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i

OXFORD STUDIES IN EUROPEAN LAW

Series Editors
PAU L C R A I G
Professor of English Law at St John’s College, Oxford
GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA
Professor of Law at New York University School of Law

National Parliaments After the Lisbon Treaty and the Euro Crisis
ii

OXFORD STUDIES IN EUROPEAN LAW

Series Editors: Paul Craig, Professor of English Law at St John’s College, Oxford and
Gráinne de Búrca, Professor of Law at New York University School of Law
The aim of this series is to publish important and original research on EU law. The
focus is on scholarly monographs, with a particular emphasis on those which are
interdisciplinary in nature. Edited collections of essays will also be included where they
are appropriate. The series is wide in scope and aims to cover studies of particular areas of
substantive and of institutional law, historical works, theoretical studies, and analyses of
current debates, as well as questions of perennial interest such as the relationship between
national and EU law and the novel forms of governance emerging in and beyond Europe.
The fact that many of the works are interdisciplinary will make the series of interest to all
those concerned with the governance and operation of the EU.
Other titles in this series
Environmental Integration in Competition and Free-​Movement Laws
Julian Nowag
EU Agencies
Legal and Political Limits to the Transformation of the EU Administration
Merijn Chamon
Coherence in EU Competition Law
Wolf Sauter
Foreign Policy Objectives in European Constitutional Law
Joris Larik
Economic Governance in Europe
Comparative Paradoxes and Constitutional Challenges
Federico Fabbrini
Private Regulation and the Internal Market
Sports, Legal Services, and Standard Setting in EU Economic Law
Mislav Mataija
The EU Deep Trade Agenda
Law and Policy
Billy A. Melo Araujo
The Human Rights of Migrants and Refugees in European Law
Cathryn Costello
An Ever More Powerful Court?
The Political Constraints of Legal Integration in the European Union
Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen
The Concept of State Aid under EU Law
From internal market to competition and beyond
Juan Jorge Piernas López
Justice in the EU
The Emergence of Transnational Solidarity
Floris de Witte
The Euro Area Crisis in Constitutional Perspective
Alicia Hinarejos
The European Fundamental Freedoms
A Contextual Approach
Pedro Caro de Sousa
iii

National
Parliaments After
the Lisbon Treaty
and the Euro Crisis
Resilience or Resignation?

Edited by
D AVO R J A N Č I Ć
Lecturer in Law, Queen Mary University of London

1
iv

1
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v

Preface
At a time when the position, legitimacy and even the continued existence of the
European Union has been seriously questioned, and the EU confronts a range of
daunting challenges, a book which examines the role of national parliaments is to be
welcomed. After all, one of the reasons often suggested for the lack of popular sup-
port for the EU is the remoteness of the Brussels institutions from national political
institutions and from daily life in the member states. More substantial involvement by
national parliaments in the workings of the EU has often been proposed as one possi-
ble avenue for addressing the EU’s democratic legitimacy deficit, enhancing its domes-
tic connectedness and improving the representative nature of its decision-making.
This book adds to the burgeoning literature on national parliaments by focusing on
the changed role of national parliaments within the EU after the coming into force of
the Lisbon Treaty. The book gives particular attention to the question of how national
parliaments have responded to the increased centralization and intergovernmentalism
of the EU’s functioning in the wake of the Euro crisis.
The editor and contributors have taken the view that ex-ante involvement by
national parliaments in EU law and policy making is more significant than ex-post
involvement, and the various chapters in the book emphasize the importance of the
representative function of national parliaments, as well as their capacity to express
aspects of national identity.
The different sections of the book contain a range of detailed and interesting con-
tributions dealing with topics including the contribution of national parliamentary
activity to the democratic legitimacy of the EU, the various ways in which the financial
crisis and the EU’s response to it have affected national parliaments, the subsidiarity
mechanism and the range of ways in which national parliaments interact and cooper-
ate with one another across the EU. The contributors include academics from various
disciplinary backgrounds and policy-makers with insights into different aspects of the
functioning of national parliaments.
This is a timely and welcome book which should be of interest to all students and
scholars of the law and politics of the European Union.
Gráinne de Búrca
Paul Craig
vi
vii

Acknowledgements
The role of national parliaments in the European Union is one of the most topical
institutional issues of European integration and democracy. This is because, despite
recurring amendments of the EU founding treaties and incremental Europeanization
of national parliaments in terms of adapting to the exigencies of EU policy-​making,
their role remains in the constitutional shadow of executive actors and courts. Taking
them out of this shadow by incorporating them into the EU’s institutional spectrum
in a way that creates a stronger linkage between the citizens and EU decision-​making
processes remains a puzzle and an object of disagreement in both academia and politi-
cal practice.
This raises important theoretical questions related to the concepts of constitu-
tionalism and democratic legitimacy. The outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis in the
Eurozone has engendered a new context in which parliaments have had to calibrate
their functions afresh. A rapidly developing network of relations between national par-
liaments themselves, as well as between them and the European Parliament and the
European Commission has been a constantly evolving dynamic of EU development.
This edited volume addresses these three issues in greater depth in a manner that will
appeal to both scholars and policy-​makers.
The book is based on the LSE and British Academy conference that the editor organ-
ized together with Prof. Damian Chalmers on 10 April 2015 at the LSE Department
of Law. The event took stock of the evolution of the functions of national parliaments
in the contemporary EU. The conference was funded by the British Academy’s Newton
International Fellowship scheme in cooperation with the LSE and marked the comple-
tion of the editor’s two-​year post-​doctoral tenure at the LSE.
I am therefore indebted to the British Academy, the LSE Law Department, and
Prof. Chalmers personally, for their generous financial, academic, and logistical sup-
port in organizing this conference, without which this book would not have been pos-
sible. I would also like to thank the speakers at the conference, who have contributed
chapters to this book, and to all the participants. Their diverse disciplinary background
and inquisitive minds have enriched the debate and greatly helped to develop ideas for
the contents of the book. Despite being an EU law volume, legal scholars have joined
forces with political scientists to provide interdisciplinary insights into a topic that is
inevitably of appeal to both disciplines.
I am also very grateful to the TMC Asser Instituut from The Hague for their insti-
tutional support and for creating a congenial atmosphere in which I was able to work
on this book.
Perhaps most of all, I am thankful to all the contributors for their cooperation,
effort, and commitment and for putting up with my numerous comments and requests
in the process of producing this volume. I hope our collaboration will yield new knowl-
edge, provoke further research projects, and solidify our contribution to analyzing and
strengthening EU democracy in this turbulent period of European integration.
The manuscript was sent to production on 28 August 2016.
London, 12 September 2016
Dr Davor Jančić
Lecturer in Law, Queen Mary University of London
viii
ix

Contents
List of Abbreviations xi
List of Contributors xv

1. The Legacy of an Evolving Polity: Democracy, National Identity,

and the Good Functioning of the EU  1
Davor Jančić

PART I EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM

AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY
2. EU Constitutionalism and National Parliaments: Insiders
or Outsiders?  25
Leonard Besselink

3. National Parliaments and Mediated Legitimacy in the EU: Theory

and History  37
Peter L Lindseth

4. Constitutional Review and the Powers of National Parliaments

in EU Affairs: Erosion or Protection?  59
Cristina Fasone and Nicola Lupo

5. National Parliaments and the European Union—A View From

Westminster 77
Julie Smith

6. Mind the Gap! The Implications of Comitology and the Open

Method of Coordination for National Parliaments  97
Gavin Barrett

PART II NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS AND THE EURO CRISIS

7. Financial Crisis, National Parliaments, and the Reform of the
Economic and Monetary Union   115
Ingolf Pernice

8. Accountability of the European Central Bank in a Deepening

Economic and Monetary Union  141
Davor Jančić
x

x Contents

9. Executive Accountability to National Parliaments in Post-​crisis

EU Affairs: The Persistent Shortcomings in the Council and
European Council Oversight  159
Diane Fromage

10. Parliaments as Arenas of Representation and Public

Contestation: Insights from the Eurozone Crisis  177
Frank Wendler

11. European Semester Compliance and National Political Party

Ownership  193
Aleksandra Maatsch

PART III INTERPARLIAMENTARY COOPERATION

IN EU INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
12. The Emerging Order of Interparliamentary Cooperation in the
Post-​Lisbon EU  227
Ian Cooper

13. From the Early Warning System to a ‘Green Card’ for National
Parliaments: Hindering or Accelerating EU Policy-making? 247
Karolina Borońska-​Hryniewiecka

14. National Parliaments as Political Safeguards of

Federalism: Interparliamentary Cooperation in the EU, the US,
and Switzerland  263
Katarzyna Granat

15. The Many Facets of Parliamentary Involvement and Interaction

in EU External Relations: A Multilevel Tale  281
Kolja Raube and Jan Wouters

16. EU Law’s Grand Scheme on National Parliaments: The Third

Yellow Card on Posted Workers and the Way Forward  299
Davor Jančić

Index 313
xi

List of Abbreviations
ACTA Anti-​Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
AFCO Committee on Constitutional Affairs (in the European Parliament)
AFET Committee on Foreign Affairs (in the European Parliament)
AMR Alert Mechanism Report
BL Basic Law
BVerfG Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Federal Constitutional Court)
BZÖ Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (Alliance for the Future of Austria)
CAP Common Agricultural Policy
CBO Congressional Budget Office
CDU/​CSU Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands/​Christlich-​Soziale Union
(Christian Democrats)
CETA Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (EU-​Canada)
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union
CODACC Conference of Defence Affairs Committee Chairpersons
CoE Council of Europe
COFACC Conference of Foreign Affairs Committee Chairpersons
COSAC Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of
the European Union
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy
DATA Digital Accountability and Transparency Act
DROI Sub-Committee on Human Rights (in the European Parliament)
EAC European Affairs Committee
ECA European Communities Act
ECB European Central Bank
ECI European Citizens’ Initiative
ECJ European Court of Justice
ECON Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (in the European Parliament)
EDA European Defence Agency
EEAS European External Action Service
EELV Europe Ecologie –​Les Verts (Europe Ecology –​The Greens)
EFSF European Financial Stability Facility
EIDHR European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
EP European Parliament
ESC European Scrutiny Committee
ESCB European System of Central Banks
ESM European Stability Mechanism
ESRB European Systemic Risks Board
EU European Union
EUC European Union Committee
EWM early warning mechanism (synonymous with ‘early warning system’)
EWS early warning system (synonymous with ‘early warning mechanism’)
FDP Freie Demokratische Partei Deutschlands (Free Democratic Party)
Fed Federal Reserve System (US)
FPÖ Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Freedom Party)
FTAs free trade agreements
xii

xii List of Abbreviations

GDP gross domestic product

GDR Gauche Démocrate et Républicaine (Democratic and
Republican Left)
GFCC German Federal Constitutional Court
GG Grundgesetz (German Basic Law)
HR/​VP High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy
ICMs Interparliamentary Committee Meetings
IIAs interinstitutional agreements
ILK Interkantonale Legislativkonferenz (Intercantonal Legislative
Conference)
IMF International Monetary Fund
INTA Committee in International Trade (in the European Parliament)
IPCs Interparliamentary Conferences
IPK Interparlamentarische Konferenz der Nordwestschweiz (The
Interparliamentary Conference of Northwestern Switzerland)
JCM Joint Committee Meeting
JHA Justice and Home Affairs
JPM Joint Parliamentary Meeting
JPSG Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group
LIBE Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (in the
European Parliament)
LTROs long-​term refinancing operations
MEPs Members of the European Parliament
MPs Members of Parliament
NAPs National Action Plans
NCBs national central banks
NCSL National Conference of State Legislatures
NHRI national human rights institutions
NKK Nationale Konferenz der Kantonsparlamente (National Conference
of Cantonal Parliaments)
NPRs national parliamentary representatives
NPs national parliaments
OMC Open Method of Coordination
OMT Outright Monetary Transactions
ÖVP Österreichische Volkspartei (Austrian People’s Party)
PIREDEU Providing an Infrastructure for Research on Electoral Democracy
in the European Union
PMBs Private Members’ Bills
PPERA Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act
PREA Prison Rape Elimination Act
PSC Political and Security Committee
QE Quantitative Easing
RQMV Reverse Qualified Majority Voting
SEA Single European Act
SECG Conference Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination
and Governance in the European Union
SEDE Sub-Committee on Security and Defence (in the European Parliament)
SNP Scottish National Party
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of
Germany)
SPÖ Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (Social Democratic Party of
Austria)
xiii

List of Abbreviations xiii

SRC Socialiste, Républicain, Citoyen et divers gauche (political group

of Socialists, Republicans and Citizens in France)
SSM Single Supervisory Mechanism
TESM Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism
TEU Treaty on European Union
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TLTROs targeted longer-​term refinancing operations
TSCG Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic
and Monetary Union (Fiscal Compact)
TTIP Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
UDI L’Union des Démocrates et Independents (Union of Democrats
and Independents)
UK United Kingdom
UKIP UK Independence Party
UMP Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (Union for a Popular Movement)
UMRA Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
US United States
VAT value added tax
VP Vice President
WEU Western European Union
xiv
xv

List of Contributors
Leonard Besselink is Professor of Constitutional Law at the Faculty of Law, University of
Amsterdam.
Gavin Barrett is Jean Monnet Professor of European Constitutional and Economic Law and a
Professor at Sutherland School of Law, University College Dublin.
Karolina Borońska-​Hryniewiecka is Head of European Union Programme at the Polish
Institute of International Affairs (PISM) and an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the
Institute of Political Science, University of Wrocław.
Ian Cooper is a Jean Monnet Fellow at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies,
European University Institute.
Cristina Fasone is an Assistant Professor of Comparative Public Law at the Department of
Political Science, LUISS Guido Carli University.
Diane Fromage is an Assistant Professor in EU Law at the School of Law, Utrecht University.
Katarzyna Granat is Marie Curie Fellow and Junior Research Fellow at Durham Law School,
Durham University.
Davor Jančić is a Lecturer in Law at the Department of Law, Queen Mary University of
London.
Peter Lindseth is Olimpiad S Ioffe Professor of International and Comparative Law at the
School of Law, University of Connecticut.
Nicola Lupo is Professor of Public Law at the Department of Political Science, LUISS Guido
Carli University.
Aleksandra Maatsch is the Chair of European and Multilevel Politics (Interim), University of
Cologne.
Ingolf Pernice is Professor of Public and European and International Law and Director of the
Walter Hallstein Institute for European Constitutional Law, Humboldt-​Universität zu Berlin.
Kolja Raube is a Senior Researcher at the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies,
University of Leuven.
Julie Smith (Baroness Smith of Newnham) is a Member of the House of Lords and Director
of the European Centre at POLIS, University of Cambridge.
Frank Wendler is a DAAD Visiting Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science
at the Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington.
Jan Wouters is Jean Monnet Chair ad personam in EU and Global Governance and Director
of the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, University of Leuven.
xvi
1

1
The Legacy of an Evolving Polity
Democracy, National Identity, and the Good Functioning
of the EU

Davor Jančić

1. Theme, Objectives, and State of the Art

This book analyses the latest phase of the evolution of the role of national parliaments
(NPs) in the EU as shaped by two key factors: the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty1
and the outbreak and management of the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone.2 These
two ground-​breaking events carry important repercussions for NPs,3 both in terms of
their traditional constitutional functions and in terms of the newly emerging functions
that they are seeking to assume at a time of exceptional turbulence across Europe.4
The overarching research question posed in this volume is whether NPs exhibit resil-
ience or resignation in these changed politico-​legal and socio-​economic circumstances
in the Union. Resilience is understood as a set of successful individual and collective
efforts of NPs to increase their presence and power in the EU, while resignation sig-
nifies the lack thereof. This simple dichotomy between resilience and resignation is
chosen to facilitate capturing and evaluating the main trends that underlie the devel-
opment of the NPs’ European role. This dichotomy is used not only to expound the
factual constitutionalization of that role, but, where relevant, also as an instrument for
a normative appraisal of the constitutional thought about this process.
There is, however, no scarcity of accounts on this topic. In internal EU affairs, the
literature typically observes their role as a matter of subsidiarity monitoring5 and as a

1 Paul Craig, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: Process, Architecture and Substance’ (2008) 33 EL Rev 137,
149 ff; Philipp Kiiver, ‘European Treaty Reform and the National Parliaments: Towards a New
Assessment of Parliament-​friendly Treaty Provisions’ in Jan Wouters, Luc Verheij, and Philipp Kiiver
(eds), European Constitutionalism beyond Lisbon (Intersentia 2009); Alain Delcamp, ‘Les parlements
nationaux et l’Union européenne: de la reconnaissance à l’engagement’ (2011) 544 Revue du Marché
Commun et de l’Union Européenne 7.
2 Alicia Hinarejos, The Eurozone Crisis in Constitutional Perspective (Oxford University Press 2015);
Kaarlo Tuori and Klaus Tuori, The Eurozone Crisis: A Constitutional Analysis (Cambridge University
Press 2014); Giandomenico Majone, Rethinking the Union of Europe Post-​crisis: Has Integration Gone
Too Far? (Cambridge University Press 2014) ch 6.
3 Katrin Auel and Thomas Christiansen, ‘After Lisbon: National Parliaments in the European
Union’ (2015) 38 WEP 261, 277.
4 Tapio Raunio, ‘The Role of National Legislatures in EU Politics’ in Olaf Cramme and Sarah
Hobolt (eds), Democratic Politics in a European Union under Stress (Oxford University Press 2014).
5 See most recently: Anna Jonsson Cornell and Marco Goldoni (eds), National and Regional
Parliaments in the EU-​Legislative Procedure Post-​Lisbon: The Impact of the Early Warning Mechanism
(Hart Publishing 2017); Philipp Kiiver, The Early Warning System for the Principle of Subsidiarity:
Constitutional Theory and Empirical Reality (Routledge 2012).

The Legacy of an Evolving Polity: Democracy, National Identity, and the Good Functioning of the EU.
First Edition. Davor Jančić. © Davor Jančić 2017. Published 2017 by Oxford University Press
2

2 Davor Jančić

matter of Europeanization.6 In external EU affairs, the academic debate views NPs as

vehicles for democratizing EU foreign policy broadly conceived. These three strands of
scholarly endeavour are inspired by the quest for a solution to the infamous EU demo-
cratic deficit.7 Yet each of them exhibits certain limitations thus laying bare further
research needs. The first strand by and large agrees that subsidiarity only enables parlia-
ments to provide limited input in EU decision-​making. There are hence strong argu-
ments in favour of reforming this mechanism, affording NPs greater leeway to render
political judgments on EU policy, and enhancing their agenda-​setting competence.8
The second literature strand, which began in the mid-​1990s, has spurred an unabated
discussion both on the domestic adaptation of the parliamentary scrutiny arrange-
ments to the exigencies of European integration and on the changing morphology of
executive-​legislative relations. Their conclusion is that most parliaments have improved
their standing in EU affairs, but that the ever-​evolving Union requires constant reform.
The third strand almost infallibly concentrates on the NPs’ control over the areas of
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence
Policy (CSDP),9 while virtually no attention has been paid to their involvement in
other areas of EU external action, such as trade, development, and human rights.
The existing literature thus provides an invaluable basis for this volume, whose
objective is to take the discussion forward by filling some of the said gaps and to offer
novel insights by raising foundational theoretical questions of EU constitutionalism,
separation of powers, and democratic legitimacy from evolutional, context-​driven, and
path-​dependent perspectives. To do so, the book rests on the premise that the ‘gate-
keeping’10 and ‘networking’11 functions of NPs are becoming increasingly important
yet multifaceted concepts. This book unpacks them through the lens of the burgeon-
ing array of parliamentary processes, actors, and factors brought about by the Lisbon
Treaty and the euro crisis. In particular, the contributions to the volume examine: how
NPs envision their constitutional purposefulness in the wake of these two events; how
they have responded to the challenges flowing from the crisis-​sponsored centralization
and intergovernmentalization of EU policy-​making; how this has affected the relations
between NPs, governments, courts, and EU institutions; and whether new parliamen-
tary initiatives are suited to reinforcing the EU’s democratic fundament. Through an
analysis of NPs in the EU, the volume also speaks to the more encompassing questions

6 See the most recent among a long line of works on this: Claudia Hefftler and others (eds), The
Palgrave Handbook of National Parliaments and the European Union (Palgrave 2015); Gavin Barrett
(ed.), National Parliaments and the European Union: The Constitutional Challenge for the Oireachtas
and Other Member State Legislatures (Clarus Press 2008); John O’Brennan and Tapio Raunio (eds),
National Parliaments within the Enlarged European Union: From Victims of Integration to Competitive
Actors? (Routledge 2007).
7 Stephen C Sieberson, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon and Its Impact on the European Union’s Democratic
Deficit’ (2008) 14 Colum J Eur L 445.
8 See a set of main challenges in Cristina Fasone, Diane Fromage, and Zoe Lefkofridi (eds),
‘Parliaments, Public Opinion and Parliamentary Elections in Europe’, EUI Working Paper MWP
2015/​18.
9 Ariella Huff, ‘Executive Privilege Reaffirmed? Parliamentary Scrutiny of the CFSP and CSDP’
(2015) 38 WEP 396; Anna Herranz-​Surrallés, ‘The EU’s Multilevel Parliamentary (Battle)Field: Inter-​
parliamentary Cooperation and Conflict in Foreign and Security Policy’ (2014) 37 WEP 957.
10 Tapio Raunio, ‘The Gatekeepers of European Integration? The Functions of National Parliaments
in the EU Political System’ (2011) 33 J Eur Integration 303.
11 Carina Sprungk, ‘A New Type of Representative Democracy? Reconsidering the Role of National
Parliaments in the European Union’ (2013) 35 J Eur Integration 547.
3

The Legacy of an Evolving Polity 3

of authority in EU law and competence delimitation between the EU and the Member
States.12
However, some choices had to be made given that the volume does not pretend
to cover all areas of relevance to the European role of NPs. Two significant areas are
excluded. The first is the role of regional parliaments. This is omitted chiefly because
decisions taken at the regional level are less likely to have a direct impact on a given
Member State and the EU as a whole, even though it is acknowledged that sub-​
national parliamentary bodies contribute to the formation and enrichment of national
identity.13 The second is the transposition of directives into domestic legal orders.14
Although this is an important area where parliaments may perform a legislative role
in the context of the EU, the volume adheres to the thesis that ex ante involvement is
more conducive to exerting influence and rectifying the democratic deficit. The vol-
ume nonetheless espouses the view that the existence of parliamentary rights does not
equate with influence,15 and it refrains from measuring influence as this is virtually
impossible owing to the intervention of a vast multitude of very elusive parameters,
which are well documented in political science.16
To grasp the political and discursive contexts in which the continuous delegation
of powers from the Member States and their parliaments to the EU unravelled—​one
is advised to take a brief look back at the history. This is the topic of the next section.
The section after that explicates why the Lisbon Treaty and the euro crisis have been
fundamental to NPs’ positioning on the EU’s constitutional map. On that basis, the
notions of ‘national identity’ and ‘good functioning of the EU’ are decomposed and
reconstructed as core determinants of the permanence of NPs in European public law.
It will be argued that the manner in which NPs shape these two notions constitutes the
linchpin of the discursive component of EU democracy, which has been at the heart of
the problem of the Union’s legitimacy for decades. This will enable one to understand
why EU-​related activity of parliaments has grown, despite the modesty in their formal
powers. The chapter ends by outlining the structure of the book.

2. National Parliaments in European Integration: Roots

and Inspiration
The European Coal and Steel Community of 1951 began with a toothless Common
Assembly with merely supervisory powers. The Assembly was composed of national
parliamentarians and endowed with the task of counterbalancing the European
Commission’s predecessor, the High Authority.17 In fact, the Assembly only surfaced

12 Stephen Weatherill, ‘Using National Parliaments to Improve Scrutiny of the Limits of EU

Action’ (2003) 28 EL Rev 909.
13 Karolina Borońska-​Hryniewiecka, ‘Differential Europeanization? Explaining the Impact of the
Early Warning System on Subnational Parliaments in Europe’ Eur Pol Sci Rev (forthcoming); Anna-​
Lena Högenauer, ‘The Impact of the Lisbon Reform Treaty on Regional Engagement in EU Policy-​
making—​Continuity or Change?’ (2008) 10 Eur J L Reform 535, 537; Philipp Kiiver (ed), National
and Regional Parliaments in the European Constitutional Order (Europa Law Publishing 2006).
14 Carina Sprungk, ‘Legislative Transposition of Directives: Exploring the Other Role of National
Parliaments in the European Union’ (2013) 51 JCMS 298.
15 Katrin Auel, ‘Democratic Accountability and National Parliaments: Redefining the Impact of
Parliamentary Scrutiny in EU Affairs’ (2007) 13 ELJ 487.
16 This is why political science literature usually focuses on ‘strength’ rather than ‘influence’ of NPs.
17 Berthold Rittberger, ‘Building Europe’s Parliament: Democratic Representation beyond the
Nation State’ (Oxford University Press 2005) 73 ff.
4

4 Davor Jančić

at a later stage of the Schuman Plan negotiations, which led to the creation of this
first, and often forgotten, Community. The rationale for the ‘founding Six’ to include
a representative body with some electoral credentials as a check on the supranational
executive is ever so important, because it was rooted in exactly the same concern that
underlies the increasing popular scepticism towards the EU of today.18 That concern is
the democratic legitimacy of and accountability for the ‘new’ and ‘unknown’ ways and
means of life and the preservation of the ‘old’ and ‘well-​known’ ones.19
Nowhere was this kind of concern more tangible than in Britain, where there was
bipartisan consensus against the experimental pooling of competences beyond the
nation state.20 This consensus was based less on an economic calculus than on the
perceived necessity to protect economic freedom, political autonomy, and a sense of
national pride. In the European Unity pamphlet, which the then governing Labour
Party published in 1950, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevan claimed that the UK is ‘in
every respect except distance … closer to our kinsmen in Australia and New Zealand
on the far side of the world, than … to Europe’, and especially in terms of language,
origins, social habits, institutions, political outlook, and economic interest.21 His
party colleague, Chancellor of the Exchequer Stafford Cripps, argued in the House
of Commons that ‘participation in a political federation, limited to Western Europe,
is not compatible either with our Commonwealth ties, our obligations as a member
of the wider Atlantic community, or as a world power’.22 Harold Adams MP (Lab)
thought that this would ‘destroy the future greatness’ of the UK,23 while Julian Amery
MP (Con), although being in favour of Britain’s approximation with continental
Europe, stated that: ‘it is not a bad thing for ministers to think that the British people
are superior to anyone else—​I confess I rather share that view myself ’.24 Even Winston
Churchill, who in 1946 in Zurich famously called for the creation of a United States
of Europe, did not envisage the UK being a member of it but merely its ‘friend and
sponsor’ alongside the United States, because Britain had ‘its own Commonwealth’.25
In Parliament, Churchill found supranationalism to be a repulsive notion, because, as
he stressed, he would be unhesitatingly opposed to a ‘supranational authority which
has the power to tell Great Britain not to cut any more coal or make any more steel,
but to grow tomatoes instead’.26

18 The Eurobarometer survey of July 2016 shows that: (a) the number of the EU citizens inter-
viewed who feel that their voice does not count in the EU has risen to 55 per cent, while those believ-
ing it does has declined to 38 per cent; (b) by far the most important concerns are immigration (48 per
cent, down by 10 per cent) and terrorism (39 per cent, up by 14 per cent); (c) 55 per cent support the
euro and the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), while 38 per cent do not; (d) 66 per cent feel
like a citizen of the EU (up by 2 per cent), while 33 per cent do not (down by 1 per cent); (e) 72 per
cent have a positive or neutral image of the EU, while 27 per cent have a negative image of it (1 per
cent do not know). Finally, a declining majority of EU citizens are optimistic about the EU’s future:
50 per cent (down by 3 per cent) against 41 per cent (up by 3 per cent) of those who are pessimis-
tic. See Standard Eurobarometer 85, ‘Public Opinion in the European Union—​First Results’ http://​
ec.europa.eu/​COMMFrontOffice/​PublicOpinion/​index.cfm/​ResultDoc/​download/​DocumentKy/​
70150 (last accessed 13 October 2016).
19 Habermas has described subsidiarity as a way to ‘protect national ways of life’. Jürgen Habermas,
‘Democracy in Europe: Why the Development of the EU into a Transnational Democracy Is Necessary
and How It Is Possible’ (2015) 21 ELJ 546, 555.
20 See more on the UK Parliament’s European role in the chapter by Julie Smith in this volume.
21 Edmund Dell, The Schuman Plan and the British Abdication of Leadership in Europe (Oxford
University Press 1995) 199.
22 HC Deb 26 June 1950, vol 476, col 1948. 23 ibid, col 2028.
24 ibid, col 2020.
25 The Churchill Society, Zurich Speech of 19 September 1946 http://​www.churchill-​society-​
london.org.uk/​astonish.html (last accessed 13 October 2016).
26 HC Deb 27 June 1950, vol 476, col 2147.
5

The Legacy of an Evolving Polity 5

Over sixty-​five years on, the rhetoric principally reliant on sovereigntist imagery is more
alive than ever. If the Commons debates held in the early 1950s sound familiar, this is
because very similar arguments were the cornerstone of the ‘Leave’ campaign in the UK’s
referendum on EU membership that took place on 23 June 2016. Briefly, the surrender
of sovereignty was and, whatever is left of it, remains at stake.27 The parliament was and
remains the political marketplace, where views and visions of the goals and manner of
coexistence and joint action are exchanged.28 Talking shops, you might think. But talking
shops confront ‘demand’ with ‘supply’, so that the two can be weighed out and a decision
taken on how to satisfy one’s needs or, rather, those of an entire polity. This is the value
that NPs add to ‘Europe’.
However, the restricted scope of the Common Assembly’s competences—​captured by
the right to censure the High Authority at its single annual meeting—​was not its only
woe. More chronically, its meaningfulness was undercut by the ‘lack of supranational
identification among the Community’s population’.29 Therein lies a perennial conundrum
that consecutive Treaties have sought to address with more or less success. The undying
puzzle is how to strike a balance between collective action through various forms and
levels of integration and the relinquishment of the methods of taking the same action
individually—​all of this in a way that is acceptable to Europe’s different nations. Each
of these nations has its own individual historical, cultural, and socio-​economic interests,
affinities, and biases, which are in the first place expressed in their NPs.30
Jean Monnet himself very relevantly underlined that no matter the path of integra-
tion—​whether through a variant of federalism or intergovernmentalism—​the domes-
tic embedding of the pursuit of integration is of critical importance. On leaving the
presidency of the High Authority, Monnet delivered a farewell speech in the Common
Assembly saying that: ‘the decision to transfer new powers to the European institutions
belongs entirely to the [national] parliaments and governments. The impulse must,
therefore, come from without’.31 Although external, NPs were therefore the forma-
tive spark sine qua non of European unification. This is why European integration has
been a fundamentally political process from its very inception and NPs have been the
bedrock of it.
Soon, the dual mandate of national parliamentarians, which had been foreseen as a
temporary solution, proved unworkable owing to absenteeism and the lack of powers.
The first direct election of the European Parliament (EP) in 1979 inaugurated a new
era in the democratization of the Communities. The structural linkage with NPs was
severed and two separate channels of parliamentary representation were born: one oper-
ating directly at the Community level through the EP and one indirectly at the national
level through NPs. Their mutual relationship has formally developed as one of amity,
while informally the EP and NPs have gone through numerous patches of rivalry and

27 Raymond Vernon, ‘The Schuman Plan: Sovereign Powers of the European Coal and Steel
Community’ (1953) 47 AJIL 183, 188.
28 See similarly Sonja Puntscher Riekmann, ‘Constitutionalism and Representation: European
Parliamentarism in the Treaty of Lisbon’ in Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin (eds), The Twilight of
Constitutionalism (Oxford University Press 2010) 120, 133.
29 Gerhard Bebr, ‘The European Coal and Steel Community: A Political and Legal Innovation’
(1953) 63 Yale LJ 1, 38.
30 Giandomenico Majone, Europe as the Would-​be World Power: The EU at Fifty (Cambridge
University Press 2009) 156.
31 Walter Yondorf, ‘Monnet and the Action Committee: The Formative Period of the European
Communities’ (1965) 19 Int’l Org 885, 889.
6

6 Davor Jančić

institutional jealousy.32 The reason for this is that they have the same principal—​first
the peoples of the Member States, later EU citizens. Either way, the absence of a single
European demos and the consequent conceptualization of the EU as a system of demo-
icracy meant that the public sphere was dispersed across individual countries, causing
sentiments to be nurtured nationally rather than on an EU-​wide scale. Integration thus
presupposes mutual recognition and not a merger of the many European identities.33
Within the separate public spheres and apart from the media, NPs and political par-
ties have played a notable part in the creation of the public opinion on the EU and in
performing scrutiny and control over the EU policy of their executive, thereby ensur-
ing the plurality and complementarity of the avenues for bringing EU governance
closer to the citizen.34 Compared to the EP, NPs’ competences in the spheres of demo-
cratic legitimacy and accountability have thus rightly been assessed as unmatched.35
Although NPs were mentioned in a declaration appended to the Maastricht Treaty,
the Lisbon Treaty was the first one to grant them an explicit place in the Treaty texts.

3. The Lisbon Incentive

The Lisbon Treaty merits credit for empowering the EP and for recognizing that NPs
of the EU Member States do have a role in the European integration process beyond
merely authorizing it. However, NPs’ powers remain circumscribed by the understand-
able unwillingness to usurp the EU institutional balance and by the centrality of their
functions at the domestic level.
The key post-​Lisbon prerogatives of NPs are to receive information on draft EU
legislation and third-​country applications for EU membership, to police the princi-
ple of subsidiarity, to monitor Europol’s and Eurojust’s activities, to participate in the
revision of the Treaties, and to build tighter relations with the EP. As Table 1.1 shows,
these rights refer to both primary and secondary EU law and can be divided into active
and passive ones. Despite this, it has rightly been emphasized that NPs have not been
recentred in EU law-​making.36 In fact, some have suggested that the EU’s democratic
deficit resides primarily at the national level,37 which highlights the weakness of NPs.
However, this also speaks of their essentiality because if NPs did not matter, they would
not be able to affect the quality of EU democracy.38 There is much historical and
empirical evidence that shows that the EP was largely devised as a compensation for
the diminution of the powers of domestic parliamentary institutions.39 The Dutch

32 Karlheinz Neunreither, ‘The European Parliament and National Parliaments: Conflict or

Cooperation?’ (2005) 11 J Legis Stud 466. See more comprehensively Lucile Debras, Les relations
entre le Parlement européen et les parlements nationaux depuis 1979: étude comparative des cas allemand,
belge et français (2008) PhD dissertation, Université de la Sorbonne Nouvelle–​Paris III.
33 Kalypso Nicolaïdis, ‘The Idea of European Demoicracy’ in Julie Dickson and Pavlos Elefteriadis
(eds), Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law (Oxford University Press 2012) 248, 267.
34 Kalypso Nicolaïdis, ‘European Demoicracy and Its Crisis’ (2013) 51 JCMS 351, 363–​64.
35 Kaarlo Tuori, European Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press 2015) 330.
36 Adam Cygan, ‘The Parliamentarisation of EU Decision-​making? The Impact of the Treaty of
Lisbon on National Parliaments’ (2011) 36 EL Rev 480.
37 Francis Cheneval and Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘The Case for Demoicracy in the European
Union’ (2013) 51 JCMS 334, 347.
38 See the ‘grassroots’ approach to NPs in Olaf Tans, Carla Zoethout, and Jit Peters (eds), National
Parliaments and European Demoicracy: A Bottom-​up Approach to European Constitutionalism (Europa
Law Publishing 2008).
39 Berthold Rittberger, ‘The Creation and Empowerment of the European Parliament’ (2003) 41
JCMS 203, 218.
7

Table 1.1 Exhaustive list of the rights of national parliaments under the Lisbon Treaty
Type Substance Article

Primary Active 1. participation in a Convention for 48(3)(1) TEU

EU Law ordinary Treaty amendment
2. opposition within 6 months to 48(7)(3) TEU
European Council proposals for
simplified Treaty amendment, ie,
the two general bridging clauses
authorising the Council, without
ratification by the Member States, to
act by qualified majority instead of by
unanimity or in accordance with the
ordinary legislative procedure instead
of in accordance with the special
legislative procedure
Passive 1. notification of proposals for ordinary 48(2) TEU
Treaty amendment
2. notification 6 months in advance of 6 Prot. NPs
European Council’s initiatives for
simplified Treaty amendment
3. notification of third-​country 49(1) TEU
applications for EU membership
Secondary Active 1. subsidiarity monitoring: 5(3)(2) TEU69
EU Law -​in general TFEU
-​in the field of judicial cooperation
in criminal matters and in police
cooperation
2. sending within 8 weeks reasoned 3 Prot. NPs +6
opinions to EU institutions on the Prot. Subs.
compliance with subsidiarity of draft
legislative acts
3. bringing actions before the Court 8 Prot. Subs.
of Justice for infringements of
subsidiarity by EU legislative acts
4. opposition within 6 months to the use 81(3)(3) TFEU
of the special bridging clause in cross-​
border family law
5. evaluation of Eurojust’s activities 85(1)(3) TFEU
6. scrutiny of Europol’s activities 88(2)(2) TFEU
7. participation in COSAC 10 Prot. NPs
Passive 1. receipt directly from the Commission 1&2 Prot. NPs +
of draft legislative acts, amended 4 Prot. Subs.
drafts, consultation documents
(Green and White Papers and
communications), annual legislative
programmes and other instruments of
legislative planning or policy (or from
the EP and Council in case of non-​
Commission drafts)

(Continued)
8

Table 1.1 Continued

Type Substance Article
2. receipt of detailed statements on 5 Prot. Subs.
subsidiarity and proportionality that
accompany draft legislative acts,
with information on the financial
impact, implications of directives
for implementation, qualitative and
quantitative indicators, financial or
administrative burden
3. assurance that no agreement may be 4 Prot. NPs
reached in the Council on a draft
legislative act during the 8 weeks
between receiving a draft legislative act
and its being placed on the Council’s
agenda for decision as well as during
10 days between its placing on the
Council’s agenda and the Council’s
decision (both periods can be
overridden in cases of urgency, which
needs to be duly explained)
4. receipt directly from the Council 5 Prot. NPs
of the agendas and outcomes of its
meetings and minutes of meetings
where draft legislative acts were
deliberated
5. receipt of the Commission’s annual 9 Prot. Subs.
reports on the application of the
subsidiarity principle
6. receipt of annual reports of the Court 7 Prot. NPs
of Auditors
7. information on the content and results 70 TFEU
of evaluations of the implementation
by the Member States’ authorities
of Union policies in the Area of
Freedom, Security and Justice
8. information on the proceedings 71 TFEU
of a Council standing committee
charged with coordinating operational
cooperation between Member States’
authorities competent for internal
security
9. attention drawn to the recourse to the 352(2) TFEU
flexibility clause
9

The Legacy of an Evolving Polity 9

ratification of the Lisbon Treaty demonstrates this ‘compensatory’ reasoning rather

well, because, except for a limited number of cases, the requirement of parliamentary
consent to the government’s position on draft EU decisions in the area of freedom,
security, and justice was abolished because the EP had acquired those powers.40
The Lisbon Treaty furthermore enshrines the principle that the EU is based on rep-
resentative democracy.41 In this respect, the domestic constitutional link between NPs
and their executive is all but symbolic. Quite on the contrary, in addition to the EP, this
link is vital because it establishes the structural, albeit indirect and still evolving, rela-
tionship of democratic accountability between NPs and the Council and the European
Council, which are composed of representatives of national governments and heads
of state.42 This is a fundamental linkage that ensures that EU decisions are taken ‘as
openly and as closely as possible to the citizen’.43 Yet the Lisbon Treaty supplements
the parliamentary means of legitimization with two methods of participatory democ-
racy—​stakeholder consultations and the European Citizens’ Initiative.44
While these mechanisms seek to improve the citizens’ input in EU policy-​making,
their democratic potential has been questioned on the grounds that they favour the
representation of the interests of business and industry organizations, that their politi-
cal representativeness is dubious and requires extensive civil society mediation, and that
the registration and admissibility requirements that may apply are rather restrictive.45
On top of this, domestic law infuses European integration with episodes of direct
democracy through referenda, which can refer to treaty ratification, EU membership,
or participation in certain policy fields.46 Hence, NPs operate in a maze of institutional
frameworks for enhancing the democratic character of EU decision-​making.
However, the role of NPs in the EU is much wider than that which the Treaties
prescribe. Besides the ‘Lisbon’ rights, parliaments have crucial representative functions.
These are fulfilled not only through subsidiarity review but also through mediating
political conflicts over the nature, objectives, and direction of European integration.47
Acting as ‘access points for voices and perspectives beyond those represented by govern-
ments’,48 parliaments are indispensable to informing the debate within their elector-
ates of the desired ‘depth’ of integration, manner of attaining it, as well as, ultimately,

40 Leonard Besselink and Brecht van Mourik, ‘The Roles of the National Parliament and the
European Parliament in EU Decision-​making: The Approval of the Lisbon Treaty in the Netherlands’
(2009) 15 EPL 307, 314.
41 TEU, art 10(1).
42 ibid art 10(2), second sentence. See more broadly Mark Bovens and Deirdre Curtin, ‘An Unholy
Trinity of EU Presidents? Political Accountability of EU Executive Power’ in Damian Chalmers,
Markus Jachtenfuchs, and Christian Joerges (eds), The End of the Eurocrats’ Dream: Adjusting to
European Diversity (Cambridge University Press 2016).
43 TEU, art 10(3). 44 ibid art 11.
45 See these arguments fleshed out in Acar Kutay, ‘Limits of Participatory Democracy in European
Governance’ (2015) 21 ELJ 803; Christian Marxsen, ‘Open Stakeholder Consultations at the
European Level—​Voice of the Citizens?’ (2015) 21 ELJ 257; James Organ, ‘Decommissioning Direct
Democracy? A Critical Analysis of Commission Decision-​making on the Legal Admissibility of
European Citizens Initiative Proposals’ (2014) 10 EuConst 422.
46 Fernando Mendez, Mario Mendez, and Vasiliki Triga, Referendums and the European
Union: A Comparative Inquiry (Cambridge University Press 2014).
47 See a critique of this in Gareth Davies, ‘Democracy and Legitimacy in the Shadow of Purposive
Competence’ (2015) 21 ELJ 2. See more on the EU’s mediated legitimacy in the chapter by Peter
Lindseth in this volume.
48 Damian Chalmers, ‘The Democratic Ambiguity of EU Law-​ making and Its Enemies’ in
Anthony Arnull and Damian Chalmers (eds), The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law (Oxford
University Press 2015).
10

10 Davor Jančić

whether to propel, unravel, or even discontinue the EU project.49 Only in this way
can domestic legislatures substantively reclaim some of the prerogatives conferred on
the Union and help internalize the authority of EU law. Only in this way can a pan-​
European conversation, involving both the EP and NPs, be had on the desirability of an
‘ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’.50 Whether or not this is accompanied
by binding rights of pronouncement,51 public debate and the expression of the politi-
cal will of the Union’s constituent nations can generate critical mass that can produce
important political effects in the EU, such as a change in the approach to law-​making
towards a more inclusive and citizen-​sensitive process. The basis for this is the NPs’
vote of approval of the EU Treaties, which gave the latter ‘origin-​based constitutional
legitimacy’.52 These considerations warrant the call for weaving parliaments into the
EU’s ‘cooperative constitutionalism’ dominated by the dialogue between domestic and
EU courts.53 This is why the debate on the NPs’ European calling has been incessant.
The Lisbon Treaty touches on the essence of the NPs’ place in the EU’s multilevel
constitution in the parts where it addresses ‘national identity’ and the ‘good function-
ing of the Union’. These two notions, examined in turn below, entrench the precedence
of identity over integration and underscore the intrinsically polemical nature of the
EU’s future progress.

3.1 National Identity as Democratic Identity

The Lisbon Treaty enjoins the EU to respect the Member States’ national identities,
which are inherent in their fundamental political and constitutional structures.54 As
the previous section has demonstrated, the question of identity has pervaded the pro-
cess of European integration since its onset. Confining NPs to being subsidiarity over-
seers, called upon to comment on whether the EU should exercise the competence it
shares with the Member States, thus appears rather apolitical and prohibitive of the
citizens’ and their representatives’ inner homo politicus. National identity, however, has
many dimensions. For the analysis of NPs, key among them is constitutional identity.
The constitutional guise of national identity refers to norms of a constitutional char-
acter, whether written in a constitutional document or not, that are of an overriding
importance. Since the EU constitutional order builds on those of its Member States
and is therefore a Verfassungsverbund,55 the values inspiring national constitutions
inform the European integration process writ large. This is important because NPs
have a significant role in shaping these values. Indeed, values underpinning national
constitutional orders are a product of political consensus and are defended and dis-
puted in parliaments. The latter take part in the creation, affirmation, protection, and
moulding of national identity, which stems from the common historical heritage and
interests particular to a given political community. No other body in the EU is so

49 See contra András Jakab, European Constitutional Language (Cambridge University Press 2016)
198.
50 TEU, art 1(2).
51 See a discussion of this in the concluding chapter to this volume by Davor Jančić.
52 Tuori, European Constitutionalism (n 35) 33.
53 Anneli Albi, ‘Supremacy of EC Law in the New Member States: Bringing Parliaments Into the
Equation of “Co-​operative Constitutionalism” ’ (2007) 3 EuConst 25, 66.
54 TEU, art 4(2). See analyses in Armin von Bogdandy and Stephan Schill, ‘Overcoming Absolute
Primacy: Respect for National Identity Under the Lisbon Treaty’ (2011) 48 CML Rev 1417; Leonard
Besselink, ‘National and Constitutional Identity Before and After Lisbon’ (2010) 6 Utrecht L Rev 36.
55 Ingolf Pernice, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: Multilevel Constitutionalism in Action’ (2009) 15 Colum
J Eur L 349, 352.
11

The Legacy of an Evolving Polity 11

directly involved in these domestic processes, which are of primary concern to the
citizens and which define the EU’s own constitutional fibre.56 It has therefore rightly
been posited that constitutional identity is a more effective check on the exercise of
EU competences than subsidiarity: it ensures the diversity of domestic approaches
to regulation and upholds substance-​oriented review of EU action rather than that
focused on procedure.57
National constitutional values have been the object of judicial dialogue between
domestic and EU courts about the limits of EU competences and about the necessity
to shield national legal orders from unwanted effects of EU law.58 It is argued here that
constitutional identity is not only the province of adjudication but also of legislation
and politicization through NPs. Several examples shed more light on the institutional
and substantive aspects of this argument.
In institutional terms, one of the strongest and most orthodox protections of constitu-
tional identity qua ‘parliamentary identity’ is performed by Germany.59 Besides ultra vires
review, the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht—BVerfG)
applies ‘identity review’ (Identitätskontrolle) to check that EU law does not encroach on
the non-​amendable parts of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz).60 These include fundamental
rights, the rule of law, social state, federalism, and, crucially, the principle of democracy.61
Insistence on democracy refers to the participation in EU affairs of the Bundestag acting
as constituted power, one existing within the margins of the Basic Law. However, it is
important to note that, because of Germany’s national socialist past, preoccupation about
the maintenance of democracy goes beyond majority rule itself. Encapsulated by the con-
cept of militant democracy (streitbare Demokratie) is precisely the idea that even elected
representatives may not abolish the state’s liberal democratic order.62 This is because such
an order is the domain of constituent power and not that of constituted power—​a matter
of Verfassungsidentität and not of the Identität der Verfassung.63 All organs of constitu-
tional power thus enjoy wide powers to shield this original claim to democracy from any
threats of subversion in the direction of what led to the adoption of the Enabling Act of
1933 and the subsequent instalment of a totalitarian regime.
Further aspects of the parliamentary dimension of constitutional identity relate to
the core tenets of constitutional structuring: the nature of the electoral system, the com-
position and competences of constitutional organs, the legislative process, the rules of
executive accountability, and internal proceedings of the domestic representative body.

56 See similarly Elke Cloots, National Identity in EU Law (Oxford University Press 2015) 145.
57 François-​Xavier Millet, ‘The Respect for National Constitutional Identity in the European
Legal Space: An Approach to Federalism as Constitutionalism’ in Loïc Azoulai (ed), The Question of
Competence in the European Union (Oxford University Press 2014) 253, 262.
58 Theodore Konstadinides, ‘Dealing with Parallel Universes: Antinomies of Sovereignty and the
Protection of National Identity in European Judicial Discourse’ (2015) 34 YEL 127; Alejandro Saiz
Arnaiz and Carina Alcoberro Llivina (eds), National Constitutional Identity and European Integration
(Intersentia 2013).
59 See more on the role of the German Federal Constitutional Court in this regard in the chapter
by Ingolf Pernice in this volume.
60 Basic Law, art 79(3) (so-​called ‘eternity clause’ or Ewigkeitsklausel).
61 ibid art 38. See Davor Jančić, ‘Caveats from Karlsruhe and Berlin: Whither Democracy After
Lisbon?’ (2010) 16 Colum J Eur L 337.
62 See a further discussion in Jan-​Werner Müller, ‘Militant Democracy’ in Michel Rosenfeld
and András Sajó (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford University
Press 2012).
63 Monica Claes and Jan-​Herman Reestman, ‘The Protection of National Constitutional Identity
and the Limits of European Integration at the Occasion of the Gauweiler Case’ (2015) 16 German
LJ 917, 920.
12

12 Davor Jančić

Member States are thus free to organize the operation of their legislatures and decide
how parliamentarians are elected or, in the case of the British House of Lords, whether
they need to be elected in the first place. For instance, it is the UK’s first-​past-​the-​post
system that allows a political party, in this case UKIP, to win some 3.8 million votes
and gain just one Member of Parliament (MP), while the EU’s proportional electoral
system allows the same party to be the most represented British party at the EU level
with twenty-​four Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). The same applies to
France, where Front National has only two MPs in the Assemblée nationale but no less
twenty-​three MEPs at the EU level.
That electoral autonomy is constitutionally sensitive is attested by the EP’s proposal
for a reform of EU electoral law, which is mandated by the Lisbon Treaty.64 This elic-
ited six reasoned opinions within the early warning mechanism and seven opinions
within the political dialogue.65 Besides the Dutch, Swedish, and Luxembourgish par-
liamentary chambers, both Houses of the UK Parliament objected too. Apart from
procedural shortcomings related to the lack of a detailed statement corroborating the
proposal, the Commons and the Lords also invoked constitutional identity concerns.66
These challenged the obligations to render regional parliamentarians ineligible for EP
elections, to ensure gender equality of electoral candidates, to agree common deadlines
for candidate lists, to accept a mandatory 3–​5 per cent threshold for gaining a seat in
the EP, and to extend the right to vote to EU citizens living beyond EU borders.67 Such
constitutional specificities hence have a strong impact on the structure of democratic
representation. By implication, this parliamentary identity has significant repercus-
sions for both domestic and EU policy-​making.
In substantive terms, the UK’s 2016 referendum on EU membership provides a
powerful illustration.68 A wide-​ranging London School of Economics survey of the
potential impact of a ‘Brexit’ concludes that concerns about the EU’s democracy and
accountability is reinforced by ‘a sense of our [British] identity being threatened’.69
Close to a half of some 3,000 UK citizens interviewed between July and November
2015 felt that the EU is ‘undermining Britain’s distinctive identity’.70 Public opinion
on this issue is crucially shaped by parliamentarians and political parties. Furthermore,
the so-​called ‘emergency brake’ that was foreseen in the now defunct UK–​EU set-
tlement of February 2016 aimed to enable Britain to restrict EU migrants’ access to
in-​work benefits.71 But this would only have been permissible if an inflow of workers

64 According to TFEU, art 223(1), the EP ‘shall draw up a proposal to lay down the provisions
necessary for the election of its Members by direct universal suffrage in accordance with a uniform
procedure in all Member States or in accordance with principles common to all Member States’.
65 IPEX data http://​www.ipex.eu/​IPEXL-​WEB/​dossier/​document/​PE20152035.do#dossier-​
APP20150907 (last accessed 13 October 2016).
66 See other examples of subsidiarity violations in Pietro Faraguna, ‘A Living Constitutional
Identity: The Contribution of Non-​judicial Actors’, (2015) Jean Monnet Working Paper No 10/​
15, 67 ff.
67 See House of Lords, EU Committee, HL Paper 87 ‘Subsidiarity Assessment: Reform of the
Electoral Law of the EU’, 7th Report of Session 2015–​16 of 27 January 2016; House of Commons,
European Scrutiny Committee, HC 342-​xviii ‘Reform of the Electoral Law of the EU’, 19th Report
of Session 2015–​16 of 13 January 2016.
68 Patrick Birkinshaw and Andrea Biondi, Britain Alone! The Implications and Consequences of
United Kingdom Exit From the EU (Kluwer Law International 2016).
69 LSE Commission on the Future of Britain in Europe, ‘Overview and Summary of Reports’, 7
June 2016, 14.
70 John Curtice, ‘A Question of Culture or Economics? Public Attitudes to the European Union in
Britain’ (2016) 87 Pol Quarterly 209, 214.
71 European Council, ‘A New Settlement for the United Kingdom Within the European Union’,
Annex I (‘Decision of the Heads of State or Government, meeting within the European Council,
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 Fig. 220. Fig. 221.

131. Pine.—Fig. 221. Very variable, very light and soft in “soft” pine, such as
white pine; of medium weight to heavy and quite hard in “hard” pine, of which
longleaf or Georgia pine is the extreme form. Usually it is stiff, quite strong, of even
texture and more or less resinous. The sapwood is yellowish white; the heartwood,
orange brown. Pine shrinks moderately, seasons rapidly and without much injury; it
works easily; is never too hard to nail (unlike oak or hickory); it is mostly quite
durable, and if well seasoned is not subject to the attacks of boring insects. The
heavier the wood, the darker, stronger and harder it is, and the more it shrinks and
checks. Pine is used more extensively than any other kind of wood. It is the
principal wood in common carpentry, as well as in all heavy construction, bridges,
trestles, etc. It is used also in almost every other wood industry, for spars, masts,
planks, and timbers in ship building, in car and wagon construction, in cooperage,
for crates and boxes, in furniture work, for toys and patterns, railway ties, water
pipes, excelsior, etc. Pines are usually large trees with few branches, the straight,
cylindrical, useful stem forming by far the greatest part of the tree.
132. Spruce.—Fig. 222. Resembles soft pine, is light, very soft, stiff, moderately
strong, less resinous than pine; has no distinct heartwood, and is of whitish color.
Used like soft pine, but also employed as resonance wood and preferred for paper
pulp. Spruces, like pines, form extensive forests; they are more frugal, thrive on
thinner soils, and bear more shade, but usually require a more humid climate.
“Black” and “white” spruce as applied by lumbermen, usually refer to narrow and
wide ringed forms of black spruce.
 Fig. 222. Fig. 223.

Broad-Leaved Woods.
133. Ash.—Fig. 223. Wood heavy, hard, strong, stiff, quite tough, not durable in
contact with soil, straight grained, rough on the split surface and coarse in texture.
The wood shrinks moderately, seasons with little injury, stands well and takes a
good polish. In carpentry ash is used for finishing lumber, stairways, panels, etc.; it
is used in shipbuilding, in the construction of cars, wagons, carriages, etc., in the
manufacture of farm implements, machinery, and especially of furniture of all
kinds, and also for harness work; for barrels, baskets, oars, tool handles, hoops,
clothespins, and toys. The trees of the several species of ash are rapid growers, of
small to medium height with stout trunks; they form no forests, but occur scattered
in almost all broad-leaved forests.
134. Basswood.—Fig. 224. (Lime tree, American linden, lin, bee tree): Wood
light, soft, stiff but not strong, of fine texture, and white to light brown color. The
wood shrinks considerably in drying, works and stands well; it is used in carpentry,
in the manufacture of furniture and woodenware, both turned and carved, in
cooperage, for toys, also for paneling of car and carriage bodies. Medium to large
sized trees, common in all Northern broad-leaved forests; found throughout the
Eastern United States.
Fig. 224.
 Fig. 225. Fig. 226.

135. Birch.—Fig. 225. Wood heavy, hard, strong, of fine texture; sapwood
whitish, heartwood in shades of brown with red and yellow; very handsome, with
satiny luster, equaling cherry. The wood shrinks considerably in drying, works and
stands well and takes a good polish, but is not durable if exposed. Birch is used for
finishing lumber in building, in the manufacture of furniture, in woodturnery for
spools, boxes, wooden shoes, etc., for shoe lasts and pegs, for wagon hubs, ox
yokes, etc., also in wood carving. The birches are medium sized trees, form
extensive forests northward and occur scattered in all broad-leaved forests of the
Eastern United States.
136. Butternut.—Fig. 226. (White Walnut.) Wood very similar to black walnut,
but light, quite soft, not strong and of light brown color. Used chiefly for finishing
lumber, cabinet work and cooperage. Medium sized tree, largest and most
common in the Ohio basin; Maine to Minnesota and southward to Georgia and
Alabama.
 Fig. 227.

137. Cherry.—Fig. 227. Wood heavy, hard, strong, of fine texture: sapwood
yellowish white, heartwood reddish to brown. The wood shrinks considerably in
drying, works and stands well, takes a good polish, and is much esteemed for its
beauty. Cherry is used chiefly as a decorative finishing lumber for buildings, cars
and boats, also for furniture and for turnery. It is becoming too costly for many
purposes for which it is naturally suited. The lumber-furnishing cherry of this
country, the wild black cherry, is a small to medium sized tree, scattered through
many of the broad-leaved woods of the western slope of the Alleghanies, but
found from Michigan to Florida and west to Texas.
138. Chestnut.—Fig. 228. Wood light, moderately soft, stiff, not strong, of
coarse texture; the sapwood light, the heartwood darker brown. It shrinks and
checks considerably in drying, works easily, stands well, and is very durable. Used
in cabinet work, cooperage, for railway ties, telegraph poles, and locally in heavy
construction. Medium sized tree very common in the Alleghanies, occurs from
Maine to Michigan and southward to Alabama.
 Fig. 228. Fig. 229.

139. Elm.—Fig. 229. Wood heavy, hard, strong, very tough; moderately durable
in contact with the soil; commonly cross-grained, difficult to split and shape, warps
and checks considerably in drying, but stands well if properly handled. The broad
sapwood whitish, heart brown, both shades of gray and red; on split surface rough,
texture coarse to fine, capable of high polish. Elm is used in the construction of
cars, wagons, etc., in boat and ship building, for agricultural implements and
machinery; in rough cooperage, saddlery, and harness work, but particularly in the
manufacture of all kinds of furniture, where the beautiful figures, especially of the
tangential or bastard section, are just beginning to be duly appreciated. The elms
are medium to large sized trees, of fairly rapid growth, with stout trunk, form no
forests of pure growth, but are found scattered in all the broad-leaved woods of our
country.
140. Gum.—This general term refers to two kinds of wood usually distinguished
as sweet or red gum, and sour, black, or tupelo gum, the former being a relative of
the witch-hazel, the latter belonging to the dogwood family.
Sweet Gum. Fig. 230. (red gum, liquidambar); Wood rather heavy, rather soft,
quite stiff and strong, tough, commonly cross-grained, of fine texture; the broad
sapwood whitish, the heartwood reddish brown; the wood warps and shrinks
considerably, but does not check badly, stands well when fully seasoned, and
takes good polish. Sweet gum is used in carpentry, in the manufacture of furniture,
for cut veneer, for wooden plates, plaques, baskets, etc., also for wagon hubs, hat
blocks, etc. A large sized tree, very abundant, often the principal tree in the
swampy parts of the bottoms of the Lower Mississippi Valley; occurs from New
York to Texas and from Indiana to Florida.
 Fig. 230. Fig. 231.

141. Hickory.—Fig. 231. Wood very heavy, hard and strong, proverbially tough,
of rather coarse texture, smooth and of straight grain. The broad sapwood white,
the heart reddish nut brown. It dries slowly, shrinks and checks considerably, is not
durable in the ground, or if exposed, and, especially the sapwood, is always
subject to the inroads of boring insects. Hickory excels as carriage and wagon
stock, but is also extensively used in the manufacture of implements and
machinery, for tool handles, timber pins, for harness work and cooperage. The
hickories are tall trees with slender stems, never form forests, occasionally small
groves, but usually occur scattered among other broad-leaved trees in suitable
localities.
Hickory excels as carriage and wagon stock, but is also extensively used in the
manufacture of implements and machinery, for tool handles, timber pins, for
harness work and cooperage. The hickories are tall trees with slender stems,
never form forests, occasionally small groves, but usually occur scattered among
other broad-leaved trees in suitable localities.
142. Maple.—Fig. 232. Wood heavy, hard, strong, stiff, and tough, of fine
texture, frequently wavy grained, thus giving rise to “curly” and blister” figures; not
durable in the ground or otherwise exposed. Maple is creamy white, with shades of
light brown in the heart; shrinks moderately, seasons, works and stands well,
wears smoothly and takes fine polish. The wood is used for ceiling, flooring,
paneling, stairway and other finishing lumber in house, ship and car construction; it
is used for the keels of boats and ships, in the manufacture of implements and
machinery, but especially for furniture, where entire chamber sets of maple rival
those of oak. Maple is also used for shoe lasts and other form blocks, for shoe
pegs, for piano actions, school apparatus, for wood type in show bill printing, tool
handles, wood carving, turnery and scroll work.

Fig. 232.

The maples are medium sized trees, of fairly rapid growth; sometimes form
forests and frequently constitute a large proportion of the arborescent growth.
143. Oak.—Fig. 233. Wood very variable, usually very heavy and hard, very
strong and tough, porous, and of coarse texture; the sapwood whitish, the heart
“oak” brown to reddish brown. It shrinks and checks badly, giving trouble in
seasoning, but stands well, is durable and little subject to attacks of insects. Oak is
used for many purposes; in shipbuilding, for heavy construction, in common
carpentry, in furniture, car and wagon work, cooperage, turnery, and even in wood
carving; also in the manufacture of all kinds of farm implements, wooden mill
machinery, for piles and wharves, railway ties, etc. The oaks are medium to large
sized trees, forming the predominant part of a large portion of our broad-leaved
forests, so that these are generally “oak forests” though they always contain a
considerable proportion of other kinds of trees. Three well marked kinds, white,
red, and live oak are distinguished and kept separate in the market. Of the two
principal kinds, white oak is the stronger, tougher, less porous, and more durable.
Red oak is usually of coarser texture, more porous, often brittle, less durable, and
even more troublesome in seasoning than white oak. In carpentry and furniture
work, red oak brings about the same price at present as white oak. The red oaks
everywhere accompany the white oaks, and like the latter, are usually represented
by several species in any given locality. Live oak, once largely employed in
shipbuilding, possesses all the good qualities (except that of size) of the white oak,
even to a greater degree. It is one of the heaviest, hardest and most durable
building timbers of this country; in structure it resembles the red oak but is much
less porous.

Fig. 233.

144. Sycamore.—Fig. 234 (button wood, button-ball tree, water beech): Wood
moderately heavy, quite hard, stiff, strong, tough, usually crossgrained, of coarse
texture, and white to light brown color; the wood is hard to split and work, shrinks
moderately, warps and checks considerably but stands well. It is used extensively
for drawers, backs, bottoms, etc., in cabinetwork, for tobacco boxes, in cooperage,
and also for finishing lumber, where it has too long been underrated. A large tree,
of rapid growth, common and largest in the Ohio and Mississippi valleys, at home
in nearly all parts of the eastern United States.

Fig. 234. Fig. 235.

145. Tulip Wood.—Fig. 235. Tulip tree. (yellow poplar, white wood): Wood quite
variable in weight, usually light, soft, stiff but not strong, of fine texture, and
yellowish color; the wood shrinks considerably, but seasons without much injury;
works and stands remarkably well. Used for siding, for paneling, and finishing
lumber in house, car and shipbuilding, for sideboards and panels of wagons and
carriages; also in the manufacture of furniture, implements and machinery, for
pump logs, and almost every kind of common woodenware, boxes, shelving,
drawers, etc. An ideal wood for the carver and toy man. A large tree, does not form
forests, but is quite common, especially in the Ohio basin; occurs from New
England to Missouri and southward to Florida.
146. Walnut.—Fig. 236. Black Walnut. Wood heavy, hard, strong, of coarse
texture; the narrow sapwood whitish, the heartwood chocolate brown. The wood
shrinks moderately in drying, works and stands well, takes a good polish, is quite
handsome, and has been for a long time the favorite cabinet wood in this country.
Walnut formerly used, even for fencing, has become too costly for ordinary uses,
and is to-day employed largely as a veneer, for inside finish and cabinet work, also
for turnery, for gunstocks, etc. Black walnut is a large tree, with stout trunk, of rapid
growth, and was formerly quite abundant throughout the Alleghany region,
occurring from New England to Texas, and from Michigan to Florida.
Fig. 236.
 CHAPTER XIII.
Wood Finishing.

147. Wood Finishes.—Finishes are applied to wood surfaces (1)

that the wood may be preserved, (2) that the
appearance may be enhanced.
Finishing materials may be classed under one or the other of the
following: Filler, stain, wax, varnish, oil, paint. These materials may
be used singly upon a piece of wood or they may be combined in
various ways to produce results desired.
148. Brushes.—Good brushes are made of bristles of the wild
boar of Russia and China. These bristles are set in
cement and are firmly bound by being wrapped with wire in round
brushes or enclosed in metal in flat brushes. Fig. 237.
 Fig. 237. Fig. 238.

A large brush, called a duster, is used for removing dust or loose

dirt from the wood, Fig. 238. Small brushes, used for tracing, usually
have chiseled edges, Fig. 239.
Bristle brushes are expensive and should be well cared for.
Brushes that have been used in shellac and are not soon to be used
again should be cleaned by rinsing them thoroughly in a cup of
alcohol. This alcohol may be used later for thinning shellac.
 Fig. 239.

Varnish and paint brushes should be cleaned in turpentine. If they

are to be laid away for some time, a strong soap suds, or lather
made from some of the soap powders, should be well worked into
the brush, after the preliminary cleansing. It should then be carefully
pressed into proper shape and laid away flat on a shelf. When the
brush is to be used again, it should first be washed out, to get rid of
all the soap.
Brushes that are used from day to day should be kept suspended,
when not in use, as in Fig. 240, so that their bristles shall be kept
moist, without their touching the bottom of the bucket or can.
 Fig. 240. Fig. 241.

Since alcohol evaporates rapidly, shellac cans with cone tops

should be used or, better, a can in which the brush handle may
extend through the top.
Fig. 241 shows a can which is made double. Varnish is kept in the
inner portion and water in the outer ring. The cover fits over the inner
can and into the water space, thus sealing the varnish air-tight but
removing all danger of the cover’s sticking to the sides of the can.
The brush is suspended from the “cleaning wire” so that its bristles
rest in the liquid.
If delicate woods are to be varnished, stone or glass jars would
better be used to hold the liquid, for metal discolors it slightly.
 Fig. 242. Fig. 243.

149. General Directions for Using Brush.—(1) Hold the brush

as in Fig. 242. (2) Dip
the end of the brush in the liquid to about one-third the length of the
bristles. (3) Wipe off the surplus liquid on the edge of the can, wiping
both sides of the brush no more than is necessary to keep the liquid
from dripping. A wire stretched across the can as in Fig. 243
provides a better wiping place for the dripping brush. In wiping the
brush on the edge of the can, some of liquid is likely to “run” down
the outside. (4) Using the end of the brush, apply the liquid near one
end of the surface to be covered. (5) “Brush” in the direction of the
grain. (6) Work towards and out over the end of the board, leveling
the liquid to a smooth film of uniform thinness. The strokes should be
“feathered,” that is, the brush should be lowered gradually at the
beginning of the sweep and raised gradually at the close, otherwise,
ugly “laps” will result. The reason for working out over the ends
rather than from them will appear with a little thought. (7) Now work
toward the second end. The arrows, Fig. 244, show the general
directions of the final or feathering strokes.

Fig. 244.

Edges are usually covered first and adjoining surfaces afterward.

It frequently happens that surplus liquid runs over a finished
surface, especially when working near the arrises. This surplus can
be “picked up” by wiping the brush upon the wire of the bucket until
the bristles are quite free of liquid, and giving the part affected a
feathering sweep.
If the object has an internal corner, work from that out over the
neighboring surfaces.
Panels and sunk places should be covered first. Afterward, the
raised places, such as stiles, rails, etc., may be attended to.
Wherever possible the work should be laid flat so that the liquid may
be flowed on horizontally. This is of especial advantage in
varnishing. Vertical work should always be begun at the top and
carried downward.
 Tracing consists in working a liquid up to a given line but not over
it, such as painting the sash of a window. Tracing requires a steady
hand and some practice. A small brush is generally used and the
stroke is made as nearly continuous as the flow of the liquid will
allow. Fig. 245.

Fig. 245.

150. Fillers.—Fillers are of two kinds, paste and liquid. They are
used to fill up the wood pores and thus give a smooth,
level, non-absorbent surface, upon which other coverings may be
placed. Paste fillers are for use upon coarse grained woods such as
oak and chestnut, while liquid fillers are for close grained woods
such as Georgia pine.
 Fillers are not a necessity, especially the liquid, but the saving
affected by their use is considerable. Not only are they cheaper than
varnish but one or two coats of filler will take the place and permit a
saving of two or three coats of the more expensive material.
Liquid filler should be applied evenly with a brush and allowed to
dry twenty-four hours, after which it may be sanded smooth with No.
00 paper. It is used mainly upon large work such as porch ceilings
and interior finish, like Georgia pine. On fine cabinet work, one or
two coats of thin white shellac is used as a filler upon close grained
wood. Shellac forms a surface which after twenty-four hours, can be
sandpapered so as to make a very smooth surface. Varnish applied
to the bare wood has a tendency to darken and discolor it. Filling
with shellac preserves the natural color.
Paste filler is sold by the pound in cans of various sizes. The best
fillers are made of ground rock crystal mixed with raw linseed oil,
japan and turpentine.
For preserving the natural color of the wood, filler is left white; for
Flemish, it is colored brown; for antique and weathered finishes, it is
dark. Fillers can be purchased ready colored.
151. Filling with Paste Filler.—(1) Thin the filler with turpentine
until it makes a thin paste. (2) With a
stiff-bristled brush, force the filler into the pores of the wood and
leave the surface covered with a thin coating. (3) Allow this to stand
until the filler has “flatted,” that is, until the “gloss” has disappeared
and the filler becomes dull and chalkish. The time required for this to
take place varies. Twenty minutes is not unusual. (4) Rub the filler off
just as soon as it has flatted—do not let it stand longer, for the longer
it stands the harder it is to remove. Rub across the grain as much as
is possible, using a wad of excelsior. Finish fine work by going over it
a second time with a cloth, rubbing with the grain as well as across,
that the “high lights” may be clear of filler.
On fine work use a felt pad to rub the filler into the pores, and rub
off with a cloth only.
Twenty-four hours should be allowed the filler to harden. One
filling is sufficient for ordinary work; on fine work the above process
is sometimes repeated after the first filling has hardened.
 The striking contrasts in the grain of wood such as oak and
chestnut, obtained by the use of colored fillers, are due to the dark
filler’s remaining in the open grain but being wiped off of the close
grain—the “high lights.”
On quarter-sawed oak, each flake is sometimes sanded with fine
paper, No. 00, to remove the stain that the contrast may be sharper.
Excelsior and rags used in cleaning off filler must not be allowed to
lie around but must be burned for they are subject to spontaneous
combustion and are dangerous.
152. Stains.—Stains are used to darken the high lights of wood
preparatory to the application of a relatively darker
filler. By varying the intensity of the stain different results may be
obtained with the same color of filler. Stains are also used without
fillers.
There are three kinds of stains: (1) water, (2) oil, (3) spirit. Each
kind has its advantages and its disadvantages.
Wood stains are cheap, penetrate the wood deeply, and are
transparent. They cause the grain of the wood to “rough up,”
however, and for this reason are used mainly upon hard woods
which require darkening before the application of a filler. The wood is
sanded before the filler is applied. Where water stain is not to be
followed by filler, it is customary to thoroughly moisten the surface to
be covered with water alone. After this has dried, the surface is
sanded with fine paper and the stain applied. The stain does not
raise the grain as it otherwise would.
Water stains may be applied with a brush or a sponge. They are
sometimes heated that they may enter the wood more deeply. Any
coloring matter that can be dissolved in water will make a wood dye
or stain.
Oil stains, like water stains, are often used to stain wood before
filling. They are more generally used where no filling is desired. They
are easier to apply evenly than water or spirit stains. They do not
raise the grain of the wood like the other stains. On the other hand,
they do not penetrate and therefore cannot color hard woods dark.
Neither do they give the clear effects.
Most oil stains are applied with a brush, after which the surface of
the wood is immediately wiped clean with a cloth.