Arc Flash Personal Protective Equipment

Applying Risk Management Principles - II

Daniel Roberts
Copyright Material IEEE
Paper No. ESW2011-22

Member, IEEE
Schneider Electric Canada Inc.
6675 Rexwood Road
Mississauga, ON L4V IVI
daniel.roberts@ca.schneider-electric.com

Abstract - Arc flash personal protective equipment is
generally selected based on one of two methods: an incident
energy analysis method or a hazard/risk category method.
Neither method adequately addresses the deployment of arc
flash personal protective equipment using risk management
principles and processes.
The obj ective of this paper is to identify and apply risk
management principles and methodology found in current
standards to assist with the selection of arc flash personal
protective equipment and to determine when deployment of the
arc flash protective equipment is warranted.
Index terms - acceptable risk, arc flash, electrical safety,
hazard assessment, hazard/risk categories, risk analysis, risk
assessment, risk evaluation, risk management, risk control
I. INTRODUCTION
Safety is "freedom from unacceptable risk" [1]. It is
generally recognized by work-practice safety standards,
equipment safety standards, health and safety professionals
and even society in general that there is no absolute safety.
To achieve a situation of zero occupational health and safety
risk in the workplace is impossible. Every workplace and
work activity has inherent risks.
In the field of occupational health and safety the objective
is absence from harm. Managing safety risk focuses on
reducing risk by applying the hierarchy of risk control
methods to achieve an acceptable level of risk. The concept
of an acceptable level of risk is sometimes referred to as risk
that is as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) [3]. It must
be acknowledged that not all workplace parties readily
embrace the term "acceptable risk," preferring to call it
"effective risk reduction."
CSA Z1002 Occupation health and safety hazard
identification and elimination and risk assessment and
control, currently undergoing development, has as its scope
the objective of specifying "requirements for identification
and elimination of occupational health and safety hazards,
and assessment and control of the associated risks." This
standard borrows the risk management principles and terms
from the following standards:
ISO 31000 Risk management - principles and guidelines
ISO 14121-1 Principles of risk assessment for machinery
ISO Guide 51 Safety aspects - Guidelines for their
inclusion in standards
ISO/IEC Guide 73 Risk management vocabulary
This paper will describe how the principles being
developed in CSA Z1002 can be applied to arc flash risk, and
in particular, to the selection of arc flash personal protective
equipment (PPE).
For consistency and clarity the following definitions found
in CSA Z1002 will apply in this paper:
Consequence - outcome of an event
Harm - physical injury or damage to health
Hazard - a source potential of harm to a worker
Risk - combination of the likelihood of the occurrence of
harm and the severity of that harm
Source - item or activity having a potential for a
consequence
II. RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS
The following is a general overview of the iterative risk
management process found in CSA Z1002 and shown in
Figure 1.
A. Establish the Risk Assessment Context
Risk cannot be managed in a vacuum. Effective risk
management requires criteria or a term of reference against
which the significance of a risk is evaluated.
Relevant occupational health and safety risk criteria can
include social, political, legal, regulatory, financial,
technological and economic factors as well as an
organization's policies and objectives.
B. Risk Assessment
Risk assessment is the overall process of hazard
identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation.
i) Hazard Identification
Hazard identification is the process to fmd, list and
characterize hazards. Put another way: sources of harm,

978-1-4673-1059-8/11/$26.00 ©2011 IEEE

 their causes and potential consequences need to be • Identifying changes to the risk assessment context
identified. (i.e. changes in legislation, technology, etc.)
ii) Risk Analysis
Sources, causes and potential consequences are
analyzed to determine their severity and the likelihood of
I I
I
those consequences occurring. Likelihood and severity are
Establishing the conte xt
combined to determine a level of risk. The level of risk
provides input to risk evaluation.
a) Likelihood Risk assessment
The likelihood of the occurrence of an event that
could result in harm refers to the chance of something
happening, whether defined, measured or determined I Hazard identiflcation
I
objectively or subjectively, qualitatively or + Monitor

I I
and
quantitatively. Likelihood can be described using Risk analysis
revrew
general terms or mathematically (such as a probability
or a frequency over a given time period). +
b) Severity
The potential severity of harm may be objectively I Risk evaluation
I
quantified (i.e. first-degree bum, second-degree bum,
...
etc.) or subjectively qualified (i.e. minor, serious or,
major).
!
I Risk control
I
c) Level ofRisk
The level of risk is determined by combining the 1
outcome of the analysis of the likelihood that harm will
result and the potential severity of that harm. Fig. I. Risk Management Process
iii) Risk Evaluation
The level of risk is compared to the risk criteria to III. ApPLYING RISK MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES TO ARC FLASH
determine if the risk is acceptable or if risk control is HAZARDS

required. This paper will focus on applying the first three steps of
C. Risk Control the risk management process to arc flash hazards:
Risk control involves selecting one or more options to establishing the risk assessment context, risk assessment and
modify the risk to achieve a level of risk that is as low as risk control.
reasonably practicable. For occupational health and safety A. Establishing the Risk Assessment Context
risks risk control typically involves: In the context of current social, legal and regulatory
• Removing the risk source factors workplace injuries are not a desirable outcome.
• Changing the likelihood that harm may result Employers are required by regulation to exercise due
•
diligence and create a workplace free of reasonably
Changing the potential severity of the harm that may
foreseeable harm.
result
"The entirety of purpose of those responsible for safety,
D. Monitor and Review
regardless of the titles, is to identify, evaluate, and eliminate
The risk management process should be monitored and
or control hazards so that the risks deriving from those
reviewed for the purposes of:
hazards are acceptable." [3].
• Ensuring that controls are effective and efficient in
NFPA 70E-09 Electrical Safety in the Workplace [4], CSA
both design and operation
Z462-08 Workplace Electrical Safety [5] and other standards
• O btaining further information to improve risk that deal with arc flash frequently refer to the threshold
assessment incident energy predicted to cause the onset of second-degree
• Analyzing and learning lessons from events bum. This is often misinterpreted as an acceptable threshold
(including near-misses), changes, trends, successes below which arc flash risk can be tolerated without risk
and failures control. In view of the foregoing, this premise is
unacceptable.
Conclusion: Arc flash risk must be managed to achieve a
level of risk as low as reasonably practicable (sometimes
1 ISO 3 1000 Section 5.4.3 "The way in which consequences and likeli­
referred to as ALARP) [3].
hood are expressed and the way in which they are combined to determine a
level of risk should reflect the type of risk, the information available and the
purpose for which the risk assessment output is to be used."

2
B. Risk assessment The level of risk is determined by combining the
i) Hazard Identification Boolean expressions identified in the Risk Analysis for
a) Source likelihood and severity in the Boolean operation called
Arc flash hazards are described by the conjunction [AND]:
aforementioned standards as "a release of energy Likelihood 0 [AND] Severity 0 = 0 Level of Risk
caused by an electric arc." The energy released is in Likelihood 0 [AND] Severity 1 = 0 Level of Risk
the form of heat, light, and mechanical forces such as Likelihood 1 [AND] Severity 0 = 0 Level of Risk
sound and blast pressure. Current standards deal Likelihood 1 [AND] Severity 1 = 1 Level of Risk
primarily with the thermal component of arc flash iii) Risk Evaluation
energy, as will this paper. When the level of risk is "0" risk controls do not need
b) Cause to be applied as harm is not reasonably foreseeable. When
An electric arc is initiated when the insulation or the level of risk is "1" then risk controls need to be applied
isolation of an energized electrical conductor is as harm is reasonably foreseeable.
compromised; the electric arc is sustained when there is The risk evaluation could be described in a matrix as
sufficient voltage to drive the arc and available fault shown in Table 1.
2
current to feed the arc [6].
c) Potential consequence TABLE 1
LEVEL OF ARC FLASH RISK REQUIRING RISK CONTROL
Injury or death and the destruction of equipment and Likelihood of occur-
Likelihood of occur-
property. rence of harm not
rence of harrn ALARP
ii) Risk AnalysiS ALARP
Severity of Incident
a) Likelihood Energy 0 calo-
=
Risk Control Not Re- Risk Control Not Re-
quired quired
Since an arc flash event is initiated when insulation ries/cm2
or isolation of energized electrical conductors is Severity of incident
Risk Control Not Re-
compromised, the risk of an arc flash event occurring is Energy> 0 calo- Risk Control Required
2 quired
ries/cm
proportional to the likelihood that such a situation may
occur.
To simplify the risk analysis, the likelihood of an arc C. Risk Control
flash event will be qualified by the Boolean expressions The risk management process can and should be applied to
of "0" and "1," where "0" is the situation where arc flash hazards during the "design" phase (or design-review
likelihood is impossible or "as low as reasonably 3
of equipment already in use) and during the "use" phase.
practicable" and "1" is every other situation. i) Risk control during the Design Phase
b) Severity a) Likelihood
Arc flash injuries can range from minor, curable Risk control for likelihood during the design phase
burns to severe burns requiring skin grafting or and pre-use phase could include:
amputation. Death can occur when a significant • Equipment design features such as insulated bus or
portion of the victim's body is burned. distribution system design such as high-resistance
In occupational health and safety severity of harm is grounded distribution system
usually quantified by dose or magnitude of exposure. It • Testing, inspecting, commissioning to ensure the
is the magnitude of exposure that generally determines equipment is not defective and is installed per the
the severity of harm. In arc flash terms, the magnitude manufacturer's specifications and applicable codes
of exposure is currently defined as incident energy: and standards
"the amount of [thermal] energy impressed on a surface
b) Severity
a certain distance from the source, generated during an
Risk control for severity during the design phase
electrical arc event."
could include:
U sing the risk criteria that injuries are not a
• Reduce the arc flash energy by faster arcing fault
desirable outcome, any potential level of incident
interruption time
energy should receive risk control. To simplify the risk
• Divert the arc flash energy - "crowbar" the
analysis outcome, absence of incident energy will be
qualified by the Boolean expression "0," any incident conductors to collapse the voltage and extinguish
energy above zero will be qualified by the Boolean the arcing event
expression "1." • Contain the arc flash energy through arc resistant
c) Level ofRisk design

2 IEEE 1584 Section 4.2 and 9.3.2 3 ISOIlEC Guide 5 1: 1999(E) Section 6 and Figure 2

3
 • Create distance between personnel and the arc
flash energy through the use of remote operation
and remote racking
The above lists are by no means exhaustive. Safety by
design (inherently safe design) is a topic on its own that
has been and should continue to be developed.
ii) Risk Treatment during the "Use" Phase
a) Remove the risk source
De-energize electrical equipment before beginning
work.
The importance of this risk control option cannot be
overstated. Experience has shown that far too many arc
flash mJunes occur when work is performed
unnecessarily on energized electrical equipment.
Note: Some risk control measures can of themselves
introduce additional risks. The process of de-
energizing has inherent risks.
b) Likelihood
Risk control for likelihood during the "use: phase
could include:
•
Adequate maintenance and inspection of electrical
distribution equipment and conductors to minimize
the probability of insulation or isolation of
energized conductors being compromised.
c) Severity
Risk control for severity during the "use" phase
could include:
• Training, education and methodology to ensure
that when a fuse is replaced the correct model and
type is used; or if an overcurrent relay's settings
are temporarily adjusted for testing or other
purposes that they are returned to the correct
settings. Example: An incorrect fuse replacement
can significantly increase the duration of an arcing
fault event with a commensurate increase in the arc
flash energy.
• Routine testing of overcurrent protective relays
and their associated interrupting device (i.e. circuit
breaker) to ensure the pick-up and timing
characteristics are within tolerance.
• Contain the energy with arc flash blankets.
• Use of personal protective equipment rated for the
potential severity of the arc flash energy. In
harmony with the hierarchy of occupational health
and safety risk elimination and control principles,
this should be the last option explored.
IV. DETERMINING ARC FLASH PERSONAL PROTECTIVE
EQUIPMENT NEEDS USING RISK MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES
As shown in Section III of this paper, personal protective
equipment is a risk control option for severity, not likelihood.
Personal protective equipment selection is based on the
equipment performance meeting or exceeding the exposure
potential. [7] Whether or not the personal protective equip-
4
ment is required in a given work situation would be the result
of estimating the likelihood.
To summarize:
Severity of exposure determines PPE selection
Likelihood of exposure determines PPE deployment
A. Estimating Arc Flash Severity
O ne method to determine the potential severity of an arc
flash event is referred to as an incident energy analysis. This
method generally involves the use of complex formulas.
Examples of these formulas and sample calculations can be
found in IEEE 1584 and in Annex D of NFPA 70E-09 and
CSA Z462-08. While this method provides relatively reliable
4
consequence data, it is best done with the use of software by
someone skilled in the use and evaluation of such formulas.
Incident energy estimation tables are another method of
providing an estimate of incident energy exposure levels for
workers that do not possess the means or skill sets to perform
incident energy calculations. While there are many
parameters used in current calculation methods, incident
energy is generally the product of the short circuit current, the
arcing fault duration and the distance of the worker from the
electric arc (known as the "working distance"). If the
electrical worker can estimate the short circuit current and the
time it will take the over-current device to interrupt arcing
fault, then he or she can use an incident energy estimation
table where those parameters have been used to provide
estimates of incident energy levels for various typical
5 6
scenarios. NFPA 70E-09 Tables D.9.1 and D.9.2 (CSA
Z462-08 Tables D.8 and D.9) are examples of incident
energy estimation tables where this premise has been used.
To a limited extent this premise was also used by the
creators of the hazard/risk category method found in NFPA
70E-09 and CSA Z462-08. As indicated in NFPA 70E-09
7
Article 130.7(C)(9) Fine Print Note No. 1 : the protective
clothing and equipment specified by the hazard/risk category
method "were generally based on a determination of
estimated exposure levels." However, the Fine Print Note
goes on to state that where the "risk" (i.e. likelihood) of an
arc flash event occurring was unlikely, very unlikely or
extremely unlikely the PPE has been reduced one, two or
three levels respectively. A reduction in the protection
4 Incident energy calculation methods are an evolving science. The cal­
culation method most often referred to is found in the standard IEEE 1584
Guide for Performing Arc Flash Hazard Calculations. At best, this and other
peer reviewed methods should be viewed as 'best available estimates' of
potential incident energy exposures.
5 Table D.9. 1 Low-Voltage Systems - Maximum Three-Phase Bolted­
Fault Current Limits at Various System Voltages and Fault-Clearing Times
of Circuit Breakers, for the Recommended Use of HazardlRisk Category
(HRC) 2 and HRC 4 Personal Protective Equipment in an "Arc in a Box"
Situation.
6 Table D.9.2 High-Voltage Systems - Maximum Three-Phase Bolted­
Fault Current Limits at Various System Voltages and Fault-Clearing Times
of Circuit Breakers, for the Recommended Use of Hazard / Risk Category
(HRC) 2 and HRC 4 Personal Protective Equipment in an "Arc in a Box"
Situation
7 See also CSA Z462-08 Clause 4.3.7.3.9 Note 1
afforded by personal protective equipment is not consistent of operation, environment the equipment is located
with risk management principles. This principle is reinforced in, etc.
by a comment made in the 2011 Annual Revision Cycle As shown in Section III of this paper, probability can be
NFPA Report on Proposals by Mr. David M. Wallis of the qualified by the Boolean expressions of "0" and "1," where
US Department of Labor: "The fact that it is a component [of "0" is the situation where probability is impossible or "as low
the task based tables] does not justify that risk should be used as reasonably practicable," and "1" is every other situation.
to lower protection. The likelihood that an arc flash will Some activities involving interactions with energized
occur is not relevant to how much protection should be equipment could be characterized as "normal" operating
provided but only to whether protection should be required at interactions. The equipment was designed to be inherently
all." [8] safe while operated within the design parameter, provided
Table 2 is an example of an incident energy estimation that the condition of the equipment is also "normal." An
table. Incident energy levels have been estimated for 480 V example of a "normal" operating interaction is circuit breaker
and 600 V Class switchgear using various typical short circuit or fused switch operation with the enclosure door closed.
currents and typical fault clearing times. Similar tables can Provided the equipment condition is "normal," circuit breaker
be developed for other types and voltage classes of or fused switch operation with the enclosure door closed the
equipment. The table can be modified to substitute typical risk is "as low as reasonably practicable."
transformer sizes and impedances in the place of short circuit "Normal" operating interactions can be qualified by the
currents. Boolean expression "0."
TABLE 2
Some activities involving interactions with energized
INCIDENT ENERGY ESTIMATION TABLE - 480 & 600 V CLASS
SWITCHGEAR electrical equipment can be characterized as "abnormal"
Short Circuit Fault clearing time (seconds) operating interactions. The activity is outside the equipment
Current (kA) 0.5 0.33 0. 1
"normal" operating parameter. An example of an "abnormal"
activity is removal of a bolted cover to expose energized
65 74 cal/cm2 49 cal/cm2 IS cal/cm2
electrical conductors.
55 63 cal/cm2 42 cal/cm2 13 cal/cm2
"Abnormal" operating interactions can be qualified by the
45 52 cal/cm2 34 cal/cm2 11 cal/cm2 Boolean expression "l."
35 4 1 cal/cm2 27 cal/cm2 8. 1 cal/cm2 The same logic can be applied to the condition of the
25 30 cal/cm2 20 cal/cm2 5.8 cal/cm2 electrical equipment. A "normal" condition would be a state
15 20 cal/cm2 12 cal/cm2 3.6 cal/cm2 approximating the original manufactured condition (i.e.
properly maintained) and manufacturer's operating
Notes: conditions (i.e. covers in place).
1. This table is provided for example purposes only. The calculations and
Deciding to deploy arc flash personal protective
assumptions have not been peer reviewed.
2. The incident energy has been estimated for solidly grounded electrical equipment can be determined by the combination of activity
distribution systems using the method found in IEEE 1584 and condition using the Boolean operation called disjunction
3. The assumed working distance 46 cm ( 18 inches)
=
(Activity O R Condition):
4. The calculations assumed zero conductor impedance
5. Incident energy results under 10 cal/cm2 have been rounded up to the Activity 0 [O R] Equipment Condition 0 = 0 Likelihood
nearest 0. 1 cal/cm2 Activity 1 [O R] Equipment Condition 0 = 1 Likelihood
6. Incident energy results over 10 cal/cm2 have been rounded up to the Activity 0 [O R] Equipment Condition 1 1 Likelihood
nearest 1 cal/cm2
=

Activity 1 [O R] Equipment Condition 1 = 1 Likelihood

A result of "0" would not require the use of arc flash
B. Estimating Arc Flash Likelihood personal protective equipment, a result of "1" would require
The likelihood of an arc flash event is proportional to the the use of arc flash personal protective equipment. Table 3
probability that the insulation or isolation of an energized provides an overview of this concept. Table 4 expands on the
conductor may be compromised. Factors affecting likelihood concept using the task based risk estimation information
can be grouped into two broad, but interrelated categories: found in NFPA 70E-09 Table 130.7(C)(9) and CSA Z462-08
8
1. Activities involving interactions with energized Table 4.
equipment. Examples of activity factors are found
in NFPA 70E-09 Table 130.7(C)(9) and CSA TABLE 3
Z462-08 Table 4. RISK GUIDE FOR DETERMINING WHEN TO USE ARC FLASH PER­
SONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT
2. The condition of the electrical distribution
Normal Equipment Abnormal Equipment
equipment, such as state of maintenance, frequency Condition Condition
Normal Operating Arc Flash PPE not Arc Flash PPE Re-
Interaction Required auired
Abnormal Operating Arc Flash PPE Re- Arc Flash PPE Re-
8 See NFPA 70E-09 & CSA Z462-08 Definition "Arc flash hazard" Fine Interaction quired auired
Print Note No. 1

5
 TAB LE 4
TASK BASED RISK GUIDE FOR DETERMINING WHEN TO U SEAR C F LASH PER SONAL P ROTECTIVEEQUIPMEN T
Normal Equipment Abnormal Equipment
Condition Condition

• Conductors in a guarded or enclosed • Conductors not in a guarded or enclosed

condition
• Installation compliant with applicable
codes, standards and manufac-
turer's instructions
• Equipment state of maintenance
compliant with manufacturer's in-
structions
• Equipment known to be free of elec-
trical faults (overload, short circuit)
• Conductor insulation and isolation
not susoect
Testing control components:s; 120 V (Note 1)
.!. =
•
condition
• Installation not compliant with applicable
codes, standards and manufacturer's in-
structions
• Equipment state of maintenance not com-
pliant with manufacturer's instructions
• Equipment may not be free of electrical
faults (overload, short circuit)
• Conductor insulation and isolation suspect
(deterioration due to contaminates or
environmental conditions)

.. = Arc Flash PPE not Required Arc Flash PPE not Required
.. -. • Programming or reading a panel meter (Note 1)
.. ....
c.. .. • Ooerating a panel meter switch (Note 1)
o �
-;� • Opening hinged doors/covers where use of tools
e..s not required
.. CIl Arc Flash PPE not Required Arc Flash PPE Required
= = • Operating circuit breakers, fused switches or
Z .-
contactors rated < 1 kV
• Work on energized conductors, including volt-
age testing
• Opening hinged doors/covers where use of tools
CIl required
=
;: Operating circuit breakers, fused switches or
.. •
.. =
.. - contactors rated> 1 kV
c...=
Ot: • Removal of bolted covers
-; f Arc Flash PPE Required Arc Flash PPE Required
• Insertion or removal of individual MCC starter
e�=
.. - "buckets,"
=
= Insertion or removal of busway plug-in devices
.Q
•

0( • Insertion or removal (racking) of power circuit

breakers
• Installation of personal protective grounding
equipment
Notes.
1. Due to the nature of these activities or the voltage level involved it is unlikely that an arc flash event would occur regardless of the condition of the
electrical equipment.

V. CONCLUSION V I. VITA

Risk management principles and process can be applied to
any type of risk, including arc flash risk.
When applied at the design or design review phase of
electrical distribution equipment risk management principles
and process can facilitate the identification of opportunities to
reduce arc flash energy levels and to decrease the likelihood
of an arc flash event occurring.
Applying risk management principles and methodology to
the selection of arc flash personal protective equipment
ensures that:
1. Severity of exposure is used to select the required
protective value of the personal protective
equipment.
Daniel Roberts is the National Safety Manager for
Schneider Electric Canada Services and Projects Division.
An Electronics Engineering Technician with 15 years of field
experience working on industrial and commercial power
distribution systems, he is also a graduate of Ryerson
University's O ccupational Health and Safety Certificate
Program.
Daniel serves on various Canadian Standards Association
(CSA) technical committees and sub-committees including
Canadian Electrical Code Part 1 and serves as the vice-chair
of CSA Z462-08Workplace Electrical Safety Technical
Committee. He teaches electrical safety as a virtual faculty
member for CSA. Daniel is an IEEE and ASSE member.

2. Likelihood of exposure is used to determine when

deployment of the personal protective equipment is
warranted.

6
 V II. REFERENCES
Standards:
[1] ISO/IEC Guide 5I:I999(E) Safety aspects - Guidelines for their
inclusion in standards
[2] ISO 31000:2009(E) Risk management - Principles and guidelines
[4] NFPA 70E-09 Electrical Safety in the Workplace
[5] CSA Z462-08 Workplace Electrical Safety
[6] IEEE 1584 Guide to performing arcjlash calculations

Periodicals:
[3] F. A. Manuele; "Acceptable Risk - Time for SH&E professionals to
adopt tbe concept," ASSE Professional Safety; page 30; May 2010
[7] H. Landis Floyd II, "Arc Flash - Designing and implementing an
effective mitigation program," ASSE Professional Safety; page 33;
November 2010

Other:
[8] NFPA Report on Proposals, 2011 Annual Revision Cycle