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Textbook Jimmy Carter and The Anglo American Special Relationship 1St Edition Thomas K Robb Ebook All Chapter PDF
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Jimmy Carter and the
Anglo-American
Special Relationship
euppublishing.com/series/esar
Thomas K. Robb
A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library
The right of Thomas K. Robb to be identified as the author of this work has
been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988,
and the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003 (SI No. 2498).
Acknowledgements vi
Abbreviations viii
Introduction 1
1. Détente, Human Rights and Anglo-American Relations 10
2. Embracing the Special Relationship, 1977–8 24
3. Stresses and Strains 64
4. Thatcher Comes to Power 89
5. The End of Détente 113
Conclusion 152
Notes 158
Select Bibliography 233
Index 239
vi
this work at various stages of the writing process and his sharp
insights and questions have resulted in a much stronger work
than it would have been otherwise. Of course, it is to my family
and friends that I also offer my appreciation. It is to them that I
dedicate this book.
vii
Main Text
viii
ix
a means of making sure that if this little British gunboat was follow-
ing in the wake of the American battleship . . . on the bridge . . . the
Americans would be receiving messages from the British who had
this long experience of international affairs and knew so much more
about things than the Americans did.13
The period preceding Carter’s presidency was a difficult one for the
United States. Undoubtedly, the Nixon administration had accom-
plished a number of significant things in the international realm
but with the Watergate scandal forcing Nixon to resign his office
in August 1974 and America’s eventual evacuation of Vietnam in
April 1975 it is with good reason that Henry Kissinger termed
this period the ‘Years of Upheaval’. Given these circumstances, it
is little wonder that the American electorate in 1976 wanted an
‘outsider’ to assume the presidency and to bring a fresh approach
to the conduct of foreign affairs. Carter’s election brought a presi-
dent to the White House determined to promote a post-Vietnam
foreign policy that would not be dictated solely by Cold War con-
siderations.1
For the United Kingdom the 1970s was a time marked by
continued relative economic decline, industrial unrest, political
uncertainty and global military retrenchment. The decision by the
Heath government in 1970 to endorse Wilson’s East of Suez with-
drawal meant that by 1977 the United Kingdom would no longer
retain significant global military bases. The outbreak of the fourth
Arab–Israeli war in October 1973 and the subsequent Arab oil
embargo added to Britain’s significant economic problems. Such
were these problems that by the middle of the 1970s the United
Kingdom was being described by political commentators as the
‘sick man of Europe’.2 The extent of this sickness was highlighted
in 1976 as the British government had to resort to the ignominy
of accepting a financial bailout from the IMF. Further damaging
10
British sensibilities was the fact that the British government had
been treated by the IMF as ‘just another’ country.3
The immediate years prior to Carter’s election had also been
difficult ones for the Anglo-American relationship. Disagreement,
antagonism and discord appeared to be the main characteris-
tics of the relationship during the government of Edward Heath
(1970–4). Anglo-American disagreement was so severe that the
likes of Nixon and Kissinger even spoke about the end of the
‘special relationship’. Both showed what this meant in practical
terms as the Nixon administration temporarily suspended both
nuclear and intelligence collaboration with the British govern-
ment in 1973–4 because of ongoing political disagreements. The
governments of Harold Wilson (1974–6) and James Callaghan
(1976–9), whilst never quite hitting the lowest points witnessed
during the Heath years, also found themselves facing the ire of
Washington on a number of occasions.4 Nevertheless, diplomatic
flashpoints were the exception, rather than the rule, for Anglo-
American relations during the presidencies of Nixon and Ford.5
A case in point is illustrated by the decision of the Nixon admin-
istration in 1974 to approve additional assistance to the British
nuclear programme. Though the Anglo-American relationship had
diminished in importance, such cooperation in the nuclear field
guaranteed that it would remain relevant for years to come. But
when the British government sought to exploit its special relation-
ship with Washington for its own interests during the IMF Crisis
London found US support lacking. Crucially then, events during
the IMF Crisis demonstrated the lack of influence which London
had over Washington when it really mattered. There were limits to
just how much leverage the British government could exercise over
Washington and on this occasion the consequences of this limited
influence were to prove profoundly negative for the government
of James Callaghan.6 London was not oblivious to its dimin-
ished position with Washington. One briefing memorandum for
David Owen (appointed foreign and Commonwealth secretary in
February 1977) articulated this very point:
During the last administration our relations with the US were gen-
erally good, due both to mutual interest and to the close relation-
ship which Mr Callaghan and later Mr Crosland developed with
11
12
Jimmy Carter
13
14
15
Further yet, the United States had compromised its ‘moral author-
ity’ and had ‘been out traded in almost every instance’ of US–
Soviet diplomacy.28 ‘It must be the responsibility of the president
to restore the moral authority of this country in its conduct of for-
eign policy’, Carter argued. In his memoir Carter concluded that
‘Our country has been strongest and most effective when moral-
ity and a commitment to freedom and democracy has been most
clearly emphasized in our foreign policy.’29
Carter’s future national security team was just as scathing of
the Ford administration’s legacy. Walter Mondale, who would
serve as Carter’s vice president, provided a damning critique of
the Nixon–Ford policy of shunning multilateralism in favour of
pursing narrow ‘national interests’ to the detriment of all other
considerations.30 He claimed soon after America’s evacuation
from Vietnam:
The idea of national security has militarized our foreign policy to the
point of being virtually helpless when confronted by major economic
problems such as energy . . . I believe the fog of national security
helped to lead us into the tragic swamp of Vietnam, into the morass
called Watergate.31
16
17
East Asia and the Middle East there was little change in policy in
spite of human rights violations being practised by allies such as
Iran, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. Anthony Lake, the Director of
the Policy Planning Staff, acknowledged this contradiction at the
centre of Carter’s foreign policy:
The public clearly understands that the Carter foreign policy is derived
from an affirmative commitment to certain basic human values . . .
Starting from that moral basis, your basic priorities for our foreign
policy . . . are coherent and consistent: (1) we will seek to coordinate
more closely with our principal allies in order to provide the founda-
tion for a more stable international system; (2) we will engage in a
North–South dialogue in order to deal with wider human needs; (3)
we will seek accommodation on the East–West front in order to avoid
war and to widen trans-ideological cooperation. In addition, we will
seek to halt the spread of arms, both conventional and nuclear.43
18
dit une complainte du temps qui roule sur ses infortunes. Un jour ses
amis du Caveau, s’inspirant peut-être de la comédie de Brécourt : le
Jaloux invisible, qui repose sur une donnée analogue, parvinrent à
convaincre le crédule petit homme qu’il pouvait se dérober aux
regards, en se frottant le visage d’une certaine pommade fournie par
un philosophe cabalistique. Il se soumet à l’opération, et reçoit avec
extase les coups de poing, les verres de vin qu’on lui jette à la figure,
les assiettes qu’on lui lance dans les jambes, persuadé que ce sont
là autant de preuves de l’efficacité de la pommade. Il fallut, pour le
désabuser, que son père, chez qui il s’était introduit, oint du précieux
baume, pour dévaliser son secrétaire, lui démontrât à coups de
bâton qu’il n’était pas suffisamment invisible [51] .
[51] Journal de Favart.
C’est encore là une mystification, qui n’est pas sans rapport avec
celle de Poinsinet, mais qui tourne beaucoup trop au tragique pour
qu’il nous soit possible d’en rire. S’il fallait absolument s’amuser de
quelqu’une de ces farces, non-seulement bêtes, comme les
appellent les Mémoires de Bachaumont, mais encore plus ignobles
et plus humiliantes, nous choisirions, malgré sa cruauté, celle dont
Barthe fut victime en 1768.
L’auteur des Fausses Infidélités était un homme aussi poltron
que violent, orgueilleux et égoïste. « Ayant eu une querelle littéraire
dans une maison avec M. le marquis de Villette, la dissertation a
dégénéré en injures, au point que le dernier a défié l’autre au
combat, et lui a dit qu’il irait le chercher le lendemain matin à sept
heures. Celui-ci, rentré chez lui et livré aux réflexions noires de la
nuit et de la solitude, n’a pu tenir à ses craintes. Il est descendu chez
un nommé Solier, médecin, homme d’esprit et facétieux, demeurant
dans la même maison, rue de Richelieu, et lui a exposé ses
perplexités et demandé ses conseils. « N’est-ce que cela ? Je vous
tirerai de ce mauvais pas : faites seulement tout ce que je vous dirai.
Demain matin, quand M. de Villette montera chez vous, donnez
ordre à votre laquais de dire que vous êtes chez moi et de me
l’amener. Pendant ce temps, cachez-vous sous votre lit. » Le
lendemain, on introduit M. de Villette chez M. Solier, sous prétexte
d’y venir chercher M. Barthe : « Il n’y est point, mais que lui veut
monsieur le marquis ? » Après les difficultés ordinaires de
s’expliquer, il conte les raisons de sa visite : « Vous ne savez donc
pas, monsieur le marquis, que M. Barthe est fou ? C’est moi qui le
traite, et vous allez en voir la preuve. » Le médecin avait fait tenir
prêts des crocheteurs. On monte, on ne trouve personne dans le lit ;
on cherche dans tout l’appartement. Enfin, M. Solier, comme par
hasard, regarde sous le lit ; il y découvre son malade : « Quel acte
de démence plus décidé ? » On l’en tire plus mort que vif. Les
crocheteurs se mettent à ses trousses, et le fustigent d’importance,
par ordre de l’Esculape. Barthe, étonné de cette mystification, ne sait
s’il doit crier ou se taire. La douleur l’emporte : il fait des hurlements
affreux. On apporte ensuite des seaux d’eau, dont on arrose les
plaies du pauvre diable. Puis on l’essuie, on le recouche, et son
adversaire ne peut disconvenir que ce poëte ne soit vraiment fou. Il
s’en va, en plaignant le sort de ce malheureux. Du reste M. Barthe a
trouvé le remède violent, surtout de la part d’un ami [54] . » Je le crois
sans peine. Il fallait, ce me semble, avoir bien piètre opinion d’un
homme pour entreprendre de le sauver ainsi.
[54] Mémoir. secrets, t. IV, p. 28.
Un lazariste inflexible,
Ennemi de tout repos,
Prend un instrument terrible,
Et l’exerce sur son dos…