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Global South
Perspectives
on Diplomacy

Yolanda Kemp Spies

Global South Perspectives on Diplomacy
 Yolanda Kemp Spies

Global South
Perspectives
on Diplomacy
Yolanda Kemp Spies
University of Johannesburg
Johannesburg, South Africa

ISBN 978-3-030-00529-0 ISBN 978-3-030-00530-6 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00530-6

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018954968

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 I always learn from my students. The younger ones—unencumbered by the
baggage of life experience—are adventurous, naïve and often irreverent
about the norms and conventions of older generations. They entice me to
think in new ways and to peel back layers of my own cynicism. My mature
students all have a story to tell, a lived experience that gives wider context to
whatever I bring to the classroom. Wherever I have taught, in Africa and
beyond, I have gained insights from them, which in turn impacted many of
the ideas in this book.
Several people—a combination of academics and diplomats, some of them
serving ambassadors—were approached to review draft chapters of this book.
Kingsley Makhubela, Dayanand Naidoo, Mxolisi Nkosi, Dirk Kotzé and
Louise Lepan gave me advice and gently corrected me where I strayed off
course. Thank you so much, colleagues! I relished the opportunity to draw on
your combined experience of diplomacy and diplomatic studies.
I wish to dedicate the book in its entirety to two other diplomatic experts: my
husband, Hannes, and my son, Simon. Hannes founded the South African
Foreign Service Institute (now the Diplomatic Academy) in 1995 and
trained the first cohort of ambassadors for the ‘new South Africa’, before
he served in two ambassadorial postings. We share a love of diplomacy, a
passion for Africa and a dedication to lifelong education.
Simon grew up immersed in diplomatic culture, and his world is large,
exquisitely diverse and bursting with ideas. He sharpens my diplomatic skills
on a daily basis! May you always live fiercely, my son. I know you will never
bow to anyone, except God.
 Contents

1 Introduction 1

2 Bilateral Diplomacy: The Perennial Basics of Diplomacy 11

1 Introduction 11
2 Representing the Sending State 12
2.1 To Represent, or Not … 12
2.2 Representative Behaviour 14
2.3 Representing Multiple Identities and Interests 16
2.4 Representing with Legality and Legitimacy 17
2.5 Innovative Bilateral Representation 20
3 Protecting Interests 26
3.1 Public Interest(s), Public Service 26
3.2 Security Interests 29
3.3 Ethics and Political Interests 30
3.4 Economic Interests 33
3.5 Development—A Primary Interest 35
4 Negotiating 37
4.1 A Negotiated World 37
4.2 A Very Specific Skill 38
4.3 Why Diplomats? 39
4.4 ‘Virtual’ Negotiations 41
5 Information Gathering and Reporting 42
5.1 Ascertaining What? 42

vii
viii    Contents

5.2 Only ‘by All Lawful Means’! 43

5.3 Information ‘Management’ 44
5.4 The Imperative of Reporting 45
5.5 Reporting for Posterity 47
6 Promoting and Developing Relations 47
6.1 The Human Element 47
6.2 The ‘Official’ Friendly Relations 49
6.3 Public Diplomacy 50
6.4 Cultural and Other Niche Public Diplomacy 52
6.5 E-Diplomacy 54
6.6 Beyond Bilateral Relations 56
7 Conclusion 56
Sources Used 59

3 Multilateral Diplomacy: Diplomacy in Congress 65

1 Introduction 65
2 Manifestations of Multilateral Diplomacy 66
2.1 Conference Diplomacy 66
2.2 Parliamentary Diplomacy 68
2.3 Bloc Diplomacy 71
2.4 Minilateral and Club Diplomacy 73
2.5 Associative Diplomacy 75
3 Catalysts of Multilateral Diplomacy 77
3.1 Normative Ideals of International Society 77
3.2 Symbolic Membership of International Society 79
3.3 Global Governance: Legitimacy and Participation 80
3.4 Regional Integration 82
3.5 State Pragmatism 83
4 Intergovernmental Organisations and Diplomatic Practice 84
4.1 The Nature and Roles of Intergovernmental
Organisations 84
4.2 Intergovernmental Organisations as Diplomatic Actors 86
4.3 Secretariats: The Multilateral Counterpart of Foreign
Ministries 88
4.4 The IGO CEO: Secretaries-General et al. 91
4.5 Extensions of IGO CEOs: Special Representatives,
Commissions and High-Level Panels 92
5 Foreign Ministries and Multilateral Diplomacy 94
 Contents    ix

5.1 Foreign Ministry Organisation of Multilateral

Diplomacy 94
5.2 Even Greater Bureaucratic Management of Foreign
Policy 97
5.3 Multifaceted Representative Roles 98
5.4 Mastering the Rules of the Game 100
5.5 Multilateral Socialisation of States 101
6 Conclusion 102
Sources Used 105

4 Third-Party Diplomacy: The Diplomacy of Peace

and Intercession 109
1 Introduction 109
2 Good Offices 111
2.1 A Diplomatic Institution 111
2.2 The Role of Neutral States 113
3 Pacific Settlement of Disputes 115
3.1 Chapter VI of the UN Charter: Legal Instruments 116
3.2 Chapter VI of the UN Charter: Diplomatic
Instruments 117
3.3 The Diplomacy of UN Mediation 120
3.4 Keeping the Peace: Chapter ‘VI 1/2’ 122
4 New Diplomatic Conceptualisation of Peace and Conflict 124
4.1 The New Profile of Conflict 124
4.2 The New Profile of Peace 128
4.3 Profiling and Equipping the Peacemakers 130
5 Peace as a Diplomatic Project 132
5.1 Peacebuilding 132
5.2 Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development 135
5.3 Peace as a Regional Project 137
5.4 The Peace Project and (the Problem of) Justice 138
6 States and Third-Party Niche Diplomacy 141
6.1 States That Specialise in ‘the Business of Peace’ 141
6.2 Special State Envoys 142
6.3 Foreign Ministry Implications of Third-Party
Diplomacy 143
7 Conclusion 146
Sources Used 149
x    Contents

5 Polylateral Diplomacy: Diplomacy as Public–Private

Collaboration 153
1 Introduction 153
2 The Privatisation of Diplomacy 154
2.1 Degovernmentalisation of Diplomacy 154
2.2 People-to-People Diplomacy 156
2.3 ‘Privatised’ Foreign Ministries 158
3 Diplomacy and the Global Commons 159
3.1 Global Public Goods 159
3.2 Technology and Information as Public Goods 161
3.3 The Watchdogs: Transnational Social Movements 163
4 Non-state Actors in the Diplomatic Arena 165
4.1 Non-governmental Organisations 165
4.2 Multinational Corporations 167
4.3 The Media 169
4.4 Individuals and Celebrity Diplomacy 171
5 The Comparative Advantages of Non-state Actors 173
5.1 Proactive, Single-Issue Focus 173
5.2 Grass-Roots Connectivity 174
5.3 Organisational Efficiency and Resources 175
5.4 Influence and Policy Impact 176
5.5 The Moral High Ground? 178
6 Foreign Ministries and Polylateral Diplomacy 180
6.1 The Rationale for Polylateralism 180
6.2 Official Joint Ventures: Some Examples 182
6.3 Institutional Foreign Ministry Adjustments 186
6.4 Embracing Media Diplomacy 188
6.5 Polylateral Human Resources Management 189
7 Conclusion 191
Sources Used 194

6 Structural Diplomacy: Development, Participation

and Governance 201
1 Introduction 201
2 Diplomatic Arena Under Construction 202
2.1 The Insecurity of Globalisation and Global
Governance 202
2.2 Fluid Polarity 203
 Contents    xi

2.3 Fragmentation and Regional Microcosms 206

2.4 The New Kids on the Block: Emerging Powers 208
3 The Diplomacy of the ‘Middle’ 212
3.1 Constitutive Elements: Traditional and Emerging
Middle Powers 212
3.2 Behavioural Aspects of Middle Power Diplomacy 213
3.3 Declaratory Statements About (Middle) Power 217
4 The New Diplomacy of Development 219
4.1 Status Check: End of the Cold War and an Uneven
Playing Field 219
4.2 A New Development Narrative 220
4.3 The South-South Aid Discourse 226
4.4 Institutionalising Development at Foreign Ministry
Level 229
5 Transformation and Reformation 231
5.1 Starting at the Top: Reform of the UN Security
Council 231
5.2 The Financial and Economic Arena of Global
Governance 236
6 Conclusion 240
Sources Used 245

7 Conclusion 251

Index 261
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Diplomacy has been practised since the beginning of human evolution,

and it carries enormous practical and symbolic value. Yet historically,
it received scant academic attention. The culprit is its arcane image: it
is seen by many people, including academics, as elitist and politically
manipulated. Sadly this is not altogether untrue. To some or other
extent, diplomacy has always been concealed from public scrutiny. It is
only in recent decades that diplomatic studies have surged, driven by
demands for democratic accountability and boosted by more accessible
information in the public domain.
Ideationally, however, diplomacy remains a slippery notion. Many
people use the term without understanding what it means and end up
confusing it with a range of other concepts. Foreign policy, negotia-
tion, international politics, even exploitative tactics such as espionage
and propaganda, are frequently conflated with diplomacy. As a diplo-
matic practitioner-turned-academic, I am vested in the institution and
rather protective of its conceptual demarcation. So let me start off by
offering a definition of diplomacy, to set it apart from all other inter-
national engagements: it is a peaceful and continuous process of com-
munication that involves international relations among states or other
collectivities, on the basis of intermediation, reciprocity and formal rep-
resentation. As implied by the definition, diplomacy cannot be unilateral;
it exists only by mutual participation. The formal dimension is equally
important, because all the prestige and interests of an international actor
are at stake when it confers authority to an official representative. Under

© The Author(s) 2019 1

Y. K. Spies, Global South Perspectives on Diplomacy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00530-6_1
2 Y. K. SPIES

international law, states are held accountable for what their diplomats
do, hence the extensive international legal framework that protects and
guides the practice of diplomacy.
In international studies, the agency of individual diplomats is gener-
ally under-appreciated because their work—even on high profile issues—
is done in a discreet, low profile manner, thereby blending into the
bureaucratic ‘white noise’ of global relations. It deserves to be studied
much more attentively, because diplomats constantly weave a safety net
for the preservation of international society. Consider, for a moment,
the distinction made in Ancient Greece between two types of interna-
tional envoys, ‘heralds’ and ‘diplomats’. Heralds, regardless of their sta-
tus, could only convey news about imminent war. They were respected
individuals, but they were only messengers. Diplomats, on the other
hand, communicated messages but also had the leeway to negotiate trea-
ties. This manoeuvring space continues to define the institution of diplo-
macy. Contrary to what cynics allege, diplomats have a mandate that
far exceeds the simple communication of preset messages. They have to
bargain, ‘think out of the box’, create common ground, add value and
engineer peace where none exists. The work is never done: new fissures
appear; new generations of politicians forget the lessons learnt. The
profession’s duty, and its strength, lies in its continuity of communica-
tion. After all, the world we live in is largely a product of diplomacy: the
peace treaties, charters of international organisations, even the borders
of sovereign states result from deals struck by diplomats. Diplomacy out-
lives empires and ideologies, trends and fads, and all the many ways we
humans find to undermine each other.
In this book, the modalities used by diplomats will be investigated, so
as to provide a framework for analysis of diplomacy. I should add that the
book complements a predecessor, Global Diplomacy and International
Society, which provided wider contextual perspective on diplomatic prac-
tice and theory. Theoretical, historical, legal, bureaucratic and cultural
frameworks for diplomacy were variously discussed in the previous book.
I should also make it clear why the title of this book refers to Global
South perspectives. Most scholarly work on diplomacy originates in the
industrialised countries of the Global North. The rest of the world is yet
to make a definitive mark on diplomatic studies, and as proud African
and Global Southerner, I want to see this rectified. Diplomacy is truly
global; it does not belong exclusively to any part of humanity, it is uni-
versally practised and universally institutionalised. For that reason, we
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

have to study it in its totality: not just the content of what we analyse,
but also the perspectives we engage. It makes practical as well as theoret-
ical sense to do so.
Ironically, the Global South itself is still understudied in the field of
international relations (IR). This is astounding, given that it includes the
bulk of humanity and the most ancient of civilisations. Yet even the name
people use for the world beyond the highly industrialised Western coun-
tries is contested. The many labels (‘Developing World’, ‘Third World’,
‘Global South’, ‘Periphery’ and so forth) all seem to be imprecise as a
collective term, because the constituent units of the Global South are
hugely dissimilar; much more so than those of the Global North. They
range from desperately poor states such as Haiti and Bangladesh and
failed states like Somalia; to newly industrialising middle-income coun-
tries like Mexico and Turkey; and even the world’s aspirant superpower,
China. While the Global South label implies that most of its members
are physically located in the southern hemisphere, this is of course not
necessarily the case. Australia and New Zealand are both in the south-
ern hemisphere, but are categorised as Global North. By the same token,
many states in the northern hemisphere, such as Uzbekistan, Mongolia
and North Korea, are part of the Global South. The latter label is more
political than geographical, but it is not an entirely subjective identity.
States in the Global South tend to have unconsolidated or very uneven
socio-economic development; authoritarian or only recently evolved
democracies; and usually a history of colonisation. They are vulnerable to
the political and economic policies of the rich industrialised states; their
development dependent on access to the markets, investment and tech-
nology of the Global North. To this extent, they perceive themselves to
be subjugated or dictated to; treated as second-class members of interna-
tional society. The Global South is therefore mostly defined in negative
terms, namely by what it is not (yet).
What this separate ‘world’ has accomplished is to have inserted devel-
opment onto the global diplomatic agenda. Since the first generation
of development diplomacy appeared in the late 1950s, an alternative
diplomatic narrative gained momentum and in today’s world the issue
of development is more ‘mainstreamed’ than ever before. It should
be emphasised that for the Global South, diplomacy is primarily about
development, the countering of asymmetry in the global economy. For
the most marginalised of these countries, diplomacy is the only viable
foreign policy tool with which to wage an existential struggle. Countries
4 Y. K. SPIES

that lack comparative advantage in alternative foreign policy instruments,

especially ‘hard’ military or economic power, have a disproportionately
high interest in successful diplomacy to advance their national interests.
At the same time, it is an unfortunate reality for many of the world’s
states that the weight of their national bargaining power is inversely pro-
portionate to the size of their developmental needs. Their diplomats
are routinely outnumbered, out-trained and out-(hard)powered in the
global diplomatic arena. Often their domestic realities are as unpredicta-
ble as the dynamics within international relations.
The plight of struggling diplomats motivates me to bring their views
in from the cold, not to reinforce an identity of ‘otherness’ but to ensure
that the puzzle of diplomacy features a complete picture. Hence this
book, which includes cases from around the world (not just the Global
South), highlights the particular challenges experienced by struggling
states.
The focus is on ‘contemporary’ diplomacy, an elastic time frame
but one which I consider to indicate essentially the post-Cold War era.
Nevertheless, historical elements infuse all the chapters, because an
ancient, constantly evolving profession like diplomacy draws on prece-
dent as well as innovation.
The methodological approach of the book, as mentioned, involves
a modal analysis of diplomacy. I distinguish among four main
modes: bilateral, multilateral, third-party and polylateral diplomacy.
Diplomatic modes are determined by the number and identity of par-
ties that are involved, and the nature of the relationship that ties them
together. Modes are not mutually exclusive, and they can be conducted
simultaneously.
An important clarification is that modes are not synonymous with issue
specialisation in diplomacy. A plethora of issues punctuate present-day
books on diplomacy: nuclear proliferation, human rights, the environment,
trade, energy, migration and so forth. It is not uncommon for diplomats
to specialise in an issue-field, because it requires knowledge of specific
processes and jargon, and networking with exclusive epistemic commu-
nities. Foreign ministries might even recruit technical experts to become
diplomats, if a given issue is a foreign policy priority. Nonetheless, what-
ever the specialisation, it is still practised by means of a diplomatic mode
(one or more, or a combination). To illustrate: Egypt’s economic diplo-
macy can be bilateral (if conducted with one other state, such as Kenya)
or multilateral (if conducted with several others states simultaneously,
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

for instance within the World Trade Organisation or Organisation of

Islamic Cooperation). It can also be polylateral, if one or more non-state
parties (such as Nestlé or Samsung) collaborate in reaching the Egyptian
objectives.
Like much of diplomatic theory, there is no uniformity when it
comes to identification of modes. There is broad agreement that bilat-
eral diplomacy is the oldest, most traditional form of diplomacy, and that
it is distinct from a more recent practice, namely for clusters of actors
to conduct ‘multilateral’ diplomacy. Some authors do not include third-
party diplomacy as a separate mode, on account of its indirect nature:
it indicates that there is a problem between parties that prevents them
from having normal diplomatic relations. Intercession by a third party
is therefore required, but only on a consensual basis. In a best-case sce-
nario, the third-party role will be short-lived: it should end when the
problem is resolved and the primary parties return to a normal diplo-
matic relationship.
Polylateral diplomacy—where state and non-state actors cooperate in
diplomatic processes—is absent from traditional, state-centric diplomatic
literature. Contrarily, it dominates recent diplomatic texts from authors
who hail from liberal democracies. Summitry, the practice where political
executives interact directly and visibly, is treated as a separate diplomatic
mode by authors such as Geoff Berridge; whereas I see summitry as a
technique that can occur in any of the main modes. My own identifica-
tion of and differentiation among four modes are simply what I perceive
to be most practical for analytical purposes.
Another caveat regarding modes of diplomacy should be noted.
Diplomatic practice might seem rigidly constrained by rules and tra-
dition, but the opposite is true. It has survived and grown in scope
through all the ages precisely because diplomacy evolves in tandem with
international society. Polylateral diplomacy is a testimony to the influ-
ence and agency of non-state actors, and it is often used in hybrid form
with other modes. When the African Union cooperates with France in
post-conflict reconstruction and development in Côte d’Ivoire, and
they outsource implementation of certain projects to the International
Committee of the Red Cross, they are engaging in a hybrid of third-
party, multilateral and polylateral diplomacy. The overlap between modes
is indicative of a larger, integrated picture that I hope the book will
reveal. Nevertheless, I separate out the modes in structuring the book,
for ease of study.
6 Y. K. SPIES

Chapter 2 deals with bilateral diplomacy, the foundation of diplomatic

practice as we know it, the oldest and most traditional mode, where two
entities engage directly with each other. The chapter’s contents are what
I term the ‘perennial basics’ of diplomacy, because the principles, tech-
niques and institutions of bilateral diplomacy are replicated in all the
other modes of diplomacy. The discussion is structured according to
the five functions of diplomatic missions, which are listed in Article 3 of
the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. These functions
are (a) representation of a sending state; (b) protection of the sending
state’s interests (and by implication, promotion of those same interests);
(c) negotiation with host state authorities; (d) information gathering
and reporting thereon to own authorities; and (e) promotion of friendly
interstate relations. International relations have obviously changed signif-
icantly since the early 1960s when the Vienna Convention was adopted,
but these generic functions were selected for good reason: they are a suc-
cinct summary of the timeless duties of diplomats.
In the discussion, attention is given to the way in which these func-
tions have expanded in recent decades, how they manifest when states
do not have resident embassies to perform the stated tasks, and how less-
er-endowed (struggling) states deal with the challenges of their capac-
ity deficit. An important consideration is the impact of information and
communication technology (ICT) on diplomacy’s core tasks of commu-
nicating and handling information. Another key aspect is the abundance
of new actors that are stakeholders in diplomacy and need to be engaged
by official diplomats. These include all levels of intra-state governance,
as well as non-state actors. In the post-Cold War era, there is also the
increasing imperative for diplomats to interact with the public of a host
state, not just its authorities. And, to return to my Global South perspec-
tive, the issue of development assistance has become core bilateral busi-
ness for states; for donors, recipients and especially those Global South
states that are at the same time aid beneficiaries and aid benefactors.
Multilateral diplomacy, the focus of Chapter 3, encompasses everything
that bilateral diplomacy does, but involves three or more states (and/
or organisations) doing so simultaneously. Multilateral diplomacy is not
merely a matter of larger numbers, however, even though the quantitative
expansion of international society has fed the phenomenon. It has evolved
for a combination of practical, normative and symbolic reasons; ergo its
proliferation (in volume and in diversity) since the end of World War I.
The reasons for its exponential growth are explored in some detail.
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

In the chapter, the contemporary manifestations of multilateral diplo-

macy are identified: the traditional distinction between conference and
parliamentary diplomacy; new concepts such as ‘minilateral’, ‘network’
and ‘club’ diplomacy; as well as multilateral-within-multilateral diplo-
macy, i.e. different forms of ‘plurilateral’ diplomacy. Attention is also
given to the role of intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) because
they create hubs of multilateral diplomacy. IGOs such as the World
Trade Organisation, United Nations and European Union are not
merely passive meeting venues for states and other organisations. When
they transcend the sum of their parts, as they tend to do, they morph
into independent diplomatic actors. The distinctive contribution of IGOs
to diplomatic practice is discussed, as is the role of their staff—the inter-
national civil servants that take on supranational diplomatic identity.
Of interest in the same chapter is the organisational impact of mul-
tilateral diplomacy on foreign ministries. State bureaucratisation of this
mode of diplomacy is very recent but it happened swiftly, and by the end
of the twentieth century all foreign ministries had institutionalised mul-
tilateral diplomacy. Among the implications that are considered are the
placement and capacity building of states’ resident embassies at IGOs,
the intra-state management and coordination of multilateral foreign pol-
icy, and the complex representative mandate(s) and technical require-
ments of diplomats in multilateral postings.
In Chapter 4, the modal lens is that of third-party diplomacy. It is
largely a mode of conflict management, reduction and resolution. For
that same reason, it happens to be the diplomatic mode that attracts the
most vehement criticism, because there is little opportunity for diplomats
to prove their success: a prevented conflict (or a prevented escalation in
conflict) is counterfactual. On the other hand, third-party diplomacy
speaks to the very raison d’être of diplomacy. The pursuit of peace fits
the profile of brokerage, or intermediation, that underpins the institution
of diplomacy. It also requires constant innovation, because in third-party
mode space has to be created for diplomacy precisely when circumstances
dictate against it.
The chapter starts off by examining the phenomenon of ‘good offices’
where a third party’s institutional facilities are provided to enable diplo-
macy between actors that are unable or unwilling to deal with each other
directly. So-called neutral states have historically provided good offices,
and in the contemporary era, multilateral organisations fulfil the same
role. In fact, during the past century many IGOs were founded with
8 Y. K. SPIES

the goal of fostering peace and security. The United Nations Charter
provides for the legal use of force by its Security Council, but of more
interest to diplomatic practice are the options for third-party diplomacy
enumerated in Chapter VI of the UN Charter.
The pacific (peaceful) settlement of disputes, including mediation, is
contextualised within the changing profile of global peace and conflict.
Peace is no longer contingent on once-off agreement among politi-
cal executives; it requires multi-stakeholder buy-in and long-term ‘pro-
ject management’ when conflict-ravaged societies need to be rebuilt.
Third-party diplomacy is therefore increasingly tied to peacebuilding and
post-conflict reconstruction and development. In the process, diplomats
are confronted with an ethical dilemma: the contradiction between polit-
ical settlement (the usual diplomatic route) and judicial closure (the legal
imperative).
Chapter 5 addresses polylateral diplomacy and explains the catalytic
processes that constitute this interface of official diplomacy with pri-
vate initiatives. The book thereby moves beyond traditional state-cen-
tric perspectives, into the context of a diplomatic arena that is pluralistic,
dynamic and networked. Geopolitical location and formal authority have
far less impact on the activities of non-state actors—multinational com-
panies, ethnic diaspora, celebrities, trade unions, the media, religious
groups and many more—that operate at domestic, transnational, inter-
national and global levels. The de facto diplomacy of these actors often
happens in parallel to the governments of sovereign states, challenging
their jurisdiction.
The intersection of state and societal interests is of key interest to
diplomats, all the more so when it concerns global public goods. The
‘global commons’ comprises human interests that transcend sovereign
borders. As is the case at the domestic level, at the global level the provi-
sion of services requires transparency and accountability, and diplomacy
thereby assumes characteristics of legislative, representative governance—
hence the term ‘global governance’. It is a historically unprecedented
element of diplomacy, and possibly a new mode in the making.
The chapter identifies the main types of non-state actors and their
‘diplomacy’, with a discussion of their comparative advantages vis-à-vis
traditional (state-centric) actors. This is followed by a discussion of the
impact that diplomatic ‘civilcraft’ has on the traditional statecraft focus of
foreign ministries. Examples of polylateral partnerships, from around the
world, are provided.
 1 INTRODUCTION 9

Chapter 6, the final substantive chapter of the book, is titled ‘struc-

tural diplomacy’ and deals with a hybrid approach rather than a distinct
mode. Structural diplomacy is geared (in purpose as well as methodol-
ogy) towards the terms of interaction in the international system. It con-
fronts the discrepancies between notions of global ‘democracy’ and the
actual, entrenched hierarchies of power. It focuses on the power-diplo-
macy nexus, a political connection that is, of course, truly timeless. What
has changed in recent times is that a far greater section of the world
has become vocal about systemic flaws, and is insisting on equity in the
forums of global governance.
The fast-evolving diplomatic arena is one that is ‘under construction’,
and new emerging powers are using the rules of the game to challenge
those same rules of the game. These powers are spearheading a second
generation diplomacy of development, a discourse that invokes new nor-
mative and legal assumptions about world order.
Chapter 6 also considers the ‘diplomacy of the middle’, exhibited by
states that (by choice rather than necessity) prioritise diplomacy over
other tools of statecraft. ‘Middlepowermanship’, a status based on diplo-
matic behaviour and leadership, was traditionally associated with certain
Western states, but in recent decades several Global South states have
joined the category. Their niche diplomacy is discussed alongside that of
the traditional middle powers.
Chapter 7, the conclusion, reflects on the key findings of the book. It
addresses the question whether international society is being discounted
by ‘alternative’ voices from the Global South. The discussion returns to
where it started, namely the role of diplomacy, and the need to study it
in more depth, with greater perspective.
I welcome feedback on the book; also criticism (contestation is part of
the territory of academic enterprise, and it certainly induces diplomacy!)
to enrich future incarnations of the book. It would be a real honour if it
inspires more contributions from peers in the Global South. Our views
should no longer be considered peripheral.
As an African scholar, I particularly look forward to diplomatic schol-
arship from the continent. Africa is, after all, the cradle of humankind,
and therefore also the birthplace of diplomacy! There is so much wisdom
and experience locked up in this extraordinary continent. It needs to be
published for consumption by a global audience.
 CHAPTER 2

Bilateral Diplomacy:
The Perennial Basics of Diplomacy

1   Introduction
Up till the beginning of the twentieth century, the history of diplomacy
was largely the history of bilateral diplomacy. This mode of diplomacy—
also referred to as ‘traditional’, ‘old’ or ‘the French system’—represents
the foundation of diplomatic practice as we know it. It became synon-
ymous with the institution of resident embassies when the latter origi-
nated in fifteenth-century Italy and spread throughout Europe before
becoming a universal phenomenon.
The important symbolism of bilateral diplomatic relations is that the
two political entities acknowledge each other’s relevance as diplomatic
actors. In the conventional sense, ‘they are in principle prepared to con-
duct any necessary business by direct communication through official
representatives’ (Berridge 1995: 19). Diplomacy is rooted in reciprocity
and the term ‘bilateral’ (literally meaning two-sided) emphasises the fact
that it can exist only by mutual participation. Contact is done through
institutionalised communication channels, ordinarily the respective for-
eign ministries and their networks of diplomatic missions. However, the
exchange of resident diplomatic missions is by no means a precondition
for bilateral relations: many states maintain warm and regular diplo-
matic interaction without representative offices in each other’s territo-
ries. In some cases, the physical representation may be maintained by one
side only—once again, without necessarily reflecting negatively on the
relationship.

© The Author(s) 2019 11

Y. K. Spies, Global South Perspectives on Diplomacy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00530-6_2
12 Y. K. SPIES

When the generic functions of diplomatic missions were codified

into diplomatic law by Article 3 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, it did more than articulate the reasons why states
maintain resident diplomatic missions. In essence, it confirmed inter-
national consensus on the broad functions of diplomats per se. I have
therefore selected the five de jure functions listed in Article 3—rep-
resentation of a sending state; protection of its interests; negotiation with
host authorities; information gathering and reporting thereon; and pro-
motion of friendly interstate relations—as a framework for this chapter’s
discussion of diplomatic practice. This holistic picture includes consid-
eration of activities that were not covered by the Vienna Convention,
because the operating environment of diplomats has obviously changed
significantly since the early 1960s when the Convention was concluded.
It is important to note that the generic functions of diplomacy are
not restricted to the bilateral mode. They pervade all the other modes
of diplomacy, hence the subtitle of this chapter: ‘the perennial basics of
diplomacy’. Subsequent chapters on multilateral, third-party and polylat-
eral diplomacy will therefore build on these basics.

2  Representing the Sending State

‘Representing the sending state in the receiving state’ (VCDR 1961: Art. 3a)

Like a sacrament, diplomacy’s symbols are often the reality they signify.
(Filipino Ambassador José Lino Guererro 1999, at the conclusion of his
posting in Ankara, Turkey)

2.1   To Represent, or Not …

A diplomat’s representative role is a constitutive element of diplomatic
activity, and most diplomatic duties evolve from this responsibility (Calvet
de Magalhães 1988: 103). Representation encompasses not only the diplo-
mat’s symbolic presence at events—being clearly ‘visible on behalf of’, or
what diplomats light-heartedly refer to as ‘flying the flag’—but also his/
her substantive representation, which literally requires ‘acting on behalf of’
a state’s leadership. Even the most energetic and charismatic leaders can
only be in one place at a time, and the advantage of having official repre-
sentatives based around the world to execute symbolic duties on a contin-
uous basis is one of the oldest arguments for resident embassies.
 2 BILATERAL DIPLOMACY: THE PERENNIAL BASICS OF DIPLOMACY 13

Ceremonial events such as state funerals, commemoration ser-

vices, inauguration of heads of state, military parades and so forth hold
national importance to host states. The presence of the diplomatic
corps at such events is carefully managed and monitored. Any unex-
plained absence can be construed as a political message. Actually, in cer-
tain instances non-attendance of events (or a visible ‘walk-out’ midway)
can be a deliberate diplomatic strategy. On 17 April 2013, Argentina’s
Ambassador to the UK was conspicuous by her absence from the offi-
cial state funeral of former UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. The
event at St. Paul’s Cathedral in London was attended by scores of heads
of state and ambassadors accredited to the UK. Ambassador Alicia Castro
had declined the official invitation to attend the funeral and did not del-
egate the duty to any of her staff members either, in a clear demonstra-
tion of lingering tension between the two countries. Thatcher’s role in
the 1982 war over the islands that the British refer to as The Falklands
(known as Las Malvinas in Argentina) continues to irk Argentina. The
Argentine boycott was also in protest at the fact that their President at
the time, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, was not invited to the event,
apparently at the explicit request of the Thatcher family. The latter had
taken umbrage at her series of provocative statements about the UK’s
continued ‘colonial’ rule in the islands.
A rather common diplomatic strategy is for a state to ‘recall’ its
ambassador when the host state has angered it in some or other way. It
is never done discreetly, because the move is meant to be highly sym-
bolic. During June 1981, in protest against the Netherlands’ sale1 of two
submarines to Taiwan, China downgraded bilateral diplomatic relations
by replacing its Ambassador in The Hague with a chargé d’affaires (i.e.
a lower-level official who takes charge in the temporary or long-term
absence of an ambassador). It has reacted in similar diplomatic manner
towards other states that indulged Taiwan to an extent the Chinese deem
inappropriate.
As in the case of China and Taiwan, Turkey also has a longstand-
ing diplomatic nemesis and its neighbour, Armenia. The historical ten-
sion has impacted negatively on Turkey’s otherwise cordial relations
with the non-Muslim world; an inclusive diplomatic strategy evidenced
most symbolically in the bilateral relations Turkey has maintained with
the Holy See (Vatican) since 1868. It was thus provocative when, on 12
April 2015 at a service in Rome, Pope Francis referred to2 Turkey’s mass
killing of Armenians (under Ottoman rule during the World War I) as
14 Y. K. SPIES

the ‘first genocide of the 20th century’. His comment so infuriated the
Turkish government that it recalled its Ambassador to the Vatican. (The
Ambassador was reinstated, but only ten months later.) Turkey has also
recalled its Ambassadors from various other states—among them France
in 2011 and Germany in 2016—after their respective national legisla-
tures intentionally labelled the Armenian killings as ‘genocide’.
Sometimes a state has a similar bilateral diplomatic spat with several
other states at the same time, and this can lead to simultaneous withdraw-
als of more than one ambassador from a host state. It happened when
Indonesian authorities sentenced convicted drug smugglers to death
(among them members of an Australian drug-trafficking ring in the infa-
mous ‘Bali-9’ case) during early 2015. The presence of foreign nation-
als among the condemned prisoners caused an international outcry. In
addition to the lobbying of various non-state groups, the governments of
Brazil, the Netherlands and Australia all appealed to the Indonesian gov-
ernment to commute the death sentence of their nationals.
When the executions took place despite the bilateral diplomatic
efforts, the three states recalled their respective ambassadors from
Indonesia. But diplomatic symbolism can only achieve so much—a sov-
ereign state’s legal jurisdiction within its own territory is a principle of
international law. The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs tersely con-
firmed this right, in a statement on 22 February 2015:

As a democratic sovereign state with its own sovereign, independent and

impartial justice system, no foreign country nor party can and may inter-
fere with the implementation of Indonesia’s prevailing laws within its juris-
diction, including in the enforcement of laws to address drug trafficking.
(Otto 2015)

As in most instances where such symbolic measures are resorted to, the
three countries soon after normalised their diplomatic relations with
Indonesia.

2.2   Representative Behaviour

With representation at the core of diplomacy’s raison d’être, a diplo-
mat has to represent his/her sending state continuously and unambig-
uously. The task can be mundane but can also range from glamorous
 2 BILATERAL DIPLOMACY: THE PERENNIAL BASICS OF DIPLOMACY 15

(being chauffeur-driven, mixing with heads of state and walking red

carpets) to humiliating (being expelled from a host state in a fit of
political pique or being pelted with tomatoes by protesters because
one’s government has done something offensive). Diplomats have to
absorb all the sentiment their sending states, and specifically their gov-
ernments, conjure up in a foreign domain. Regardless of their behav-
iour as individuals, they might attract adulation or hostility simply
because they represent a certain political entity. It is a heavy responsi-
bility, hence the prestige of the profession and the intricate attention
within diplomatic law to the immunities and privileges of individual
diplomats.
The corollary is that diplomats are held to high standards of personal
conduct. Skills training in etiquette, protocol and personal grooming is
routinely part of diplomatic training, and most foreign ministries allo-
cate special ‘representative’ allowances to their diplomats to ensure that
they can afford to dress elegantly. The subtext is always that a diplo-
mat has to project the most favourable image of his/her sending state.
There are no ‘office hours’ to the responsibility of representing one’s
country, and diplomats have to mind their conduct even when officially
‘off duty’. This explains why, despite worldwide democratic imperatives
for foreign ministries to reflect the social reality of society, the diplo-
matic environment continues to be marked by conservative parameters
for personal behaviour. It also accounts for the continuing elitist instinct
in the recruitment of individuals who are physically, intellectually, and
in terms of personality and refinement, the most agreeable ‘face’ of a
country.
Unacceptable behaviour includes anything that draws negative atten-
tion to the individual and, by extension, the sending state, such as inap-
propriate sexual conduct, substance addiction, domestic violence and
so forth. Diplomats (and their accompanying family members) who
behave in an uncouth manner—even if they are within the host state’s
legal parameters—can be reported to the sending state’s authorities with
the request that they be disciplined or recalled. In many cases, the with-
drawal will be a proactive measure done by a sending state when its for-
eign ministry realises that an employee is acting outside of diplomatic
norms. Unless the media had covered a particular incident, the with-
drawal usually takes place in a discreet manner so as not to impact the
bilateral state-to-state relationship.
16 Y. K. SPIES

2.3   Representing Multiple Identities and Interests

Representation is an existential challenge that defines the diplomatic
profession. It starts with the individual: even the most professional dip-
lomat is never just a ‘generic’ functionary. An African-American US dip-
lomat is obviously a member of a minority population group, just as a
Christian Syrian diplomat is part of a minority religion in that country.
Yet, their official duty is to represent their states, even if at the personal
level each of them (as does any diplomat) has a multifaceted identity
which he/she consciously or unconsciously represents. Something else
all diplomats share is that they represent an institution of international
society—diplomacy itself—which is imbued with global norms and
conventions.
The uniqueness of the diplomatic profession is that it requires indi-
viduals to transcend their personal identity and values so as to represent
a state and its people in their entirety. This task is difficult enough when
a diplomat represents a single ‘nation’. But the majority of the world’s
states do not resemble the classical ‘nation state’, where a single nation
inhabits a single geopolitical unit. A South African diplomat, for exam-
ple, represents a country that is hugely diverse: multiracial, multi-ethnic,
multilingual, multi-religious; and featuring deep socio-economic and
political schisms. It is a non-negotiable package deal: an individual South
African diplomat may not ‘cherry-pick’ the parts of the country that he/
she wishes to represent.
As South African diplomats experienced during the 1990s, the official
representatives of states in transition have to make additional representa-
tive leaps: from one domestic political culture to another, and from one
international state identity to another. Diplomats whose careers survive
the transition are products of a defunct old order and like the rest of
their compatriots are materially and emotionally affected by the instabil-
ity and unpredictability of constitutional ‘revolution’. They nevertheless
have to represent, to the outside world, the identity of a state with its
very nature in flux. By the same token, their new colleagues who had
fought against the previous order are required to represent the new state
in its totality, including the institutional remnants of the past. The dip-
lomats of new states face a similar challenge, and their representative
responsibility takes on a critical dimension because the brand-new inter-
national actor (their sending state) displays its international identity pri-
marily through diplomatic visibility.
 2 BILATERAL DIPLOMACY: THE PERENNIAL BASICS OF DIPLOMACY 17

State identity itself can be multidimensional, and diplomats have

to simultaneously represent the existential nuances, and all the linked
interests, in the course of their work. A Turkish Ambassador rep-
resents a state that is predominantly Muslim, secular, developing, a
donor as well as recipient of development assistance, a North Atlantic
Treaty Organization member, an aspiring European Union member,
an emerging power, a geographically Eurasian territory, a neighbour
to conflict-ridden Syria, to name but a few of its ‘identity-interests’.
He/she will thus have to draw on different dimensions of represent-
ative instinct and foreign policy interests at various times, playing up
the positive elements and potential of a specific affiliation, depending
on the diplomatic setting. But at all times, he/she will have to keep
an holistic perspective and ensure that there are coherence and con-
tinuity—and representation of Turkey, above all—in the diplomatic
interaction.
It is important to note that representatives of the same state might
advance different bureaucratic identities and interests. The governments
of states are not monolithic institutions, and the contemporary trend is
for numerous state agencies to be represented abroad under the aegis of
individual diplomatic missions. The manifold concerns of development
corporations, investment agencies, trade and tourism offices, ministries
of finance, agriculture and so forth can cause duplication or rivalry, mul-
tiple channels of information to principals in sending state and general
problems of foreign policy coordination (Barston 2006: 22–23).

2.4   Representing with Legality and Legitimacy

Diplomats work within the parameters of international law, and the
legal element of their work is a perennial theme in diplomatic studies.
The formal requirements of diplomacy are essential, for good reason.
The full title of a resident ambassador is ‘Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary’ with the term ‘plenipotentiary’ indicating full author-
ity to act on behalf of his/her head of state. In theory, therefore, an
ambassador can declare war! This representational weight also explains
why an ambassador ‘presents credentials’ to the head of the host state
during a face-to-face meeting, rather than sending the document to a
designated functionary in the host government. This ceremonial require-
ment can be frustrating, as newly arrived ambassadors sometimes have
to wait for months before they can see the head of the host state for the
18 Y. K. SPIES

presentation of credentials. Until such time as they had done so, they
may not assume their duties officially.
Diplomacy takes place in a very political arena, among constantly
evolving international actors, and ideally, all diplomats need to oper-
ate with both legality and legitimacy on their side. In reality, however,
diplomacy continues even when (or precisely because) there is a deficit in
either.
A lack of legitimacy can result from representational ambiguity,
something that can occur during the process of state creation or state
disintegration, when the very identity of a state is questioned. It is debil-
itating for diplomats to operate in a legal void, and the process can be
contentious, drawn-out and harrowing. The truncation of Yugoslavia
during the 1990s, and anarchy in Libya immediately after the interna-
tional intervention of 2011, left the diplomats of those states in a pro-
fessional vacuum. They suffered harrowing uncertainty about personal
circumstances, career progression and physical safety. Until such time
as the international community bestows political recognition on a state,
its diplomats cannot be quite sure what they represent and diplomatic
law does not suffice, at the professional level, to protect ‘orphaned’
representatives.
Unconventional (de facto rather than de jure) diplomacy is required
when international actors do not have official diplomatic relations.
The sovereign status of one or both parties might be disputed or hos-
tility between them might prevent initialisation or resumption of for-
mal diplomatic relations. They can conduct diplomacy either indirectly
(facilitated by a third party) or directly, in which case it is usually not
acknowledged publicly. Liberation movements are great practitioners
of de facto diplomacy, which they conduct under the banner of being
legitimate ‘governments-in-waiting’ or ‘governments-in-exile’. Thus,
the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan-Africanist Congress
of Azania (PAC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party were all represented
abroad, before they became part of normalised democratic politics in
post-apartheid South Africa.
Unconventional bilateral diplomacy can also become institutionally
entrenched and in some cases enjoy partial (restricted to certain states/
regions) legality and legitimacy. Contested states fit into this category,
and their enthusiasm for the representational aspects of diplomacy is a
common denominator. The fact that statehood entails membership of a
society of which the chief medium of communication is diplomacy has
 2 BILATERAL DIPLOMACY: THE PERENNIAL BASICS OF DIPLOMACY 19

underlined the importance of representatives being visible, and thus

being seen as participating, in the symbolism of diplomacy. The unrelent-
ing efforts of aspiring sovereign entities to spread their diplomatic rep-
resentation are because they ‘continue to believe that securing diplomatic
recognition in many ways precedes achieving political independence and
goes a long way to constituting it’ (Sharp 1999: 42). Western Sahara,
for example, as of July 2017 was ‘recognised’ diplomatically by 84 of the
UN member states. The Ambassador of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic
Republic, based in Algiers, enjoys full diplomatic recognition, immunities
and privileges but ‘loses’ all of that when leaving Algeria and crossing
the border into Morocco, where Western Sahara’s claim to sovereignty is
rejected outright.
Depending on the warmth of relations with the host state, the con-
tested state might be fully recognised, in which case it could open a resi-
dent embassy in the capital of the host state. Even if it is not recognised,
it could be given permission to maintain a representative office in order
to conduct de facto diplomacy. This is the case with Palestine, which
has embassies in many states around the word, even in states where its
nemesis, Israel, also maintains embassies. The case of Taiwan is slightly
different. States that ‘recognise’ the People’s Republic of China can-
not also ‘recognise’ Taiwan (Republic of China), for the simple reason
that both states claim representation of the same entity: greater China.
Under international law, they can therefore not be recognised simultane-
ously, hence the imperative for other states to make a diplomatic ‘choice’
between PRC and ROC. South Africa maintained diplomatic relations
with Taiwan until 1996, when it ‘switched’ recognition to China. Until
1996, the Taiwanese office in Pretoria thus operated as a full ‘embassy’,
but the reversal of South Africa’s recognition meant that Taiwan had
to remove the diplomatic designation of its representative office. It was
subsequently renamed the ‘Taipei Liaison office in the RSA’, and the
Taiwanese Ambassador was no longer allowed to use his title within
South Africa.
The diplomats of contested states deal with their own unique chal-
lenges: from not being recognised by third states to playing an activist
role for broader diplomatic recognition, a position taken for granted
by diplomats from undisputed sovereign states. Like other contested
states, Western Sahara suffers continuous ups and downs in recognition.
India established diplomatic relations with the aspirant state in 1985,
but withdrew its recognition in 2000. Paraguay rescinded its diplomatic
20 Y. K. SPIES

relations with Western Sahara at the end of 2013, but during the same
year Honduras established relations with the contested state. It cannot
be easy when uncertainty dogs the very existence of a diplomat’s rep-
resentative duties. As a result, the diplomats of contested states tend to
be unusually resilient: they practise a very conventional profession under
very unconventional circumstances.

2.5   Innovative Bilateral Representation

The Vienna Convention of 1961 was drafted with bilateral, resident dip-
lomatic missions in mind, but the point should be reiterated that bilateral
diplomacy has never been dependent on resident missions. In the latter
part of the twentieth century, many critics3 wrote ‘obituaries’ for the res-
ident embassy, claiming that the practice had become redundant in an
age of rapid, ubiquitous ICT and transport infrastructure. They argued
that permanent diplomatic missions imposed unnecessary tax burdens
while also presenting security hazards to the sending state. The point was
made that competing agencies could perform similar services as well as, if
not more efficiently than, traditional diplomatic establishments.
The debate had particular resonance in the integration-oriented
politics of Europe, with many commentators asking why EU member
states needed to maintain bilateral embassies in each other’s capitals.
At the turn of the century, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer
was so vexed by the debate that he commissioned a high-level investiga-
tion into the relevance of resident bilateral missions (Sucharipa 2003).
Headed by former German Ambassador and UN Under-Secretary-
General for Internal Oversight Services, Karl Theodor Paschke, a study
was undertaken into the operations of German diplomatic missions in
14 different European states. Paschke’s 2000 report concluded that
Germany’s bilateral embassies within Europe had not diminished in
importance but had, to the contrary, taken on additional functions.
Some of the missions even had to be enlarged, in the light of their bur-
geoning workload. He noted:

In no member country to date does the term ‘European Union’ carry

the positive emotional connotations associated with such words as ‘home
country’ or ‘native land’. Yet the relationship between two European
countries or nations always has an emotional side, as is obvious not only
from international football matches. (Paschke 2000)
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
 The Chronicles being thus under suspicion, we must go for
our main knowledge of the story to record sources, many of
which are fortunately accessible in print. Palgrave’s Kalendars
and Inventories of the Exchequer, i. 251–99 (Record Commission,
1836), publishes the writs appointing the two commissions of
enquiry and the verdicts of the juries empanelled by them. The
writs are also in Rymer’s Fœdera, i. 956, 959 (Record
Commission). The confession of Richard Pudlicott is printed in an
English translation in H. Hall’s Antiquities of the Exchequer,
pp. 25–8, and also in L. O. Pike’s History of Crime in England,
Vol. i. The French original can be read in Exchequer Accounts,
K. R., 332/8. Cole’s Records (Record Commission, 1844) prints
the indenture in which Droxford, the Keeper of the Wardrobe,
specifies the jewels lost and recovered. Some entries in the
Calendar of Patent Rolls and the Calendar of Close Rolls usefully
supplement the continuous records.
There are several fairly full modern accounts, the majority of
which are not quite satisfactory. That in Dean Stanley’s Memorials
of Westminster Abbey is more eloquent than critical. H. Harrod’s
article in Archæologia, lxiv. 375, “on the crypt of the chapter
house at Westminster,” is valuable for its clear identification of the
crypt under the chapter house with the scene of the robbery.
Equally useful is J. Burtt’s important paper “On some discoveries
in connexion with the ancient treasury of Westminster,” published
in G. G. Scott’s Gleanings from Westminster Abbey, pp. 18–33.
The two fullest modern accounts are in L. O. Pike’s History of
Crime in England, i. 199–203 and 466–7, and Hubert Hall’s
Antiquities of the Exchequer, pp. 18–33. The latter is perhaps the
better because, though telling the story in a book dealing with the
exchequer, it recognises that the treasury robbed was the
treasury of the wardrobe. There are, however, materials for a
more detailed critical narrative than has hitherto been attempted.
 II. Note on the Illustrations.

The two rough drawings, figured in the text, are reproduced

from f. 192d of a Manuscript Chronicle in the British Museum
[MS. Cotton, Nero, D. ii.]. The first, opposite p. 19, represents the
story of the robbery of the treasury of the wardrobe “by a single
robber,” which this chronicle, following the Westminster version,
adopts. The second, opposite p. 20, depicts the outrage on
Boniface VIII by the agents of Philip the Fair at Anagni, in
September, 1303. This picture of the attack on the pope
emphasizes the comparison made by the sympathetic monastic
writers between the scandal of Anagni and the analogous outrage
on the church by the imprisonment of the monks of Westminster.
The photographs were taken by the permission of the Principal
Librarian of the British Museum by the Artists Illustrators, Limited.
The rough plan of Westminster Abbey and the adjoining royal
palace is taken from that published in Hall’s Antiquities of the
Exchequer, p. 31. I am indebted to my friend Mr. Hubert Hall and
to his publisher, Mr. Elliott Stock, for permission to reproduce this.
Transcriber’s Note
Capitalisation of “christianity” and “Wardrobe/wardrobe” retained
as printed.
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