Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Textbook Military Entrepreneurs and The Spanish Contractor State in The Eighteenth Century 1St Edition Torres Sanchez Ebook All Chapter PDF
Textbook Military Entrepreneurs and The Spanish Contractor State in The Eighteenth Century 1St Edition Torres Sanchez Ebook All Chapter PDF
https://textbookfull.com/product/american-foreign-policy-in-the-
english-speaking-caribbean-from-the-eighteenth-to-the-twenty-
first-century-samantha-s-s-chaitram/
https://textbookfull.com/product/fictions-of-friendship-in-the-
eighteenth-century-novel-1st-edition-bryan-mangano-auth/
https://textbookfull.com/product/the-routledge-companion-to-
eighteenth-century-literatures-in-english-1st-edition-sarah-eron/
The Birth of Thought in the Spanish Language 14th
century Hebrew Spanish Philosophy 1st Edition Ilia
Galán Díez (Auth.)
https://textbookfull.com/product/the-birth-of-thought-in-the-
spanish-language-14th-century-hebrew-spanish-philosophy-1st-
edition-ilia-galan-diez-auth/
https://textbookfull.com/product/sweden-in-the-eighteenth-
century-world-provincial-cosmopolitans-goran-ryden-editor/
https://textbookfull.com/product/berlin-s-forgotten-future-city-
history-and-enlightenment-in-eighteenth-century-germany-matt-
erlin/
https://textbookfull.com/product/immunity-s-sovereignty-and-
eighteenth-and-nineteenth-century-american-literature-rick-
rodriguez/
https://textbookfull.com/product/the-spanish-civil-war-a-
military-history-charles-j-esdaile/
M I L I TA RY E N T R E PR E N E U R S A N D
T H E S PA N I S H C ON T R AC TOR S TAT E
I N T H E E IGH T E E N T H C E N T U RY
Military Entrepreneurs and
the Spanish Contractor
State in the Eighteenth
Century
R A FA E L TOR R E S S Á NC H E Z
1
1
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries
© Rafael Torres Sánchez 2016
The moral rights of the author have been asserted
Impression: 1
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics
rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above
You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available
Library of Congress Control Number: 2016935745
ISBN 978–0 –19–878411–1
Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and
for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials
contained in any third party website referenced in this work.
Acknowledgements
Behind each book lies a story, and it’s almost always pleasant in the telling, spell-
ing out the gestation of the book and how it became possible. Each book, after
all, is a group story, of shared hopes and expectations, of countless and almost
always unrepayable gestures of support from friends and colleagues. In my case,
this story is particularly agreeable. The germ of this book was an invitation by
Huw Bowen to give a lecture at Leicester University, United Kingdom, about
Spanish eighteenth-century military entrepreneurs. The setting was an unforget-
table ‘brown-bag seminar’, a format that certainly comes across as strange for a
Spanish academic but that turned out be very fruitful. Professor Huw Bowen’s
unflagging initiative and vitality rubs off on one. With his collaboration we
were able to bring more colleagues into the fold, the area of research as yet little
explored that we all began to delve into together. With Stephen Conway, Agustín
González Enciso, Richard Harding, and Patrick O’Brien we began to ferret out
the role played by military entrepreneurs in the mobilization of warfare resources
and state construction during the eighteenth century; at the same time the whole
project became more international, attracting new colleagues and friends and
creating new stimuli. Giving oneselves a name is always fun so we came to call
ourselves the Contractor State Group (<www.unav.es/centro/contractorstate/>
(accessed January 2016)). Without any doubt this book is the fruit of this thrill-
ing collective academic adventure, which I was lucky enough to be part of. The
research was funded by the Spanish government, ref. HAR 2015-64165-C2-1-P.
Many colleagues have chipped in over time with their critiques and comments
in ongoing meetings and get-togethers to help flesh out the thesis of this book,
but I owe a special debt of gratitude to the savoir faire and friendship of Paco
Andujar, Alberto Angulo, María Baudot, Michael Beltran, Pepijn Brandon, Javier
Cuenca-E steban, Isidro Dubert, Anne Dubet, Joël Félix, Jeff Fynn-Paul, Farley
Grubb, Marjolein ’t Hart, Roger Knight, Cristina Moreira, Helen Julia Paul,
Pierrick Pourchasse, Guy Rowlands, Margrit Schulte, Sergio Solbes, Christopher
Storr, Toshiaki Tamaki, Iván Valdez-Bubnov, and Martin Wilcox. In recent
years I have also run up a special debt with David Parrott, the firmest inspiration
behind this book, who has offered me his friendship and shrewd advice since we
first met in Brussels at that unforgettable seminar, ‘War, Entrepreneurs, and the
State in Europe and the Mediterranean 1300–1800’.
However, without doubt what make the whole journey more safe and agreeable
are the emotional boosts offered day to day by one’s nearest and dearest. Special
thanks go to Ana, Jacin, Pedro, and Salva, for their unstinting efforts to improve
the culinary level of the enano de los Canales. No less effective is the constant
effort, with the collaboration of Badulaque’s house, made by Diego, Javi, Laura,
Natalia, and Waldo to offer unconditional emotional support. This was also the
case with my brother Quico and Enca, and our balcony chats at La Manga, which
vi Acknowledgements
List of Figures ix
List of Maps x
List of Tables xi
List of Abbreviations xiii
Glossary xv
I . I N T RODU C T IO N
1. From the Fiscal-Military State to the Contractor State 3
2. Economic Policy and Military Supplies 13
I I . V IC T UA L L I N G T H E S PA N I S H
A R M E D F ORC E S
3. Public and Private Business: Soldiers’ Bread Ration 43
4. National and State Capitalism 66
5. Monopolist Entrepreneurs at the State’s Service 96
I I I . BU I L DI N G T H E K I N G ’ S S H I P S
6. The Fiscal-Naval State 115
7. The Paradigm of State Intervention 136
8. The Spanish Naval Contractor State and Entrepreneurs 166
I V. T H E C O N T R AC T OR S TAT E I N AC T IO N
9. National Market versus International Market: The Limits of
Mercantilism 189
10. Monopoly versus the Market: Urgency and Flexibility 210
11. Conclusions 230
Notes 235
Bibliography 275
Index 293
List of Figures
Lisbon
Murcia
Alicante
Córdoba Murcia
Andalusia Cartagena
Sevilla
Granada
.
Cadiz Almería
Málaga
Algeciras
Gibraltar
Orán
Ceuta
Melilla
Riv
er
Eb
River Duero ro
Ib
ste
l Sy
er
tra
ia
Cen
n
Sy
st
em
r Tajo
Rive
adiana
River Gu
na Riv
More er
Sierra Se
gu
ra
ir
lquiv
ada
r Gu
Rive e
ang
tic R
Bae
2,000 m.
1,500 m.
1,000 m.
500 m.
Cumana
Trinidad
Cartagena
Portobelo
Cavite
Philippines
Map 0.3 The Spanish West Indies, Viceroyalty of New Spain, and Philippines
Source: Author’s own.
Cartagena
Realejo
Panamá Viceroyalty of
New Granada
Guayaquil
Viceroyalty of
Peru
Lima
Callao
Potosí
Asunción
Viceroyalty of
Río de la Plata
Santiago
Angostura
Montevideo
Chile Buenos Aires
Valdivia
Chiloé
I N T RODUC T ION
1
From the Fiscal-Military State to the
Contractor State
this is a matter that, like all other commercial affairs, should be based upon a perfect
economy if it is to be as successful as we wish. There is no doubt that a contractor
tallies better with this overarching idea than any state commissary. The former, after
all, looks after his own interest, on the strength of his own activity, efficiency and
industriousness whereas the latter lacks this money-saving motive … Furthermore
the contractor looks beyond the short-term benefit of each individual contract and
sets his eyes rather on the long-term business that might accrue therefrom … which
is the truest way of thinking in business houses.1
This official had no doubts about the superiority of these military contractors
in terms of meeting the state’s needs, satisfying as they did a series of prerequis
ites that were all particularly conducive to long-term managerial efficiency. This
official of the Spanish state attributed them with a readiness to fulfil the state’s
commission in the best way possible, since they were driven above all by their
own private interest. In his opinion they would therefore be sure to carry out
their tasks efficiently, since their expertise was based on their superior commercial
networking capacity. If the state turned to these businesspeople, he argued, the
state itself would ‘go further’, that is, grow and develop. This example illustrates
the theme of this book: how the Spanish state’s pressing need for military sup-
plies during the eighteenth century spurred, shaped, and constrained an emergent
military-entrepreneur market and how state and contractors influenced each oth-
er’s development and ipso facto the nation as a whole. This theme fits in with the
thoroughgoing historiographical rethinking, in recent decades, of the traditional
debate on the construction of the state; it aims ultimately to answer the question
of why warfare, or rather the state’s prime function of sustaining its armed forces,
was a key factor in the growth and development of some nations and states and
4 Military Entrepreneurs and the Spanish Contractor State
not in others. The key point, more specifically, is why for some states military
enterprise became an authentic lever of wealth, helping to knit the whole society
together, whereas for other states and nations it was a brake on development and
a source of social friction.
Historians have long tended to link the emergence of modern states with the
growth of military activity.2 The driving force behind this relation was the con-
stant rivalry between European states, and these states’ desire to achieve secu-
rity, stability, and sovereignty in the territories they governed.3 An ever closer and
stronger relationship between state and warfare was forged throughout the early
modern era as the scale of warfare increased together with its cost and techno-
logical level. The state met this challenge by streamlining its administration and
mobilizing economic and material resources. The response to these challenges
apparently determined the differences in the states’ various political models.
Factors such as geography or the economy, and concepts like ‘monopoly of vio-
lence’, ‘military revolution’, and ‘fiscal-military state’ have helped to articulate
and renew this historiographical discourse largely derived from the field of socio
logy.4 Problems arose when these doctrinaire interpretations were set against the
historical reality of the early modern era; then the ostensible differences in the
political regimes of the belligerent states, parliamentarian or absolutist, turned
out to be less crucial than previously thought as explanatory factors of historical
developments. No automatic or universal relationship between state and warfare
can in fact be postulated; neither did this relation even act in the same direction
in all cases. What does seem to be clear is that the reason why the warfare–state
interrelationship was more intense in Europe than in other parts of the world
is that it was in Europe and its colonies where rivalry and competition were fiercest
(dynastic, religious, economic, or national) and also it was in Europe where
states proved themselves to be most imaginative and efficient in finding resource-
mobilizing solutions, without causing any sort of rupture with the societies that
sustain them. It is precisely in this bond between state and society where the study
of warfare r esource mobilization comes into its own. Thus Great Britain’s success
in the eighteenth century, the most highly taxed and indebted nation in the
world, resided precisely, as Martin Daunton reminds us, in raising these taxes and
running up this debt ‘without serious political problems and with a remarkable
level of compliance’.5
The traditional answer that states managed to raise their wherewithal by
strong-arm tactics (in the words of Charles Tilly because ‘coercion works’6) does
not really hold up. It fails to explain European states’ varying levels of effective-
ness in the race to meet the growing demand for military activity in the early
modern era. The fact that a state managed to raise enough money was no guaran-
tee that this would be transformed into military wherewithal and much less that
this would be done efficiently. Witness the naval confrontations of the Napoleonic
Wars. The English lost 17 ships against the French toll of 229. Such a glaring dif-
ference cannot be accounted for solely on economic terms. In one way or another
the English proved to be more efficient than the French at mustering seamen, fit-
ting out and repairing their ships, training sailors, nursing the injured, providing
Fiscal-Military to Contractor State 5
pork fat or cannons and, as the author of a study on this subject, Douglas Allen,
argues, doing so without stoking up social resistance or bringing down its econ-
omy or state structure.7 The English were somehow more efficient than the French
in recycling taxes as a perceived benefit to the society that had furnished them.
Money without any doubt formed the sinews of war, but there was also a need for
a consensus in those societies for it to be raised and then spent on military activ-
ity.8 Once the underpinning society had learnt to see benefits for itself, it would
be more likely to collaborate in the mutual endeavour. Everything would seem
to suggest that collaboration did in fact override coercion in all European states’
resource-mobilizing arrangements during the early modern era. In all probabil-
ity, as argued by Peer Vries, this was precisely what differentiated European states
from the rest of the world.9
Focusing on collaboration rather than coercion puts a different slant on the
warfare resource-mobilizing process. The traditional view highlights the state’s
role as the main agent, unilaterally exerting all its coercive clout on its own soci-
ety to obtain the military resources it needed. This view is now being ousted by a
broader awareness of other types of collaboration and participation, in which the
salient feature is beginning to be recognized as the resource-raising arrangements
woven between state and society. As Stephen Conway claims, it is high time to start
concentrating less on whether this relationship tended to strengthen or weaken
the state and turn our attention instead to how the relationship came about and
the consequences it might have for the prime end in view, which was none other
than increasing military resource-raising efficiency.10 One of the authors who have
done most to bring out this new warfare-resource-raising relationship between
state and society is David Parrott.11 Parrott argues that there is not necessarily
any incompatibility between the growth of state power and the development of
significant participation of private agents and individuals in mobilizing resources
for the military activity. He has even forthrightly shown that, without this par-
ticipation, states would in fact have been unable to build up the resource-mobi-
lization levels actually achieved. This new way of looking at things casts doubt
on some long-held tenets. First, that there is no single and irreversible paradigm
for growth driven by the state’s ambition to increase its control over armed forces
and to mobilize military resources. Moreover there is the possibility of change, of
divergence in these developments, if the state’s relationship with the surrounding
society changes. Secondly, this new slant calls into question the traditional role
assigned to private agents, whose performance ostensibly represented a weaken-
ing in state power. In other words it is no longer valid to continue assuming that
if contractors and private agents collaborated they did so at the cost of the state’s
political capacity and authority. Rather would it seem to be quite the opposite,
that the collaboration reinforced and enlarged the state’s capacity for political
action. Thirdly, if we admit that the mobilization of military resources is the result
of the relationship built up between state and society, to the mutual benefit of
both, the crux of the matter is then to ascertain why the private agents wished to
collaborate and what were the consequences of this collaboration: for the contrac-
tors, for the state, and for the nation as a whole.
6 Military Entrepreneurs and the Spanish Contractor State
Centring the state-building debate on the relations between the state and mili-
tary entrepreneurs is a promising way of dealing with the problems that have now
cropped up in studies of the fiscal-military state. These studies have run into a
serious initial limitation, deriving from the priority given to the study of only one
side of the equation, namely the mobilization of economic resources. When John
Brewer coined the term ‘fiscal-military state’ in 1989 it was intended to bring out
the two main functions of the eighteenth-century English state: bringing in tax
revenue and spending it on warfare.12 Brewer’s book paints the English state as a
strong, centralized regime with a professional and highly skilled bureaucracy and
administration, which pursued efficient fiscal policies and was capable of keeping
up with the soaring needs of public credit and armed forces. The term ‘fiscal-mil-
itary state’ spread like wildfire despite attracting some critical scrutiny.13 As Peter
Ertman pointed out, apart from questioning the Whig myth of a weak state, ‘this
is a book where one does not learn very much that one has not read elsewhere,
except in respect of the excise where Brewer’s own researches have established
Britain´s relative efficiency as a bureaucracy’.14 Despite the criticism, the term
‘fiscal-military’ has been widely taken up, partly because it has come in handy
for replacing the more hackneyed concept of ‘absolutism’. As Chester Dunning
proposed: ‘there is a good chance that the model of the fiscal-military state will
eventually replace the vague and hollow concept of absolutism as the preferred
framework for the study of early modern Europe’.15 But the very usefulness of
the term, as anticipated by Dunning, has become counterproductive, ending up
by blurring the concept itself. Max Edling refers here to two fiscal-military states
with completely different political, economic, and social policies: ‘If the American
Revolution is regarded as a revolt against the extension of the British “fiscal-mili-
tary state” to the colonies, it is of course ironic that the Revolution’s very success
should create the demand for an American “fiscal-military state”.’16
The term ‘fiscal-military’ has gradually shed its original remit, that is, link-
ing the state’s two primordial functions in the early modern era, revenue col-
lecting and military expenditure. Furthermore historians have tended to put too
much weight on only one strand of this argument. Fairly logically, in the light
of the very strength of economic history, historians have tended to concentrate
on the economic strand in their studies of fiscal-military states: the capacity for
mobilizing greater revenues. When a comparison is made between the various
fiscal-military states, historians all too often refer only to how fiscal policies and
administration enabled states to widen the tax trawl and increase available warfare
resources. Efficiency, therefore, could be measured solely as the capacity to muster
enough money to spend on military resources.17 This focus upon the first function
of the fiscal-military state has offered important clues to understanding the tran-
sition, already mooted by Schumpeter, from a ‘domain state’, with recourses taken
from the king’s property, to a ‘tax state’, where it is the kingdom and its subjects
who come up with the resources, also currently dubbed as a ‘fiscal state’.18 In other
words, stress was placed on explaining how fiscal-military states began piecing
together public finance systems, doing so by curbing feudal or regional treasur-
ies. Studies also looked at how financing resources were multiplied, using more
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
mea
Mead
meager
meagerly
meagre
meal
meals
mean
meaner
meaning
meanings
meanness
means
meant
meantime
meanwhile
measles
measurably
measure
measured
measurement
measures
measuring
Meat
meats
Mecca
mechanic
MECHANICAL
MECHANICS
Mechanicsburg
mechanism
Mecklenburg
medal
medals
meddling
media
median
mediate
mediating
mediation
mediator
mediators
Medical
medicinal
medicine
medicines
medieval
Medina
mediocre
meditated
meditation
Mediterranean
medium
mediæval
mediævalism
medley
meek
meet
meeting
meetings
meets
megalithic
Mehtar
Meiji
Meiklong
Meinam
Meishan
Mekka
Mekong
Mekran
melancholy
Melbourne
Melchite
Meline
mell
Mellen
mellow
melodramatically
Melouna
melt
melting
meltings
Melvil
Melville
member
members
membership
membrane
memoir
memoirs
memorable
memoranda
memorandum
memorial
memorialised
memorialist
memorialists
memorialize
memorialized
memorializing
Memorials
memories
Memory
Memphis
men
MENA
menace
menaced
menaces
menacing
Menam
Mencius
mend
mendacity
mendicant
mending
MENELEK
Menes
Mengtz
meningitis
mensuration
mental
mentall
mentally
mention
mentioned
mentioning
mentions
mentis
Merawi
Mercado
Mercantile
Mercedes
mercenaries
merchandise
merchandize
merchant
merchantmen
merchants
Mercier
mercies
merciful
mercifully
merciless
mercilessly
mercury
Mercy
mere
merely
MERENPTAH
meres
merest
merge
merged
Mergen
Mergenthaler
merging
meridian
meridional
merit
merited
merits
Merodach
Meron
Merriam
Merrill
MERRIMAC
Merritt
Merry
Mersine
mes
Mesa
Mesaba
Meshed
Mesopotamia
message
messages
messenger
messengers
Messieurs
messing
Messrs
mestizo
met
metal
metallic
Metalliferous
metallism
metallurgical
metallurgists
metals
Metcalfe
mete
meteoric
meteorite
meteorites
Meteoritic
meteorological
Meteorology
Meteors
meters
Metford
Metfords
methane
method
methodical
Methodist
methods
Methuen
metre
metres
metric
metropolis
Metropolitan
mewed
MEXICAN
Mexico
Meyer
Mgr
miasms
mice
Michael
MICHIGAN
Michoacan
micro
microbe
microbes
Microcassettes
microgametes
microscope
microscopic
microzoa
Mid
midday
Middelburg
Middle
middlemen
Midi
Midland
Midlothian
midnight
midshipman
midst
midway
midwinter
Mieh
Mier
Mifflin
might
mightier
mightiest
Mighty
Miguel
Mihaileano
Mihaly
Mikado
Milan
Milanese
Milburn
mild
milder
mile
mileage
Miles
Miley
militaire
militarism
MILITARY
militated
militia
milk
MILL
Millard
Millennial
MILLENNIUM
millenniums
Miller
Millerand
millet
milliard
million
millionaire
millionaires
millions
mills
Milner
Milouna
Milton
Milvart
Milwaukee
mimicking
Min
mind
MINDANAO
minded
mindedness
mindful
Mindoro
minds
mine
mined
miner
mineral
Mineralogy
minerals
miners
Mines
Ming
mingled
Mingo
miniature
minimise
minimum
mining
minister
Ministerial
ministers
Ministries
Ministry
Ministère
Minneapolis
Minnesota
minor
minorities
minority
minors
MINOS
Minotaur
mint
mintage
mints
Minute
minuteness
minutes
minutest
minutiæ
Miquel
Miquelon
miracle
miracles
miraculously
mirage
Mirko
Miro
Mirri
Mirs
Mirza
misadventure
misapprehension
misbehaviour
miscalculated
MISCELLANEOUS
mischief
mischievous
misconception
misconduct
misconstruction
misdeed
misdeeds
misdemeanor
misdemeanors
misdoing
miserable
miserably
miseries
misery
misfortune
misfortunes
misgiving
misgivings
misgovernment
misguided
mishap
mishaps
misinform
misinformed
misinterpretation
mislead
misleading
misled
mismanaged
mismanagement
misnamed
misnomer
misrepresent
misrule
misruled
Miss
missed
missing
mission
Missionaries
missionary
missioners
MISSIONS
Mississippi
Missouri
mist
mistake
mistaken
mistakes
mistrust
misunderstand
misunderstanding
misunderstandings
misunderstood
misuse
misused
Mitchel
Mitchell
mitigate
mitigated
Mitry
mix
mixed
mixing
mixture
MM
Mme
moat
moats
mob
Mobile
mobilisation
mobility
mobilization
mobilize
mobilized
mobilizing
mobs
Mochamera
mock
mockery
Modder
mode
model
modeled
models
moderate
moderately
Moderates
moderating
moderation
Modern
modernised
modernizing
modes
modest
modestly
modification
modifications
Modified
modify
modifying
modus
Moeris
Mohamed
Mohammed
Mohammedan
Mohammedans
Mohmand
moieties
moiled
Moines
Moisson
molasses
Moldavia
molded
mole
Molecular
molecules
molest
molestation
molested
molesting
Molinos
Molokai
Molucca
Moluccas
Mombasa
moment
momentarily
Momentary
momentous
moments
Mommsen
Mona
Monaco
Monaghan
Monarch
monarchical
Monarchists
monarchs
monarchy
monasteries
monastery
monastic
Moncada
Monday
Monet
MONETARY
MONEY
moneys
Mongol
Mongolia
Mongolian
Mongols
monied
Monier
monitors
monk
monks
Monmouth
monographs
monometallic
monometallism
MONOPOLIES
monopolise
monopolistic
monopolize
monopolized
MONOPOLY
monotonous
Monroe
Monseigneur
monsieur
Monsignor
monsoon
monster
monsters
monstrosity
monstrous
Mont
Montalban
Montana
Montauk
Monte
Montefiore
Montenegrin
Montenegrins
MONTENEGRO
Monterey
Montero
Montevideo
Montgomery
month
monthly
months
Montjuich
Montluçon
Montreal
Montreux
Montserrat
Montsioa
Montt
monument
monumental
monuments
Monza
moods
Moody
Mooi
Moon
Moore
moored
moorings
mooted
Moral
Morales
morality
morally
Morals
Moravia
Morazan
More
Moreau
Morelos
Moreover
Morgan
Moritz
Morley
Mormon
morning
Moro
Morocco
Morong
MOROS
Morozugu
Morrill
Morris
Morrison
Morro
morrow
MORSE
mortal
mortality
mortally
mortars
mortgage
mortgaged
mortgages
mortification
mortifying
Mortimer
Mortimore
mortised
mortmain
Morton
mosaic
Moscow
Moses
Moslem
MOSLEMS
Mosque
mosques
Mosquito
mosquitoes
Moss
Mossamedes
mosses
most
mostly
mot
Motcha
mote
Mother
motherland
mothers
motion
motionless
motions
motive
motives
motley
Motono
motor
motors
motto
mottoes
Mouillin
Moukden
mouldering
moulding
mouldy
mound
mounds
Mount
Mountain
mountainous
Mountains
Mounted
mounting
Mouravieff
mourned
mourning
mourns
Moush
mouth
mouths
movable
move
moveable
Moved
movement
Movements
moves
moving
Mowbray
Mozambique
Mpanjakany
Mr
Mrs
Msiri
MSS
Mu
Mubarak
much
mud
muddy
Mudirieh
Mudirs
Muertos
Muhammadan
Muhammadans
Muhlenberg
Mujelibeh
MUKDEN
Mul
mulatto
mulattoes
mulberry
mule
mules
Mulhall
Mulk
mullah
multiplication
multiplicity
multiplied
multiply
multiplying
multitude
multitudes
multitudinous
Mundella
Muneris
Munich
MUNICIPAL
municipalities
Municipality
municipio
municipios
munificence
munificently
munitions
Munkacsy
Munroe
Muong
mural
Muravieff
MURDER
murdered
murderer
murderers
murdering
murderous
murders
Murdoch
murmur
Murphy
Murray
Mururuma
muscle
muscles
Muscogee
Muscovite
muscular
museum
museums
MUSIC