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The MR of the petitioners was denied; hence, they filed a
RULE 72 petition forcertiorari, contending that:

(1) the venue was improperly laid; (2) the trial court did not
Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules acquire jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share of the
surviving spouse was included in the intestate proceedings;
VDA DE MANALO VS. CA (2001) (4)there was absence of earnest efforts toward
Arcilla, Jay compromise among members of the same family, in
accordance with Article 222 of NCC, and (5) no certification of
FACTS: non-forum shopping was attached to the petition.
Troadio Manalo, a resident of Sampaloc, Manila, died
intestate in 1992. He was survived by his wife and his eleven CA dismissed; MR was denied. Hence, this petition for
children, who are all of legal age. He left several real properties review.
located in Manila and in Tarlac including a business- Manalo’s
Machine Shop with offices at Quezon City and at Valenzuela. In ISSUES:
November, the respondents, who are eight of the W/N CA erred in upholding the questioned orders of the
surviving children filed a petition with the RTC for the judicial RTC which denied their motion for the outright dismissal
settlement of the estate of their late father and for the of the petition for judicial settlement of estate ?
appointment of their brother, Romeo, ias administrator thereof.
The trial court issued an order setting the said petition for RULING:
hearing and directing the publication of the order for three (3) NO. The Petition for Issuance of Letters of
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate is a
Metro Manila, and directing service by registered mail of the SPECIAL PROCEEDING and, as such, it is a remedy
order. The trial court issued an order declaring the whole world whereby the respondents seek to establish a status, a
in default, except the government, and set the reception right, or a particular fact..
of evidence of the petitioners.
In the determination of the nature of an action
However, this order of general default was set aside by the trial or proceeding, the averments and the character of
court upon motion of the petitioners who were granted ten(10) the relief sought in the complaint shall be controlling.
days within which to file their opposition to the petition. A careful scrutiny of the petition belies the claim that the same
is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petition
The trial court called resolved such issues in the contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a
following manner: petition for the settlement of estate of a
1. admitted the opposition for the purpose of considering the deceased person such as the fact of death and
merits 2. denied the hearing for such affirmative defenses are his residence which are foundation facts upon
irrelevant and immaterial 3.declared that the court had which all the subsequent proceedings in the
jurisdiction 4.denied the motion for inhibition 5.) set the administration of the estate rest. It also
application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regular contains an enumeration of the names of his legal
administrator in the for hearing. heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by
the deceased which are sought to be settled in
the probate proceedings. In addition, the reliefs
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 60

prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired the 2nd
as regard the intention to seek judicial settlement of the lot by making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale
estate of their deceased father. in her favour; that their legitimes have been impaired. In her
reply, Natcher averred that she was legally married to
DISPOSITION:Petition is denied for lack of merit
Graciano on 20 March 1980 and thus, under the law, she
was likewise considered a compulsory heir of the
latter .RTC ruled that the deed of sale executed by the late
Graciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia Natcher is prohibited by
law and thus a complete nullity, that no evidence that a
separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage
PATRICIA NATCHER VS. HON. COURT OFAPPEALS
settlements nor there has been decreed a judicial separation of
Arcilla, Jay
property between them ,hence, the spouses are prohibited
FACTS: from entering into a contract of sale. It is not also a valid
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra donation BUT can be regarded as an extension of
were registered owners of a parcel of land in Manila .Upon the advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a
death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six compulsory heir of the deceased. On appeal, the Court of
children entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower courts decision
Graciana's estate. They adjudicated and divided among ratiocinating t is the probate court that has exclusive
themselves the real property .Under the agreement: Graciano jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the
received 8/14 share while each of the six children received 1/14 estate. The court a quo, trying an ordinary action for
share of the said property .The heirs executed and forged an reconveyance/annulment of title, went beyond its
"Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a special
Waiver of Rights"- they subdivided among themselves the proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased
parcel of land. Graciano then donated to his children, share and person.
share alike, a portion of his interest in the land amounting to ISSUE:
4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60 square May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general
meters registered under Graciano's name .The land was jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance/ annulment of title
with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of
further subdivided into two separate lots. Graciano sold the 1 st
the estate of a deceased person particularly on questions as to
lot to a third person but retained ownership over the 2ndlot. advancement of property made by the decedent to any of the
Graciano married petitioner Patricia Natcher .He sold the heirs?
2nd lot to Natcher, a title was issued under her name. Graciano
dies leaving his 6 children and Natcher as heirs . HELD:
A civil case was filed a complaint before the RTC of Manila by NO. CA decision is AFFIRMED.
the 6 children; alleging that Natcher through the employment

Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Special proceeding # 5198 (settlement of intestate
Procedure defines civil action and special proceedings, in this estate of Calaliman) was filed in RTC Iloilo. RTC rendered a
wise: a) A civil actionis one by which a party sues another for decision that they will no longer be setting any hearing as
parties assured that they are going to submit a "Motion for
the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
judgment based on an amicable settlement" on or before
redress of a wrong. December 25, 2004. On March 2, 2005, RTC terminated the
A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are proceedings for failure to submit amicable settlement invoking
governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to Sec.3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner and Calaliman
specific rules prescribed for a special civil action. A special filed MR. On the ground that it was premature there being yet
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a no payment of debt and distribution of estate and that they
status, a right or a particular fact. There lies a marked have prepared necessary papers for amicable settlement. MR,
distinction between an action and a special proceeding. An denied.Hence this petition.
actionis a formal demand of ones right in a court of justice in
the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the ISSUE: whether or not Judge Ruiz is correct in dismissing the
method of applying legal remedies according to definite case for failure of parties to submit amicable settlement?
established rules. The term special proceedingmay be
defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status RULING: Judge Ruiz erred when it dismissed the case for failure
or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special of parties to submit amicable settlement. While a compromise
proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the agreement or an amicable settlement is very strongly
statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the encouraged, the failure to consummate one does not warrant
remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion any procedural sanction, much less provide an authority for the
It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include court to jettison the case. Sp. Proc. No. 5198 should not have
those proceedings which are instituted and prosecuted been terminated or dismissed by the trial court on account of
according to the ordinary rules and provisions relating to the mere failure of the parties to submit the promised amicable
actions at law or suits in equity, and that special proceedings settlement and/or the Motion for Judgment Based On An
include those proceedings which are not ordinary in this sense, Amicable Settlement. Given the non-contentious nature of
but is instituted and prosecuted according to some special special proceedings (which do not depend on the will of an
mode as in the case of proceedings commenced without actor, but on a state or condition of things or persons not
summons and prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are entirely within the control of the parties interested), its
characteristics of ordinary actions. A special proceeding must dismissal should be ordered only in the extreme case where the
therefore be in the nature of a distinct and independent termination of the proceeding is the sole remedy consistent
proceeding for particular relief, such as may be instituted with equity and justice, but not as a penalty for neglect of the
independently of a pending action, by petition or motion upon parties therein. The third clause of Section 3, Rule 17, which
notice authorizes the motu propio dismissal of a case if the plaintiff
fails to comply with the rules or any order of the court, cannot
TABUADA VS. RUIZ even be used to justify the convenient, though erroneous,
Azarcon, Pia Lea termination of the proceedings herein. An examination of the
December 6, 2004 Order readily reveals that the trial court
FACTS: neither required the submission of the amicable settlement or
the aforesaid Motion for Judgment, nor warned the parties that

should they fail to submit the compromise within the given pending claims then being litigated before the Bacolod City
period, their case would be dismissed. Hence, it cannot be courts.
categorized as an order requiring compliance to the extent that
its defiance becomes an affront to the court and the rules. And Subsequently, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a
even if it were worded in coercive language, the parties cannot Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, praying that they
be forced to comply, for, as aforesaid, they are only strongly be furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining
encouraged, but are not obligated, to consummate a to the intestate proceedings. petitioners filed an omnibus
compromise. An order requiring submission of an amicable motion praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for the
settlement does not find support in our jurisprudence and is submission by private respondent of the required inventory of
premised on an erroneous interpretation and application of the the decedent's estate. Petitioners also filed other pleadings or
law and rules. motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of
private respondent in her administration of the estate, and
HILADO VS. CA assailing the inventory that had been submitted thus far as
Azarcon, Pia Lea unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.
Facts: Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion,

on the ground that petitioners are not interested parties within
The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the
intestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived by his wife, private intestate proceedings. CA likewise dismissed the petition.
respondent Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto),
and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino. At the time ISSUE:
of his death, there were two pending civil cases against WON creditors whose credit is based on contingent claim
Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first, was then pending have the right to participate in the settlement proceeding by
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44, way of intervention under Rule 19
with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein.
The second was then pending with the RTC of Bacolod City, Won petitioners, as persons interested in the intestate estate of
Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and First the deceased person, are entitled to copies of all processes and
Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein. orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings.
Thereafter, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed RULING:

with the RTC of Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of Notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set
administration in her favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent
the Revised Rules of Court. the Manila RTC issued an order whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The definition of
appointing private respondent as administrator of the estate of "intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate
her deceased husband, and issuing letters of administration in contingent claims.
her favor. In January 2001, private respondent submitted an
Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties, Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband. In the List requires that an intervenor "has a legal interest in the matter in
of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondent litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely

affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the time and place of examining and allowing the account of the
custody of the court x x x" While the language of Section 1, executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning
Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening the petition to authorize the executor or administrator to sell
in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber
the legal interest required of an intervenor "must be actual and real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for
material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and the application for an order for distribution of the estate
expectant." residue. After all, even the administratrix has acknowledged in
her submitted inventory, the existence of the pending cases
Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of filed by the petitioners.
claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under
Rule 86. These actions, being as they are civil, survive the
death of the decedent and may be commenced against the
administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87.
RULE 73
Venue and Process
#2
In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do EUSEBIO V. EUSEBIO
not provide a creditor or any person interested in the estate, Alvarez, Miguel Lorenzo
the right to participate in every aspect of the testate or
intestate proceedings, but instead provides for specific FACTS:
instances when such persons may accordingly act in those
proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to In the instant case, petitioner Eugenio Eusebio filed with
intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed to the CFI of Rizal a petition for his appointment as administrator
seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not of the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio. He alleged that his
explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief father, who died on November 28, 1952, resided in Quezon City.
sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and Eugenio’s siblings (Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and
there is no other modality under the Rules by which such Carlos),on the other hand, who claim that they are illegitimate
interests can be protected. children of Andres, opposed the petition and alleged that
Andres was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga. They prayed
Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the venue had
records of the intestate proceedings is an eminently preferable been improperly laid.
precedent than mandating the service of court processes and
pleadings upon them. In either case, the interest of the creditor The CFI of Rizal ruled in favor of Eugenio Eusebio. Hence the
in seeing to it that the assets are being preserved and disposed petition.
of in accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied.
ISSUE:
Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Whether or not venue had been properly laid in Rizal?
Proceedings do require notice to any or all "interested parties"
the petitioners as "interested parties" will be entitled to such RULING:
notice. The instances when notice has to be given to interested
parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Don Andres In the whole, the Court found that Andres was, at the
Eusebio up to October 29, 1952, was and had always been time of his death, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga; that
domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga. He only bought a house the CFI of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an
and lot at 889-A Espana Extension, Quezon City because his administrator of the estate of the deceased, the venue having
son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at No. 41 P. been laid improperly.
Florentino St., Quezon City. Even before he was able to transfer
to the house he bought, Andres suffered a stroke and was
forced to live in his son’s residence. It is well settled that GARCIA FULE V. COURT OF APPEALS
“domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a place Alvarez, Miguel Lorenzo
merely for one own’s health” even if coupled with “knowledge
that one will never again be able, on account of illness, to return FACTS:
home. Having resided for over seventy years in Pampanga, the On April 26, 1973 Amado G. Garcia died, he owned
presumption is that Andres retained such domicile. property in Calamba, Laguna. On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule
filed with CFI Laguna a petition for letters of administration and
Andres had no intention of staying in Quezon City exparte appointment as special administratrix over the estate.
permanently. There is no direct evidence of such intent – Andres Subsequently, the motion was granted..There was an allegation
did not manifest his desire to live in Quezon City indefinitely; that the wife was Carolina Carpio
Eugenio did not testify thereon; and Dr. Jesus Eusebio was not
presented to testify on the matter. Andres did not part with, or Preciosa B. Garcia, wife of deceased, and nn behalf of
alienate, his house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Some of his their child: Agustina B. Garcia opposed, which was denied by
children remained in that municipality. In the deed of sale of his CFI. Preciosa alleged that Fule was a creditor of the estate, and
house at 889 – A Espana Ext., Andres gave San Fernando, as a mere illegitimate sister of thedeceased is not entitled to
Pampanga, as his residence. The marriage contract signed by succeed from him.
Andres when he was married in articulo mortis to Concepcion
Villanueva two days prior to his death stated that his residence The Court of Appeals reversed and annulled the
is San Fernando, Pampanga. appointment of Fule. Preciosa became special administratrix
upon a bond of P30, 000.00.
The requisites for a change of domicile include (1)
capacity to choose and freedom of choice, (2) physical presence ISSUES:
at the place chosen, (3) intention to stay therein permanently. a.)What is the distinction between venue and jurisdiction
Although Andres complied with the first two requisites, there is b.)What does the word “resides” in Revised Rules of
no change of domicile because the third requisite is absent. Court Rule 73, Section 1 mean?
RULING:
With respect to the contention that appellants submitted
themselves to the authority of the CFI of Rizal because they Rule 73, Section 1.“if the decedent is an inhabitant of
introduced evidence on the residence of the decedent, it must the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
be noted that appellants specifically made of record that they alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
were NOT submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, granted, and his estate settled at the CFI in theprovince in
except for the purpose only of assailing the same. which he resides at the time of his death, And if he is an

inhabitant of a foreign country, the CFI of any province in which Piy Margal St., Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and by his
he had estate. children of the first marriage, respondents herein, namely,
Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco, Concepcion Cuenco
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the Manguera, Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and
estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to theexclusion Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in Cebu.
of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as
it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a
thelocation of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or Petition for Letters of Administration with the Court of First
proceedings, except in an appeal from that court, inthe original Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator died intestate in
case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and
”Fule’s own submitted Death Certificate shows that the Quezon City.
deceased resided in QC at the time of his death, therefore the
venueof Laguna was improper. The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco,
Venue is subject to waiver (Rule 4, Section 4), but the second wife, filed a petition with CFI Rizal (Quezon City) for
Preciosa did not waive it, merely requested for the probate of the last will and testament, where she was
alternativeremedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse. named executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to
However, venue is distinct from “jurisdiction” which is conferred dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in abeyance resolution
by Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended to bewith CFIs over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have acted on the
independently from the place of residence of the deceased. probate proceedings.
Rule 79 Section 2, demands that the petition should Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI
show the existence of jurisdiction to make the Quezon, on ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper
appointmentsought, and should allege all the necessary facts venue, considering that CFI Cebu already acquired exclusive
such as death, name, last residence, existence, situs of assets, jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to dismiss
intestacy, right of person who seeks administration as next of were denied. Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and
kin, creditor or otherwise to be appointed. issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon.
Resides – ex vi termini “actual residence”-Elastic and The CA ruled in the following manner:
should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the
statute or rule in which it isemployed.-Same meaning as settlement of the estate of a deceased person, covers both
“inhabitant”. testate and intestate proceedings. The Special Proceeding of
the Cebu CFI having been filed ahead, it is that court whose
CUENCO VS. CA jurisdiction was first invoked and which first attached. It is that
Balanay, Rendel Bryan court which can properly and exclusively pass upon the factual
issues of (1) whether the decedent left or did not leave a valid
FACTS: will, and (2) whether or not the decedent was a resident of Cebu
at the time of his death.
In 1964, Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila Doctors’ Considering therefore that the first proceeding was instituted in
Hospital survived by his widow, the herein petitioner, Rosa the Cebu CFI), it follows that the said court must exercise
Cayetano Cuenco and their two (2) minor sons all residing at 69 jurisdiction to the exclusion of the Rizal CFI, in which the

petition for probate was filed by the respondent Rosa Cayetano left now, by the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise
Cuenco. The said respondent should assert her rights within the jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
framework of the proceeding in the Cebu CFI, instead of
invoking the jurisdiction of another court. The residence of the decent or the location of his estate is not
an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of
The respondents try to make capital of the fact that the judge of venue. If this were otherwise, it would affect the prompt
the Cebu CFI, stated that the petition for appointment of special administration of justice. It would be an unfair imposition upon
administrator was "not yet ready for the consideration of the petitioner as the one named and entitled to be executrix of the
Court today. It would be premature for this Court to act thereon, decedent's last will and settle his estate in accordance
it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue
proceeding ..." It is sufficient to state in this connection that the and the law on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more
said judge was certainly not referring to the court's jurisdiction time, money and effort to have to go from Quezon City to the
over the res, not to jurisdiction itself which is acquired from the Cebu court every time she has an important matter of the
moment a petition is filed, but only to the exercise of estate to take up with the probate court.
jurisdiction in relation to the stage of the proceedings. At all
events, jurisdiction is conferred and determined by law and In the case at bar, the Cebu court declined to take cognizance
does not depend on the pronouncements of a trial judge. of the intestate petition first filed with it and deferred to the
testate proceedings filed with the Quezon City court and in
ISSUE effect asked the Quezon City court to determine the residence
Whether or not in Special Proceedings, the court with of the decedent and whether he did leave a last will and
whom the estate or intestate petition is first filed acquires testament upon which would depend the proper venue of the
exclusive jurisdiction. estate proceedings, Cebu or Quezon City.
RULING: Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's
No. The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on the
issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court basis of the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow
from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and and finding that Quezon City was the first choice of residence of
setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission the decedent, who had his conjugal home and domicile therein
to probate of the last will and testament of the deceased and — with the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu court —
appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond could not be contested except by appeal from said court in the
pursuant to the deceased testator's wish. original case. The last paragraph of said Rule expressly
provides:
Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the ... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on
settlement of the estate of a decent, shall exercise jurisdiction the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his
to the exclusion of all other courts, not the court with whom the estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in
estate or intestate petition is first filed. Since the Quezon City an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
court took cognizance over the probate petition before it and want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73)
assumed jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and
deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court should be The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record" could probably be properly invoked, had

such deference in comity of the Cebu court to the Quezon City up to his death on December 18, 1992. Upon death of
court not appeared in the record, or had the record otherwise Felicisimo, Felicidad (respondent in this case) sought the
shown that the Cebu court had taken cognizance of the petition dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
before it and assumed jurisdiction. settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she
filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional
Finally, venue was properly assumed by and transferred to the Trial Court of Makati City.
Quezon City court and that it is the interest of justice and in
avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the
exercise of jurisdiction over the testate estate of the decedent children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to
(with the due deference and consent of the Cebu court) and its dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a
admission to probate of his last will and testament and cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of
appointment of petitioner-widow as administratrix without bond administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna
in pursuance of the decedent's express will and all its orders because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his
and actions taken in the testate proceedings before it be death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal
approved and authorized rather than to annul all such personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress
proceedings regularly had and to repeat and duplicate the same of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still
proceedings before the Cebu court only to revert once more to legally married to Merry Lee.
the Quezon City court should the Cebu court find that indeed
and in fact, as already determined by the Quezon City court on The RTC ruled that Felicidad, as a widow of the decedent,
the strength of incontrovertible documentary evidence of possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that the
record, Quezon City was the conjugal residence of the venue was properly laid. Mila, one of the children by first
decedent. marriage, filed a motion for inhibition against Judge Tensuan.
The motion was granted and the case was reraffled to Branch
SAN LUIS VS. SAN LUIS 134 presided by Judge Arcangel. Same issues were raised at the
Balanay, Rendel Bryan second trial. However, the trial court dismissed the petition for
letters of administration. It held that, at the the time of
FACTS: Felicisimo’s death, he was duly elected governor and a resident
During his lifetime, Felicisimo T. San Luis contracted of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta.
three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that
March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children. On August respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for
11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. Five years later, on letters of administration because her marriage with the
May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom decedent was bigamous, thus, void ab initio.
he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee,
an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the On appeal to the CA, it reversed the decision of the RTC. The
Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, which issued a appellate court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules
Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody of Court, the term "place of residence" of the decedent, for
on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate,
Felicidad San Luis (marriage solemnized at California, U.S.A.), refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
then surnamed Sagalongos. He had no children with respondent residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from
but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo

discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of thereat.
administration was properly filed in Makati City.
In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence
that the venue of the subject petition for letters of simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given
administration was improperly laid because at the time of his place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and
death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length
contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray and of time of residence is required though; however, the residence
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, "residence" is must be more than temporary. There is a distinction between
synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for
residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases,
claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms,
time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent,
for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, one has the intention of returning. However, for purposes of
Laguna. fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a
person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
Hence the instant petition for review on certiorari. residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his
legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with
ISSUE: continuity and consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person
Whether venue was properly laid. may have his residence in one place and domicile in another. In
the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo
RULING: was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he
Yes. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982
petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo up to the time of his death. From the foregoing, we find that
should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of
which he resides at the time of his death." The term "resides" fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. The subject
connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the
"legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms Regional Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction over
"residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on
in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a
which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the
rules - Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction
such nature - residence rather than domicile is the significant over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per
factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject
construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of
technical sense. The word "resides" should be viewed or Makati City.
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual
or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of Petition is DENIED.

RULING:
It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in
charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot
adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part
of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside
CAMAYA VS. PATULANDON parties. All that said court could do as regards said properties is
Borja, Catherine to determine whether they should or should not be included in
the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
FACTS: administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there
On November 17, 1972, Rufina Reyes (testatrix) is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties
executed a notarized will wherein she devised Lot no. 288-A to have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of
her grandson Anselmo Mangulabnan. During her lifetime, the the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot
testatrix herself filed the petition for the probate. Later, the do so.
testatrix executed a codicil modifying her will by devising the Having been apprised of the fact that the property in
said Lot 288-A in favor of her four children Bernardo (the question was in the possession of third parties and more
executor), Simplicia, Huillerma and Juan, and her grandson important, covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in the
Mangulabnan – to the extent of 1/5 each. name of such third parties, the respondent court should have
Mangulabnan later sought the delivery to him by denied the motion of the respondent administrator and
executor Patulandong of the title of Lot 288-A, but Patulandong excluded the property in question from the inventory of the
refused to heed the request because of the codicil which property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such third
modified the will of the testatrix. Thus, Mangulabnan filed an persons of their possession and ownership of the property
‘action for partition’ against Patulandong in the RTC. The court Moreover, Section 48 of the Property Registry Decree provides
in this partition ordered the partitioning of the property. that certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack.
However, the court holds that the partition is without prejudice
to the probate of the codicil in accordance with the Rules of
Court. Hence, subsequently, Patulandong filed before the PACIOLES VS. CHUATOCO-CHING
Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija a petition for probate of the Borja, Catherine
codicil of the testatrix.
Meanwhile, by virtue of the decision in the partition case, FACTS:
Mangulabnan caused the cancellation of the title of the testatrix Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties, stock
over Lot No. 288-A and a new TCT was issued in his name. He investments, bank deposits and interests in certain businesses.
later on sold the lot to herein petitioner, Camayas. She was survived by her husband, petitioner, and their two
Finally, when the RTC ruled on admitting the petition filed by minor children. Milio Pacioles husband of deceased Miguelita
Patulandong for probate of the codicil, the RTC likewise declared filed with the RTC a verified petition for the settlement of
that the sale between Mangulabnan and Camayas, null and Miguelita’s estate.
void. Miguelita’s mother, Miguela, filed an opposition, on the grounds
ISSUE: that petitioner is incompetent and unfit to exercise the duties of
Does the RTC Nueva Ecija as probate court have an administrator; and the bulk of Miguelita’s estate is composed
jurisdiction to declare the sale between Mangulabnan and of “paraphernal properties.”
Camayas null and void?

Petitioner moved to strike out respondent’s opposition, the propriety of oppositors (respondents) claim. According to
alleging that the latter has no direct and material interest in the the intestate court, if it is true that the oppositor (respondent)
estate. Respondent countered that she has direct and material owns the bulk of (Miguelitas) properties, then it means that she
interest in the estate because she gave half of her inherited has a material and direct interest in the estate and, hence, she
properties to Miguelita on condition that both of them “would should be given her day in court. The intended day in court or
undertake whatever business endeavor they decided to, in the hearing is geared towards resolving the propriety of
capacity of business partners.” respondent’s contention that she is the true owner of the bulk
Subsequently, petitioner filed with the intestate court an of Miguelitas estate.
omnibus motion that an Order be issued directing the: 1) Although, the respondent made it appear that her only intent
payment of estate taxes; 2) partition and distribution of the was to determine the accuracy of petitioner’s inventory,
estate among the declared heirs; and 3) payment of attorney’s however, a close review of the facts and the pleadings reveals
fees. Respondent opposed on the ground that the partition and her real intention.
distribution of the estate is “premature and precipitate,” Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped
considering that there is yet no determination “whether the its jurisdiction. Its proper course should have been to maintain a
properties specified in the inventory are conjugal, paraphernal hands-off stance on the matter. It is well-settled in this
or owned in a joint venture.” jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of
The intestate court allowed the payment of the estate decisions, that when a question arises as to ownership of
taxes and attorney’s fees but denied petitioner’s prayer for property alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased
partition and distribution of the estate, holding that it is indeed person, but claimed by some other person to be his property,
“premature.” It also ordered that a hearing on oppositor’s claim not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but
as indicated in her opposition to the instant petition is by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such
necessary to determine ‘whether the properties listed in the question cannot be determined in the course of an intestate or
amended complaint filed by petitioner are entirely conjugal or probate proceedings. The intestate or probate court has no
the paraphernal properties of the deceased, or a co-ownership jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be
between the oppositor and the petitioner in their partnership submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction
venture.’” as a regional trial court.
REYES vs. SOTERO

ISSUE: Bueno, Jirene Mercy
May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and
pass upon questions of ownership involving properties claimed FACTS:
to be part of the decedents estate?
RULING: Private Respondent Corazon Chichioco filed a petition for
It is already recognized that probate court may hear and the settlement of estate of Elena Lising, claiming that she is the
pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose is to niece and heir of the latter who died intestate.Petitioner Reyes
determine whether or not a property should be included in the filed for an Opposition claiming that she was an adopted child of
inventory. In such situations the adjudication is merely Elena Lising and the latter’s husband Serafin Delos Santos,
incidental and provisional. hence the petition should be dismissed and that she be
However, it is apparent from the Resolutions that the purpose of appointed administrator of the estate.
the hearing set by the intestate court was actually to determine

In her Supplemental she attached Certification issued be RULING:
the Municipal Civil Registrar stating that she was adopted by No. Petitioner need not prove her legal adoption by any
the spouses pursuant to a decision rendered by the Court of evidence other than those which she had already presented
First Instance promulgated and duly registered with the Office of before the trial court. The documents presented by the
Civil Registrar. Also presenting a copy of Judicial Form indicating Petitioners were issued under the seal of the issuing offices and
that the adoption decree was on file in the RTC-Tarlac City and a were signed by the proper officers.
Decree of Final Distribution issued by the Philippine Veterans
Affairs Office (PVAO) showing that benefits were paid to Elena Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
Lising, widow of Serafin Delos Santos and his daughter Anna performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie
Joyce Delos Santos. evidence of the facts therein stated. Mere imputations of
irregularities will not cast a cloud of doubt on the adoption
Respondent filed before the CA a petition for annulment of the decree since the certifications and its contents are presumed
adoption decree claiming that no proceedings for adoption ever valid until proof to the contrary is offered.
took place. Upon Motion, RTC suspended the hearing, however
CA dismissed the petition which became final and executory. In this regard it must be pointed out that such contrary proof
can be presented only in a separate action brought principally
Petitioner filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion for immediate for the purpose of nullifying the adoption decree. It cannot be
resolution of her opposition. RTC issued a Resolution deferring assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of
resolution pending the outcome of the criminal case filed decedent’s estate as held in Santos v. Aranzanso.
against the Petitioner for falsification of public documents.
Respondents cannot assail in these proceedings the validity of
Respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Appoint Special the adoption decree in order to defeat petitioner’s claim that
Administrator before the RTC, praying that the Branch Clerk of she is the sole heir of the decedent. Absent a categorical
Court Atty. Paulino Saguyod be appointed as such, which the pronouncement in an appropriate proceeding that the decree of
court granted. adoption is void, the certifications regarding the matter as well
as the facts stated should be deemed legitimate, genuine and
Petitioner moved for reconsideration for the appointment of Atty real.
Saguyod reiterating his contention that she is the sole heir of
the decedent and that the former was appointed without being Petitioner’s status as an adopted child of the decedent remains
required to file a bond. Petitioner subsequently filed a special rebutted and no serious challenge has been brought against her
civil action before the CA alleging that said resolution. CA standing as such. Therefore as long as petitioner’s adoption is
nullified the resolution of the RTC and it held that the presiding considered valid, respondents cannot claim any interest in the
Respondent Judge Cesar Sotero gravely abused his discretion in decedent’s estate.
appointing Atty. Saguyod as special administrator.
COCA VS. BORROMEO
ISSUE: Bueno, Jirene Mercy
Whether Petitioner need to prove the validity of her
adoption as assailed by the respondents in the proceeding of FACTS:
settlement of estate.
Spouses Juan and Teresa Pangilinan died intestate. They

possessed property namely Lot 1927 with an area of 3.97
hectares covered by OCT under the name of Juan Pangilinan; ISSUE:
Lot 1112 with an area of 18.02 hectares covered by OCT in the Whether the ownership of the 12 hectare land should be
name of heirs of Juan Pangilinan and Lot 1920 with an area of 8 decided in the intestate proceeding or in a separate action.
hectares which was surveyed in the name of Concepcion
Pangilinan. The spouses had 3 children namely, Prima, RULING:
Concepcion, and Francisco all surnamed Pangilinan.
It should be clarified that whether a particular matter
A Special Proceeding was instituted for the settlement of estate should be resolved by the CFI in the exercise of its general
of the deceased spouses Pangilinan. The administrator jurisdiction or of its limited probate jurisdiction is in reality not a
presented a project partition combining Lots 1927 and 1112 jurisdictional question. It is a procedural question involving a
with an area of 22 hectares. The partition are as follows: 3 mode of practice which may be waived.
hectares for Crispin Borromeo for his attorney’s fees; 5.3
hectares for Francis; 6.33 hectares for Prima and 7.3 hectares As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not
for Concepcion. It was also provided therein that the sum of be passed upon in the testate or intestate proceeding. That
5,O88.50 pesos as alleged debt of Concepcion should equally question should be ventilated in a separate action. However
divided among the 3 heirs. that general rule has qualifications or exceptions justified by
expediency and convenience.
Heirs of Francisco opposed the said partition contending that in
an order of the court in December 6, 1963, Francisco owned 12 Although generally, probate court may not decide a question of
hectares in 18 hectares of Lot 1112 because Prima sold her title of ownership yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or
share to Francis and what is left for Concepcion is only 6 the question is one of collation or advancement or the parties
hectares and that the payment for Concepcion’s debt was not consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court
properly allowed. and the rights of third parties are not impaired then the probate
court is competent to decide the question of ownership.
The lower court deferred action on the partition until ownership
of the 12 hectares is determined in an ordinary action.. Heirs of We held that the instant case may be treated as an exception to
Francisco moreover filed a supplemental opposition praying that the general rule. Here the probate court had already received
Lot 1920 with 8 hectares should also be included in the project evidence on the ownership of the 12 hectare land during the
partition. hearing of the motion for its exclusion from the inventory. The
only interested parties are the heirs who have all appeared in
No separate action had been filed with regard to the ownership the intestate proceeding.
of the 12 hectare land hence the trial court approve the project
partition excluding the 12 hectares. Petitioners headed by As pointed out by the appellees they belong to the poor stratum
Filomena Coca, as administrator assailed the lower court’s of society, they should not be forced to incur additional
decision, which however was sustained by the CA. expenses by bringing a separate action to determine the
ownership of the 12-hectare land. The just, expeditious and
Petitioners appealed contending that the lower court as a inexpensive solution is to require the heirs of Francisco to file in
probate court has no jurisdiction to decide the ownership of the the intestate proceeding , Special Proceeding, a motion in the
12 hectare portion of Lot 1112. form of a complaint wherein they should set forth their claim for

the 12 hectare land in question stating the ultimate facts in A Pre-Trial Order was issued & after trial, the trial court
support of their claim. dismissed the case for lack of cause of action and lack of
jurisdiction without resolving the issues as stated in the pre-trial
order, on the ground that petitioner’s status and right as
ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR., putative heirs had not been established before a probate court.
VS.
LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to CA, citing the case of Carino
Borlagdatan, April vs. Carino. In this case, the SC ratiocinates that the court may
pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the
FACTS: parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential
It appears from the records that Jose Portugal (Portugal, to the determination of the case.
Sr.) contracted two marriages.
However, the CA found Carino to be inapplicable. The appellate
1st marriage with Paz Lazo in 1942 whom he had a daughter court held that in Carino case, the main issue was the validity of
named Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal (respondent) 2nd the two marriages, whereas in the instant case, the main issue
marriage with Isabel de la Puerta in 1948, who gave birth to a is the annulment of title to property. Thus, the CA affirmed the
boy named Jose Douglas Portugal, Jr. (petitioners). TC’s dismissal of the case.
By virtue of a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver of Hence, the present petition.
Rights executed by Portugal Sr. and his 4 siblings, over the
estate of their father, a parcel of land n Caloocan was issued a ISSUE:
TCT in the name of “Jose Q. Portugal, married to Paz C. Lazo”. WON petitioners have to institute a special proceeding to
determine their status as heirs before they can pursue the case
Paz died in 1984, while Portugal Sr. died intestate in 1985. for annulment of respondent’s Affidavit of Adjudication and of
the TCT issued in her name.
In 1988, Leonila executed an “Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole
Heir of Estate of Deceased Person”, adjudicating to herself the RULING: NO.
Caloocan parcel of land, and was subsequently registered In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or
(1988) in her name “Leonila Portugal Beltran, married to wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugal’s estate,
Merardo M. Beltran, Jr.” executed on February 15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit of
Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of
In 1996, Isabel and Portugal, Jr. (petitioners) filed a complaint the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception to the
against Leonila for cancellation of Affidavit of Adjudication and general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it
TCT issued in her name, alleging that Leonila is not related should be judicially administered and the competent court
whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, Sr., hence, not entitled to should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order
inherit the Caloocan parcel of land, and accordingly prayed that established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will,
said TCT be cancelled and a new one be issued in their or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.
(petitioner’s) name.

Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. RULING:No.
A probate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to
declare who are the heirs of a deceased. Under Act No. 3176, there are two actions/remedies for the
liquidation of conjugal property:
CALMA VS. TANEDO 1) Institution of testate or intestate proceedings for the

settlement of the estate of a deceased spouse
Shain Ann C.
2) An ordinary action for the liquidation and partition of the
Doctrine: Debts chargeable against the conjugal property property of a conjugal partnership.
should be filed in the testamentary proceeding of the deceased
wife. These remedies cannot be availed of at the same time.
FACTS: In the present case, a testamentary proceeding was already

instituted for the partition of the conjugal property. It follows
Spouses Eulalio Calma and Fausta Macasaquit were owners of then that when respondent filed a suit, the power of Eulalio
the subject property, being their conjugal property. They were Calma as legal administrator of the conjugal property while
indebted to respondent Esperanza Tanedo, chargeable against Fausta was living had ceased and passed to Maria Calma as
the conjugal property. Fausta died leaving a will wherein she administratrix appointed in the testamentary proceedings.
appointed her daughter, Maria Calma as administratrix of her
properties. In the probate proceedings, Maria was appointed as Hence, the claim for the debts which is chargeable against the
judicial administratrix of the properties of the deceased. conjugal property should have been filed in the testamentary
proceedings of the deceased and not against the husband of
While probate proceedings were pending, respondent Tanedo the deceased who had already ceased as administrator of the
filed a complaint against Eulalio Calma for the recovery of the conjugal property.
debt. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent. In the
execution of the judgment, the subject property was sold by the The court also annulled the sale of the subject property. The
sheriff. property should be demed subject to the testamentary
proceedings of the deceased Fausta.
Maria Calma ,as administratrix of the estate of Fausta, filed the
present action to annul the sale of the property and prays that OCAMPO VS. POTENCIANO
the estate of the deceased be declared as the absolute owner. Castillo, Shain Ann
The probate proceedings of the deceased were instituted in
Doctrine: Husband is no longer an administrator of the
accordance with Act No. 3176.
conjugal estate of deceased wife.
ISSUE: Whether the debts may be recovered against the
FACTS:
husband of the deceased.

Spouses Edilberto Ocampo and Paz Yatco executed a RULING:
deed to convey to spouses Conrado Potenciano and Rufina
Reyes by way of sale with pacto de retro a town lot with a (1) The real contract entered into between petitioner and
house. The subject property though registered in the name of respondent was an equitable mortgage. Therefore, the
Ocampo, in reality it belonged to him and his wife as conjugal consolidation of title effected by respondent Potenciano
property. was null and void. As a consequence, Potenciano’s
children has no right over the subject property, since the
On the same day, Ocampo signed another document, making it property never passed to their parents.
appear that, for an annual rental, the spouses Potenciano were
leasing the house to him for the duration of the redemption (2) Potenciano had no such authority. The rule that upon the
period. dissolution of the marriage by the death of the wife, the
husband must liquidate the partnership affairs is now
Petitioner spouses failed to repurchase the property. Thus, an obsolete.
affidavit for consolidation of title was filed by Potenciano, on the
strength of which, the Register of Deeds issued TCT in the name The present rules of court now provides that,“when the
of spouses Potenciano. marriage is dissolved by the death of either husband or
wife, the partnership affairs must be liquidated in the
When Edilberto Ocampo and Rufina Reyes died, respondent testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
Potenciano gave Paz Yatco another option to repurchase the spouse.”
property. Yatco sought to exercise the option and deposited the
money in court, when Potenciano rejected the same. Yatco
brought an action to compel respondent to accept the money
and to have the property reinstated in her name and that of her
husband. She also alleged that the real transaction between
them was an equitable mortgage.
RULE 74
Summary Settlement of Estates
Potenciano’s children intervened and filed a cross-complaint,
alleging that the option to repurchase was null and void as to MALAHACAN VS. IGNACIO
the share of their mother Rufina Reyes in the property which Castillo, Rochelle Jane
share passed to them by right of inheritance.
FACTS:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First
ISSUES: Instance of the subprovince of Marinduque, Province of Tayabas,
(1) What is the real contract between the parties? the Hon. J.S. Powell presiding, awarding the possession of the
lands described in the complaint to the plaintiff, with costs. The
(2) Whether the surviving spouse (Potenciano) has the action is brought by Simon Malahacan as administrator of the
authority to enter in anagreement of repurchase after the death goods, chattels, and credits of Guillerma Martinez, deceased,
of his wife. against the defendants, the only heirs at law of the said
deceased, to recover possession of the real estate of which the
said Guillerma Martinez died seized, which said real estate the

defendants had been occupying for some years before the Filed before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga on
commencement of this action. November 12 and 16, 1962, respectively, are two separate
petitions having direct and special reference to Lot No. 276. This
ISSUE: lot, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-244 (2155 (0-
Whether or not Simon Malahacan can validly demand 656), forms a major part of the estate of the late Eustaquio
the recovery of possession from the Ignacio? Arcillas who died intestate on March 8, 1958 in the City of
Zamboanga. In the petition dated November 12 Geronimo
RULING: Arcillas, one of the heirs of the deceased, sought the
No. Under the provisions of the Civil Code the ownership cancellation of TCT No. RT-244 in the name of the deceased and
of real estate passes to the heirs of the owner instantly in his prayed for the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names
death. Guillerma Martinez, having died seized of the lands of the heirs in the enumerated proportions alleged in the
involved in this suit, leaving the defendants as her only heirs at petition. It was claimed that at various dates after the death of
law, it follows that said heirs instantly became the owners and the deceased, several transactions affecting Lot No. 276
were entitled to the immediate possession thereof. It is not transpired, prominent among which were the separate sales of
alleged in the complaint nor does it appear from the record or their respective shares and participation in Lot No. 276
the evidence in this case that there were debts outstanding executed by four (4) other children of the deceased in favor of
against Guillerma Martinez at the time of her death. The only co-heir Vicente Arcillas. Invoking section 112 of Act No. 496
ground upon which an administrator can demand of the heirs at (Land Registration Act), Geronimo Arcillas argued that the
law possession of the real estate of which his intestate died proportion of each heir's participation in said lot should be
seized is that such land will be required to be sold to pay the accurately reflected in a new certificate of title. But before any
debts of the deceased. In the case of Ilustre, administrator of other material pleading could be filed with respect to this
the estate of the deceased Calzado vs. Alaras Frondosa (17 Phil. petition, five (5) other children of the deceased filed the
Rep., 321), this court said: "x x x The Code of Procedure in Civil November 16 petition aforementioned. This later petition,
Actions provides how an estate may be divided by a petition for docketed as Special Proceeding No. 632, prayed for the
partition in case they can not mutually agree in the division. issuance of letters of administration in favor of herein petitioner
When there are no debts existing against the estate, there is preparatory to the final settlement of the deceased's estate.
certainly no occasion for the intervention of an administrator in
the settlement and partition of the estate among the heirs. ISSUE:
When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts, Whether or not respondent Judge acted properly in
there is no reason why the estate should be burdened with the dismissing the administration proceedings under the authority
costs and expenses of an administrator. The property belonging of section 1, rule 74 of the New Rules of Court upon averments
absolutely to the heirs, in the absence of existing debts against that the estate left no debts and all the heirs entitled to share in
the estate, the administrator has no right to intervene in any its distribution are all of age?
way whatever in the division of the estate among the heirs."
RULING:
ARCILLAS VS. MONTEJO No. Under section 1, Rule 74 of the New Rules of Court,
Castillo, Rochelle Jane if the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs and
legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by their
FACTS: judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see

fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the • Rita instituted a special proceeding before the RTC for
Register of Deeds and should they disagree, they may do so in the issuance of letters of administration in her favor
an ordinary action of partition. And primarily anchored on the alleging that:
proposition that inasmuch as in the present case the minimum
requirements of the aforementioned section obtain, i.e. the 1) She and Victoria are the only surviving heirs;
decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age,
respondents claim that there is no necessity for the institution 2) Deceased left no will;
of special proceedings and the appointment of an administrator
for the settlement of the estate for the reason that it is 3) There are no creditors;
superfluous and unnecessary. In other words, respondents
apparently view section 1 of Rule 74 as mandatory upon the 4) He left several properties his death benefits to PAL,
heirs so long as the deceased left no will nor any pending
PALEA, PESALA and SSS as well as savings deposit
obligations to be paid and his heirs are all of age. We cannot
entirely agree with the respondents. On a similar contention in with PNB and PCIB
the past, we had occasion to explain in Rodriguez, et al. v. Tan,
et al., 92 Phil. 273: ... section I does not preclude the heirs from 5) 300 sqm lot
instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no
debts or obligation, if they do not desire to resort for good 6) That the spouse is working in London as an auxiliary
reasons to an ordinary action of partition. While section 1 allows nurse and ½of her salary forms part of the estate.
the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may
see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action of partition, it does not • Petitioner filed her opposition and a motion to dismiss
compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a alleging that there exists no estate of the deceased for
different course of action. Said section is not mandatory or purposes of administration and if an estate exists, the
compulsory as may be gleaned from the use made therein of letters of administration be issued in her favor as the
the word may. If the intention were otherwise the framer of the
surviving spouse.
rule would have employed the word shall as was done in other
provisions that are mandatory in character. Note that the word
may its used not only once but in the whole section which • RTC appointed Rita administratrix of the estate of the
indicates an intention to leave the matter entirely to the deceased upon a bond posted by her in the amount of
discretion of the heirs. 1k. The Trial Court ordered her to take custody of the
real and personal properties and make an inventory
PEREIRA VS. COURT OF APPEALS thereof.
Cadavis, Albert
• Petitioner appealed to CA but CA affirmed the decision.
FACTS:
ISSUES:
• Andres Pereira is an employee of PAL. He died without a
will and survived by his spouse victoria herein petitioner 1) WON there exists an estate of the deceased Andres for
and his sister Rita herein private respondent. purposes of administration?

2) WON a judicial administration proceeding is necessary
where there are no debts lefts by decedent?
2) The general rule is that when a person dies leaving
RULING: property, the same should be judicially administered and
the competent court should appoint a qualified
1) Petitioner contends that there exists no estate for administrator established in sec. 6 rule 78, in case the
purposes of administration for the reason: First, the deceased left no will or in case he had left one, or should
death benefits from PAL, PALEA, PESALA and SSS belong he fail to name an executor therein. An exception to this
exclusively to her, being the sole beneficiary and she rule, when all of the heirs of lawful age and there are no
submitted letter-replies to support her claim showing debts due to the estate, they may agree in writing to
that she is the exclusive beneficiary. Second, the savings partition the property without instituting the judicial
deposit of her husband from PNB and PCIB had been administration or applying for the appointment of an
used to defray the funeral expenses. Finally, only real administrator.
property of the deceased extrajudicially settled between
them as the only surviving heirs. Sec.1 of Rule 74, does not preclude the heirs from
instituting administration proceedings even if the estate
Respondent argues that it is not for petitioner to decide has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to
what properties form part of the estate and to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for
appropriate for herself. She also points out that this partition. While Sec. 1 allows the heirs to divide the
function is vested in the court in charge of the intestate estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to
proceedings. resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said
provision does not compel them to do so if they have
Petitioner asks this court to declare that the properties
good reasons to take a different course of action. It
specified do not belong to the estate of the deceased on
should be noted that recourse to an administration
the basis of her bare allegations and handful documents.
proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned
Since this court is the trier of facts, the court cannot
only if the heirs have good reason for not resorting to an
order unqualified and final exclusion or non-exclusion of
action for partition.
the property involved from the estate.
When partition is possible, either in or out of court, the
The resolution is better left to the probate court before
estate should not be burdened with an administration
which the administration proceeding are pending. The
proceeding without good or compelling reasons.
trial court is in the best position to receive evidence. The
function of resolving WON the property should be The court see no reason not to apply the doctrine to the
included in the inventory or list of properties is one case at bar. There are 2 surviving heirs, and admitted
clearly within the competence of the probate court. that there are no debts. What is apparent is that these 2
are not in good terms. The reason why private

respondent seeks the appointment is her to obtain which they, however, never registered in the office of
possession for her own purposes, since these properties the Registrar of Deed.
are presently in the hands of the petitioner who
supposedly disposed in fraudulently. • Both Ananias and Marciano, represented by his
daughter, Maria, that cadastral Lot as allocated
The court is of the opinion that this is not a compelling during the said partition. Then Ananias died, his
daughter, Juanita, succeeded to his right as co-owner of
reason which will necessitate a judicial administration of
said property. Juanita Pada sold to engr. ernesto Paderes,
the estate of the deceased. the right of his father, Ananias, as co-owner.
The Court hold that, the Trial court which the
• L a t e r o n , M a r i a Pa d a s e l l t h e c o o w n e r s h i p r i
administration proceedings are pending was not justified ght of his father, Marciano. Private
in issuing the letters of administration there being no respondent, who is the first cousin of Maria, was the
good reasons for burdening the estate. buyer.
PADA-KILARIO VS. COURT OF APPEALS • Private respondent demanded that petitioner spouses
Cadavis, Albert vacate the northern portion so his family can utilize the
said area. The amicable settlement was failed.
FACTS:
• Jacinto Pada had six children, namely, Marciano, • Private respondent filed in the MCTC, a complaint for
Ananias, Amador, Higino, Valentina and Ruperta. ejectment with prayer for damages against petitioner
He died intestate. spouses. However, the heirs of Amador Pada executed a
Deed of Donation transferring to petitioner Verona Pada
• His estate included a parcel land a residential and hilario, their respective shares as co-owners of the lot.
coconut land in Leyte. It is the northern portion Petitioner spouses alleged that the northern portion of
cadastral Lot which is the subject to the instant the Lot had already been donated to them by the heirs
controversy. of Amador Pada.
• They contended that the extra-judicial partition of the
• During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, estate of Jacinto Pada executed was invalid and
feliciano Pada, obtained permission from him to build a ineffectual since no special power of attorney
house on the northern. Then feliciano died, his son, was executed by Marciano, Amador or Higino in favor
Pastor, continued living in the house together with his of their respective children presented them in the
eight children. Petitioner Verona Pada hilario, one of extrajudicial partition.
Pastor/s children, has been living in that house. • Moreover, it was effectuated only through a private
document that was never registered in the office of
• The heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into an the Registrar of Deeds of leyte. the MCTC rendered
extrajudicial partition of his estate. For judgment in favor of petitioner spouses.
this purpose, they executed a private document • Private respondent appealed to the Regional trial court
and render the reversal of judgment. Petitioners filed

in the court of Appeals a petition for relief and later on, a Margarita Jose, a native of the Philippines, died
Motion for Reconsideration, however, bot here sometime on February 1902 in Amoy, China. Engracio
dismissed. Hence this petition.
Palanca was appointed as administrator of the estate left
ISSUE: by Jose, which estate was partly located in Hong Kong and
partly in the Philippines. Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco
Whether or not the extrajudicial partition of the estate is and Dy Cunyao executed bonds as sureties of Palanca
valid
who thereafter took possession of all the properties of
RULING: Jose. Upon the death of Mariano Ocampo in 1904, Palanca
We hold that the extrajudicial partition of the estate of was required to furnish a new bond, which new bond was
Jacinto Pada among his heirs made in 1951 is valid albeit subsequently filed through new sureties.
executed in an unregistered private document. No law requires
partition among heirs to be in writing and be registered in order
Mariano Ocampo (Palanca’s former surety) left an estate
to be valid. The requirement in sec. 1 of Rule 74 of the Revised
Rules of court that a partition and Doroteo Velasco was appointed as its administrator
be put in a public document and registeredhas for its purpose th with sureties Mariano Velasco and Pio de la Guardia
e protection of creditors and the heirs themselves against tardy Barretto. Mariano Ocampo was also survived by his
claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive
notice to others. it follows then that the intrinsic validity of
heirs; a daughter to whom he left 2/3 of his estate and 3
partition not executed with the prescribed formalities is not sons in China to whom he left the remaining 1/3 of his
undermined when no creditors are involved. Without creditors estate. Doroteo, Mariano Ocampo’s estate administrator
to take into consideration, it is competent for the heirs of an filed a complete report and inventory of the latter’s
estate to enter into agreement for distribution thereof in
manner and upon a plan different from those provided by the properties, together with a statement of all his debts and
rules from which, in the first place, nothing can be inferred that liabilities. As a part of said report, Doroteo filed an
a writing and be registered in order to be valid. The partition of instrument signed by all of the persons interested in the
inherited property need not be embodied in a public document estate of Mariano Ocampo agreeing to the partitition of
so as to be effective as regards the heirs that participated
therein. The 1951 extrajudicial partition of Jacinto Pada’s estate the estate among themselves without proceedings in
being legal and effective as among his heirs, Juanita and maria court, at the same time assuming the payment of all
pada validly transferred their ownership rights over the lot to obligations against the estate. Such partition agreed to
engr. Paderes and private respondent. was affirmed and approved by an order of the court and
Doroteo, in pursuance of such order and after having
MCMICKING VS. SY CONBIENG settled all liabilities of the estate delivered all of the
dela Cruz, Kyzeth properties to the respective devisees and legatees leaving
no property of the estate in his hands.
FACTS:

Sometime in 1908, Engracio Palanca was removed from Whether or not Benito Sy Conbieng as administrator of Pio
office as the administrator of Margarita Jose’s estate by de la Guardia Barretto’s estate is liable for the claim made
reason of the fact that Palanca failed and refused to by Jose McMicking in favor of Margarita Jose’s estate.
render an account of the property and funds of the said
estate and even failed and refused to deliver such
property and funds to his successor Jose McMicking who HELD:
was appointed as administrator of Margarita Jose’s estate
in Palanca’s stead. Palanca retained possession of said Judgment of the lower court disallowing the claim against
property and funds, absconded with the same, and never Pio de la Guardia Barretto’s estate affirmed.
returned to the Philippines. Due to these circumstances
McMicking instituted a claim against the estate of Mariano Doroteo Velasco, for whom the deceased Pio was surety,
Ocampo who was a surety of Palanca. The court approved would not have been liable himselfhad this action been
such claim and directed that Doroteo Velasco, the commenced against him. If the principal is not liable upon
administrator of Mariano Ocampo’s estate, pay it if he had the obligation, the surety cannot be. The basis of the
sufficient funds. No payment was made to Margarita liability of a surety on administrator's bond is the fault or
Jose’s estate. failure of the principal. If the latter incurs no liability, the
former incurs none. The administrator who complies with
McMicking then instituted a claim against the estate of the law incurs no liability to any person.
Pio de la Guardia Barretto who died in 1905. Pio was
one of the sureties of Doroteo Velasco when he was The estate of Mariano Ocampo against which McMicking’s
appointed as administrator of Mariano Ocampo’s estate. original claim was made and to which Doroteo Velasco
Pio left an estate to which the defendant Benito Sy was appointed as administrator was already partitioned at
Conbieng was appointed as administrator. The the time the claim was made.
committee appointed by the court to appraise and hear
A partition of the property of a deceased person may be
claims against Pio’s estate disallowed McMicking’s claim
made under the provisions of sections 596 and 597 of the
and such finding of the committee was affirmed by said
Code of Civil Procedure, notwithstanding that an
lower court.
administrator with the will annexed has been appointed
and the administration of the estate under said
appointment is in progress. Such provisions are applicable
ISSUE: no matter what stage the administration has reached.
"SEC. 596. Settlement of intestate estates, without

legalproceedings, in certain cases.—Whenever all probated partitioning the same between them under said
the heirs of a deceased person are of lawful age and sections of the Code of Civil Procedure, the delivery of the
legal capacity, and there are no debts due from the property to such partitioning owners by such
intestate estate, or all the debts have been paid by administrator, under proper proceedings and order of
the heirs, the heirs may, by a family council as
court and after compliance with the provisions of such
known under Spanish law, or by agreement between
sections, is, in effect, a discharge of such administrator as
themselves, duly executed in writing, apportion and
divide the estate among themselves, as they may to all future obligations and responsibilities in relation to
see fit, without proceedings in court." said property. In other words, if he turns such property
over to the owners thereof after a partition among them
"SEC. 597. In such case distributees liable for debts. was made in complete accordance with said sections, and
—But if it shall appear, at any time within two years he performs his full duty as such administrator, neither he
after such settlement and distribution of the estate,
nor his bondsmen are liable to any person for such act. An
that there are debts outstanding against the estate
administrator cannot be held to accountability for
which have not been paid, any creditor may compel
the settlement of the estate in the courts in the property over which he has no power or control or
manner hereinafter provided, unless his debt shall jurisdiction and in which he has no legal interest. The
be paid, with interest; and the administrator thing on which he was appointed to operate having been
appointed by the court may recover the assets of withdrawn wholly beyond his ken by the very power (the
the estate from those who have received them, for law, secs. 596 and 597) which appointed him, there is a
the purpose of paying the debts; and the real estate complete revocation of the original appointment dating
belonging to the deceased shall remain charged with from the day of the removal from his hands of the
the liability to creditors for the full period of two property which he was appointed to administer.
years after such distribution, notwithstanding any
transfers thereof that may have been made." The administrator has no power or control or jurisdiction
and no legal interest in the property anymore because by
These sections provide for the voluntary division of the
such partition, the estate passes out of existence. The
whole property of the decedent without proceedings in
whole property is taken from the administrator and
court.
passed on to the owners. They become the absolute
Where, after the appointment of an administrator with the owners thereof, subject only to the liability of divestiture
will annexed of a deceased person and the due making of on the happening of certain events; but even such
the inventory of the property and the taking possession divestiture may be avoided by paying the debt, which is
thereof by such administrator, an agreement is made the moving cause thereof.
between the owners thereof under the will already

While at any time within two years after such partition the within the time prescribed.
property, or a portion thereof, then in possession of the
partitioning parties, may be placed again in The partition provided for in these sections is binding and
valid even though not all of the debts actually outstanding
administration in the event of the discovery of unpaid
were paid before the partition was made. The discovery of
debts "within two years after such settlement and an unpaid obligation after partition does not destroy the
distribution of the estate," it would not be the same partition. It simply furnishes ground for the application of
estate represented by the prior administrator, and he the creditor for the appointment of an administrator. The
would not be the administrator of the new estate by virtue discovery of a debt after partition does not permit the
of his appointment in the old. It would be necessary to whole property in possession of the partitioning parties to
appoint, upon proper application and notice, another be thrown into administration. Only so much of the
property is subject to such administration as is sufficient
administrator for the purposes set forth in said sections.
to pay the claim discovered, leaving the partitioning
Before this, it is necessary that the requisite conditions persons in undisturbed possession of the remainder.Even
are present; the unpaid debt must be discovered and the after the discovery of a debt subsequent to partition, the
creditor must make his application. In the case at bar, partitioning persons may prevent any administration
neither of the above conditions being present, there could whatever by paying the debt discovered, thereby
be no administration after partition. No new administrator preserving the partition intact in all its parts.
was or could be appointed. There was no administration.
The appointment of commissioners to hear plaintiff's
GERONA V. DE GUZMAN
claim was without authority. It was an appointment in
dela Cruz, Kyzeth
respect to an estate that did not legally exist and in
relation to an administration that had never been
inaugurated. The acts of such commissioners were FACTS:
without legal effect.
Petitioners herein, namely, Ignacio, Maria Concepcion,
In effect, Section 597 creates a statute of limitations, Francisco and Delfin, all surnamed Gerona, alleged that
which deprives all debtsnot discovered within the they are the legitimate children of Domingo Gerona and
prescribed time, of the power of requiring an Placida de Guzman; that the latter, who died on August 9,
administration of the estate remaining. Such 1941 was a legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzman
administration, after partition, depends upon the and his first wife, Teodora de la Cruz; thatafter the death
discovery of the debt "at any time within two years after of his first wife, Marcelo de Guzman married Camila
the settlement and distribution of the estate." These Ramos, who begot him several children, namely,
sections do not operate unless that discovery is made respondents Carmen, Jose, Clemente, Francisco, Rustica,

Pacita and Victoria, all surnamed De Guzman; that
Marcelo de Guzman died on September 11, 1945; that
subsequently, or on May 6, 1948 respondents executed a ISSUE:
deed of "extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the Whether or not the action of the petitioners to annul the
deceased Marcelo de Guzman", fraudulently extrajudicial settlement executed by the respondents has
misrepresenting therein that they were the only surviving prescribed.
heirs of the deceased although they well knew that
petitioners were, also, his forced heirs. Thatrespondents
had thereby succeeded fraudulently in causing the
transfer certificates of title to seven (7) parcels of land, HELD:
issued in the name of said deceased, to be cancelled and
The SC affirmed the decision of the CA affirming the RTC’s
new transfer certificates of title to be issued in their own
dismissal of the case on the ground that the action has
name, in the proportion of 1/7th individual interest for
prescribed.
each; that such fraud was discovered by the petitioners
only the year before the institution of the case; that Upon appeal, petitioners contended that since they and
petitioners forthwith demanded from respondents their the respondents were co-heirs of Marcelo, the action for
share in said properties, to the extent of 1/8th Interest partition does not prescribe.
thereon.
The SC held that although, as a general rule, an action for
Petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered nullifying partition among coheirs does not prescribe, this is true
said deed of extrajudicial settlement, insofar as it only as long as the defendants do not hold the property in
deprives them of their participation of 1/8th of the question under an adverse title. The statute of limitations
properties in litigation. On the other hand, respondents operates, as in other cases; from the moment the
maintained that petitioners' mother, the deceased Placida possessor of the property asserts such adverse title.
de Guzman, was not entitled to share in the estate of When respondents executed the deed of extrajudicial
Marcelo de Guzman, shebeing merely a spurious child of settlement stating therein that they are the sole heirs of
the latter, and that petitioners' action is barred by the the deceased, and secured new transfer certificates of
statute of limitations. title in their own name, they thereby excluded the
petitioners from the estate of the deceased, and
The RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the action
consequently, set up a title adverse to them.
has prescribed, which decision was affirmed by the CA.

The action to annul a deed of extrajudicial settlement toward a compromise were made between the plaintiffs and the
upon the ground of fraud may be filed within four years defendants, but the same failed. The Regional Trial Court
from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed dismissed the complaint. The appellate court affirmed the
to have taken place when said instrument was filed with decision of the trial court.
the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were
issued in the name of the respondents exclusively. ISSUES:
(1) whether or not the complaint for annulment of the Deed of

PEDROSA VS. COURT OF APPEALS Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition had already prescribed (2)
De guzman , Jabrielle whether or not said deed is valid
FACTS: HELD:
Spouses Miguel Rodriguez and Rosalina J. de Rodriguez initiated Section 4, Rule 74 provides for a two year prescriptive period
proceedings before the CFI of Ozamiz City for the legal adoption (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice
of herein petitioner, Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa. CFI granted of the extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when the
the petition. Miguel died intestate. Thereafter, petitioner and provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied
Rosalina entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Miguels with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have
estate, adjudicating between themselves in equal proportion taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by
the estate of Miguel. Private respondents filed an action to themselves or through guardians. Petitioner, as the records
annul the adoption of petitioner before the CFI of Ozamiz City. confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial partition.
CFI denied the petition and upheld the validity of the adoption. Patently then, the two-year prescriptive period is not applicable
Thereafter, the private respondents appealed said decision to in her case. The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4)
the Court of Appeals. While said appeal was pending, the years. Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed
Rodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial settlement with on January 28, 1987, or three years and ten months after the
respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel and questioned extrajudicial settlement dated March 11, 1983, was
of another sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative of executed, we hold that her action against the respondents on
the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez. Pilar had no heirs except his the basis of fraud has not yet prescribed.
brothers and sisters. Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal but
upheld the validity of the adoption of petitioner. Thereafter, Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule
petitioner sent her daughter, Loreto Jocelyn, to claim their share on publication of extrajudicial settlement. It states: The fact of
of the properties from the Rodriguezes. The latter refused the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published
saying that Maria Elena and Loreto were not heirs since they in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in
were not their blood relatives. Petitioner, then, filed a complaint the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement
to annul the 1983 partition. Said complaint was later amended shall be binding upon any person who has not participated
on March 25, 1987 to include the allegation that earnest efforts therein or had no notice thereof. Under said provision, without

the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, the in the partitioned property. Under the rule, no extrajudicial
extrajudicial settlement cannot be binding on said persons. The settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not
rule contemplates a notice which must be sent out or issued participated therein or had no notice thereof. As the partition
before the Deed of Settlement and/or Partition is agreed upon, was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was
i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge
said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition, not after, the partition had prescribed after two years from its execution
which was when publication was done in the instant case. in 1941. To say that Maria Elena was represented by Rosalina in
the partitioning is imprecise. Maria Elena, the adopted child,
The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the was no longer a minor at the time Miguel died. Rosalina, only
deed of extrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled on the represented her own interests and not those of Maria Elena.
ground of fraud. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed Since Miguel predeceased Pilar, a sister, his estate
without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of automatically vested to his child and widow, in equal shares.
and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. Maria Elena Respondent Rodriguezes interests did not include Miguels
is an heir of Miguel together with her adopting mother, estate but only Pilars estate.
Rosalina. Being the lone descendant of Miguel, she excludes the
collateral relatives of Miguel from participating in his estate, Petition is GRANTED.
following the provisions of Article 1003 of the Civil Code. The
private respondent Rodriguezes cannot claim that they were not ESTATE OF FRANCISCO VS. CARREON
De guzman , Jabrielle
aware of Maria Elenas adoption since they even filed an action
to annul the decree of adoption. Neither can they claim that FACTS:
their actions were valid since the adoption of Maria Elena was
still being questioned at the time they executed the deed of Rosa Aldana Francisco petitioned the Court of First Instance of
partition. The complaint seeking to annul the adoption was filed Rizal summarily to settle the estate of her husband Jose M.
only twenty six (26) years after the decree of adoption, patently Francisco. Alleging that they had three minor children who were
a much delayed response to prevent Maria Elena from inheriting his legal heirs, and that the deceased left a parcel of land with
from her adoptive parents. The decree of adoption was valid house thereon, and no creditors, she asked for declaration that
and existing. With this factual setting, it is patent that private the persons entitled to share in his estate are the said three
respondents executed the deed of partition in bad faith with minor children, with herself as usufructuary. She requested for
intent to defraud Maria Elena. appointment as guardian ad item of her three minor children,
and her request was granted in due course. Petition was
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the approved and was registered.
partition in question which was null and void as far as the
plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid partitions. Rosa Aldana Francisco mortgaged her share of the realty to the
The partition in the present case was invalid because it sisters Fausta Carreon and Catalina Carreon and was duly
excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares registered. Afterwards, she conveyed by absolute deed of sale,

to the aforesaid creditors, her interest and participation in the children of the deceased, subject to usufructuary rights of the
land. This sale was likewise inscribed in the office of the widow; it annulled the mortgage and the sale executed by Rosa
Register of Deeds. Aldana in favor of the Carreon sisters, and then issued other
appropriate instructions to the Register of Deeds.
However, in a motion, Tiburcia Magsalin Vda.de Francisco,
mother of the deceased Jose M. Francisco, allegedly in ISSUES:
representation of the minor Jose Francisco y Palumpon, averred
that this minor was a recognized natural son of the deceased, WON the court erred: (1) in continuing to hear the motion for
with legal right to participate in his estate, that the previous reopening, even after the natural child had withdrawn from the
proceedings were void because Rosa Aldana Francisco had litigation and (2) in taking cognizance of the annulment of the
concealed such fact, and because she had interests in conflict mortgage and sale, which it could validly consider as a probate
with those of her three sons, the truth being that the land was court.
private property of Jose M. Francisco of which she could not
HELD:
have been awarded a portion in fee simple.
Supposing the original motion did not afford legal standing to
When the motion to annul or reopen was called for hearing,
the three legitimate children, and that it could not be
Macaria Palumpon requested in open court the dismissal,
"amended", as contended by appellants, we perceive no reason
without prejudice, of Jose Francisco y Palumpon's demand for
to prevent the court below from considering such amended
recognition. Her request was granted.
motion as a new and independent petition in the expediente,
Both Rosa Aldana and the Carreons moved for reconsideration, filed expressly on behalf of the three minor children. The matter
contending that, inasmuch as Jose Francisco y Palumpon had of time might conceivably be material in regard in considering
withdrawn, there was no authority to continue, for the matter the "amended" motion as "original" motion; but in this case it
became a closed incident. Thereafter, Tiburcia Magsalin Vda. de happens to be immaterial, because under section 5 of Rule 74
Francisco, as guardian ad item of the three legitimate, such motion may be lodged with the court within one year after
submitted an "amended motion" wherein she made practically the minors have reached majority; and they are still minors
the same allegations of her previous motion and prayed for now. Incidentally this section 5 fully answers appellants'
identical remedies — except those touching the recognition of contention that Tiburcia's moves should have been initiated
Jose Francisco y Palumpon. Overruling objections, the court within two years after November 8, 1947.
admitted the amended motion, heard it granting the interested
Appellants may not justly complain that they thought such
parties opportunity to present their evidence and arguments,
petition for readjustment or reopening could take place only
and rendered judgment holding the realty was private property
within two years as prescribed by section 4 of Rule 74 and as
of the deceased Jose Francisco, who had acquired it four years
annotated in the certificate of title; because they are
before his marriage to Rosa Aldana. Wherefore it held that the
conclusively presumed to know the existence and provisions of
whole property passed to the ownership of the three legitimate
section 5, Rule 74. As the trial judge correctly observed:

But the whole trouble is that they accepted the mortgage with The resolution under review apportions property admittedly
the encumbrance annotated; and while it referred to Rule 74, belonging to the decedent among his legal heirs. It is no
Section 4, and did not specifically mention section 5, the fact objection that it affects the herein appellants. They knew or
that section 4, Rule 74 was therein noted should have been ought to know the rule permitting such to reapportionment
sufficient warning to them that the title was subject to the even after two years, and they have been given every chance
interest of persons unduly prejudiced hereby. We take judicial to be heard, having been by their own petition, regarded as
notice of the fact that in the adjudication in summary parties to the entire proceedings. And section 4, Rule 74 (which
settlements more often that not, the order merely says that the must be deemed extensible to situations covered by section 5,
sale shall be subject to the provisions of section 4, Rule 74. This Rule 74) expressly authorizes the court to give to every heir his
is the case because the Court can not foresee whether the lawful participation in the real estate "notwithstanding any
movant would be affected; but section 5 being an imposition of transfers of such real estate" and to "issue execution" thereon.
the law, and being a mere sequence to the provisions of Section All this implies that, when within the amendatory period the
4; we hold that where the title on its face shows that it was realty has been alienated, the court in re-dividing it among the
subject to the provisions of Rule 74, section 4, a third person heirs has authority to direct cancellation of such alienation in
who accepts it must take notice that he is running the risk of the same estate proceedings, whenever it becomes necessary
interferring with the rights of minors as provided under section to do so. To require the institution of a separate action for such
5, Rule 74. annulment would run counter to the letter of the above rule and
the spirit of these summary settlements.
Contrary to appellants' claim, relief for the minors cannot be
directed against the bond which, according to appellants, From the foregoing, the conclusion follows that no prejudicial
should have been demanded under section 3, Rule 74, because error was committed by the lower court, whose order is,
that section applies where personal property is distributed — not consequently, affirmed with costs.
where, as here, realty is the subject of partition.
Several decisions hold that "If during the summary proceeding SAMPILO ET. AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
some of the heirs claim, by title adverse to that of the Dimaliwat, Dianne
decedent, some parcels of land, the probate court has no
FACTS:
jurisdiction to pass upon the issue which must be decided in a
separate suit". But here there is no question that the realty Teodoro Tolete died intestate in January, 1945. Teodoro
belonged to the decedent; and a separate suit was left four parcels of land in Pangasinan. He left as heirs his
unnecessary, specially remembering that in these summary widow, Leoncia de Leon, and several nephews and nieces.
settlements the judge is expected to "proceed summarily" and Without any judicial proceedings, Leoncia (his widow) executed
"without delay""to determine who are the persons legally an affidavit (Exhibit A) stating that "the deceased Teodoro Tolete
entitled to participate in the estate, and to apportion and divide left no children or respondent neither ascendants or
it among them." acknowledged natural children neither brother, sisters, nephews

or nieces, but the, widow Leoncia de Leon, the legitimate wife of had no knowledge either of the death of the decedent or of the
the deceased, the one and only person to inherit the above extrajudicial settlement or affidavit, especially as no mention of
properties”. Leoncia then executed a deed of sale (Exhibit B) of such effect is made, either directly or by implication.
all the above parcels of land in favor of Benny Sampilo. Benny
then sold (Exhibit C) the parcels of land to Honorato Salacup. Following the above-quoted decision of this Court in the
These three documents were registered in the Office of the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur, supra, we are of the opinion and so
Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. hold that the provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring
distributees or heirs from objecting to an extrajudicial partition
Felisa Sinopera instituted proceedings for the after the expiration of two years from such extrajudicial
administration of the estate of Teodoro Tolete. The complaint partition, is applicable only (1) to persons who have participated
alleges that the widow Leoncia de Leon, had no right to execute or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and, in
the affidavit of adjudication and that Honorato Salacup acquired addition, (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have
no rights to the lands sold to him, and that neither had Benny been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of
Sampilo acquired any right to the said properties the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or
are represented by themselves or through guardians.
ISSUE:
The case at bar fails to comply with both requirements
Whether or not respondent Felisa Sinopera's right of because not all the heirs interested have participated in the
action to recover her and her co-heirs' participation to the lands extrajudicial settlement, the Court of Appeals having found that
in question had not prescribed at the time the action to recover the decedent left aside from his widow, nephews and nieces
was filed. living at the time of his death.
RULING:
It is argued that as the action was instituted almost four

years after the affidavit of adjudication, Exhibit "A", was
registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds Of Pangasinan,
RULE 75
Production of Will. Allowance of Will Necessary
the right of action of the administratrix has prescribed and
lapsed because the same was not brought within the period of
two years as Prescribed in Section 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules of US VS. CHIU GUIMCO
Court. Dimaliwat, Dianne
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of FACTS:

extrajudicial settlement, or by affidavit, is an ex parte
proceeding. It cannot by any reason or logic be contended that Joaquin Cruz, a chinese merchant living for many years
such settlement or distribution would affect third persons who in the municipality of Gingoog, Province of Misamis, died while

visiting China. Before his departure from the Philippines he had No. Section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now
executed a will before Anastacio Servillon, a notary public, in section 5 of Rule 75), which allows imprisonment of a person
which Chiu Guimco and Co-Iden were named as executors. Chiu who neglects to deliver a will after the death of the testator
Guimco is Joaquin Cruz’s brother. without reasonable cause, can only be applied when a court is
acting in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the administration
Guimco, as attorney in fact and manager of the estate of of the estates of deceased persons. Where administration
his deceased brother, entered into an agreement with his proceedings are not already pending, the court, before taking
brother’s Filipina wife, whereby she relinquished her claims to action under this section, should require that there be before it
the estate for a consideration. He also entered into an some petition, information, or affidavit of such character as to
agreement with Uy Cuan, his brother’s Chinese wife, for the make action by the court under this section appropriate.
distribution of the estate and for the payment of rentals on her
interest in the real estate. No payments have, however, been The remedy provided in section 629 of the Code of Procedure is
made by Guimco. clearly a totally different remedy, having no relation with that
provided in section 628 (now section 4 of Rule 75). It is not
Ramon Contreras, acting on behalf of Uy Cuan, wrote a letter to permissible in a prosecution under Sec. 628 to superimpose
Guimco urging him to produce the will of the decedent for the upon the penalty of fine therein prescribed the additional
institution of lawful proceedings in accordance therewith. penalty of imprisonment prescribed under Sec. 629.
Guimco replied that the will in question had never been in his
possession and that he had never seen it. To enforce the production of the will by the accused at a trial
under Sec. 628 would virtually compel him to convict himself,
A complaint was filed under section 628 of the Code of since the mere production of the will by him would be
Civil Procedure charging Guimco with the failure to produce the conclusive that he had possession of it as charged in the
will within the time required by law. The court found the criminal complaint. This would constitute an infringement of the
accused guilty and imposed upon him a fine of P1800. provision of law which says that in a criminal action the
Subsequently, the court, believing that the will was in his defendant shall be exempt from testifying against himself.
possession, ordered him to produce it but Guimco still failed to
do so. The court ordered the confinement of Guimco in the
provincial jail.
ISSUE: GUEVARRA VS. GUEVARRA

Dimaampao, Mahadodin
Whether the judge was acting within his power when he
ordered the commitment of Guimco to the provincial jail? PALACIOS VS. CATIMBANG-PALACIOS
Dumapias, Gay
RULING:
FACTS:

June 25, 1946 - Juan Palacios executed his last will and entirely un-affected, and may be raised even after the will has
testament. Availing himself of the provisions of the new Civil been authenticated."
Code, he filed on May 23, 1956 before the Court of First On the other hand, "after a will has been probated during the
Instance of Batangas a petition for its approval. In said will, he lifetime of a testator, it does not necessarily mean that he
instituted as his sole heirs his natural children Antonio C. cannot alter or revoke the same before he has had a chance to
Palacios and Andrea C. Palacios. present such petition, the ordinary probate proceedings after
June 21, 1956 - an opposition was filed by Maria Catimbang to the testator's death would be in order".The reason for this is
the probate of the will. Ground: she is the acknowledged natural that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the
daughter of petitioner but that she was completely ignored in moment of the death of the decedent (Article 777, new Civil
said will thus impairing here legitime. She objects to its intrinsic Code.).
validity or to the legality of the provisions of the will. Trial court erred in entertaining the opposition and in annulling
July 6, 1956 – court issued an order ADMITTING the will to the portion of the will which allegedly impairs the legitime of
probate. After proper hearing concerning the intrinsic validity of the oppositor on the ground that, as it has found, she is an
the will, the court issued another order declaring oppositor to extraneous matter which should be treshed out in a separate
be the natural child of petitioner and annulling the will insofar action.
as it impairs her legitime, with costs against petitioner.
Petitioner appealed in order to secure the probate of his will
availing himself of the provisions of Article 838 (2) NCC, which FERNANDEZ VS. DIMAGIBA
permit a testator to petition the proper court during his lifetime Dumapias, Gay
for the allowance of his will.
ISSUE: FACTS:
WON the opposition can be entertained/heard. The heirs intestate of the late Benedicta de los Reyes
RULING: have petitioned for a review of the decision of the Court of
NO. Its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law, in a Special Proceeding, admitting to probate the alleged last
much less if the purpose of the opposition is to show that the will and testament of the deceased, and overruling the
oppositor is an acknowledged natural child who allegedly has opposition to the probate.
been ignored in the will for issue cannot be raised here but in a On January 19, 1955, Ismaela Dimagiba (respondent),
separate action. This is especially so when the testator, as in submitted to the Court of First Instance a petition for the
the present case, is still alive and has merely filed a petition for probate of the purported will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes,
the allowance of his will leaving the effects thereof after his executed on October 22, 1930. The will instituted the petitioner
death. as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased. The petition was
In Montañano vs. Suesa, court said: "The authentication of the set for hearing, and in due time, Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio
will decides no other questions than such as touch upon the Reyes and Luisa Reyes and one month later, Mariano, Cesar,
capacity of the testator and the compliance with those Leonor and Paciencia, all surnamed Reyes, all claiming to be
requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the heirs intestate of the decedent, filed oppositions to the probate
validity of a will. It does not determine nor even by implication asked. Grounds: forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix,
prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions; that may be estoppel by laches of the proponent and revocation of the will
impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its by two deeds of conveyance of the major portion of the estate
authentication. The questions relating to these points remain made by the testatrix in favor of the proponent in 1943 and

1944, but conveyances were finally set aside by this Supreme and enforceable or otherwise. As such, the probate order is final
Court. and appealable; Section 1 of Rule 109 specifically prescribes
CFI: will was genuine and properly executed; but that "any interested person may appeal in special proceedings
deferred resolution on the questions of estoppel and revocation from an order or judgment . . . where such order or judgment:
"until such time when we shall pass upon the intrinsic validity of (a) allows or disallows a will."
the provisions of the will or when the question of adjudication of Appellants argue: they were entitled to await the trial
the properties is opportunely presented." Court's resolution on the other grounds of their opposition
Oppositors Fernandez and Reyes petitioned for before taking an appeal, as otherwise there would be a
reconsideration, and/or new trial, insisting that the issues of multiplicity of recourses to the higher Courts. This contention is
estoppel and revocation be considered and resolved. without weight.
Court overruled the claim that proponent was in estoppel to ask The probate decree of the Court was not appealed on time, the
for the probate of the will, but "reserving unto the parties the same had become final and conclusive. Hence, the appellate
right to raise the issue of implied revocation at the opportune courts may no longer revoke said decree nor review the
time." evidence upon which it is made to rest.
1960, the CFI appointed Ricardo Cruz as administrator for the The revocation invoked by the oppositors-appellants is not an
sole purpose of submitting an inventory of the estate, and this express one, but merely implied from subsequent acts of the
was done on February 9, 1960. testatrix allegedly evidencing an abandonment of the original
On the question of whether the execution by the intention to bequeath or devise the properties concerned. As
testatrix of deeds of sale of the larger portion of her estate in such, the revocation would not affect the will itself, but merely
favor of the testamentary heir, subsequent to the execution of the particular devise or legacy. Only the total and absolute
her 1930 testament, had revoked the latter, the trial Court revocation can preclude probate of the revoked testament
resolved against the oppositors and held the will of the late (Trillana vs. Crisostomo, supra.).
Benedicta de los Reyes "unaffected and unrevoked by the (b) The presentation and probate of a will are
deeds of sale." Whereupon, the oppositors elevated the case to requirements of public policy, being primarily designed to
the Court of Appeals. protect the testator's, expressed wishes, which are entitled to
respect as a consequence of the decedent's ownership and
ISSUES: right of disposition within legal limits. Evidence of it is the duty
(a) whether or not the decree of the CFI allowing the will to imposed on a custodian of a will to deliver the same to the
probate had become final for lack of appeal. Court, and the fine and imprisonment prescribed for its violation
(b) whether or not the order of the Court of origin overruling the (Revised Rule 75). It would be a non sequitur to allow public
estoppel invoked by oppositors-appellants had likewise become policy to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel.
final. (c) Article 957(2) of the Civil Code of 1950 (Art. 869 of
(c) whether or not the 1930 will of Benedicta de los Reyes had the Code of 1889), which recites:
been impliedly revoked by her execution of deeds of Art. 957. The legacy or devise shall be without effect:
conveyance in favor of the proponent. (2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the
RULING: thing bequeathed or any part thereof, it being understood that
(a) It is elementary that a probate decree finally and in the latter case the legacy or devise shall be without effect
definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the only with respect to the part thus alienated. If after the
testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last will alienation the thing should again belong to the testator, even if
and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid it be by reason of nullity of the contract, the legacy or devise

shall not thereafter be valid, unless the reacquisition shall have Emil Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized
been effected by virtue of the exercise of the right of citizen of the United States. He died in the city of Manila leaving
repurchase. a will. The will is an holographic instrument, being written in the
As observed by the Court of Appeals, the existence of any such
testator's own handwriting, and is signed by himself and two
change or departure from the original intent of the testatrix,
expressed in her 1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the witnesses only, instead of three witnesses required by section
circumstance that the subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A petition, however, was
were executed in favor of the legatee herself, appellee presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila for
Dimagiba. As found by the Court of Appeals in its decision the probate of this will, on the ground that Johnson was at the
annulling these conveyances, "no consideration whatever was time of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States
paid by respondent Dimagiba" on account of the transfers, of America; that the will was duly executed in accordance with
thereby rendering it even more doubtful whether in conveying
the laws of that State; and hence could properly be probated
the property to her legatee, the testatrix merely intended to
comply in advance with what she had ordained in her here pursuant to section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The
testament, rather than an alteration or departure therefrom. hearing on said application was set for March 6, 1916, and three
Revocation being an exception, we believe, that in the weeks publication of notice was ordered in the "Manila Daily
circumstances of the particular case, Article 957 of the Civil Bulletin." Due publication was made pursuant to this order of
Code of the Philippines, does not apply to the case at bar. the court.
If the annulment was due to undue influence, then the
transferor was not expressing her own free will and intent in However, after the will had been probated, her daughter
making the conveyances. Hence, it cannot be concluded, either, from first marriage, EbbaIngeborg, moved for the annulment of
that such conveyances established a decision on her part to
the decree of probate and put the estate into intestate
abandon the original legacy.
The recovery of the alienated property "even if it be by reason administration, thus preparing the way for the establishment of
of the nullity of the contract" does not revive the legacy. An the claim of the petitioner as the sole legitimate heir of her
alienation through undue influence in no way differs from one father. She contended, among others, that the order admitting
made through violence or intimidation. In either case, the the will to probate was made without notice to her. In the
transferor is not expressing his real intent, and it cannot be held argument submitted in behalf of the petitioner, that, at the time
that there was in fact an alienation that could produce a the court made the order of publication, it was apprised of the
revocation of the anterior bequest.
fact that the petitioner lived in the United States and that as
Appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed.
daughter and heir she was necessarily interested in the probate
PASCUAL VS COURT OF APPEALS of the will. It is, therefore, insisted that the court should have
Dorado, Czaybeeh appointed a date for the probate of the will sufficiently far in the
future to permit the petitioner to be present either in person or
IN RE JOHNSON by representation; and it is said that the failure of the court thus
Espino, Carla to postpone the probate of the will constitutes an infringement
of that provision of the Philippine Bill which declared that
FACTS:
property shall not be taken without due process of law.

ISSUE: entered in ordinary contentious litigation. In other words the
utility of the provision is not limited to actions proper but
Whether or not the order admitting the will to probate extends to all sorts of judicial proceedings. The word "party,"
was beyond the jurisdiction of the court and void because it was used in this section, means any person having an interest in the
made without notice to the petitioner; and subject matter of the proceeding who is in a position to be
concluded by the judgment, order, to other proceeding taken.
RULING:
Therefore, also in conformity with the doctrine
The proceedings for the probate of the will were regular
announced in the Davis case, the petitionerin this case could
and that the publication was sufficient to give the court
have applied at any time within six months for March 16, 1916,
jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding and to allow the will to
and upon showing that she had been precluded from appearing
be probated.
in the probate proceedings by conditions over which she had no
In the case of In re Davis, the Court ruled that "the control and that the order admitting the will to probate had
proceeding as to the probate of a will is essentially one in rem, been erroneously entered upon insufficient proof or upon a
and in the very nature of things the state is allowed a wide supposed state of facts contrary to the truth, the court would
latitude in determining the character of the constructive notice have been authorized to set the probate aside and grant a
to be given to the world in a proceeding where it has absolute rehearing. It is no doubt true that six months was, under the
possession of the res. It would be an exceptional case where a circumstances, a very short period of time within which to
court would declare a statute void, as depriving a party of his expect the petitioner to appear and be prepared to contest the
property without due process of law, the proceeding being probate with the proof which she might have desired to collect
strictly in rem, and the res within the state, upon the ground from remote countries. Nevertheless, although the time allowed
that the constructive notice prescribed by the statute was for the making of such application was inconveniently short, the
unreasonably short." remedy existed; and the possibility of its use is proved in this
case by the circumstance that on June 12, 1916, she in fact
Further, section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure here appeared in court by her attorneys and excepted to the
provides that “Upon such terms as may be just the court may order admitting the will to probate.It follows that the order of
relieve a party or his legal representative from a judgment, March 16, 1916, admitting the will of Emil H. Johnson to probate
order or other proceeding taken against him through his cannot be declared null and void merely because the petitioner
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; Provided, was unavoidably prevented from appearing at the original
That application therefor be made within a reasonable time, but hearing upon the matter of the probate of the will in question.
in no case exceeding six months after such judgment, order, or
proceeding was taken.” The use of the word "judgment, order or
MANAHAN VS. MANAHAN
other proceeding" in this section indicates an intention on the
Espino, Carla
part of the Legislature to give wide latitude to the remedy here
provided, and is not to be restricted to judgments or orders FACTS:

The petitioner, Tiburcia Manahan instituted special appellant has not been instituted heir. Furthermore, not being a
proceedings No. 4162, for the probate of the will of the forced heir, she did not acquire any successional right.
deceased Donata Manahan. The court set the date for the
hearing and the necessary notice required by law was (2) No. The decree of probate is conclusive with respect
accordingly published. It, later on, entered the decree admitting to the due execution thereof and it cannot be impugned on any
the will to probate as prayed for. The will was probated on of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any
September 22, 1930 and appointed the herein petitioner as the separate or independent action or proceedings. Also, inasmuch
executrix. On May 11, 1932, the appellant herein, Engracia as the proceedings followed in a testamentary case are in rem,
Manahan, filed a motion for reconsideration and a new trial, the trial court's decree admitting the will to probate was
praying that the order admitting the will to probate be vacated effective and conclusive against her, in accordance with the
and the authenticated will declared null and void ab initio. She provisions of section 306 of the said Code of Civil Procedure
claimed that she was an interested party in the testamentary which reads as follows:
proceedings and, as such, was entitled to and should have been
SEC. 306.EFFECT OF JUDGMENT. — . . . .
notified of the probate of the will.
1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in
ISSUE:
respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the
(1) Whether or not the petitioner was entitled to and should estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal,
have been notified of the probate of the will: and political, or legal condition or relation of a particular person the
judgment or order is conclusive upon the title of the thing, the
(2) Whether or not the will is null and void ab initio on the will or administration, or the condition or relation of the person:
ground that the external formalities prescribed by the Provided, That the probate of a will or granting of letters of
Code of Civil Procedure have not been complied with in administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death
the execution thereof. of the testator or intestate; . . . .
RULING:
ALABAN VS COURT OF APPEALS
(1) The appellant's contention is obviously unfounded Hipolito, Nina Anthonette
and untenable. She was not entitled to notification of the
probate of the will and neither had she the right to expect it, FACTS
Respondent Francisco Provido filed a petition for the probate
inasmuch as she was not an interested party, not having filed
of the Last Will and Testament of the late Soledad Provido
an opposition to the petition for the probate thereof. Her Elevencionado a. ALLEGATION: he was the heir of the decedent
allegation that she had the status of an heir, being the and the executor of her will. b. RTC’s RULING: allowed the
deceased's sister, did not confer on her the right to be notified probate of the will and directed the issuance of letters
on the ground that the testatrix died leaving a will in which the testamentary to respondent

Petitioners after 4 months filed a motion for the reopening of (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in
the probate proceedings a. CLAIMs: 1) they are the intestate the province, as well as furnished to the designated or other
heirs of the decedent. 2) RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator b.
the petition due to non-payment of the correct docket fees, Petitioners became parties due to the publication of the notice
defective publication, and lack of notice to the other heirs. of hearing 2.The filing of motion to reopen is similar to a motion
for new triala.The ruling became final and executor because the
will could not have been probated because: a) the motion was filed out of time. Given that they knew of the
signature of the decedent was forged; b) the will was not decision 4 months after they could have filed a petition for relief
executed in accordance with law, that is, the witnesses failed to from judgment after the denial of their motion to reopen. 3.
sign below the attestation clause; c) the decedent lacked Petition for annulment of judgment must still fail for failure to
testamentary capacity to execute and publish a will; d) the will comply with the substantive requisites, a. An action for
was executed by force and under duress and improper pressure; annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the
e) the decedent had no intention to make a will at the time of case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered.
affixing of her signature; and f)she did not know the properties PURPOSE: to have the final and executory judgment set aside
to be disposed of, having included in the will properties which so that there will be a renewal of litigation. 4. Notice is required
no longer belonged to her. b. RTC’s Ruling: denied motion 1) to be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and devisees of
petitioners were deemed notified of the hearing by publication the testator a. the will states that the respondent was instituted
and that the deficiencyin the payment of docket fees is not a as the sole heir of the decedent thus he has no legal obligation
ground for the outright dismissal of the petition. 2) RTC’s to mention petitioners in the petition for probate or personally
Decision was already final and executory even before notify them.
petitioners’ filing of the motion to reopen 3. Petitioners filed a
76
petition to annule RTC’s decision a.CLAIM: there was a
compromise agreement between petitioners and respondents RULE
and they learnt the probate proceeding only in July 2001 b.CA’s
Allowance or Disallowance of Will
RULING: petition dismissed 1) no showing that petitioners failed
to avail of or resort to the ordinary remedies of newtrial, appeal,
SANTOS VS. CASTILLO
petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies
Hipolito, Nina Anthonette
through no fault of their own.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Petitioner Emerita Santos, in her behalf and as guardian
W/N the allowance of the will to probate should be
of the minor acknowledge natural children of the deceased,
annulled for failure to mention the petitioners asparties
filed a petition for probate of the will of Nicolas Azores. She also
filed a motion for the appointment of a special administrator. At
RULING:
the hearing, respondents Jose, Sinfrosa and Antonio Azores,
No 1. Probate of a will is considered action in rem a.
legitimate children of the deceased filed their opposition, on the
Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee
ground that the court had not acquired jurisdiction on the case.
named in a will, or any other personinterested in the estate
Petitioner's allegations being insufficient to confer jurisdiction
may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the
because she did not allege that she had the custody of the will,
court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed. Notice of the
and therefore, was not entitled to present it for probate and
time and place for proving the will must bepublished for three

furtherance because the will that should be probated is the designated nobody as custodian of the will, it cannot be denied
original and not a copy thereof, as the one presented by the that his act of subsequentl$ making a codicil and entrusting the
petitioner. Petitioner filed an amended petition prayingthat custody thereof to his legitimate children, clearly modified his
respondents be required to present the copies of the will and last will. In this sense, the custody of both is entrusted to his
the codicil in their possession. Court issued an order denying legitimate children and not to Manuel Azores or to petitioner.
the petition for the appointment of a special administrator by Hence, as the legitimate children of the deceased had custody
petitioner and ordered Jose Azores, who has custody of the last of the originals of the will and of the codicil, they alone could,
will and testament and all other documents in relation thereto, had the right and where bound by law to apply for the probate
to deliver said papers to the court within the date from notice. of their father' last will. In order that the court may acquire
Consequently, petitioner filed a motion praying that her jurisdiction over the case for the probate of a will and for the
amended petition be admitted. However, before this motion administration of the properties left by a deceased person, the
was decided, respondents, after their father's death, presented application must allege, in addition to the residence of the
the original of the will and codicil, and petitioned that they be deceased and other indispensable facts or circumstances, that
admitted for probate. The court issued an order dismissing the the applicant is the executor in the will or is the person who had
petition filed by the petitioner. custody of the will to be probated. The original of said
document must be presented or sufficient reasons given to
ISSUE: justify the nonrepresentation of said original and the
Who is entitled to apply for probate? WON the court acceptance of the copy or duplicate thereof. Inasmuch as these
acquired jurisdiction over the case requisites had not been complied with in the application filed by
the petitioner, the respondent judge did not exceed in
RULING: jurisdiction in dismissing the application in question.
Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that
no will shall pass either real or personal estate, unless it is
proved and allowed. For this purpose, section 626 provides that PEREZ VS. PEREZ
the person who has the custody of he will shall, within 4 days Katigbak , Paula Margareth
after he knows of the death of the testator, deliver the will to
the court which has jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the FACTS:
will. Sections 628 and 629 proscribed coercive means to compel On May 25, 1973, the plaintiffs-appellants executed a
a person having the custody of a will to deliver it to the court deed of real estate mortgage in favor of the Development Bank
which has jrisdiction. Petitioner alleged that the deceased of the Philippines over the property located in Bataan as
designated nobody as custodian of his will but that he directed security for an agricultural loan of P6,500.00. The mortgage
his nephew Manuel Azores to deliver a copy thereof to her, to contract was registered in the Registry of Deeds of Bataan. The
keep one in his possession, and to turn over the other two plaintiffs failed to pay their obligation which prompted DBP in
copies to his son Jose Azores, with instructions to the effect that extrajudicially foreclosing the property. the application was filed
if petitioner or his son failed to present said will for probate, And the necessary notice of Sheriffs sale was issued and posted
Manuel should take charge of presenting it to the court. +aking by the deputy sheriff at three (3) public places in Morong,
everything into account therefore, it is of the court's vieww that Bataan, where the mortgaged property is located and duly
Jose Azores, the son of the deceased, had the custody of the will published for three (3) consecutive weeks in the Olongapo
because the original thereof was turned over to him. For the News. On December 19, 1978, the public auction sale was
sake of argument, however, admitting that the testator had conducted at the municipal building in Morong, Bataan, wherein

Democrito Perez emerged as the winning bidder for P11,000.00. the sheriff had posted the notice, he may not have posted it
Certificate of sale in favor of Democrito Perez was issued and anymore for the remaining nineteen (19) days, as required by
registered in the Registry of Deeds. Since plaintiffs-appellants Act No. 3135. It could also be, according to petitioners, that
failed to exercise their right to redeem the foreclosed property, after the notice was posted, the same may have been removed
original defendant Democrito Perez executed an affidavit of from where it was posted either by an act of man or by an act of
consolidation which resulted in the issuance of a new TCT. On nature. But such contention was not supported with evidence.
1985, a civil case for Annulment of Public Auction Sale with As correctly held by the trial court and the appellate court, the
Damages coupled with Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for deputy sheriff has in his favor the presumption that his official
Restraining Order was filed by herein petitioners against the duty was regularly performed. The petitioners herein were
respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Balanga, unable to topple this presumption in the trial court, the Court of
Bataan. The case was dismissed. Petitioners filed an appeal Appeals, and now in this Court. -No. To be a newspaper of
alleging that the RTC erred in holding that the public auction general circulation, it is enough that it is published for the
sale of the subject mortgaged property was valid despite the dissemination of local news and general information; that it has
lack of notice to them, thus, depriving them of their right to a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; and that it is
property without due process of law. They further alleged that published at regular intervals. The newspaper must not also be
the notice of public auction sale was not validly published in a devoted to the interests or published for the entertainment of a
newspaper of general circulation, as required by law. But CA particular class, profession, trade, calling, race or religious
affirmed RTC's decision. Motion for reconsideration was filed but denomination. The newspaper need not have the largest
the same was denied. circulation so long as it is of general circulation. Based from the
testimonies of the witnesses, it was proven that Olongapo News
ISSUE/s: was indeed a newspaper of general circulation. That although in
WHETHER THERE WAS NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE 1978, it was not published in Morong, Bataan, under P.D. No.
REQUIREMENTS ON POSTINGS. WHETHER THERE WAS NO 1079, it is categorical that in the event there is no newspaper or
PUBLICATION IN A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION periodical published in the locality, the same may be published
WHERE THE REAL PROPERTY IS SITUATED. in the newspaper or periodical published, edited and circulated
in the nearest city or province. Since no newspaper of general
RULING: circulation was being published in Morong, Bataan, in the year
No. The requirement on the posting of notices is found in 1978, then the respondents were right in availing themselves of
Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, viz: the services of the Olongapo News, which, as found by the trial
Sec. 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for court, was the nearest publication in Bataan.
not less than twenty days in at least three public places of the
municipality or city where the property is situated, and if such
property is worth more than four hundred pesos, such notice DE ARANZ VS. GALING
shall also be published once a week for at least three Katigbak , Paula Margareth
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
municipality or city. Their position that the puericulture center FACTS:
and the municipal building should be considered one and the On 3 March 1986, private respondent Joaquin R-Infante
same place because they were located in one place is pure filed RTC Pasig a petition for the probate and allowance of the
fallacy and totally unacceptable for being contrary to the actual last will and testament of the late Montserrat R-Infante y G-Pola.
state of things. The petitioners further contend that even after The petition specified the names and addresses of herein

petitioners as legatees and devisees. The probate court issued Philippines at their places of residence, if such places of
an order setting the petition for hearing. Said order was residence be known. There is no question that the residences of
published in the "Nueva Era" A newspaper of general circulation herein petitioners legatees and devisees were known to the
in Metro Manila once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks. probate court. But despite such knowledge, the probate court
On the date of the hearing, no oppositor appeared. The hearing did not cause copies of the notice to be sent to petitioners. The
was then reset and private respondent presented his evidence requirement of the law for the allowance of the will was not
ex-parte and placed Arturo Arceo one of the testamentary satisfied by mere publication of the notice of hearing for three
witnesses, on the witness stand. During the proceedings, (3) weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
private respondent was appointed executor. Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration alleging that, as named legatees, no BASA VS. MERCADO
notices were sent to them as required by Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Lee, Mariline
Rules of Court and they prayed that they be given a period of
ten (10) days within which to file their opposition to the probate MANINANG VS. COURT OF APPEALS
of the will. This was denied by the Court. Petition for certiorari Lee, Mariline
was filed and referred to CA which was also dismissed. Hence,
present petition. ACAIN VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
Lectura, Erika
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in ruling that the requirement of GAN VS. YAP
notice on heirs, legatees, and devisees is merely a procedural Lectura, Erika
convenience to satisfy the requirements of due process?
RODELAS VS ARANZA
RULING: Lim, Justin
76
Yes. Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Cof reads: SEC. 4.
Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail RULE
or personally.— The court shall also cause copies of the notice of
the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to Allowance of Will Proved Outside of the
the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder
the testator resident in the Philippines at their places of
residence, and deposited in the post office with the postage LEON & GHEZZIE VS.MANUFACTURERS LIFE INS.
thereon prepaid at least twenty (20) days before the hearing, if Lim, Justin
such places of residence be known. A copy of the notice must in
like manner be mailed to the person named as executor, if he
be not, the petitioner; also, to any person named as co-executor SUNTAY VS. SUNTAY
not petitioning, if their places of residence be known. Personal Lubay, Angela
service of copies of the notice at least ten (10) days before the
day of hearing shall be equivalent to mailing. It is clear from the VDA. DE PEREZ VS. TOLETE
aforecited rule that notice of the time and place of the hearing Lubay, Angela
for the allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designated
or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees residing in the FACTS:

Subject of this case is the probate of the will of Spouses relax the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive the best
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became evidence of which the matter is susceptible before a purported
American citizens and practicing doctors in New York, U.S.A. The will is probated or denied probate
spouses executed separate wills for the benefit of each other.
The spouses and their family perished when they were trapped Respondent Judge was ordered to give the petitioner a
by fire that gutted their home. reasonable time within which to submit evidence.
Thereafter, their wills were admitted to probate with the
Surrogate Court of the County of Onondaga, New York. Then,
petitioner who is the mother of Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan filed ANCHETA VS GUERSAY-DALAYGON
for the reprobate of the will with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Mercado, Trish
of Malolos, Bulacan. The will was denied probate for the reason
that the documents did not establish the law of New York on the ANCHETA v. GUERSEY-DALAYGON
procedure and allowance of wills. The petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration to be given sufficient time to prove New York GR NO. 139868; June 8, 2006
law was denied. On appeal, petitioner contend that the
evidence submitted to the RTC were already sufficient to allow TOPIC: Rule 77 –Allowance of Will Proved Outside of the
probate of will.
Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder
ISSUE:
WON it was necessary to prove the foreign law. Facts: Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard
Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who have
RULINGS: resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an
NO.The evidence necessary for the reprobate or
adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). Audrey died in
allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the
Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in 1979. She left a will wherein she bequeathed her entire
accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his estate to Richard consisting of Audrey’s conjugal share in
domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) real estate improvements at Forbes Park, current account
the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the
with cash balance and shares of stock in A/G Interiors. Two
fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws
of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills. Except years after her death, Richard married Candelaria
for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all Guersey-Dalaygon. Four years thereafter, Richard died
the needed evidence. and left a will wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon
which the probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by respondent, except for his shares in A/G, which he left to
the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them his adopted daughter.
.Petitioner must have perceived the omission of the fifth
requirement above as in fact she moved for more time to Petitioner, as ancillary administrator in the court where
submit the pertinent procedural and substantive New York laws
but which request respondent Judge just glossed over. While the Audrey’s will was admitted to probate, filed a motion to
probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein courts should declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey and a project

of partition of Audrey’s estate. The motion and project of of Audrey’s estate according to the terms of her will and
partition were granted. Meanwhile, the ancillary as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic
administrator with regards to Richard’s will also filed a fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders
project of partition, leaving 2/5 of Richard’s undivided dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be
interest in the Forbes property was allocated to upheld.
respondent Candelaria, while 3/5 thereof was allocated to
their three children. Respondent opposed on the ground
that under the law of the State of Maryland, where
Richard was a native of, a legacy passes to the legatee
RULE 78
Letters Testamentary and of Administration, When
the entire interest of the testator in the property subject and to Whom issued
to the legacy.
NGO THE HUA VS. CHUNG KIAT HUA
Mercado, Trish
Issue: Whether or not the decree of distribution may still
be annulled under the circumstances. NGO THE HUA v. CHUNG KITA HUA
Held: A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased GR NO. L-17091; Sept. 30, 1963
person vests the title to the land of the estate in the
Facts:
distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a
timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its binding effect is This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of
like any other judgment in rem. Rizal appointing Chung Kiat Hua as administrator of the estate
of the deceased Chung Liu.
However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of
Ngo The Hua, claiming to be the spouse of the deceased, filed a
distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of petition to be appointed administratix of the estate of the
jurisdiction or fraud. Further, in Ramon vs. Ortuzar, the aforementioned deceased. The petition was opposed by the
Court ruled that a party interested in a probate children of the deceased claiming that Ngo Hua is morally and
proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he physically unfit to execute the duties of the trust as
is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control administratix, and that the she and the deceased procured an
or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to absolute divorce in Taiwan. The lower court found that Ngo Hua
negligence. and the deceased were validly divorced in Taipei. The court
issued an order appointing Chung Kiat Hua as administrator
instead.
Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution

Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in passing upon the Proceso de Guzman died on January 1, 1937, without leaving a
validity of the divorce obtained by Ngo Hua and the deceased will. The deceased was first married to Agatona Santos, with
and upon the filiation of the oppositors? whom he had four children, named Nicolasa, Apolinario, Ana
and Tomasa. After Agatona's death, the deceased contracted a
Held: second marriage with Angela Limcolioc, with whom he did not
have any child.
No. It is well settled that the declaration of heirs shall only take
place after all the debts, expenses and taxes have been paid. A
cursory reading of the pertinent section discloses that what the
court is enjoined from doing is the assignment or distribution of On the 7th of the same month of January, 1937, the Court of
the residue of the deceased’s estate before the above- First Instance of Rizal appointed Nicolasa de Guzman judicial
mentioned obligations chargeable to the estate are first paid. administratrix of the properties of the deceased Proceso de
Nowhere from the said section may it be inferred that the court Guzman. On the 8th of the same month of January, 1937,
cannot make a declaration of heirs prior to the satisfaction of Angela Limcolioc, widow of the deceased, asked that this
these obligations. It is to be noted, however, that the court in appointment be set aside and that she had named
making the appointment of the administrator did not purport to administratrix instead, on that ground of her preference as the
make a declaration of heirs. widow. The court denied this petition and sustained the
appointment of Nicolasa. From these resolutions, Angela
appealed.
MEDINA ET. AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Mansul, Nabral
MALOLES II VS. PHILLIPS ISSUE:

Mansul, Nabral
REPUBLIC VS. MARCOS

Pangilinan, Legis Whether the trial court erred in not appointing her
administratrix of the estate of the deceased Proceso de Guzman
TORRES VS. JAVIER
Pangilinan, Legis and in appointing Nicolasa de Guzman as such administratrix
without first setting the case for hearing.
DE GUZMAN VS. LIMCOLIOC

Rabanal, Michelle
RULING:
FACTS:

Tarlac court petitioning for the issuance of letter of
administration in favor of Atty. Pedro B. De Jesus, for the
The application filed by Nicolasa de Guzman for her purpose of settling the estate of the deceased.
appointment alleges that during the marital life of the deceased
with his first wife Agatona Santos, both, through their mutual Twelve days afterwards the widow voiced her opposition, and
claimed preference to be appointed as administratrix. She said
labor, acquired all the properties left by the deceased, not
the only close relatives and forced heirs were her six legitimate
having acquired any property during his second marriage with minor children, besides herself.
Angela Limcolioc. The court bore these allegations in mind. It is
true that the case was not heard for the purpose of establishing RTC:
these allegations, but when Angela asked for the
reconsideration of the appointment of Nicolasa, she did not The petitioner presented evidence. The oppositor submitted
deny these allegations and merely stated that they do not none. Then the trial judge, disregarding the preference
established by law for the surviving widow, entered on August
justify her appointment as administratrix. For failure of Angela
16, 1951 an order appointing Atty. Pedro B. De Jesus as
to deny these allegations, thus taking them for granted, the administrator.
court was justified in considering them when it denied the
reconsideration of its resolution and when it sustained the Under section 6, rule 79 of the Rules of Court, when a person
appointment of Nicolasa. dies intestate, administration should be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be
(b) if such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or

If the properties left by the deceased Proceso de Guzman were next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or
acquired during his marriage with Agatona Santos, his children, unwilling, . . . it may be granted to one or more of the principal
among them Nicolasa, have more interest therein than his now creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it
widow, Angela Limcolioc, who would only be entitled, by way of
may be granted to such other person as the court may select.
usufruct, to a portion equal to that corresponding to one of the
children who has received no betterment. The trial judge was cognizant of this statutory preference. But
he expressly stated his reason for disregarding it, saying in
effect: "Apparently the amount of credits exceeds the value of
the conjugal assets; therefore the interest of the creditors
TORRES VS. SICAT deserves paramount consideration. Now inasmuch as the widow
Rabanal, Michelle has shown hostility to the creditors by openly disputing their
credits, she is therefore unsuitable, for having adverse
FACTS: interests."
On August 25, 1950, Luis Morales, married to
Hermenegilda Sicat, died in the municipality of Tarlac, Tarlac A probate court cannot arbitrarily disregard the preferential
Seven days later, Jose Torres alleging to be a creditor of the rights of the surviving spouse to the
conjugal partnership commenced this special proceeding in the

administration of the estate of a deceased person; but if the acknowledged indebtedness to every one coming forward with
person enjoying such preferential rights is unsuitable the court a claim, regardless of its merit, she would be useless, even
may appoint another person. harmful, both to the heirs and the actual creditors.
Unsuitableness for appointment as administrator may consist in Under the rules (Rule 87) creditors; claims may be filed, and
adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately considered, only after the regular administrator has been
interested in the estate of such an extent as to render the appointed. Hence, in selecting the administrator, the court
appointment inadvisable. could not yet normally accord priority treatment to the interests
of those whose credits were in dispute. And counsel for herein
"The surviving widow" the trial judge stated, "has always appellant did well in opposing the presentation of evidence of
consistently refused to recognize the credits" and manifested the objected credits at the hearing, arguing in part,
her determination to "resist the claims of creditors."
. . . the time has not yet arrived when this court can even
ISSUE: entertain the presentation of those exhibits because the stage
Whether RTC’s appointment should be upheld, ignoring of presenting claims has not yet arrived. Consequently, this
the surviving widows preferential right. court can not even receive as evidence the said documents as
evidence of indebtedness, because if those evidence will be
RULING: accepted then we will be in a position to rebut them and to
In our opinion it is a sound juridical principle that the enter into actual trial to show that they are not really evidence
administrator should not adopt attitudes nor take steps inimical of indebtedness, and in that case we will not terminate because
to the interests of the creditors. The administration of the then we will be contending as to whether those were really
intestate is undertaken for the benefit of both the heirs and the executed or really contracted. ...
creditors. but by creditors we mean those declared to be so in
appropriate proceedings. Before their credits are fully On the other hand, the appealed order conceding that the
established they are not "creditors" within the purview of the evidence "showed clearly that the surviving widow is fully
above principle. So it is not improper — it is even proper — for competent in a high degree to administer the intestate of her
the administrator or whoever is proposed for appointment as deceased husband", plainly indicates that except for her
such, to oppose, or to require competent proof of, claims supposed hostility to creditors she was suitable for the trust.
advanced against the estate. "The propriety of contesting Consequently, having found that her attitude did not per se
particular claims must frequently be left largely to his discretion constitute antagonism to the creditors, we must necessarily
and no presumption of bad faith or misconduct will be made declare and enforce her superior right to appointment as
against him." (34 C. J. S., p. 259.) administratrix under Rule 79.
At the hearing of the petition for the appointment of Wherefore, the questioned order appointing Atty. Pedro B. De
administrator, this widow practically did nothing more than to Jesus is annulled, and one will be entered requiring the issuance
inform the alleged creditors, "prove your credit before I honor by the court a quo of letters of administration to the widow
it." That is not necessarily dishonest nor contrary to real appellant subject to such terms and conditions as are
creditors. And then, not having opposed all creditors, because appropriate under the Rules. Costs against the appellee.
she did not deny the estate's liability to the People's Bank, she
could not strictly be considered hostile to the creditors. Had she

SUNTAY III VS. COJUANGCO-SUNTAY ISSUE :
Rivera, Hiezll Wynn Who, as between Emilio III and respondent, is better qualified to
act as administrator of the decedent’s estate.
FACTS:
On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina married to Dr. HELD:
Federico died intestate. In 1979, their only son, Emilio Suntay The underlying philosophy of our law on intestate
(Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina and Federico. At the time succession is to give preference to the wishes and presumed
of her death, Cristina was survived by her husband, Federico, will of the decedent, absent a valid and effective will. The basis
and several grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron curtain
Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay. bar rule, is quite the opposite scenario in the facts obtaining
Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they begot herein for the actual relationship between Federico and Cristina,
three children, namely: respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and on one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, was akin to the normal
Emilio II. Emilio I’s first marriage was subsequently annulled. relationship of legitimate relatives. Emilio III was reared from
Thereafter, Emilio I had two children out of wedlock, Emilio III infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her husband, Federico,
and Nenita Suntay, by two different women. Respondent and who both acknowledged him as their grandchild. Emilio III is a
her siblings Margarita and Emilio II, lived separately from their legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the
father and paternal grandparents. After her spouse’s death, distribution of the latter’s estate as a direct heir, one degree
Federico adopted their illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and from Federico, not simply representing his deceased illegitimate
Nenita. On October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition for the father, Emilio I.
issuance of letters of administration in her favor. Federico filed
his opposition. Being the surviving spouse of Cristina, he is From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA erred
capable of administering her estate and he should be the one in excluding Emilio III from the administration of the decedent’s
appointed as its administrator; that as part owner of the mass estate. As Federico’s adopted son, Emilio III’s interest in the
of conjugal properties left by Cristina, he must be accorded estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this Court as the
legal preference in the administration. After a failed attempt by interest therein of respondent, considering that the CA even
the parties to settle the proceedings amicably, Federico filed a declared that under the law, Federico, being the surviving
Manifestation dated March 13, 1999, nominating his adopted spouse, would have the right of succession over a portion of the
son, Emilio III, as administrator of the decedent’s estate on his exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his share in
behalf. The trial court granted Emilio III’s Motion for Leave to Intervene the conjugal partnership.
considering his interest in the outcome of the case. In the
course of the proceedings, Federico died. The trial court Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of
rendered a decision appointing herein petitioner, Emilio III, as preference in the appointment of an administrator of an estate:
administrator of decedent Cristina’s intestate estate. Aggrieved,
respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which reversed and SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of
set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in
Administration issued to Emilio III. The CA zeroed in on Emilio III’s the will, or the executor or executors are
status as an illegitimate child of Emilio I and, thus, barred from incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond,
representing his deceased father in the estate of the latter’s or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
legitimate mother, the decedent. granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case animosity and antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate
may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion descendants of a deceased.
of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have The petition is GRANTED.
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case

may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by RULE 79
them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the Opposing Issuance of Letters Testamentary,
husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for Petition and Contest for Letters of Administration
thirty (30) days after the death of the person to
apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, GUTIEREZ VS VILLEGAS
it may be granted to one or more of the principal Rodriguez, Maria Lorraine
creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
FACTS:
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and In 1954, Irene Santos died intestate, leaving as her only
willing to serve, it may be granted to such other heirs her surviving spouse Jose Villegas and two nieces —
person as the court may select. daughters of a deceased brother, Rizalina and Adela Gutierrez.
Thereafter, the surviving spouse filed with the Rizal CFI- Pasay,
a petition for Letters of Administration , and was appointed
However, the order of preference is not absolute for it administrator of the estate. In the petition, he named as
depends on the attendant facts and circumstances of each intestate heirs, besides himself, the 2 nieces of his deceased
case. Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an wife. Under the unverified manifestation signed by Adela
administrator lies in the sound discretion of the trial court. In Gutierrez, accompanied by a public instrument entitled
the main, the attendant facts and circumstances of this case "Kasulatan ng Bilihan at Salinan", renounced all her rights ,
necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both interests and participation in the estate of Irene in favor of her
respondent and Emilio III of their grandmothers, Cristina’s sister.
estate. However, Adela averred that the deed of assignment of
her rights, participation and interest in the estate of Irene
Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately Santos and the first manifestation were obtained thru fraud
reflect the basis of intestate succession, i.e., love first descends, practiced by the administrator upon her and were vitiated by
for the decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish between her mistake or undue influence. Therein, she narrated that due to
legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her stringent financial conditions, she (Adela) requested the
husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of administrator for an advance of P2,000.00 from the estate. The
Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate administrator refused on the ground that it is against the law,
child. The peculiar circumstances of this case, painstakingly but suggested that she might obtain a loan from her sister
pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal Rizalina, offering to help. Thereafter, the administrator informed
presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist Adela that he was able to secure the conformity of Rizalina to

give her a loan of P10,000.00 instead of only P2,000.00. Adela YES. It cannot be successfully denied that Adela Santos
was then brought by Villegas and Rizalina to the office of their Gutierrez is an indispensable party to the proceedings in
lawyer, where she was made to sign a document she could not question. Her interest in the estate is not inchoate, it was
read. The lawyer asked Adela to sign another document, which established at the time of death of Irene Santos. While it is true
he said was to be presented in Court and explained the that she executed a deed of assignment, it is also a fact that
contents of the document signed the day before. It was only she asked the same to be annulled, which action is now pending
then that Adela came to know that said document was a deed before the CFI-Pasig Although Adela had filed a manifestation
of sale. When Adela protested, Villegas told her that the matter dropping herself from the proceedings and presenting therewith
could be discussed better in his house. During the discussion, the supposed Deed of Assignment, the record, nevertheless
Villegas informed Adela that the amount of P50,000.00 which fails to show that action thereon had been taken by the probate
Rizalina was paying for her share in the inheritance, was Court. Every act intended to put an end to in division among co-
probably more than what she would get in the estate, because heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition,
the estate is not valuable and had plenty of debts. Although although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a
Adela did not want to accept the money, Villegas refused to compromise, or any other transaction. No serious argument can
take them back. When she was made to sign the deed of be offered to deny the co-heirship of appellee in the estate
assignment, Adela did not know the true value of the estate. under probate. It appearing (if We assume the due execution of
The administrator Villegas and Rizalina denied the the Deed of Assignment), that the transaction is in the nature of
allegations of fraud, undue influence and the like. extrajudicial partition, court approval is imperative, and the
Adela presented with the Probate Court, a motion heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over the
praying that the administrator and/or his attorneys be required estate and over their persons, by the mere act of assignment
to furnish her all copies of pleadings filed or to be filed in the and desistance. Even if the partition had been judicially
intestate proceedings, it appearing that the administrator approved on the basis of the alleged deed of assignment, an
presented pleadings in Court without serving her copies thereof. aggrieved heir does not lose her standing in the probate court.
An opposition was interposed by the administrator, who Adela was not a third person; she was an original party
alleged that the movant, although originally a party to the therein.
probate proceeding, has voluntarily and expressly desisted from
being so, and that having assigned by sale, all her rights, DURAN VS. DURAN
interests and participations in the estate, she has no longer any Rodriguez, Maria Lorraine
legal standing in the case.
CFI: Favored Adelina and ordered the administrator to FACTS:
furnish the former copies of pleadings. Pio Duran died intestate. Among his alleged heirs are
Rizalina and the Administrator appealed. Josefina, as surviving spouse; several brothers and sisters;
nephews and nieces.
Subsequent to his death, Cipriano, one of the surviving
ISSUE: brothers, executed a public instrument assigning and
Whether or not Adela Santos Gutierrez has a right to renouncing his hereditary rights to decedent’s estate in favor of
intervene in the probate proceeding. Josefina for consideration. However, a year later, Cipriano filed
in CFI-Albay a petition for intestate proceedings to settle Pio’s
RULING: estate and an ex parte motion to be appointed as Special
Administrator. Josefina opposed and moved for the dismissal

upon the ground that the petitioner is not an interested person TAYAG VS. TAYAG-GALLOR
in the estate, in view of the deed of transfer and renunciation, Salayog, Benny Rico
in the alternarive, she asked to be appointed administratrix.
Whereas Cipriano alleged that Josefina was not the decedent’s FACTS:
wife and that the deed of assignement was procured through Respondent, Tayag-Gallor or TG, filed a petition for
fraud, with gross inadequacy of consideration and vitiated by the issuance of letters of administration over the estate of
lesion.
Ismael Tayad. She claims that she is 1 of 3 illegitimate
Meanwhile, Miguel, another brother of decedent, filed a
petition to be joined as co-petitioner of Cipriano. Josefina moved
children of Ismael. Ismael was married to petitioner but
to strike out said petition as an improper attempt to intervene they didn't have any children of their own.
in the case.
CFI: dismissed the petition of Cipriano for lack of interest Ismael died intestate, leaving behind 2 lots and one
in the estate premised on the deed of assignment signed by motor vehicle, both in possession of petitioner. Petitioner
Cipriano. promised respondent and her brothers 100K each as their
Cipriano and Miguel appealed. share in the proceeds of the sale of the motor vehicle.
ISSUE: Petitioner only gave half.
Whether petitioner Cipriano can be considered as an
“interested person” in the estate
Respondent alleged that petitioner intends to
RULING:
No.Petitioner Cipriano is not an interested person in the
dispose of the properties of Ismael to the respondents
estate of the decedent. In the present case, there was really no prejudice, Petitioner opposed this petition of TG asserting
settlement proceedings. The remedy of the petitioner is to that the properties were purchased by her using her own
rescind or to annul the deed of assignment or the extrajudicial money, she even denied all of petitioners allegations.
partition. The assignment took place without pending
settlement proceeding. The properties subject matter of the Petitioner filed for dismissal for failure to state a
assignment were not under the jurisdiction of the settlement cause of action. Petitioner reiterated that she is the sole
court. Allowing that the assignment must be deemed a partition owner of the properties by presenting TCTs. She also
between the assignor and assignee, the same does not need averred that it was necessary for respondent to show
court approval to be effective between parties. An extrajudicial proof that she was acknowledged and recognized by
partition is valid as between participants even if the requisites
Ismael Tayag. There being no such allegation, the action
of Sec. 1 Rule 74 are not followed, since such requisites are for
purposes of binding creditors and non-participating heirs only. becomes one to compel recognition. DENIED. CA also
Under the Rules of Court, a petition for administration denied petitioners motion and directed the trial court to
and settlement of an estate must be filed by an interested proceed with the dispatch. CA ruled that the allegation of
person. And in the meanwhile, the assigning heir cannot respondent that she is an illegitimate child suffices for a
initiate a settlement proceedings, for until the deed of cause of action, without the need to state that she had
assignment is annulled or rescinded, it is deemed valid and been recognized or acknowledged.
effective against him, so that he is left without that “ interest”
in the estate required to petition for settlement proceedings.

Petitioner came to the SC and asserts that recognition or whether she has a material and direct
respondent should not be allowed to prove her filiation in interest to maintain the suit. So, the allegation that
the settlement of Ismael's estate. Because the claim of respondent is an illegitimate child suffices even without
filiation should not be allowed to be proved in an action stating that she has been recognized or acknowledged.
for settlement of an estate.
This petition by petitioner is DENIED.
ISSUE: Whether respondent's petition for the issuance of
letters of administration sufficiently states a cause of
action considering that she merely alleged she is an
illegitimate child?
RULE 80
RULING: YES. Special Administrator
Petition for issuance of letters of administration must be
filed by an interested person. An interested party is one FULE VS. COURT OF APPEALS
who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or Salayog, Benny Rico
one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor. The interest must be material and direct.
FACTS:
- Amado Garcia died - left property in Calamba, Laguna.
The petition for the issuance is a suit for the settlement of
- Virginia Garcia Fule (illeg sis) àpet for letters of admin & ex
the intestate estate of Ismael Tayag. The right of parte appointment as special administratix in CFI Laguna
respondent to maintain such a suit is dependent on - Motion was granted.
whether she is entitled to successional rights as an - Preciosa Garcia (wife) and in behalf of their child - opposed
illegitimate child which may be established through - failure to satisfy jurisdictional requirement & improper
voluntary or compulsory recognition. venue (avers no domicile/residence of deceased as
required by Rule 79 Sec. 21) - death certs presented by
Petitioner’s ground is essentially based on her contention Fule show QC as deceased’s last residence
that by Ismael's death, respondent can no longer - Fule was a creditor of the estate, and as a mere
establish her filiation. However, petitioner overlooked the illegitimate sister of the deceased is not entitled to succeeding
from him2
fact that respondent's successional rights may be
established not just by judicial action to compel 1Rule 79 Sec 2 - petition should show the existence of jurisdiction to make the
recognition but also by proof that she had been appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts such as death, name, last
voluntarily acknowledged. residence, existence, situs of assets, intestacy, right of person who seeks administration as
next of kin, creditor or otherwise to be appointed
Respondent was yet to show her proof of filiation because
of petitioner's opposition. So, there is no way yet to 2NCC Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestado from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in
determine if her petition is actually one to compel the same manner from the illegitimate child.

- CFI - denied opposition ▪ Clause “so far….”
- CA reversed and annulled the appointment of Fule ▪ Caption “Settlement of estate of Deceased Person.
- Preciosa became special administratrix upon a bond of P30k.
Venue and Processes
ISSUES/HELD
▪ Contained in a law of procedure - merely a matter of
method & convenience to parties
a) Venue v. Jurisdiction o Rule 4 Sec 4 - Venue is subject to waiver
➢ JURISDICTION –power/authority of court over subject matter ▪ but Preciosa did not waive it, merely requested for
o Jurisdiction over all probate cases is w/ CFIs alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving
independently from the place of residence of the spouse
deceased (Judiciary act 1948)
o Not changed by procedure b) What does the word “resides”in Rule 73 Sec 1 mean
o There are cases though that if such power is not ➢ Resides –“actual residence”
exercised conformably w/ procedure, court loses power
- Requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given
to exercise it legally. However, this doesn’t amount to place
loss of jurisdiction over subject matter but only over the
- In statutes fixing venue
person or that judgment may be rendered defective for
lack of something essential to sustain it. “residence”&“domicile”synonymous àeven when statue
➢ VENUE –place where each case shall be brought uses “domicile”, it is still construed as residence & not
o Because there are many CFIs, ROC fixed the venue (of domicile in its technical sense
settlement of estates, probate of will & issuance of - Elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the
letters of admin) - place of residence of deceased / object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
province employed.
▪ Death Certificate àdeceased resided in QC at the - Popular sense –the personal, actual or physical
time of his death, therefore the venue of Laguna was habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
improper (death cert admissible to prove residence abode
of deaceased at time of his death) - No particular length of time required but must be more
o Rule 73 Sec 13 - really a matter of venue than temporary
➢ legal residence or domicile –requires bodily presence and an
3RULE 73 Sec.1. if the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at intention to make it one’s domicile.
the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled at the CFI in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death. And if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the CFI
of any province in which he had estate.The court 1 st taking cognizance of the settlement of DISPOSITION: Fule’s petition DENIED.
the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of
the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or DE GUZMAN VS. GUADIZ
proceedings, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of Sumaway, Dylan
jurisdiction appears on the record.
FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition with the Court of First Instance
of Nueva Ecija, Branch V, Gapan, docketed as Special

Proceeding No. 865 for the probate of a will alleged to have The basis for appointing a special administrator under the Rules
been executed by one Catalina Bajacan instituting the herein is broad enough to include any cause or reason for the delay in
petitioner as sole and universal heir and naming him as granting letters testamentary or of administration as where a
executor. contest as to the will is being carried on in the same or in
The private respondents filed a motion to dismiss and/or another court, or where there is an appeal pending as to the
opposition contending, among others, that all the real proceeding on the removal of an executor or administrator, or in
properties of Catalina Bajacan are now owned by them by virtue cases where the parties cannot agree among themselves.
of a Deed of Donation Intervivos executed on June 19, 1972 by Likewise, when from any cause general administration cannot
Arcadia Bajacan and Catalina Bajacan in their favor; that on be immediately granted, a special administrator may be
September 30, 1977, the respondent judge resolved to defer appointed to collect and preserve the property of the deceased.
resolution on the said motion to dismiss until the parties shall The facts justifying the appointment of a special administrator
have presented their evidence; that a motion for the are:
appointment of a special administrator was filed by the (1) Delay in the hearing of the petition for the probate of the
petitioner on September 23, 1977 alleging that the unresolved win.
motion to dismiss would necessarily delay the probate of the (2) The basis of the private respondents' claim to the estate of
will and the appointment of an executor. Catalina Bajacan and opposition to the probate of the will is a
The respondent judge issued an order denying the motion for deed of donation dated June 19, 1972 allegedly executed by the
appointment of a special administrator. deceased Catalina Bajacan and her late sister Arcadia Bajacan
ISSUE: whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse in their favor.
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in There is an immediate need to file an action for the annulment
issuing the order d denying petitioner's motion for the of such deed of donation in behalf of the estate. Precisely, the
appointment of a special administrator petitioner filed Civil Case No. 1080 in the Court of First Instance
RULING: Rule 80, Sec. 1, of the Revised Rules of Court of Nueva Ecija Branch V, against the herein private
provides: respondents.
Section 1 — Appointment of Special Administrator — When there Upon the filing of this petition, the respondent judge, on motion
is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by of the private respondents, postponed the hearing of the
any cause including an appeal from the allowance or probate of the will which was then scheduled on August 23,
disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special 1978 to September 20, 1978.
administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the The reasons for the appointment of a special administrator are:
deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and The reason for the practice of appointing a special administrator
executors or administrators appointed. rests in the fact that estates of decedents frequently become
Under the above rule, the probate court may appoint a special involved in protracted litigation, thereby being exposed to great
administrator should there be a delay in granting letters waste and losses if there is no authorized agent to collect the
testamentary or of administration occasioned by any cause debts and preserve the assets in the interim. The occasion for
including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will. such an appointment usually arises where, for some cause,
Subject to this qualification, the appointment of a special such as a pendency of a suit concerning the proof of the will,
administrator lies in the discretion of the Court. This discretion, regular administration is .delayed. No temporary administration
however, must be sound, that is, not whimsical, or Contrary to can be granted where there is an executor in being capable of
reason, justice, equity or legal principle. acting, however.

Principal object of appointment of temporary administrator is to 1951, was in effect denied, with the result that the petitioner
preserve estate until it can pass into hands of person fully must be deemed as having the right to continue as
authorized to administer it for benefit of creditors and heirs. administratrix until her appeal is finally disposed of. It is
It appears that the estate the properties registered under the noteworthy that the petitioner was named in the will of Felipe
Torrens system in the name of the deceased Catalina Bajacan Relucio, Sr., (already duly probated) not only as administratrix
consisting of eighty (80) hectares of first class agricultural land. but as executrix, and her substitution by Rolando Relucio in
It is claimed that these 80 hectares produce P50,000.00 worth virtue of the appealed order of January 15, 1951 is not for any
of palay each harvest twice a year. Obviously there is an cause, but is based solely on the circumstance that Rolando
immediate need for a special administrator to protect the Relucio is an heir
interests of the estate as regards the products. The cases in which a special administrator may be appointed
All the facts which warrant the appointment of a special are specified in section 1 of Rule 81 of the Rules of Court which
administrator in accordance with Rule 80, Sec. 1 of the Revised provides as follows: "When there is delay in granting letters
Rules of Court are present in the case at bar. testamentary or of administration occasioned by an appeal from
the allowance or disallowance of a will, or from any other cause,
RELUCIO VS SAN JOSE the court may appoint a special administrator to collect and
Sumaway, Dylan take charge of the estate of the deceased and executors or
administrators thereupon appointed." A special administrator
FACTS: Petitioner, Julita Relucio, was appointed administratrix may also be appointed in a case covered by section 8 of Rule 87
of the testate estate of Felipe Relucio, Sr., Upon petition filed on which provides as follows: "If the executor or administrator has
June 27, 1950 by Lorenzo, Rolando and Leticia Relucio, to which a claim against the estate he represents, he shall give notice
the petitioner filed an opposition, the Court of First Instance of thereof, in writing, to the court, and the court shall appoint a
Manila issued an order on January 15, 1951, appointing Rolando special administrator who shall, in the adjustment of such claim,
Relucio as administrator in substitution of the petitioner. have the same power and be subject to the same liability as the
Before the appeal could be perfected, Rolando Relucio moved general administrator or executor in the settlement of other
for the immediate execution of the order appointing him as claims. The court may order the executor or administrator to
administrator. pay to the special administrator necessary funds to defend such
The court merely made reference to the letters of claim."
administration issued in favor of Rolando Relucio and did not There is no pretense that the case at bar is one falling under
pass on the motion for immediate execution. either section 1 of Rule 81 or section 8 of Rule 87. In any view of
Rolando Relucio filed a motion praying that the petitioner be the case, there is a regular administrator. Pending her appeal
declared in contempt of court for failing to deliver to him, after from the order of January 15, 1951, the petitioner had the right
demand, all papers, documents, titles and properties of the to act as administratrix.
estate under her administration. In the order dated April 10,
1951, the Court of First Instance of Manila denied this motion DE GUZMAN VS ANGELES
for contempt and appointed the Equitable Banking Corporation Tomarong, Marian
as special administrator pending the appeal of the petitioner FACTS:
from the order of January 15, 1951.
RULING: From the very position taken by the respondent Judge On May 5, 1987 Private Respondent Elaine de Guzman filed a
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, it is plain that the petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Manolito de
motion for immediate execution of the order of January 15,

Guzman before RTC of Makati City. The petition alleges among No. In the instant case, there is no doubt that the respondent
others that petitioner as the surviving spouse of the decedent is court acquired jurisdiction over the proceedings upon the filing
most qualified and entitled to the grant of letters of of a petition for the settlement of an intestate estate by the
administration. On May 22, 1987, PR filed a motion for writ of private respondent. Verily, notice through publication of the
possession over 5 vehicles registered under the name of the petition for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person is
said deceased person, alleges to be conjugal properties of the jurisdictional, the absence of which makes court orders
de Guzmans and in order to preserve the assets of her late affecting other persons, subsequent to the petition void and
husband, but which are at present in the possession of PR’s subject to annulment. In the instant case, no notice as
father-in-law, herein Petitioner Pedro de Guzman. mandated by section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court
was caused to be given by the probate court before it acted on
On May 28, 1987, PR filed her “ex-parte motion to appoint the motions of the private respondent to be appointed as
petitioner as Special Administratix of the estate of Manolito de special administratrix, to issue a writ of possession of alleged
Guzman”. Hearing was set on June 5, 1987, however, no notice properties of the deceased person in the widow's favor, and to
was given to petitioner. In the order dated June 5, 1987, the RTC grant her motion for assistance to preserve the estate of
granted the PR’s motion to be appointed as special Manolito de Guzman.
administratix. The RTC issued another order dated June 8, 1987,
granting the Urgent ex-parte Motion for assistance filed by PR A special administrator has been defined as the "representative
for appointment of two deputy sheriffs with some of decedent appointed by the probate court to care for and
military/policemen to assist her in preserving the estate of her preserve his estate until an executor or general administrator is
late husband. Petitioner resisted on taking the subject vehicles appointed." The petitioner as creditor of the estate has a similar
on the ground that they were his personal properties. interest in the preservation of the estate as the private
Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition to annul the RTC’s orders respondent who happens to be the widow of deceased Manolito
dated June 5 and June 8, 1987. He alleges that the appointment de Guzman. Hence, the necessity of notice as mandated by the
of a special administrator constitutes an abuse of discretion for Rules of Court. It is not clear from the records exactly what
having been made without giving petitioner an opportunity to emergency would have ensued if the appointment of an
oppose said appointment. administrator was deferred at least until the most interested
parties were given notice of the proposed action. No
ISSUE: unavoidable delay in the appointment of a regular administrator
is apparent from the records.
Whether or not the probate court may appoint a special
administratix and issue a writ of possession of alleged
properties of a decedent for the preservation of the estate of HEIRS OF CASTILLO VS. GABRIEL
the said deceased person even before the probate court causes Tomarong, Marian
notice be served upon all interested parties
On January 25, 1989, Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel, wife of Lorenzo
HELD: Almoradie, died in Malabon City leaving behind a sizable

inheritance consisting mostly of real estate and shares of stock. Whether the appointment of Dolores as special administratix by
A month after her death, Crisanta’s mother commenced an probate court is proper
intestate proceedings before RTC of Malabon City docketed as
Spc. Proc. No. 192-MN. She prayed among others that the HELD:
letters of administration be issued to her son, Mariano Yanga,
Yes. The Court has repeatedly held that the appointment of a
brother of Crisanta. RTC appointed Lorenzo as administrator. special administrator lies in the sound discretion of the probate
However, the marriage between Lorenzo and Crisanta was court. A special administrator is a representative of a decedent,
declared void for being bigamous. Then, RTC removed Lorenzo appointed by the probate court to care for and preserve his
as administrator and appointed Mariano. estate until an executor or general administrator is appointed.
When appointed, a special administrator is regarded not as a
On October 16, 1989, Belinda Dahlia Castillo filed a motion for representative of the agent of the parties suggesting the
intervention, claiming that she is the only legitimate child of appointment, but as the administrator in charge of the estate,
Lorenzo and Crisanta but on June 2, 1990 Belinda Castillo died. and, in fact, as an officer of the court. As such officer, he is
subject to the supervision and control of the probate court and
On November 3, 1989, Roberto Y. Gabriel filed before RTC a
is expected to work for the best interests of the entire estate,
petition for probate of an alleged will and for the issuance of especially its smooth administration and earliest settlement.
letters testamentary in his favour. He alleged that he discovered The principal object of appointment of temporary administrator
his mother’s will on Oct. 25, 1989 in which he was instituted is to preserve the estate until it can pass into hands of person
as the sole heir and designated as alternate executor for the fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and
named executor therein, Francisco Yanga, brother of Crisanta, heirs. In many instances, the appointment of administrators for
who had predeceased the latter. The RTC of Malabon City the estates of decedents frequently become involved in
protracted litigations, thereby exposing such estates to great
dismissed the intestate proceedings of Spec. Proc. No. 192-MN.
waste and losses unless an authorized agent to collect the
The probate court appointed Roberto Y. Gabriel as special debts and preserve the assets in the interim is appointed. The
administrator of his mother’s estate. However, on April 16, occasion for such an appointment, likewise, arises where, for
2001, Roberto died. His widow Dolores filed a Manifestation and some cause, such as a pendency of a suit concerning the proof
Motion where she informed the probate court about her of the will, regular administration is delayed. The new Rules
husband’s death and prayed that she be admitted as substitute have broadened the basis for the appointment of an
in place of her late husband and be appointed as administratix administrator, and such appointment is allowed when there is
delay in granting letters testamentary or administration by any
as well. Heirs of Belinda opposed to it contended that she was
cause, e.g. , parties cannot agree among themselves. It needs
not Crisanta’s next of kin. RTC appointed Dolores as special to be emphasized that in the appointment of a special
administratix. The Heirs of Belinda moved to reconsider but it administrator (which is but temporary and subsists only until a
was denied by the probate court. CA affirmed the decision of regular administrator is appointed), the probate court does not
the lower court. determine the shares in the decedents estate, but merely
appoints who is entitled to administer the estate. The issue of
ISSUE: heirship is one to be determined in the decree of distribution,
and the findings of the court on the relationship of the parties in
the administration as to be the basis of distribution. Thus, the

preference of respondent is sound, that is, not whimsical, or Rizal and for the appointment of Nenita Alonte as Administrator
contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle. The because she (Rowena) is presently employed in the United
petitioners strenuous invocation of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Nations in New York City. The probate Court appointed Alonte as
Rules of Court is misplaced. The rule refers to the appointment
Special Administratix. On On December 12, 1980, the surviving
of regular administrators of estates; Section 1, Rule 80, on the
other hand, applies to the appointment of a special husband, Romarico Vitug, filed an "Opposition and Motion" and
administrator. It has long been settled that the appointment of prayed that the Petition for Probate be denied and prayed for
special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding his appointment as Special Administrator because the Special
the appointment of regular administrators Administratix appointed is not related to the heirs and has no
interest to be protected. On December 18, 1980, Nenita P.
Alonte posted her Php100,000 bond and took her oath of office
before a Notary Public. On February 6, 1981, the Probate Court
set aside its Order of December 2, 1980 appointingNenita as
Special Administratrix, and appointed instead the surviving
husband, Romarico as Special Administrator for the reasons that
under Section 6, Rule 78, of the Rules of Court, the surviving
spouse is first in the order of preference for appointment as
Administrator as he has an interest in the estate; that the
CORONA VS COURT OF APPEALS
disinheritance of the surviving spouse is not among the grounds
Tresvalles, Kris
of disqualification for appointment as Administrator; that the
FACTS: next of kin is appointed only where the surviving spouse is not
competent or is unwilling to serve besides the fact that the
On November 10, 1980, Dolores Luchangco Vitug died in New Executrix appointed, is not the next of kin but merely a niece,
York, U.S.A., leaving two Wills: one, a holographic Will dated and that the decedent's estate is nothing more than half of the
October 3, 1980, which excluded her husband, respondent unliquidated conjugal partnership property.
Romarico G. Vitug, as one of her heirs, and the other, a formal
Will sworn to on October 24, 1980, or about three weeks ISSUE:
thereafter, which expressly disinherited her husband Romarico
Whether the Appellate Court erred in upholding the
"for reason of his improper and immoral conduct amounting to
appointment of the surviving husband as special administrator
concubinage, which is a ground for legal separation under
Philippine Law"; bequeathed her properties in equal shares to HELD:
her sisters Exaltacion L. Allarde, Vicenta L. Faustino and Gloria
L. Teoxon, and her nieces Rowena F. Corona and Jennifer F. Way; This Court, in resolving to give due course to the Petition taking
and appointed Rowena F. Corona, herein petitioner, as her into account the allegations, arguments and issues raised by
Executrix. On November 21, 1980, Rowena filed a petition for the parties, is of the considered opinion that petitioner's
the probate of the Wills before the Court of First Instance of nominee, Nenita F. Alonte, should be appointed as co-Special

Administrator. The executrix's choice of Special Administrator, sustaining said opposition and denying the petition for probate.
considering her own inability to serve and the wide latitude of Subsequently, Aurea Matias brought the matter on appeal.
discretion given her by the testatrix in her Will, is entitled to the Meanwhile, or on February 17, 1956, Basilia Salud moved for
highest consideration. Objections to Nenita's appointment on the dismissal of Horacio Rodriguez, as special administrator of
grounds of impracticality and lack of kinship are over-shadowed the estate of the deceased, and the appointment, in his stead of
by the fact that justice and equity demand that the side of the Ramon Plata. The motion was set for hearing on Feb 23, 1956
deceased wife and the faction of the surviving husband be but was postponed to Feb 27, 1956. Although notified of this
represented in the management of the decedent's estate. order, Rodriguez did not appear on the date last mentioned.
Instead, he filed an urgent motion praying for additional time
En passant, it is apropos to remind the Special Administrators within which to answer the charges preferred against him by
that while they may have respective interests to protect, they Basilia Salud and for another postponement of said hearing.
are officers of the Court subject to the supervision and control This motion was not granted, and Basilia Salud introduced
of the Probate Court and are expected to work for the best evidence in support of said charges, whereupon respondent
interests of the entire estate, its smooth administration, and its Judge by an order, dated February 27, 1956, found Rodriguez
earliest settlement. guilty of abuse of authority and gross negligence, and,
accordingly, relieved him as special administrator of the estate
of the deceased and appointed Basilia Salud as special
administratrix thereof, to "be assisted and advised by her niece,
MATIAS VS GONZALES Miss Victorina Salud," who "shall always act as aide, interpreter
Tresvalles, Kris and adviser of Basilia Salud." Said order, likewise, provided that
"Basilia Salud shall be helped by Mr. Ramon Plata . . . who is
FACTS: hereby appointed as co-administrator."
On May 15, 1952, Aurea Matias initiated said special
proceedings with a petition for the probate of a document
purporting to be the last will and testament of her aunt, Gabina Aurea asked that said order be set aside and that she be
Raquel, who died single on May 8, 1952, at the age of 92 years. appointed special co-administratix with Horacio on the ground
The heir to the entire estate of the deceased — except the that Basilia is over 80 years of age, totally blind and physically
properties bequeathed to her other niece and nephews, namely, incapacitated to perform the duties of said office and the said
Victorina Salud, Santiago Salud, Policarpio Salud, Santos Matias movant is the universal heiress of the deceased and the person
and Rafael Matias — is, pursuant to said instrument, Aurea appointed by the latter as executrix of her alleged will. This
Matias, likewise, appointed therein as executrix thereof, without motion was denied and maintained the appointment of the
bond. Basilia Salud, a first cousin of the deceased, opposed the three. However, on March 17, 1956, Basilia Salud tendered her
probate of her alleged will, and, after appropriate proceedings, resignation as special administratix by reason of physical
the court, presided over by respondent Judge, issued an order,

disability, due to old age and recommended the appointment of estate of the deceased, because the probate of the alleged will
victorina Salud. and testament of the latter — upon which petitioner relies — has
been denied; that Horacio Rodriguez was duly notified of the
Shortly afterwards, or on June 18, 1956, respondents Ramon proceedings for his removal; and that Victorina Salud and
Plata and Victorina Salud requested authority to collect the Ramon Plata have not done anything that would warrant their
rents due, or which may be due, to the estate of the deceased removal.
and to collect all the produce of her lands, which was granted
on June 23, 1956. On June 27, 1956, said respondents filed ISSUE: whether the judge committed grave abuse of discretion
another motion praying for permission to sell the palay of the for not appointing the named executrix and the propriety of
deceased then deposited in different rice mills in the province of appointing more than one administratix
Cavite, which respondent judge granted on June 10, 1956. Later
on, or on July 10, 1956, petitioner instituted the present action HELD:
against Judge Gonzales, and Victorina Salud and Ramon Plata,
Although Horacio Rodriguez had notice of the hearing of the
for the purpose of annulling the above mentioned orders of
motion for his removal, dated February 17, 1956, the record
respondent Judge, upon the ground that the same had been
shows that petitioner herein received copy of said motion of
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
February 24, 1956, or the date after that set for the hearing
excess of jurisdiction.
thereof. Again, notice of the order of respondent Judge, dated
Petitioner argued that she should have preference in the choice February 23, 1956, postponing said hearing to February 27,
of special administratix of the estate of the decedent being the 1956, was not served on petitioner herein.
universal heiress to said estate and the executrix appointed in
In her motion of February 17, 1956, Basilia Salud prayed for the
the alleged will of the deceased, that until its final disallowance
dismissal of Horacio Rodriguez, and the appointment of Ramon
— which has not, as yet, taken place she has a special interest
Plata, as special administrator of said estate. Petitioner had,
in said estate, which must be protected by giving
therefore, no notice that her main opponent, Basilia Salud, and
representation thereto in the management of said estate; that,
the latter's principal witness, Victorina Salud, would be
apart from denying her any such representation, the
considered for the management of said. As a consequence, said
management was given to persons partial to her main
petitioner had no opportunity to object to the appointment of
opponent. That the Rules of Court do not permit the
Basilia Salud as special administratrix, and of Victorina Salud, as
appointment of more than one special administrator and that
her assistant and adviser, and the order of February 27, 1956,
Ramon and Victorina were authorized to collect the rents and
to this effect, denied due process to said petitioner.
sell the palay without previous notice to petitioner.
The rule, laid down in Roxas vs. Pecson to the effect that "only
Respondents maintain that respondent Judge acted with the
one special administrator may be appointed to administrator
scope of his jurisdiction and without any abuse of discretion;
temporarily" the estate of the deceased, must be considered in
that petitioner can not validly claim any special interest in the
the light of the facts obtaining in said case. The lower court

appointed therein one special administrator for some properties administrator may be appointed to administer, liquidate and
forming part of said estate, and a special administratrix for distribute the estate of a deceased spouse, it clearly follows
other properties thereof. Thus, there were two (2) separate and that only one special administrator may be appointed to
administer temporarily said estate, because a special
independent special administrators. In the case at bar there is
administrator is but a temporary administrator who is appointed
only one (1) special administration, the powers of which shall be to act in lieu of the general administrator. "When there is delay
exercised jointly by two special co-administrators. Moreover, in granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned
there are authorities in support of the power of courts to by an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of will, or from
appoint several special co-administrators. any other cause, the court may appoint a special administrator
to collect and take charge of the estate of the deceased until
the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or
administrators thereupon appointed," (sec. 1, Rule 81).
ROXAS VS. PECSON Although his powers and duties are limited to "collect and take
Tuason, Jannelle charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the
deceased and preserve the same for the executor or
FACTS: administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may
commence and maintain suits as administrator, and may sell
Pablo M. Roxas died leaving properties in Bulacan. The such perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A
petitioner, widow of the deceased, filed a petition for the special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the
probate of an alleged will of her deceased husband and for her deceased." (Section 2, Rule 81.)
appointment as executrix of his estate designated in said will.
Petitioner was appointed as special administratrix and qualified DE GALA VS. GONZALES
as such over the objection of the respondents who sought the Tuason, Janelle
appointment of Maria, sister of the deceased. Upon petition by FACTS:
the respondents, the respondent judge rendered his resolution
appointing the petitioner as special administratrix only of all the Severina Gonzales executed a will in which Serapia de Gala, a
conjugal properties of the deceased, and Maria Roxas as special niece of Severina, was designated executrix. The testatrix died
administratrix of all capital or properties belonging exclusively leaving no heirs by force of law, and Serapia, through her
to the deceased Pablo M. Roxas. counsel, presented the will for probate. Apolinario Gonzales, a
ISSUE: nephew of the deceased, filed an opposition to the will on the
ground that it had not been executed in conformity with the
Whether or not respondent judge acted in excess of the court's provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Serapia
jurisdiction in appointing two special co-administratices of the de Gala was appointed special administratrix of the estate of
estate of the deceased. the deceased.
On the other hand,Sinforoso, husband of the deceased, filed a
RULING: motion asking the appointment of Serapia de Gala as special
administratrix be cancelled and that he, be appointed in her
Yes. There is absolutely no reason for appointing two separate stead. The motion was opposed by both Apolinario Gonzales
administrators. As under the law, only one general and by Serapia de Gala, but it was nevertheless granted.Serapia

was removed, and Sinforoso was appointed special administratrix of the estate before the RTC. The action also
administrator in her place, principally on the ground that he had prayed for the appointment of a receiver.
possession of the property in question and that his appointment Gliceria filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that she may
would simplify the proceedings. not be sued as special administratrix. She also filed an
ISSUE: opposition to the prayer for the issuance of a writ of
receivership on the ground that the property subject of the
Whether or not petitioner may be removed as a special foreclosure proceedings is in custodia legis, since administration
administratix of the estate of the deceased proceedings had already been instituted for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased.
RULING: ISSUES:
Yes. The appointment of a special administrator lies entirely in

1. WON Gliceria Liwanag can be sued as special
the sound discretion of the court; the function of such an administratix.
administrator is only to collect and preserve the property of the
deceased and to return an inventory thereof; he cannot be sued 2. WON there was abuse of discretion on the part of the
by a creditor and cannot pay any debts of the deceased. The lower court in the issuance of its order for the
fact that no appeal can be taken from the appointment of a appointment of a receiver.
special administrator indicates that both his appointment and
his removal are purely discretionary, SC cannot find that the HELD:
court below abused its discretion in the present case. In
removing Serapia de Gala and appointing the present possessor 1. YES.
of the property pending the final determination of the validity of
the will, the court probably prevented useless litigation. Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit making
the special administratrix a defendant in a suit against
LIWANAG, vs. REYES the estate. Otherwise, creditors would find the adverse
Umbalin, Norissa effects of the statute of limitations running against them
in cases where the appointment of a regular
FACTS: administrator is delayed. So if the court is to deny the
On July 14, 1960, the late Liwanag executed in favor of the present action on this technical ground alone, and the
mortgagee Rotegaan Financing, Inc., a real estate mortgage on appointment of a regular administrator will be delayed,
a parcel of residential land to secure the payment of a loan. It the very purpose for which the mortgage was
was stipulated in the mortgage contract that the total amount constituted will be defeated.
of mortgage debt shall be fully paid on or before July 14, 1961.
Before the one year period expired, Liwanag died intestate. 2. NO.
As the mortgage obligation of the deceased was not fully
paid, the mortgagee, instituted a complaint for foreclosure It is to be noted that the contract of mortgage
against the Estate of Pio D. Liwanag and Gliceria Liwanag as between the deceased and the Rotegaan Financing,

states the in case of judicial foreclosure, the “Mortgagor About two years later, special administrator Alfonso
hereby consents to the appointment of the president of submitted a petition seeking authority to sell, or give away to
the mortgagee corporation or any of its officers as some charitable or educational institution/s, some personal
receiver, without any bond, to take charge of the effects (clothes, books, gadgets, electrical appliances, etc.)
mortgaged property at once, and to hold possession of which were allegedly deteriorating both physically and in value.
the same, and the rents and profits derived from the The court required a specification of the properties sought to be
mortgaged property, before the sale, x x x.” Hence, the sold. Instead, the special administrator submitted a copy of the
will of the deceased himself allowed that, in case of inventory of the personal properties belonging to the estate
foreclosure, the property be put into the hands of a with the items sought to be sold marked with a check in red
receiver, and this provision should be respected by the pencil.
administratrix of the estate. The cases cited by
Idonah filed an opposition to the proposed sale. But, the
petitioner in favor of the theory that property in custodia
lower court approved the proposed sale. Idonah moved to
legis can not be given to a receiver is not applicable,
reconsider on the following grounds:
considering that this is an action to enforce a superior
lien on certain property of the estate and the 1. The order in effect authorized the special
appointment of a receiver, which is a very convenient administrator to sell the entire personal estate of the
and feasible means of preserving and administering the deceased;
property, has been agreed upon by the contracting
parties. 2. There was no showing that the goods sought to be
sold were perishable;
3. The goods sought to be sold represented her
lifetime savings and collections;
ANDERSON VS. PERKINS 4. There were unauthorized withdrawals from the
Umbali, Norissa properties of the estate, and the sale of the
inventoried lot would prevent identification and
recovery of the articles removed; and
FACTS :
5. There is evidence showing Idonah’s separate
Special proceedings were commenced by Dora Perkins rights to a substantial part of the personal estate.
Anderson seeking the probate of the late Eugene Arthur Perkins’
will. Dora also filed an urgent petition for the appointment of ISSUES:
Alfonso Ponce Enrile as special administrator of the estate. On 1. Is the special administrator’s power to sell limited to
the same day, Alfonso was appointed upon his posting of a “perishable property.”
P50,000 bond. Idonah Slade Perkins, surviving spouse of 2. WON the lower court erred in authorizing the special
Eugene, entered an opposition to the probate of the will. Later, administrator to sell certain personal properties of the
the special administrator Alfonso submitted an inventory of all estate. – YES. It was premature. RATIO
the assets which have come to his knowledge as belonging to
Eugene at the time of his death.
HELD:

1. NO. is an indication of her unmeritorious claim – Idonah was
not given a reasonable opportunity to point out which
Section 2, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court, provides
items she did not want sold. Her opposition and motion
that the special administrator "may sell such perishable
for reconsideration were overruled by the lower court
and other property as the court orders sold", which
without reasons. The records do not even show that an
shows that the special administrator's power to sell is
inquiry was made as to the validity of the grounds of her
not limited to "perishable" property only. The function of
opposition.
a special administrator is only to collect and preserve
the property of the deceased until a regular
administrator is appointed. But it is not alone the specific CO VS. ROSARIO
property of the estate which is to be preserved, but its Uy, Charles
value as well, as shown by the legal provision for the
sale by a special administrator of perishable property. It FACTS:
is in line with this general power to preserve not only the Upon the death of the father of herein parties, Co Bun
property of the estate but also its value, that Section 2, Chun, the RTC of Makati City appointed petitioner Luis Co as co-
Rule 81 also empowers such administrator to sell "other administrator together with a Vicente Yu. Subsequently,
property as the court ordered sold". petitioner nominated his son, Alvin Co, as special co-
administrator, which motion was granted by the trial court.
2. YES. It was premature.
About four years later, numerous criminal charges have been
The records show that up to the time the filed against Alvin Co, and at the basis of the same, the other
proposed sale was asked for and judicially approved, no heirs asked that he be removed as special co-administrator.
proceeding had been taken to segregate the alleged Said motion was granted by the trial court. Aggrieved,
exclusive property of Idonah from the mass of the estate petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but upon the
supposedly left by Eugene or to liquidate the conjugal denial of the same, he brought the matter to the CA under Rule
partnership property of the spouses. Until the issue of 65. The CA affirmed the decision, hence, this appeal
the ownership of the properties sought to be sold is
heard and decided, and the conjugal partnership
liquidated or at least an agreement be reached with
Idonah as to which properties of the conjugal partnership ISSUE:
she would not mind being sold to preserve their value,
the proposed sale is premature. Also, there are no Whether or not it is proper for the trial court to dismiss
reasons of extreme urgency to justify the proposed sale the services of Alvin Co on the basis of the criminal charges
over the strong opposition and objection of Idonah who filed against him even if he had not yet been convicted
may later be adjudged owner of a substantial portion of
the personalities in question. After all, most of the items RULING:
sought to be sold can easily be preserved in either or The Court ruled in the affirmative. As a special co-
both of two residential houses (Manila and Baguio City). administrator, Alvin Co may be removed by the trial court even
if the grounds for his removal are not enumerated under the
Re: special administrator Alfonso’s claim that rules. This is because he is a special administrator, not a regular
Idonah should have indicated the alleged "fine furniture" administrator, and special administrators are not covered by
which she did not want sold and that her refusal to do so

the rules covering regular administrators. The appointment of RULING:
special administrators are left to the sound discretion of the
courts, and thus, the removal of special administrators are also The Court ruled in the affirmative. At the outset, it must
left to the sound discretion of the courts. be noted that the appointment of Jesus Samson was as special
administrator, while that of Codia was of a regular
ALCASID VS SAMSON
administrator. The appointment of a special administrator is
Uy, Charles
discretionary upon the court, hence, the court may also remove
FACTS: the said special administrator, including when a regular
administrator is appointed. Section 3, Rule 81 of the Rules of
An application for the issuance of letters of Court provides that the authority of the special administrator
administration was filed by herein respondents in favor of one ends when a regular administrator is appointed. Even assuming
of their numbers, herein respondent Jesus V. Samson, in the CFI that Cotia v Pecson applies – which it does not because that is
of Albay. Such application was granted and on the same day, the removal of a regular administrator – still, the authority of
Jesus Samson was appointed special administrator for the Jesus Samson has ended because the April 3 Order is a special
estate. Said appointment was opposed by herein petitioner order as was required by Section 2, Rule 39. It boils down to the
Josefina Samson, the widow of Jose Samson, the deceased, fact that the appointment of special administrators is up to the
together with her three minor children. They asked that discretion of the court.
Josefina, and not Jesus be appointed administrator. After two
years of hearing, the trial court appointed Antonia Codia, city JUNQUERA VS. BORROMEO
treasurer, petitioner, as regular administrator. The court also Viernes , Wayne
ordered Jesus to turn over to Codia all papers regarding the
administration of the estate in the March 12, 1956 order. Upon RULE 81
motion of the widow, the April 3, 1956 Order was issued, Bonds of Executors and Administrators
ordering Jesus to turn over all documents to Codia within three
COSME DE MENDOZA V. PACHECO, 64 PHIL 134 (1937)
days. It would appear, however, that respondents opposed the
appointment of Codia but their motion was denied, hence, they FACTS:
went up to the CA who decided in favor of herein respondents
on the basis of Cotia v Pecson where it was ruled that the Manuel Soriano was former administrator of the estate
appeal stayed the appointment of Codia. Aggrieved, petitioners of Cosme. As such administrator, he filed a bond for
filed this petition before the Court P5,000 with Januario Pacheco and Raymundo Cordero as
sureties. When an account was made, Soriano was
ISSUE: indebted to the estate. Thus, the lower court ordered
the execution of his bond.
Whether or not Codia qualifies as administrator of the
estate Some time later, Soriano and the new administratrix
entered into a settlement whereby Soriano ceded

certain real properties to the estate, thereby reducing
his indebtedness to P5,000. The sureties now question FACTS:
the jurisdiction of the court to execute the bond. Warner, Barnes and Co., Ltd.(WBC), filed a complaint
against Luzon Surety Co., Inc.(LSC), of the recovery of the sum
ISSUE: of P6,000. The basis of the complaint was a bond in the sum of
P6,000 filed by Agueda Gonzaga as administratrix of the
Whether or not a probate court has the power to order Intestate Estate of Agueda Gonzaga in Special Proceedings No.
the execution of an administrator's bond? 452, the condition being that said bond would be void if the
HELD: administratrix "faithfully prepares and presents to the Court a
correct inventory of all the property of the deceased which may
To begin with, it lies within discretion of the court to have come into his possession or into the possession of any
select an administrator of the estate of a deceased other person representing him according to law, if he
person. Before an administrator, or an executor, enters administers all the property of the deceased which at any time
upon the execution of his trust, and letters testamentary comes into his possession or into the possession of any other
or of administration are issued, the person to whom they person representing him; faithfully pays all debts, legacies, and
are issued is required to give a bond in such reasonable bequests which encumber said estate, pays whatever dividends
sum as the court directs, with one or more sufficient which the Court may decide should be paid, and renders a just
sureties, conditioned upon the faithful performance of and true account of his administrations to the Court within a
his trust. The administrator is accountable on his bond year or at any other date that he may required so to do, and
along with the sureties for the performance of certain faithfully executes all orders and decrees of said court."
legal obligations.
It was alleged in the complaint that WBC had a duly approved
It is clear that the Court of First Instance, exercising claim against the Estate of Aguedo Gonzaga in the sum of
probate jurisdiction, is empowered to require the filing P6,485.02, plus 2 per cent annual interest; that the
of the administrator's bond, to fix the amount thereof, administratrix violated the conditions of her bond "(a) by failing
and to hold it accountable for any breach of the to file an inventory of the assets and funds of the estate that
administrator's duty. Possessed, as it is, with an all- had come into her hands; (b) by failing to pay or discharge the
embracing power over the administrator's bond and over approved claim of the plaintiff; (c) by failing to render a true
administration proceedings, a Court of First Instance in and just account of her administration in general, and of the
a probate proceeding cannot be devoid of legal authority said war damage payments in particular."; that the defendant,
to execute and make that bond answerable for the very as surety in the bond, failed to pay to the plaintiff,
purpose for which it was filed. It is true that the law notwithstanding the latter's demand.
does not say expressly or in so many words tat such
court has power to execute the bond of an administrator, The LSC filed an answer setting up the special defenses that the
but by necessary and logical implication, the power is complaint did not state a cause of action.
there as eloquently as if it were phrased in unequivocal
term. On January 6, 1953, the WBC filed a motion for summary
judgment, alleging that "the special defenses relied upon by the
WARNER, BARNES & CO. VS. LUZON SURETY CO, INC. LSC in her Answer raise only questions of law, and the WBC
Vizcarra, William

believes that LSC cannot produce counter-affidavits that would Though nominally payable to the Republic of the Philippines, the
raise any 'genuine issues as to any material facts.' bond is expressly for the benefit of the heirs, legatees and
The CFI rendered a summary judgment sentencing LSC to pay creditors of the Estate of the deceased Aguedo Gonzaga. There
WBC the sum of P6,000. From this judgment the defendant is no valid reason why a creditor may not directly in his name
appealed. enforce said bond in so far as he is concerned.
RULING: Under the fifth assignment of error, it is alleged that the WBC
Under the first assignment of error, LSC contends that should have first filed a claim against the Estate of the
the lower court had no jurisdiction to pass upon its liability deceased administratrix Agueda Gonzaga, in conformity with
under the bond in question, because it is only the probate court section 6 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court providing that "Where
that can hold a surety accountable for any breach by the the obligation of the decedent is joint and several with another
administratrix of her duty, citing the case of Mendoza vs. debtor, the claim shall be filed against the decedent as if he
Pacheco, 64 Phil., 134. It is, however, noteworthy that while the were the only debtor, without prejudice to the right of the
citation is to the effect that the probate court has jurisdiction estate to recover contribution from the other debtor." Apart
over the forefeiture or enforcement of an administrator's bond, from the fact that his defense was not pleaded either in a
it was not held therein that the same matter may not be motion to dismiss or in the answer and was therefore waived
litigated in an ordinary civil action brought before the court of (section 10, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court), it appears that even
first instance. as late as September 17, 1952, when the present complaint was
filed, (more than two years after the death of Agueda Gonzaga),
Under the second assignment of error, LSC claims that there are there were no proceedings for the administration of her estate,
genuine controversies between the parties litigant, and that, with the result that section 6 of Rule 87 loses its applicability.
contrary to the allegations of the complaint, the administratrix Moreover, it is to be noted that the LSC had also chosen to file a
made a return to the court of the war damage payments she third-party complaint in the present case against Romualdo
received; the administratrix cannot be charged with having Araneta, joint and several counter-guarantor of the deceased
failed to pay plaintiff's claim because there is no showing that administratrix, instead of presenting a claim against the latter's
she was ever authorized to pay approved claims; the estate.
administratrix may be presumed to have rendered an
accounting of her administration, likely in 1948, in accordance Wherefore, it being understood that the defendant-appellant is
with section 8 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. In answer, it is sentenced to pay to the plaintiff-appellee only the sum of
sufficient to state that the allegations that the administratrix P6,000, plus the cost, the same is hereby affirmed.
failed to file an inventory, to pay the plaintiff's claim, and to
render a true and just account of her administration, are factual LUZON SURETY CO., INC. VS. QUEBAR
and remained uncontroverted by counter-affidavits which the Vizcarra, William
appellant could have easily filed.
FACTS
Under the third and fourth assignments of error, it is insisted for Luzon Surety issued two administrator's bond in behalf of
LSC that the bond in question was executed in favor of the defendant Quebrar as administrator of 2 estates (Chinsuy and
Republic of the Philippines and that the proper procedure would Lipa). The plaintiff and both Quebrar and Kilayko bound
seem to be that it might be enforced in the administration themselves solidarily after executing an indemnity agreement
proceedings were it was filed. This view is likewise not tenable. where both the defendants agreed to pay the premiums every

year. In the years 1954-55, the defendants paid the premiums liable and the plaintiff's liabilities subsist being the co-extensive
and the documentary stamps. In 1957, the Court approved the with the administrator.
project of partition, while in 1962, Luzon Surety demanded
payments of premiums from 1955 onwards. It was also in the
same year when the court granted the motion of the defendants
to have both bonds cancelled. Hence, plaintiff files a case in the
RULE 82
CFI. The court (CFI) allowed the plaintiff to recover since the Revocation of Administration, Death, Resignation
bonds were in force and effect from the filing until 1962. The and Removal of Administrator or Executor
Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court on
questions of law. BORROMEO VS BORROMEO
Yatco, Nathaniel
ISSUE: FACTS:
Dr. MaximoBorromeo died testate designating Borromeo
Are the bonds still in force and effect from 1955 to 1962 Brothers Estate, Inc. as sole heir. His brother CanutoBorromeo
acted as executor of the said will. The said corporation is owned
RULING by the testator and his brothers and sisters. Proceedings have
been instituted. The widow, Johanna Hofer Borromeo filed an
YES. Under Rule 81 (Sec.1) of the Rules of Court, the Urgent Motion to remove the executordue to negligence in the
administrator is required to put up a bond for the purpose of performance of duties and unfitness to continue as executor.
indemnifying creditors, heirs, legatees and the estate. It is While the action was still pending, CanutoBorromeo withdrew
conditioned upon the faithful performance of the administrator's his joint bank account with the decedent and deposited it on his
trust. Hence, the surety is then liable under the administrator's and his other brother Exequiel’s joint account without authority
bond. from the Court. In time the petition was heard and the judge
relieved Canuto as executor for some reasons including that of
Even after the approved project of partition, Quebrar as
the unauthorized withdrawal of the decedent’s joint account
administrator still had something to do. The administration is for
with the executor.Canuto appealed. Canuto claims that they
the purpose of liquidation of the estate and the distribution of
were joint owners of such account and either of them (decedent
the residue among the heirs and legatees. Liquidation means
or Canuto) has right over it.
the determination of all the assets of the estate and the
ISSUE: WON a conflict of interest arose in such withdrawal
payment of all debts and expenses. It appears that there are
made by Canuto which is a ground for removal as executor of
still debts and expenses to be paid after 1957.
the estate.
Moreover, the bond stipulation did not provide that it will RULING:
Yes.It was found by the SC that the money taken from
terminate at the end of the 1st year if the premium remains
the joint account in the Bank was done by Canuto with
unpaid. Hence, it does not necessarily extinguish or terminate representation as executor of the estate of deceased
the effectivity of the counter bond in the absence of an express Dr.Maximo. There was bad faith in the concealment of property
stipulation to this effect. As such, as long as the defendant belonging to the decedent’s estate. Canuto should have
remains the administrator of the estate, the bond will be held deposited the P23, 930.39 on the estate andnot at his disposal.
It then constituted as hiding such property from the widow and
he, as executor of the estate, bypassed judicial adjudication of

the said property.Conflict between the interest of the executor Renato and Erlinda (Respondents herein) appealed to the CA
and the interest of the deceased is ground for removal or and CA ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
resignation of the former, who has thereby become unsuitable in appointing Melinda (daughter of Dalisay) as a regular
to discharge the trust. According to Rule 82, sec 2, if an administrator.
executor neglects to settle his account and settle the estate
according to law, the court may remove him or, in its discretion ISSUE:
permit him to resign.
WON the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion on
OCAMPO VS OCAMPO the revocation of the respondents as special administrators and
Yatco, Nathaniel appointment of Merlinda (daughter of Dalisay) as regular
administratrix.
FACTS:
RULING”
Vicente and Maxima Ocampo died intestate leaving 3
children namely Leonardo, Renato and Erlinda. The 3 siblings The court finds no abuse of discretion on the revocation
divided the profits of the decedents’ estate among themselves. but finds it improper for Merlinda to be a “regular”
Subsequently, Leonardo died leaving his surviving spouse administratrix. The probate court may at its discretion appoint
Dalisay and 3 children namely Vince, Merlinda and Leonardo, Jr. or remove special administrators toher than the
When Leonardo died, Renato and Erlinda took over to the groundsenumerated in the Rules. The respondents were not
exclusion of the widowed wife Dalisay.Dalisay and her 3 children able to comply with the payment of the bond which is required
filed a petition for intestate proceedings of the estate of in Rule 81 and also, there was evident bad faith on the part of
Vicente, Maxima and her deceased husband Leonardo. It seeks the respondents as administrators when an alleged sale of the
to settle the estate and appoint an administrator to divide such property included in the estate was done thru a conditional
as they were not receiving any profit anymore. Respondents deed of sale. As a result of such transaction, it deprived the
Renato and Erlinda countered assailing the petition defective as estate of profits accruing from the said real property (monthly
it sought two estates in one proceeding (Estate of Vicente and rentals.) Such reason of the probate court being grounded
on equity, justice and legal principles. As to the appointment of
Maxima; and Leonardo’s estate.)There was a motion to appoint
Renato and Erlinda as administrators but was countered by Merlinda, it must be as a “special” administrator and not a
Dalisay as it would cause further injustice and nominated Binan “regular” administrator. Rule 78 determines the persons to be
Rural Bank as administrator. Trial Court accepted that appointed as regular administrators. She is neither an heir or a
respondent Renato and petitioner Dalisay be appointed as joint creditor to the estate. However, the SC held her as a special
administrators. Petitioner Dalisay was revoked of her administratrix due to her competency in filing the bond and true
appointment as her nomination of Binan Rural bank constituted inventory of the estate as soon as the RTC appointed her of
a waiver and the court found that she is unfit to such such responsibility. Such acts clearly manifested her intention to
office.Renato and Erlinda, as special administrators, was serve willingly. Pending the proceeding for regular
ordered by the court to produce a true inventory of the estate. administration, Merlinda is designated as special administratrix
RTC later on revoked the appointment of Renato and Erlinda for of the estate.
failure to comply with the order and failure to pay the bond as
prescribed by the rules and that there was an alleged sale made
by them involving a real property belonging to the estate. RULE 83
Inventory and Appraisal . Provision for Support of administrator, was appointed administrator by the CFI of Cebu.
Family Antigua included the salt bed in the inventory of Irene’s estate
and asked the Cebu CFI to order petitioners to deliver the salt to
him. The Cebu CFI granted the same.
SEBIAL VS. SEBIAL
Alvarez, Miguel Lorenzo ISSUE:
GARCIA VS. GARCIA Whether a court handling the intestate proceedings has
Arcilla, Jay jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a TCT issued
in favor owners who are not parties to the intestate proceedings
CUIZON VS. RAMOLETE if the said parcels of have been?
Azarcon, Pia Lea
RULING:
FACTS:
As early as 1961, Marciano Cuizon applied for the No. It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in
registration of several parcels of land in Mandaue City docketed charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot
as L.R. Case No. N-179. In 1970, he distributed his property adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part
between his two daughters, Rufina and Irene, to whom the salt of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside
beds subject of the controversy was given. In 1971, Irene parties. All said court could do is to determine whether they
executed a Deed of Sale with Reservation of Usufruct involving should or should not be included in the inventory of properties
the said salt beds in favor of petitioners Franciso et al. Although to be administered by the administrator. If there is dispute, then
the decision in L.R. Case No. N-179 was rendered way back in the administrator and the opposing parties have to resort to an
1972, the decree of registration and the corresponding O.C.T. ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims
was issued only in 1976 in the name of Marciano Cuizon. In that of title because the probate court cannot do so. In the instant
same year, T.C.T No. 10477 covering the property in question case, the property involved is not only claimed by outside
was issued to Irene. The latter died in 1978. During the parties but it was sold seven years before the death of the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate, Rufina, the mother of decedent and is duly titled in the name of the vendees who are
Francisco et al., adjudicated to herself all the property of Irene not party to the proceedings. In Bolisay vs. Alcid, the Court held
including the salt beds in question. She then executed a deed of that “if a property covered by Torrens Title is involved, the
Confirmation of Sale wherein she confirmed and ratified the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due
1971 deed of sale and renounced and waived whatever rights weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the
and interests and participation she may have in the property in contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner
question in favor of the petitioners. The deed was annotated in of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or
T.C.T. No. 10477. Subsequently, T.C.T. No. 12665 was issued in modified in an appropriate ordinary action.” Having been
favor of the petitioners. In 1978, Domingo Antigua, who apprised of the fact that the property in question was covered
allegedly was chosen by the heirs of Irene to act as by a TCT issued in the name of third parties, the respondent

court should have denied the motion of the respondent as an advancement. The purpose of the motion was to force the
administrator and excluded the property in question from the first set of children to bring into collation the properties that had
inventory of the property of the estate. been received by them, in conformity with article 1035 of the
Civil Code; and the motion was based partly on the supposition
that Ignacio Abuton had never in fact effected a liquidation of
the conjugal property pertaining to himself and DionisiaOlarte.
GUINGUING VS. ABUTON

This motion was formally opposed by two of the children
Balanay, Rendel Bryan of the first marriage, namely, Agapito and CalixtoAbuton y
Olarte.
FACTS:
The trial judge found that after the death of the first wife
Ignacio Abuton died, testamentary, leaving two sets of the testator had acquired no property after the first marriage
children by two different wives. First from DionisiaOlarte whom and the testator liquidated the ganacial estate and had divided
he had 12 children and 3 already died. Second from, Teodora among the first set of children all of the property that pertained
Guinguing whom he had 4 children, all still living. Upon to the first wife in the division, with the exception of the home-
allowance of the will, Gabriel Binaoro was appointed as place in the poblacion, in which the testator had continued to
administrator. Binaoro submitted the inventory to the court but reside till death. The share pertaining to the testator in said
he included only the lands which the testator had devised to the division was, so the court found, retained in his own hands; and
children of the second marriage, omitting other lands possessed this property constituted the proper subject matter of the
by him at the time of his death and which were claimed by the present administration proceedings.
children of the first marriage as having been derived from their
mother.
ISSUE:
This prompted Teodora Guinguing to file a motion, asking Whether or not the provisional inventory should include
that the administrator be required to amend his inventory and all property pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the
to include therein all property pertaining to the conjugal deceased.
partnership of Ignacio Abuton and DionisiaOlarte, including
property actually in the hands of his children by her which (the
motion alleged) had been delivered to her four minor children RULING:

Yes.The making of the inventory is necessarily of a
preliminary and provisional nature, and the improper inclusion
of property therein or the improper omission of property
therefrom is not absolutely decisive of the rights of persons in RULE 84
interest. In addition, the inclusion of a property in the inventory General Powers and Duties of Executors and
does not deprive the occupant of possession; and if it is finally Administrators
determined that the property has been properly included in the
estate, the occupant heir is liable for the fruits and interest only WILSON VS REAR
Borja,Catherine
from the date when the succession was opened (art. 1049, Civ.
Code). The provisions of the Civil Code with reference to FACTS:
collation clearly contemplate that disputes between heirs with
respect to the obligation to collate may be determined in the July 14, 1925, Charles C. Rear was murdered by some
course of the administration proceedings. Moros on his plantation. The whole plantation consisted of
public lands. J.J. Wilson qualified as special administrator of the
Among the properties remaining in possession of Ignacio estate on November 17, 1925.
Abuton at the time of his death was a piece of land covered by
a composition title No. 11658, issued in 1894 in the name of Later, the property of the estate was appraised at
DionisiaOlarte. At the same time that this title was issued, P20,800, of which the commissioners filed an inventory and
AgapitoAbuton procured two other titles, Nos. 11651 and report, which was also signed by Wilson. January 4, 1927, the
11654, covering adjacent properties to be issued in his own commissioners made and filed a report of claims against the
name. From the circumstance that title No. 11658 was issued in estate, but by reason of the fact that it was claimed and alleged
the name of DionisiaOlarte the opponents, theAbutons , appear that the administrator did not have any funds to pay, on March
to believe that this land was her particular property and should 30, 1927, the court ordered the administrator to sell a portion of
now vest exclusively in her heirs. This conclusion is erroneous. the property.
There is nothing to show that the land covered by title No.
11658 was not acquired by the spouses during their marriage, After due notice, the public sale took place, and the property
and the circumstance that the title was taken in the name of was sold to Wm. Mannion for P7,600. April 26, 1927,
the wife does not defeat its presumed character as ganacial
March 23, 1928, Wilson filed his final account which later was
property. Therefore, in liquidating the ganacial property of the
amended on June 10, 1928, to which the heirs made numerous
first marriage it was within the power of the surviving husband
and specific objections, including that Wilson, as special
to assign other property to the first set of children as their
administrator and as administrator, was neglectful and
participation in the estate of their mother and to retain in his
imprudent and he committed waste. He is, therefore, liable.
own hands the property for which a composition title had been
issued in the name of the wife. ISSUE:

Is Wilson, as special administrator, liable? P1,655.54, was all wiped out and lost, and left with a deficit of
P1,809.69.
RULING:
The law does not impose upon an administrator a high degree

of care in the administration of an estate, but it does impose SAN DIEGO VS. NOMBRE
upon him ordinary and usual care, for want of which he is Borlagdatan, April
personally liable. In the instant case there were no
FACTS:
complications of any kind and in the usual and ordinary course
of business, the administrator should have wound up and
-AdeloNombre as duly constituted judicial administrator
settled the estate within eight months from the date of his leased a fishpond to Pedro Escanlar (respondent)
appointment.
-Terms of the lease : 3yrs
When he was appointed and qualified as administrator, the law
imposed upon him legal duties and obligations, among which -It is executed without previous authority or approval of the
was to handle the estate in a business-like manner, marshal its Court where the proceedings was pending
assets, and close the estate without any unreasonable or
unnecessary delay. He was not appointed to act for or on behalf -Nombre was removed as administrator by Order of the court
and one SofronioCampillanos was appointed in his stead
of the creditors, or to represent the interests of the heirs only.
He should have administered the affairs of the estate for the -Campillanos filed a motion asking for authority to execute a
use and benefit alike of all interested persons, as any prudent lease contract of the same fishpond in favor of petitioner for 5
business man would handle his own personal business. When years from 1961
appointed, it is the legal duty of the administrator to administer,
settle, and close the administration in the ordinary course of - Nombre opposed this alleging that to grant such motion by the
business, without any unnecessary delay. Neither does an new administrator would nullify the contract of lease validly
executed
administrator, in particular, without a specific showing or an
order of the court, have any legal right to continue the
operation of the business in which the deceased was engaged,
or to eat up and absorb the assets of the estate in the payment RULING OF TRIAL COURT:
of operating expenses. Yet, in the instant case, the
administrator on his own volition and without any authority or
process of court continued the operation of the plantation, and
in the end, as shown by his own report, the estate, which was -It held that the contract with Escanlar was null and void, for
want of judicial authority and that unless he would offer the
appraised at P20,800, with actual debts of the deceased of only
same as or better conditions than the prospective lessee - San
Diego

-No good reason why the motion for authority to lease the -A judicial administrator is appointed by the Court. He is not
property to San Diego should not be granted only the representative of said Court, but also the heirs and
creditors of the estate.
RULING OF CA:
-A judicial administrator before entering into his duties, is
-It reversed the trial court's decision explaining that even in the required to file a bond.
absence of such special powers, a contract or lease for more
than 6 years is not entirely invalid -This is not applicable in case of agency wherein agent is only
answerable to his principal. The protection which the law gives
-No such limitation on the power of a judicial administrator to the principal, in limiting the powers and rights of an agent,
grant a lease of property placed under his custody is provided stems from the fact that control by the principal can only be
for in the present law thru agreements, whereas the acts of a judicial administrator
are subject to specific provisions of law and orders of the
-In accordance with Article 1647, CC it is only when the lease is appointing court.
to be recorded in the Registry of Property that it cannot be
instituted without special authority
-However under Rule 85, Section 3, of the Rules of Court it

authorizes a judicial administrator, among other things, to
administer the estate of the deceased not disposed of by will
which includes leasing the property
JARODA VS. CUSI

ISSUE: WON a judicial administrator can validly lease property Bueno, Jirene
of the estate without prior judicial authority and approval
FACTS:
RULING:
-The court denied the petition & affirmed CA's ruling.

Antonio Tan filed for a Special Proceeding before the respondent
-While it may be admitted that the duties of a judicial court stating that the deceased Carlos Villa Abrille died
administrator and an agent (petitioner alleges that both act in intestate leaving estates consisting of his conjugal share in real
representative capacity), are in some respects, identical, the and personal properties and some of them are shares in the co-
provisions on agency this should not apply to a judicial
ownership in Juna Subdivision and cash on bank.
administrator

The heirs of the deceased are his surviving spouse, nine (9) ISSUE: Whether Respondent Judge gravely abused his
children (among them the herein petitioner, Natividad V. A. discretion when it granted the withdrawal of the bank deposits,
Jaroda), and four (4) grandsons, among them the herein as well as the order which approved the power of attorney of
respondent, Antonio V. A. Tan. After Respondent Tan was Special Administrator Tan to sell or dispose the lots co-owned by
appointed special administrator he petitioned for the withdrawal the deceased in Juna Subdivision.
of sums of P109,886.42 and P72,644.66 from the Philippine
National Bank, which sums were not listed in his petition for
administration as among the properties left by the deceased
RULING:
instead actually belong to and were held in trust for the co-
owners of the Juna Subdivision. Powers of attorney purportedly
signed by the co-owners authorizing the late Carlos Villa Abrille
to sell the lots in the Juna Subdivision and to deposit the Yes. We agree with petitioner that the order allowing the special
proceeds thereof with the Philippine National Bank were administrator to withdraw the bank deposits standing in the
exhibited. The court granted the petition. name of the decedent is in abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. In the first place, said withdrawal is foreign
Tan executed, together with the other co-owners of the Juna to the powers and duties of a special administrator, which, as
Subdivision a power of attorney appointing himself as attorney- Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court provides, are to —take
in-fact to sell (or) dispose the lots in the 99.546-hectare possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits and
subdivision. Tan filed before the court for the approval of the estate of the decease and preserve the same for the executor
power of attorney executed authorizing himself to sell the lots, or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose
which the court also granted. may commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may
sell only such perishable and other property as the court orders
Petitioner Natividad V. A. Jaroda moved to nullify the order that
allowed the withdrawal of the bank deposits, as well as the sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts
order which approved the power of attorney which was granted of the deceased unless so ordered by the court.
by the respondent court. Jaroda appealed but it was also
dismissed. Petitioner Jaroda filed the present petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction alleging, among other
things, that appeal would not be speedy and adequate as In the second place, the order was issued without notice to, and
respondent Tan has sold and continues to sell the subdivision hearing of, the heirs of the deceased. The withdrawal of the
lots on the strength of the respondent court's order, to her bank deposits may be viewed as a taking of possession and
irreparable prejudice and that of the other heirs which the Court charge of the credits of the estate, and apparently within the
gave due and issued an order restraining the respondent from powers and duties of a special administrator; but actually, said
selling the share of the intestate estate.
withdrawal is a waiver by the special administrator of a prima
facie exclusive right of the intestate estate to the bank deposits
in favor of the co-owners of the Juna Subdivision, who were

allegedly claiming the same as alleged by the administrator in
his motion.
It is well settled that an executrix holds the property of her
testator's estate as a trustee and that an executrix will not be
permitted to deal with herself as an individual in any
The bank deposits were in the name of the deceased; they, transaction concerning the trust property.
therefore, belong prima facie to his estate after his death. And
until the contrary is shown by proper evidence at the proper
stage, when money claims may be filed in the intestate
proceedings, the special administrator is without power to make The opinion of some commentators that, as a general rule,
the waiver or to hand over part of the estate, or what appears auto-contracts are permissible if not expressly prohibited and
to be a prima facie part of the estate, to other persons on the that there is no express provision of law prohibiting an
ground that the estate is not the owner thereof. If even to sell administrator from appointing himself as his own agent, even if
for valuable consideration property of the estate requires prior correct, cannot and should not apply to administrator of
written notice of the application to the heirs, legatees, or decedent's estates, in view of the fiduciary relationship that
devisees under Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, such notice is they occupy with respect to the heirs of the deceased and their
equally, if not more, indispensable for disposing gratuitously of responsibilities toward the probate court. A contrary ruling
assets of the decedent in favor of strangers. Admittedly, no would open the door to fraud and maladministration, and once
such notice was given, and without it the court's authority is the harm is done, it might be too late to correct it.
invalid and improper.
A concrete example would be for administrator Tan to authorize

b) The order approving the power of attorney executed by agent Tan to sell a lot for P50, with the condition that if he can
administrator Tan and appointing himself as attorney-in-fact to sell it for more he could keep the difference; agent Tan sells the
sell the subdivision lots for a price at his discretion is, likewise, lot for P150.00; he retains P100.00 and deposits in the bank
void for want of notice and for approving an improper contract P50.00 "in the name of Antonio V. A. Tan, in trust for Juna
or transaction. Subdivision" (as worded in the power of attorney. Annex "F-1");
thus, administrator Tan's accounting to the estate for the sale of
the lot for P50 would be in order, but the estate would have
been actually cheated of the sum of P100, which went to agent
As provided under Section 4 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court , Tan in his individual capacity.
power of attorney for the sale of the pro-indiviso share of the
estate requires "written notice to the heirs, devisees, and
legatees who are interested in the estate to be sold" and
admittedly, administrator Tan did not furnish such notice.

The court below also failed to notice that, as alleged in the Cadavis , Lloyd
administrator's petition after the death of Carlos Villa Abrille the
administrator Tan, in his personal capacity, had replaced said FACTS:
deceased as manager of the Juna Subdivision by authority of
• A verified complaint for disbarment case filed by Mauro
the other co-owners. By the court's questioned order
Mananquil against Atty. Villegas w/ gross misconduct or
empowering him to represent the interest of the deceased in
malpractice committed while acting as counsel of record
the management of the subdivision, the administrator Tan came
of one Felix Leong in the latter’s capacity as
to be the agent or attorney-in-fact of two different principals:
administrator of the Testate Estate of the late Felomina
the court and the heirs of the deceased on the one hand, and
Zerna. The complainant was appointed special
the majority co-owners of the subdivision on the other, in
administrator after Felix Leong died.
managing and disposing of the lots of the subdivision. This dual
agency of the respondent Tan rendered him incapable of
• March 21, 1961, respondent was retained as counsel of
independent defense of the estate's interests against those of
record for Felix Leong, one of the heirs of the late
the majority co-owners. It is highly undesirable, if not improper,
Felomina Zerna, who was appointed as administrator of
that a court officer and administrator, in dealing with property
the Testate Estate of the Felomina Zerna.
under his administration, should have to look to the wishes of
strangers as well as to those of the court that appointed him. A • A lease contract was executed between Felix and the
judicial administrator should be at all times subject to the Heirs of Jose Villegas represented by respondent’s
orders of the appointing Tribunal and of no one else. brother in law Marcelo involving, among others, sugar
lands of the Estate.
Jaroda's interest in the estate demands that she be heard by

• Felix Leong was designated as administrator and owner,
by testamentary disposition, of 5/6 of all said parcels of
the court in all matters affecting the disposal of her share, and
land.
that the administrator should primarily protect the interest of
the estate in which she is a participant rather than those of the
• The lease contract was for 4 sugar crop years, w/ 10%
decedent's co-owner. The partial partition approved by the
yearly rental of the value of the sugar produced from the
court has no effect, one way or the other, upon the orders
leased land.
contested in the present case because it is not definite whether
the lots described in the 57 pages of the partition agreement • April 20, 1965,the formal partnership of Hijos De Jose
correspond to those of the Juna Subdivision as described in the Villegas was formed among the heirs of Jose Villegas, of
power of attorney. which respondent was a member.
• Another lease contract was executed bet. Felix and the

partnership, containing basically the same terms and
MANANQUIL VS. VILLEGAS

conditions as the 1stcontract , w/ Marcelo signing again estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the
as representative of the lessee. payment of the debts and the expenses of administration. He
may, therefore, exercise acts of administration without special
• After the demise of Marcelo, respondent was appointed authority from the court having jurisdiction of the estate. For
manager of Hijos De Jose Villegas by the majority of instance, it has long been settled that an administrator has the
partners. power to enter into the lease contracts involving the properties
of the estate even without prior judicial authority and approval.
• Renewals of the lease contract were executed bet. Felix
and Hijos De Jose Villegas and respondent signing Thus, considering that administrator Felix was not
therein as representative of the lessee. required under the law and prevailing jurisprudence to seek
prior authority from the probate court in order to validly lease
• In 1980, respondent was replaced by his nephew real properties of the estate, Villegas, as counsel of Felix,
Geronimo Villegas as the manager of the family cannot be taken to task for failing to notify the probate court of
partnership. the various lease contracts involved herein and to secure its
judicial approval thereto.
• Villegas was both counsel of Felix Leong and a partner in
the partnership of Hijos De Jose Villegas. 2. NO. there is no evidence to warrant disbarment, although
Villegas should be suspended from the practice of law because
• When Felix died, this disbarment case was filed by he participated in the renewals of the lease contracts involving
Mananquil. He alleged that the lease contracts were the properties of Zerna’s estate in favor of the partnership of
made iniquitous terms and conditions. He also alleged Hijos De Jose Villegas. Under Art. 1646 of the Civil Code,
that Villegas should have notified and secured the “lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be
approval of the probate court in Zerna’s estate before the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue
contracts were renewed, Villegas being counsel of that of their profession” are prohibited from leasing, either in person
estate’s administrator. or through the mediation of another, the properties or things
mentioned. Such act constituted gross misconduct, hence,
ISSUES: 1. WON Villegas should have first secured the probate
suspension for 4 months.
court’s approval regarding the lease?
2. WON Villegas should be disbarred?
RULING: RULE 85
Accountability and Compensation of Executors and
1. NO. Pursuant to sec.3 of the Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Administrators
Court, a judicial executor or administrator has the right to the
possession and management of the real as well as the personal JOSON VS. JOSON
Castillo, Shain Ann

Heir Eduardo Joson filed an opposition to said motion but, after
FACTS: hearing, the court issued an order declaring the proceedings
Tomas Joson died on July 5, 1945 in Nueva Ecija leaving terminated and relieving the administrator not only of his duties
behind heirs and properties. He married three times and was as such but also of his accounts notwithstanding the heirs'
survived by nine (9) heirs: two (2) children and grandchildren by opposition to said accounts.
his first wife Eufemia de la Cruz; two (2) daughters by his
second wife Pomposa Miguel and his third wife and surviving The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner.
widow Dominga M. Joson.
ISSUES:
Upon his death, his will was presented to the RTC of Nueva Ecija (1) Is the duty of an administrator to make an accounting of his
by his son Felicisimo Joson for probate. In August, said will administration a mere incident which can be avoided once the
having been duly probated, Felicisimo Joson was appointed estate has been settled?
administrator of the estate and, accordingly, he filed an
inventory of the properties left by the deceased. (2) Are the proceedings deemed terminated by the mere
execution of an extrajudicial partition of the estate without the
The administrator filed his first account and second account for necessity of having the accounts of the administrator heard and
the year 1945-1946 and 1946-1947 respectively. This was approved by the court?
ordered by the court to be examined by the clerk of court but
the same has never been approved.On, 1948, the administrator (3) Is the administrator ipso facto relieved of his duty of
filed another account for the year 1947-1948 and, upon motion proving his account from the moment said partition has been
of the heirs, he was ordered to file an accounting covering the executed?
properties under his administration.
RULING:
Eduardo Joson, one of the heirs, filed an opposition to all the (1) No.The duty of an administrator to render an account is not
accounts filed by theadministrator where he alleged that the a mere incident of an administration proceeding which can be
administrator diminished the shares of the heirs and had waived or disregarded when the same is terminated, but that it
padded his expenses of administration. is a duty that has to be performed and duly acted upon by the
court before the administration is finally ordered closed and
The heirs were able to compromise their differences and terminated.
entered into an extrajudicial settlement and partition of the
entire estate under the provisions of the Rules of Court which The trial court erred in acceding to the motion for in doing so it
provides for the settlement of the estate without court disregarded the express provisions of our rules relative to the
intervention. This settlement was contained in two documents settlement of accounts of a judicial administrator specifically
executed on the same date wherein they manifested that they Section 1, Section 8,9 and 10.
are entering into it because of their desire to put an end to the
judicial proceeding and administration. (2) No. The proceedings is not deemed terminated by the mere
execution of an extrajudicial partition of the estate. The fact
Without said accounts having been heard or approved, that all the heirs of the estate have entered into an extrajudicial
the administrator filed a motion to declare the proceedings settlement and partition in order to put an end to their
closed and terminated and to relieve him of his duties as such. differences cannot in any way be interpreted as a waiver of the

objections of the heirs to the accounts submitted by the ISSUE:
administrator not only because to so hold would be a Whether or not the court should have required the
derogation of the pertinent provisions of our rules but also executrix to render an accounting of the cash and stock
because there is nothing provided in said partition that the dividends received after the approval of her final accounts.
aforesaid accounts shall be deemed waived or condoned.
RULING:
(3) No.The administrator is not yet relieved of his duty of Yes. Section 8 of Rule 85 provides that the "executor or
proving his account.While the attitude of the heirs in concluding administrator shall render an account of his administration
said extrajudicial settlement is plausible and hascontributed to within one (1) year from the time of receiving letters
the early settlement of the estate, the same cannot however be testamentary or of administration ..., and he shall render such
considered as release of the obligation of the administrator to further accounts as the court may requite until the estate is
prove his accounts.This is more so when, according to the wholly settled." In the instant case, further accounts by the
oppositors, the administrator has committed in his accounts a executrix appear to be in order, in view of the fact that the
shortage in the amount of P132,600.00 which certainly cannot dividends sought to be accounted for are not included in the
just be brushed aside by a mere technicality. final accounts rendered by the executrix. It appears that the
interests of all the parties will be better served and the conflict
between petitioners and respondent will be resolved if such
TUMANG VS. LAGUIO additional accounting is made. Further, "it has been held that an
Castillo, Rochelle Jane executor or administrator who receives assets of the estate
after he has filed an account should file a supplementary
FACTS: account thereof, and may be compelled to do so, but that it is
In Special Proceeding No. 1953 involving the estate of only with respect to matters occuring after the settlement of
the late Dominador Tumang and pending before the Court of final account that representatives will be compelled to file
First Instance of Pampanga, the widow of the deceased, namely supplementary account." It is only in a case where the petition
Magdalena A. Tumang, administratrix and executrix of the will, to compel an executor to account after he has accounted and
filed a petition to declare the testate proceedings definitely has been discharged fails to allege that any further sums came
terminated and closed with respect to herself and two of her into the hands of the executor, and the executor specifically
children — Melba Tumang Ticzon and Nestor A. Tumang. The denies the receipt of any further sums that the accounting
petition was premised on the fact that the aforesaid heirs had should be denied.
already acknowledged receipt of the properties adjudicated to
them, and in order for such properties to be transferred in their
names, there was need for an order of the court declaring the RODRIGUEZ VS. SILVA
proceedings closed with respect to the aforesaid heirs. The Dela Cruz, Kyzeth
petition was opposed by appenee's daughter, Guia T. Laguio
and her children on the ground that appellee, as administratrix PHIL. TRUST CO., VS. LUZON SURETY
and executrix, had not yet delivered all properties adjudicated Deguzman, Jabrielle
to them. Moreover, the oppositors contended that there could
be no partial termination of the proceedings. Thereafter, the FACTS:
administratrix withdrew the aforementioned petition. Court of First Instance of Manila appointed Francis R.
Picard, Sr. as Administrator the Intestate Estate of the deceased

James R. Burt upon a bond. Thereafter he submitted and the After the denial of appellant's lotion for reconsideration, it took
Court approved his bond in the required amount, with appellant the present appeal.
Luzon Surety Co., Inc. as his surety. Court dismissed Picard, as
administrator and appointed the Philippine Trust Co. in his ISSUES: WON (1) the Court cannot order the confiscation of the
place. The latter submitted an inventory-report showing that the administrator's bond, on prejudice or injury to creditors,
only asset of the Intestate Estate of Burt that had come into its legatees or heirs of the estate of James R. Burt having been
possession was the sum of P57.75 representing the balance of shown, and (2) a probate court cannot, ex proprio motu,
the checking account of said deceased with the Philippine prosecute the probate bond.
National Bank. A review, however, of the record of the case
reveals that former Administrator Francis Picard, filed an RULING:
inventory of the estate of the deceased, from which it appears Appellant's contention that the probate court, ex proprio
that the sole property he found was the amount of P8,873.73 in motu, cannot order the confiscation or forfeiture of an
current account with the Philippine National Bank. This amount administrator's bond, is clearly without merit. Whatever may be
was reduced to P7,986.53 after deducting therefrom his the rule prevailing in other jurisdictions, in ours probate court is
expenses in the amount of P887.22; and as reported by him in possessed with an all-embracing power not only in requiring but
his petition , the further expenses in the amount of P865.20 also in fixing the amount, and executing or forfeiting an
were deducted, thereby leaving the balance of P7,121.33. Court administrator's bond. The execution or forfeiture of an
hereby orders said Francis Picard, to deliver within 48 hours administrator's bond, is deemed be a necessary part and
from the receipt of a copy of the order the difference of incident of the administration proceedings as much as its filing
P7,063.58 to the present Administrator, Philippine Trust and the fixing of its amount. The rule, therefore, is that the
Company. Picard, submitted an itemized statement of probate court may have said bond executed in the same
disbursements made by him as administrator of the estate, probate proceeding. Moreover, the condition of the
showing that the estate funds amounted to P7,986.53; that he administrator's bond in question is that Francis L. Picard shall
reported to the Court additional expenses incurred amounting faithfully execute the orders and decrees of the court; that if he
to P865.20, thus leaving a balance of P7,121.33; that thereafter did so, the obligation shall become void, otherwise it shall
he disbursed the sum of P250.00 to defray the burial expenses remain in full force and effect. In having been established that
of the deceased, thus leaving a balance of P6,871.33; that on Picard disbursed funds of the estate without authority, the
several occasions he had delivered to Feliciano Burt adoptive conclusion follows that he had and his surety became bound
son of the deceased James R. Burt different sums of money upon the terms of their bond. Appellant also contends that it
totalling P5,825.00, thus leaving a balance of P972.33. After was not proper for the lower court to order the confiscation of
considering this statement, the Court, issued an order finding its bond because no prejudice or injury to any creditor, heir or
Picard, guilty of having disbursed funds of the estate amounting other interested person has been proved. This is also without
to about P8,000.00, without authority. Picard was prosecuted for merits. According to the record, the claims against the estate
estafa. Having pleaded guilty to the charge, judgment of filed by Antonio Gardiner and Jose Teruel for the sum of P200.00
conviction was accordingly rendered, and he was, besides, held and P3,205.00, respectively, were approved by the probate
civilly liable. Court issued an order requiring appellant Luzon court but the same have remained unpaid because of lack of
Surety Co., Inc. to show cause why the administrator's bond funds. Finally, appellant claims that it had been released from
filed by it on behalf of Picard would not be confiscated. liability as surety because it received no notice of the
Appellant filed a motion to set aside said order. Court denied proceedings for the determination of the accountability of the
appellant's motion and ordered the confiscation of its bond. administrator. This contention we also find to be untenable.

From the nature of the obligation entered into by the surety on their litigation expenses but the RTC denied the said
an administrator's bond — which makes him privy to the motion in May 1955.
proceedings against his principal — he is bound and concluded,
in the absence of fraud and collusion, by a judgment against his In 1996, Atty. Quasha also passed away. Atty. Redentor
principal, even though said surety was not a party to the Zapata also of the Quasha Law Office,
proceeding. In the case of the De Mendoza vs. Pacheco, 64 Phil. took over as the counsel of the Triviere children, and
135, the sureties on the administrator's bond were held liable continued to help Atty. Syquia in the settlement of the estate.
thereon altho they were not parties to the proceeding against On 6 September 2002, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Zapata filed
the administrator, nor were they notified in connection another Motion for Payment, for their own behalf and for their
therewith prior to the issuance of the court order for the respective clients.
confiscation of the bond. Lastly, according to Section 11, Rule
86 of the Rules of Court, upon the settlement of the account of On the other hand, LCN, the only remaining claimant
an executor or administrator, his sureties "may upon against the Intestate Estate of the Late Raymond Triviere filed
application, be admitted as a party to such accounting." The its Comment on/Opposition to the Motion on 2. LCN countered
import of this provision is that the sureties are not entitled to that the RTC had already resolved the issue of payment of
notice but may be allowed to intervene in the settlement of the litigation expenses when it denied the first Motion for Payment
accounts of the executor or administrator if they ask for leave filed by Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha for failure of the
to do so in due time. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from administrators to submit an accounting of the assets and
is hereby affirmed, with costs. expenses of the estate as required by the court.
QUASHA-PENA VS. LCN CONS. Eventually, the RTC granted the second Motion for
Dimaliwat, Dianne Payment; however, it reduced the sums to be paid. LCN, then
filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by
FACTS: the RTC. Recourse was then resorted to the Court of Appeals.
On May 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision
Raymond Triviere passed away on December 14, 1987. essentially ruling in favor of LCN. While the Court of Appeals
On January 13, 1988, proceedings for the settlement of his conceded that Atty. Syquia and the Quasha Law Office, as the
intestate estate were instituted by his widow, Amy Consuelo administrators of the estate of the late Raymond Triviere, were
Triviere, before the RTc of Makati City Atty. Enrique P. Syquia and entitled toadministrator's fees and litigation expenses, they
Atty. William H. Quasha of the Quasha Law Office, representing could not claim the same from the funds of the estate.
the widow and children of the late Raymond Triviere,
respectively, were appointed administrators of the estate of the ISSUE:
deceased in April 1988. As administrators, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Whether or not Quasha Law Office is entitled to payment
Quasha incurred expenses for the payment of real estate taxes, of the expenses incurred as executor or administrator of the
security services, and the preservation and administration of estate of Triviere.
the estate, as well as litigation expenses.
HELD:
In February 1995, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha filed No. Section 7, Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court,
before the RTC a Motion for Payment of which reads: Section 7. What expenses and fees allowed
executor or administrator. Not to charge for services as

attorney. Compensation provided by will controls unless claim against said estate. The lower court issued the order
renounced. When the executor or administrator is an attorney, refusing to entertain the aforementioned claim. De Guzman
he shall not charge against the estate any professional fees for invokes, in support of his appeal, section 2, Rule 87 of the Rules
legal services rendered by him.
of Court. He maintains that his claim was filed prior to the
The afore-quoted provision is clear and unequivocal and distribution of the estate of the deceased. Further, he now
needs no statutory construction. Here, in attempting to exempt alleges, for the first time, a "cause" why the lower court should
itself from the coverage of said rule, the Quasha Law Office allegedly have considered his claim. He says, in his brief that he
presents conflicting arguments to justify its claim for attorney's had no actual knowledge of the fact that the estate of the
fees against the estate. At one point, it alleges that the award deceased was then already in the process of settlement.
of attorney's fees was payment for its administration of the
estate of the late Raymond Triviere; yet, it would later renounce ISSUE:
that it was an administrator.
Whether or not the claim of De Guzman should be granted
SISON VS. TEODORO
Mahadodin Dimaampao RULING:
No. First, as provided in Section 2, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:

UY TIOCO VS. IMPERIAL
Dorado, Czaybeeh Time within which claims shall be filed.—In the
notice provided in the preceding section, the
RULE 86 court shall state the time for the filing of claims
against the estate, which shall not be more than
Claims against Estate twelve nor less than six months after the date of
the first publication of the notice. However, at
AFAN VS DE GUZMAN
any time before an order of distribution is
Espino, Carla
entered, on application of a creditor who has
FACTS: failed to file his claim within the time previously
limited, the court may, for cause shown and on
On July 12 1957, De Guzman filed a claim in the special such terms as are equitable, allow such claims to
proceeding for the settlement of intestate estate of be filed within a time not exceeding one month.
ArsenioAfan. The claim was allegedly due from Afan, with
interest thereon, within 30 days from August 16, 1949, as set The second sentence thereof clothes the court with authority to
forth in a promissory note then issued by Afan. On July 22, permit the filing of a claim after the lapse of the period stated in
1957, theadministratix objected to the consideration of the the first sentence, but prior to and distribution, subject to the
claim upon the ground, among others, that it had been filed following conditions, namely (1) there must be tin application
long after the expiration of the period for the presentation of therefor; (2) a cause must be shown why the permission should

be granted; and (3) the extension of time granted for the filing filing of his aforementioned "compliance."Instead of furnishing a
of the claim shall not exceed one (1) month.In this case, De "cause" for the extension of the reglementary period for the
Guzman has not sought permission to file the claim. Moreover, filing of his claim, this omission on the part of De Guzman fully
the same does not allege any reason why he should be excused justifies the denial of such extension and the order appealed
for his failure to file the claim in this proceeding within the from. In one case, the Court have already held that failure to file
period stated in the Rules of Court. a claim within the time provided therefor upon the sole ground
that the claimant was negotiating with one of the heirs for
Second, on his contention that he had no actual knowledge of payment, is not sufficient to justify extension. Lastly, the Court
the fact that the estate of the deceased was then already in the also ruled in another case that where a claimant knew of the
process of settlement, the Court found otherwise. He had actual death of the decedent and for four or five months thereafter he
knowledge of the present proceeding long before the filing of did nothing to present his claim, this can hardly be considered
his claim therein on July 27, 1957. It appears that, during the as a good excuse for such neglect.
lifetime of Afan, or on May 24, 1950, De Guzman instituted,
against him, a civil case to recover the amount of the Therefore, De Guzman’s claim should not be granted on the
promissory note. The Court of Appeals set aside the decision of ground that it was filed out of time.
the trial court in favor of De Guzman and ordered a trial de
novo. Sometime after the records had been remanded to the
lower court, Afan died. On August 15, 1955, that court issued an HEIRS OF PIZARRO vs. CONSOLACION
order requiring counsel for his heirs to submit to the court the
number of the intestate estate proceedings of the deceased FACTS:
Arsenio R. Afan. This order was complied with on August 30, Petitioners are the oppositors in the special proceeding
1955 and a copy of "notification" containing the required case filed by private respondent Luis Tan for the settlement of
information was served upon counsel for De Guzman, as the estate of the late Dominga Garcia. In 1977, Luis Tan,
plaintiff therein. On January 18, 1956, his counsel filed in said allegedly the only surviving son of Dominga Garcia who died
sometime in 1930 in Canton, China, filed for the issuance of the
case a motion for the appointment of a legal representative of
letters of administration in favor of Alfonso Atilano. Garcia left a
the deceased Afan, to substitute him as defendant therein. On parcel of land located in Davao City which is under the
January 24, 1956 De Guzman filed, therefore, a statement, possession of the heirs of Ramon Pizarro. Respondent court set
entitled "compliance", setting forth the names, ages and the petition for hearing and the said order and petition were
addresses of the heirs of the deceased, "as shown by the duly published. After the private respondent Tan had begun
records in Special Proceedings No. 26858, entitled 'Instance presentation of evidence, the parties entered into a compromise
estate of Arsenio R. Afan' before the Court of First Instance of and the petitioners withdrew their opposition to the intestate
proceedings. Meanwhile in 1979, Tan and the City of Davao filed
Manila," with the prayer that said "heirs be substituted as party
a joint motion asking the respondent court to take notice of the
defendants" in Case No. 1148, "in place of the deceased Arsenio agreement which in substance seeks to proceed with the
R. Afan." Yet, De Guzman choose not to file his claim in such determination of the heirs of Dominga Garcia which shall be
proceeding until July 27, 1957, one year and a half after the determinative of their respective claims against the estate.

Petitioners filed their opposition and the respondent court Gutierrez, while the testate proceeding was opened, filed
issued an order taking note of the agreement. Private a complaint for 2 items: first, for the sum of P32,000.00
respondent Tan filed a motion to drop and exclude the representing advance rentals he had to the decedent and
petitioners on the ground that they do not even claim to be second, the sum of P60,000.00 as damages in the concept of
heirs of the deceased Garcia. Respondent court dismissed both earned profits, that is, profits which the claimant failed to
claims of the petitioners on the ground that they are barred for realize because of the breach of the lease contract.
having been filed out of time.
ISSUE: On June 7, 1957, appellant commenced an ordinary civil
WON the order of the respondent court which directed action against the executrix of the testate for the recovery of
that the filing of claims against the estate be filed within 6 the same amount of P60,000 referred to as the second item. In
months after the first publication of the notice is null and void July 1957 appellant amended his claim in the testate
and violative of Sec 2, Rule 86 of Revised Rules of Court. proceeding by withdrawing therefrom the item of P60,000.00,
leaving only the one for refund of advance rentals in the sum of
RULING: P32,000.00.
Yes. The range of period specified in the Rules is
intended to give the probate court the discretion to fix period After the issues were joined in the present, the court
for the filing of claims. The probate court is permitted by the dismissed the action for abandonment by both parties.
rule to set the period provided it is not less than 6 months nor Appellant moved to reconsider; the court denied the motion for
more than 12 months from the date of the first publication of reconsideration on the ground that the claim should have been
notice. Since the notice issued and the period set by the court prosecuted in the testate proceeding and not by ordinary civil
was not in accordance with the requirements of Sec 2, Rule 86, action.
what should apply then is the period as provided for by the
rules which is not less than 6 months nor more than 12 months ISSUE:
from the date of first publication. The first publication of notice Whether or not Gutierrez’s claim for damages based on
in the Mindanao Times was on March 30? 1978. Thus, the two unrealized profits is a money claim against the estate of the
claims of the petitioners against the estate which were filed on deceased Maria Gerardo Vda. de Barretto?
March 5, 1979 and March 29, 1979 respectivelu were filed on
time. RULING:
Yes. The word "claims" as used in statutes requiring the
GUTIERREZ VS. DATU presentation of claims against a decedent's estate is generally
Katigbak, Paula construed to mean debts or demands of a pecuniary nature
which could have been enforced against the deceased in his
FACTS: lifetime and could have been reduced to simple money
In 1940, Maria Gerardo Vda. De Barretto, owner of judgments; and among these are those founded upon contract.
fishpond lands in Pampanga, leased to Ricardo Gutierrez for a The claim in this case is based on contract — specifically, on a
term to expire on May 1, 1947. On November 1, 1941, it was breach thereof. It falls squarely under section 5 of Rule 87
found that the dikes were opened, resulting in their destruction "Upon all contracts by the decedent broken during his lifetime,
and in the loss great quantities of fish inside, to the damage even though they were personal to the decedent in liability, the
and prejudice of the lessee. personal representative is answerable for the breach out of the
assets." A claim for breach of a covenant in a deed of the

decedent must be presented under a statute requiring such RULING::
presentment of all claims grounded on contract.
As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the
The only actions that may be instituted against the debtor does not extinguish the obligation.Obligations are
executor or administrator are those to recover real or personal transmissible to theheirs, except when the transmission is
property from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and
prevented by the law, the stipulations of the parties, or the
actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property,
real or personal. The instant suit is not one of them. nature of the obligation.Only obligations that are personal or are
identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by
death.Furthermore, the liability of petitioner is contractual in
AGUAS VS. LLEMOS nature, because it executed a performance bond, as a surety,
Lee, Mariline petitioner is solidarilyliable with Santos in accordance with the
Civil Code.
BPI VS. CONCEPCION AND HIJOS
Lectura, Erika Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the
prosecution of money claims arising from a contract against the
IMPERIAL INS., VS. DAVID
Lim, Justin estate of a deceased debtor. Evidently, those claims are not
actually extinguished.What is extinguished is only the obligee’s
STRONGHOLD VS. REPUBLIC action or suit filed before the court, which is not then acting as
Lubay, Angela a probate court.
FACTS:
In the present case, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations
Republic Asahi Glass contracts with JDS for Santos had under his contracts with respondent were not
the construction of roadways and drainage systems in RAG's intransmissible by their nature, by stipulation, or by provision of
compound. JDS does so andfiles the required compliance bond law. Hence, his death did not result in the extinguishment of
with Stronghold Insurance acting as surety. The contract is 5.3M those obligations or liabilities, which merely passed on to his
the bond is 795k. JDS falls woefully behind schedule, prompting estate. Death is not a defense that he or his estate can set up
RAG to rescind the contract and demand the compliance to wipe out the obligations under the performance bond.
bond. The owner of JDS dies and JDS disappears. Shire fuses to Consequently, petitioner as surety cannot use his death to
pay the bond claiming that the death of JDS owner extinguishes escape its monetary obligation under its performance bond.
the obligation.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner’s liability under the performance bond

was automatically extinguished by the death of Santos, the MBTC VS. ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT CORP
principal. Mercado, Trish

11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court; the settlement of the estate of
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY vs. ABSOLUTE deceased persons (where claims against the deceased should
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION be filed) is primarily governed by the rules on special
G.R. No. 170498. January 9, 2013 proceedings, while the rules provided for ordinary
claims,including Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, merely
FACTS: apply suppletorily.
On October 5, 2000, Sherwood Holdings Corporation, Inc.
(SHCI) filed a complaint for sum of money against Absolute SANTOS VS. MANARANG
Management Corporation (AMC). The complaint was docketed Mansul, Nabral
as Civil Case No. Q-00-42105 and was assigned to
the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 80. SHCI alleged in its complaint ESTATE OF OLAVE VS. REYES
that it made advance payments to AMC for the purchase of Pangilinan , Legis
27,000 pieces of plywood and 16,500 plyboards in the sum of
P12,277,500.00, covered by Metrobank Check Nos. SALONGA-HERNANDEZ VS. PASCUAL
1407668502, 140768507, 140768530, 140768531, 140768532, Rabanal Michelle
140768533 and 140768534. These checks were all crossed, and
were all made payable to AMC. They were given to Chua, AMC’s
87
General Manager, in 1998. Chua died in 1999, and a special
proceeding for the settlement of his estate was commenced RULE
before the RTC of Pasay City. This proceeding was pending at
the time AMC Actions by and Against Executors and Administrators
filed its answer with counterclaims and third-party complaint.
SHCI made demands on AMC, after Chua’s death, for allegedly HEIRS OF GREGOIRE VS. BAKER
undelivered items worth P8,331,700.00. According to AMC, Rivera, Hiezll Wynn
these transactions could not be found in its records. Upon
investigation, AMC discovered that in 1998, Chua received from FACTS: J. H. Ankrom died, and thereafter, A. L. Baker, qualified
SHCI 18 Metrobank checks worth P31,807,500.00. These were as his administrator. The administrator filed his inventory of the
all payable to AMC and were crossed or for payee’s account assets pertaining to the estate of his decedent, in which
only inventory was included a tract of land covered by Torrens
certificate of title and containing an area of more than 930
ISSUE: hectares. The heirs of Rafael Gregoire filed a claim against the
Whether Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint against
estate of Ankrom for the sum of $35,438.78, U. S. currency, or
Chua’s estate should be allowed.
P70, 877.56, based upon a judgment rendered in the Supreme
HELD: Court of the Republic of Panama. It appears that the total
YES. recognized claims against the estate amounted originally to
P76,645.13, but four of the creditors, having claims in the
RATIO: amount of P1,639.82, have been paid in full, leaving a balance
The specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules owing by the estate of P75,005.31, the greater part of which is
of Court should prevail over the general provisions of Section

comprised of the claim of the appellants. As the affairs of the such other expenses as the court deems equitable. The remedy
estate stood upon the original inventory, there appeared to be of the heirs of Gregoire is, therefore, to indemnify the
sufficient assets to pay all claimants; but while these intestate administrator against costs and, by leave of court, to institute
proceedings were being conducted, the administrator an action in the name of the administrator to set aside the
discovered that a year and a half before his death, Ankrom had assignment or other conveyance believed to have been made in
executed a mortgage on the property here in question in favor fraud of creditors.
of the Philippine Trust Company. Two days after this mortgage
had been executed, Ankrom appears to have made an
assignment of all his interest in the mortgaged property to one
SINFOROSO PASCUAL VS. PONCIANO PASCUAL
J. G. Jung, of Cincinnati, Ohio, for a purported consideration of Rodriguez, Maria Lorraine
the sum of P1 and other good and valuable considerations. In
view of these conveyances by his intestate, the administrator FACTS:
presented an amended inventory, omitting therefrom the tract The plaintiff and defendants are legitimate children of
of 930 hectares with its improvements thereon, the same being the testratix, Eduarda de los Santos.In 1940, while the
the land covered by the transfers above mentioned. The court proceedings for the probate of the will of the deceased Eduarda
de los Santos were pending in CFI-Rizal plaintiff, Sinforoso
made an order, approving of the omission by the administrator
Pascual, instituted in the CFI-Pampanga against Ponciano S.
of said property from the inventory; and its is from this order Pascual and others, an action for the annulment of a contract of
that the present appeal is here being prosecuted. sale of a fishpond situated in Pampanga, supposedly executed
without consideration by said deceased in her lifetime in favor
HELD: When there is a deficiency of assets in the hands of an of the defendants.
executor or administrator to pay debts and expenses, and when
the deceased person made in his life-time such fraudulent Defendants filed of a motion to dismiss, alleging want of
conveyance of such real or personal estate or of a right or cause of action, limitation of action, wrong venue and pendency
interest therein, as is stated in the preceding section, any of another action. RTC: granted the motion on the ground that
creditor of the estate may, by license of the court, if the the action should have been brought by the executor or
administrator of the estate left by the deceased, and directed
executor or administrator has not commenced such action,
the plaintiff to amend his complaint. Plaintiff filed an amended
commence and prosecute to final judgment, in the name of the complaint. However, RTC declared that such amendment did not
executor or administrator, an action for the recovery of the cure the insufficiency of the complaint, dismissed the action.
same and may recover for the benefit of the creditors, such real
or personal estate, or interest therein so conveyed. But such ISSUE: Whether the action should have been filed by the
action shall not be commenced until the creditor files in court a executor and not by the plaintiff-heir?
bond with sufficient surety, to be approved by the judge, HELD: No.
Under Rule 86, section 1, of the new Rules of Court,
conditioned to indemnify the executor or administrator against
actions for the recovery or protection of the property or rights of
the costs of such action. Such creditor shall have a lien upon the deceased for causes which survive may be prosecuted or
the judgment by him so recovered for the costs incurred and defended by his executor or administrator. Upon the

commencement of the testate or intestate proceedings the intestate supposed to be in Cerilio’s possession. Thereafter, writ
heirs have no standing in court in actions of the above of execution was issued. By virtue of it, the provincial sheriff
character, except when the executor or administrator is issued notice of attachment against the real property described
unwilling or fails or refuses to act, in which event to heirs may
in COT of the Register of Deeds and under the tax assessment
act in his place.
Here, the fictitious sale is alleged to have been made to in the name of Cerilio. Cerilio filed an urgent motion to set aside
the defendants, one of them, Miguel S. Pascual, being the the writ of execution and for writ of preliminary injunction which
executor appointed by the probate court. Such executor was opposed by Jesus. The public auction was set and Jesus
naturally would not bring an action against himself for recovery Modesto named as the highest and only bidder. Then,
of the fishpond. His refusal to act may, therefore, be implied. Certificate of final sale in favour of Jesus was issued by the
And this brings the case under the exception. It should be noted Provincial Sheriff. Cerilio filed motion for reconsideration,
that in the complaint the prayer is that the fishpond be
however, it was denied by the CFI. In pursuance to the writ of
delivered not to the plaintiff but to the executor, thus indicating
that the action is brought in behalf of the estate of the possession filed by Jesus, the Provincial Sheriff issued a
deceased. notification to Cerilio placing Jesus in possession of the real
property sold to him. Cerilio filed petition for certiorari to annul
the proceedings had before the CFI of Leyte.
VELASQUEZ VS. GEORGE
Salayog, Benny Rico ISSUE:
Whether the CFI had the authority to decide whether the

RIOFERIO ET. AL. VS COURT OF APPEALS properties, real or personal belong to the estate or to the
Sumaway, Dylan persons examined
MODESTO VS. MODESTO HELD:
Tomarong, Marian
No.
FACTS:
Bruno Modesto died leaving several heirs, among them, If an executor or administrator or any interested individuals in
Cerilio Modesto and Jesus Modesto. In the course of the the estate of the deceased, complains to the court having
intestate proceeding, Jesus, acting as administrator of the jurisdiction of the estate that a person/s are suspected of
estate of Bruno, filed in the CFI of Tacloban, Leyte, motion to having possessed or having knowledge of the properties left by
cite and examine under oath several persons, especially Cerilio a deceased person, or of having concealed, embezzled or
regarding the properties concealed, embezzled or fraudulently conveyed any of the said properties of the deceased, the court
conveyed which was granted by the lower court. Joint may cite such person/s to appear before it and may examine
commissioners were appointed by CFI. Thereafter, submitted him or them on oath on the matter of such complaint. In such
their report. Jesus filed a motion in court to require Cerilio to proceedings the trial court has no authority to decide whether
turn over to him the personal properties belonging to the or not said properties, real or personal, belong to the estate or

to the persons examined. If, after such examination there is merely provisional in character, made solely to determine
good reason to believe that said person or persons examined whether or not the fishpond should be included in the inventory
are keeping properties belonging to the estate, then the next of estate assets. So it was evidently understood by the
step to be taken should be for the administrator to file an administrators who have more than once asserted that "the
ordinary action in court to recover the same. probate court has jurisdiction to determine the ownership of the
fishpond for purposes of inclusion in the inventory of the
properties. So it was made clear by the Probate Court itself
VALERA VS. INSERTO
which, at the outset, stated that the hearing on the matter was
Tresvalles, Kris
meant "merely to determine whether or not the fishpond should
FACTS: In the proceedings for the settlement of the intestate be included as part of the estate and whether or not the person
estate of the decedent spouses, Rafael Valera and Consolacion holding it should be made to deliver and/or return ** (it) to the
Sarrosa — in which Eumelia Cabado and Pompiro Valera had estate. And so it was emphasized in another Order, denying
been appointed administrators — the heirs of a deceased reconsideration of the Order of September 17, 1980. Judge Adil
daughter of the spouses, Teresa Garin, filed a motion asking afterwards granted the administrators' motion for execution of
that the Administratrix, Cabado, be declared in contempt for her the order pending appeal, and directed the sheriff to enforce
failure to render an accounting of her administration. Cabado the direction for the Garin Heirs to reconvey the fishpond to the
replied that no accounting could be submitted unless Jose estate. The corresponding writ was served on Manuel Fabiana,
Garin, Teresa's husband and the movant heirs' father, delivered the supposed caretaker. Voicing no objection to the writ, and
to the administrator an 18-hectare fishpond in Baras, Barotoc declaring to the sheriff that he was a mere lessee, Fabiana
Nuevo, Iloilo, belonging to the estate and she in turn moved for voluntarily relinquished possession of the fishpond to the
the return thereof to the estate, so that it might be partitioned sheriff. The latter, in turn, delivered it to the administrators.
among the decedents' heirs. Jose Garin opposed the plea for the
Later however, Fabiana filed a complaint-in-intervention with
fishpond's return to the estate, asserting that the property was
the Probate Court seeking vindication of his right to the
owned by his children and this was why it had never been
possession of the fishpond, based on a contract of lease
included in any inventory of the estate.
between himself, as lessee, and Jose Garin, as lessor. 16 But
The Court viewed the Garin Heir's motion for contempt, as well Judge Adil dismissed his complaint.
as Carbado's prayer for the fishpond's return within the purview
In the meantime, Jose Garin — having filed a motion for
of Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. The incident was set
reconsideration of the above mentioned order of Judge Adil
for hearing and thereafter, the court issued an order
(declaring the estate to be the owner of the fishpond), in which
commanding the heir of Teresa Garin to reconvey immediately
he asserted that the Probate Court, being of limited jurisdiction,
the fishpond to the estate of the spouses.
had no competence to decide the ownership of the fishpond, 22
There seems little doubt, however, that the Court's which motion had been denied 23-filed a notice of appeal from
pronouncement regarding the estate's title to the fishpond was said Order. 24 But he quickly abandoned the appeal when, as

aforestated 25 Judge Adil authorized execution of the order issue definitely and permanently, and writing "finis" thereto, the
pending appeal, instead, he initiated a special action for question being explicitly left for determination "in an ordinary
certiorari prohibition and mandamus )with prayer for civil action," but merely to determine whether it should or
preliminary injunction) in the Court of Appeals should not be included in the inventory. This function of
resolving whether or not property should be included in the
estate inventory is, to be sure, one clearly within the Probate
Court's competence, although the Court's determination is only
ISSUE: whether the probate court had jurisdiction to take
provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the
cognizance of and decide the issue of title covering a fishpond
final decision in a separate action that may be instituted by the
being claimed by an heir adversely to the decedent spouses
parties. 32
HELD:
The same norm governs the situation contemplated in Section
Jurisdiction of Probate Court 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, expressly invoked by the
Probate Court in justification of its holding a hearing on the
Settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional issue arising from the parties' conflicting claims over the
Trial Court), acting as a Probate Court, exercises but limited fishpond. 33 The examination provided in the cited section is
jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take cognizance of and intended merely to elicit evidence relevant to property of the
determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third decedent from persons suspected of having possession or
person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all knowledge thereof, or of having concealed, embezzled, or
the Other parties having legal interest in the property consent, conveyed away the same. Of course, if the latter lays no claim
expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the to the property and manifests willingness to tum it over to the
Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons estate, no difficulty arises; the Probate Court simply issues the
are not thereby prejudiced, the reason for the exception being appropriate direction for the delivery of the property to the
that the question of whether or not a particular matter should estate. On the other hand, if the third person asserts a right to
be resolved by the Court in the exercise of its general the property contrary to the decedent's, the Probate Court
jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (e.g., would have no authority to resolve the issue; a separate action
probate, land registration, etc., is in reality not a jurisdictional must be instituted by the administrator to recover the property.
but in essence of procedural one, involving a mode of practice 34
which may be waived.
Parenthetically, in the light of the foregoing principles, the
The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the Probate Court could have admitted and taken cognizance of
application of the exception to the rule. As already earlier Fabiana's complaint in intervention after obtaining the consent
stressed, it was at all times clear to the Court as well as to the of all interested parties to its assumption of jurisdiction over the
parties that if cognizance was being taken of the question of question of title to the fishpond, or ascertaining the absence of
title over the fishpond, it was not for the purpose of settling the

objection thereto. But it did not. It dismissed the complaint in
intervention instead. And all this is now water under the bridge. FACTS:
Possession of Fishpond Pending Petitioners executed separate complaint-affidavits charging

private respondents of several violation of penal laws when they
Determination of Title Thereto went to the premises of ABS CBN and informed the employees
thereof regarding the forced closure of the premises of the
Since the determination by the Probate Court of the question of station and stoppage of its operation due to the LOI No. 1 issued
title to the fishpond was merely provisional, not binding on the by then Pres. Marcos during Martial Law.
property with any character of authority, definiteness or
permanence, having been made only for purposes of in. Benedicto, PH ambassador to Japan and the principal
conclusion in the inventory and upon evidence adduced at the stockholder of RPN 9, the only station allowed to broadcast
hearing of a motion, it cannot and should not be subject of during martial law, rented the studios owned by ABSCBN and
execution, as against its possessor who has set up title in occupied the same during negotiation about the monthly
himself (or in another) adversely to the decedent, and whose rentals. Due to failure to reach the desired monthly rental rate,
right to possess has not been ventilated and adjudicated in an the counsel for petitioner demanded RPN 9 to vacate the
appropriate action. These considerations assume greater studios and pay rentals but respondents refused to do so. At the
cogency where, as here, the Torrens title to the property is not end of Marcos’ regime, ABS CBN was returned to the Lopez’ and
in the decedents' names but in others, a situation on which this allowed operation. Unfortunately, the complaints previously
Court has already had occasion to rule. filed were dismissed by the Ombudsman for lack of probable
cause. Hence, the present petition. Noteworthy is the fact that
In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that
Benedicto died during the pendency of the case and was
if a property covered by Torrens title is involved, the
dropped as party herein.
presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due
weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the ISSUE:
contrary, the holder thereof should be consider as the owner of
the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified Whether or not the civil liability of Benedicto subsists even after
in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the his death, which extinguished his criminal liability.
case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons
named in the title RULING:
No. The rules on whether the civil liability of an accused, upon

death, is extinguished together with his criminal liability, has
long been clarified and settled in the case of People v. Bayotas:
ABS-CBN VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN 1. Death of an accused pending appeal of his conviction
Tuason, Jannelle extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil

liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice any apprehension on a possible [de]privation of right by
Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior prescription.
to final judgment terminates his criminal liability Applying the foregoing rules, ABS-CBN's insistence that the case
and only the civil liability directly arising from and based at bench survives because the civil liability of the respondents
solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex subsists is stripped of merit.
delicto in sensostrictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives

notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may
RULE 88
also be predicated on a source of obligation other than Payment of the debts of the Estate
delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these
other sources of obligation from which the civil liability ALDAMIZ VS. JUDGE OF CFI-MINDORO
may arise as a result of the same act or omission: Umbalin, Norissa
a) Law BUAN VS. LAYA

b) Contracts Uy, Charles
c) Quasi-contracts
FACTS:
d) x xx
e) Quasi-delicts A contingent claim for P50,000 was filed by Sylvia Laya against
the intestate estate of the deceased Florenica and Rizalina
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in
Buan. The contingent claim was based on the fact that a
Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action Philippine Rabbit Bus, owned and operated by the spouses
and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Buan, collided with a private car resulting to the death of Juan
Criminal Procedure15 as amended. The separate civil Laya, the father of Sylvia Laya. The driver of the bus was
action may be enforced either against the charged with homicide and serious physical injuries through
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, reckless imprudence and was sentenced therefor. The heirs of
depending on the source of obligation upon which the Juan Laya had reserved the right to file a separate civil action,
same is based as explained above.
and they did so. Administrators of the estate opposed the
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a contingent claim, arguing that the same could not be allowed
forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by because it has not been filed before the death of the spouses.
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of
The CFI of Tarlac admitted the claim, but denied that a portion
the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the
private-offended party instituted together therewith the of the estate be set aside to answer for the claim. Counsel for
civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the administrator then moved to set aside the order, but before
civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency they could do so, the civil action instituted in Manila was
of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of declared premature because the criminal conviction is not yet
Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid final, and ordered plaintiffs therein to file an amended

complaint, which they did so. The CFI of Tarlac then dismissed
the contingent claim on the ground that the reason for the
same had ceased to exist. Assuming that an amended DINGLASA VS. ANG CHIA
Viernes, Wayne
complaint had been filed, still, the same had not yet been acted
upon.
ISSUE
RULE 89
Whether or not the contingent claim may be admitted Sales, Mortgages, and other Encumbrances of Property
of decedent
RULING
The Court ruled in the affirmative. A contingent claim is one GODOY VS. ORELLANO
that, by its nature, is dependent upon the happening of an Vizcarra, William
uncertain event. it may or may not develop into a valid claim,
depending upon that uncertain event. Whether or not the heirs FACTS :
of the deceased, Juan C. Laya, would succeed in the action
In consideration of P1,000 received by Felisa Pañgilinan,
brought in Manila against the administrators of the estate of the
a document was executed by her giving Eusebio A. Godoy, an
deceased spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina P. Buan, is the
option to buy a dredge for the sum of P10,000. It appears
uncertain event or contingency upon which the validity of the
from that document that the dredge is the common property of
claim presented in the administration proceedings depends.
the vendor and of the brothers Demetrio, Jose, Guillermo,
While the contingent event had not yet happened, Sylvia has no Alfredo, and Paz, all surnamed Orellano; that the condition was
claim upon the intestate estate, for such claim would only arise that Godoy was to pay the whole price of the dredge within
after the event happened. As such, the contingent claim may twenty days; and that said option was granted in accordance
not be dismissed. Contingent claims follow the result of the with the power of attorney executed by her coowners who
action, and as such, the fact that the case is temporarily reserved the right to ratify whatever sale might be made, or
dismissed may not terminate the claim, as only the final results option granted by Pañgilinan, their attorney-in-fact. The latter's
of the action could do that. The rules provide that a contingent co-owners did not ratify the option contract. Before the
claim is to be presented in the administration proceedings in expiration of twenty days, the Godoy was ready to make
the same manner as any ordinary claim, and that when the complete payment of the price, but Pañgilinan failed to deliver
contingency arises which converts the contingent claim into a the dredge. Then the Godoy brought suit in the CFI against
valid claim, the court should then be informed that the claim Feliza Pañgilinan, Paz Orellano, Jose Orellano, Demetrio
had already matured. Orellano, Guillermo Orellano, and Alfredo Orellano, praying that
they be ordered to deliver the dredge, upon payment by him of
the sum of P9,000; to pay him the sum of P10,000 as damages,

and to return to the plaintiff the sum of P1,000 should the from the plaintiff and that she has tendered it several times, but
carrying out of the sale become impossible. that the Godoy refused to accept it.
The defendants Orellano set up in their answer a general The judge a quo rendered judgment, ordering Pañgilinan
denial of the facts alleged in the complaint and, as a special to pay Godoy the sum of P2,000 with legal interest.
defense, alleged that the dredge in question was the property
of the intestate estate of Julio Orellano, pending in the CFI, and ISSUE:
under the administration of Felisa Pangilinan; that Godoy
Whether or not the option contract between Pañgilinan
perfectly knows that said dredge is under judicial control and
and Godoy is void because of absence of authority of the court.
could not be disposed of without judicial authority, and that the
court has never authorized the sale mentioned in the complaint RULING:
filed herein; and that the defendants Jose, Guillermo, and
Alfredo surnamed Orellano are at present under age, and the Under the law, the court has exclusive jurisdiction to authorize
defendant Paz Orellano is a married woman who had not the sale of properties like the one under consideration and the
obtained the consent of her husband before executing the power of attorney executed by the heirs of Orellano in favor of
power of attorney in favor of the Pañgilinan. Pañgilinan, without authority of court, has no legal effect, and
this is the more so, since two of the said heirs are under age,
The defendant Felisa Pañgilinan filed a separate answer, and the others did not ratify the option contract, as provided in
and alleges: that Godoy, as well as the defendants, and the the aforesaid power of attorney.
notary who prepared the aforesaid option sale, were all aware
of these facts, and they led her to believe that she had the
authority to dispose of the dredge in her name and by
themselves; that believing herself to be under obligation to In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that
comply with the aforesaid option deed, she applied to the court the Pañgilinan was not, in her capacity as judicial administratrix
of probate for permission to sell the dredge in the sum of of the intestate estate of Julio Orellano, legally authorized to
P10,000; that on the day of the hearing of the motion, her co- sell, or contract to sell, any property belonging to said estate
defendants who had themselves authorized her by means of a without the authority of the court, and the contract entered into
power of attorney on the ground that there were higher bidders by her with the plaintiff, without this authority, is null and void.
and the best thing to do was to sell it at public auction; that in
The judgment appealed from is reversed and the complaint
view of this opposition, Pañgilinan asked the court that it be sold
against the appellant Felisa Pañgilinan is hereby dismissed.
at public auction, and the court authorized said defendant to
sell it at public auction; that the Pañgilinan did not at any time
refuse to make delivery of the dredge to the Godoy, but that it CFI OF RIZAL VS. COURT OF APPEALS
was the court that would not give her the authority to do so; Yatco, Nathaniel
and that she is all times ready to return the P1,000 received

FACTS: Facts:
Elena OngEscutin, executrix of testate estate of late The Special Proceeding was commenced by Antonio Tan
PoncianoOngLacson asked for authority from probate court to
sell a real property to pay taxes and claims against the estate. (Tan) allegingin the petition that Carlos Villa Abrille died
It was granted and thus was sold to GanHeng for P400K. The intestate and that his heirsare his surviving spouse, 9 children
sale was perfected and taxes were paid for the estate. Felix Ong (among them is petitioner NatividadJaroda) and 4 grandsons,
filed an opposition on the approval by the court of such sale and
among them respondent Tan.
offered P450K for such real property and prayed for the
acceptance of such offer. Probate court dismissed Felix Ong’s
petition, and so did the CA. However upon MR of Felix Ong, the Tan was appointed special administrator.
CA found that the probate court committed grave abuse of
discretion as such offer by Felix Ong was at a higher price and Tan filed a petition for the withdrawal of sums from PNB
thus more beneficial for the estate. alleging thatthese sums were registered in the name of the
deceased but they wereactually held in trust for co-owners of
ISSUE:
Juna Subdivision. CFI grantedthis motion.
WON the CA erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on
the probate court’s approvale of the sale to GanHeng. CFI issued to Tan letters of administration. Tan filed a
petition allegingthat the deceased was a manager and co-owner
RULING:
of Juna Subdivision andpraying for approval by the court of the
Yes. The sale to be annulled was a private sale and not power of attorney executed by him, on behalf of the intestate
thru public auction. Felix Ong had no legal personality to
estate, appointing himself to sell share of
impugn such sale of real property to GanHeng. Felix was neither
a creditor nor an heir to the estate. Also, he did not comply with
the estate in the subdivision lots. CFI granted the petition.
the bond requirement of Rule 89, sec 3 of the Rules. Persons
interested on such property of the estate may be prevented by Jaroda moved to nullify the 2 CFI orders. CFI denied the
posting a bond which is fixed by the court. Furthermore, the motion for lack of merit. Jaroda elevated the case to the SC.
subsequent motion filed by the executrix to withdraw the sale
as the property in question is now worth P1M is denied. Issue:
GanHeng was a purchaser in good faith and the estate had
already benefitted from the payment made by GanHeng. The (1) Whether or not the CFI Order allowing the withdrawal of
SC affirmed the private sale made by the executrix and
GanHeng. bank deposits was in abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction? .
JARODA VS. CUSI (2) Whether or not the CFI Order approving the power of
Alvarez, Miguel Lorenzo attorney is valid.

Ruling: subdivisionon the other, in managing and disposing of the lots of
thesubdivision. This dual agency of Tan rendered him incapable
ofindependent defense of the estate's interests against those of
On the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled in the
themajority co-owners.
affirmative. Said withdrawal is foreign to the powers
and duties of a specialadministrator. (Rule 80.2)
The CFI order was issued without notice to, and hearing
of, the heirs of PAHAMOTANG VS. PNB
the deceased. The withdrawal of the bank deposits may be Arcilla, Jay
viewed aswithin the powers and duties of a special
administrator; but actually, it isa waiver by the special
administrator of a prima facie exclusive right ofthe intestate
RULE 90
Distribution and Partition of the Estate
estate to the bank deposits in favor of the co-owners of theJuna
Subdivision. The bank deposits were in the name of the
deceasedso they belong prima facie to his estate after his death. GATMAITAN VS. MEDINA
Azarcon, Pia Lea
And until thecontrary, the special administrator is without power
to make the waiveror to hand over part of the estate to other FACTS:
persons on the ground that theestate is not the owner thereof. On March 10, 1956, Felicisimo Gatmaitan filed a petition,
seeking his appointment as administrator of the property of his
On the second issue, the High Tribunal ruled in the wife, Veronica Medina, who died intestate. Gorgonio Medina and
Dominica Medina, as heirs of the deceased (she being their full-
negative. The CFI order is void for want of notice and for
blooded sister), filed an opposition, praying that Gorgonio
approving animproper contract or transaction. Medina, or a neutral third party, or Felicisimo Gatmaitan and
Gorgonio Medina, jointly, be appointed as administrator or
An administrator is not permitted to deal with himself as administrators of the estate. The court appointed Felicisimo
an individual in any transaction concerning trust property. Gatmaitan as administrator of the estate with a bond and
Gorgonio Medina as co-administrator without compensation and
This isbecause of the n view of the fiduciary relationship that
bond. On March 14, 1957, administrator Gatmaitan filed an
theyoccupy with respect to the heirs of the deceased and amended inventory of the estate but was opposed on the
theirresponsibilities toward the probate court. ground that the same did not represent the true and faithful list
of the properties left by the deceased. In view of the opposition,
By the CFI’s order, administrator Tan came to be the the hearing and consideration of the amended inventory was
postponed until further assignment. On April 2, 1957, the heirs
agent of two different principals: the court and the heirs of
of the deceased, through counsel, filed a "Motion for Partial
the deceasedon the one hand, and the majority co-owners of the Partition and Distribution," The court heard counsel for

administrator Gatmaitan and for the heirs or oppositors, but be countenanced. The reason for this strict rule is obvious —
without receiving any evidence whatsoever. The administrator, courts should guard with utmost zeal and jealousy the estate of
Gatmaitan, filed a motion for reconsideration, calling attention the decedent to the end that the creditors thereof be
to the fact that, contrary to what the order states, "he has not
adequately protected and all the rightful heirs assured of their
agreed to the partial distribution of the estate in the manner
contained in the order", and urging that "the sums ordered to shares in the inheritance. Why the appealed order is
be partially distributed are not warranted by the circumstances unwarranted is evident on three counts. Firstly, the partial
obtaining" in the case and that, moreover, "the manner of distribution was prematurely ordered by the lower court. It
distribution will work difficulties to the estate and to the heirs appears that at the time the questioned order was rendered,
themselves". Motion was denied for lack of merit. Gatmaitan the amended inventory and appraisal filed by the administrator-
filed a notice of appeal from the foregoing orders. Appellant appellant was not yet even accepted, and it was still under
filed a record on appeal and notified counsel for the oppositors
consideration by the court, in view of an opposition to the
of the date he would move for the approval thereof by the
court. The court approved the record on appeal presented by admission thereof by some of the heirs. Moreover, it seems that
appellant for failure to file written opposition thereto as required notices for the presentation of claims by possible creditors of
in the order of the court notwithstanding the length of time that the estate had not yet been published, so that the period for
had already elapsed. In his brief, appellant only made one the presentation of claims had not as yet elapsed.
assignment of error, and it reads thus: The lower court gravely Consequently, it cannot be safely said that the court had a
abused its discretion in directing a partial distribution of the sufficient basis upon which to order a partial distribution of the
intestate estate of the deceased Veronica Medina in favor of
properties, having in mind the adverse effects that it might
appellees, without requiring the distributees to file the proper
bonds pursuant to the provisions of Rule 91, Section 1 of the have on the rights of the creditors and the heirs alike. Second,
Revised Rules of Court. and more important, no bond was fixed by the court as a
condition precedent to the partial distribution ordered by it, a
ISSUE: bond which, because of the reasons already adduced, becomes
WON the lower court gravely abused its discretion in all the more imperative. Rule 91, Section 1 of the Rules of Court,
directing a partial distribution of the intestate estate of the specifically provides as follows: When the debts, funeral
deceased Veronica Medina in favor of appellees, without
charges, and expenses of administration, the allowances to the
requiring the distributees to file the proper bonds pursuant to
the provisions of Rule 91, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in
Court. accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the
application of the executor or administrator, or of a person
RULING: interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall
assign the residue of the estate to the person entitled to the
The lower court, erred in rendering the order appealed same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which is
from. A partial distribution of the decedent's estate pending the entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their
final termination of the testate or intestate proceedings should respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any
as much as possible be discouraged by the courts and, unless in other person having the same in his possession. . . . No
extreme cases, such form of advances of inheritance should not distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations

above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the order of this Court dated June 12, 1957, notwithstanding the
distributees or any of them, give a bond, in the sum to be fixed length of time that has already elapsed and the absence of
by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations proof that the bond offered was ever filed and approved by the
within such time as the courts directs. Appellees contend that Court, fortify that conclusion. Anyway, since the purpose of the
the order of partial distribution having been issued pursuant to bond required by section 1, paragraph 2, of Rule 91 is to protect
an agreement of the parties, the same could not now be not only the appellant but also the creditors and subsequent
assailed by the appellant. While the wording of the appealed claimants to the estate, in order that they may not be
order seem to indicate that it was rendered with the conformity prejudiced by the partial distribution, the amount of the bond
of the heirs, there is reason to believe that it was just a could not be fixed without hearing such interested parties, and
mistaken impression on the part of the court. Soon after the there is no showing that they were consulted. Hence, the bond
order was rendered, the administrator-appellant filed a motion offered could not affect the merits of this appeal, although the
for reconsideration, among other things, calling the attention of Court below is not precluded for approving a new bond.
the court that he never agreed to the partial distribution of the Wherefore, the order of partial distribution appealed from is set
estate in the manner ordained in the appealed order. Although aside, without prejudice to the issue of another order after strict
said motion was denied for lack of merit, the court did not deny compliance with the Rules of Court. The records are ordered
categorically appellant's imputation, which could have been remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.
easily averred to by it; nor did the appellees at any time prior to
this appeal controvert the aforesaid allegation of the
administrator. There is plausibility in appellant's statement that
QUASHA-PENA VS. LCN CONSTRUCTION*
the agreement referred to in the order was actually one Balanay, Rendel Bryan
between the appellees among themselves. It should be noted,
furthermore, that the bond required by the Rules is not solely FACTS:
for the protection of the heirs then appearing, but also for the
benefit of creditors and subsequent claimants who have not In December 1987, Raymond Triviere died intestate and
agreed to the advances. Lastly, appellees urged that this appeal the proceedings for the settlement of his estate were instituted
by his widow, Amy Consuelo Triviere. Atty. Enrique P. Syquia
was prematurely taken in that appellant has not as yet formally
(Syquia) and Atty.William H. Quasha (Quasha) of the Quasha
objected to the proffered bond as mentioned in an alleged order Law Office, representing the widow and children of the late
of the court, dated May 16, 1957. The tenor of the order of May Raymond Triviere, respectively, were appointed administrators
16, 1957, as well as the fact that neither said order nor the of the estate of the deceased. As administrators, Atty. Syquia
"constancia" of appellees are included in the Record on Appeal, and Atty. Quasha incurred expenses for the payment of real
indicates that the belated offer to file a bond amounted to no estate taxes, security services, and the preservation and
more than an attempt of appellees to settle the particular issue administration of the estate, as well as litigation expenses. Atty.
Syquia and Atty. Quasha filed before the RTC a Motion for
between the parties that was rejected by the appellant. That
Payment of their litigation expenses.
the record on appeal was approved much later, on July 15,
1957, and yet without the written opposition . . . required in the

RTC denied their motion citing their failure to submit an as they have over a decade now spent so much time, labor and
accounting of the assets and liabilities of the estate under skill to accomplish the task assigned to them; and the last time
administration in May 1995. the administrators obtained their fees was in 1992.
In 1996, Atty. Quasha also passed away. Atty. Redentor Zapata LCN sought recourse from CA maintaining, among others, that
(Zapata), also of the Quasha Law Office, took over as the the awards violate Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, as
counsel of the Triviere children, and continued to help Atty. there still exists its (LCN's) unpaid claim in the sum
Syquia in the settlement of the estate. On 6 September 2002, of P6,016,570.65.
Atty. Syquia and Atty. Zapata filed another Motion for Payment,
for their own behalf and for their respective clients, claiming for CA conceded that Atty. Syquia and the Quasha Law Office, as
the payment of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. the administrators of the estate of the late Raymond Triviere,
were entitled to administrator's fees and litigation expenses,
LCN Construction Corp., as the only remaining claimantagainst they could not claim the same from the funds of the estate
the Intestate Estate of the Late Raymond Triviere in Special reasoning that the award of expenses and fees in favor of
Proceedings, filed its Comment on/Opposition to the afore- executors and administrators is subject to the qualification that
quoted Motion on 2 October 2002. LCN countered that the RTC where the executor or administrator is a lawyer, he shall not
had already resolved the issue of payment of litigation charge against the estate any professional fees for legal
expenses when it denied the first Motion for Payment filed by services rendered by him. Instead, the Court of Appeals held
Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha for failure of the administrators to that the attorney's fees due Atty. Syquia and the Quasha Law
submit an accounting of the assets and expenses of the estate Offices should be borne by their clients, the widow and children
as required by the court. of the late Raymond Triviere, respectively.
Among others, LCN argued that its claims are still outstanding The appellate court likewise revoked the P450,000.00 share
and chargeable against the estate of the late Raymond Triviere; and P150,000.00 share awarded by the RTC to the children and
thus, no distribution should be allowed until they have been widow of the late Raymond Triviere, respectively, on the basis
paid; especially considering that as of 25 August 2002, the that Section 1, Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court proscribes
claim of LCN against the estate of the late Raymond Triviere the distribution of the residue of the estate until all its
amounted to P6,016,570.65 as against the remaining assets of obligations have been paid.
the estate totaling P4,738,558.63, rendering the latter
insolvent. Petitioners, maintain that the RTC Order should not be
construed as a final order of distribution, but a mere
RTC issued its Order, taking note that the widow and the heirs of interlocutory order that does not end the estate proceedings.
the deceased Triviere, after all the years, have not received Only an order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue
their respective shares in the Estate, declaring that there was of the estate to the proper distributees brings the intestate
no more need for accounting of the assets and liabilities of the proceedings to a close and, consequently, puts an end to the
estate considering that the estate has no more assets except administration and relieves the administrator of his duties. That
the money deposited with the Union Bank of the Philippines and the said Order grants the payment of certain amounts from the
that both the Co-Administrator and counsel for the deceased funds of the estate to the petitioner children and widow of the
are entitled to the payment for the services they have rendered late Raymond Triviere considering that they have not received
and accomplished for the estate and the heirs of the deceased their respective shares therefrom for more than a decade. Out

of the reportedP4,738,558.63 value of the estate, the petitioner No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the
children and widow were being awarded by the RTC, their obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for,
shares in the collective amount of P600,000.00. Evidently, the unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to
remaining portion of the estate still needs to be settled. The be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said
intestate proceedings were not yet concluded, and the RTC still obligations within such time as the court directs.
had to hear and rule on the pending claim of LCN against the
estate of the late Raymond Triviere and only thereafter can it While the awards in favor of petitioner children and widow
distribute the residue of the estate, if any, to his heirs. made in the RTC Order dated 12 June 2003 was not yet a
distribution of the residue of the estate, given that there was
ISSUE: still a pending claim against the estate, still, they did constitute
a partial and advance distribution of the estate. Virtually, the
Whether or not the awards of the RTC in favor of the petitioner, petitioner children and widow were already being awarded
children and widow constitute a partial distribution of the estate shares in the estate, although not all of its obligations had been
and is proscribed by Rule 90 Section 1. paid or provided for.
RULING: Section 2, Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly

recognizes advance distribution of the estate, thus:
Yes. Petitioners, insist that the awards in favor of the petitioner Section 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. -
children and widow of the late Raymond Triviere is not a Notwithstanding a pending controversy or appeal in
distribution of the residue of the estate, thus, rendering Section proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court may,
1, Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court inapplicable. in its discretion and upon such terms as it may deem proper
and just, permit that such part of the estate as may not be
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: affected by the controversy or appeal be distributed among the
heirs or legatees,upon compliance with the conditions set forth
Section 1. When order for distribution of residue made. - When in Rule 90 of these rules. (Emphases supplied.)
the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the
allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable The second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised
to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, Rules of Court allows the distribution of the estate prior to the
on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a payment of the obligations mentioned therein, provided that
person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, "the distributees, or any of them, gives a bond, in a sum to be
shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said
the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which obligations within such time as the court directs."
each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover
their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or In sum, although it is within the discretion of the RTC whether or
any other person having the same in his possession. If there is a not to permit the advance distribution of the estate, its exercise
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of of such discretion should be qualified by the following:
the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which
each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be [1] only part of the estate that is not affected by any pending
heard and decided as in ordinary cases. controversy or appeal may be the subject of advance
distribution (Section 2, Rule 109); and

[2] thedistributees must post a bond, fixed by the court, countenanced. The reason for this rule is that courts should
conditioned for the payment of outstanding obligations of the guard with utmost zeal and jealousy the estate of the decedent
estate (second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 90). to the end that the creditors thereof be adequately protected
and all the rightful heirs be assured of their shares in the
There is no showing that the RTC, in awarding to the petitioner inheritance.
children and widow their shares in the estate prior to the
settlement of all its obligations, complied with these two
requirements or, at the very least, took the same into TORRES VS. ENCARNACION
consideration. Its Order is completely silent on these matters. It Borja, Catherine
justified its grant of the award in a single sentence which stated
that petitioner children and widow had not yet received their FACTS:
respective shares from the estate after all these years. Taking
into account that the claim of LCN against the estate of the late The petitioners contest the jurisdiction of the respondent
Raymond Triviere allegedly amounted to P6,016,570.65, already Judge to issue the order herein sought to be reviewed directing
in excess of the P4,738,558.63 reported total value of the them to deliver to the administrator of the intestate estate of
estate, the RTC should have been more prudent in approving Marcelo de Borja, a certain parcel of land which is in petitioners’
the advance distribution of the same.
possession and to which they assert exclusive ownership. They
Petitioners invoked Dael v. Intermediate Appellate Court,where contend that the administrator’s remedy to recover that
the Court sustained an Order granting partial distribution of an property is an action at law and not by motion in the intestate
estate. proceeding.
However, in Dael is the estate has sufficient assets to ensure It appears that in the above-entitled intestate estate, the
equitable distribution of the inheritance in accordance with law commissioners appointed by the court submitted on February 8,
and the final judgment in the proceedings and it does not
1944, a project of partition, in which the land in question, which
appear there are unpaid obligations, as contemplated in Rule
90, for which provisions should have been made or a bond is and was then in the possession of the herein petitioners, was
required, such partial distribution may be allowed. included as property of the estate and assigned to one Miguel
B. Dayco, one of Marcelo de Borja’s heirs. Although the
No similar determination on sufficiency of assets or absence of administratrix of Quintin de Borja’s estate was the party named
any outstanding obligations of the estate of the late Raymond in the partition in behalf of that estate, the present petitioners
Triviere was made by the RTC in this case. In fact, there is a took active part in the proceeding for the reason that they had
pending claim by LCN against the estate, and the amount
thereof exceeds the value of the entire estate. been declared their father’s sole heirs in the settlement of their
father’s estate. Moreover, one of these children was herself the
Furthermore, in Dael, the Court actually cautioned that partial duly appointed administratrix of the last named intestate
distribution of the decedent's estate pending final termination estate.
of the testate or intestate proceeding should as much as
possible be discouraged by the courts, and, except in extreme ISSUE:
cases, such form of advances of inheritance should not be

Can the remedy to recovery the property be done by said proceeding being the most convenient one in which this
motion in the same intestate proceeding? power and function of the court can be exercised and performed
without the necessity of requiring the parties to undergo the
RULING: inconvenience, delay and expense of having to commence and
litigate an entirely different action.
Pertinent to the question posed by the petitioners is
section 1 of Rule 91 which provides as follows:
IMPERIAL VS. MONOZ

"When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of Borlagdatan, April
administration, the allowances to the widow, and inheritance
tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, FACTS:
have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or
administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after -On 1957, Luis Santos surviving spouse of the deceased
Fermina Bello Santos, who died intestate filed Special
hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to
Proceeding No. 1049, entitled "Intestate Estate of Fermina Bello
the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the Santos", in CFI Bulacan
proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such
persons may demand and recover their respective shares from -Luis was appointed regular Administrator on 1958, as
the executor or administrator, or any other person having the there was no opposition filed by the only other heir, herein
same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the petitioner Purificacion Santos Imperial
court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or
as to the distributive share to which each person is entitled -Later on petitioner Purificacion Santos Imperial entered
her appearance in the abovementioned intestate proceedings
under the law, the testimony as to such controversy shall be as Oppositor, and filed a motion to require the regular
taken in writing by the judge, under oath. administrator to render an accounting
"No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the -This resulted in the approval by the Court a quo on 1967
obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for, of the project of partition with the following awards:
unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to
be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said 1. To Dr. Luis U. Santos, citizen of the Philippines, of age,
married to Socorro Manankil and resident of Malolos, Bulacan, is
obligations within such time as the court directs."cralairtua1aw
hereby awarded and adjudicated an undivided FIVE-EIGHTH(5/8)
library share in each of the above-described properties; and
Applying this Rule, the probate court, having the custody 2. To Purificacion Santos-Imperial, citizen of the Philippines, of
and control of the entire estate, is the most logical authority to age, married to Eloy Imperial and resident of Malolos, Bulacan,
effectuate this provision within the same estate proceeding, is hereby awarded and adjudicated an undivided THREE-
EIGHTH(3/8) share in each of the properties described above;

Santos filed a Motion for Correction of both the -This Court citing the case of Santillon held that in deciding the
Amended Project of Partition of 1966, approved by the Court on issue as to whether the order of the lower court is final and
June 6, 1967, and the Final Partial Project of Partition of March appealable, went on to say:
22, 1968, likewise approved by the same court on April 26,
1968, claiming that the partition submitted to the Court was It is clear that the order of the lower court is final and,
erroneous, as the same did not conform with the ruling laid therefore, appealable to this Court.
down in the case of Santillon vs. Miranda
Under Rule 109, section 1, a person may appeal in special
-Luis contended that he should get the properties proceedings from an order of the Court of First Instance where
partitioned while oppositor-petitioner Purificacion Santos such order "determines ... the distributive share of the estate to
Imperial, the only child (adopted), should get only the remaining which such person is entitled."
of the estate.
The two (2) questioned orders, being final in character, should
ISSUES: have been appealed by the party adversely affected within the
30-day reglementary period provided for appeal. This was not
WON: done.
(1) An order of a probate court in testate or intestate (2)

proceedings approving a project of partition which clearly fixed
the distributive share to which each heir is entitled is merely -The contention of petitioner that an order which has already
interlocutory in nature so that the probate court can correct and become final and therefore executory is not subject to
set aside the same anytime; or is final and, therefore, correction, finds support in Chereau vs. Fuentebella, where it
appealable within the 30 day period for appeal; and was held that an erroneous decree or judgment although
granted without legal authority and contrary to the express
(2) A court can order the correction of an erroneous final provision of the statute, is not void. Here, as no appeal was
decision after it had become final and executory. taken, the decree must be conceded to have full force and
effect. An erroneous decree is not a void decree.
RULING:
-The questioned orders having become final and, therefore,
(1) executory because of the failure of the herein respondent Luis
U. Santos to appeal on time by allowing the period for appeal to
-The contention of petitioner to the effect that the orders of the lapse before filing his motion for correction on June 18, 1968, he
court a quo dated 1967 as well as that of 1968, are final as the has to suffer the misfortune brought about by his own
same have determined the distributive shares of the known negligence and fatal inadvertence
forced heirs, finds support in the very same case cited by the
respondents as their authority. LOPEZ VS. LOPEZ
Bueno, Jirene
FACTS:

no prayer therein that she be declared an acknowledged natural
Concepcion Lopez filed a petition in the intestate proceedings of child, but only that she be adjudged universal heiress, of the
the deceased Emeterio Lopez, claiming to be an acknowledged deceased. In the body of the petition there is an allegation that
natural daughter of the deceased and praying that she be she is a natural child of the based and has been in an
declared his universal heiress entitled to a summary award of uninterrupted possession of such status.
his estate, same being valued at less than six thousand pesos
(P6,000). The oppositors-appellants filed an opposition, denying The court ruled that inasmuch as the recognition of her status is
petitioner’s claim and praying that, as they are nephews and a prerequisite to her right to heirship, her prayer that she be
nieces of the deceased, they be adjudged entitled to the declared universal heiress implies a like prayer that she
property. be recognized as an acknowledged natural child.
Furthermore, it is a well-settled rule of pleadings,
Concepcion Lopez filed later an amended petition, alleging applicable to motions or petitions, that the prayer for
that, according to a new assessment, the estate was worth nine relief, though part of the pleading, is no part of the
thousand pesos (P9,000) and that, therefore, its distribution cause of action or defense alleged therein, and the
could not be made summarily but thru regular administration pleader is entitled to as much relief as the facts duly
proceedings. Accordingly, an administrator was appointed who, pleaded may warrant. In previous cases, similar facts
but appellants filed a motion that they be declared heirs of the were held to be sufficient to entitle a natural child to
deceased. The court issued an order declaring the petitioner an recognition.
acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased entitled to the
rights accorded her by law. The oppositors appealed. Appellants claim that they had no notice either of the petition
for the declaration of heirs or of the date set for the hearing
ISSUE: Whether Concepcion Lopez is an acknowledged natural thereof. We find in the record no evidence affirmatively
daughter of Emeterio Lopez who died intestate, leaving no showing that they had no such notice; therefore, the
legitimate descendants, ascendants or widow. presumption of regularity of proceedings should stand.
RULING: In the motion for reconsideration filed by them, the lack of

notice is alleged; but the motion is not even verified. Besides,
Yes. Concepcion Lopez is an acknowledged daughter of the according to the record Attorney Simplicio B. Peña was the
deceased and is the only heiress. counsel for both the administrator and the oppositors-
appellants. The petition for declaration of heirs, although signed
Contrary to appellants’ contention it is a well-settled rule that a by Attorney Simplicio B. Peña as "abogado del administrador",
person claiming to be an acknowledged natural child of was, in fact, a petition filed in behalf of the oppositors-
a deceased need not maintain a separate action for appellants as their right to succession is therein asserted and
recognition but may simply intervene in the intestate prayed for. Under these circumstances, there exists sufficient
proceedings, by alleging and proving therein his or her ground for holding, as we do hold, that the oppositors-
status as such, and claiming accordingly the right to appellants had notice of the petition as well as of the hearing
share in the inheritance. where the said attorney was present.
The petition filed by Concepcion Lopez in the intestate

proceedings is alleged to be insufficient. It is said that there is GUY VS. COURT OF APPEALS

Cadavis, Lloyd • Petitioner and his co-heirs alleged that private
respondents claim have been paid, waived, abandoned
FACTS: or otherwise extinguished by reason of Remedios
Release and waiver of claim stating that in exchange for
• Private respondents-minors Karen and Kamille Oanes
the financial and educational assistance received from
Wei, represented by their mother Remedios filed a
petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge
petition for letters of administration.
the estate of SimaWei from any and all liabilities.
• Private respondents alleged that they are the duly
• RTC-denied the motion to dismiss as well as the
acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who
supplemental motion to dismiss. It ruled that while the
died intestate leaving an estate valued at P10m
Release and waiver of claim was signed by Remedios, it
consisting of real and personal properties. His known
had not been established that she was the duly
heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children
constituted guardian of her minor daughters. No
Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael.
renunciation of right occurred. Trial court also rejected
• Private Respondents prayed for the appointment of a petitioner’s objections on the certification against forum
regular administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima shopping.
Wei Estate. Prayed by Petitioner Michael, son of the
• Petitioner mover for reconsideration but was denied. He
decedent, be appointed as special administrator of the
filed a petition for certiorari before CA which affirmed
estate.
the RTC orders. CA denied the MFR. Hence this petition.
• Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition. He
• Petitioner argues that the CA disregarded existing rules
asserted that his father left no debts and that his estate
on certification against forum shopping; that the release
can be settled without securing letters of administration
and waiver of claim executed by Remedios released and
pursuant to sec.1, rule 74. He argued that private
discharged the Guy family and estate of Sima Wei from
respondents should have established their status as
any claims or liabilities; and that private respondents do
illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima wei
not have the legal personality to institute the petition for
pursuant to Art.175 of the family code.
letters of administration as they failed to prove their
• The other heirs filed a joint motion to dismiss on the filiation during the lifetime of Sima Wei.
ground that the certification against forum shopping has
• Private respondents contended that their counsels
been signed by the private respondents and not their
certification can be considered substantial compliance
counsel. They contended that Remedios should have
with the rules on certification of non-forum shopping.
executed the certification on behalf of her minor
daughters.

ISSUES: 1. Whether private respondents should be dismissed settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind
for failure to comply w/ the rules on certification of non-forum against the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim. Considering
shopping? that the document did not specifically mention private
respondents hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it
2. whether the release and waiver of claim precludes cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights.
private respondents from claiming their successional rights?
Even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights
3. whether private respondents are barred by of private respondents, such waiver will not bar the latter’s
prescription from proving their filiation? claim. Under article 1044 of CC, parents and guardians may not
therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without
RULING:
judicial approval. Not having been judicially authorized, the
1. Rule 7, sec.5 of the ROC provides that the certification on Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will
non-forum shopping should be executed by the plaintiff or the not bar private respondents from asserting their rights as heirs
principal party. Failure to comply with the requirement shall be of the deceased.
cause for dismissal of the case. However, liberal application of
In the present case, private respondents could not have
the rules is proper where the higher interest of justice would be
possibly waived their successional rights because they are yet
served. In Sy Chin vs CA, we ruled that while a petition may
to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of
have been flawed where the certificate of non-forum shopping
the deceased.
was signed only by counsel and not by the party, this
procedural lapse may be overlooked in the interest of 3. Anent the issue on private respondents filiation, we agree
substantial justice. So it is in the present controversy where the with the CA that a ruling on the same would be premature
merits of the case and the absence of an intention to violate the considering that private respondents have yet to present
rules with impunity should be considered as compelling reasons evidence. Before the family code took effect, the governing law
to temper the strict application of the rules. on actions for recognition of illegitimate children was article 285
of the Civil code, to wit:
2. As regards Remedios release and waiver of claim, the same
does not bar private respondents from claiming successional Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may
rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents,
clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the except in the ff.cases:
intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally
pertains to him. In this case, we find that there was no waiver of 1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the
hereditary rights. The release and waiver of claim does not child, in which case the latter may file the action before
state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states the expiration of 4 years from the attainment of his
that remedies received 300k and an educational plan for her majority;
minor daughters by way of financial assistance and in full

Xxxx
In this case, the action must be commenced within 4 years from

RULE 91
Escheats
the finding of the document.
We ruled in Bernabe vs Alejo, that illegitimate children who

INRE ESTATE OF LAO SAYCO
were still minors at the time of the Family code took effect and Castillo, Shainn
whose putative parent died during their minority are given the
right to seek recognition for a period of up to 4 years from FACTS:
attaining majority age. This is an appeal by the Chinaman Lao Chiama,
administrator of the estate of the decedent Bernardo Rafanan
Under the family code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is Lao Sayco, aliasSaya, and guardian of the minor Lay Chuyting
established by a record of birth appearing in the civil register or from the judgment rendered in a special proceeding.
The municipal council of Mambajao appeared in the said
a final judgment, or an admission of filiation in a public
proceedings and prayed that, since Bernardo Rafanan died in
document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the that pueblo without leaving any known legitimate successor,the
parent concerned, the action for recognition may be brought by real and personal property left by the said decedent within the
the child during his or her lifetime. However, if the action is district of the property left by the said decedent within the
based upon open and continuous possession of the status of an district of the aforementioned municipality be awarded to the
illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the rules or latter. The administrator also prayede that his administration be
special laws, it may only be brought during the lifetime of the closed, and, as the guardian of the Chiaman Lay Chuyting,
requested that the property referred to be delivered to the
alleged parent.
latter as the son and sole heir of the decedent Rafanan.
It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of
The municipal council of Mambajao,which believed that
prescription depends on the type of evidence to be adduced by
it was entitled to the said property, opposed the delivery of the
private respondents in proving their filiation. However, it would property to the alleged heir.
be impossible to determine the same in this case as there has
been no reception of evidence yet. This court is not a trier of The lower court, rendered judgment ordering that the
facts. Such matters may be resolved only by the RTC. property left by the decedent, Bernardo Rafanan Lao Sayco, be
assigned to the municipality of Mambajao, Province of Misamis,
to be administered by its municipal council and placed at the
disposal of the school in the same manner as other property
intended for the same use.
ISSUE:
Whether the municipality of Mambajao is entitled to the
property left by the decedent.

RULING: 7808 of the Registry of Deeds. Private respondent alleged that
No. Rule 91 of the Civil Procedure provides the rules for she misplaced the deeds of donation and were nowhere to be
filing a petition for escheat. In the present case,it does not found. While the deeds of donation were missing, the Republic
appear that there was made, at the request of counsel for the
filed a petition for the escheat of the estate of Elizabeth Hankins
president and the municipal council of Mambajao, the
inquisition provided by law, for the record is not accompanied before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. During the
by any certified copy of the investigatory of the real and proceedings, a motion for intervention was filed by Romeo
personal property that belonged to the said decedent, with a Solano, spouse of private respondent, and one Gaudencio
statement of the places where the realty is located.Moreover, Regosa, but on 24 June 1987 the motion was denied by the trial
the notice summoning the persons who believed they were court for the reason that "they miserably failed to show valid
entitled to his property should have been published for at least claim or right to the properties in question." Since it was
six consecutive weeks, and not for three.Furthermore, the
established that there were no known heirs and persons entitled
person who lays claim to the property left by the decedent at
death, as the latter's successor or heir, must prove his identity to the properties of decedent Hankins, the lower court
and rights. escheated the estate of the decedent in favor of petitioner
Republic of the Philippines.
In the present case, counsel for the municipality of
Mambajao merely prayed for an order of reversion and for the ISSUE:
adjudication in behalf of the municipality of the property
aforementioned; he did not comply with the provisions of the Whether or not the lower court had jurisdiction to
law by furnishing the required proofs in regard to the matters declare the same escheated in favor of the state.
hereinabove indicated, which must be the subject of an
investigation. RULING: (A)We rule for the petitioner. Escheat is a proceeding,
REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS unlike that of succession or assignment, whereby the state, by
Castillo, Rochelle Jane virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and claims the real or personal
property of a person who dies intestate leaving no heir. In the
FACTS:
absence of a lawful owner, a property is claimed by the state to
For more than three (3) decades (from 1952 to 1985) forestall an open "invitation to self-service by the first comers."
private respondent Amada Solano served as the all-around Since escheat is one of the incidents of sovereignty, the state
personal domestic helper of the late Elizabeth Hankins, a widow may, and usually does, prescribe the conditions and limits the
and a French national. During Ms. Hankins' lifetime and most time within which a claim to such property may be made. The
especially during the waning years of her life, respondent procedure by which the escheated property may be recovered
Solano was her faithful girl Friday and a constant companion is generally prescribed by statue, and a time limit is imposed
since no close relative was available to tend to her needs. In within which such action must be brought. (b) In this
recognition of Solano's faithful and dedicated service, Ms. jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file his
Hankins executed in her favor two (2) deeds of donation claim "within five (5) years from the date of such judgment,
involving two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 7807 and such person shall have possession of and title to the same, or if

sold, the municipality or city shall be accountable to him for the
proceeds, after deducting the estate; but a claim not made shall TESTATE ESTATE OF VDA.DE BIASCAN VS. BIASCAN
be barred forever." The 5-year period is not a device Dela Cruz, Kyzeth
capriciously conjured by the state to defraud any claimant; on
REPUBLIC VS. NISHINA
the contrary, it is decidedly prescribed to encourage would-be De guzman, Jabrielle
claimants to be punctilious in asserting their claims, otherwise
they may lose them forever in a final judgment. (c) In a special FACTS:
proceeding for escheat under sections 750 and 751 the Nisaida Sumera Nishina (respondent), represented by
petitioner is not the sole and exclusive interested party. Any her mother Zenaida Sumera Watanabe, filed before the RTC of
person alleging to have a direct right or interest in the property Malolos, Bulacan a verified petition for cancellation of birth
record and change of surname. In her petition, respondent
sought to be escheated is likewise an interested party and may
alleged the following: She was born on October 31, 1987 in
appear and oppose the petition for escheat. In the present case, Malolos, Bulacan to her Filipino mother Zenaida and Japanese
the Colegio de San Jose, Inc. and Carlos Young appeared father Koichi Nishina who were married. Her father later died.
alleging to have a material interest in the Hacienda de San Her mother married another Japanese, Kenichi Hakamada. As
Pedro Tunasan; the former because it claims to be the exclusive they could not find any record of her birth at the Malolos civil
owner of the hacienda, and the latter because he claims to be registry, respondents mother caused the late registration of her
the lessee thereof under a contract legally entered with the birth under the surname of her mothers second husband,
Hakamada. Her mother and Hakamada eventually divorced. Her
former (underscoring supplied). (d) A judgment in escheat
mother married another Japanese, Takayuki Watanabe, who
proceedings when rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction later adopted her by a decree issued by the Tokyo Family Court.
is conclusive against all persons with actual or constructive It was filed and recorded in the civil registry of Manila. It
notice, but not against those who are not parties or privies surfaced that her birth was in fact originally registered at the
thereto. As held in Hamilton v. Brown,"a judgment of escheat Malolos Civil Registry under the name Nisaida Sumera
was held conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement to Nishina,hence, her filing before the RTC of her petition praying
all persons interested. Absolute lack on the part of petitioners of that her second birth certificate bearing the surname
Hakamada, issued through late registration be cancelled; and
any dishonest intent to deprive the appellee of any right, or in
that in light of the decree of adoption, her surname Nishina in
any way injure him, constitutes due process of law, proper the original birth certificate be changed to Watanabe. After
notice having been observed." With the lapse of the 5-year hearing the petition, RTC, granted respondents petition and
period therefore, private respondent has irretrievably lost her directed the Local Civil Registry of Malolos to cancel the second
right to claim and the supposed "discovery of the deeds of birth record of Nisaida Sumera Hakamada and to change it from
donation" is not enough justification to nullify the escheat NISAIDA SUMERA NISHINA to NISAIDA SUMERA WATANABE.
judgment which has long attained finality. Before the Court of Appeals, respondent filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal, alleging that petitioner adopted a wrong
mode of appeal since it did not file a record on appeal as
RULE 109 required under Sections 2 and 3, Rule 41 (appeal from the RTCs)
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The appellate court
Appeals in Special Proceedings dismissed petitioners appeal, holding that since respondents

petition before the RTC is classified as a special proceeding, determined by the trial court after it issued the appealed order
petitioner should have filed both notice of appeal and a record granting respondents petition for cancellation of birth record
on appeal within 30 days from receipt of the October 8, 2007 and change of surname in the civil registry. WHEREFORE, the
Order granting respondents petition, and by not filing a record petition is GRANTED.
on appeal, petitioner never perfected its appeal
ISSUE:
RULES 99-100
WON the CA erred in dismissing the appeal. Adoption and Custody of Minors
RULING: REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND BOBILES

SECTION 1, Rule 109 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure Dorado, Czaybeeh
specifies the orders or judgments in special proceedings which
may be the subject of an appeal, viz: SECTION 1. Orders or REPUBLIC VS. TOLEDANO AND SPOUSES CLOUSE
judgments from which appeals may be taken. An interested Espino, Carla
person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or
judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and FACTS:
Domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment: (a)
Allows or disallows a will; (b) Determines who are the lawful On February 21, 1990, Spouses Alvin Clouse, a natural-born US
heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the Citizen and Evelyn Clouse, a former Filipino who became a
estate to which such person is entitled; (c) Allows or disallows, naturalized US citizen, filed a petition to adopt Solomon Alcala,
in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased a minor who is Evelyn's youngest brother. The trial court
person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset granted the petition. Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor
to a claim against it; (d) Settles the account of an executor, General appealed contending that the lower court erred in
administrator, trustee or guardian; (e) Constitutes, in
granting the petition for the spouses are not qualified to adopt
proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, under Philippine Law.
a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party
appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the ISSUE:
appointment of a special administrator; and (f) Is the final order
or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial Whether or not Spouses Clouse are qualified to adopt
rights of the person appealing unless it be an order granting or
denying a motion for a new trial or for reconsideration. The RULING:
above-quoted rule contemplates multiple appeals during the
pendency of special proceedings. A record on appeal in addition Under Articles 184 and 185 of The Family Code of the
to the notice of appeal is thus required to be filed as the original Philippines, private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly
records of the case should remain with the trial court to enable barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.
the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and
distinct issue is resolved by said court and held to be final. In Article 184, paragraph (3) expressly enumerates the persons
the present case, the filing of a record on appeal was not who are not qualified to adopt, viz.:
necessary since no other matter remained to be heard and

(3) An alien, except: Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the
following cases:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by
consanguinity; (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child;
or
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her
Filipino spouse; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the
other.
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt
jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a
latter. condition that must be read along together with Article 184.
Aliens, not included in the foregoing exceptions, may adopt Under the Family Code, joint adoption by husband and wife is
Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-country mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint
adoption as may be provided by law. parental authority over the child, which is the ideal situation. As
the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate
There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly.
Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.
any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. In the
first place, he is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born
citizen of the United States of America. In the second place,
Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity REPUBLIC VS. MILLER
nor the legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place, when
private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to FACTS:
adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private On July 29, 1988, Spouses Miller, both American
respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. citizens, filed with the RTC, Angeles City a verified petition to
She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a adopt Michael Magno Madayag, a Filipino child, under the
citizen of the United States in 1988. provision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code which allows
aliens to adopt. The natural parents executed affidavits giving
Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may their irrevocable consent to the adoption and the DSWD
appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184. She recommended approval of the petition on the basis of its
evaluation. On May 12, 1989, the trial court rendered decision
was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger
granting the petition for adoption. On August 3, 1998, the
brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be Family Code became effective, prohibiting the adoption of a
granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185 which Filipino child by aliens. The Solicitor General appealed to the
mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads: granting of the petition for adoption by the RTC.

ISSUE: natural parent instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be
Whether or not aliens may be allowed to adopt a Filipino sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
child when the petition for adoption was filed prior to the objectives of the law.
effectivity of the Family Code prohibiting the same.
IN RE MICHELLE LIM
RULING: Katigbak, Paola Margareth
Yes. An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and
Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing FACTS:
of the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be
affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law Monina Lim (petitioner) is an optometrist by profession.
disqualifying him. The enactment of the Family Code, effective On 1974, she married Primo Lim. Being childless, they
August 3, 1988, will not impair the right of respondents who are registered the minor children entrusted to them by certain
aliens to adopt a Filipino child because the right has become Ayuban as their own----named Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude
vested at the time of filing of the petition for adoption and shall P. Lim.
be governed by the law then in force. A vested right is one
whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon When Primo died, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an
events foreign to the will of the holder. Vested rights include not American citizen. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by
only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to those
also an exemption from new obligations created after the right individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April
has vested. As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of
form and substance in accordance with the law in governance Michelle and Michael. At the time of the filing of the petitions for
at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while
retains it until it fully disposes of the case. To repeat, the Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at
the time of the commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction RTC dismissed the petitions on the ground that since the
of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it attaches petitioner had remarried, she should have filed the petition
cannot be ousted by a subsequent happenings or events, jointly with her new husband. Motion for reconsideration was
although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction filed but was denied. Mere consent of the husbend was
from attaching in the first instance. Therefore, an alien who filed insufficient because the law gives additional requirements, such
a petition for adoption before the effectivity of the Family code, as residency and certification of his qualification, which the
although denied the right to adopt under Art. 184 of said Code, husbandmust comply. As to the argument that the adoptees are
may continue with his petition under the law prevailing before already emancipated and joint adoption is merely for the joint
the Family Code. Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, exercise of parental authority, the trial court ruled that even an
hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount emancipated child acquires certain rights from his parents and
consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental assumes certain obligations and responsibilities.
care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children
and give them the protection of society and family in the person Hence, the present petition.
of the adopter, as well as childless couples or persons to
experience the joy of parenthood and give them legally a child ISSUE:
in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their

Whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly ruled that until and unless there is a judicial decree for the
adopt? dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the
marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by
RULE: the husband and the wife is required.
Denied. Under Section 7 of RA 8552, the use of the
word “shall” means that joint adoption by the husband
and the wife is mandatory. Petitioner, having remarried at CANG VS. CLAVANO
the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly Lectura, Erika
adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by
petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, DSWD VS. BELEN
the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for Lim, Justin
adoption on this ground.
Even if Olario gave his consent, there are requirements that

must be complied, as set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: REPUBLIC VS HERNANDEZ
(1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with Lubay, Angela
the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in
the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the FACTS:
filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such
residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl
capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is Bartolome Moran and simultaneously granted the prayer
allowed to enter the adopters country as the latters adopted therein for the change of the first name of said adoptee to
child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved
Aaron Joseph, to complement the surname Munson y Andrade
during the trial. These requirements on residency and
certification of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot likewise which he acquired consequent to his adoption.
be waived pursuant to Section 7.
Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name
Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore in the same petition for adoption objecting to the joinder of the
necessary since the children have been emancipated having petition for adoption and the petitions for the change of name in
reached the age of majority. This is untenable. It is true that a single proceeding, arguing that these petition should be
when the child reaches the age of emancipation that is, when conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings.
he attains the age of majority or 18 years of age emancipation
terminates parental authority over the person and property of Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for
the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts change of name are two special proceedings which, in
of civil life. However, parental authority is merely just one of the
substance and purpose, are different from and are not related
effects of legal adoption. Other effects were enumerated in
Article V of RA 8552. to each other, being respectively governed by distinct sets of
law and rules. Petitioner further contends that what the law
Petitioner further insist that joint adoption was possible since allows is the change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter
Olario already filed a case for dissolution of marriage, the court of right, to conform with that of the adopter and as a natural

consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation,
the change of the registered given or proper name, and since to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the
this would involve a substantial change of one’s legal name, a decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptee’s surname to
petition for change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary
be instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be
therefor being conformably satisfied. contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed
for by petitioner.
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the
petition for adoption with a prayer for change of name However, the given or proper name, also known as
predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it
joinder of causes of action in order to avoid multiplicity of suits was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an
and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted and adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a
vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no prohibition in license to change the adoptee’s registered Christian or first
the Rules against the joinderof adoption and change of name name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the
being pleaded as two separate but related causes of action in a adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of
single petition. adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an
adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively
ISSUE: inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot
properly be granted.
WON respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the
change of the given or proper name if the adoptee in a petition The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the
for adoption. civil register is the name appearing therein. If a change in one’s
name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly
RULING:
complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for
No. a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or
Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legal grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly
effect of adoption: determined.
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict
a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire compliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensable
the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It
relationship of parent and child, including the right of the is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by
adopted to use the surname of the adopters; itself, governed by its own set of rules. Afortiori, it cannot be
granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a

mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding including the right to bear the surname of her father and her
would be to denigrate its role and significance as the mother.
appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system.
Since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by
IN RE STEPHANIE GARCIA her natural father to use, as middle name her mother’s
Mercado, Trish surname, the Court finds no reason why she should not be
allowed to do so.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY
ASTORGA GARCIA, HONORATO B. CATINDIG
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
BRIONES VS. MIGUEL
FACTS: Dumapias, Gay*
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein
petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child SY VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among Rivera, Hiezll Wynn
others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that her
mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been FACTS:
using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is
On 19 January 1994, Mercedes Tan Uy-Sy filed a petition
now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He
prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to for habeas corpus against Wilson Sy before the Regional Trial
“Garcia” her mother’s surname, and that her surname “Garcia” Court of Manila, Branch 48, docketed as Special Proceeding No.
be changed to “Catindig” his surname. 94-69002. Mercedes prayed that said writ be issued ordering
Wilson to produce their minor children Vanessa and Jeremiah
ISSUE: before the court and that after hearing, their care and custody
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural be awarded to her as their mother.
father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle
In his answer, Wilson prayed that the custody of the
name?
minors be awarded to him instead. Petitioner maintained that
Mercedes was unfit to take custody of the minors. He adduced
HELD:
the following reasons: firstly, respondent abandoned her family
YES.
in 1992; secondly, she is mentally unstable; and thirdly, she
cannot provide proper care to the children.
RATIO:
An adopted child is entitled to all the rights provided by
ISSUES:
law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind,
1. Whether or not the custody of the minor children be
including the right to bear the surname of her father and her
given to the mother.
mother. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it
2. Whether or not the father is obligated to provide
follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by
financial support to the minor children not in his
law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind,
custody.

RULING:
1. Yes. Section 213 of the Family Code states that:
“In case of separation of the parents, parental authority
shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The
Court shall take into account all relevant considerations,
RULE 103
especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, Change of Name
unless the parent is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS (May 21, 1992)
order otherwise.” Rodriguez, Maria Lorraine
In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the
sole and foremost consideration is the physical, educational, FACTS:
social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into Private respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of
account the respective resources and social and moral Maximo Alcala, Sr. and Segundina. When he was but 2 and a
situations of the contending parents. half years old and then known as Maximo Alcala, Jr., and his
However, the law favors the mother if she is a fit and sister Margaret Alcala, was then 9 years old, they were, with the
proper person to have custody of her children so that they may consent of their natural parents and by order of the court,
not only receive her attention, care, supervision but also have adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong,
the advantage and benefit of a mother’s love and devotion for both naturalized Filipinos. Hoong Wong, now deceased, was an
which there is no substitute. Generally, the love, solicitude and insurance agent while Concepcion Ty Wong was a high school
devotion of a mother cannot be replaced by another and are teacher. They decided to adopt the children as they remained
worth more to a child of tender years than all other things childless after 15 years of marriage. Upon reaching the age of
combined. 22, private respondent, by then married and a junior
Engineering student, filed a petition to change his name to
2. Yes. Maximo Alcala, Jr. It was averred that his use of the surname
Article 203 of the Family Code states that the obligation Wong embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and
to give support is demandable from the time the person who friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth
has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim
shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial community, and he wants to erase any implication whatsoever
demand. of alien nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a
The Court likewise affirms the award of P50,000.00 as support Chinese surname, thus hampering his business and social life;
for the minor children. As found by both courts, petitioner’s and that his adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to
representations regarding his family’s wealth and his capability revert to his former surname.
to provide for his family more than provided a fair indication of
his financial standing even though he proved to be less than RTC: resolved in favor of private respondent, decreeing that,
forthright on the matter. In any event, this award of support is the jurisdictional requirements having been fully complied with.
merely provisional as the amount may be modified or altered in
accordance with the increased or decreased needs of the needy Republic through the Solicitor General appealed. The Solicitor
party and with the means of the giver. General contends that private respondent's allegations of
ridicule and/or isolation from family and friends were

unsubstantiated and cannot justify the petition for change of Justice dictates that a person should be allowed to
name. He claims that for private respondent to cast aside the improve his social standing as long as in doing so, he does not
name of his adoptive father is crass ingratitude to the memory cause prejudice or injury to the interest of the State or other
of the latter and to his adoptive mother who is still alive,
persons .Nothing whatsoever is shown in the record of this case
despite her consent to the petition for change of name. Further,
the Solicitor General posits that the reversion of Maximo Wong that such prejudice or injury to the interest of the state or of
to his old name violates Articles 341 and 365 of the Civil Code, other persons would result in the change of petitioner's name.
which requires an adopted child to use the surname of the To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must
adopter. show not only some proper or compelling reason therefor but
CA: Affirmed. also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. name. Among the grounds for change of name which have
been held valid are: (a) When the name is ridiculous,
ISSUE:
Whether the reasons given by private respondent in his dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b)
petition for change of name are valid, sufficient and proper to When the change results as a legal consequence, as in
warrant the granting of said petition. legitimation; (c) When the change will avoid confusion; (d)
Having continuously used and been known since childhood by a
RULING: YES. The assertion of the Solicitor General was Filipino name, unaware of her alien parentage; (e) A sincere
unacceptable. The testimony of private respondent in the lower desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former
court bears out the existence of valid cause in his bid for alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and
change of name: that he observed that “Wong” as a surname (f) When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no
embarrassed him to his friends and when he goes with Chinese showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
friends he cannot talk Chinese; that private respondent was purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public
living in Campo Muslim, a Muslim community but no one can interest.
believe that he is a Muslim; that he has a little business of In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the
Furniture but has little customer because no one believes that question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound
he is Muslim. Hence, the SC upheldthe decision of respondent discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be
appellate court. The purpose of the law an allowing of change of satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available.
name as contemplated by the provisions of Rule 103 of the Summarizing, in special proceedings for change of name, what
is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of
Rules of Court is to give a person an opportunity to improve his
the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and
personality and to provide his best interest.In granting or propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof,
denying the petition for change of name, the question of proper mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and
and reasonable cause is left to the discretion of the court. The with the sole prerogative for making such determination being
evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and lodged in the courts.
not all the best evidence available is required.In the present While it is true that under Article 365 of the Civil Code is
to the effect that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the
case, the court had exercised its discretion judiciously when it
adopter, it must nevertheless be borne in mind that the change
granted the petition.

of the surname of the adopted child is more an incident rather father had abandoned them; that her daughter has always used
than the object of adoption proceedings.0 The act of adoption the name Mary Pang at home and in the Baguio Chinese
fixes a status, viz., that of parent and child. More technically, it Patriotic School where she studies; that on August 16, 1966,
is an act by which relations of paternity and affiliation are
petitioner Pang Cha Quen married Alfredo De la Cruz; that as
recognized as legally existing between persons not so related
by nature. It has been defined as the taking into one's family of her daughter has grown to love and recognize her stepfather,
the child of another as son or daughter and heir and conferring Alfredo De la Cruz, as her own father, she desires to adopt and
on it a title to the rights and privileges of such. The purpose of use his surname "De la Cruz" in addition to her name "Mary
an adoption proceeding is to effect this new status of Pang" so that her full name shall be Mary Pang De la Cruz; that
relationship between the child and its adoptive parents, the Alfredo De la Cruz gave his conformity to the petition by signing
change of name which frequently accompanies adoption being at the bottom of the pleading; that the petition was not made
more an incident than the object of the proceeding. 31 The
for the purpose of concealing a crime as her ten-year old
welfare of the child is the primary consideration in the
determination of an application for adoption. daughter has not committed any, nor to evade the execution of
a judgment as she has never been sued in court, and the
petition is not intended to cause damage or prejudice to any
SILVERIO VS. REPUBLIC third person. She prayed that her daughter be allowed to
Salayog, Benny Rico change her name from May Sia, alias Manman Huang, to Mary
Pang De la Cruz.
PEOPLE VS. CAGANDAHAN
Sumaway, Dylan On April 4, 1968, respondent Judge issued an order setting the
hearing of the petition on September 16, 1968 at 9:00 o'clock in
REPUBLIC VS. AQUINO
Tomarong, Marian the morning and inviting all interested persons to appear and
show cause, if any, why the petition should not be granted. The
REPUBLIC VS. MARCOS order also directed that it be published at the expense of the
Tresvalles, Kris petitioner in the Baguio and Midland Courier, a newspaper of
general circulation in Baguio City and Mountain Province, once a
FACTS: On March 30, 1968, a verified petition was filed by week for three (3) consecutive weeks, the first publication to be
private respondent Pang Cha Quen alleging that she is a citizen made as soon as possible. The order also commanded that the
of Nationalist China, married to Alfredo De la Cruz, a Filipino Solicitor General and the City Attorney of Baguio be furnished
citizen; that she had resided in Baguio City since her birth on copies of the order and petition.
January 29, 1930; that by a previous marriage to Sia Bian alias
Huang Tzeh Lik, a citizen of Nationalist China, she gave birth to On September 16, 1968, when the petition was called for
a daughter, May Sia alias Manman Huang on January 28, 1958 hearing, nobody opposed it. Upon motion of petitioner's
in the City of Manila; that on January 12, 1959, she caused her counsel, respondent Judge authorized the Clerk of Court or his
daughter to be registered as an alien under the name of Mary deputy to receive the evidence of the petitioner, Pang Cha
Pang, i.e., using the maternal surname, because the child's Quen.

Then, respondent Judge issued an order on February 12, 1969 IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF THE MINOR MAY SIA
authorizing the name of the minor, May Sia alias Manman ALIAS MANMAN HUANG TO MARY PANG DE LA CRUZ, PANG CHA
Huang, also known as Mary Pang, to be changed to Mary Pang QUEN, Petitioner. (P. 15, Rollo.)
De la Cruz.
The omission of her other alias-- "Mary Pang"-- in the captions
The Government, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the of the court's order and of the petition defeats the purpose of
Supreme Court on the ground that the court's order is contrary the publication. In view of that defect, the trial court did not
to law acquire jurisdiction over the subject of the proceedings, i.e., the
various names and aliases of the petitioner which she wished to
ISSUE: whether respondent Judge erred in granting the petition change to "Mary Pang De la Cruz."
although private respondent Pang Cha Quen failed to adduce
proper and reasonable cause for changing the name of the
minor "May Sia" alias Manman Huang."
2. The following have been considered valid grounds for a
HELD: The Government's contention is well-taken. change of name:
1. We accordingly hold that for a publication of a petition for a (1) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely
change of name to be valid, the title thereof should include, difficult to write or pronounce;
first, his real name, and second, his aliases, if any. this Court
explained the reason for the rule requiring the inclusion of the (2) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in
name sought to be adopted and the other names or aliases of legitimation;
the applicant in the title of the petition, or in the caption of the
(3) when the change will avoid confusion (Haw Liong vs.
published order. It is that the ordinary reader only glances
Republic, L-21194, April 29,1966; Chill Hap Chin vs. Republic, L-
fleetingly at the caption of the published order or the title of the
20018, April 30, 1966; Republic vs. Tanada, et al., L-31563,
petition in a special proceeding for a change of name. Only if
November 29, 1971; Alfon vs. Republic, I,51201, May 29, 1980);
the caption or the title strikes him because one or all of the
names mentioned are familiar to him, does he proceed to read (4) having continuously used and been known since childhood
the contents of the order. The probability is great that he will by a Filipino name, unaware of his alien parentage (Josefina Ang
not notice the other names or aliases of the applicant if they are Chay vs. Republic, L-28507, July 31, 1980); or
mentioned only in the body of the order or petition.
(5) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of
In the case at bar, the caption of both the verified petition dated former alienage all in good faith and not to prejudice anybody
March 30,1968, and the published order of the trial court dated (Uy vs. Republic, L-22712, November 29, 1965).
April 4, 1968 read, thus:
As may be gleaned from the petition filed in the lower court, the
reasons offered for changing the name of petitioner's daughter

are: (1) that "her daughter grew up with, and learned to love Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City to
and recognize Alfredo de la Cruz as her own father. (2) to afford parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not
her daughter a feeling of security and (3) that "Alfredo de la yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got
married, they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so
Cruz agrees to this petition, and has signified his conformity at
that the child’s name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to
the foot of this pleading" Julian Lin Carulasan Wang
Clearly, these are not valid reasons for a change of name. The The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in
general rule is that a change of name should not be permitted if Singapore for a long time because they will let him study there
together with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born
it will give a false impression of family relationship to another
in Singapore. Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden
where none actually exists. we specifically held that our laws do surname of the mother are not carried in a person’s name, they
not authorize legitimate children to adopt the surname of a anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated
person not their father, for to allow them to adopt the surname against because of his current registered name which carries a
of their mother's husband, who is not their father, can result in middle name. Julian and his sister might also be asking whether
confusion of their paternity. they are brother and sister since they have different surnames.
Hence, they filed a petition for change of name and/or
Another reason for disallowing the petition for change of name correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin
is that it was not filed by the proper party. Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and
have his registered name changedto Julian Lin Wang.RTC denied
Clearly, the petition for change of name must be filed by the the petition because the reasons for the change of name were
not within the grounds recognized by law. Appeal made thereon
person desiring to change his/her name, even if it may be
was subsequently denied.
signed and verified by some other person in his behalf. In this
case, however, the petition was filed by Pang Cha Quen not by ISSUE:
May Sia.Hence, only May Sia herself, alias Manman Huang, alias Whether or not the denial to grant the change of name was
Mary Pang, when she shall have reached the age of majority, proper.
may file the petition to change her name. The decision to RULING:
change her name, the reason for the change, and the choice of Yes. The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that
a new name and surname shall be hers alone to make. It must there be ‘proper and reasonable cause’ for which the change is
be her personal decision. sought. To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must
show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but
also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been
IN RE: PETITION OF JULIAN WANG held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or
Tuason, Jannelle extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change
results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the
FACTS: change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously
used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and
was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a

Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith surnames were taken from then name and alias of their father,
and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname Ang Kiu Chuy, alias Sioma Luy. Petitioner and Sioma Luy were
causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired never married, and Sioma Luy is married to another woman.
change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the
Petitioner filed the petition to remove the name of the father so
change of name would prejudice public interest.16
that the son would be Jorge Batbatan and the daughter would
The present petition seeks to drop the middle name altogether. be Delia Batbatab. The petition was denied by the trial court on
Decided cases in this jurisdiction involving petitions for change
the grounds that the records show that it was the petitioner who
of name usually deal with requests for change of surname.
There are only a handful of cases involving requests for change supplied the information in the birth certificate of her son, and
of the given name and none on requests for changing or that entries in the records of birth are correctable only if the
dropping of the middle name. Does the law allow one to drop effect would not change status, citizenship, or any substantial
the middle name from his registered name? We have to answer alterations. Such changes must be decided in the appropriate
in the negative because middle names serve as to identify the proceeding.
maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further
distinguish him from others who may have the same given ISSUE:
name and surname as he has.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for Whether or not the name change could be allowed
the dropping his middle name is convenience. However, how
such change of name would make his integration into RULING:
Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly
established. That the continued use of his middle name would The Court ruled in the affirmative. The changes sought
cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and by petitioner would not affect the status of the children because
reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name. they are illegitimate in the first place. The law requires that
illegitimate children should carry the surname of their mothers
REPUBLIC VS. CAPOTE and that is precisely what the petitioner was trying to achieve
Umbalin, Norissa here. A clerical error implies mistakes by the clerk in copying or
writing, the making of wrong entries in the public records
contrary to existing facts. It is not a clerical error if it would
RA 9048 & 10172 bring about a substantial change.
Clerical Error Law
BATBATAN VS. OFFICE OF LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR

Uy, Alexander
FACTS:
Petitioner Eligia Batbatan is the mother of two minor LEE VS. COURT OF APPEALS
children, Jorge Batbatan Ang and Delia Batbatan Luy. The G.R. NO. 118387, 367 SCRA 110

OCTOBER 11, 2001 mistress. As a result of their illicit relations, Tiu Chuan
Meiki , Merlin gave birth to petitioners.
FACTS: Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents,

The private respondents are the children of Lee Tek every time Tiu Chuan gave birth to each of the
Sheng and his lawful wife, Keh Shiok Cheng. The petitioners, their father, falsified the entries in the
petitioners are children of Lee Tek Sheng and his records of birth of petitioners by making it appear that
concubine, Tiu Chuan. petitioners’ mother was Keh Shiok Cheng.
Private Respondents—Rita K. Lee, Leoncio Lee Tek Since the birth of petitioners, it was Tiu Chuan who took
Sheng, Rosa K. Lee-Vanderlek, Melody K. Lee-Chin, Lucia care of the petitioners. They all lived in the same
K. Lee Tek Sheng-Ong, Julian K. Lee, Henry K. Lee, compound Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents
Martin K. Lee, Victoriano K. Lee, Natividad K. Lee-Miguel were residing in. All was well, therefore, before private
and Thomas K. Lee, filed two (2) separate petitions for respondents’ discovery of the dishonesty and fraud
the cancellation and/or correction of entries in the perpetrated by their father, Lee Tek Sheng.
records of birth of the petitioners—Marcelo Lee, Albina
Lee-Young, Mariano Lee, Pablo Lee, Helen Lee, Catalino When Keh Shiok Cheng died, Lee Tek Sheng insisted that
K. Lee, Eusebio Lee, and Emma Lee. the names of all his children, including those of
petitioners’, be included in the obituary notice of the
A case was filed against all petitioners, except Emma former’s death that was to be published in the
Lee, before RTC Manila assigned to respondent Judge newspapers.
Lorenzo B. Veneracion. A similar petition against Emma
Lee was filed before the RTC of Kalookan and assigned The private respondents requested the NBI to conduct
to the sala of respondent Judge Jaime T. Hamoy. an investigation. After investigation, the NBI prepared a
report that the false entries in the records of birth of
Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the false petitioners made it appear that the latter were
and erroneous entries in all pertinent records of birth of legitimate children of Kek Shiok Cheng.
petitioners by deleting and/or canceling therein the
name of “Keh Shiok Cheng” as their mother, and by It was this report that prompted private respondents to
substituting the same with the name “Tiu Chuan”, who file the petitions for cancellation and/or correction of
is allegedly the petitioners’ true birth mother. entries in petitioners’ records of birth with the lower
courts.
The private respondents alleged in their petitions that
they are the legitimate children of spouses Lee Tek The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss both petitions
Sheng and Keh Shiok Cheng who were legally married in on the grounds that: (1) resort to Rule 108 is improper
China. where the ultimate objective is to assail the legitimacy
and filiation of petitioners; (2) the petition, which is
Tiu Chuan was introduced by Lee Tek Sheng to his family essentially an action to impugn legitimacy was filed
as their new housemaid but immediately became his prematurely; and (3) the action to impugn has already
prescribed.

Respondent Judge Veneracion denied the motion to Contrary to petitioners’ contention that the petitions
dismiss for failure of the petitioners to appear at the before the lower courts were actually actions to impugn
hearing of the said motion. legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare that
petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng,
On the other hand, respondent Judge Hamoy issued an but to establish that the former are not the latter’s
Order stating that the petitioners have complied with children. There is nothing to impugn as there is no
the jurisdictional requirements for the Court to take blood relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and
cognizance of this case. petitioners.
Petitioners’ attempts at seeking a reconsideration of the In Republic vs. Valencia, this Court, held that even
above-mentioned orders failed and they appealed to the substantial errors in a civil register may be corrected
CA. The CA, however, found no merit in their arguments and the true facts established provided the parties
and dismissed their petition. aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding. A proceeding for
correction and/or cancellation of entries in the civil
ISSUES: register under Rule 108 ceases to be summary in nature
1. Whether or not resort to Rule 108 of the Revised and takes on the characteristics of an appropriate
Rules of Court is proper adversary proceeding when all the procedural
2. Whether or not the private respondent’s suits requirements under Rule 108 are complied with.
amounted to a collateral attack against petitioner’s
legitimacy in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding “Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings
where all relevant facts have been fully and properly
developed, where opposing counsel have been given
HELD: opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and
The proceedings are simply aimed at establishing a where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
particular fact, status and/or right. The thrust of said considered, the suit or proceeding is ‘appropriate.’
proceedings was to establish the factual truth regarding
the occurrence of certain events which created or The pertinent sections of rule 108 provide:
affected the status of persons and/or otherwise
deprived said persons of rights. ‘SEC. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an
entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court establishes the and all persons who have or claim any interest which
status or right of a party, or a particular fact. The would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
petitions filed by private respondents for the correction proceeding.’
of entries in the petitioners’ records of birth were
intended to establish that for physical and/or biological ‘SEC. 4.Notice and publication. - Upon the filing of the
reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and
conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable
their birth records. notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the

petition. The court shall also cause the order to be of entries in the records of birth of petitioners in the
published once in a week for three (3) consecutive lower courts are appropriate adversary proceedings.
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.’ We agree. As correctly observed by the Court of
Appeals:
‘SEC. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person
having or claiming any interest under the entry whose In the instant case, a petition for cancellation and/or
cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen correction of entries of birth was filed by private
(15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last respondents and pursuant to the order of the RTC-
date of publication of such notice, file his opposition Manila, dated February 17, 1993, a copy of the order
thereto.’ setting the case for hearing was ordered published once
“Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper
proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of of general circulation in the Philippines. In the RTC-
an entry in the civil register are - (1) the civil registrar, Kalookan, there was an actual publication of the order
and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which setting the case for hearing in “Media Update” once a
would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the week for three (3) consecutive weeks. In both cases
petition, it becomes the duty of the court to - (1) issue notices of the orders were ordered served upon the
an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the Solicitor General, the Civil Registrars of Manila and
petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be Kalookan and upon the petitioners herein. Both orders
published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks set the case for hearing and directed the Civil Registrars
in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. and the other respondents in the case below to file their
The following are likewise entitled to oppose the oppositions to the said petitions. A motion to dismiss
petition: - (1) the civil registrar, and (2) any person was consequently filed by herein petitioners Marcelo,
having or claiming any interest under the entry whose Mariano, Pablo, Helen, Catalino and Eusebio, all
cancellation or correction is sought. surnamed Lee, and Albina Lee-Young in the RTC-Manila,
“If all these procedural requirements have been and an opposition was filed by Emma Lee in the RTC-
followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of Kalookan.
entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted
under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no In view of the foregoing, we hold that the petitions filed
longer be described as “summary”. There can be no by the private respondents in the courts below by way
doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed of a special proceeding for cancellation and/or
either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or correction of entries in the civil registers with the
claiming any interest in the entries sought to be requisite parties, notices and publications could very
cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is actively well be regarded as that proper suit or appropriate
prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversary action. (Underscoring supplied.)
proceedings.” (Underscoring supplied.)
The petitioners assert, however, that making the
According to the Court of Appeals, the proceedings proceedings adversarial does not give trial courts the
taken in both petitions for cancellation and/or correction license to go beyond the ambit of Rule 108 which is
limited to those corrections contemplated by Article 412

of the New Civil Code or mere clerical errors of a illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and
harmless or innocuous nature. The petitioners point to controversial alterations which can only be allowed after
the case of Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic, which is of a later appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon the
date than Republic vs. Valencia, where this nature of the issues involved. Changes which affect the
Courtreverted to the doctrine laid down in earlier cases, civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in
starting with Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic, prohibiting the character and should be threshed out in a proper action
extension of the application of Rule 108 beyond depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy,
innocuous or harmless changes or corrections. and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the
Petitioners contend that as held in Go, et al. vs. Civil entries are notified or represented and evidence is
Registrar, allowing substantial changes under Rule 108 submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and
would render the said rule unconstitutional as the same proof to the contrary admitted. x x x.” (Underscoring
would have the effect of increasing or modifying supplied.)
substantive rights.
It is true that in special proceedings formal pleadings
At the outset, it should be pointed out that in the cited and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the remedy
case of Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic, the reason we granted upon mere application or motion. But this is
declared null and void the portion of the lower court’s not always the case, as when the statute expressly
order directing the change of Labayo-Rowe’s civil status provides. Hence, a special proceeding is not always
and the filiation of one of her children as appearing in summary. One only has to take a look at the procedure
the latter’s record of birth, is not because Rule 108 was outlined in Rule 108 to see that what is contemplated
inappropriate to effect such changes, but because therein is not a summary proceeding per se. Rule 108
Labayo-Rowe’s petition before the lower court failed to requires publication of the petition three (3) times, i.e.,
implead all indispensable parties to the case. once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks (Sec. 4).
The Rule also requires inclusion as parties of all persons
Far from petitioners’ theory, this Court’s ruling in who claim any interest which would be affected by the
Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic[ does not exclude recourse to cancellation or correction (Sec. 3). The civil registrar
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to effect and any person in interest are also required to file their
substantial changes or corrections in entries of the civil opposition, if any, within fifteen (15) days from notice of
register. The only requisite is that the proceedings the petition, or from the last date of publication of such
under Rule 108 be an appropriate adversary proceeding notice (Sec. 5). Last, but not the least, although the
as contra-distinguished from a summary proceeding. court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is
Thus: after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the
petition or issue an order granting the same (Sec. 7).
“If the purpose of the petition [for cancellation and/or
correction of entries in the civil register] is merely to Thus, we find no reason to depart from our ruling in
correct the clerical errors which are visible to the eye or Republic vs. Valencia, that Rule 108, when all the
obvious to the understanding, the court may, under a procedural requirements thereunder are followed, is the
summary procedure, issue an order for the correction of appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial
a mistake. However, as repeatedly construed, changes corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.
which may affect the civil status from legitimate to It must be conceded, however, that even after Republic

vs. Valenciathere continues to be a seesawing of opinion and Virginia’s civil status from married to single and of
on the issue of whether or not substantial corrections in their three children from legitimate to illegitimate. x x x’
entries of the civil register may be effected by means of
Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. “Thus, where the effect of a correction of an entry in a
The more recent cases of Leonor vs. Court of civil registry will change the status of a person from
Appealsand Republic vs. Labradordo seem to signal a “legitimate” to “illegitimate,” as in Sarah Zita’s case,
reversion to the Ty Kong Tin ruling which delimited the the same cannot be granted in summary proceedings.”
scope of application of Article 412 to clerical or
typographical errors in entries of the civil register. It is, therefore, high time that we put an end to the
confusion sown by pronouncements seemingly in
In Republic vs. Labrador, the Court held that Rule 108 conflict with each other, and perhaps, in the process,
cannot be used to modify, alter or increase substantive stem the continuing influx of cases raising the same
rights, such as those involving the legitimacy or substantial issue.
illegitimacy of a child. We ruled thus: The basis for the pronouncement that extending the
scope of Rule 108 to substantial corrections is
‘On its face, the Rule would appear to authorize the unconstitutional is embodied in the early case of Ty
cancellation of any entry regarding “marriages” in the Kong Tin vs. Republic[40] that first delineated the
civil registry for any reason by the mere filing of a extent or scope of the matters that may be changed or
verified petition for the purpose. However, it is not as corrected pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code.
simple as it looks. Doctrinally, the only errors that can The Supreme Court ruled in this case that:
be canceled or corrected under this Rule are
typographical or clerical errors, not material or “x x x. After a mature deliberation, the opinion was
substantial ones like the validity or nullity of a marriage. reached that what was contemplated therein are mere
A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or corrections of mistakes that are clerical in nature and
obvious to the understanding; error made by a clerk or a not those that may affect the civil status or the
transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing (Black vs. nationality or citizenship of the persons involved. If the
Republic, L-10869, Nov. 28, 1958); or some harmless and purpose of the petition is merely a clerical error then
innocuous change such as a correction of name that is the court may issue an order in order that the error or
clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the mistake may be corrected. If it refers to a substantial
occupation of the parent (Ansalada vs. Republic, L- change, which affects the status or citizenship of a
10226, Feb. 14, 1958).’ party, the matter should be threshed out in a proper
action depending upon the nature of the issue involved.
‘Where the effect of a correction in a civil registry will Such action can be found at random in our substantive
change the civil status of petitioner and her children and remedial laws the implementation of which will
from legitimate to illegitimate, the same cannot be naturally depend upon the factors and circumstances
granted except only in an adversarial x x x.’ that might arise affecting the interested parties. This
opinion is predicated upon the theory that the
‘Clearly and unequivocally, the summary procedure procedure contemplated in article 412 is summary in
under Rule 108, and for that matter under Article 412 of nature which cannot cover cases involving controversial
the Civil Code cannot be used by Mauricio to change his issues.”

opine that the procedure contemplated in Article 412 is
This doctrine was taken a step further in the case of summary in nature and cannot, therefore, cover cases
Chua Wee, et al. vs. Republicwhere the Court said that: involving controversial issues. Subsequent cases have
merely echoed the Ty Kong Tin doctrine without,
“From the time the New Civil Code took effect on August however, shedding light on the matter.
30, 1950 until the promulgation of the Revised Rules of
Court on January 1, 1964, there was no law nor rule of The flaw in Ty Kong Tin lies in its theory that Article 412
court prescribing the procedure to secure judicial contemplates a summary procedure.
authorization to effect the desired innocuous First of all, Article 412 is a substantive law that provides
rectifications or alterations in the civil register pursuant as follows:
to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. Rule 108 of the “No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
Revised Rules of Court now provides for such a corrected, without a judicial order.”
procedure which should be limited solely to the It does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be
implementation of Article 412, the substantive law on followed except to say that the corrections or changes
the matter of correcting entries in the civil register. must be effected by judicial order. As such, it cannot be
Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the Rules of gleaned therefrom that the procedure contemplated for
Court, was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant obtaining such judicial order is summary in nature.
to its rule-making authority under Section 13 of Art. VIII
of the Constitution, which directs that such rules of Secondly, it is important to note that Article 412 uses
court ‘shall not diminish or increase or modify both the terms “corrected” and “changed”. In its
substantive rights.’ If Rule 108 were to be extended ordinary sense, to correct means “to make or set
beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of right”;“to remove the faults or errors from” while to
errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the change means “to replace something with something
understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and else of the same kind or with something that serves as a
controversial alterations concerning citizenship, substitute”. The provision neither qualifies as to the
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of kind of entry to be changed or corrected nor does it
marriage, said Rule 108 would thereby become distinguish on the basis of the effect that the correction
unconstitutional for it would be increasing or modifying or change may have. Hence, it is proper to conclude
substantive rights, which changes are not authorized that all entries in the civil register may be changed or
under Article 412 of the New Civil Code.”[43] corrected under Article 412. What are the entries in the
(Underscoring supplied). civil register? We need not go further than Articles 407
We venture to say now that the above pronouncements and 408 of the same title to find the answer.
proceed from a wrong premise, that is, the
interpretation that Article 412 pertains only to clerical Thirdly, Republic Act No. 9048 which was passed by
errors of a harmless or innocuous nature, effectively Congress on February 8, 2001 substantially amended
excluding from its domain, and the scope of its Article 412 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
implementing rule, substantial changes that may affect
nationality, status, filiation and the like. Why the “SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or
limited scope of Article 412? Unfortunately, Ty Kong Tin Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
does not satisfactorily answer this question except to Nickname.- No entry in a civil register shall be changed

or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical
or typographical errors and change of first name or
nickname which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and
its implementing rules and regulations.”
The above law speaks clearly. Clerical or typographical

errors in entries of the civil register are now to be
corrected and changed without need of a judicial order REPUBLIC VS. KHO
and by the city or municipal civil registrar or consul GR. NO. 170340
general. The obvious effect is to remove from the ambit JUNE 29, 2007
of Rule 108 the correction or changing of such errors in Meiki , Merlin
entries of the civil register. Hence, what is left for the
scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial changes FACTS:
and corrections in entries of the civil register. This is
precisely the opposite of what Ty Kong Tin and other On February 12, 2001, Carlito and his siblings Michael,
cases of its genre had said, perhaps another indication Mercy Nona and Heddy Moira filed before the RTC of
that it was not sound doctrine after all. Butuan City a verified petition for correction of entries
in the civil registry of Butuan City to effect changes in
It may be very well said that Republic Act No. 9048 is their respective birth certificates. Carlito also asked the
Congress’ response to the confusion wrought by the court in behalf of his minor children, Kevin and Kelly, to
failure to delineate as to what exactly is that so-called order the correction of some entries in their birth
summary procedure for changes or corrections of a certificates.
harmless or innocuous nature as distinguished from that
appropriate adversary proceeding for changes or In the case of Carlito, he requested the correction in his
corrections of a substantial kind. For we must admit birth certificate of the citizenship of his mother to
that though we have constantly referred to an "Filipino" instead of "Chinese," as well as the deletion of
appropriate adversary proceeding, we have failed to the word "married" opposite the phrase "Date of
categorically state just what that procedure is. Republic marriage of parents" because his parents, Juan Kho and
Act No. 9048 now embodies that summary procedure Epifania Inchoco (Epifania), were allegedly not legally
while Rule 108 is that appropriate adversary proceeding. married. The same request to delete the "married"
Be that as it may, the case at bar cannot be decided on status of their parents from their respective birth
the basis of Republic Act No. 9048 which has prospective certificates was made by Carlito’s siblings Michael,
application. Hence, the necessity for the preceding Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira. With respect to the birth
treatise. certificates of Carlito’s children, he prayed that the date
of his and his wife’s marriage be corrected from April
27, 1989 to January 21, 2000, the date appearing in
their marriage certificate.

On April 23, 2001, Carlito et al. filed an Amended the petition for correction of entries in the subject
Petition3 in which it was additionally prayed that documents despite the failure of respondents to implead
Carlito’s second name of "John" be deleted from his the minors’ mother, Marivel, as an indispensable party
record of birth; and that the name and citizenship of and to offer sufficient evidence to warrant the
Carlito’s father in his (Carlito’s) marriage certificate be corrections with regard to the questioned "married"
corrected from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho" and "Filipino" to status of Carlito and his siblings’ parents, and the
"Chinese," respectively. latter’s citizenship.
On September 14, 2001,7 the OSG entered its CA Ruling;

appearance with an authorization to the city prosecutor
of Butuan City to appear in the case and render By the assailed Decision of October 27, 2005, the CA
assistance to it (the OSG). denied petitioner’s appeal and affirmed the decision of
the trial court.
On January 31, 2002, respondents presented
documentary evidence showing compliance with the
jurisdictional requirements of the petition and ISSUE:
testimonial evidence consisting of the testimonies of
Carlito and his mother, Epifania. During the same Whether the failure to implead Marivel and Carlito’s
hearing, an additional correction in the birth certificates parents rendered the trial short of the required
of Carlito’s children was requested to the effect that the adversary proceeding and the trial court’s judgment
first name of their mother be rectified from "Maribel" to void. NO
"Marivel."
RTC Ruling: HELD:
The trial court directed the local civil registrar of Butuan A similar issue was earlier raised in Barco v. Court of
City to correct the entries in the record of birth of Appeals. That case stemmed from a petition for
Carlito, as follows: (1) change the citizenship of his correction of entries in the birth certificate of a minor,
mother from "Chinese" to "Filipino"; (2) delete "John" June Salvacion Maravilla, to reflect the name of her real
from his name; and (3) delete the word "married" father (Armando Gustilo) and to correspondingly change
opposite the date of marriage of his parents. The last her surname. The petition was granted by the trial
correction was ordered to be effected likewise in the court.
birth certificates of respondents Michael, Mercy Nona,
and Heddy Moira. As well as the prayer for the Barco, whose minor daughter was allegedly fathered
correction in the birth certificates of Carlito’s minor also by Gustilo, however, sought to annul the trial
children are granted. Further, the trial court granted the court’s decision, claiming that she should have been
correction prayed for in Carlito’s marriage certificate. made a party to the petition for correction. Failure to
implead her deprived the RTC of jurisdiction, she
Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, appealed the RTC contended.
Decision to the CA, faulting the trial court in granting

In dismissing Barco’s petition, this Court held that the validated essentially through publication. Publication is
publication of the order of hearing under Section 4 of notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its
Rule 108 cured the failure to implead an indispensable object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to
party. make an objection of any sort against the right sought
to be established. It is the publication of such notice
The essential requisite for allowing substantial that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and
corrections of entries in the civil registry is that the true vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.
facts be established in an appropriate adversarial
proceeding. This is embodied in Section 3, Rule 108 of Given the above ruling, it becomes unnecessary to rule
the Rules of Court, which states: on whether Marivel or respondents’ parents should have
Section 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of been impleaded as parties to the proceeding. It may not
an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar be amiss to mention, however, that during the hearing
and all persons who have or claim any interest which on January 31, 2002, the city prosecutor who was acting
would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the as representative of the OSG did not raise any objection
proceeding. to the non-inclusion of Marivel and Carlito’s parents as
parties to the proceeding.
xxxx
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Parenthetically, it seems highly improbable that Marivel
Section 3 of Rule 108. Her interest was affected by the was unaware of the proceedings to correct the entries in
petition for correction, as any judicial determination her children’s birth certificates, especially since the
that June was the daughter of Armando would affect her notices, orders and decision of the trial court were all
ward’s share in the estate of her father. x x x. sent to the residence she shared with Carlito and the
children.
Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the
petition, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that It is also well to remember that the role of the court in
the defect was cured by compliance with Section 4, Rule hearing a petition to correct certain entries in the civil
108, which requires notice by publication x x x. registry is to ascertain the truth about the facts
recorded therein.
xxxx
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind With respect to the date of marriage of Carlito and
the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the Marivel, their certificate of marriage25 shows that
petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even indeed they were married on January 21, 2000, not on
parties who should have been impleaded under Section April 27, 1989. Explaining the error, Carlito declared that
3, Rule 108, but were inadvertently left out. x x x the date "April 27, 1989" was supplied by his helper,
adding that he was not married to Marivel at the time
xxxx his sons were born because his previous marriage was
Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an annulled only in 1999.Given the evidence presented by
action against a thing and not against a person. The respondents, the CA observed that the minors were
decision on the petition binds not only the parties illegitimate at birth, hence, the correction would bring
thereto but the whole world. An in rem proceeding is about no change at all in the nature of their filiation.

a minor; and (o)changes of name. (Emphasis and
With respect to Carlito’s mother, it bears noting that she underscoring supplied)
declared at the witness stand that she was not married
to Juan Kho who died in 1959. Again, that testimony was Hence, while the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103
not challenged by the city prosecutor. (which governs petitions for change of name) were not
complied with, observance of the provisions of Rule 108
The documentary evidence supporting the deletion from suffices to effect the correction sought for.
Carlito’s and his siblings’ birth certificates of the entry
"Married" opposite the date of marriage of their More importantly, Carlito’s official transcript of record
parents, moreover, consisted of a certification issued on from the Urious College in Butuan City, certificate of
November 24, 1973 by St. Joseph (Butuan City) Parish eligibility from the Civil Service Commission, and voter
priest Eugene van Vught stating that Juan Kho and registration record satisfactorily show that he has been
Epifania had been living together as common law couple known by his first name only. No prejudice is thus likely
since 1935 but have never contracted marriage legally. to arise from the dropping of the second name.
A certification from the office of the city registrar, which The correction of the mother’s citizenship from Chinese
was appended to respondents’ Amended Petition, to Filipino as appearing in Carlito’s birth record was also
likewise stated that it has no record of marriage proper. Of note is the fact that during the cross
between Juan Kho and Epifania. Under the examination by the city prosecutor of Epifania, he did
circumstances, the deletion of the word "Married" not deem fit to question her citizenship. Such failure to
opposite the "date of marriage of parents" is warranted. oppose the correction prayed for, which certainly was
not respondents’ fault, does not in any way change the
With respect to the correction in Carlito’s birth adversarial nature of the proceedings.
certificate of his name from "Carlito John" to "Carlito,"
the same was properly granted under Rule 108 of the Also significant to note is that the birth certificates of
Rules of Court. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the Carlito’s siblings uniformly stated the citizenship of
cancellation or correction of entries involving changes of Epifania as "Filipino." To disallow the correction in
name falls under letter "o" of the following provision of Carlito’s birth record of his mother’s citizenship would
Section 2 of Rule 108: perpetuate an inconsistency in the natal circumstances
of the siblings who are unquestionably born of the same
Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction.— mother and father.
Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in
the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) Outside the ambit of substantial corrections, of course,
births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separation; is the correction of the name of Carlito’s wife from
(e) judgments of annulment of marriage; (f) judgments "Maribel" to "Marivel." The mistake is clearly clerical or
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) typographical, which is not only visible to the eyes, but
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of is also obvious to the understanding considering that
natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or the name reflected in the marriage certificate of Carlito
recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial and his wife is "Marivel."
determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of

Apropos is Yu v. Republic which held that changing the abeyance" by Malacañang in view of the question
appellant’s Christian name of "Sincio" to "Sencio" relating to the citizenship of respondent Gregory S. Ong.
amounts merely to the righting of a clerical error. The There is no indication whatever that the appointment
change of name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu to has been cancelled by the Office of the President.
Emperatriz Labayo was also held to be a mere innocuous
alteration, which can be granted through a summary On May 19, 2007, the major daily publications reported
proceeding. The same ruling holds true with respect to that respondent Executive Secretary stated that the
the correction in Carlito’s marriage certificate of his appointment is "still there except that the validation of
father’s name from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho." Except in the issue is being done by the Judicial and Bar Council
said marriage certificate, the name "Juan Kho" was (JBC)."
uniformly entered in the birth certificates of Carlito and
of his siblings. Petitioners contend that the appointment extended to
respondent Ong through respondent Executive
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Secretary is patently unconstitutional, arbitrary,
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. whimsical and issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese

citizen, that this fact is plain and incontestable, and that
his own birth certificate indicates his Chinese
citizenship. Petitioners attached a copy of said birth
KILOSBAYAN VS. ONG certificate as Annex "H" to the petition. The birth
G.R. NO. 177721 certificate, petitioners add, reveals that at the time of
JULY 3, 2007 respondent Ong’s birth on May 25, 1953, his father was
Meiki , Merlin Chinese and his mother was also Chinese.
Petitioners invoke the Constitution:

FACTS:
Section 7 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
On May 16, 2007, respondent Executive Secretary, in provides that "No person shall be appointed Member of
representation of the Office of the President, announced the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless
an appointment in favor of respondent Gregory S. Ong he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines ."Sec. 2 of
as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court to fill up the Art. IV defines "natural-born citizens as those who are
vacancy created by the retirement on April 28, 2007 of citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. The appointment perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
was reported the following day, May 17, 2007, by the Citizenship."
major daily publications.
Petitioners maintain that even if it were granted that
On May 18, 2007, the major daily publications reported eleven years after respondent Ong’s birth his father was
that the appointment was "recalled" or "held in finally granted Filipino citizenship by naturalization,

that, by itself, would not make respondent Ong a
natural-born Filipino citizen. Ong’s Comment:
Petitioners thereupon pray that a writ of certiorari be Respondent Ong submitted his Comment with
issued annulling the appointment issued to respondent Opposition, maintaining that he is a natural-born
Ong as Associate Justice of this Court. Filipino citizen; that petitioners have no standing to file
the present suit; and that the issue raised ought to be
Subsequently, on May 24, 2007, petitioners filed an addressed to the JBC as the Constitutional body
Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary mandated to review the qualifications of those it
Restraining Order (TRO), praying that a TRO be issued, recommends to judicial posts. Furthermore, the
in accordance with the Rules of Court, to prevent and petitioners in his view failed to include the President
restrain respondent Executive Secretary from releasing who is an indispensable party as the one who extended
the appointment of respondent Ong, and to prevent and the appointment.
restrain respondent Ong from assuming the office and
discharging the functions of Associate Justice of this As to his citizenship, respondent Ong traces his
Court. ancestral lines to one Maria Santos of Malolos, Bulacan,
born on November 25, 1881, who was allegedly a
Executive Secretary’s Comment: Filipino citizen5 who married Chan Kin, a Chinese
citizen; that these two had a son, Juan Santos; that in
Respondent Executive Secretary accordingly filed his 1906 Chan Kin died in China, as a result of which Maria
Comment, essentially stating that the appointment of Santos reverted to her Filipino citizenship; that at that
respondent Ong as Associate Justice of this Court on time Juan Santos was a minor; that Juan Santos thereby
May 16, 2007 was made by the President pursuant to also became a Filipino citizen;6 that respondent Ong’s
the powers vested in her by Article VIII, Section 9 of the mother, Dy Guiok Santos, is the daughter of the spouses
Constitution, thus: Juan Santos and Sy Siok Hian, a Chinese citizen, who
were married in 1927; that, therefore, respondent’s
SEC. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and Judges mother was a Filipino citizen at birth; that Dy Guiok
of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from Santos later married a Chinese citizen, Eugenio Ong Han
a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial Seng, thereby becoming a Chinese citizen; that when
and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments respondent Ong was eleven years old his father, Eugenio
need no confirmation. Ong Han Seng, was naturalized, and as a result he, his
brothers and sisters, and his mother were included in
Respondent Executive Secretary added that the the naturalization.
President appointed respondent Ong from among the
list of nominees who were duly screened by and bore Respondent Ong subsequently obtained from the Bureau
the imprimatur of the JBC created under Article VIII, of Immigration and the DOJ a certification and an
Section 8 of the Constitution. Said respondent further identification that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen
stated: "The appointment, however, was not released, under Article IV, Sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution,
but instead, referred to the JBC for validation of since his mother was a Filipino citizen when he was
respondent Ong’s citizenship." born.

Petitioners, in turn, filed a Consolidated Reply, in which naturalization papers of his father. His birth certificate
they asserted their standing to file this suit on the states that he was a Chinese citizen at birth and that his
strength of previous decisions of this Court, e.g., mother, Dy Guiok Santos, was a Chinese citizen and his
Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona8 and Kilosbayan, father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was also a Chinese
Incorporated v. Morato,9 on the ground that the case is citizen.
one of transcendental importance. They claim that the
President’s appointment of respondent Ong as Supreme It was on the basis of these allegations under oath and
Court Justice violates the Constitution and is, therefore, the submitted evidence of naturalization that this Court
attended with grave abuse of discretion amounting to allowed respondent Ong to take the oath as a lawyer.
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Finally, they reiterate that
respondent Ong’s birth certificate, unless corrected by It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court,
judicial order in non-summary proceedings for the respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The
purpose, is binding on all and is prima facie evidence of alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born
what it states, namely, that respondent Ong is a Chinese status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot
citizen. The alleged naturalization of his father when he amend the final decision of the trial court stating that
was a minor would not make him a natural-born Filipino respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along
citizen. with his father.
Furthermore, as petitioners correctly submit, no

ISSUE: substantial change or correction in an entry in a civil
register can be made without a judicial order, and, under
Whether or not respondent Ong is a natural-born the law, a change in citizenship status is a substantial
Filipino citizen. NO change.
Republic Act No. 9048 provides in Section 2 (3) that a

HELD: summary administrative proceeding to correct clerical or
typographical errors in a birth certificate cannot apply
He is still required to submit evidentiary documents. to a change in nationality. Substantial corrections to the
nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the civil
In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar, registry should, therefore, be effected through a
docketed as B.E. No. 1398-N filed on September 14, petition filed in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of
1979, under O.R. No. 8131205 of that date, respondent Court.
Ong alleged that he is qualified to be admitted to the
Philippine bar because, among others, he is a Filipino The series of events and long string of alleged changes
citizen; and that he is a Filipino citizen because his in the nationalities of respondent Ong’s ancestors, by
father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, a Chinese citizen, was various births, marriages and deaths, all entail factual
naturalized in 1964 when he, respondent Ong, was a assertions that need to be threshed out in proper
minor of eleven years and thus he, too, thereby became judicial proceedings so as to correct the existing records
a Filipino citizen. As part of his evidence, in support of on his birth and citizenship. The chain of evidence would
his petition, be submitted his birth certificate and the have to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ong’s

mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still
appears in the records of this Court. Respondent Ong
has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral
tree as well as his citizenship under the time-line of
three Constitutions. Until this is done, respondent Ong
cannot accept an appointment to this Court as that
would be a violation of the Constitution. For this reason,
he can be prevented by injunction from doing so.

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The MR of the petitioners was denied; hence, they filed a

RULE 72 petition forcertiorari, contending that:

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Facts: Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion,

Thereafter, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed RULING:

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REYES vs. SOTERO

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CALMA VS. TANEDO 1) Institution of testate or intestate proceedings for the

FACTS: In the present case, a testamentary proceeding was already

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"SEC. 596. Settlement of intestate estates, without

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(1) whether or not the complaint for annulment of the Deed of

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It is argued that as the action was instituted almost four

The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of FACTS:

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ISSUE: GUEVARRA VS. GUEVARRA

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MALOLES II VS. PHILLIPS ISSUE:

REPUBLIC VS. MARCOS

DE GUZMAN VS. LIMCOLIOC

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(b) if such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or

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