self-​Executory Treaties 767
E. International Legal Provisions on the Relationship between
International Law and National Law 768
III. The Relationship between Treaties and the National Legal Orders of
Arab States with New or Amended Constitutions 769
A. What Is the Scope of the Treaty-​making Power of the Executive? 770
1. Bahrain 771
2. Egypt 772
3. Jordan 773
4. Morocco 773
5. Syria 774
6. Tunisia 774
7. Conclusion 775
B. Do Treaties Become Part of the National Legal System? If So, When? 775
1. Domestic Validity 776
2. Direct Applicability in Courts 776
3. When Do Treaties Gain Domestic Legal Status? 777
a. Direct Domestic Legal Force Once the Treaty Is Ratified
and Enters into Force 777
b. Direct Domestic Legal Force Once the Treaty Is Ratified
and Enters into Force Plus Publication 778
c. Indirect Domestic Legal Force 778
4. Policy Reasons for and against Direct Applicability of
Treaties 779
C. What Is the Constitutionally Recognized Role of the Legislature
in the Treaty-​making Process? 780
1. Bahrain 780
2. Egypt 781
3. Jordan 782
4. Morocco 782
5. Syria 782
6. Tunisia 783
7. Conclusion 784
D. What Rank Do Treaties Have Internally? 784
1. Bahrain 785
2. Egypt 786
3. Jordan 787
 Detailed Contents xxvii

4. Morocco 787
5. Syria 788
6. Tunisia 788
7. Conclusion 789
E. Are the Constitutional Courts Authorized to Monitor
Treaties? 789
1. Oversight by the Constitutional Courts over the
Constitutionality of Treaties 790
a. Morocco 790
b. Tunisia 791
c. Jordan 791
2. Constructing the Power of Oversight by Way of
Interpretation? 792
a. Repressive Oversight over the Constitutionality of Treaties
that Require Parliamentary Approval 792
b. Repressive Oversight over the Conformity of Ordinary
Laws to Treaties 793
IV. Conclusion 794

7.2 Turkish Constitutionalism: A Model for Reforms in Arab Countries? (Bâli) 795
I. Introduction: A “Turkish Model” for Reform in the Arab World? 795
II. Perceptions of the “Turkish Model” 797
III. Characteristics of the Turkish Constitutional Order 800
IV. Challenges to the “Turkish Model” since the Arab Uprisings 806
A. Revelations of the Gezi Protests and Their Aftermath 807
B. Failed Constitutional Transition: 2007–​2015 810
V. Conclusion: The Limited Applicability of the “Turkish Model” 813

7.3 The Arab Spring and the Development of Islamic Constitutionalism

in Iran (Banisadr/​Rezaei) 817
I. Introduction 817
II. Conditions for Muslim Revolutions 818
III. Revolution for Islamic Theocracy or Constitutional
Democracy 819
IV. The Inter-​Islamic Evolution of Modern Concepts of the State 820
V. From the Revolution for Constitutionalism to the Absolute Rule
of the Shīʿite Jurist 825
VI. Revolutionary Constitution-​Making and Its Risks 830
VII. Between Islamism and Republicanism: An Unresolved Dichotomy 833
VIII. The Violence of Revolution and the Rule of Law 837
IX. Conclusion and Prospects 839
xxviii Detailed Contents

7.4 Lessons from the Iraqi Constitution-​making Process (Hamoudi) 845

I. Introduction 845
II. The Main Steps toward an Iraqi Constitution 847
III. Who Wrote the Constitution? Sunni Participation, the Constitutional
Commission, and the Leadership Council 849
IV. Utilizing Foreign Experts: Useful or Constraining? 852
V. The Sectarian Crisis 853
VI. Third-​Party Influence: Between Meditation and Occupation 855
VII. From Draft to Reality: Iraq’s Constitutional Development since 2005 858
VIII. Lessons from the Iraqi Constitutional Process 859

7.5 Impulses from the Arab Spring on the Palestinian State-​Building Process
(Khalil) 861
I. Introduction 861
II. Constitutional Deadlock 863
III. Building State Institutions during Occupation 865
IV. The Non-​Member State Status at the UNGA 867
V. The Reconciliation Efforts 870
VI. Ḥamās Rule of Gaza 872
VII. PA Rule of the West Bank 875
VIII. Conclusion 876

7.6 The European Union and the Constitution-​making Processes in the Arab
World: Observer or Actor? (Tohidipur) 879
I. Introduction: Postcolonial Drift 879
II. The EU’s External Action and the Access to the Arab Region 881
A. Common Policies, Principles, Actions, and Cooperation 881
B. Neighbourhood Policy, Union for the Mediterranean, and
Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity 885
1. Views on the Barcelona Process 885
2. European Neighbourhood Policy and Union for the
Mediterranean 888
3. Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity 889
III. Observation, Dialogue, and Influence 891
A. The Quest for (Common) Values and for a Vision 891
B. Supporting State Transition: Framework of Constitutional
Processes 894
1. Democracy, Rule of Law, and Institution Building: Impact
of the EU? 894
2. Security, Stability, Military: Ambivalence Test 897
Another random document with
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just so will the most highly trained men in the future outdistance all
others in endurance.
Navy. We now come to the consideration of the Navy. The Navy
will use gas both in its guns and in smoke clouds, and in some form
of candle that will float. The toxic smokes that in high enough
concentrations will kill are extraordinarily irritating in minute
quantities—so minute they cannot be seen or felt for a few moments.
Every human being on a ship must breathe every minute just as
every human being everywhere must breathe every minute or die. A
gas that gets into the ventilating system of a ship will go all through it
and the Navy realizes it.
The Navy is studying how to keep the gas out of their own ships,
and how to get it into the enemy’s ships. The toxic smokes may be
dropped from aeroplanes or turned loose from under water by
submarines. In either case they will give off smokes over wide areas
through which ships must pass. Any defects will let these toxic
smokes in and will force every man to wear a mask. Aeroplane
bombs will come raining down on the ship or alongside of it either
with toxic smokes or other terrible gases. White phosphorus that
burns and cannot be put out wet or dry will be rained on ships. Yes,
chemical warfare materials will be used by the Navy.
Gas Against Landing Parties. The use of gas against landing
parties or to aid landing parties has come up in many ways. Our
studies to date indicate that gas is a greater advantage to the
defense against landing parties than to the offense. Mustard gas and
the like may be sprinkled from aeroplanes, and while it will not float
long on the water, it will float long enough to smear any small boats
attempting to land. It can be sprinkled over all the areas that landing
parties must occupy. Mustard gas may be placed in bombs or drums
around all areas that are apt to be used as landing places and
exploded in the face of advancing troops.
Storing Reserve Gases in Peace. And a word here about how
long gases may be stored. One of the statements made by
opponents of chemical warfare was that gas is a purely war time
project and could not be stored up in peace. We have today at
Edgewood Arsenal some 1,400 tons of poisonous gases not
including chlorine. Those gases have been manufactured, practically
every ounce of them, for three years, and are yet in almost perfect
condition. Our chemists believe they can be kept in the future for ten
years and perhaps longer. Our gas shells then will have the life
almost of a modern battleship, while the cost of a million will be but a
fraction of the cost of a battleship. What I have just said applies
particularly to liquid gases such as phosgene, chlorpicrin, and
mustard gas. We know that many of the solids may be kept for far
longer periods.
Storing Gas Masks. Our masks, too, we believe can be kept for
at least ten years. Experience to date indicates that rubber
deteriorates mainly through the action of sunlight and moisture that
cause oxidation or other change in the crystalline structure of cured
rubber. Accordingly, we are putting up masks today in hermetically
sealed boxes. It is thus evident that we can store a reserve of masks
and gases in peace the same as other war materials.
Use of Gas by Gas Troops. Now we come to the use of gas by
special gas troops. In the war, Gas Troops used 4-inch Stokes’
mortars and 8-inch Livens’ projectors and in a very short time would
have used a new portable cylinder for setting off cloud gas, using
liquid gases, such as phosgene. They will use these same weapons
in future wars. All of these are short-range weapons, but since the
Livens’ bomb or drum contains 50 per cent of its weight in gas while
the artillery shell contains 10 per cent, they have an efficiency away
beyond that of artillery or any other method of discharging gas
except cloud gas. They will, therefore, produce more casualties than
any other method known for the amount of material taken to the
front. These short-range weapons were developed by the British for
trench use and not for open warfare, and yet our troops developed
methods with the Stokes’ mortars that enabled them to keep up with
many of the Infantry divisions.
Phosphorus and Thermit Against Machine Gun Nests. The
use of phosphorus and thermit against German machine gun nests
by the Gas Troops is well known. How effective it was is not known
to so many. Phosphorus and thermit were so used from the early
days of the Marne fight in the latter part of July, 1918, to the very
close of the war. There is no recorded instance where the Gas
Troops failed to silence machine gun nests once the machine guns
were located. In the future Gas Troops will put off the majority of all
cloud gas attacks even with toxic smoke candles.
Necessity for Training in Peace. This is an outline of the
subject of chemical warfare. As stated in the beginning, the
fundamental underlying principles for the successful use of
poisonous gas is necessarily the same as for any other war
materials. The necessity for continuous training in peace is just the
same with chemical warfare as with the rifle, the machine gun, with
field artillery or any other weapon of war. Indeed it is more so
because the use of gas is so perfectly adaptable to night work. Men
must be taught to take precautionary measures when so sleepy, tired
and worn out that they will sleep through the roar of artillery.
How Chemical Warfare Should be Considered. We ask you
only to look at the use of chemical warfare materials as you look at
the use of the artillery, infantry, cavalry, tanks or aeroplanes.
Measure its possible future use; not simply by its use in the World
War, but by considering all possible developments of the future.
Remember that its use was barely four years old when the war
closed, while the machine gun, the latest type of infantry weapon,
had been known for more than one-third of a century. Chemical
warfare developments are in the infant stage. Even those on the
inside of chemical warfare when the Armistice was signed can see
today things that are certain to come that were undreamed of at that
time. This is bound to be so with a new weapon.
To sum up, gas is a universal weapon, applicable to every arm
and every sort of action. Since we can choose gases that are either
liquid or solid, that are irritating only or highly poisonous, that are
visible or invisible, that persist for days or that pass with the wind, we
have a weapon applicable to every act of war and for that matter, to
every act of peace. But we must plan its use, remembering there is
no middle ground in war, it is success or failure, life or death.
Remember also that training outruns production in a great war, that
5,000,000 men can be raised and trained before they can be
equipped unless we with proper foresight build up our essential
industries, keep up our reserve of supplies, and above all, keep such
perfect plans that we can turn all the wheels of peace into the wings
of war on a moment’s notice.
 CHAPTER XXIII
THE OFFENSIVE USE OF GAS

What Chemical Warfare Includes

Chemical Warfare includes all gas, smoke and incendiary
materials and all defensive appliances, of which the mask is the
principal item, used by the Army. Some of the items or materials in
both offense and defense are used by the entire Army, while a few
are used only by Chemical Warfare troops.

The Term “Gas”

The term “gas” is now taken to include all materials that are
carried to the enemy by the air, after their liberation from cylinders,
bombs or shell. It is necessary that this broad use of the term “gas”
be thoroughly understood, because some of these materials are
solids, while all others are liquids, until liberated from the containers
at the time of the attack. These containers may be special cylinders
for cloud gas attacks, special bombs for Livens’ projectors and
mortars, or artillery shell, and even aviation bombs. Some of the
liquids which have a very low boiling point volatilize quickly upon
exposure to air, and hence require only enough explosive to open
the shell and allow the liquid to escape. Practically all solids have to
be pulverized by a large amount of high explosive, or driven off as
smoke by some heating mixture.

Technical Nature
Chemical warfare, besides being the newest, is the most
technical and most highly specialized Service under the War
Department. There is no class of people in civil life, and no officers
or men in the War Department, who can take up chemical warfare
successfully until they have received training in its use. This applies
not only to the use of materials in attack, but to the use of materials
for defense. Ten years from now perhaps this will not be true. It is
certainly hoped that it will not be. By that time the entire Army should
be pretty thoroughly trained in the general principles and many of the
special features of chemical warfare. If not, chemical warfare cannot
be used in the field with the efficiency and success with which it
deserves to be used. Furthermore, it is believed that within ten years
the knowledge of the gases used in chemical warfare will be so
common through the development of the use of these same
materials in civil life, that it will not be so difficult, as at the present
date, to get civilians who are acquainted with Chemical Warfare
Service materials.

Effectiveness of Gas
Chemical warfare materials were used during the war by
Chemical Warfare Service troops, by the Artillery and by the Infantry.
In the future the Air Service and Navy will be added to the above list.
Chemical warfare, even under the inelastic methods of the Germans,
proved one of the most powerful means of offense with which the
American troops had to contend. To realize its effectiveness we need
only remember that more than 27 out of every 100 casualties on the
field of battle were from gas alone. Unquestionably many of those
who died on the battlefield from other causes suffered also from gas.
No other single element of war, unless you call powder a basic
element, accounted for so many casualties among the American
troops. Indeed, it is believed that a greater number of casualties was
not inflicted by any other arm of the Service, unless possibly the
Infantry, and even in that case it would be necessary to account for
all injured by bullets, the bayonet, machine guns and hand grenades.
This is true, in spite of the fact that the German was so nearly
completely out of gas when the Americans began their offensive at
St. Mihiel and the Argonne, that practically no gas casualties
occurred during the St. Mihiel offensive, and only a very few until
after a week of the Argonne fighting. Furthermore, the Germans
knew that an extensive use of mustard gas against the American
lines on the day the attack was made, and also on the line that
marked the end of the first advance a few days later, would have
produced tremendous casualties. Judging from the results achieved
at other times by an extensive use of mustard gas, it is believed that
had the German possessed this gas and used it as he had used it a
few other times, American casualties in the Argonne would have
been doubled. In fact, the advance might even have been entirely
stopped, thus prolonging the war into the year 1919.

Humanity of Gas
A few words right here about the humanity of gas are not out of
place, notwithstanding the Army and the general public have now so
completely indorsed chemical warfare that it is believed the
argument of inhumanity has no weight whatever. There were three
great reasons why chemical warfare was first widely advertised
throughout the world as inhumane and horrible. These reasons may
be summed up as follows:
In the first place, the original gas used at Ypres in 1915 was
chlorine, and chlorine is one of a group of gases known as
suffocants—gases that cause death generally by suffocating the
patient through spasms of the epiglottis and throat. That is the most
agonizing effect produced by any gas.
The second reason was unpreparedness. The English had no
masks, no gas-proof dugouts, nor any of the other paraphernalia that
was later employed to protect against poisonous gas. Consequently,
the death rate in the first gas attack at Ypres was very high, probably
35 per cent. As a matter of fact, every man who was close to the
front line died. The only ones who escaped were those on the edges
of the cloud of gas or so far to the rear that the concentration had
decreased below the deadly point.
 The third great reason was simply propaganda. It was good war
propaganda to impress upon everybody the fact that the German
was capable of using any means that he could develop in order to
win a victory. He had no respect for previous agreements or ideas
concerning warfare. This propaganda kept up the morale and
fighting spirit of the Allies, and was thoroughly justifiable upon that
score, even when it led to wild exaggeration.
The chlorine used in the first attack by the German is the least
poisonous of the gases now used. Those later introduced, such as
phosgene, mustard gas and diphenylchloroarsine are from five to ten
times as effective.
The measure of humanity for any form of warfare is the
percentage of deaths to the total number injured by the particular
method of warfare under consideration.
American Gas Casualties. The official list of casualties in battle
as compiled by the Surgeon General’s office covering all cases
reported up to September 1, 1919, is 258,338. Of these 70,752, or
27.4 per cent, were gas casualties. Also of the above casualties
46,519 resulted in death, of whom about 1,400 only were due to gas.
From these figures it is readily deduced that while 24.85 per cent of
all casualties from bullets and high explosives resulted in death, only
2 per cent of those wounded by gas resulted in death. That is, a man
wounded on the battle field with gas had twelve times as many
chances of recovery as the man who was wounded with bullets and
high explosives.

Fundamentals of Chemical Warfare

Before taking up in some detail the methods of projecting gas
upon the enemy, it is very desirable to understand the fundamentals
of chemical warfare, in so far as they pertain to poisonous gases.
Following the first use of pure chlorine all the principal nations
engaged in the war began investigations into a wide range of
substances in the hope of finding others more poisonous, more
easily produced, and more readily projected upon the enemy. These
investigations led to the use of a large number of gases which
seriously complicated manufacture, supply, and the actual use of the
gases in the field. Gradually a more rational conception of chemical
warfare led both the Allies and the enemy to restrict the numbers of
gases to a comparative few, and still later to divide all gases into
three groups. Thus the German divided his into three groups known
as (1) Green Cross, the highly poisonous non-persistent gases, (2)
Blue Cross, or diphenylchloroarsine, popularly known as sneezing
gas, and (3) Yellow Cross, highly persistent gases, such as mustard
gas. In the American Chemical Warfare Service we have finally
divided all gases into two primary groups. These groups are known
as “Non-persistent” and “Persistent.” The “Non-persistent” gases are
those quickly volatilizing upon exposure to the air, and hence those
that are carried away at once by air currents, or that in a dead calm
will be completely dissipated into the surrounding air in a few hours.
If sufficient high explosive be used to pulverize solids, they may be
used in the same way, and to a large extent certain highly persistent
liquid gases may have their persistency greatly reduced by using a
large amount of high explosive, which divides the liquid into a fine
spray. The “Persistent” group constitutes those gases that are very
slowly volatilized upon exposure to the atmosphere. The principal
ones of these now used or proposed are mustard gas and
bromobenzylcyanide. For purposes of economy, and hence
efficiency, certain gases, both persistent and non-persistent, are
placed in a third group known as the “Irritant Group.” These gases
are effective in extremely low concentrations against the lungs and
other air passages, or the eyes. Diphenylchloroarsine, and some
other solids when divided into minute particles by high explosive or
heat, irritate the nose, throat and lungs to such an extent in a
concentration of one part in ten millions of air as to be unbearable in
a few minutes. The tear gases are equally powerful in their effects on
the eyes. The irritating gases are used to force the wearing of the
mask, which in turn reduces the physical vigor and efficiency of the
troops. This reduction in efficiency, even with the best masks, is
probably 25 per cent for short periods, and much more if prolonged
wearing of the mask is forced.
 Efficiency of Irritant Gases
One pound of the irritant gases is equal to 500 to 1,000 pounds
of other gases when forcing the wearing of the mask alone is
desired. The great economy resulting from their use is thus
apparent. Due to the rapid evaporation of the non-persistent gases
they are used generally only in dense clouds, whether those clouds
be produced from cylinders or from bombs. These gases are used
only for producing immediate casualties, as the necessary amount of
gas to force the enemy to constantly wear his mask by the use of
non-persistent gases alone could not possibly be taken to the front.
Mustard gas, which is highly persistent and also attacks the
lungs, eyes and skin of the body, may and will be used to force the
wearing of the mask. It has one disadvantage when it is desired to
force immediately the wearing of the mask, and that is its delayed
action and the fact that it acts so slowly, and is usually encountered
in such slight concentrations that several hours’ exposure are
necessary to produce a severe casualty. For these reasons the
enemy may often take chances in the heat of battle with mustard
gas, and while himself becoming a casualty, inflict quite heavy
casualties upon opposing troops by continuing to operate his guns or
rifles without masks. A powerful tear gas on the other hand forces
the immediate wearing of the mask.

Material of Chemical Warfare

Used by C. W. S. Troops
Chemical warfare troops, in making gas attacks, use cylinders for
the cloud or wave attack, and the Livens’ projector and the 4-inch
Stokes’ mortar for attacks with heavy concentrations of gas projected
by bombs with ranges up to a mile. This distance will in the future
probably be increased to 1½ or 1¾ miles. The original cylinders used
in wave attacks were heavy, cumbersome and very laborious to
install, and notwithstanding the wave attack was known to be the
deadliest form of gas attack used in the war, fell into disrepute after
the use of gas became general in artillery shells and in special
bombs.
Cloud Gas. The Americans at once concluded that since cloud
gas attacks were so effective, efforts should be made to make these
attacks of frequent occurrence by decreasing the weight of the
cylinders, and by increasing the portability and methods of
discharging the cylinders. As early as March, 1918, specifications for
cylinders weighing not more than 65 pounds, filled and completely
equipped for firing, were cabled to the United States. They would
have been used in large numbers in the campaign of 1919 had the
enemy not quit when he did. Toxic smoke candles that are filled with
solids driven off by heat will probably be the actual method in the
future for putting off cloud attacks. The toxic smoke candle is
perfectly safe under all conditions and can be made in any size
desired. Cloud gas attacks will be common in the future, and all
plans of defense must be made accordingly. They will usually be
made at night, when, due to fatigue and the natural sleepiness which
comes at that time, men are careless, lose their way, or neglect their
masks, and are thus caught unprepared. Experience in the war
proved that a wave attack always produced casualties even, as
several times occurred, when the enemy or the Allied troops knew
some hours beforehand that the attack was coming. The English
estimated these casualties to be 10 or 11 per cent of the troops
exposed.
Livens’ Projectors. The second most effective weapon for using
gas by gas troops was and will be the Livens’ projector. This
projector is nothing less than the simplest form of mortar, consisting
of a straight drawn steel tube and a steel base plate. As used during
the World War by the Allies it did not even have a firing pin or other
mechanism in the base, the electric wires for firing passing out
through the muzzle and alongside the drum or projectile which was
small enough to permit that method of firing. These were set by the
hundreds, very close behind or even in front of the front line
trenches. They were all fired at the same instant, or as nearly at the
same instant as watches could be synchronized, and firing batteries
operated. As discussed on 18 these mortars were emplaced deep
enough in the ground to bring their muzzles practically level with the
surface. It usually took several days to prepare the attack, and
consequently allowed an opportunity for the enemy to detect the
work by aeroplane photographs or by raids, and destroy the
emplacements by artillery fire. It should be added, however, that
notwithstanding this apparent great difficulty, very few attacks were
broken up in that way. Nevertheless, in line with the general policy of
the American troops to get away from anything that savored of
trench warfare, and to make the fighting as nearly continuous as
possible with every means available, the American Chemical
Warfare Service set at work at once to develop an easy method of
making projector attacks.
It was early found, that, if the excavation was made just deep
enough so that the base plate could be set at the proper angle, the
drums or projectiles were fired as accurately as when the projectors
or mortars were set so that the muzzles were level with the surface.
The time required to emplace a given number of mortars in this way
was only about one-fifth of that required for digging them completely
in.
Coupled of course with these proposed improvements in
methods, studies were being made and are still being made to
produce lighter mortars, better powder charges, and better gas
checks in order to develop the full force of the powder. Many
improvements along this line can be made, all of which will result in
greater mobility, more frequent attacks, and hence greater efficiency.
4-Inch Stokes’ Mortar. The Stokes’ mortar is not different from
that used by the Infantry, except that it is 4-inch, while the Infantry
Stokes’ is 3-inch. The 4-inch was chosen by the British for gas, as it
was the largest caliber that could be fired rapidly and yet be
moderately mobile. Its range of only about 1,100 yards handicapped
it considerably. The poor design of the bomb was partly responsible
for this. The powder charges also were neither well chosen nor well
designed. It is believed that great improvements can be made in the
shape of the bomb and in the powder charge, which will result in
much longer range and high efficiency, while in no way increasing
the weight of the bomb or decreasing the rate of fire. These last two
weapons were used during the World War, and will be very
extensively used in the future for firing high explosive, phosphorus,
thermit and similar materials that non-technical troops might handle.
Since gas has proven without the shadow of a doubt, that it will
produce more casualties for an equal amount of material transported
to the front than any other substance yet devised, all troops using
short range guns or mortars should be trained to fire gas whenever
weather conditions are right. When weather conditions are not right,
they should fire the other substances mentioned. The Livens’
projector with its 60 pound bomb, of which 30 pounds will be gas or
high explosive, is a wonderful gun up to the limit of its range. The
bomb, not being pointed, does not sink into the ground, and hence
upon exploding exerts the full force of high explosive upon the
surroundings, whether bombs, pill boxes, barbed wire or trenches, to
say nothing of personnel.
High Explosive in Projectors. When these are burst by the
hundreds on a small area everything movable is blotted out. Thus
concrete machine gun emplacements, lookout stations, bomb-proofs
and wire entanglements are destroyed, trenches filled up, and the
personnel annihilated. This was amply demonstrated on the few
occasions when it was actually used at the front. The American
Infantry, wherever they saw it tried out, were wild to have more of it
used. The German was apparently equally anxious to have the use
stopped. It is, however, one of the things that must be reckoned with
in the future. It means practically that No Man’s Land in the future
will be just as wide as the extreme range of these crude mortars—
and here a word of caution. While efforts have been made to
increase the range of these mortars, whether of the Livens’ projector
or Stokes’ variety, no further increase will be attempted when that
increase reduces the speed of firing or the efficiency of the projectile.
In other words results depend upon large quantities of material
delivered at the same instant on the point attacked, and if this cannot
be obtained the method is useless. For this reason these mortars will
never be a competitor of the artillery. The artillery will have all that it
can do to cover the field within its range—beyond that reached by
the mortars.
 Phosphorus in 4-Inch Stokes. Phosphorus will be used largely
by gas troops, but only in the 4-inch or other Stokes’ mortar that may
be finally adopted as best. The Livens’ projector carries too great a
quantity, and being essentially a single shot gun, is not adapted to
keeping up a smoke screen by slow and continued firing, or of being
transported so as to keep up with the Infantry. Phosphorus has also
very great value for attacking personnel itself. Any one who has
been burned with phosphorus or has witnessed the ease with which
it burns when exposed to air, wet or dry, has a most wholesome fear
of it. The result of it in the war showed that the enemy machine
gunners or other troops would not stand up under a bombardment of
phosphorus fired from the 4-inch Stokes’ mortar—each bomb
containing about seven pounds.
Thermit. Thermit is used in the same way, and while the idea of
molten metal, falling upon men and burning through clothing and
even helmets, is attractive in theory, it proved absolutely worthless
for those purposes on the field of battle. It was found impossible to
throw sufficiently large quantities of molten metal on a given spot to
cause any considerable burn. In other words, the rapid spreading out
and cooling of the metal almost entirely ruined its effectiveness,
except its effect on the morale. This latter, however, was
considerable, as one might judge from seeing the thermit shells burst
in air. For this reason thermit may find a limited use in the future.

The Spread of Gas

Height of Gas Cloud. The height to which gas rises in a gas
cloud is not exactly known, but it is believed to be not much more
than fifty feet, and then only at a considerable distance from the
point of discharge. Moving pictures taken of gas clouds show this to
be true. It is also indicated by the fact that pigeons, which are very
susceptible to poisonous gas, practically always return to their cages
safely when liberated in a gas cloud. This was a good deal of a
mystery until it was realized that the pigeon escaped through his
rising so quickly above the gas. This of course would be expected
when it is known that practically all gases successfully used were
two or more times as heavy as air. Such gases rise only by slow
diffusion, or when carried upwards by rising currents. The absence
of these upward currents at night is one of the reasons why gas
attacks are more effective at night than during the day.
Horizontal Spread of Gas. Another important thing to know in
regard to the behavior of the wave of gas is the horizontal spread of
a cloud. If gas be emitted from a cylinder the total spread in both
directions from that point is from 20° to 30° or an average of 25°.
This varies, of course, with the wind. The higher the wind the less
the angle, though the variation due to wind is not as great as might
be expected. This horizontal spread of the gas cloud was measured
experimentally, and the results checked by aeroplane pictures of
heavy wave attacks over the enemy line. In the latter case the path
of the gas was very closely indicated by the dead vegetation. This
vegetation was killed and bleached so that it readily showed up in
aeroplane photographs. The visibility of a gas cloud arises from the
fact that when a large amount of liquid is suddenly evaporated, the
air is cooled and moisture condensed, thereby creating a fog. With
gases such as mustard gas and others of slight volatility, a visible
cloud is not formed. For purposes of identification of points struck by
shell, smoke substances are occasionally added, or a few smoke
shell fired with the gas shell. As future battle fields will be dotted
everywhere with smoke clouds, a point that will be discussed more
fully later, the firing of smoke with gas shell will probably be the rule
and not the exception.

Requirements of Successful Gas

If we succeed in getting a poisonous gas that has no odor it will
be highly desirable to fire it so that it will not be visible. In that case
no smoke will be used. Carbon monoxide is such a gas, but there
are several important reasons why it has not been used in war. (See
page 190). These considerations indicate the general requirements
for a successful poisonous gas. If non-persistent it must be quickly
volatilized, or must be capable of being driven off by heat or by other
means, which can be readily and safely produced in the field. It must
be highly poisonous, producing deaths in high concentrations, and
more or less serious injuries when taken into the system in quantities
as small as one-tenth of that necessary to produce death. If it has a
slightly delayed action with no intervening discomfort, it is still better
than one that produces immediate discomfort and more or less
immediate action. It must be readily compressed into a liquid and
remain so at ordinary temperatures, with the pressure not much
above 25 or 30 pounds per square inch.
As a persistent gas it must be effective in extremely low
concentrations, in addition to having the other qualities mentioned
above.
These general characteristics concerning gases apply whether
used by Chemical Warfare troops, the Artillery, the Air Service, the
Navy, or the Infantry. In speaking of these substances being used by
the Infantry, it is understood that an ample number of Chemical
Warfare officers will be present to insure that the gases may not be
turned loose when weather conditions are such that the gas might
drift back and become a menace to our own troops. This is
absolutely essential since no troops who have as varied duties to
perform as the Infantry, can be sufficiently trained in the technical
side of chemical warfare to know when to put it off on a large scale
with safety and efficiency.

Artillery Use of Gas

The Artillery of the future will probably fire more gas than any
other one branch of the Army. There are two reasons for this—first,
the large number of guns now accompanying every Army, and
second, the long range of many of these guns. As before indicated,
the gases are adaptable to various uses, and hence to guns differing
both in caliber and range. The gas will be fired by practically all guns
—from the 75 mm. to the very largest in use. It is even possible that
if guns smaller than the 75 mm. become generally useful that certain
gases will be fired by them.
 Efficiency of Artillery Gas Shell. It is well to remember in the
beginning that all artillery shell so far designed and used, contain
only about 10 per cent gas, i.e., 10 per cent of the total weight of
shell and gas. It is hoped that gas shell may later be so designed
that a somewhat greater proportion of the total weight of the shell will
be gas than is now true. This is very desirable from the point of
efficiency. As stated above the bombs used by Chemical Warfare
troops contain nearly 50 per cent of their total weight in gas, and
hence are nearly five times as efficient as artillery shell within the
limit of range of these bombs. This fact alone is enough to warrant
the use of gas troops to their full maximum capacity in order that the
artillery may not fire gas at the ranges covered.

Guns Firing Persistent and

Non-Persistent Gases
Considering the firing of non-persistent and persistent gases, it
may be said generally that non-persistent gases will be fired only by
the medium caliber guns which are available in large numbers. In
fact, the firing of non-persistent gases will be confined mainly to the
6-inch or 155 mm. Howitzer and gun.
As our Army was organized in France, and as it is organized at
present, the number of 155 mm. guns will be greater than all others
put together, except the 75 mm. In order that a non-persistent gas
may be most effective a high concentration must be built up very
quickly. This necessitates the use of the largest caliber shell that are
available in large numbers. Of course, a certain percentage of the
gas shell of other calibers may consist of non-persistent gases in
order to help out the 155 mm. gun. This is in accordance with the
present program for loading gas shell and applies particularly to the
8-inch and 240 mm. Howitzer.
Few Ideally Persistent or Non-Persistent Gases. Naturally
there will be very few gases that are ideally non-persistent or ideally
persistent. The groups will merge into one another. Those on the
border line will be arbitrarily assigned to one group or the other. It
might be said definitely, however, that a gas which will linger more
than six or possibly eight hours under any conditions, except great
cold, will not be considered non-persistent. For reasons of efficiency
and economy persistent gases will not be chosen unless they will
persist under ordinary conditions for two or three days or more.
Accordingly, a gas which would persist for one day only would have
to be extraordinarily useful to lead to its adoption.
Firing Non-Persistent Gases. Of the non-persistent gases
phosgene is the type and the one most used at present.
Furthermore, so far as can now be foreseen, it will continue to be the
non-persistent gas most used. It volatilizes very quickly upon the
bursting of the shell. Accordingly, in order that the shell fired at the
beginning of a gas “shoot,” as they are generally referred to in the
field, shall still be effective when the last shell are fired, it is
necessary that the whole number be fired within two to three
minutes. The temperature and velocity of the wind both affect this. If
it be in a dead calm, the time may be considerably extended; if in a
considerable wind, it must be shortened. Another important
consideration requiring the rapid firing of non-persistent gases is the
fact that nearly all masks thoroughly protect against phosgene and
similar gases. It is accordingly necessary to take the enemy
unawares and gas him before he can adjust his mask; otherwise,
practically no harm will result. From the considerations previously
mentioned, these “gas shoots” are usually made at night when, as
before stated, carelessness, sleepiness and the resulting confusion
of battle conditions always insure more casualties than firing gas in
the daytime.
Firing Persistent Gases. The persistent gases will be fired by all
caliber guns, but to a less extent by the 155 mm. than by the other
calibers. Persistent gases must be sufficiently effective in low
concentrations to act more or less alone. If it be desirable to fill an
atmosphere over a given area with mustard gas, the firing may
extend for two or three, or even five or six hours and all shell still act
together. The same is true of bromobenzylcyanide. This, then,
permits the minimum number of guns to be used in firing these
persistent gases. Inasmuch as they persist and force the wearing of
the mask, they are available for use in long-range, large-caliber guns
for interdiction firing on cross-roads, in villages, and on woods that
afford hiding places, as well as on other similar concentration points.
Firing Irritant Gases. The irritant gases will be fired by the
various caliber guns, in the same manner as the persistent and non-
persistent gases. We will have non-persistent irritant gases and
persistent irritant gases. They are, however, considered as a group
because they are used for harassing purposes, due to their
efficiency in forcing the wearing of the mask.
Before the signing of the Armistice, the General Staff, A. E. F.,
had authorized, beginning January 1, 1919, the filling of 25 per cent
of all shell with Chemical Warfare materials. The interpretation there
given to shell was that it included both shrapnel and high explosive.
Of the field guns in use, the 75 mm. will be best, up to the limit of
its range, for persistent gases such as mustard gas, and the tear
gas, bromobenzylcyanide. A considerable number, however, were
filled with non-persistent gases and probably will continue to be so,
since, due to the very large number of 75 mm. guns available, they
can be used to add greatly at times to the amount of non-persistent
gas that can be fired upon a given point.

Use of Gas by the Aviation Service

No gas was used by aeroplanes in the World War. Many rumors
were spread during the latter part of the war to the effect that the
Germans had dropped gas here or there from aeroplanes. Every
such report reaching the Chemical Warfare Service Headquarters
was run down and in every case was found to be incorrect. However,
there was absolutely no reason for not so using gas, except that the
German was afraid. In the early days of the use of gas he did not
have enough gas, nor had he developed the use of aeroplanes to
the point where it would have seemed advisable. When, however, he
had the aeroplanes the war had not only begun to go against him,
but he had become particularly fearful of gas and of aeroplane
bombing.
 It does not seem to be generally known, but it is a fact, that after
three or four months’ propaganda he made a direct appeal to the
Allies to stop the use of gas sometime during the month of March,
1918. This propaganda took the form of an appeal by a Professor of
Chemistry who had access to Switzerland, to prevent the annihilation
of the Allied forces by a German gas that was to make its
appearance in 1918. This German professor claimed that, while
favoring the Germans winning the war, he had too much human
sympathy to desire to see the slaughter that would be caused by the
use of the new gas. The Allies in the field felt that this was simply an
expression of fear and that he did not have such a gas. The
Germans were accordingly informed that the Allies would not give up
the use of gas. Later events proved these conclusions to be
absolutely correct. The German evidently felt that the manufacturing
possibilities of the Allies would put them in a more predominant
position with gas than with anything else. In that he was exactly
correct.
The use of gas by aeroplanes will not differ from its use in artillery
or by Chemical Warfare Troops. Non-persistent gases may be
dropped on the field of battle, upon concentration points, in rest
areas, or other troop encampments to produce immediate casualties.
Persistent gases will be dropped particularly around cross-roads,
railroad yards, concentration points and encampments that cannot
be reached by the artillery. The sprinkling of persistent gases will be
one of the best ways for aeroplanes to distribute gas.
It might be said here that the aviation gas bomb will be highly
efficient, inasmuch as it has to be only strong enough to withstand
the low pressure of the gas and ordinary handling, whereas artillery
shell must be strong enough to withstand the shock of discharge in
the gun.

Infantry and Gas Warfare

When one suggests the possibility of the infantry handling gas, it
is at once argued that the infantry is already overloaded. That is true,
but in the future, as in the past, the infantryman will increase or