Faculty of Chemical Engineering

Universiti Teknologi MARA

Hazards and Operability

Studies (HAZOP)
HAZOP
• This technique uses a systematic process to (1)
identify possible deviations from normal operations
and (2) ensure that appropriate safeguards are in
place to help prevent accidents.
• Carried out by a team and involve brain-storming.
• Before a HAZOP is carried out, detailed information on
the process must be available. This include, process
flow diagram (PFD), process & instrumentation
diagram (P&ID), equipment specifications, materials of
construction, mass & energy balances.
 HAZOP
• This technique uses special guidewords such as:
• NO
• MORE
• HIGHER
• LESS
• The guidewords are combined with process
parameters (e.g. speed, flow, pressure etc.) to
systematically consider all credible deviations from
normal conditions. For example:
• MORE FLOW
• HIGHER TEMPERATURE
HAZOP
Potential Potential
Accident Accident

Deviation 1 Deviation 3

NORMAL OPERATION (e.g. normal feed flow rate into a reactor)

Deviation 2 Deviation 4

Potential Potential
Accident Accident

Guideword + Process Parameter = Deviation

“LESS” + “FLOW” = “ LESS FLOW”
“MORE” + “FLOW” = “ MORE FLOW”
Step 1 in HAZOP: Choose a study
node
• A node is a specific location in the process in which
the deviations of the process/design intention are
evaluated.
 Example might be: separator, heat exchanger, scrubber,
pump, compressor, pipeline, etc.
• Design/process intent is how a study node is expected
or required to behave.
 For example: A reactor is designed to operate between 300
to 360 °C, OR
 Cooling water is expected to continuously flow inside a
cooling coil
Step 1 in HAZOP: Choose a study
node
Step 2 in HAZOP: Pick a Process
Parameter
• Example:
• Flow
• Level
• Temperature
• Pressure
• Concentrations
• pH
• Agitation
• State (solid, liquid, or gas)
• Volume
Step 3 in HAZOP: Apply a
guideword
Guidewords Meaning Guidewords Meaning
PART OF Only some of the
NO, NOT, The complete negation design intentions are
NONE of the intention achieved.
MORE, Quantitative increase REVERSE The logical opposite of
HIGHER, (temperature, flow rate, OTHER Complete substitution
GREATER heating, reaction). THAN
LESS, LOWER Quantitative decrease SOONER Too early or in the
(temperature, flow rate, THAN wrong order
heating reaction) LATER THAN Too late or in the wrong
order
AS WELL AS Intentions are achieved WHERE ELSE In additional locations
along with some
additional activity, such
as contamination.
Step 3 in HAZOP: Apply a
guideword
• Some combinations of guideword and process
parameter are meaningless.
• For example: NO TEMPERATURE; PART OF PRESSURE;
REVERSE PRESSURE
• The guidewords AS WELL AS, PART OF, and OTHER
THAN can sometimes be conceptually difficult to
apply.
• The guidewords SOONER THAN, LATER THAN, and
WHERE ELSE applicable to batch processing.
Step 4 in HAZOP: Determine
possible causes
• Some Possible Causes of NO FLOW:
• No reactant in the intermediate storage
• Pump breaks down
• Line blockage
• Line fracture
• Isolation valve closed in error
• Some Possible Causes of LESS FLOW:
• Partial blockage
• Defective pump
• Density or viscosity changes
• Leaking
Step 4 in HAZOP: Determine
possible causes
• Some Possible Causes of HIGH FLOW:
• Increased pumping capacity
• Increased suction pressure
• Control faults
• Running multiple pumps
• Some Possible Causes of REVERSE FLOW:
• Defective one way (check) valve
• Incorrect pressure differential
• Pump reversed
• Two way flow
Step 4 in HAZOP: Determine
possible causes
• Some Possible Causes of HIGH LEVEL:
• Outlet isolated or blocked
• Faulty level measurement
• Inflow or outflow control failure
• Pressure surge
• Some Possible Causes of LOW LEVEL:
• Inlet flow stops
• Leak
• Control failure
• Faulty level measurement
Step 4 in HAZOP: Determine
possible causes
• Some Possible Causes of HIGH PRESSURE:
• Relief valve isolated
• Boiling
• Incorrect vent set pressure for vents
• Surge problem
• Possible Causes of LOW PRESSURE:
• Generation of vacuum conditions
• Undetected leakage
• Gas dissolving in liquid
• Restricted pump/compressor line
Step 4 in HAZOP: Determine
possible causes
• Some Possible Causes of HIGH TEMPERATURE:
• Fouled or failed heat exchanger tubes
• Cooling water failure
• Internal fire
• Faulty instrumentation and control
• Possible Causes of LOW TEMPERATURE:
• Fouled or failed heat exchanger tubes
• Loss of heating
• Faulty instrumentation and control
Step 5 in HAZOP: Evaluate the
consequences of the deviation
• CONSEQUENCES may both comprise process hazards and
operability (e.g. shut down) problems.
• More CONSEQUENCES may results from one CAUSE.
• In turn, one CONSEQUENCE can have several CAUSES.

Consequence of LESS LEVEL in V-40

 V-40 empty leading to pump P-8

running dry
Final Step in HAZOP
• Recommend action
• What?
• By whom
• By when?
• It is at this stage that consequences and associated
safeguards are considered.
• Action falls into two groups:
• Actions that remove the cause
• Actions that mitigate or eliminate the consequences.
• RECORD ALL THE INFORMATION !!!!
Sample of HAZOP Worksheet
HAZOP of a Car
Item Study Process Deviations Possible causes Possible Action required
node Parameters (guide consequences
words)
1A Tire Tread LESS 1. Tire too old 1. Car skidded 1. Check tire
tread
frequently.
Have a spare
2. Often 2. “ tire
speeding and 2. Avoid speeding
emergency if unnecessary
brake.
1B Pressure HIGHER 1. Over-inflation 1. Tire could damage
easily when running 1. Use correct
over pot holes or pressure when
debris on the road. inflate the tire

1C LOWER 3. Under- 1. Tire failure.

inflation Shorten the life of 1. Check tire
tire tread. pressure
Increase rolling regularly
resistance and Use correct
increase fuel pressure
consumption. when inflate
Loss of steering the tire
precision and
cornering
stability.
4. Tire puncture 2. “ 2. Repair or
replace tire
HAZOP of a Reactor System
 HAZOP of a Reactor System
• The reaction inside the reactor system shown in the previous
slide is exothermic.
• A cooling system is provided to remove the excess energy of
reaction.
• When the cooling function is lost, the reactor temperature
would increase. This would lead to an increase in the
reaction rate, leading to additional energy release.
• The result would be a runaway reaction with pressures
exceeding the bursting pressure of the reactor vessel.
• We want to perform a HAZOP study on this unit using cooling
coil (process parameters: flow & temp) and the stirrer
(process parameter: agitation) as study nodes.
Item Study Process Deviations Possible causes Possible Action required
node Parameters (guide consequences
words)
1A Coolin Flow No 1. Controller fails 1. Loss of cooling, 1. Always check
g Coils and closes valve possible and monitor
runaway
2. Plugged cooling 2. “ 2. Install filter
coils Install flow meter
Install low flow
alarm
3. Cooling water 3. “ 3. Check and
service failure monitor reliability of
water service
1B High 1. Controller fails 1. Reactor cools, 1. Instruct
and opens valve reactant conc. operators and
builds, possible update procedures
runaway on
1C heating.
Low 2. Partially plugged 1. Diminished 1. See 1A. 2
cooling line cooling, possible
runaway
3. Partial water 2. “ 2. See 1A. 3
source failure
1D Temp Low 1. Low water 1. None – 1. None
supply controller handles
temperature
High 1. High water 1. Cooling system 1. Install cooling
supply capacity limited, water high temp
temperature temp increases alarm.
Item Study Process Deviations Possible causes Possible Action required
node Parameters (guide consequences
words)
2A Stirrer Agitation No 1. Stirrer motor 1. No mixing, 1. Interlock with
malfunction possible feed line
accumulation of
unreacted
materials
2. Power failure 2. Monomer feed 2. Automatically
continues, close monomer
possible feed valve on
accumulation of power loss.
unreacted
materials
2B More 1. Stirrer motor 1. None 1. None
controller fails,
resulting in high
motor speed
HAZOP of a Polyethylene
Plant
 HAZOP of a Polyethylene
Plant
• Previous slide shows a simplified flow diagram of a
polyethylene plant.
• Ethylene at 1500 bar and 175°C is fed with a reaction
initiator, into the reactor where 15-25% of it polymerize to
form polymer product called polyethylene.
• A cooling jacket removes the heat of reactions.
• The product is separated from the unconverted gas in two
separators and the gas is recycled.
• We want to carry out a HAZOP study with reactor as a study
node and the temperature and flow rate (ethylene,
polyethylene & initiator) as process parameters.
Item Study Process Deviations Possible causes Possible Action required
node Parameters (guide consequences
words)
1A Reactor Temperatu HIGHER 1. Coolant pump 1. Runaway 1. Provide
re to reactor reaction in temp. control
fails. reactor Provide high
“ temp alarm
Provide spare
coolant
2. Coolant temp 2. “ pump
high 2. Provide heat
exchanger
temp control
to adjust inlet

1B LOWER 1. Coolant temp 1. Poor or no cooler temp

low reaction; poor
quality product 1. Provide temp
monitoring
in
reactor
Use heat
exchanger to
adjust inlet
coolant
temp.
Item Study Process Deviations Possible causes Possible Action required
node Parameters (guide consequences
words)
1C Reactor Flow NO 1. Melt Pump 1 1. Level build up in 1. Provide
(polyethyle fails reactor level control
ne) “ in reactor with
automatic flow
through a
spare pump
1D Flow LESS 1. Make-up or 1. System upset ; 1. Provide a spare
(ethylene) recycle Product quality compressor
compressor affected; with auto
failure system s/down switch from
the failed
compressor
1E Flow MORE 2. Initiator pump 1. More 1. Provide
(Initiator) malfunction polymerisation; adequate
possibility of flow controls
runaway; on both
product quality initiator and
off-spec. monomer to
maintain
desired
initiator to
monomer
ratio.
LESS 3. Initiator pump 2. Less Provide flow
malfunction polymerisation; controllers
product quality on
affected ethylene and
initiator lines.
 Limitations of HAZOP
• Requires a well-defined system or activity
• To apply the HAZOP guidewords effectively and to address
the potential accidents that can result from the guide word
deviations, the analysis team must have access to detailed
design and operational information.
• Tedious to apply and time consuming.
• Focuses on one-event causes of deviations
• The HAZOP process focuses on identifying single failures
that can result in accidents of interest.