Developing the Newtown Line- A

Study of Unease and Uncertainty

about Primary Tasks in a Railway
Company
 Step 1: Data Collection
Population

Industrial Activities

The existing railway line in Newtown did not extended

across the region and the lack of adequate alternative
passenger transport service was falling to meet public
demand in the area.
Step 1: Data Collection Contd
King Cross and Clapham Common railway disaster
(1980s) and the proposed privatization of the railway,
the Government brought in the Railways (Safety Case)
Regulations requiring the railway industry to examine to
its actual and proposed activities to ensure that they
were safe and that risks were as low as reasonably
practicable- ALARP principle.
Step 1: Data Collection Contd
A safety case is intended to demonstrate that the management;
Understand the inherent hazards, their causes and consequences;
Have provided sufficient and robust defences to avoid the hazard and
mitigate the consequences;
Have reduced the risk to a level in accordance with ALARP.

In essence, manager must show that they understand what must

be done to maintain a required level of safety in practical terms,
for example key maintenance activities, decision criteria, and
appropriate combinations of control measures.
Step 1: Data Collection Contd
The Newtown expansion work is composed of two main
aspects;
1) The expansion project itself run by the engineering design
team to design, plan and built the extension.

2) The establishment of the system to operate the extended line

once handed over, including staffing, training , maintenance
etc.
Step 1: Data Collection Contd
Two problems arose.
1) The HAZOP would need a system diagram or system description
of the railway business system, and this did not exist. An SSM
approach could help to fill this gay by;
Establishing primary tasks,
Identifying issues for further system analysis,
Producing a cascade of conceptual models of the railway system which
might be suitable for HAZOP if supplemented with notes about real-World
implementation.

2) The unease felt by theThesafety

safetycase
case manager
manager and about a number
the project directorof
were
aspects of their work. sensitive to the fact that all these different groups would
inevitably be making assumptions about what is and what
will be and about what other people were doing and thinking.
Step 1: Data Collection Contd
The safety case manager and project director were concerned that assumptions
which were inaccurate could carry through into the operational phase and result in
poor system performance as well as the safety case being invalidated if hazard
identification and risk analyses failed to match the actual line operating conditions.
The level of uncertainty about this issue was such that an SSM study was
commissioned with the objective of
a) dentifying different understandings and conflicts about the nature of the extended railway
system and approaches to the project task
b) Helping to resolve differences
c) Providing the basis for proceeding confidently with the main system analysis and HAZOP
programmed by developing a jointly agreed set of primary tasks and notional system
diagrams.
The system consultant interviewed a range of people from both the engineering
design and operational planning teams.
Step 2: Analysis
A RICH PICTURE

Figure 1. A rich picture of the situation concerning the Newtown Railway

 Step 2: Analysis
Unease, concern and uncertainty were hallmarks of the problem situation.
Most topics raised to the primary task, i.e. What is the railway system's
primary purpose and function?
The following summarizes the concerns:
Primary- task-based
The overall system
Maintenance & servicing
skills, training and human resources
Capturing experience of existing staff and maintaining these experiences
Decision support
Crippled trains and evacuation
Procedures

Testing system integration and interfaces with existing Newtown line

Driver boredom and driver needs
Car design and passenger needs

Line control Centre

Performance standards, measures and measuring

Issue- based
Means to examinee big issues
Noticing and adapting to changes
Step 3: Relevant Systems and
Root Definitions
The most relevant system is chosen as Overall
System by the consultant and safety case team.

The subsytems is developed from the overall system at

Level 0.
Step 3: Relevant Systems and
Root Definitions Contd
RS0: The overall notional system (Level 0) comprising the following subsystems

RS1: A system for embarking and disembarking passengers

RS2: A system to move passengers from train embarcation point to a chosen Newtown
destination

RS3: A system to provide and adequate pool of qualified staff and to allocate them to
tasks and shifts

RS4: A system to regulate the service on the line

RS5: A system to maintain the rallway ( including inspections, cleaning and preventive
maintenance)

RS6: A system to control emergencies

Step 3: Relevant Systems and Root
Definitions Contd
Root Definition (RD0)
A system operated and maintained by the extended Newtown
line (ENL) manager, facilitated by staff and contractors, to
transport passengers from a chosen ENL embarcation point X

along the ENL route to an ENL destination of their choice, rapidly,

reliably, safety and in comfort, within operating and cost criteria
Y
agreed with the Government and regulatory authorities, for the
benefit of the public and the Newtown Railway Company. Z
Step 3: Relevant Systems and Root Definitions
Contd
CATWOE-RD0

Customers : passengers

Actors : staff and contractors

Transformation : passengers with travel requirements converted into satisfied, transported

passengers

Worldview : shared values of providing Newtown with a mass rapid transport system to
support social and economic needs

Owners : extended Newtown line manager

Environment : constraints of time, budget, legislation, public opinion, regulatory

authorities,etc.
 Step 3: Relevant Systems and Root Definitions
Contd
Root Definition (RD5)
A system owned by the ENL manager and operated by the ENL

engineering manager, maintenance staff and contractors and monitored

by the engineering department to maintain the ENL railway and including

preventive maintenance, maintenance inspections, cleaning, and

breakdown recoveries, so as to sustain a specified level of safety,

reliability and availability of electrical and mechanical equipment, civil

engineering infrastructure and configuration data for the benefit of

passengers and staff.

Step 3: Relevant Systems and Root Definitions
Contd
CATWOE-RD5
Customers : passengers and staff

Actors : ENL engineering manager, maintenance staff and contractors and

monitored by the engineering department

Transformation : safety, reliability and availability of hardware and infrastructure of the ENL
railway sustained

Worldview : belief that inadequate maintenance contributes to service down-time and

safety problems, with associated higher operating costs, higher overheads and decreased
revenue

Owners : extended Newtown line manager

Environment : constraints of time, budget, legislation, public opinion, insurance

requirements, statutory and company safety requiremnets.
Step 4: Conceptual Modelling
The main processes of RD0 are the followings;
Provide embarcation/disembarcation

Move passengers from train embarcation to chosen destination

Supply adequate pool of qualified staff, allocated to tasks and

shifts
Regulate the service on the line
Qualified
Maintain the railway
Step 4: Conceptual Modelling
Contd

Figure 2. Conceptual model of the overall notional Newtown railway system as

defined by RD0[1]
 Step 4: Conceptual Modelling
Contd

Figure 3. Expanded conceptual model of the overall notional Newtown railway system as
Step 5: Comparison
A number of mismatches and omissions were identified, particularly in

relation to the railway system as it would be operated and matters that

would have to be set in motion early in the deisgn phase in order to meet

operational requirements.

Arrangements for RS3, RS5 and RS6 would require much greater attention

than had been recognized so far.

Step 5: Comparison contd
Table 1. Comparison with the real world
Step 6: Debate
The safety case team had been kept fully informed of
the soft system studys progress.

They were in an informed position to discuss the root

definitions, conceptual models, comparison with the real
world and implications.
Step 7: Action
The safety case team was able to proceed with the main
systems analysis and HAZOP studies with renewed
confidence.

The conceptual system diagram for RD0 was developed

further and notes made for each-subsystem about real
world implementation.

Thus, the basic inputs to the HAZOP study, a contextual

References
[1]Waring, A. (1996). SSM Case Studies. In Practical Systems
Thinking (pp. 189-210). London: Chapman and Mall.