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AIRLINER JANUARY·MARCH 1991

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 The Last Two Minutes
Flighl Opera/ions Eng;netr;ng
Boeing Commercial Airplane Group

Walt Blake Richard L. El/iotl

anding a commercial jet airplane can be the most

L dimc~h tas~ l~~ ~rew faces on a da~.lo-day basis.

Restncted vIsibility, traffic congesuon, wind and
wet and slippery runways are just a few aCme factors the
crew must contend with. Approximately half of all
aircraft accidents occur during the final approach and
landing. This article deals with preventing the landing
overrun accidenL It reviews some of the basic principles
of airplane perfonnance during the landing rollout, and
bow approach, fiart: and touchdown influence the {mal
stopping maneuver. The objective is to help crews better
understand the stopping capabilities and limitations of
their airplane, and to be better prepared to cope with the
landing situations they may encounter.
ACCIDENT: A fast and steep approach was made
to the .....et 7,850-fool runway. Threshold speed was
170 knots. Touchdown ...'as l,roJ reet beyond the:
normal touchdown point. There was evidence of
hydroplaning. Full reverse thrust was not used until
the airplane neared thec:nd of the runway. Theairplanc:
o\erran the runway. slid down a JO..root embankmeru
and collapsed all thr~ landing gear. One engine
separated from the airplane. There was a large: fuel
leak, but no fire.

AlRUNER/JAN·MAR 1991 1
APPROACH AND LANDING SAFETY
STATISTICS
During the past three decades, the westem-built jet fleet
has experienced 389 in-service accidents during final
approach and landing. These accidents resulted in 159
hull write-offs and 3,423 fatalities. Approximately one
half of these accidents occurred in the landing phase. The
investigating authorities assigned primary responsibility
to the flight crew in approximately 70% of these
accidents. There can be no mistake. The final approacb
and landing phases are statistically the most dangerous
part of the flight profile.
There were five landing overrun accidents during 1959.
This problem does not seem to be solved. The rate of
landing overrun accidents is about one per 3.6 miUion
flights. This rate would project one landing overrun
accident every three months for 1990, where the westem-
built jet fleet is eJlpected to make 14,000,000 flights (see
Table I.). We must make every reasonable effort to
reduce this number.
1959 Thru 1989 Proiected 1990
Flights 2I8.()()().()()() 14,000,000
Landing Overrun
Accidents 60 4 Excess approach speed carried onto the runway will
Table 1. Landing overrun accident summary.
The circumstances surrounding each of the past overrun
accidents were unique to the situation but there appear
to be some common threads. Onen, a series of factors
such as poor visibility, turbulent winds during approach
and rollout, and/or contaminated runway surfaces were
involved. In addition, there were usually deviations from
recommended procedures caused by ATC requirements,
or initiated by the crew, that compounded the difficulty
of the situation. The common crew procedural deviations
included eJlcess speed, unstable approach, excess height
over tbe end of the runway, and incorrect stopping
technique. While the crew cannot control the weather,
the wind, or ATC during approach, perhaps they could
have made the decision to go around if they were not
satisfied with the conditions they were experiencing. That
was their choice.
APPROACH
It has been said many times that a good landing begins
with a good approach. A good approach is stabilized at
least by the time the airplane is SOO feet above the
runway. This is approximately one minute prior to
touchdown. It includes flight on the glide path
(instrument or visual), a steady rate of descent (500-800
feet per minute), and speed stabilized at the correct value.
If the approach is on the /lumbers, thrust will be set and
tbeairplane will be in trim. The crew can then be mentally
ahead of the airplane and more able to mollitor the
2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - AIRLINER/JAN.MAR 1991
airplane's progress, other traffic or any other factors that
might affect the landing.
Approach Speed
A very common ingredient of landing overrun accidents
is excess approach speed. Boeing recommends an
approach speed of Vref + 5 knots with calm or light and
variable winds reported. The 5 knots should be bled ofT
as the airplane approaches touchdown. The general wind
correction is one half of the steady tower-reported
headwind component plus aU of the gusl value. The
steady wind correction sbould be bled off as the airplane
approacbes touchdown while the gust correction is
carried onto the runway. The total approach speed
correction should not exceed 20 knots. No wind
correction should be made for tailwinds.
Some crews have become complacent about the 5 knot
addition to Vref that is recommended for the approach
in calm or light and variable wind. They have become
so accustomed to using this correction that it has
subconsciously become the standard approach speed.
They add the wind and gust correction to Vref + 5. This
is not correct. The wind and gust corrections to approach
speed should be applied only to Vref.
increase the minimum stopping distance required by
20-30 feet per knot for a dry runway and 40-50 feet for
a wet runway. Worse yet, the excess speed will increase
the chances of an extended flare, which will increase the
distance to touchdown by approximately 200 feet for each
knot of speed bled ofT prior to touchdown (see Figure I).
If the landing is planned with an approach speed of Vref
+ 5 and an autobrakes 3 stop, the airplane will stop
comfortably within the FAR wet field length provided
the touchdown is on targel.
If the final approach is in fact 10 knots fasler than
planned, autobroker 3 will not Stop the airplane within
the FAR wet distance. The crew will need to override
the autobrakes. increase the braking to conclude the stop
within the FAR distance.
Approach Path Control
Another common error contributing to landing overrun
accidents is excessive height over the threshold. This
could be the result of an unsteady approach, or a stable
but high approach. It may occur during an instrument
approach where the missed approach point is close to or
at the threshold. Regardless of the cause, excessive height
over the threshold will most likely result in a touchdown
beyond the normal aiming point. If the airplane is stable
and two dots high at the middle marker, and this
deviation is carried to touchdown, the landing will use
1,100 feet more runway than if the airplane had been on
the glide slope (see Figure 2).
 n7-300FLAPS 40 l'
110.000 LBS
SEA LEVEL
V"PPR "VREF
WET RUNWAY
t I

+ 5 KT$
""-' FAR WET
-....... TO FIELD LENGTH Figure I. The effetl of excess
-_..........
~==.:"-=:..-_--_!- approach speed on landing
distance.
~ ,.,t"...... ~
II
I _.~ I
VAPPR +10~====::f:'..
I I
+1°1~...=---=
lIt U1~'''''' "_110 lIlI'IAttCI.
III ""'0-...........<:fU:I<A.!OI<

Figure 2. The effetl of a high

approach path.

Unacceptable Approacb?...
Go Around!
The approach leads to the flare, the touchdown and the
stop. If Ibe approach is nol stable and on track (Le. on
the numbers), Boeing recommends thai a go-around be
considered. Only the crew can make this decision. There
are times when it may be possible to make a good landing
from a difficull or bad approach. But, there are many
cases where a go-around reflects good judgement more
that it shows bad performance.
ACClDENT: Heavy rain obscured the far halfof the
runway. The tower reported a 20 knot crosswind. The
airplane encountered heavy turbulence during
approach. The airplane touched down nose gear first
at a speed of 160 knots. The nose gear collapsed and
the airplane stopped on the runway. There was
substantial damage to the forward ponion of the
airplane and FOe damage to both engines.

AIRLINER/JAN.MAR 1991 ---------------------3

nARE AND TOUCHDOWN
The nare reduces the approach rate of descent to a
more acceptable rate for touchdown. Many pilotS try
to achieve an excessively smoolh touchdown. Boeing
recommends the somewhat more fum touchdown. A
smooth touchdown may please the passengers, but
there are significant advantages 10 a finner touchdown
where landing performance is considered. A firm
touchdown as used in this article, does not mean a hard
landing, but rather a deliberate or positive landing.
Flare
For most airports, the airplane will pass over the end
of the runway with the landing gear 3045 feel above
!.he surface. depending upon the landing Oap setting
and the location of the touchdown zone. It will take
5-7 seconds from the time the airplane passes the end
of the runway until touchdown. The nare is initiated
by increasing the pitch attitude by approximately
3 degrees when the landing gear is appro:timately
IS feet above the runway surface. The thrust is
smoothly reduced to idle as the flare progresses.
The normal speed bleedoff during the time between
passing the end of the runway and touchdown is
5 knots. Most of the decrease occurs during the flare
when thrust is reduced. If the flare is extended while
an additional 10 knots of speed is bled ofT, 2,000 feet
of runway will be wasted (see Figure 3). Had the same
10 knots deceleration been done during braking on the
ground, the runway used would have been as little as
200 feet. The extended nare will also result in
additional pitch attitude which may lead to a tail strike.
It is imperative to fly the airplane onto the runway at
the target point, even if the speed is excessive.
TOUCliDOWN
ON TARGET
10 KNOTS OECELERATION
~ ON GROUND (MAXIMUM BRAKING)
--,-,-,-,
I-I 200 fEET (DRY RUNWAY)
SOO FEET (WET RUNWAY)
EXTENDED
fLARE
----1-""fEET-1
10 KNOT'S DECELERATION
'-- IN FLARE
------------....-
(AIR)
4---------------------
Pilots must learn the flare characteristics ofeach model
of airplane they fly. The visual reference cues observed
from each cockpit are different because window
geometry and visibility are different. The geometric
relationship between the pilot's eye and the landing
gear will be different for each model. It is essential to
coordinate the flare maneuver to begin at the proper
height - not too high and not 100 low.
Beginning the flare too high or reducing the thrust too
early may result in the airplane floating beyond the
target touchdown point at a nose high attitude as the
crew attempts to prevent a high sink rate touchdown.
This can lead to a tail strike (see Figure 4).
The flare that is initiated too late may result in a hard
touchdown or may include a rapid pitch up as a result
of a desperate attempt 10 arrest the sink rate. [n either
case, the airplane will not be in the correct condition
to begin the stop.
Proper thrust management through the flare is also an
important factor. With many airplanes, the engines
produce a noticeable effect on pitch trim when the
thrust setting is changed. A rapid change in the thrust
setting requires a quick elevator response. If the thrust
levers are moved to idle too quickly during the flare,
the pilot flying must make rapid changes in pitch
control. If the thrust levers are moved more slowly,
the elevator input can be more easily coordinated.
Toucbdown
A good approach and flare positions the airplane to
touch down in the target zone. This is usually 1,000
to 1,500 feel beyond the threshold, depending upon the
arrangement of the particular runway. In most landing
overrun cases, the touchdown was far beyond the
larget zone. If the final approach is high or fast and
Figure J. The distance
required to decelerate 10 knots.
AlRLlNER/JAN·MAR 1991
 the crew is attempting a smooth touchdown, there will
be an increased chance that the touchdown will be
beyond the target zone. One need only observe the
extent of the spread of the rubber deposits on most
runways to gel an idea of how many touchdowns are
long and by how far (see Figure 5). Boeing recommends
a deliberate touchdown be planned and practiced on
every flight. A positive touchdown will help prevent
an extended nare.
Once the main wheels have contacted the runway, the
crew must maintain directional control, initiate the
stopping procedures and promptly lower the nose
wheel to the runway. Lowering the nose quickly helps
in several ways. First, the nose wheel will assist in
maintaining directional conlrol. Secondly, lowering
the nose decreases the wing angle of attack, decreasing
the lift, placing more load onto the tires, thereby
increasing the lire-ta-ground friction.
AIRLINER/JAN·MAR 1991 ------------
ACCIDENT: The airplane touched down 6,500 feet
beyond the runway threshold. Approach speed was
higher than normal. The airplane came to rest 100 feet
10 the left of and 100 feel beyond the end of the
9.800.foot long runway. The runway was dry and the
wind was 8 knots. The right main landing gear, the
nose gear and the No.2 engine separated. There was
extensive damage 10 the lower fuselage and a
subsequent fire.
LANDING DISfANCE
The distance used 10 land and stop the airplane is the sum
of the air and ground distances. Airplane certification
establishes the minimum landing field length required.
The pilot's use of the runway available determines
whether or not the landing concludes safely or as an
overrun accident.
figure 4. Pitch attitude ror a tail strike.
Figure S. Rubber marks on the approach
ends of runways re"eal the number and
extent or long touchdowns.
5
• Cutified Landing Distan«:s
The FAA landing field length requirements are specified
in FAR 25.125. It defines the minimum field length (and
therefore minimum margins) thai can be: scheduled.
PAR 25.125 describes me landing proftJe as the disllU\CC
required from a point SO feet above: the runway threshold,
through the flarc: to touchdown, and men stopping using
the maximum slopping capability on a dry runway
surface. The actual demonstrated distance is increased by
67% and presmted in the Airplane Right Manual as the
FAR dry runway landing distance (see Figure 6). For wei
runways. the FAR dry runway distance is increased by
an additional 15%. Thus the minimum dry runway field
landing length wiU be 1.67 times the actual minimum air
and ground distance needed and the wet runway
minimum landing field length will be 1.92 limes the
minimum dry air and ground distance needed.
Certified landing field length performance is computed
for the stop made wilh speedbrakes up and maximum
wheel braking. Reverse thrust is not used in establishing
the certified FAR landing distances. However, the
reverses should defmitely be used in service. The reversers
can provide a substantial deceleration force that is
particularly useful when landing on slippery runways.
For the nonnal stop, the energy that the reversers
dissipate is energy the brakes do not have to absorb. Brake
temperatures will be reduced and brake life increased.
Operational Landing Distance
In practical tenos, the certified landing field lengths
specified for either dry or wet runway surfaces are
approximately two to three times the minimum stopping
distance needed. Imagine landing on a S,(x)()'foot wet
runway at the limit weight. The minimum stopping
6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - A l R L I N E R / J A N · M A R 1991
distance needed (i.e. using brakes, speedbrakes and
reverse) would be approximately 2,500 feet. The
touchdown aimiog point is 1,(0) feet., leaving only
1,500 feet of mDrgin. If the approach if 5 knots fast with
the flare extended such tbat louchdown occurs at the
normal speed, an additional 1,(0) feet will be lost. The
stop will then mtuire near maximum bra.Jcing and reverse
in order to avoid an o"·erron. This illustrates the
importance of avoiding ucess approach speed and an
utended flare.
The records show that mOSI landing overrun accidents
do not occur under runway limit conditions. Most
landings (and overruns) occur 00 runways that are quite
long when compared to the minimum length required.
These accidents need not and should not occur.
At the point of touchdown, the airplane represents a very
large mass that is moving al a relatively high speed. The
large lotal energy must be dissipated by the brakes, the
aerodynamic drag and the thrusl reversers. The stop must
be made on the runway that remains in front of the
airplane. The runway distance available to stop is longest
if the touchdown was on target. The energy to be
dissipated is least if there is no excess speed. The stop that
begins with a touchdown that is on tM IIlJmben will be
the easiesl slap to make for any set of conditions.
INCIDENT: The approach was flown through
heavy rain and lightning. The ta..·er reported a 2S knot
crosswind. The landing ",as made with Flaps 10.
Touchdown was reported at 196 knoLS at a point 6,lXlO
feel down the 10,800-foot runway. The airplane
overran the departure end of the runway onlO the
desert sand.
Flgure 6. FAR landing field
length required.
THE LANDING ROLLOUT
Once the airplane is on the runway, tbe job is twofold:
maintain directional control and at the same time stop.
The ability to do these two jobs successfully will depend
upon the use of a combination of aerodynamic and
ground forces. Tire-to-ground friction can be the most
important single factor in controlling and slopping the
airplane.
Both directional control and braking utilize tire-ground
friction. They share the maximum friction force the tires
can provide. [ncreasing either will subtract from tbe
other. Understanding tire-ground friction, how runway
contamination affects it. and how to use the friction
available to maximum advantage may help crews make
the right decisions in some future landing.
Speed-brakes and Auto Speedbrakes
All Boeing jetliners 8rc equipped with very effective
speedbrakes. The speedbrakes Brc a series of spoiler
panels on the upper surface of the wings, which serve two
important functions when trying to stop. Firstly, they
increase drag by 50-60%. Secondly, and most
importantly, the speedbrakes spoil much of the lift which
the wing is creating, thereby causing more of the weight
of the airplane to be loaded onto the wheels. The
speedbrakes increase wheel loading by as much as 200%
in the landing nap configuration. This increases the
tire-ground friction force, making the maximum tire
braking and cornering forces available.
Some airplanes are eqwpped with an auto speedbrake
system. This system was pioneered on the Model 737 and
introduced in the early 1970s. The auto speedbrake
system was developed to reduce crew workload and to
assure that the speed brakes are deployed soon after
touchdown. The auto speedbrakes must be armed by
moving the speedbrake handle out of the down detent
prior to touchdown. This normally is done as part of the
landing checklist. Whether extending the speedbrakes via
the automatic system or manually, it is important that
they be raised as soon as possible after touchdown.
Whenever the auto speedbrake system is used, and Boeing
strongly recommends it be used for aU landings, the crew
must confirm that the speed brakes deploy as expected.
If the automatic system fails to raise the speedbrakes they
must be promptly raised manually.
There is another method by which some crews extend the
speedbrakes. This alternate path is not recommended or
authorized. It can lead to a potentially dangerous
situation. Some auto speedbrake systems provide for
speedbrake CJl:tension when the ground safety sensor is
closed, at least two wheels have spun up, and the reverse
levers are moved to the interlock position. When these
conditions have been met, the speedbrakes will deploy
AIRLINER/JAN.MAR 1991 -------------------7
whether they are armed or not. Some crews use this
feature for their normal landings. This usually works
well, but there have been cases where considerable time
was wasted pulling on the reverse levers which refused
to release to the interlock position for lack of ground
sensing, which could be delayed due to lack of speedbrake
deployment.
ACCIDENT: The 737 touched down smoothly 1,500
feet from the threshold end of the 6,5QO.foot long
runway. The runway was very slippery. The nose was
promptly lowered and the crew attempted to initiate
reverse thrust. There was no speedbrake deployment
or wheel braking for IS seconds (despite both auto
speedbrake and auto brakes being armed and selected),
and no reverse thrust. The airplane overran the
runway, sliding down a 45-foot bank and collapsing
all landing gear. Both engines were badly damaged by
FOD. There was no fire.
Speedbrake deployment ensures the transfer of the weight
of the airplane from the wings onto the wheels,
compressing the oleos and assuring that the wheels do
spin up. Wheel spinup and/or oleo compression are
necessary in order to cause the auto speedbrake system
to deploy the speedbrakes. It can become a dangerous
cycle of one waiting for the other to happen. The best
way to avoid such a cycle is to have a firm touchdown.
This should compress the landing gear oleo sufficiently
to activate the ground sensor and will assist wheel spinup.
If the passengers complain that it was a hard landing,
explain that your policy is safety first!
Braking and Autobrake:s
All Boeing jetliners are equipped with powerful and
reliable brakes. Brake designs have been improved over
the years to keep pace with the takeoff weight increases
that have occurred. The Model 737 -pioneered the
autobrake system during the early 19705. This system is
designed 10 reduce crew workload during the
touchdown/nose down phase and assures that braking
is initiated promptly. The autobrake system is intended
to improve the consistency and smoothness of braking
during the landing rollout by modulating the brake
pressure to provide a constant pre-selected deceleration
level.
Whether an airplane is equipped with autobrakes or not,
it is important to begin braking as soon after touchdown
and wheel spinup as possible, and to smoothly continue
the braking until stopped or a safe taxi speed is reached.
Reverse Thrust
The thrust reversers can be used for two purposes; to
shorten the stopping distance or to reduce brake and tire
wear. Normally il is the latter. On very slippery or short
• runways it may be the former. Regard1es.s. reverse thnm
is most effective al high speeds and should be initiated
promptly after touchdown.
Regardless of model. lhe reversers provide an important
contribution to stopping the airplane and are normally
used on each landing. On all Boeing jetliners the net
reverse lbru.sl is significantly greater at the higher po"'er
settings than al reverse idle.
INCIDENT: Amicipalmg a relatively short runway,
the captain of the 731-300 held the reverse thrust levers
against the interlock. stops during flare. AI 10 fed radio
altitude the interlock released and reversers deployed.
The change in thrust resuhed in a rapid downward
acceleration which the captain was unable to arrest.
The airplane landed hard with no structural damage
but a number of shaken passengers, and one
embarrassed captain, who was using a familiar bUI
unauthorized 737-200 techniQue.
Landing flap Selertion
From tbe standpoint of avoiding a landing overrun, the
greater the landing nap setling, the bener. For example,
in the Model 737, the recommended approach speed for
Flaps 40 is 3-4 knots lower than V ref speeds for
Flaps 30. The higher Flaps 30 speed will increase the
minimum stopping distance by at least 200 feet on a wet
runway. The approach speed difference between Flaps 30
and Flaps 15 is 7·10 knots. This will increase the weI
runway minimum stopping distance by another 500 feet.
Crews are urged to use the maximum landing nap setting
possible (consistent with climb limit considerations)
when short runways or runway conlamination may
unduly compromise stopping distance.
STOPPING ON THE RUNWAY
There are only three forces available for stopping the
airplane. They are wheel braking, reve~ thrust and
aerodynamic braking. Altogether they can produce
nearly .5g of deceleration forces on a dry runway. For
the typical wet runway, the total may be only 75% of
the maximum dry runway force. On a slippery runway
or ice, the total force may be half or less ofthe dry runway
force.
Stopping Forces
The brakes are the most effective and therefore the most
important stopping force for most landings. When the
runway is very slippery, reverse thrust and drag may be
the dominant forces. Both reverse thrust and
aerodynamic drag are most effective at high speeds.
Neither is affected by the condition of the runway surface.
Deploying the speedbrakes increases the aerodynamic
drag and causes a large portion of the weight of the
8-----------------__
airplane to be carried by the wheels. thereby increasing
potential brake effectiveness.
The landing roUout distance will depend upon the
touchdown speed and what forces are applied and when
they are: applied. The crew controls the what and when
factors but the maximum braking force may be limited
by tire·to-ground friction.
RolJout Distance
For the V ref + 5 approach with touchdown in the target
zone, on dry or wet runways, there will be sufficient
runway to make a comfortable stop (see Figure 7). If the
runway is icy, there may not be sufficient stopping
distance available even if maximum forces are used,
depending upon the friction available.
If the approach speed is increased by 10 knots, the
minimum stopping distance is increased. The increased
speed quickly reduces the margins available even if the
maximum stopping forces are used. It also promotes the
likelihood of experiencing dynamic hydroplaning if the
runway is covered with standing water.
A long louchdown, whether it be the result ofan extended
flare or high approach, is an unnecessary and potentially
dangerous waste of runway. An approach 2 dots high
(touchdown 1,100 fe:e1long) and 10 knots extra speed will
require near maximum stopping capability to avoid an
ovenun for the limit runway case on dry or wet runways.
If the runway is icy, an ovenun is unavoidable under
these conditions.
It is easy to see that the safest stop begins with a
touchdown in the target zone at the proper speed. But
that is only the beginning of the stop. The brakes,
spe«lbrakes and reve~rs must be used promptly and
effectively.
SUMMARY
In the reDl 'NQrld of poor visibiljty, turbulence, traffic
congestion and slippery runways, crews must be a1en to
the possibility of running out of runway before the stop
can be completed. It may be diffiCult to make a decision
to go around before a stop is even attempted: bow can
one know if the nare wiJl be extended or bow slippery
the runway will be? After all, the airplane ahead made
it in all right!
~'S must be aware oftbe signs that the:irapproach may
not be proceeding as weD as it needs to be for the
conditions of the runway ahead. Judgement, based on
experience is probably the best indicator. If the approach
is creating a difficult landing rollout situation. go around.
The go around decision is not necessarily a renection of
poor performance, but, a landing ovenun may be.
AIRLINER/JAN-MAR 1991
 •
731-300
110,000 LBS
FLAPS 40
SEA LEVEL
VoVPR. YflEF ,·t 5 KTS

'" V"PPR II
~ FAR FAR
-...........
-.- -
TO
~~
- ""-' .... ,.
• DRY WET

I
V
APPR
."
"." jl~.~I".I-II'-.I'I'I·I·I·.liil._. I
c> -i. I
10 ~• • • • • • •IiiI..I~_I.
APPR
V t

I
VAPPR + 10
2 DOTS HIGH
1-,,--••••••••••l!!!lijiloJJl._.,

Figure 7. Typical landing distance summary.

The APPROACH MUST BE SfABILIZED - on the
/lumbers, speed and path, at least by the time the airplane
is 500 feel above the runway. This is approximately
1 minute prior to touchdown.
The flare should position the airplane for touchdown in
the target zone. This is easiest if the approach was stable,
on speed and path. The TOUCHDOWN should be
POSITIVE and IN THE TARGET ZONE. Planning a
positive touchdown will help prevent an extended nare.
A positive touchdown will promote prompt wheel spinup,
and will assure oleo compression.
PROMPTLY, after touching down, INITIATE
WHEEL BRAKING, DEPLOY THE
SPEEDBRAKES AND INITIATE REVERSE
THRUST.
Boeing recommends the use of auto speedbrakes for all
landings. The crew must always monitor the system to
be sure they deployed and must activate them manually
if they do not.
For short runways (i.e. when operating al or near a
landing field length limit weight), Boeing recommends
we use of auto brakes (if installed) to initiate wheel
braking without delay. Even on relatively longer
runways. operators may want to use the auto brake
system, but at a low setling.
Note: The accidents and incidents described in this article
are based on real events. They were not all Boeing
jediners. They are presented to illustrate the typical
circumstances or series of events lhat contribute to the
accidents or incidents. The descriptions given are not
comprehensive. but focus on the airplane and human
performance aspects of the event.

AIRLINER/JAN·MAR 1991 9
 ENGINE NACELLE VIBRATION ISOLATION
Tad S. Skrobecki
Supervisor,
Propulsion. Structures
Design and Anal)'sis
[ii ngiDes have long been isolated for vibration from
the equipment they propel in transportation
vehicles. Propeller-driven aircraft with
reciprocating engines required vibration isolation because
of the magnitude of the vibrations. Early turbojets had
a relatively small mass, thereby producing remarkably
low vibration. 10 fact, small vibrators had to be installed
in the pilot's instrument panel to prevent sticking of
certain instruments. However, second generation jet
engines wtih low by-pass fans were of larger mass and
required the introduction of isolators to suppress the
greater vibrations. Airframe design improvements, in me
form of more efficient structure. also brought the natural
frequencies of the engine and structure closer together.
10
Andrew Knyzanowski
PrinciptJI Engineer,
777 Propulsion Slruclures
Boeing Commercial Group
adding to the impact of engine vibration on the cabin,
even with well·balanced engines, Balancing of the larger
diameter (inertia), high by·pass engines is essential in
vibration control. The purpose of Ihis article is to describe
the introduction of engine nacelle isolation on high
by·pass jet engines.
CABIN NOISE AND VmRATION
The cabin environment is one of the measures airlines and
airline passengers use to evaluate the airplane they are
flying in, A characteristic of the cabin environment is the
level of noise and vibration perceived by crew and
passengers, Cabin noise is described by sound pressure
AlRLlNER/JAN·MAR 1991

Figure 1. Model 757 typical spectrum durin~.;-"'"","'.-­
with N1 at 79%.
level (SPL), measured in decibels at a given frequency.
Figure I shows this relationship at one location in the
cabin. The sound pressure level may vary for each part
of the airplane cabin.
One of the main sources of cabin noise and vibration is
the airplane engines. A typical example of an isolation
design is the Boeing 757-200 equipped with Pratt and
Whitney 2000 series engines. Altbough this article deals
largely with tbis airplane and engine combination, it is
typical of the effort required to improve the cabin
environment on any model.
AIRLINER/JAN-MAR 1991
WHERE TO ISOLATE1
There are many structural attachments between an
engine and the airplane cabin. Engineering studies have
been conducted on at least twelve possible isolation
methods on the 757·200 airplane.
A combination of improved engine balance, damped
engine bearings and the addition of engine nacelle
vibration isolators showed the most promise for reducing
cabin noise and vibration. Autter and vibration analysis
then identified the stiffness characteristics for the
isolators that would meet the isolation objectives without
compromising airplane perfonnance.
It was found that isolators could be placed at three
primary nacelle mounting points. These were the front
and aft engine mounts and the six thrust reverser cowl
hinges on the pylon. Elastomeric materials were selected
as having the best combination of stiffness characteristics
for use in the isolators. Figure 2 sbows the relationship
of these locations to the engine and pylon.
ISOLATOR REQUIREMENTS AND TESTING
Specifying an isolator requires careful balancing of static
and dynamic stiffness requirements. A mIl dynamic
stiffness response is needed to cushion small vibrations
while a hard sIalic stiffness response is sought to minimize
the structural motion of the nacelle.
In addition to the stiffness requirements. any isolator
design has to meet structural strength and durability
requirements.
Engine nacelle isolators are designed to suspend the
engine on an elastomeric cushion during selected
Figure 2. Primary locations for
elastomer installation in the nacelle.
11
segments ofa flight. This aUows the necessary attenuation
of cabin noise and vibration and provides a more
comfortable flight environment. When higher loads are
experienced by isolators. such as dynamic loading and
during takeoff when engines are at fuD power, the
isolators are designed to short circuit the elastomeric
component in each isolator and rest on metal·to-metal
stops. These stops provide redundant load paths to
maintain the fail-safe nacdle mounting concept originaUy
designed into the mounts.
Prior to production incorporation of engine nacelle
isolators. each isolator is eJttensively tested in a flight
dynamics and strUCtural test laboratory. Based 00 test
results, each design is reftned for flight testing. During
flight testing, both isolated and non-isolated nacelle
conftgurations are flown on the same airplane to provide
a direct comparison of the cabin noise and vibration
levels. Instrumentation is used to monitor each isolator.
Certification criteria are evaluated, including flutler
clearance marWns to assure airplane perfonnance is
maintained.
In the case of the 7S7·2OO airplane, three airplanes were
delivered to customers to lead the fleet through in-service
evaluation of the isolation system. An instrumented noise
test was perfonned on each of the three in-service
airplanes 10 assure the cabin noise and vibration
improvements were maintained after the six month
evaluation period (see Figure 3). During the evaluation,
no crew or passenger complaints were recorded for cabin
noise and vibration, Ihus validating the isolation system's
objective.
Flgun 3. Test results for. Model 757·200
po"ered by PW2037 engines.
Figure 4. The engine ..ibntion isolator components
may "ear al different ntes. bul can be replaced as
indiridual nnits. ~
~
12
ISOLATOR MAINTENANCE
Nearly all engine vibration isolators have replaceable
components (see Figure 4). Each isolator has criteria for
replacement, depending on the airplane model and
isolator location. Some isolators may be hard timed so
that they are replaced at specified intervals regardless of
the condition of the isolator. Other isolators can be
evaluated for replacement by on-condition criteria such
as the condition of the elastomer or the distance
remaining between the isolator and its stops.
Maintenance manuals and maintenance planning
documents, for each model airplane, provide specific
criteria for each isolator and should be used in developing
service intervals. Isolator life varies with how an airplane
is operated.
ISOLATOR DEVELOPMTh'T: THE STATE OF
THE ART
Development of more efficient isolators. with longer
useful service intervals continues even after a specific
design is placed in production.
New isolator materials and compounds are being tested.
Concepts such as fluid-filled OT hydraulic isolators are
already being flight tested with the promise of better
dynamic response characteristics, Jess engine nacelle
motion and longer service life.
Tunable or adjustable isolation systems and active smart
isolators are being evaluated fOT possible use on future
production naCelles. Both the cabin environment and the
airplane may see a beneftt from the reduced transmission
of noise and vibration.
AlRUNERlJAN·MAR 1991
 Fuel Conservation
&
Operations NEWSLETTER
Boeing Airliner Magazine
CONTENTS
Introduction .•••.•.•.•. 1
Drag Benefits of Washing
Airplanes ....•....... 1
Recommended Trim
Procedures for Boeing
Aircraft 2 safety aspects of taxiing with
Engine-out Taxi •..•.... 3
Flight Operations Review
(F.O.R.) Index .•...•.• 4
INTRODUCTION
s fuel prices continue 10
A rise. we have been reo
ceiving a steady stream of
inquiries relating to airplane drag
and various other fuel bum issues
for all Boeing models. Of
particuJar note are questions on
whether washing a dirty airplane
will reduce its drag significantly
enough to benefit overall operating
economy. The first article in this
issue discusses the drag penalty for
an unwashed airplane and the
resulting fuel burn penalty. A
summary table of how to prioritize
certain fuel conservation measures
is also provided.
Another concern which is being
re-visited by many operators
centers around in-night trim
procedure and its effect on airplane
drag. Over the years, we have
published various AIRLINER
articles on lhe subject of how best
to trim a Boeing airplane for
minimum cruise drag. Since that
time, other models have been
introduced. In the second article
Fuel Conservation and Operations N e w s l e t t e r - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
No. 41
we review in brief our past
recommend81ions for in-night
trimming and update the
information to include those
models.
We follow the trim procedures
article with a discussion of the
engine(s) shutdown as a fuel saving
measure. Although Boeing does
not recommend taxiing out with
engine(s) shutdown, we neverthe-
less recognize that many operators
have adopted Engine-Out Taxi
procedures and lherefore feel it
would be prudent for us to review
some of the more salient points of
such a policy.
We encourage your review of these
and all past Fuel Conservation
Newsletters in establishing or
improving your existing fuel
conservation policies.
Also in this issue we have compiled
for the reader a complete listing of
all Flight Operations Review
(F.O.R.) articles published to date.
The F.O.R. was first published in
March of 1986 and have gone on
to 19 issues since that time. The
F.O.R. has been and will continue
to be used as a valuable com-
munication tool to line pilots to
enhance overall flight safety and
efficiency of operating Boeing
airplanes.
Finally, as in past issues we list
instructional video programs
newly available from Customer
Training and Right Operations
Support for your reference.
January-March 1991
DRAG BENEFIT OF
WASHING AIRPLANES
Ruid(S) leaking onto the exterior
surfaces of an aircraft is the main
cause of surface contamination by
dirt and dust. This sticky layer of
contaminant provides the basis for
a build-up of contamination by
dirt/dust/other airborne particles.
Traditionally, engine struts, lower
aft fuselage, lower surface of the
wing, in particular the lower
surfaces of the flaps and flap track
fairings experience the greatest
amount of dirt contamination.
Instead of having what is aero-
dynamically termed hydraulically
smoOlh skins as the airplane
designer had intended, the surface
may now be rough and abrasive to
the airflow.
As a reference case, a 747-200
with contaminated area mostly
confined to the wing lower surface,
wing trailing edge flaps and flap
track fairings (about 650 square
feet in total) with an average
physical roughness height of .00t I
inches will have an added drag of
.10% (1.001 drag factor) of typical
cruise drag.
Table I shows the expected fuel
bum penalties associated with an
unwashed airplane for various
Boeing airplane models. The
penalties are based on a reference
mission stage length and a
reference number of nights per
year as shown. The penalties also
assume the same ratio of con-
taminated area to the aircraft's
respective Reference Wing Area as
[
 the 747 example above (0. 12). Ifan
airplane has a greater level of
surface roughness and/or a higher
area percentage of surface being
contaminated, the actual fuel
penalty may be higher than the
values shown in Table 1.
To estimate the fuel bum penalty,
multiply the Table I fuel bum
penalties by the ratio of the actual
number of nights per year divided
by the reference nights per year.
For example, if a 747 had an actual
204 nights this year and it was
considered dirty, the average fuel
burn penalty would be approxi-
mately 6,080 US Gallons (USO)
per year (half of 12,160 USO/yr)
for that airplane.
Washing the airplane has other
important benefits besides
customer appeal. Since the wing
leading edge and high lift devices
are aerodynamically critical, the
wing leading edge and the
associated leading edge high
lift devices (LED's) should be
periodically cleaned of dirt/insect
accumulation to maintain low
speed performance.
Fuel Bum Penalty
Model CUSG/yr/ Airplane)
727 3,320
737 1,150
757 2,570
767 4,940
747 12,160
Table 1. Fuel burn penalty for unwashed airplanes.
II - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Fuel Conservation and Operations Newsletter
Effects of Skin Polishing
Uncontaminated plain aluminum
skin and smooth painted skin can
be regarded as hydraulically
smooth surfaces giving a minimum
turbulent now skin friction
coefficient. Carefully applied
Carogai'd protective coatings also
qualify as hydraulica//y smooth.
Therefore, polishing a high speed
aircraft is considered a negligible
drag benefit.
Table 2 provides a general guide in
prioritizing aerodynamically
related fuel conservation measures
from the most critical to the least
critical in terms of fuel bum
penalty. Operators should give the
appropriate attention to each
concern for their operation.
RECOMMENDED TRIM
PROCEDURES FOR BOEING
AIRCRAFT
An airplane in steady cruising
flight will in general require some
degree of lateral and/or directional
trim inputs to achieve a stahle
platform. The trim requirement
Rererenee
Conditions
500 nm missions
2,120 nightslyr
500 nm missions
'.,120 nightslyr
1,0Cl0 nm missions
1,300 nightslyr
3,000 nrn missions
590 llights/yr
5,0Cl0 nm missions
409 llightslyr
-
Rel.tin AerodyDallllc Fuel
I.
2.
Couen.tloa Measure
Flight Controls rigging
Trim Procedures
3. Aerodynamic seals
4. Clean airplane
Table 2. Aerodynamic fuel
conservation priority.
can arise from imperfect rigging of
night controls after maintenance,
internal load distribution, fuel
unbalance, and engine thrust
setting imbalance. The degree of
trim inputs required will depend
on two basic factors: I) The degree
of controls mlsng, lateral
unbalance, etc., and 2) Trim
technique employed. The
following reviews the correct Trim
Technique for minimum drag.
Before trimming the airplane,
check that fuel balance and engine
thrusts are within practical limits
and zero OUI aileron and rudder
trim inputs.
Autopilot Disengaged
Using Attitude Director (ADI)
indication, hold wings level with
control wheel. Do not trim out
control wheel force.
Stop any wings-level-skidding tum
tendency by trimming rudder in
same directjon the control wheel is
displaced. (A further change in
control wheel angle will be
required to hold wings level).
Trim out control wheel force with
aileron trim. (Depending on the
degree of lateral unbalance, the
control wheel may not be
centered).
 Autopilot Engaged
Do nOI apply aileron trim.
Trim rudder in the direction that
the control wheel is initially
displaced until the airplane
maintains heading with wings
level.
(When the autopilot is disengaged,
it may be necessary to apply roll
trim. Hold the wheel until this is
accomplished).
Do not rush the trim procedure.
Allow time for the airplane to
stabilize afler each trim change.
In general if the final trim inpuls
result in any spoiler pick-up, either
an improper trim procedure was
employed, or the airplane truly
requires maintenance action.
Flight crews should be aware that
they may have to re-trim the
airplane if there is any uncertainty
as to how Ihey arrived at their
current trim inputs.
Table 3 shows the approximate
aileron trim position at spoiler
pickup for various Boeing models.
Trim drag increases rapidly as roll
trim exceeds spoiler pick-up wheel
angle.
Flight crews should also be aware
that due to the installation of a
Rudder Ratio Changer (RRC) on
the 747·100/200/300/400, 757-
200 and 767-2001300/300ER
models, these models will exhibit
a more constant sensitivity (yaw
acceleration) to rudder pedal and
trim knob inputs, irrespective of
increasing airspeed. The RRC
provides automatically controlled
mechanical rudder deflection
limiting as opposed to
aerodynamic and/or hydraulic
load limiting on other Boeing
airplanes (707, 727-1001200 and
737-) 00/200/300/400/5(0).
On airplanes with RRC installed,
Fuel Conservation and Operations 'ewsletter
a constant rudder pedal or trim
knob displacement provides less
rudder as airspeed increases. As a
result of this characteristic, larger
trim unit values would be required
during high speed night than at
slower airspeeds to obtain the same
rudder denection.
Flight crews should be aware of
this characleristic so as not 10
unnecessarily squawk these
airplanes due to their apparently
high rudder trim unit values at
cruise speeds. Instead, the final
aileron trim unit values should be
reviewed al the end of the above
trim procedure to detennine if, in
fact, spoiler pick-up has occurred,
possibly indicating a legitimale
rigging squawk.
ApproJ: Control Wheel
Model Anale (dewees)
707 5 •
737 9 personnel/equipment will be
727 14
757 10
767 6.5
747 13
Table 3. Approximate aHeron
trim position at spoiler pick-up.
ENGINE-OUT TAXI
We recognized the fuel savings
potential of taxiing with engine(s)
intentionally shutdown in a 1981
AIRLINER article titled Engine-
Out Taxi. However, at the same
time it was stated thai the inteOl
of the article is to provide Objective
technical infonnation on taxiing
with engines shutdown, and in no
way encourages this practice.
Our position on Engine-Out Taxi
then and now, was adopted partly
as a result of the industry track
record with this practice and partly
resulting from internal review of
operational procedural require-
ments for all Boeing jetliners.
__________________ m
TRIM UNITS
1.5
1.5
2.3
2.0
1.3
1.7
Boeing does not recommend
taxiing out for night with an engine
shut down for all Boeing jet
transports for the following
reasons:
• Taxiing out with one or more
engines shut down will
invariably delay accomplish-
ment of the After Start and
Before Takeoff checklists,
thereby increasing crew
workload at a most critical
time resulting in increased risk
of crew error.
No fire protection from ground
available when starting engines
away from the ramp.
• Potential loss of braking
capability, steering, and/or
electrical and pneumatic
driven systems should the
remaining operating engine(s)
fail or experience engine fire
requiring immediate shut-
down when APU is not used.
• High taxi break-away thrust
may be required for high gross
weights, son asphalt, and/or
ramp slope conditions which
increases risk of Foreign
Object Damage (FOD), jet
blast damage and/or ground
personnel injuries.
• Engine thennal stabilization
may not be achieved for rushed
engine starts before takeoff. On
high bypass ratio engines, the
requirement to warm-up and
cool-down prior to applying
takeoff thrust or shutting down
should not be overlooked.
 • Pneumatic requirements may
exceed supply pressure when
operating with engine(s)
shutdown, possibly resulting in
inadequate using system(s)
response.
The following recommendations
should be considered before an
operator considers after landing
Engine-Out Taxi operations;
• The APU should be started and
remain ON for engine.cut taxi.
• The crew muSI be aware of
systems requirements such as
hydraulics, brakes, and
electrical as it relates to engine-
out taxi operations.
• In some operational
environments, uphill slope, soft
asphalt, high gross weights,
congested ramp areas, and
wet/slippery ramps and
taxiways, it would be advisable
to taxi wilh all engines
operating.
• Consideration should be given
to the fact that high bypass
ratio engines require a cool
down period prior to engine
shut down.
• Slow and/or tight taxi turns in
the direction of the operating
engine{s) may not be possible
at high gross weights.
The final decision whether 10
incorporate Engine-Out Taxi
procedures as part of any operation
must be based on an assessment of
not only fuel conservation
considerations but on safety
considerations as well.
Although Boeing does not outright
prohibit Engine-Oui Taxi
operations, we encourage your
review of our recommendations
before considering such a policy at
your operation.
FLIGHT OPERATIONS
REViEW (F.O.R.) LNDEX
The Flight Operations Review
(F.O.R.) is a Boeing publication
directed at airline Oight crews on
issues relating to operation of
Boeing airplanes. The scope of the
F.O.R. is limited to night
operations related topics al the
flight crew level with the overall
objective to enhance flight safety
and efficiency of operating Boeing
airplanes.
The F.O.R. is published on an
as-need-basis and does not carry a
fixed publication schedule. The
first F.O.R. was released in
March 14, 1986 and since then
there have been a number of
F.O.R.·s released for publication.
Table 4 shows the complele F.O.R.
Article Index valid through
December 31, 1990 for your
reference.

TITLE ISSUE DATE MODEL PC TITLE ISSUE DATE MODEL PC

COUNT COU!''T
I. The tmponance of MIlr 14. 1986 ALL I.' 11. Flashing IRS Apr 14. 1988 737 2.•
Pll)l:r RotalKm ALIGN Lights
Tee nique
2. 727 Reverse Thrusl Apr JO, 1986 no I.•
12. Effecl on FMC
Descent Path with
Jan 22. 1990 737 •••
Engine Surges 4~% NI Thrust

3. New Gene~tion
Weather Radar
May 30. 1986 ALL ••• 13. Effect of Enfine
RPM and AIrspeed
Jun 26, 1990 ALL 2.•

on Reverse Thrust
•• B~ke Overheat
Prevention
lui 15. 1986 ALL I.,
1<. Tuiin. with Aug 30. 1990 ALL I..
,. Thll)ule SlaUer-
JT8D Series
Sep 19. 1986 7271737 I.. Carbon Brakes
1'. Flight Crt'Vi InjuricsAug 30. 1990 ALL I..
Ensines durin. Power Seat
• P= landini
Tee niques
Dec 19, 1986 ALL 2.•
Ope~tion

I'. 737 Center Tank Dec 04. 1990 737

Fuel Scavenae
I..
7. 747 Fuel Quantit)' Apr 16, 1987 I..
Indk:adnl SYSlem '" S)'stem Operation
17. Ensine Vibration Dec to. 1990 ALL 2.•
lun 22, 1987
•• Localiur Tl'Kking
During AUIO
7" I.' Proc:edures
Landinp - 1'. Loss of an EnJine Dec 14, t990 ALL I.•
p~

9.
'"
Innight Fuel Loss Aug 28, 1988 ALL 2.
Indication While In
Flipl
10. Flashing tRS Jan 28. 1988 757/767 2.• 19. Low Oil Quantity Dec 17. 1990 ALL I..
ALlGN Lighl$
Flight OperatioM Engineering,
Table 4. Flight Openltions Review (F.O.R.) article index. Boeing Commercial Airplane Group,
P.O. Box 3707. Seatde WA 98124.
Telephone (206) 6~~-318~

IV - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Fuel Consenation and Operations Newsletter

 ENGINE INLET INGFSTION HAZARD - AN UPDATE

Albert F. Emanuel
Aircraft Safety Engineer
Renton Product Safety

n he January·March 1989 issue of the

AIRLINER contained the fourth article on the
subject of engine ingestion of personnel. Articles
on personnel ingeslion into engine inlets were previously
published in AIRLINER issues dated October-
December 1983, October-December 1984, July-
personnel ingestions have been reported since the lasl
article was published the most recent being reported in
October 1990.

Figure 1 shows the distribution over time of reported

personnel ingestions into engine inlets. The data have
September 1987, and January-March 1989. Five been normalized to flight hours to account for the steadily

AIRLINER/JAN.MAR 1991 13
 increasing fleet activity. UsuaUy the ingestions occurred
while performing maintenance. Figure 1 indicates the
,. continuing need for an effoctive training program fOT line
personnel working in the vicinity of an operating engine.
• u
It should be noted that several events of personnel
it ingestion involved experienced mechanics.

I~i"
! or the 26 personnel ingestion events reported, one
"
i ,
involved a BAc 146 airplane. (The BAe 146 engines.

5~
• Lycoming ALP 502Rs, have no inlet guide vanes, and

~
,~ the only reponed ingestion was fatal.) The other 25 events
" ,, occurred with JT8D.powered 737s. One of the 737
il ingestions also was fatal, and at least seven caused very
• serious injuries. (A review of U.S. Air Force safety
I ! I I I
._--
i I records has shown thai Ihere have been no personnel
ingestions in either the KC-135R or E.3B aircraft which
are also powered by the CFM56 engine. The same is true
for the U.S. Navy E.6s.) TheJT8D fixed inlet guide vanes
••
Figure 1. History of inlet ingestions for all oelng
provide some proleclion from Ihe rotaling fan. However,
the CFM56 has no inlet guide vanes, and the potential
Model 737 series airplanes. The incidents are plotted for serious injury and dealh is much greater. To date there
against flight bours by year, while the number of have been no ingestions of personnel in the CFM56-
incidents are shown at the top of each line having an powered 737s. As shown in Figure 2, the CFM56 inlel
incident for that year. is larger and the lower lip closer to the ground than that
of the JT8D. These characteristics of the CFM56-
powered 737 make the education of personnel who mighl
be exposed to this potential ingestion hazard especially
urgenl.

Figure 2. The differences between the Model 737-200 (left) and 737-300/-400/-500 engine inlets are readily
apparent in these views. Fixed inlet guide vanes in the JT8D engine used on the -200 offer a degree of protection
during an ingestion incident; bowever, tbe CFM56 engines on later series 737s do not have any fixed structures
ahead of the large rotating (an; thereby not offering any form of protection.

14 AIRUNERlJAN·MAR 1991
 DDN!lT
CET
SUCK
IN!

IE 'wOM 0' r~'kf t~lt·

H.OJMO ......
"'" M,ISU' '~lO '><lWC '.U'
.....0" ..... 'Ou" ,"'",

• OO
DO .""'AmAJQ.IAl •
DO NOT
lUftO .. ,.. .... orK...- ...... I'AI.II
• DG KCUIII . . - IflIIf OM "'""" ••
• ~-~ _ _0Ul
lIlITIIlMI~'IlU'

. - - 0- ''''-''''0
•

Figure 3. This poster, wbich concisely def"Lnes safe and

unsafe practices around running engines, was sent to all
operators along with Boeing All-Operator Letter
M-7230·1671. These posters afe still uailable at
D()-(:harge.

AIRLINER articles are part of a continuing Boeing
program to assist operators in maintaining personnel
awareness in the effort to prevent inlet ingestions. This
program also includes posters (see Figure 3), a video tape
presentation, naceUe warning decals. and warnings in
Maintenance Manuals and Facility and Equipment
Planning Documents. The first rule of engine safety is
Ihal no one be near an operating engine unless absolutely
necessary. When it is necessary to have someone working
near the inlet of an operating engine, a personnel safety
harness (such as Boeing part number F80239-7) should
be used, An inlet screen should be used when feasible.
All CFM56-powered 737s have nacelle markings to
indicate the hazard zone boundary aft of the inlet for
above-idle power (see Figure 5). Nacelle markings were
not originally provided on the JT8D·powered 737.
Boeing strongly recommends that JT8D nacelles also
indicate the position of the art boundary, because the
distance to the inlet is small, and many of the ingestions
occurred when the inlet was approached from behind.
Decals for marking the JT8D·powered 737 can be
obtained as shown in Table 1.

All Boeing Maintenance Manuals contain definitions of

the engine inlet hazard zones. The hazard zones shown
in Figure 4 apply to all 737 aircraft, regardless of engine
type. In addition to the published hazard zones, the
following considerations apply:

• For reported surface winds greater than 25 knots,

-
_.-
---
..._cu.. ""

increase the hazard zone boundary by 20%.

• If ramp surfaces are slippery, additional precautions

such as cleaning the ramp will be necessary.

• Following engine shutdown, allow time for spool-

down before approaching the inlet. Figure 5. Nacelle warning placards.

AlRUNER/JAN-MAR 1991 15
 •• • •••• • • • ••••••••••• I

Some operators have painted engine inlet hazard zones

on the parking ramp to clearly indicate the boundaries
(sec Figure 6). When using painted hazard zones, it is Fi..,. 7. Dimensions ,.Iating wh""l, ent.." doo, a n d @
imperative that the hazard zones unmistakably identify inlet lip positions for the Model 737,
the airplanes to which they apply, and the airplanes must
be accurately positioned to ensure that the painted
boundaries will provide the required safety margin. An
improperly parked airplane could degrade safety by
,,,Irn,,,, SO! Hel

incorrectly representing the hazard zone. The January-

Don't Gtt Sucked In poster. Boeing Field Service Rep-
March 1989 AIRLINER article contains information on
reprcsenlalive or Field
the required accuracy for positioning the airplanes and
includes a table showing important dimensions for LJ1e Service Engineering.
various 737 series airplanes. There is also a table showing Don't Get Sucked In video Boeing Field Service Rep-
dimensions which relate the wheel, passenger door, and lape presentalion. 840601 representative or Field
inlet lip positions for the various 737 series airplanes; Service Engineering.
however, some of the dimensions in this table are Engine Nacelle Warning Service Bullelin 737-11-
incorrect. The April-]une 1989 issue contains corrections
and Infonnational Decal 1010, Revision 1,
to this table. The corrected table is also included here in
Installation. June 21, 1985.
Figure 7.
Personnel Safely Lanyard, Illustrated Tool and
Available safety aids which can assist in the prevention Engine Mainlenance, pan Equipmenl List, 71-00,
of personnel ingestion, and the means of procurement, number F80239·12. page 21.
are listed in Table I. Safety Screen - CFM56 Illustrated Tool and
Engine Inlet Personnel Equipment List, 71-00,
SUMMARY Barrier, pan number page 22-
C71013-1.
The history of personnel ingestion into engine inlets
indicates a need for operators to constantly inform all Inlet Guard - Engine lJIustrated Tool and
personnel who could be exposed to this ingestion hazard. Run-up, pan number Equipment List, 12-20,
Boeing will continue to assist operators in this important CI2001·35. page 5.
effort. Posters and video tapes can be obtained by request Engine Inltt HuumJ Zont'S., AIRLiNER, January-
through your Boeing Service Representative. Ramp Marking! for Engine March, 1989.
Inltr Hazard Zones -
Painting inlet hazard zones on the parking ramp can be Jncautioru for Their U!e.
an aid to safety if properly used, but improperly used,
can degrade safety by incorrectly representing the hazard 737 Engine Inlet Hazard Boeing Service leHer
zone. Zone Boundaries Painted 737-Sl-71·28, dated II
on Ramp Surface! January 1989
Nacelle markings on the CFM56-powered 737s must be Ingestion of Penonnel into Boeing All-Operator letter
observed. Boeing strongly recommends that operators Engint Inlet M-7230-1671, dated 1
install similar markings on the JT8D-powered 737s. No\ember 1989

Boeing welcomes any recommendations which could help

in the prevention of ingestion accidents for possible Table 1. Safety aids to inlet ingestion hazards.
inclusion in future articles.

16 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - AIRLINER/JAN·MAR 1991
 Pushback Caution
PUSHBACK CARELESSNESS KILLS - STAY ALERT
G. Drew AlJdersoll
Product Safety Enginet!ring
8«ing Commercial Airplane Group
The airplane is on schedule; the fuel, cargo, and
T baggage are loaded; the required maintenance is
completed; the passengers have boarded; it is time
10 relax, push the airplane away from the gale, and
another night is on its way. Not quite!! Pushbacks
present a serious hazard to ground personnel. Slaying
alert and clear of the path of the airplane's wheels is
essential to prevent injuries.
AIRLINER/JAN·MAR 1991 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Example #1:
The engines were being started during the pushback.
The mechanic on the headset was monitoring engine
start along with watching for clearance. After engine
#2 was running, the mechanic allempted to cross
under the airplane 10 better observe the start of
engine # 1. His foot was caught by the nose wheel. He
was knocked down, run over by the nose wheels, and
fatally injurro.
Example #2:
During pushback a truck crossed behind the airplane
which caused the headset operator to focus attention
on the truck. During this time a tum was started,
unknown to the headset operator. The nose wheels
trapped and ran over both legs of the headset operator
causing serious injury.
17
 Pushback or towing involve three phases: positioning and
connecting the tug and towbar; the actual moving of the
airplane; and disconnecting of the tug and towbar.
Different hazards are encountered during each phase and
injury accidents have occurred during each phase.
However, the majority of the accidents occurred during
actual airplane movement. This article focuses on the
injury accidents that occurred during actual pushing or
towing of jet transport airplanes, including the history
and methods of reducing accidents.
HISTORY
About 25 yean ago, the fint reported pushback injury
accident occurred on a commercial jet transport airplane.
From 1964 through August 1990, there have been 23
accidents worldwide where personnel were run over by
the airplane wheels during pushing or towing. Thirteen
of the accidents have been fatal. The majority of the
accidents (87%) occurred during pushback and the
remaining 13% happened during towing. The crushing
injuries incurred, if not fatal, are always serious,
sometimes requiring leg amputation.
From 1969 through 1988 there were 15 injury accidents
during pushing or towing, averaging fewer than one a
year. In the one year period from July 1989 through June
1990. there were seven injury accidents, a dramatic
increase. Figure I shows the pushing/towing injury
accidents per million departures for the last 20 years. The
accident rate for fint half of 1990 is more than 7 times
the average annual rate prior to 1990.
The Executive Committee of International Transport
Section (ARTEX) of the National Safety Council has also
••
•
••
Figure 1. Pusbback/towing injury accidents
reported between 1971 and 1990. '--~~
18
recognized this accident trend and is actively mounting
a campaign to reverse this trend.
CAUSES
Four aspects of pushing/towing injury accidents were
investigated: airplane configuration, airport ramp
conditions, personnel experience/training, and
procedures.
Airplane Configuration
Landing gear arrangement for all commercial jet
transport airplanes is a nose gear and two or more main
gears. The nose gear was involved in 82% of the accidents
and the main gear was involved in 9%. The gear involved
in the remaining accidents (9%) is unknown.
Figure 2 shows airplane types arranged by approximate
forward fuselage ground clearance and the number o"f
pushback injury accidents for each type. There have been
no injury accidents involving airplanes with relatively low
ground clearance (less than 5 feet). The fuselage prevents
people from walking close to the nose wheels. Run over
accidents involved the A300, 8747, 8757, 8767, DC·8,
DelO, and LlOI1: these airplanes have more than five
feet of ground clearance. Personnel can easily walk close
to the nose wheels and may not be conscious of the
increased exposure to injury when moving an airplane
with high ground clearance.
Another aspect of airplane configuration is the location
of the flight phone connection. For most airplanes this
phone connection is close to the nose wheels. A headset
cord of insufficient length forces the user to walk close
Figure 2. Pusbbad: injury accidents b
airplane ground clearance. '--~~
AIRLINER/JAN·MAR 1991
to the nose wheds increasing the risk of injury. A long
headset cord, if allowed to drag near the ~ gear, may
become entangled, pulling the operator into the rotating
wheels. Three accident reports cite entanglement as a
contributing factor. A long cord, however, when let out
and kept taut by the operator, can be used as a distance
indicator to maintain separation from the ~ gear.
AIrport Conditions
Ramp and taxiway conditions have minimal impact on
accidents. Three accidents mention that the person
slipped or tripped prior to being run over. Other factors,
such as ramp surface, slope, lighting, or weather, that
could contribute to an accident were not reported.
Personnel ExperlencelTrainlng
Due to the number of new airlines and rapid growth in
the airline industry in general, experience and training
may be diluted and may have contributed to the
accidents, but there is no data to quantify this
contributor.
A number of airlines were surveyed for information
regarding the training pushback personnel received.
Training varied widely from airline to airline: some
airlines provide only a few minutes of on the job
instruction bef'ore permitting personnel to conduct
departure operations; some have fonnal classroom
instruction followed by a monitored ramp checkout and
recurrent training. Some airlines use video presentations
to illustrate the procedures to be used for dispatch and
the potential hazards. Mechanics typically receive more
training and have a better understanding of the hazards
associated with airplane operations than do other ramp
personnel. The makeup of pushback crews varies: some
airlines use maintenance personnel to dispatch the
airplanes; some use a mix of maintenance and ramp
service personnel; and, others use only ramp service
personnel. The crew experience levels vary from airline
to airline and from crew to crew.
Injuries are about equally divided between mechanics and
other ramp personnel. Also, experience level varies from
relatively inexperienced persons to senior personnel with
more than 15 years experience.
Carelessness and inattention have contributed to about
78% of the accidents. Three accidents were caused by
persons slipping or falling 01T equipment (tug or towbar)
not intended to carry people. Five accidents involved
losing balance and falling in the path of the airplane
wheels. Ten accidents cite the rolling wheels directly
pinning personnel suggesting lack of attention to the
changing airplane position.
AIRLINER/JAN·MAR 1991 ---------------------19
Pusbbaclt Prottdures
Airlines were surveyed to learn bow tbey conduct
pushback operations. They employ from one to four
people with responsibilities as outlined below:
One Person
A tug driver, who also handles tbe airplane
communication.
Two Person
A headset operator handling airplane communication
and a tug driver.
A tug driver handling airplane communication and a
wing walker.
Tbrft Person
A headset operator handling airplane communication, a
tug driver, and a wing walker.
A tug driver bandling airplane communication, and two
wing walkers.
Four Person
A headset operator handling airplane communication, a
tug driver, and two wing walkers.
The person conducting headset communications was
involved in at least 56% of the accidents, but cord •
entanglement was a factor in only three accidents. This
lack of cord entanglement suggests that connection to the
airplane is not as significant a factor as proximity to the
nosewheel.
SUMMARY
In recapping the data,
• All of the accidentS involved airplanes with ground
•
clearance greater than 5 feet.
The nose gear is involved in 82% of the accidents.
•
• Persons using the beadset ",oue run over in at least •
56% of the accidents (cord entanglement was a factor
in only 13% of the accKients).
• Airport conditions have minimal impact on run over
accidents.
• Experience &: mining is diverse.
 • Carelessness and inattention have contributed 1018%
of the accidents.
• Pushback melhods are diverse; some inherently
present less risk than others.
Accidents occur because people working io a hazard area
are not conscious of the hazards. There are two
approaches to preventing the accidents: (I) train
personnel how 10 work in the hazard area, or (2) change
the pushback procedure to prohibit personnel in the
hazard area.
Training is the key to understanding the hazards present
during all phases of pushback or towing. To prevent
injury connecting and disconnecting the tug and towbar
requires anticipation of tug or airplane movement when
not expected and having a plan for escape should it occur.
During airplane movement, personnel must be aware of
the possibility of being run over, of the continually
changing positions of the airplane and tug, and of
consciously using techniques to maintain separation from
Figure 3. Pusbback hazard zone.
20
the airplane wheels and tug. Figure 3 shows the pushback
hazard zone. The training should also be recurrent to
continually renew the consciousness of hazards.
Training, however, wiU not remove the risks of pushback
accidents; rather, lraining maintains awareness of the
hazards and provides review of the techniques for
reducing the risks.
Procedures can be developed 10 removed personnel from
the hazard area. The headset operator, who was walking
in the vicinity of the nose wheel is the person killed or
injured in the majority of the accidents which occurred
during actual airplane movement. Procedures that do not
have personnel in the vicinity of the nose wheels are the
key to reducing these accidents. One method for
accomplishing this is to have the tug driver conduct
communications with the airplane night crew. Accident
history shows that Ihe greatest pJtential for reducing
pushbackltowing injury accidents is to use procedures
that do not have personnel in the vicinity of the nose
wheels.
AIRLINER/JAN-MAR 1991
AGING AIRPLANES
BOEING AGING AIRPLANE CORROSION PREVENTION AND CONTROL PROGRAM TASK CARDS

K.G. Henr.ler
Supervisor
Maintenance Planning &- Aging Flnl •
Moinlenance & Ground Operations Systems

s airplanes age, the incidents and severely of

A corrosion damage increase. tr corrosion is not

controlled, structural integrity can be lost and
the ability of the airplane Slruclure to sustain fail safe
MODEL

707nZO
DOCUMENT

D6-S4928
NPRM

89-NM-269-AD
loads may be compromised. To address this in a
comprehensive manner, the airplane industry 727 06-S4929 89-NM-268-AD
Airworthiness Assurance Task Force (AA TF). fonned
in 1988, chanered SUUctures Working Groups (SWG), 737 06-38S28 89-NM-27G-AD
consisting of airline and manufacturer personnel, to
develop a corrosion prevention and control program that 747 06-36022 89-NM-271-AD
would ensure detection of corrosion before: it progressed
beyond safe limits. This gWG activity resulted in an
Aging Airplane Corrosion Prevention and Control
Program document for Boeing Model 707n20, n7, 737 Figure 1. AgiDg Airplane Corrosion Pre.ention aDd
and 147 airplanes. Airworthiness Directives, making the Control Prognun document Dumbers and usociated
contents of these documents mandatory for operators 'oti« o( Proposed Rule Making (or ear:b model
without a proven effective corrosion conlrOl program au Boeing jetlinu.
anticipated before the eod of 1990. (See Figure I.)

AIRLINER/JAN-MAR 1991 21
 During the development stages of the program. all known Corrosion data for each area of the airplane were
corrosion problems relating to primary Structure were reviewed by the SWG along with the airline's own
reviewed by Boeing and segregated into selected general corrosion experience. The outcome resulled in a
areas on tbe basis of having similar corrosion exposure corrosion prevention and control program tbat varies
characteristics and common inspection access somewbat from area to area for each model airplane and
requirements (see Figure 2). Problems found to be contains an initial implementation age (I) and a repeat
significant with regard to continuing airworthiness were interval (R) in calendar time for each corrosion
then identified and placed in the program. inspection and inhibitor application maintenance
requirement (see Figure J).

CORROSION PROGRAM AREAS

I Airplane I

Figure 2. The Aging Airplane

II WIng I I Fuselage I I Empennage I I LJG and strut I Corrosion Prevention and Control

._- • ElIl_IU01_
Program has been divided into tbe
• ElCIelIor 1Il1f_ ·~IUII_ ...... lMdlng lIM'

'--
four areas shown•

._-
....--...- -- -
• MaIn landing gar
• LudIng ~ ca¥lry .~~U\1Iy
....--
• Fllg!ll-e«IW

..............
._~ . _ ~

·""'"''''''''
• ndlng~cMy • TtaIlItG ~ c:a't'lfy

Figure 3. Corrosion inspection

thresholds, both initial
..,
• IJnclep lalI1ngs,

• s.c:tlon.8
A/C
implementation and repeat intenals
are shown in years, for the four
major inspection areas by model.
•
101m. m
GE.'F.RAL ARF.A
Thaho" R_ n.- R..... n .......
7J7
...... n.- '" R....'

• I.I. ,, •• I.•
I. I.
Ouler-atcmal 10 I 2

I.
Leadlnl edlC Intcnor I 2/. I U
•
;;"
Outcr-maln bo.\-Intcnor
Trallll\8 edge Inlcnor
10
I 2/.
I
JO , 10
I
10
2
lO 10
2
Center $l!CtiOll Intcnor JO I JO I JO I lO JO

• • ,,-
" I.
EJ.tcm..l (nv=IUlhnl doors 2 >II 1512 10 upper
and Iandlnl sear bIIl'l) 5 Iowcr 2 Iclwcr
Alihtcrtw rom~rtmnll JO I 10 I I Il
••
f •,• ,
Urper lobe Inlerior I I 10 I I Il
lo"'cr \obe Inlerior
(tlIcept bilge) • ,,• • • • •
1.0", er Iobe-biJic
• • , • 2/.
• • •,
I.I. I.I.
ScchOll 48 Inlcrior 10 10 I 10
,
E
I.I. I.I.
EJ.lemaJ 5Urfka 2/. JO 2 2 10
~ Ladlnl edits I JO I
,,
I Jl
,
I

I.
MaIO bo.\ \IlltnOn I 10 I JO I
~ Traihoi edges
, I

I.
10 •,
•
10

-•
~ Center K'CIion JO 10 I
> Center cnilne Inkt dlX1 - - I - - -
Nose and main 1and\Il1 JQr Landtnlltlr O\'erluoul landini FIr ovcrhaul undllll leaf ovcrhaul landIni ,car ovtrhaul

Powerplanl and SlNI

• I 2 , 2 , , 1/15 )/U

Note: Some spoeiflt artaSlilnnl wilhln lhe ~I areas havc indepmdenl thnsholds and repeal intcrvals.

22 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - AIRLINER/JAN.MAR 1991
To ensure that the data contained in the Aging Airplane
Corrosion Prevention and Control Program documents
remains current, the SWG will conduct yearly reviews
of program requirements and make changes deemed
necessary based on reported corrosion findings.
Unlike the Service Bulletin Structural Modification
Program (see AlRLINER, July-September 1990), the
Aging Airplane Corrosion Prevention and Control
Program, hereafler referred to as the baseline corrosion
program, applies to aU airplanes both new and old.
Many operators already have corrosion prevention and
control programs in place, many of which are based on
recommendations provided in Boeing Maintenance
Planning Data (MPD) Documents.
A common question asked is how does the corrosion
AIRLINER/JAN.MAR 1991
control program outlined in the MPD compare with that
of the baseline corrosion program?
Operators who presently follow MPD recommendations
will have to modify their program to be in compliance
with the baseline program. The extent of modification,
however, will vary considerably and is largely dependent
upon the effectiveness of the operator's existing corrosion
control program. For example, if an operator inspects a
given airplane area and finds no significant amount of
corrosion (corrosion which can be reworkedlblended out
within allowable Structural Repair Manual limits), the
operator need not change his existing program in that
area. On the other hand, not all items within a panicular
area may be adequately inspected by the MPD program
as component disassembly, equipment removal and
special inspections devices are required in several areas.
Additionally, there are some airplane areas for which the
baseline corrosion prevention program provides greater
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
23
 Model 727~100 undergoing structural inspection at Avianca's overhaul base at Barranquilla, Colombia
coverage than the MPO, such as the intemal areas of the
wing center section, horizontal stabilizer and night crew
compartment.
To help operators carry out the requirements of the
baseline corrosion program, Boeing is developing task
cards for each model Aging Airplane Corrosion
Prevention and Control Program Document. These task
cards correlate directly with the corrosion program
document and use the same numbering system as the
tasks identified in the document. Task cards provide
amplified instructions for each corrosion task including
area breakdown, access panel and equipment removal
requirements, airplane effectivities, illustrations,
manhour estimates, and a cross reference to MPO/MRB
tasks to facilitate planning. (See Figure 4.) Also, each task
card contains a description of the basic task to be
performed as well as a summary form for recording
corrosion inspection findings. To further enhance
product quality, the contents of each task card is being
validated on an airplane at an airline facility.
Task cards for the baseline corrosion program are being
issued to all known owners/operators on the following
schedule:
• Model 727 Aug 1990
• Model 737 Oct 1990
• Model 707/720 Dec 1990
• Model 747 Jan 1991
24
Although initially in hard copy form, Boeing is evaluating
the release of task card data in digital form and is studying
the feasibility of deyeloping a computer program for
forecasting and scheduling aging fleet maintenance
requirements.
To ensure compatibility with the mandated baseline
corrosion program, Boeing will revise, as necessary, the
corrosion prevention and control program in current
model Maintenance Planning Data documents. This is
not meant to imply that MPD recommended corrosion
prevention and control tasks will be deleted, but merely
that task contents will be revised to be in compliance with
baseline program requirements. This includes converting
all MPO recommended corrosion control tasks from
night hour to calendar time intervals. Corrosion control
tasks outlined in the MPD. which are based on cost
effectiveness, are in most cases more stringent than
corrosion tasks in the baseline corrosion program. In such
cases, the MPD corrosion control task will continue to
be recommended.
Finally. to assist operators in complying with the
requirements of the baseline corrosion program, Boeing
is developing a training course. The primary purpose of
this course, to be given to operator and regulatory
authority personnel together. is to help operators
understand and interpret baseline corrosion program
criteria such as levels of corrosion. rate of
implementation, operator reporting requirements, etc.
AIRLINER/JAN·MAR 1991
 NEW VIDEO RELEASES
In past Fuel Conservation & Operations Newsleuers have listed new video instructional programs produced by Customer
Training and Flight Operations Support. Due 10 the size of The Newslelter in this issue of the Airliner, These riders
are presented here. This list identifies the available videos by airplane model, subject, catalog number, and running time.

The tapes are currently available for purchase. For ordering information please contact:

Boeing Commercial Airplane Group

ATIN: CSMS Software Sales
P.O. BOX 3707, MIS 2M.{)4
Seattle, WA 98124-2207 USA
Tel. (206) 544-8838

747-400 General Familiarization

Catalog Number Time
M900105 36,30
747-400 Autopilot Flight Director System FVOC
Catalog Number Time
M891115 13:49
747-400 Hydraulics OV/CL
Catalog Number Time
"1881020 20,57
767 Pneumatic System W/0 Electronic Bleed Air
Control OV feL, GE CF6-8OC2
Catalog Number Time
M900I04 20,00
747400 Integrated Display System FI/OC
Catalog Number Time
M891203 14:41
737 IRS Supplementary Nonnal Procedures-Flight Crew Briefing
Catalog Number Time
F9OO426 17,33
737 Normal Procedures-Pan One Before stan-After stan
Catalog Number Time
F891222 15,38
757 Tail Strike Avoidance
Catalog Number Time
F900824 15,23

CORRECTION -

The anicle on the 747-400 Central Maintenance Computer in the October-December 1990 edition of the AIRLINER
had an error on page 17, in the paragraph on EICAS Maintenance Pages. A sentence therein inadvertently stated that:

An automatic snapshot is recorded whenever a parameter on a particular maintenance page exceeds a threshold value.

While this feature is a design goal, it is not part of the airplane specification baseline. Consideration for future
implementation of this snapshot feature, as a system enhancement, is under study.

AIRLINER/JAN·MAR 1991 25
 Region One Region Five
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CALGARY G Lowry• • 03-221"'858 WARSAW S GoI... k'.1.8 .. 2214117580
CHICAGO C 8.'.... L RJeh-l,dlO'l. 312·1101-41131
DENVER II:_'IOn. P lemk~. 303-780..8.0 Region Six
HONOLULU J. W • ...,n. 808·138-12 I 8 'DUBAI D Cock..IN, REGIONAL DIRECTOR.
HOUSTON M l.oHy,113-985<3811 1971 ~ 41377011
INDIANAPOLIS M. _'lOn. 317·2.0.7089 ABU OHABI J, K lbl'll (971 t-21787.85
KANSAS CITY R. 1I JH L...",,". 816-89 1·••• 1 ADDIS ABABA G IIy. 1251-+ 1111105611
LOS ANGELES C S W Port.,. 2 I 3.IIJ~8311 BOMBAY R AllYeIl, (91+221'11·1187
MINNEAPOLIS F Jove•. M Murblell. M Coff,n. J H'II.n CAIRO J. NlUllle. 120+21 1180389
1112·J28-21191 ISTANBUL R. To"... 190+ 1157•. 2334
PHOENIX E. O.W, 0 M........ 602.392.1075 JEDDAH R. Lo.,.•• L T.bo<. 19111l+2) 11811-110 I ,
SAN FRANCSICO M CI.,..... IIo. R. 5..... C. w.<d, LUSAKA E WIIitl \280+11 2713115
o J.eoblon.A.L.mqulllo.15.137-ll901 MANAMA R. loll... 1973-+1322200 1. 22&8
SEA-TAC W S",,,II.2011·.31·7273 NAIROBI T, M,II. 1251 +21822171. 2243
VANCOUVER. B C. S 8 ....1. 8O.·2JO-535 I
Region Seven
'SINGAPORE R. 0 Ii...... REGIONAL DIRECTOR.
Region Three 185+ )732.'.35
'MONTEVIDEO L 80n. REG.O .......l OIRECTOR. (598+2192 I J45 AUCKLAND Ii. Bow.... F. Sell.fl.., \84+8)275<39810'
2753899.••, 3305
BOGOTA FE Colon (1S7+11.138218
BUENOS AIRES G Thom•• 154+11 620-0ll20 JAKARTA T. I,.W, (112 .211550111'.
RIO DE JANEIRO J. Connill. 155+21) 393-83.3 KUALA LUMPUR J. 8erblr, A. S.ntOl.\60~ 3) 7482589
SANTIAGO o Dllbosq (1I8+211l019081. ul. 3117 MELBOURNE (ANSI W G W.(.,+31338-3JI3,
SAO PAULO J B.lrw." t!lll+ I 11543.•• 29 MELBOURNE (AUSI D eorr \.,t-3133D-3080
SINGAPORE J. H.,p. R bini. R M "'nd......... R. W.bb. £. Root.
R 'ri"kIolW, R. Ad.",., R. ftooIn, (85-+ 151 I-ll-OJ4
SYDNEY M 1i1"'~lon. C HOOYIr. R SOUIII. (Ill -t-21
Region Four 8817259
'LONDON E. W 841<11'11........ , REGIONAL DIRECTOA.I.... +8 1t Region Eight
759-3301
AMSTERDAM fKlM} J 1I.....n. M. KoII.nd, J Smllh. (31 -+ 201 04513604, 'TOKYO III. C. VOgI. REGIONAl D.RECTOR.
AMSTERDAM fTAV/MTH) 0 B.y. (31+201849380. (81 t-311195-IOOI
AMSTERDAM {HOW L GiUi"nd {31 +2911818U"" •• to 58 BANGKOK R L PI.. ",IH. IC.. Cu",,,,,ng•. R. C'.-.v,
BRUSSELS /5ABj Te. Monl.rn.yo<, (32+217234'22 III V'lOCkl. JC Lyncll. (86+211131.227.
BRUSSELS (TEA) H M.",.t/32+217IlZ.(la98 MANILA M OleklnlOl'l,183+2183I-Dl137
COLOGNE M Kalil. (48 -+ 22031402183 NAHA o C.flW. (" +988157-9218
COPENHAGEN 8 liubblorcl. R. ~..cleri<orn.(45+32) 324373 PUSAN J SII....,.\.2+1I11 325-414'
DUBLIN
EAST MIDLANDS
V RfIbb1oll•. ,3&]+ II 378800 ut, 1512\ .... 5\22
It HoIdal, (1.+332]81 11152-
SEOUL
SEOUL MRI
I"" J, ROI-COI. A. Omlk. (82+2111'34510.
1+ lIo. M 0 ......... J, C.",p,otlOll.182+218011-40911
FRANKFURT Eo Fnsl..., K T.hl, H. S~l>e\ln.m.nn.(.9+t19J TAIPEI T T.",. L GIOfd.no.188'+331833023. 0<
t'I9&-Ul' 83.251 4119
GATWICK OM,. ., II TOlI_. H "'11111"" 0 WIDm.n. TOKVO (ANA} o Rom, /81 t-31 717.157.5. 8 II:OfMtl.
IU+293) 110485 .eo.......
HAMBURG R. Nov., P H~<d.1.9+'OI fi07().31l30 TOKVO (NCAI R. Hottotl.181 +UII132-ll898
HANOVER H Sc.....Itk•• 149+151 II 7303381 TOKYO (JAl) C, Ar"'It."""" P GlfI,d. J W.lk••. S. SIII'",.n.
KEFLAVIK A. eo•. 1354 +2150289 .. PolIocll.181 +31 J47'()()811. F Powenl\:lky,
LONDON W Mln.n. A. !'to...." J S".II\UOl>, H. 1(....-0... R. N.gel. (N'''''L (8 I +476132~911
R. lqoNrv,(u+lll15l2-31150. H Pollock
LUTONJBRII o Su~n.k ... t"+1i821'28071. Region Nine
LUTON MON} M Blum. ("+1582'411849 0< 424211. UL 295 -BEIJING T,E. lin•. REGIONAl D.RECTOR.188+ \I 800f140.
MUNIC o MorN, (49+891 921'-8985 Eo CII.ne.l88t-1l 1500f1.04
STAVANGER M MeW'm IH+.18SOn.5 BEIJING o CIII... M H..lClllong•• (1I6+II4511-4411'.
STOCKHOLM W 11:_ (.11+81787.30111.11: Uwd. ..1.15•• 8
TEL AVIV G V.n<\IYIn.(972+3187111H CHENGDU S Oak.., (88t-2111 581.8',I.L 3012
GUANGZHOU C L OdIQ.rd. 0 I.l>cock 1811+201157890 I.
..L 2888
HONG KONG T 8rvln. (852+17.7-81148 M H.lI
KUNMING
SHANGHAI
f ""nII. {811+IIJ 1137.88 In 380
5 C...... (811+211 2758311

'REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS
BOEING AIRLINER MAGAZINE
JANUARY - MARCH 1991