Challenges of transmission system operation

during the NATO bombing of the Republic of Serbia

20 years of NATO air strikes
(1999-2019)

1
 CONTENTS
Introduction

Serbian power system

“
before March 24, 1999

Stages in air attacks on power system facilities

Power system operation during the NATO bombing

Consequences of destroying power system facilities

Power system restoration

Gallery

2
INTRODUCTION
 Political environment

• After the failed negotiations to reach political soluton to crisis in Kosovo and Metohija and
without the approval of the UN Security Council, NATO forces launched air strikes on military
targets in FR Yugoslavia at 7:45 p.m. on March 24, 1999
• During 78 days of bombing, air strikes extended to economic and civilian facilities.
Infrastructure, education and health institutions, media premises, cultural monuments,
churches and monasteries were destroyed
• Strikes ceased on June 10, 1999, after signing a military-technical agreement in Kumanovo on
the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army and police from Kosovo and Metohija. Resolution 1244
was also adopted by the Security Council on this date

4
 Power system during the NATO attacks

• From April 23 to June 3, 1999, there were 37 attacks on Serbian power facilities (with more than
100 destructive bombs with special charges)
• Out of this number, 10 included simultaneous attacks to a number of facilities aimed at causing
power system blackout
• PU Elektroprivreda Srbije (EPS) suffered severe destruction, while the most disastrous damage
was incurred to the electricity transmission system operated by Elektroistok (EI) company
• Interconnection of the Balkan countries was jeopardized as well
• Task of EPS and EI employees was to mitigate as much as possible the consequences of such
attacks and prevent humanitarian disasters of larger scale

5
SERBIAN POWER SYSTEM
before March 24, 1999
 International environment

• Since September 26, 1991, Serbian power system was not operating as a single system and a
part of UCPTE. Power systems of Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and a part of BiH were in
parallell operation with the systems of Greece and Albania (II synchronous area)
• Romanian PS was in synchronous operation within the II synchronous area since 1994, and the
Bulgarian PS since 1996

7
 II UCPTE synchronous area

Republic of
Srpska Serbia Romania

Net capacity: 8328 МW

Montenegro 400 kV
Bulgaria
Macedonia
220 kV

Аlbania
Greece

8
 Internal problems

• Power system in Serbia was significantly deteriorated before the air raids
• Being damaged, the following overhead lines were not operational:
400 kV
 SS Nis 2 – SS Kosovo B
 SS Kosovo B – SS Ribarevina (Montenegro)
220 kV
 SS Krusevac 1 – SS Kosovo B
 SS Kosovo B – SS Glogovac – SS Prizren 2

• Electricity consumption was on the rise due to low prices

• Coal and electricity production in thermal power plants in Kosovo and Metohija was hindered

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STAGES IN AIR ATTACKS ON POWER
SYSTEM FACILITIES
 Phases in NATO attacks from the aspect of PS operation

First phase Second phase Third phase

24/3 – 1/5/1999 2/5 – 22/5/1999 22/5 – 10/6/1999

• Massive attacks using • Destruction of

• Individual transmission
facilities targerted with the
aim to prevent supply to
particular groups of
consumers
bombs with conductive transmission system
fibres for the most facilities and overhead
important transmission lines
system nodes aimed at
causing blackout

11
 First phase: March 24 – May 1, 1999

• Prior to April 23, 1999, problems of power system operational control were reduced to repairing
disturbances caused by the transmission system failures resulting from bombing the facilities in
the immediate vicinity of the power line routes
• On April 23, 1999, the transformers in SS Belgrade 3 (220/110/10 kV; 2x150 MVA) and SS
Belgrade 9 (110/35 kV; 2х63 MVA) were bombed
Consequences:
• SS Belgrade 3 – both transformers destroyed
• SS Belgrade 9 – one transformer destroyed, the other damaged

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 23/04/1999
SRBO BRAN
Z R E N J A N IN 2
NO VI SAD 3

BEO G R AD 9
BEO G RAD 5
BEO G RAD 17
H IP
E S T IN O V O PANCEVO 2
M LADO ST B E O G R .3

S .M IT R O V IC A 2
O BRENO VAC TE DRM NO
TENT B
BEO G RAD 8 SM ED. 3
SABAC 3
TENT A
H E D JE R D A P 1

V A LJE V O 3
13
 Second phase: May 2 – May 22, 1999

• On May 2, 1999, the most important facilities of the transmission grid were attacked,
including: SS 400/220 kV Obrenovac, SS 400/220/110 kV Novi Sad 3, SS 400/220/110 kV Nis 2,
SS 220/110/35 kV Bajina Basta and SS 400 kV Drmno
• First simultaneous bombing of a huge number of high voltage facilities with the aim to cause
the breakdown of power system and to prevent the supply of consumers as long as possible
• Conductive fibres were released directly to bus bars, thus causing a number of short circuits
• Bombing of transmission facilities with conductive fibres continued on the following dates:
 May 7, 1999
 May 13, 1999
 May 22, 1999

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 Z R E N J A N IN 2
NO VI SAD 3

BEO G RAD 5
02/05/1999
BEO G R AD 17
H IP
E R N E S T IN O V O PANC EVO 2
M LADO ST B E O G R .3

S .M IT R O V IC A 2
O BRENO VAC TE DRM NO
TENT B
BEO G RAD 8 SM ED. 3 P O R T IL E
D E F IE R
SABAC 3
TENT A
H E D JE R D A P 1

V A LJE V O 3

K R AG U JEV A C 2
BO R 2

HE CACAK 3
RHE B. BASTA
B A J IN A B A S T A
B. BASTA

KRUSEVAC 1
V IS E G R A D PO ZEG A K R A LJEV O 3

H E B IS T R IC A
N IS 2

15
 Consequences of the attack of May 2, 1999

• Partial blackout of the power system and exclusion from operation of:
• 72% of total installed transformation power of 400/х kV/kV
• 79% of 400 kV OHL
• 64% of total installed power in EPS thermal power capacities
• Bombed facilities could not be used for reconnecting the system
• Evacuation of potentially generated power from the most important thermal and hydro power
plants was disabled
• High voltage power transmission was prevented, as only the 110 kV grid remained operational

16
• Third phase: May 22 - June 10, 1999
After temporary disabling of facilities, NATO attacks grew into destruction of capacities
• This transition was made in a combined attack on May 22
• Other important raids during the third phase included:
May 23, 1999
May 25, 1999
May 26, 1999
May 27, 1999
May 31, 1999
• Each of these attacks additionally deteriorated the conditions within the power system, as it was not
possible to repair such heavily damaged equipment in the period between two strikes

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 Z R E N J A N IN 2
NO VI SAD 3

BEO G R AD 5 22/05/1999
E R N E S T IN O V O
B E O G R A D 1 7 H IP

M LAD O ST B E O G R .3 PANCEVO 2
S .M IT R O V IC A 2
TE
O BRENO VAC
DRM NO
TENT B P O R T IL E
BEO G RAD 8 SM ED. 3 D E F IE R
SABAC 3
TENT A
H E D JE R D AP 1
V ALJEV O 3

TE KO LU BAR A
BO R 3
K R A G U JE V A C 2 BO R 2

HE CACAK 3
B. BASTA
RHE B A J IN A B A S T A
B. BASTA
KRUSEVAC 1
V IS E G R A D PO ZEG A K R ALJEV O 3

H E B IS T R IC A
N IS 2

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 Z R E N J A N IN 2
NO VI SAD 3

BEO G RAD 5
E R N E S T IN O V O 23/05/1999
BEO G R AD17
H IP
M LAD O ST
PANCEVO 2
B E O G R .3
S .M IT R O V IC A 2
TE
O BRENO VAC DRM NO
TENT B P O R T IL E
BEO G RAD 8 SM ED. 3 D E F IE R
SABAC 3
TENT A
H E D JE R D A P 1
V A LJE V O 3
TE KO LUBARA

BO R 3
KR AG U JEVAC 2 BO R 2

HE CACAK 3
B. BASTA
B A J IN A B A S T A
RHE
B. BASTA KRUSEVAC 1
V IS E G R A D PO ZEG A K R ALJEVO 3

H E B IS T R IC A N IS 2

S O F IJ A

PLJEVLJA 19
LESKO VAC 2
 SRBO BRAN
Z R E N J A N IN 2
NO VI SAD 3

27/05/1999
BEO G RAD 5
E R N E S T IN O V O BEO G R AD17
H IP
M LADO ST PANCEVO 2
BEO G . 3
S .M IT R O V IC A 2
O BRENO VAC TE
TENT B DRM NO
P O R T IL E
BEO G RAD 8 SM ED. 3 D E F IE R
SABAC 3
TENT A

H E D JE R D A P 1
VALJEVO 3

K R A G U JE V A C 2 BO R 2

HE CACAK 3
B. BASTA
RHE B A J IN A B A S T A
B. BASTA
KRUSEVAC 1
V IS E G R A D PO ZEG A K R A LJE V O 3

H E B IS T R IC A N IS 2

S O F IJ A
20
P LJE V LJA
 SRBO BRAN
Z R E N J A N IN 2
NO VI SAD 3

31/05/1999
BEO G RAD 5
E R N E S T IN O V O
BEO G RAD17
H IP
M LAD O ST PANCEVO 2
B E O G R .3
S .M IT R O V IC A 2
O BRENO VAC TE
TENT B DR M NO
BEO G R AD 8 P O R T IL E
SM ED. 3
D E F IE R
SABAC 3
TENT A
H E D JE R D A P 1
V A LJE V O 3

K R A G U JE V A C 2 BO R 2

HE CACAK 3
B. BASTA
RHE B A J IN A B A S T A
B. BASTA
KRUSEVAC 1
V IS E G R A D PO ZEG A K R A LJEV O 3

H E B IS T R IC A N IS 2

S O F IJ A 21

P LJE V LJA
Novi Sad 3 SubStation 22
POWER SYSTEM
OPERATION
during the NATO bombing
Condition of the power system after the attack of May 2, 1999

Significantly worsened circumstances:

• Five key nodes of 400 kV and 220 kV transmission grid were out of operation
• It was not possible to use all the power plants for restoring the system
• System analysis was made difficult based on the limited scope of information received from the
sites in a very short time
• Nodes with short circuits had to be isolated
• Decisions needed to be taken within the shortest possible time on the manner of system
restoration and potential routes of suppling priority consumers
• It was necessary to introduce large-scale load-shedding in distributions (significantly higher
than envisaged by the emergency load-shedding plans) and pass decision on the allowed
quotas for the SS 110/x kV

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 First phase of system repair

System restoration was divided into two phases:

Initially, the supply of priority consumers was provided and voltage for own production was
forwarded to TPP Kolubara and TPP Kostolac A from the closest supply points. This implied the
simultaneous creation of a number of subsystems and islands
After the successfully formed power system by means of 110 kV network, priority consumers in
Belgrade and part of Vojvodina were supplied with electricity
Part of power system in south-west Serbia and Montenigrin power system EPCG at voltage levels
of 220 kV and 110 kV operated as a separate power island

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 Forming subsystems and islands

• Another subsystem with HPP Djerdap 1 and HPP Djerdap 2 was also formed in eastern Serbia
• A separate subsystem with the same frequency was established in the part of power system in
southern Serbia together with HPP Vlasina
• HPP Zvornik black started its operation and a special island was formed
• 220 kV network was used in such a way to be supplied through 220/110 kV transformer from
the 110 kV network
• System was finally established after synchronisation of Zvornik island with Djerdap subsystem
through the bus coupler bay in TPP Kolubara on May 3

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 Voltage drops and the first breakdown of the restored system

• Consumers in the central and north parts of the country were supplied from the very remote
power plants, using the 110 kV network and challanging the limits of technical possibilities for
transmission. Such acting caused severe falls in voltage and rather insecure system operation,
implying at the same time consumption restrictions of the allowed quotas, determined in real
time.
• Due to the impossibility to control the rapid consumption surge, 110 kV overhead line stopped
operating on May 3, and the established system fell apart
• Steps in restoring the system were implemented in the same way as the day before
• Based on the acquired experience, the dispatchers of all distributions, after this breakdown,
invested all the efforts possible to prevent similar disturbances

27
 Problems caused by conductive fibers
• Second part of system establishment depended on the rate of cleaning the attacked facilities
• To enable transmission in certain supply directions as soon as possible, cleaned parts of bus
bars were physically removed from the rest of the facilities. However, these actvities did not
achieve the planned results, as after their starting the wind carried back the conductive fibres
from the ground or parts of the facilities which had not been cleaned, thus causing new
tripping
• Eight blackouts were recorded in the following period due to contact with the remaining fibres
in facilities
• Significant number of operations was required to secure that certain elements were
completely cleaned prior to their energizing
• By energizing the OHL 400 kV Nis - Kragujevac, on 7 May, power system was completely
enabled for supplying all the consumers

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 Problems with Belgrade supply. Interconnection disturbances

• New attack followed immediately afterwards. Thus, on May 7, SS 400/220 kV Obrenovac, SS

400/220 kV Belgrade 8, SS 220/110/35 kV Belgrade 5 and SS 220/110 kV Belgrade 3 were
attacked with graphite bombs. Obviously, the goal was to leave Belgrade without supply. Two
days afterwards, on May 9, the supply of all consumers in the city area was secured again.
• On May 13, the first disturbance at the interconnection took place when the overhead line 400
kV Thessaloniki (Greece) – Blagoevgrad (Bulgaria) stopped operating. Weak connections of
Serbia with south partners in interconnection caused the expansion of the disturbance and
division of interconnection in a number of islands. The disturbance was repaired when the
overhead line 220 kV Podgorica - Vau Dejes (Аlbania) was activated.

29
 Repairing the damage caused by May 13, 1999 attack

• On May 13, conductive graphite fibres were thrown again to transmission facilities, which again
caused a partial blackout of the power system. The following facilities were targeted: SS Drmno
400 kV, SS Nis 2 - 400, 220 and 110 kV, SS Novi Sad 3 - 400 and 110 kV and SS Kolubara - SS 110
kV and 35 kV. After this attack, the power system fell apart into a number of subsystems and
islands.
• As the overhead power line 220 kV SS Podgorica – SS Vau Dajes (Albania) stopped operating, a
part of Serbian power system, which included north, central and western part of the country
together with the power system of Montenegro and the Republic of Srpska, remained in
isolated operation
• Activation of underfrequency protection in the first phase or at the frequency of 49.2 Hz saved
this island from falling apart, despite the high power deficiency. Of all the generators in
operation, only the generators in TPP Kolubara stopped operating
• By May 16, all the consumers were supplied from the high-voltage network, except from the
damaged SS 110/x Bor 3 and SS SARTID (steel mill), which were ruined in the direct attack on
May 15, 1999

30
 Consequences of air strike of May 22, 1999

• The period after the air raids of May 22 at 2:18 a.m. was full of the dramatic events taking
place every minute:
• The system was separated into a number of islands whose borders were to be
determined. The frequency of one of them dropped to 47.5 Hz, causing the activation of
underfrequency protection in all four levels
• Sharp voltage surge was recorded in one of the islands due to significant unloading in the
high voltage network, so certain overhead lines were activated to prevent the release the
reactive energy into the system
• Connecting networks, joining and synchronisaton of islands, were largely made more
difficult due to improper functioning of synchroscopes in certain SS
• Connecting network within the grid of 110 kV was not sustainable due to large oscilations
in power flow in the overhead lines of small transmission capacity

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 Entire EPS power system deenergised

• When the system was stabilized as much as possible, at 8:57 a.m, the overhead line TPP
Kosovo A – SS Skoplje 1 and SS Vranje and traction substation Ristovac was attacked, leaving
the grid of Kosovo and Metohija and western Pomoravlje without voltage, and the area of
Leskovac and Vranje with HPP Vlasina remained connected through the overhead line HPP Vrla
1 – Bulgaria to the Bulgarian power system
• Immediately afterwards, at 09:02 a.m, the island with TPP Nikola Tesla A (TENT-A) and Nikola
Tesla B (TENT-B) fell apart, most probably due to the G-3 failure in TENT-A. G-2 in TENT – B and
G – 1 in TENT – A also failed in operation, and underfrequency protection was activated, and
the 110 kV island with the HPP Potpec, HPP Kokin Brod, HPP Uvac and HPP Visegrad succeeded
to remain in isolated operation. Thus, almost all Serbian power system was left in blackout
condition.

32
 New disturbances and stabilisation

• In addition, engagement of overhead lines to the end of their technical possibilities caused
some of conductors to burn out
• After a number of manipulations, system repair and putting back into service of installations
which were cleaned during the day, two additional smaller-scale network disturbances occurred
which resulted in postponing generator synchronisation in the first case, and the failure of
generator in TENT-A in the second case
• The system was reestablished (restored) at 08:00 pm
• Only 10 minutes after the explosion of the circuit breaker of the overhead power line HPP
Bajina Basta - SS Bajina Basta in SS Bajina Basta, the complete HPP Bajina Basta with four
engaged generators stopped operating
• New distrubance occurred at 10:35, when a part of the system broke down, due to insufficienly
cleaned installation of 220 kV in SS Belgrade 8
• System was stabilised again after midnight

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 Response to direct power system destruction

• However, on May 23, the facilities of 400 kV and 220 kV in SS Obrenovac were attacked by
destructive bombs
• On the same date, parts of facilities of SS Novi Sad, SS Drmno and SS Nis 2 were destroyed as
well
• Destruction continued in the following days: on May 25, the towers of 400 kV and 220 kV
overhead lines at the crossing near Sava river were destroyed
• On May 27, the facility SS Belgrade 8 and transformers in SS Belgrade 5 were attacked
• Attacks on the transmission facilities culminated by destruction of transformers in SS 400/220
kV Obrenovac, SS 400/220/110 kV Novi Sad 3 and SS 400/220/110 kV Nis 2, in early morning
hours on May 31.
• Each of these attacks additionally deteriorated the situation in power system, as it was not
possible to repair such heavy damage in the period between the two attacks

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 General overview of PS operation in war conditions

• 24 smaller or larger-scale blackouts of part or even a whole power system

• Under-frequency protection activated four times
• Stability of operation of Balkan countries interconnection significantly jeopardised
• Undelivered electricity (for the period March 1 - October 1, 1999) was estimated at 700 GWh
• Along with the effects of production decrease due to the conditions of war, the total decrease is
estimated at 3200 GWh
• Valuable assistance of neighbouring power systems in critical moments
• Since June 11, 1999, EPS has no control over the production of coal and production of electricity
in thermal power plants in Kosovo and Metohija (one fourth of the producton capacities of EPS)

35
 System operation

Within the destroyed facilities EPS and EI employees used all available elements to enable the
most important overhead lines:
• Two or three overhead power lines were connected to the anciliary systems of bus bars through
disconnectors
• Connections were established to exclude the non-operational substations
• Part of 220 kV bus bars in SS Obrenovac was used for supplying own consumption in TENT A
and B and HPP Zvornik (connected to the 110 kV network), by the transformer 220/110 kV in SS
Sabac 3, while the other part of bus bars in SS Obrenovac was used for the placement of the
generated electricity
• Radial operation of a generator in the reversible pumped storage Bajina Basta, over the ancillary
system of bus bars and only one overhead line SS Bajina Basta - SS Belgrade 3

36
 Periods of multi-subsystem o

Operation with numerous subsystems and islands

May 2 - June 12, 1999
)
from May 2nd till June 12th, 1999

Number of
Period (hours)
subsystems
Total system 340.5
2 15
3 133
4 297.5
5 125.5
6 53.5
7 3.5

37
 Organisation of dispatching unit operation

• Operation control centre has been relocated to the reserve center, planned for such situations
• Significant number of measurements in SCADA system unavailable to dispatchers and a
number of power line carriers non-operational
• Third dispacher added in the shift, and the fourth on the alert.

38
39
 Periods of multi-subsystem o
Specific characteristics of dispatching organisationin hours)
from May 2nd till June 12th, 1999

• Young team of Operational management department succeeded in meeting the goals

successfully
• Number of problems which the dispachers faced corresponds to the period of 10 years, if
compared to normal conditions
• Certain problems were so unusual that such experiences are rare to encounter in a lifetime
• Not any of the operational activity of dispatchers resulted in material damage or human
victims

40
 Periods of multi-subsystem o
Coordinated operation of all power system levels hours)
from May 2nd till June 12th, 1999

High-level coordination of all the power system operation levels:

• National Control Center dispatchers
• Regional Control Center dispatchers
• Dispatchers of electricity distribution companies
• Duty staff for facility and power plant operation, maintenance and protection

41
CONSEQUENCES OF DESTROYING
POWER SYSTEM FACILITIES
Consequences of destroying transmission system facilities

• Serbian power system was left without 31 transformers (18 power transformers destroyed, 13
power transformers damaged, 27% of total installed power of 400/х and 220/х kV/kV
transformers non-functional)
• 21 overhead lines damaged
• 25 suspension and tension towers destroyed
• 19 bays 400 kV damaged
• 15 bays 220 kV damaged
• 47 bays 110 kV damaged
• SS Bor 3 (2х40 MVA) ruined

43
 SAND O RFALVA
S U B O T IC A 3

SRBO BRAN
SERBIAN POWER
SYSTEM
NO VI SAD 3 Z R E N J A N IN 2

E R N E S T IN O V O
BEO G RAD 5

BG 3
B EO G R AD 17
H IP
PANCEVO 2
AFTER THE NATO AIR
STRIKES
M LADO ST
S .M IT R O V IC A 2
O BRENO VAC TE
TENT B SM ED. 3 DR M NO
BEO G R AD 8 H E D JE R D A P 1
P O R T IL E
SABAC 3
TENT A D E F IE R
LEG END
V A LJE V O 3 TE KO LU BAR A S S 4 0 0 /1 1 0 k V
BO R 3
S S 2 2 0 /1 1 0 k V
K R A G U JE V A C 2 BO R 2

HE
TRANSFO RM ERS
CACAK 3
B. BASTA B A J IN A
RH E
B. BASTA
BASTA
40 0 k V L IN E S
KRUSEVAC 1
V IS E G R A D PO ZEG A K R ALJEV O 3
22 0 k V L IN E S
H E B IS T R IC A N IS 2
HYDRO POW ER PLANTS
TH ERM O PO W ER PLANTS
S O F IJ A

P LJE V LJA DESTRO Y ED TO W ERS

LES KO VAC 2

KO SO VO B
DESTRO Y ED TRANSFO R M ERS
R IB A R E V IN A
TE KO SO VO B
G LO G O VAC
O U T O F O P E R A T IO N L IN E S
P R IS T IN A 4
KO SO VO A
D A M A G E D S U B S T A T IO N S
BN

T E M P O R A R Y C O N E C T IO N S
F IE R Z A P R IZ R E N 2

44

S K O P LJE
POWER SYSTEM RESTORATION
 Power system restoration

• Restoration program for the non-operational power system facilities was adopted on 15 July
1999
• Program provided specification of necessary equipment, devices and materials, overview of
works and restoration timetable in four stages
• Works on the power system reconstruction and restoration were finished after 177 days, on 4
December 1999 (first three phases)
• Complete restoration of power facilities and the elements of generation, transmission and
distributon system was completed in 2004, while numerour parts of the power system were
replaced with new ones (fourth phase)
• Employees of electrical engineering and construction companies in Serbia significantly
contributed to power system restoration

46
PHOTO ALBUM
Bombed power system elements
49
50
51
52
53
Destroyed towers
55
56
Conductive fibres
58
59
60
61
Elektomreza Srbije
March 2019
62