Sec. of DENR vs.
Yap possession of the land since time
FACTS:
● The court of appeals granted mayor
yap declaratory relief to have a judicial
confirmation of imperfect title or survey
of land for titling purposes for the land
they have been occupying and boracay.
● Yap alleged that Proclamation No.
1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised
doubts on their right to secure titles over
their occupied lands.
● Yap alleged open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation since 1945, or since time
immemorial
● Yap declared land for taxes and
paid realty taxes
ISSUE:
● W/N Proclamation 1801 and PTA
Circular 3-82 posed legal obstacles to
Yap et al. and similarly situated
individuals to acquire titles to their
occupied lands in Boracay
RULING:
● SC ruled against Yap et al.
● Proclamation did not convert
portions of Boracay into an agricultural
land
● Regalian Doctrine states that
unclassified land is State Property
● Claimants cannot apply for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under
Proclamation 1604, with respect to lands
which were classified as agricultural
lands
● Yap et al. failed to prove open,
continuous, etc possession of their lands
in Boracay
Republic vs. Munoz
FACTS:
● Munoz filed an Application for
Registration of Title of a parcel of
residential land
● Such property was acquired by his
parents through donation inter vivos,
and that their family has been in
immemorial
● Republic opposed the application,
stating that the land is part of public
domain not subject to private
appropriation
● Munoz replied to the opposition
professing that his parents acquired the
land and declared such land for taxation
purposes in his name in 1920
● RTC noted a report that such land is
covered by Free Patent of Munoz’s
mother
● RTC and CA ruled in favor of
Munoz, and granted the application
ISSUE:
● W/N Munoz has proven by
competent evidence that the property is
alienable and disposable property of the
public domain
RULING:
● SC ruled against CA, stating that
CA’s basis (report of director of lands)
is not enough to assume alienability of
said land
● Applications for confirmation of
imperfect title must be able to prove: a)
Land is part of alienable and disposable
public domain b) Open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possesstion
under a bona fide claim of ownership
since time immemorial or since June 12,
1945
● Regalian Doctrine states that all
lands of the public domain belong to the
State, which means any land not within
private ownership belongs to the state
● Applicants of registration must
establish existence of a positive act of
govt (Presidential proclamation,
Executive order, administrative action,
and/or statute)
● Munoz failed to prove a positive act
of govt due to lack of CENRO
certificate
● Republic’s petition is granted
 Rural Bank of Anda vs. Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Lingayen-
Dagupan
FACTS:
● Lot in dispute is Cadastral Lot 736
which joins the lot of RC Archbishop’s
lot
● Rector of the seminary built a fence
separating Lot 736 from the national
road, but has several openings and no
gate
● Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley,
Pangasinan passed and approved a
resolution converting said lot into a
commercial lot
● Mayor leased a portion of the lot to
Rural Bank of Anda
● During construction of Rural Bank
of Anda’s building, the Mayor and a
Father of the seminary agreed to stop
construction of the building
● A year later, the Mayor told the
Bank that construction of the building
will resume, and that he will discuss
with RC Archbishop about the problem
concerning said lot
● RC Archbishop filed a complaint
for Abatement of Illegal Constructions
● RTC granted and issued a writ of
preliminary injunction and made it
permanent
● CA affirmed RTC decision but
modified awards and expenses, and
subsequently denied motion for
reconsideration
ISSUE:
● W/N the Resolution made by
Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley is
valid
RULING:
● Both RC Archbishop and
Municipality of Binmaley admit not
having a title over the disputed Lot 736
● RC Archbishop claims the lot based
on open, continuous, adverse, and
uninterrupted possession of said lot, but
records show the lot was used by people
as pathway, parking space, and
playground
● Lot 736 was used by the public in
general
● Both parties failed to prove their
right over the lot
● Honghok v. David has established
that “No evidence whatever that the
property in question was ever
acquired by the applicants or their
ancestors…. Must be held for public
domain”
● In accordance with Article XII,
Section 2 of the Constitution (Regalian
Doctrine) the state owns all lands and
waters of the public domain
● Municipal corporations cannot
appropriate to themselves public or
government lands without prior grant
from the govt.
● Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley
exceeded its authority in passing the
resolutions, therefore making such
resolutions void
● Contract of lease between
Municipality of Binmaley, and Rural
Bank of Anda is void
Cruz vs. Sec. of DENR
FACTS:
● Isagani Cruz, and Cesar Europa, as
citizens and taxpayers assail the
constitutionality of the Indigenous
People’s Rights Act of 1997
● They state that provisions of IPRA
amount to unlawful deprivation of the
State’s ownership over lands of the
public domain, violating the Regalian
Doctrine
ISSUE:
● Does the IPRA contravene Article
XII, Section 2 of the Constitution
(Regalian Doctrine)
RULING:
● No, IPRA provisions do not
contravene the Constitution
● Nothing in the provisions grants
Indegenous people ownership over the
natural resources
 ● Natural resources still belong to the
State
● IPRA merely gives Indigenous
people rights as owners and occupants
of the land on which the resources are
found, rights to small scale utilization of
the resources, and a priority in their
large scale development and
exploitation
● Ancestral lands are not part of
the lands of the public domain, they are
of Native Title (XPN to Regalian
Doctrine)
● Rights of Indigenous people on
the land is a limited form of ownership
(They cannot alienate said land)
TN: One person cannot own an
ancestral domain, it is of communal
ownership, therefore privately owned,
but by a community
Carino vs. Insular Government
FACTS:
● Mateo Carino is an Igorot from the
Province of Benguet
● For more than 50 years before the
Treaty of Paris, Carino and his ancestors
has held the land as recognized owners
by the Igorots
● Carino petitioned alleging
ownership under the mortgage law, but
only granted him possessory title
● Even with the possessory title, he
cannot have it registered, because
Philippine Commission’s Act No. 926
of 1903, excepts Benguet among others
from its operations
ISSUE:
● W/N Carino has ownership to the
said land, and is entitled to registration
RULING:
● Spanish Law dictates that where
possessors are unable to produce title
deeds, it is sufficient that they show
ancient possession as a valid title by
prescription
● CULTIVATED LAND - 20
YEARS uninterrupted, and
UNCULTIVATED LAND - 30 YEARS
● Natives without a paper title are not
trespassers.
● Applicant's possession was not
unlawful, and no attempt at any such
proceedings against him or his father
ever was made.
TN: It is not enough to declare native
title by claiming possession since time
immemorial through predecessors, it
must be proven that even before the
Spanish conquest, that the indigenous
community has been established.
Grey Alba v. de la Cruz
Topic: Torrens System of
Registration, Meaning
Facts:
· The petitioners herein are the he only
heirs of Doña Segunda Alba Clemente and
Honorato Grey. The four petitioners, as co-
owners, on Dec. 18, 1906 sought to have
registered a parcel of agricultural land in
Bulacan. The petition was accompanied by a
plan and technical description of the said lot.
After hearing the court, on Feb. 12, 1908,
entered a decree directing that described in the
petition be registered in the names of the 4
petitioners.
· On Jun, 1908, Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz
filed a motion in the Court of Land Registration
(CLR) asking for a revision of the case,
including the decision, upon the ground that he
is the absolute owner of the 2 parcels of land
described in said motion and which he alleges to
be included in the lands decreed to the
petitioners. He alleges that the decree of Feb. 12,
1908 was obtained maliciously and fraudulently
by the petitioners, thereby depriving him of said
lands. For him, The petitioners deliberately
omitted to include in their registration his name
as one of the occupants of the land so as to be
given notice of registration. He further alleged
having inherited the 2 lots from his father,
Baldomero R. de la Cruz, who had a state grant
for the same (was duly inscribed in the old
register of property in Bulacan on April 6,
1895.)
 · He therefore asked a revision of the case,
and that the said decree be modified so as to
exclude the two parcels of land described in said
motion. The Land Court upon this motion
reopened the case, and after hearing the
additional evidence presented by both parties,
rendered, on the Nov. 23, 1908, its decision
modifying the former decree by excluding from
the same the two parcels of land claimed by
Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz.
Issue: WON modification of the decree as to
exclude said land will prosper.
Ruling:
• No, the main principle of registration
is to make registered titles indefeasible
• The Torrens Land Registration
System was introduced by Sir Robert
Torrens in 1857.
• Upon the presentation in court if an
application for the registration of the title to
lands, the theory under the Torrens system
is that all occupants, adjoining owners,
adverse claimants, and other interested
persons are notified of the proceedings, and
have a right to appear in opposition to such
application.
• IOW, the proceeding is against
the world.
• A proceeding is in rem when the
object of the action is to bar indifferently
all who might be minded to make an
objection of any sort against the right
sought to be established, and if anyone in
the world has a right to be heard on the
strength of alleging facts which, if true,
show an inconsistent interest.
• In the Torrens system title by
registration takes the place of “title by
deeds” of the system under the general law.
A sale of land, for example, is effected by
a registered transfer, upon which a
certificate of title is issued.
Legarda vs. Saleeby
Topic: Torrens System of
Registration, Purpose
Facts:
• A stone wall stands between the
adjoining lot of Legarda and Saleeby.
• The said wall and the strip of land
where it stands is registered in the Torrens
system under the name of Legarda in 1906.
• Six years after the decree of
registration is released in favor of Legarda,
Saleeby, applied for registration of his lot
under the Torrens system in 1912, and the
decree issued in favor of the latter included
the stone wall and the strip of land where it
stands.
Issue:
• Who should be considered as the
owner of the land which has been registered
under the name of two persons?
Ruling:
• Legarda first acquired title and it is
binding against the whole world.
• The first registrant, when issued a
certificate of title over that land, should
already rest secured that the title is theirs.
• The real purpose of the Torrens
System of Land Registration is to quiet title
to land; to put a stop forever to any question
of the legality of the title, except claims
which were noted, at the time of registration
in the certificate, or which may arise
subsequent thereto.
• Once a title is registered, the owner
may rest secure, the title is really yours.
The law guarantees the title of the registered
owner once it has entered into the Torrens
system. A land already registered to a
person under the Torrens System cannot
anymore be subsequently registered by
another person even if the prior registrant
did not present an opposition thereto.
 Traders Royal Bank vs. Descallar
Topic: Torrens System of
Registration, Purpose
Facts:
• A parcel of land owned by the spouses
Capay was mortgage to and subsequently
extrajudicially foreclosed by Traders Royal
Bank (TRB). To prevent property sale in
public auction, the Capays filed a petition
for preliminary injunction alleging the
mortgage was void because they did not
receive the proceeds of the loan. A notice of
lis pendens (suit pending) was filed before
the Register of Deeds with the notice
recorded in the Day Book.
• Meanwhile, a foreclosure sale
proceeded with the TRB as the sole and
winning bidder. The Capays title was
cancelled and new one was entered in
TRB’s name without the notice of lis
pendens carried over the title.
• The Capays filed recovery of the
property and damages. Court rendered a
decision declaring the mortgage was void
for want of consideration and thus cancelled
TRB’s title and issued new cert. of title for
the Capays. Pending its appeal before the
court, TRB sold the land to Santiago who
subsequently subdivided and sold to buyers
who were issued title to the land. Court ruled
that the subsequent buyers cannot be
considered purchasers for value and in good
faith since they purchase the land after it
became a subject in a pending suit before the
court. Although the lis pendens notice was
not carried over the titles, its recording in the
Day Book constitutes registering of the land
and notice to all persons with adverse claim
over the property. TRB was held to be in bad
faith upon selling the property while
knowing it is pending for litigation. The
Capays were issued the certificate of title of
the land in dispute while TRB is to pay
damages to Capays.
Issue:
• WON TRB is liable for damages
• WON the subsequent buyers have a
better right over the land in dispute.
Ruling:
• The court ruled that a Torrens title is
presumed to be valid which purpose is to
avoid conflicts of title to real properties. The
purpose of the Torrens System of
Registration is the protection of property
rights. When the subsequent buyers bought
the property there was no lis pendens
annotated on the title.
• TN: The Capays only raised the issue
of ownership of the subsequent owners after
15 years. The SC rules that they are guilty
of laches. They have slept on their right by
laches. If they wanted to protect their
ownership, they should have made sure that
it was annotated.
• Hence, the court ruled that the
subsequent buyers obtained the property
from a clean title in good faith and for value.
If a person purchases a piece of land on the
assurance that the seller's title thereto is
valid, he should not run the risk of being told
later that his acquisition was ineffectual
after all.
• Every person dealing with a registered
land may safely rely on the correctness of
the title and is not obliged to interpret what
is beyond the face of the registered title.
• Therefore, the property cannot be
taken away to their prejudice. Thus, TRB is
duty bound to pay the Capays the fair
market value of the property.
SM Prime Holdings Inc. Madayag
Topic: Torrens System of
Registration, Indefeasibility
Facts:
· In 2001, Madayag filed with the RTC of
Urdaneta, Pangasinan an application for
registration of a parcel of land with an area of
1,492 s. meters located in Barangay Anonas,
Urdaneta City, Pangasinan. Attached to the
application was a tracing cloth of Survey Plan
Psu-01-008438, approved by the LMS-DENR,
Region 1, San Fernando City.
· SM opposed the application because
allegedly, the lot encroached on the properties it
recently purchased from several lot owners. SM
also filed with the DENR a petition for
cancellation of the survey plan. After which, SM
filed with the RTC an Urgent Motion to Suspend
Proceeding in the land registration case alleging
that the trial court should wait for DENR’s
resolution of the petition.
· After the trial, the RTC suspended the
registration proceedings on the ground that the
petition for cancellation of the survey plan filed
by SM with DENR is prejudicial to the
determination of the land registration case since a
survey plan is one of the mandatory requirements
in such proceedings.
· When Madayag appealed to CA, the latter
ratiocinated that the survey plan, which was duly
approved by the DENR, should be accorded the
presumption of regularity, and that the RTC has
the power to hear and determine all questions
arising from an application for registration.
Issue:
· WON the jurisdiction the RTC has over
land registration proceedings is affected if there
is a petition filed in DENR to cancel the survey
plan
Ruling:
· Yes. The Court held that as an incident to
its authority to settle all questions over the title of
the subject property, the land registration court
may resolve the underlying issue of whether the
subject property overlaps the petitioner’s
properties without necessarily having to declare
the survey plan as void.
· A land registration court has the duty to
determine whether the issuance of anew
certificate of title will alter a valid and existing
certificate of title. An application for registration
of an already titled land constitutes a collateral
attack on the existing title, which is not allowed
by law.
· The SC held that the RTC need not wait for
the decision of the DENR in the petition to cancel
the survey plan in order to proceed with the
registration proceedings.
· PD 1529 grants the Land Registration Court
or RTC the power to settle all issues regarding
land registration including the survey plan.
· It is indefeasible because of the power of
the registration court to examine evidence of
whether or not you really are the owner of the
land; it has to go through rigorous proceedings.
· When the decree is given to you confirming
ownership over the land, it becomes indefeasible.
There is no need to wait for other administrative
agencies because that power settles issues of
ownership over the land is already given to the
RTC or Land Registration Court.
Government of the Philippine
Islands vs. Abural
Topic: Torrens System of
Registration, Indefeasibility
Facts:
· Cadastral proceedings were commenced in
the municipality of Hinigaran, Province of
Occidental Negros, upon an application of the
Director of Lands, on June 16, 1916. Notice of the
proceedings were published in the Official
Gazette as provided by law.
· The instant petitioners, Antipas Vazquez
and Basilio Gayares, although said to reside in
this municipality, and although said to have
participated in other cadastral cases, did not enter
any opposition as to this lot.
· A judgement was rendered and the court
declared that the Lot No. 1608 is to be registered
to Victoriano Siguenza and Marcela Guanzon.
· Eight months later, that is, on July 23, 1917,
but before the issuance by the Land Registration
Office of the so-called technical decree, Antipas
Vazquez and Basilio Gayares, the latter as
guardian of the minor Estrella Vazquez, came
into the case for the first time.
· The petitioners, after setting forth their right
of ownership in lot No. 1608, and that it was
included in their "Hacienda Santa Filomena," and
after stating that they were in complete ignorance
of the proceedings, asked that the judgment of the
court be annulled and that the case be reopened to
receive proof relative to the ownership of the lot.
Issue: WON the case can be re-opened.
Ruling:
· No. The SC held that it cannot be re-opened
because the ground for re-opening it was
ignorance of the proceedings, in other words they
were not informed. The ground to re-open the
case must be fraud, not ignorance.
· The prime purpose of the Torrens System,
as established in the Philippine Islands by the
Land
Registration Law (Act No. 496), is to decree land
titles that shall be final, irrevocable,
and indisputable.
· The title becomes indefeasible and
incontrovertible one year from its final decree of
registration. The SC said that on the basis of PD
1529, you may attack it on the ground of fraud,
not ignorance.
· The Torrens system aims to decree land
titles that shall be final, irrevocable, and
indisputable, and to relieve the land of the burden
of known as well as unknown claims.
· As a general rule, registration of title under
the cadastral system is final, conclusive and
indisputable, after the lapse of the period allowed
for an appeal. The prevailing party may then have
execution of the judgment as of right and is
entitled to the issuance of a certificate of title. The
exception is the special provision providing for
fraud.
· In this case, the ordinal registration
proceeding is a proceeding in rem. Once
publication is made there is an effect where
publication becomes constructive notice to the
whole world. As long as it was already published,
the whole world, including the parties are already
deemed notified.
Borromeo vs. Descallar
Topic: Torrens System of
Registration, Indefeasibility
Facts:
· Wilhelm Jambrich is an Austrian who was
assigned by his company to work in Mindoro. He
then transferred to Cebu and that’s where he met
respondent Antonietta Descallar. They eventually
fell in love and decided to live together. Later on,
they transferred to their own house and lots at
Agro-Macro Subdivision, Mandaue City.
· In the Contracts to Sell both Jambrich and
Descallar were referred to as buyers. However
when the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented
for registration at the Register of Deeds, it was
refused because Jambrich was a foreigner who
could not acquire lands. So Jambrich’s name was
erased from the document and the house and lot
was under Descallar’s name. Their relationship
didn’t last.
· In 1989, Jambrich purchased some
speedboat parts from petitioner, Camilo
Borromeo. Jambrich became indebted to
Borromeo and he sold his rights and interest to
the Agro-Macro property to Borromeo as
evidenced by a Deed of Aboslute
Sale/Assignment.
· Petitioner filed a complaint against
Descallar for recovery of real property before
RTC of Mandaue City. Petitioner alleges that the
contracts to Sell and Deed of Absolute Sale with
Descallar and Jambirch’s names do not reflect the
true agreement of the parties since respondent did
not pay a single centavo for the purchase price,
considering that it was Jambrich alone who paid
for the properties using his exclusive funds, that
Jambrich was the real absolute owner of the
properties and the petitioner acquired absolute
ownership by virtue of the Deed of Absolute
Sale/Assignment which Jambrich executed in his
favor.
· Respondent contends that the title was
already in her name, and then the title has already
been indefeasible considering the lapse of 4
years. Descallar also contends that Jambrich
could not own property in the country and
therefore could not pass it to Borromeo.
Issue:
· WON Descallar, whose name appears on
the registration alone, is the rightful owner of the
property.
Ruling:
· No. While there is a certificate of title in
her name, the registration confirms nothing.
Registration is not a mode of acquiring
ownership. It is only a means of confirming the
fact of its existence with notice to the world at
large. Registration is a mere ministerial act that
confirms ownership.
· The rule on indefeasibility of title does not
apply to Descallar. The general rule is that a
certificate of title implies that the title is quiet,
and that it is perfect, absolute and indefeasible.
However, there are exceptions to this rule, as
when the transferee is not a holder in good faith
and did not acquire the subject properties for a
valuable consideration. Descallar did not
contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of
the properties. She had no income of her own at
that time nor did she have any savings. She and
her two sons were then fully supported by
Jambrich.
· The SC held that if land is invalidly
transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes
a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the
flaw in the original transaction is cured and the
title of the transferee is rendered valid. The Court
upheld the sale of Jambrich to Borromeo.
BAGUIO V. REPUBLIC
FACTS:
· This is a petition for review of the
decision of the CA affirming the decision
of the RTC.
· Private respondent Ricardo
Michael's predecessor-in-interest,
William Michael, filed with the Bureau
of Lands an application for foreshore
lease of the land. The application was
recommended for approval by the land
investigator who also recommended that
the applicant be granted a provisional
permit to occupy the land for one year
from October 4, 1963 to October 3, 1964.
· By virtue of a permit granted to
him by the Bureau of Lands, William
Michael made some reclamation on the
land, built a fence around the premises,
and constructed a bridge over a portion
which was under water.
· Upon the expiration of the permit,
the Highways District Engineer
recommended to the Director of Lands
that the land be leased to Michael. On the
other hand, the land investigator
recommended granting Michael the
authority to survey the foreshore land in
view of the completion of the
reclamation made by him on the
premises. Michael filed a miscellaneous
sales application covering the reclaimed
foreshore land.||
· On 1976, petitioner Baguio applied
to the Bureau of Lands for a free patent
covering the same land. In his
application, petitioner stated that the land
was agricultural land and not claimed or
occupied by any other person and that he
had been in actual and continuous
possession and cultivation of the same.
On the basis of these representations, a
free patent was issued to him and on
1978, Certificate of Title was issued in
his name by the Register of Deeds of
Cebu.
· Baguio demanded payment of
rentals from William Michael for the use
of the land occupied by Michael
Slipways, Inc.. He also filed an
opposition to Michael's miscellaneous
sales application covering the land on the
ground that he was the registered owner
thereof.
· William Michael protested the
issuance by the Bureau of Lands of a free
patent to petitioner and claimed that he
had been in actual possession of the land
since 1963 and that he had introduced
substantial improvements thereon.
· The government filed a petition for
cancellation of title and/or reversion of
land against Baguio and the Register of
Deeds of Cebu.
· RTC rendered a decision canceling
the free patent and the certificate of title
of Baguio, ordering the reversion of the
land to the public domain, and declaring
private respondent Michael the true and
lawful occupant of the land.
ISSUE:
· W/N the Regional Trial Court,
erred in finding that petitioner "acted in
bad faith and procured the issuance of the
Free Patent and the Original Certificate
of Title through fraud and
misrepresentation.
HELD:
· Petitioner is guilty of making false
statements in his application for a free
patent thus justifying the annulment of
his title. The indefeasibility of a title does
not attach to titles secured by fraud and
misrepresentation.
· In his free patent application,
petitioner declared under oath that the
land in question was an agricultural land
not claimed or occupied by any other
person; that he had continuously
possessed and occupied it; and that he
had introduced improvements thereon.
These declarations constitute fraud and
misrepresentation.
 · Indeed, the indefeasibility of a
certificate of title cannot be invoked by
one who procured the title by means of
fraud. Public policy demands that one
who obtains title to public land through
fraud should not be allowed to benefit
therefrom.
FUDOT V. CATTLEYA LAND,
INC.
FACTS:
· In July 1992, Cattleya Land, Inc.,
respondent asked someone to check, on
its behalf, the titles of nine (9) lots, the
subject land included, which it intended
to buy from the spouses Troadio and
Asuncion Tecson. Finding no defect on
the titles, respondent purchased the nine
lots through a Deed of Conditional Sale
and subsequently executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale over the same properties.
Both were registered with the Register of
Deeds.
· The Register of Deeds refused to
actually annotate the deed of sale on the
titles because of the existing notice of
attachment in connection with Civil Case
pending before the RTC of Bohol the
attachment was eventually cancelled by
virtue of a compromise agreement
between the Tecsons and their attaching
creditor.
· On January 1995, petitioner
presented for registration before the
Register of Deeds the owner's copy of the
title of the subject property, together with
the deed of sale purportedly executed by
the Tecsons in favor of petitioner on
December 1986.
· So, respondent sent a letter of
protest to petitioner's application but
respondent learned that the Register of
Deeds had already registered the deed of
sale in favor of petitioner and issued a
new title in her name.
· Respondent filed its Complaint for
Quieting Of Title &/Or Recovery Of
Ownership, Cancellation Of Title With
Damages before the RTC.
· Wife Asuncion Tecson filed a
complaint-in-intervention, claiming that
she never signed any deed of sale
covering any part of their conjugal
property in favor of petitioner. She
averred that her signature in petitioner's
deed of sale was forged thus, said deed
should be declared null and void. She
also claimed that she has discovered only
recently that there was an amorous
relationship between her husband and
petitioner.
· Petitioner alleged in her answer
that the spouses Tecson had sold to her
the subject property for P20,000.00 and
delivered to her the owner's copy of the
title on December 1986. She claims that
she subsequently presented the said title
to the Register of Deeds but the latter
refused to register the same because the
property was still under attachment.
· According the RTC, respondent
had recorded in good faith the deed of
sale in its favor ahead of petitioner.
Moreover, based on Asuncion's
convincing and unrebutted testimony, the
trial court concluded that the purported
signature of Asuncion in the deed of sale
in favor of petitioner was forged, thereby
rendering the sale void.
· Petitioner avers that she was the
first buyer in good faith and even had in
her possession the owner's copy of the
title so much so that she was able to
register the deed of sale in her favor and
caused the issuance of a new title in her
name. She argues that the presentation
and surrender of the deed of sale and the
owner's copy carried with it the
"conclusive authority of Asuncion
Tecson" which cannot be overturned by
the latter's oral deposition.
· Petitioner insists that the applicable
law in this case is P.D. No. 1529, a
special law dealing precisely with the
registration of registered lands or any
subsequent sale thereof, and not Article
1544 of the Civil Code which deals with
immovable property not covered by the
Torrens System.
ISSUE:
· W/N Fudot has a better right as the
first buyer of the subject property in
accordance with Article 1544 of the CC
on double sale.
HELD:
· The Court held against the
petitioner. There is no double sale to
speak of. Art. 1544 of the Civil Code
which provides the rule on double sale,
applies only to a situation where the same
property is validly sold to different
vendees. In this case, there is only one
sale to advert to, that between the spouses
Tecson and respondent.
· The act of registration does not
validate petitioner's otherwise void
contract. Registration is a mere
ministerial act by which a deed, contract,
or instrument is sought to be inscribed in
the records of the Office of the Register
of Deeds.
· It is thus essential, to merit the
protection of Art. 1544, second
paragraph, that the second realty buyer
must act in good faith in registering his
deed of sale.
· The registration contemplated
under Art. 1544 has been held to refer to
registration under Act 496 Land
Registration Act (now PD 1529) which
considers the act of registration as the
operative act that binds the land. On
lands covered by the Torrens System, the
purchaser acquires such rights and
interest as they appear in the certificate of
title, unaffected by any prior lien or
encumbrance not noted therein. The
purchaser is not required to explore
farther than what the Torrens title, upon
its face, indicates. The only exception is
where the purchaser has actual
knowledge of a flaw or defect in the title
of the seller or of such liens or
encumbrances which, as to him, is
equivalent to registration.
PO SUN TUN V. PRICE
FACTS:
· Gabino Barreto P. Po Ejap was the
owner of a certain parcel of land situated
in the municipality of Tacloban, Province
of Leyte.
· He sold the land to Po Tecsi for the
sum of P8,000.
· Po mortgaged the land to W. S.
Price in the amount of P17,000. The
mortgage was duly noted in the office of
the register of deeds of Leyte.
· On December 17, 1924, Po
executed a deed of sale of the land to
Price in consideration of P17,000. This
sale was recorded with the register of
deeds.
· Price in turn, with the consent of
his wife, sold the land to the Province of
Leyte for P20,570.
· On the date Po Tecsi gave a general
power of attorney including the right to
sell to Gabino Barreto P. Po Ejap, acting
under this power, Gabino sold the land on
November 22, 1923, for P8,000 to Jose
H. Katigbak. On this document there
appears on the upper right-hand margin
the following: "Register of Deeds,
Received, Dec. 15, 1923, Province of
Leyte." In turn Jose H. Katigbak
transferred the property to Po Sun Tun on
October 12, 1927, for P8,000.
· As to the possession of the
property, it has been under the control of
Price and the Provincial Government of
Leyte and has not been under the material
control of Po Sun Tun.
· Predicated on these facts, Po Sun
Tun began an action in the Court of First
Instance of Leyte to gain the possession
of the property and to secure damages in
the amount of P3,600.
ISSUE:
· W/N a receipt for the document
evidencing the sale from the office of the
register of deeds amounts to registration?
HELD:
· The provision of law relied upon
by the trial judge as authority for his
decision was the second paragraph of
article 1473 of the Civil Code, which
provides that should it be real property, it
shall belong to the purchaser who first
recorded it in the Registry of Deeds."
· Recalling that the deed of Po Tecsi
to Price was duly registered on January
22, 1925, and that thereafter a Torrens
title was obtained in the name of Price,
and that the deed of Gabino Barreto P. Po
Ejap to Jose H. Katigbak has noted on it
"Register of Deeds, Received, Dec. 15,
1923, Province of Leyte.
· The American authorities conform
in this respect to the Spanish authorities
for of the term "To register" it has been
said that it means to "enter in a register;
to record formally and distinctly; to
enroll; to enter in a list”.
· Within the meaning of the law this
latter deed was not ever recorded.
· The mere presentation to the office
of the register of deeds of a document on
which acknowledgment of receipt is
written is not equivalent to recording or
registering the real property. Escriche
says that registration, in its juridical
aspect, must be understood as the entry
made in a book or public registry of
deeds.
VAGILIDAD V. VAGILILDAD
(WILFREDO T. VAGILIDAD and LOLITA A.
VAGILIDAD, Petitioners, vs. GABINO
VAGILIDAD, Jr. and DOROTHY
VAGILIDAD, Respondents.)
FACTS:
· A parcel of land (Lot No. 1253)
situated in Atabay, San Jose, Antique
was owned by Zoilo Labiao. Sometime
in 1931, Zoilo died.
· May 1986, Loreto Labiao, son of
Zoilo, sold to Gabino Vagilidad Jr. a
portion of Lot No. 1253, measuring
1,604 sq m as evidenced by the Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by Loreto.
· Zoilo’s children Loreto, Efren
Labiao and Priscilla Espanueva, in view
of their father’s death, executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated
January 1987, adjudicating the entire Lot
No. 1253, covering 4,280 square meters,
to Loreto. A Transfer Certificate of Title
was issued in favor of LORETO, EFREN
and PRISCILLA, but on even date, TCT
No. T16693 was cancelled and TCT No.
T-16694, covering the said property, was
issued in the name of LORETO alone.
· On July 1987, Gabino Jr., as
petitioner, filed a Petition for the
Surrender of TCT covering Lot No. 1253
against LORETO.
· The parties had already reached an
amicable settlement without the
knowledge of their counsels.
· Gabino Jr. paid real estate taxes on
the land he bought from Loreto.
· Gabino Jr. thereafter sold the same
lot to Wilfredo Vagilidad as per Deed of
Absolute Sale dated December 7, 1989.
On the same date, Deed of Absolute Sale
of a Portion of Land involving the opt-
described property was also executed by
Loreto in favor of Wilfredo.
· On February 1990, the sale of Lot
No. 1253-B to Wilfredo was registered.
· Spouses Wilfredo and Lolita
obtained a loan from the PNB and
mortgaged Lot No. 1253-B as collateral
of the said loan and the transaction was
inscribed at the back of TCT.
· Subsequently, Wilfredo obtained
another loan from DBP and mortgaged
Lot No. 1253-B as collateral of the loan
and the transaction was inscribed at the
back of TCT. The said loan was paid and,
consequently, the mortgage was
cancelled.
· Spouses Gabino and Ma. Dorothy
Vagilidad, as plaintiffs, filed a Complaint
for Annulment of Document,
Reconveyance and Damages.
· But Wilfredo claimed that they are
the owner the land because they already
bought it to from the former owner who
sold the same to Gabino. Then Gabino
claimed that Wilfredo resort to fraud to
 obtain ownership of the said property.
They raised that defendant Wilfredo
requested Gabino Jr. to transfer the
ownership of Lot No. 1253-B in
defendant Wilfredo’s name for loaning
purposes with the agreement that the land
will be returned when the plaintiffs need
the same. They added that, pursuant to
the mentioned agreement, plaintiff
Gabino Jr., without the knowledge and
consent of his spouse, Dorothy, executed
the Deed of Sale dated December 7, 1989
in favor of defendant Wilfredo receiving
nothing as payment therefor.
· The trial court ruled in favor of
petitioners. Gabino, Jr. and Dorothy filed
an appeal with the CA. The CA reversed
and set aside the decision of the trial
court
ISSUE:
· W/N the petitioners are correct in
their contention that since the
subdivision plan of Lot No. 1253 was
only approved on January 19, 1987, the
appellate court can not presume that the
aliquot part of Loreto was the parcel
designated as Lot 1253-B?
HELD:
· No. The mere fact that Loreto sold
a definite portion of the co-owned lot by
metes and bounds before partition does
not, per se, render the sale a nullity.
· We held in Lopez v. Vda. De
Cuaycong that the fact that an agreement
purported to sell a concrete portion of a
co-owned property does not render the
sale void, for it is well-established that
the binding force of a contract must be
recognized as far as it is legally possible
to do so.
· In the case at bar, the contract of
sale between Loreto and Gabino, Jr. on
May 12, 1986 could be legally
recognized. At the time of sale, Loreto
had an aliquot share of one-third of the
4,280-sq m property or some 1,426
square meters but sold some 1,604 sq m
to Gabino, Jr.
· We have ruled that if a co-owner
sells more than his aliquot share in the
property, the sale will affect only his
share but not those of the other co-owners
who did not consent to the sale. Be that
as it may, the co-heirs of Loreto waived
all their rights and interests over Lot No.
1253 in favor of Loreto in an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated
January 20, 1987.
· They declared that they have
previously received their respective
shares from the other estate of their
parents Zoilo and Purificacion.
· The rights of Gabino, JR. asowner
over Lot No. 1253-B are thus preserved.
These rights were not effectively
transferred by Loreto to Wilfredo in the
Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of
Land. Nor were these rights alienated
from Gabino, Jr. upon the issuance of the
title to the subject property in the name
of Wilfredo. Registration of property is
not a means of acquiring ownership. Its
alleged incontrovertibility cannot be
successfully invoked by Wilfredo
because certificates of title cannot be
used to protect a usurper from the true
owner or be used as a shield for the
commission of fraud.
Tiro vs. Philippine Estates
Corporation
Facts:
- Petitioners Guillerma Tiro, Domingo Tiro
Nunes and Maximo Tiro filed a case against
respondent Philippine Estates Corporation
which is legally allowed to operate by law
- Petitioners claimed to be ascendants of some
disputed land properties that were in the name
of the Philippine Estates Corporation
- Sadly, the said properties were transferred
through the evidence or documents provided
for by the Office of the Register of Deeds
- A property named under Julian and Pedro Tiro
was cancelled in September 10, 1969 and
placed under Spouses Julio baba and Olimpia
Mesa
- Petitioners claim, however, Ochea claiming she
is the only surviving heir turns out to be not
related to Julian and Pedro Tiro and she is not a
 legitimate heir she had no right to transfer the
disputed property through testimonies
- Respondent presented the decision made by
Spouses Velayo in support that they are the
owners of the property in the case of Spouses
Velayo v. Spouses Tiro in the Municipal Trial
Court of Lapu-Lapu City indicating that the
disputed property is owned by Spises Velayo
Issue/s:
Whether or not the claim of petitioners Tiro as the
owners of the disputed properties is valid? No
Ruling:
- Since the main point of the petitioners was
Ochea, who is not related to the descendants of
Juan and Pedro Tiro executed the transfer of the
properties is fraudulent is not sufficient
grounds to cancel all succeeding transfer of
properties
- To add, a person who has fraudulently obtained
property is concerned, the consequently
fraudulent registration in the name of such
person would confirm or record title already
existing and vested.
- The indefeasibility of the torrens title should
not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud
against the rightful owner of real property
- Good faith must concur with registration.
- However, where good faith is established, as in
the case of an innocent purchaser for value, a
forged document may become the root of a
valid title
- A person is considered in law as an innocent
purchaser for value when he bus the property of
another, without notice that some other person
has a right or an interest in such property, and
pays a full price for the same at the time of such
purchase, or person dealing with registered land
may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of the title.
- In the present case, respondent was clearly an
innocent purchaser for value. It purchased the
disputed property from Pacific Rehouse
Corporation, along with other parcels of land
for a valuable consideration
- According to Jurisprudence, it is crucial that a
complaint for annulment of title must allege
that the purchaser was aware of the defect in the
title, so that the cause of action against him or
her will be sufficient.
- In this case, petitioners directed all allegations
of bad faith solely on Ochea
Cruz vs. Cabanta
*Castillo v. Escutin, Mistas, Linatoc,
CA
Facts:
- In the course of her search for properties to
satisfy the judgment in her favor, petitioner
discovered that Raque, her mother Urbana, and
sister Perla, co-owned a parcel of land which is
covered by a Tax Declaration
- Petitioner was able to prove she was the owner
of the property by providing an order issued by
Secretary Horacio R. Morales, Jr. of the
Department of Agrarian reform in order to
convert several agricultural landholdings to
residential, commercial and recreational uses
- There are several documents presented in order
to prove that the said property was under the
name of co-owners Raque, Urbana and Perla
- When petitioner attempted to pay real estate
taxes for her property (Lot 13713), she found
out that, without giving her notice, her Tax
Declaration was cancelled due to the said
property being encompassed in and
overlapping with another property (Lot 1-B)
- Petitioners Affidavit Complaint gave rise to
simultaneous administrative and preliminary
(criminal) investigations
- Petitioner pointed out several irregularities in
the circumstances surrounding the alleged sale
of Lot 1-B to Summit Realty in the documents
evidencing the same
Ruling:
- The court must clarify that a title is different
from a certificate of title
- Title is generally defined as the lawful cause or
ground of possessing that which is ours
- It is that which is the foundation of ownership
of property, real or personal
- Title therefore, may be defined briefly as that
which constitutes a just cause of exclusive
possession, or which is the foundation of
ownership of property
- Certificate of title, on the other hand, is a mere
evidence of ownership; it is not the title to the
land itself
- Under the Torrens system, a certificate of title
may be an Original Certificate of Title, which
constitutes a true copy of the decree of
registration; or a Transfer Certificate of Title,
issued subsequent to the original registration
- Summit Realty acquired its title to Lot 1-B, not
from the issuance of the new owner’s duplicate
but from its purchase of the same from Yangin,
the attorney-in-fact of Catigbac, the registered
owner of the said property
- Summit Realty merely sought the issuance of a
new owner’s duplicate in the name of Catigbac
so that it could accordingly register thereon the
sale in its favor of a substantial portion of Lot 1
covered by said certificate, later identified as
Lot 1-B to seek the separation of the said
portion from the rest of Lot 1-B
- Petitioner’s reliance on Section 109 of the
Property Registration Decree is totally
misplaced for it is based on the certificate of
title and cannot be related to the cancellation of
petitioner’s tax declaration
- A certificate of title issued is an absolute and
indefeasible evidence of ownership of the
property in favor of the person whose name
appears therein. It is binding and conclusive
upon the whole world. All persons must take
notice, and no one can plead ignorance of the
registration. Therefore, upon presentation of
the transfer of certificate title, the Office of the
City Assessor must recognize the ownership of
Lot 1-B by Catigbac and issue in his name a tax
declaration for the said property
- And since Lot 1-B is already covered by a tax
declaration in the name of Catigbac,
accordingly, any other tax declaration for the
same property or portion thereof in the name of
another person, not supported by any certificate
of title, such that of petitioner, must be
cancelled
Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Ribaya
Facts:
- A parcel of land located in the barrio of
Magragondong, Municipality of Ligao,
Province of Albay, was surveyed by spouses
Ribaya by Telesforo Untalan, a Bureau of
Lands surveyor
- The survey plan was denominated as Plan II-
13961 and allegedly approved by Acting
Director of Lands on 3 January 1922
- The indefeasibility of title does not lie against
the State in an action for reversion of land
- The respondents allege that the petition merely
raises factual matters and argue that OCT No.
3947 is absolutely incontestable, considering
that the land was no longer part of the public
forest when it was decreed in favor of their
parents
- The spouses-applicants failed to prove
possession of the land for the period required
by law, and the evidence shows that their
possession was not open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious under a bona fide claim of
ownership and the amended survey was not
published
- Respondents claim that republication of the
original survey plan is not applicable for the
first publication has been in compliance with
law
- The land covered by OCT No. 3947 was then
part of the forest land, hence,
- inalienable and the accuracy of the land survey
was doubtful
Issue/s:
- Whether or not the land registration court
acquired jurisdiction over the four parcels of
land subject of the amended survey plan (Plan
II-13961-Amd) and covered by the decree
issued on 31 July 1926 by the General Land
Registration Office pursuant to the decision of
the said court of 18 September 1925
Ruling:
- The land registration court never acquired
jurisidiction over the land covered by either
the original plan or the amended plan for lack
 of sufficient publication the first and total
want of publication of the second
- As found by both the trial court in Civil Case
No. 6198 and the Court of Appeals, the notice
of the hearing of application of the spouses
Ribaya for the registration of the land covered
the original plan was published in the 17
March 1925 issue of the Official Gazette, In
short, there was only one publication thereof.
- Section 31 of No. 496, the governing law
then required two publications. Hence, the
decision of 18 September 1925 of the land
registration court was void for want of the
required publications
- The requirement of dual publication is one
of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the
registration court; it is a jurisidictionalr
euqisite.
- Land registration is proceeding in rem and
jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless
there be constructive seizure of the Land
through publication and service of notice
- The decision of 18 September 1925 was
entirely based on an alleged original survey
plan. The fact remains, however, that in
November of that year the original plan was
amended and the amended plan was not
published at all and there is no evidence in
court that the court amended its decision to
conform to the amended plan, neither is there
a showing that the parties even attempted
publication thereof
- However, the decree that was subsequently
issued was based on the amended plan insofar
as the four lots were concerned
- A decree of registration is required to recite
the description of the land. On the basis of the
decree, OCT No. 3947 was issued. It follows
then the land registration court may have
amended its decision to conform to the
amended plan for the four lots which
ultimately found their way into the decree
issued by the General Land Registration
Office, and finally into OCT No. 3947.
- Whether it did so or not and the General
Land Registration Office merely adjusted the
decree to conform to the amended plan, such
aims were fatally flawed due to the absence of
publication of the amended plan. As such, the
land registration court acquired no jurisdiction
over the land embraced by the amended plan
Alba v. De la Cruz
Facts:
- Petitioners, Manuela, Jose, Juan and
Francisco, surnamed Grey y Alba, are the only
heirs of Dona Seguna Alba Clementa and
Honorato Grey, deceased
- Remedios Grey y Alba, a sister of the
petitioners, was married to Vicente Reyes and
died without leaving any heirs except her
husband
- The four petitioners, as coowners, sought to
have registered the described property
- This parcel of agricultural land is sued for
the raising of rice and sugar cane and is
assessed at $1,000 United States currency.
The petition, which was filed on the 18th of
December 1906, was accompanied by a plan
and technical description of the above-
described parcel of land
- After hearing the proofs presented, the court
entered, on the 12 th of February, 1908, a
decree in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926,
directing that the land described in the petition
be registered by the names of the four
petitioners, as coowners, subject to the
usufructuary right of Vicente widower of
Remedios Grey
- On the 16 th of June, 1908, Anacleto Ratilla
de la Cruz filed a motion in the court of Land
Registration asking for a revision of the case,
including the decision, upon the ground that
he is the absolute owner of the two parcels of
land which are described in the said motion
- He alleged that the decree of February 12,
1908 was obtained fraudulently
- Respondent claims he is the absolute owner
of the parcel of land for he has inherited them
from his father, Baldomero R. de la Cruz, who
had a state of grant for the same
- It is admitted that the time appellants
presented their petition in this case the
appellee was occupying the two parcels of
land in question.
- Petitioners claim that they inherited this land
from their parents, who acquired the same,
including the two small parcels in question, by
purchase, as is evidenced by a public
 document dated the 26 th of November, 1864,
duly executed before Francisco Iriarte, alcalde
mayor and judge of the Court of First Instance
of Bulacan
- Baldomero R. dela Cruz, father of the
appellee, obtained in March, 1895, a state
grant for the several parcels of land in question
as inscribed in the old register of property in
Bulacan on the 6 th of April of the same year
- It is also admitted that the name of the
appellee does not appear in the said petition as
an occupant of the said two parcels
- The petitioners insist that the appellee was
occupying these parcels only as a tenant
- On the 13 th of June, 1882, Jose Grey, uncle
and representative of the petitioners who were
then minors, rented the land owned by the
petitioners’ deceased parents and rented it to
Baldomero R. de la Cruz, father of the
appellee for 6 mponths
- The two small parcels of land in question
were purchased and made a sale of that year to
Baldomero Ratilla dela Cruz in 1895
Ruling:
- The Land Registration Act requires that all
occupants be named in the petition and given
notice by registered mail. This did not do the
appellee any good, as he was not notified; but
he was made a party defendant, as we have
said, by means of the publication "to all whom
it may concern." If this section of the Act is to
be upheld this must be declared to be due
process of law
- Before examining the validity of this part of
the Act it might be well to note the history and
purposes of what is known as the "Torrens
Land Registration System." This system was
introduced in south Australia by Sir Robert
Torrens in 1857 and was there worked out in
its practicable form
- The main principle of registration is to make
registered titles indefeasible.
- As we have said, upon the presentation in
the Court of Land Registration of an
application for the registration of the title to
lands, under this system, the theory of the law
is that all occupants, adjoining owners,
adverse claimants, and other interested
persons are notified of the proceedings, and
have a right to appear in opposition to such
application. In other words, the proceeding is
against the whole world.
- This system was evidently considered by the
Legislature to be a public project when it
passed Act No. 496. The interest of the
community at large was considered to be
preferred to that of private individuals.
- Compensation for errors from assurance
funds is provided in all countries in which the
Torrens system has been enacted
- The court below held that the failure on the
part of the petitioners to include the name of
the appellee in their petition, as an occupant of
these two parcels fo land, was a violation of
Section 21 of Act No. 496, and that this is
constituted fraud within the meaning of
section 38 of said Land Registration Act
Moscoso v. CA
Facts:
- Petitioner applied for land registration of a
parcel of residential land which she alleged
among others that the property is her share in
the estate of her late father in partition she
entered with her five other siblings
- The application was opposed by three
alleged children of applicant’s father in a
common law union prior to his marriage with
applicant’s mother
- After the presentation of evidence, the trial
court rendered decision finding that applicant
is not the exclusive owner fo the property and
directing the registration of the land in co-
ownership with applicant and the three
oppositors
- Applicant filed motion for reconsideration
- After hearing, the trial court modified its
decision finding that the three oppositors, only
one was able to prover her being an
acknowledged natural child fo applicant’s
father by competent proof, hence the
applicant’s share would be 13/14
- CA affirmed the decision,
- Applicant contends that the trial court, acting
as a land registration court, has no jurisdiction
to pass the issue whether oppositor is
acknowledged natural child of his father
Issue:
Whether or not the court, acting in its limited
jurisdiction as a land registration court,
competent to determine the right of the oppositor
to inherit?
Ruling:
- The proceedings for the registration of title
to land under the Torrens system is an action
in rem, not in personam
- Hence, personal notice to all claimants of
the res is not necessary to give the court
jurisdiction to deal with and dispose of the res,
and neither may lack of such personal notice
vitiate or invalidate the decree or title issued
in a registration proceeding, for the State, as
sovereign over the land situated within it, may
provide for the adjudication of title in a
proceeding in rem or in the nature of a
proceeding in rem, which shall be binding
upon all persons, known or unknown
- Under the above doctrine, petitioner's
assailment that `(t)he judicial pronouncement
(referring to the holding that the oppositor
Maximina L. Moron is the acknowledged
natural child of Pascual Monge) which will
become conclusive and far reaching and in
effect binds the other heirs of Pascual Monge
consisting of the brothers and sisters as well as
the nephews and nieces of the petitioner who
are not parties in this proceedings," is
untenable.
- The final adjudication made by the trial court
in its Order dated May 25, 1975 (affirmed by
the Court of Appeals) directed the registration
of the land in question in the name of the co-
ownership of petitioner Andrea M. Moscoso
for 13/14 share and Maximina L. Moron, the
oppositor, for 1/14 share
- There were no documentary evidence of
Monge recognizing the other illegitimate
children as his natural children
- Therefore, decision has been modified
TWO SYSTEMS OF
REGISTRATION
I. Vda. de Melencion v. CA
GR No. 148846, September 25, 2007, 534 SCRA
62
FACTS:
The subject property is a 30,351 square meter
parcel of land particularly denominated as Lot
No. 3368, located at Suba-basbas, Marigondon,
Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu, and part of total area of
30,777 square meters covered by TCT No. 20626
in the name of the late petitioner Go Kim Chuan.
The entire property was originally owned by
Esteban Bonghanoy who had only one child,
Juana Bonghanoy-Amodia, mother of the late
Leoncia Amodia and petitioners Amodias. The
entire property was brought under the operation
of the Torrens System. However, the title thereto
was lost during the Second World War.
On July 10, 1964, the Amodias allegedly
executed an Extra-Judicial Partition of Real
Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale whereby they
extra-judicially settled the estate of Esteban
Bonghanoy and conveyed the subject property to
respondent Aznar Brothers Realty Company for a
consideration of P10,200.00. On August 10,
1964, the said Extra-Judicial Partition of Real
Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale was registered
under Act 3344 as there was no title on file at the
Register of Deeds of Lapiu-Lapu City.
Thereafter, AZNAR made some improvements
and constructed a beach house theron.
On February 18, 1989, petitioners executed a
Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement with Absolute
Sale, conveying the subject property in favor of
Go Kim Chuan for and in consideration of
P70,000.00. Aznar then filed a case against
petitioners Amodias and Go Kim Chuan for
Annulment of Sale and Cancellation of TCT No.
20626 alleging that the sale to Go Kim Chuan was
an invalid second sale.
ISSUE: WON there is a valid certification and
verification by only one of the plaintiffs?
HELD: Yes, the Court reiterated the ruling in the
case of Iglesia ni Cristo, 505 SCRA 828, that
Commonality of interest is material and crucial to
relaxation of the Rules. The Rules may be
reasonably and liberally construed to avoid a
patent denial of substantial justice, because it
cannot be denied, that the ends of justice are
better served when cases are determined on the
merits- after all parties are given full opportunity
to ventile their causes and defenses – rather than
on technicality or some procedural imperfections.
 The same liberality should likewise be
applied to the certification against forum
shopping. The general rule is that the certification
must be signed by all plaintiffs in a case and the
signature of only one of them is insufficient.
However, the Court has also stressed in a number
of cases that the rules on forum shopping were
designed to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice and thus should not be
interpreted with such absolute literalness as to
subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective.
The rule of substantial compliance may be
availed of with respect to the contents of the
certification. This is because the requirement of
strict compliance with the provisions merely
underscored its mandatory nature in that the
certification cannot be altogether dispensed with
or its requirements completely disregarded.
II. REPUBLIC VS. HEIRS OF
FRANCISCA DIGNOS-SORONO
G.R. No. 171571
March 24, 2008
FACTS: 2 were adjudicated by the then Court of
First Instance of Cebu in favor of the following in
four equal shares:
a) Francisca Dignos, married to Blas Sorono ¼
share in the two lots;
b) Tito Dignos ¼ share in the two lots;
c) predecessors-in-interest of the respondents ¼
share in the two lots; and
d) predecessors-in-interest of the respondents ¼
share in the two lots
It appears that the two lots were not partitioned
by the adjudicatees.
It appears further that the heirs of Tito Dignos,
who was awarded ¼ share in the two lots, sold the
entire two lots to the then Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA) via a public instrument
entitled ”Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale”
without the knowledge of respondents whose
predecessors-in-interest were the adjudicatees of
the rest of the ¾ portion of the two lots.
In 1996, CAAs successor-in-interest, the Mactan
Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA),
erected a security fence one of the lot and
relocated a number of families, who had built
their dwellings within the airport perimeter, to a
portion of said lot to enhance airport security.
MCIAA later caused the issuance in its name of a
Tax Declarations of the 2 lots.
Respondents soon asked the agents of MCIAA to
cease giving third persons permission to occupy
the lots but the same was ignored.
Respondents thereupon filed a Complaint for
Quieting of Title, Legal Redemption with Prayer
for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against
MCIAA before the RTC of Lapu-lapu City.
Respondents further alleged that neither they nor
their predecessors-in-interests sold, alienated or
disposed of their shares in the lots of which they
have been in continuous peaceful possession.
Respondents furthermore alleged that neither
petitioner nor its predecessor-in-interest had
given them any written notice of its acquisition of
the ¼ share of Tito Dignos.
The Republic, represented by the MCIAA in its
Answer with Counterclaim, maintained that from
the time the lots were sold to its predecessor-in-
interest CAA, it has been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession thereof;
through acquisitive prescription, it had acquired
valid title to the lots since it was a purchaser in
good faith and for value; and assuming arguendo
that it did not have just title, it had, by possession
for over 30 years, acquired ownership thereof by
extraordinary prescription. At all events,
petitioner contended that respondents action was
barred by estoppel and laches.
The trial court found for respondents. the CA
affirmed the trial court’s decision. Hence, the
present petition for review on certiorari
ISSUE:
1. WON the sale of the entire 2 lots by the heirs
of Tito binding to the respondents
2. WON estoppel and laches should work against
respondents
HELD: the petition is denied
1. NO. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of
his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in
its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation of the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the
co-ownership.
Apropos is the following pertinent portion of this
Courts decision in Bailon-Casilao v. CA:
As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if
a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the
sale will affect only his own share but not those
of the other co-owners who did not consent to
thesale.This is because under the aforementioned
codal provision, the sale or other disposition
affects only his undivided share and the
transferee gets only what would correspond to his
grantor in the partition of the thing owned in
common.
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since
a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share,
a sale of the entire property by one co-owner
without the consent of the other co-owners is
NOT null and void. However, only the rights of
the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby
making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
Petitioners predecessor-in-interest CAA thus
acquired only the rights pertaining to the sellers-
heirs of Tito Dignos, which is only ¼ undivided
share of the two lots.
2. NO. Registered lands cannot be the subject of
acquisitive prescription. Petitioners’ insistence
that it acquired the property through acquisitive
prescription, if not ordinary, then extraordinary,
does not lie. It bears emphasis at this juncture that
in the Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale forged by
CAA and Tito Dignos heirs the following
material portions thereof validate the claim of
respondents that the two lots were registered: x x
xx
That since the OCT of Title of the above-
mentioned property/ies has/have been lost and/or
destroyed… and the VENDEE hereby binds itself
to reconstitute said title/s at its own expense and
that the HEIRS-VENDORS, their heirs,
successors and assigns bind themselves to help in
the reconstitution of title so that the said lot/s may
be registered in the name of the VENDEE in
accordance with law x x x x
NOTES:
As for petitioners argument that the redemption
price should be ¼ of the prevailing market value,
not of the actual purchase price, since, so it
claims, (1) the respondents received just
compensation for the property at the time it was
purchased by the Government; and, (2) the
property, due to improvements introduced by
petitioner in its vicinity, is now worth several
hundreds of millions of pesos, the law is not on
its side.
Thus, Article 1088 of the Civil Code provides
Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights
to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the
co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the
purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the
sale, provided they do so within the period of one
month from the time they were notified in writing
of the sale by the vendor. The Court may take
judicial notice of the increase in value of the lots.
As mentioned earlier, however, the heirs of Tito
Dignos did not notify respondents about the sale.
At any rate, since the Extrajudicial Settlement
and Sale stipulates, thus:
That the HEIRS-VENDORS, their heirs, assigns
and successors, undertake and agree to warrant
and defend the possession and ownership of the
property/ies herein sold against any and all just
claims of all persons whomsoever and should the
VENDEE be disturbed in its possession, to
prosecute and defend the same in the Courts of
Justice.
Petitioner is not without any remedy. This
decision is, therefore, without prejudice to
petitioners right to seek redress against the
vendors-heirs of Tito Dignos and their
successors-in-interest.
EFFECT OF REGISTRATION
I. Legarda vs. Saleeby
G.R. No. 8936
October 2, 1915
FACTS: The plaintiffs and the defendant occupy,
as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita
in the city of Manila. There exists and has existed
a number of years a stone wall between the said
lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs, March 2, 1906,
presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for the registration of their lot, which
decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be
registered and issued to them the original
certificate provided for under the Torrens system.
Said registration and certificate included the wall.
Later the predecessor of the defendant presented
a petition in the Court of Land Registration for
the registration of the lot now occupied by him.
On March 25, 1912, the court decreed the
registration of said title and issued the original
certificate provided for under the Torrens system.
The description of the lot given in the petition of
the defendant also included said wall.
On December 13, 1912 the plaintiffs discovered
that the wall which had been included in the
certificate granted to them had also been included
in the certificate granted to the defendant .They
immediately presented a petition in the Court of
Land Registration for an adjustment and
correction of the error committed by including
said wall in the registered title of each of said
parties.
The lower court however, without notice to the
defendant, denied said petition upon the theory
that, during the pendency of the petition for the
registration of the defendant’s land, they failed to
make any objection to the registration of said lot,
including the wall, in the name of the defendant.
ISSUE: Who is the owner of the wall and the land
occupied by it?
HELD: The decision of the lower court is based
upon the theory that the action for the registration
of the lot of the defendant was a judicial
proceeding and that the judgment or decree was
binding upon all parties who did not appear and
oppose it
Granting that theory to be correct one , then the
same theory should be applied to the defendant
himself. Applying that theory to him, he had
already lost whatever right he had therein, by
permitting the plaintiffs to have the same
registered in their name, more than six years
before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be
permitted to regain it by simply including it in a
petition for registration?
For the difficulty involved in the present case the
Act (No. 496) provides for the registration of
titles under the Torrens system affords us no
remedy. There is no provision in said Act giving
the parties relief under conditions like the present.
There is nothing in the Act which indicates who
should be the owner of land which has been
registered in the name of two different persons.
We have decided, in case of double registration
under the Land Registration Act, that the owner
of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land.
May this rule be applied to successive vendees of
the owners of such certificates? Suppose that one
or the other of the parties, before the error is
discovered, transfers his original certificate to an
“innocent purchaser.” The general rule is that the
vendee of land has no greater right, title, or
interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right
which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the
vendee of the earlier certificate would be the
owner as against the vendee of the owner of the
later certificate.
It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when
two persons have acquired equal rights in the
same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it
first and who has complied with all the
requirements of the law should be protected.
In view of our conclusions, above stated, the
judgment of the lower court should be and is
hereby revoked. The record is hereby returned to
the court now having and exercising the
jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land
court, with direction to make such orders and
decrees in the premises as may correct the error
heretofore made in including the land in the
second original certificate issued in favor of the
predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all other
duplicate certificates issued.
II. G.R. No. 171531 January 30, 2009
GUARANTEED HOMES, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF MARIA P. VALDEZ, (EMILIA V.
YUMUL and VICTORIA V. MOLINO),
HEIRS OF SEVERINA P. TUGADE
(ILUMINADA and LEONORA P. TUGADE,
HEIRS OF ETANG P. GATMIN (LUDIVINA
G. DELA CRUZ (by and through ALFONSO
G. DELA CRUZ), HILARIA G. COBERO
and ALFREDO G. COBERO) and SIONY G.
TEPOL (by and through ELENA T. RIVAS
and ELESIO TEPOL, JR.), AS HEIRS OF
DECEDENT PABLO PASCUA, Respondents.
Facts: The descendants of Pablo Pascua filed a
complaint (in their complaint respondents alleged
that Pablo died intestate sometime in June 1945
and was survived by his four children, one of
whom was the deceased Cipriano) seeking
reconveyance of a parcel of land with an area of
23.7229 hectares situated in Cabitaugan, Subic,
Zambales with Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 404 in the name of Pablo. In the
alternative, the heirs of Valdez prayed that
damages be awarded in their favor.
OCT No. 404 was attached as one of the annexes
of respondents’ complaint. It contained several
annotations in the memorandum of
encumbrances which showed that the property
had already been sold by Pablo during his lifetime
to Alejandria Marquinez and Restituto Morales.
It was further averred in the complaint that Jorge
Pascua, Sr., son of Cipriano, filed a petition
before the RTC of Olongapo City for the issuance
of a new owner’s duplicate of OCT No. 404.
However, the RTC denied the petition and held
that petitioner was already the owner of the land,
noting that the failure to annotate the subsequent
transfer of the property to it at the back of OCT
No. 404 did not affect its title to the property.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
on the grounds that the action is barred by the
Statute of Limitations, more than 28 years having
elapsed from the issuance of TCT No. T-10863
up to the filing of the complaint, and that the
complaint states no cause of action as it is an
innocent purchaser for value, it having relied on
the clean title of the spouses Rodolfo.
The RTC granted petitioner’s motion to dismiss.
The appellate court further held that the ruling of
the RTC that petitioner is an innocent purchaser
for value is contrary to the allegations in
respondents’ complaint.
Hence, the present petition for review.
Issue: The sole issue before this Court revolves
around the propriety of the RTC’s granting of the
motion to dismiss and conversely the tenability of
the Court of Appeals’ reversal of the RTC’s
ruling.
Held: The petition is meritorious.
It is well-settled that to sustain a dismissal on the
ground that the complaint states no cause of
action, the insufficiency of the cause of action
must appear on the face of the complaint, and the
test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the
complaint to constitute a cause of action is
whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the
court could render a valid judgment upon the
same in accordance with the prayer of the
complaint.
Firstly, the complaint does not allege any defect
with TCT No. T-8242 in the name of the spouses
Rodolfo, who were petitioner’s predecessors-in-
interest, or any circumstance from which it could
reasonably be inferred that petitioner had any
actual knowledge of facts that would impel it to
make further inquiry into the title of the spouses
Rodolfo.
Secondly, while the Extrajudicial Settlement of a
Sole Heir and Confirmation of Sales executed by
Cipriano alone despite the existence of the other
heirs of Pablo, is not binding on such other heirs,
nevertheless, it has operative effect under Section
44 of the Property Registration Decree (SEC. 44.
Statutory Liens Affecting Title).
Lastly, respondents’ claim against the Assurance
Fund also cannot prosper. Section 101 of P.D.
No. 1529 clearly provides that the Assurance
Fund shall not be liable for any loss, damage or
deprivation of any right or interest in land which
may have been caused by a breach of trust,
whether express, implied or constructive. Even
assuming arguendo that they are entitled to claim
against the Assurance Fund, the respondents’
claim has already prescribed since any action for
compensation against the Assurance Fund must
be brought within a period of six (6) years from
the time the right to bring such action first
occurred, which in this case was in 1967.
The petition is GRANTED.
III. CASE 1: RABAJA RANCH
DEVELOPMENT VS. AFP
RETIREMENT AND
SEPARATION BENEFITS
SYSTEM 592SCRA 201
GR NO: 177181, July 7, 2009
FACTS: Rabaja Ranch Development
Corporation (petitioner), a domestic
corporation, is a holder of Transfer Certificate of
Title(TCT)No.T88513 covering the subject
property
particularlyidentifiedasLot395,Pls47,withanare
aof211,372 square meters more or less, and
located at Barangay (Brgy.) Conrazon,
Bansud, Bongabon, OrientalMindoro.
Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement
and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS)
is a government corporation, which manages the
pension fund of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), is a holder of TCT No. T-
51382 covering the same subjectproperty.
September 1, 1998, RABAJA filed a Complaint
for Quieting of Title and/or Removal of Cloud
from Title before the RTC.
September 6, 1955, Free
Patent No. V-19535 (Free
Patent) was issued in the name
of Jose Castromero (Jose),
registered, and Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
P-2612 covering the subject
property was issued in the
name of Jose.
o Jose sold the subject
property to Spouses Sigfriedo
and Josephine Veloso
(spouses Veloso), and
TCTNo.T-
17104wasissuedinfavorofthel
atter.
Spouses Veloso, in turn, sold
the subject property to
RABAJA RANCH
DEVELOPMENT CORPO
RATION for the sum of
P634,116.00 on January 17,
1997, and TCT No. T-88513
was issued in petitioner’s
name.
AFP-RSBS averred, title over the subject
property was protected by the Torrens system,
as it was a buyer in good faith and for value;
and that it had been in continuous possession
of the subject property since November 1989,
way ahead of RABAJA's alleged possession
in February1997.
April 30, 1966, Homestead Patent
No. 113074 (Homestead
Patent) was issued in the name
of Charles
Soguilon (Charles).
On May 27, 1966, the
Homestead Patent was
registered and OCT No. RP-
110 (P-6339) was issued in
Charles's name, covering the
same property.
On October 18, 1982, Charles sold
the subject property to JMC
Farm Incorporated (JMC),
which was
then issued TCT No. 18529.
On August 30, 1985, JMC
obtained a loan from AFP-
RSBS in the amount of
P7,000,000.00, with real
estate mortgage over several
parcels of land including the
subject property. JMC failed
to pay; hence, after extra-
judicial foreclosure and public
sale, respondent, being the
highest bidder, acquired the
subject property and was
issued TCT No. T-51382 in its
name. AFP-RSBS contended
that from the time it was
issued a title, it took
possession of the subject
property until RABAJA
disturbed AFP- RSBS's
possession thereof sometime
in1997.
RTC ruled in favor of the RABAJA on the
ground that RABAJA's title emanated from a
title older than that of AFP- RSBS. Moreover,
the RTC held that there were substantial and
numerous infirmities in the Homestead
Patent of Charles. The RTC found that there
was NO record in the Bureau of Lands that
Charles was a homestead applicant or a grantee
of Homestead Patent No. 113074. Upon
inquiry, the RTC also found that a similar
Homestead Patent bearing No.V 113074 was
actually issued in favor of one Mariano
Costales over a parcel of land with an area of
8.7171 hectares and located in Bunawan,
Agusanin Mindanao, per Certification issued by
the Lands Management Bureau dated February
18, 1998. Thus, the RTC held that Charles's
Homestead Patent was fraudulent and
spurious, and respondent could not invoke the
protection of the Torrens system, because the
system does not protect one who committed
fraud or misrepresentation and holds title in
bad faith.
- Aggrieved, AFP-RSBS appealed to the CA.
 o the CA reversed and set
aside the RTC's Decision
upon the finding that
Charles's Homestead Patent
was earlier registered than
Jose's Free Patent. The CA
held that
Jose slept on his rights,
and thus, respondent had a
better right over the subject
property. Further, the CA
opined that while “it is
interesting to note that
petitioner's claim that
Homestead Patent No.V-
113074 was issued to Mariano
Costales, per Certification
issued by the Lands
Management Bureau, there is
nothing in the
record which would show that said Homestead
Patent No.V 113074 and Homestead Patent
No.113074 granted to Charles were one and the
same.
RABAJA filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which the CA, however, denied.
Filed a petition in SC.
ISSUE:
WON RESPONDENT'S TITLE WHICH
ORIGINATED FROM A FAKE AND
SPURIOUS HOMESTEAD PATENT, IS
SUPERIOR TO PETITIONER'S TITLE
WHICH ORIGINATED FROM A VALID
AND EXISTING FREE PATENT. (who,
between the petitioner and respondent, has a
better right over the subject property)
HELD:
Petition is DENIED and the assailed Court of
Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED
Petitioner did not convincingly show that the
Homestead Patent issued to Charles is indeed
spurious. More importantly, petitioner failed to
prove that respondent took part in the alleged
fraud which dated back as early as 1966 when
Charles supposedly secured the fake and
spurious Homestead Patent.
In Republic v. Umali, court held that, in a
reversion case, even if the original grantee of a
patent and title has obtained the same through
fraud, reversion will no longer prosper as the
land had become private land and the
fraudulentacquisitioncannotaffectthetitlesofinn
ocentpurchasersforvalue.
This conclusion rests very firmly on Section 32
of P.D. No. 1529, which states:
Section 32. Review of decree of registration;
Innocent purchaser for value. The decree of
registration shall not be reopened or revised by
reason of absence, minority, or other disability of
any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any
proceeding in any court for reversing judgments,
subject, however, to the right of any person,
including the government and the branches
thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or
interest therein by such adjudication or
confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to
file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition
for reopening and review of the decree of
registration not later than one year from and after
the date of the entry of such decree of registration,
but in no case shall such petition be entertained
by the court where an innocent purchaser for
value has acquired the land or an interest therein,
whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the
phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an
equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall
be deemed to include an innocent lessee,
mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.
Upon the expiration of
said period of one year, the
decree of registration and the
certificate of title issued shall
become incontrovertible. Any
person aggrieved by such
decree of registration in any
case may pursue his remedy
by action for damages against
the applicant or any other
person responsible for the
fraud. (Underscoring ours)
No valid TCT can issue from a void TCT, unless
an innocent purchaser for value had intervened.
An innocent purchaser for value is one who
buys the property of another, without notice that
some other person has a right to or
interestintheproperty,forwhichafullandfairprice
ispaidbythebuyeratthetimeofthepurchaseorbefo
rereceipt of any notice of the claims or interest
of some other person in the property. The
protection given to innocent purchasers
for value is necessary to uphold a certificat
e of title's efficacy and conclusiveness, whi
ch the Torrens system ensures
AFP-RSBS is an innocent purchaser in good
faith and for value. Thus, as far as respondent is
concerned, TCT No. 18529, shown to it by
JMC, was free from any flaw or defect that
could give rise to any iota of doubt that it was
fake and spurious, or that it was derived from a
fake or spurious Homestead Patent. Likewise,
respondent was not under any obligation to
make an inquiry beyond the TCT itself when,
significantly, a foreclosure sale was conducted
and respondent emerged as the highest bidder.
The general rule that the direct result of a
previous void contract cannot be valid will not
apply in this case as it will directly contravene
the Torrens system of registration. Where
innocent third persons, relying on the
correctness of the certificate of title thus issued,
acquire rights over the property, this Court
cannot disregard such rights and order the
cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such
outright cancellation will be to impair public
confidence in the certificate of title. The sanctity
of the Torrens system must be preserved;
otherwise, everyone dealing with the property
registered under the system will have to inquire
in every instance as to whether the title had been
regularly or irregularly issued, contrary to the
evident purpose of the law. Every person
dealing with the registered land
may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor, and the law
will, in no way, oblige him to go behind the
certificate to determine the condition of the
property.
Respondent's transfer certificate of title, having
been derived from the Homestead Patent which
was registered under the Torrens system on
May27,1966, was thus vested with the
habiliments of indefeasibility.
OTHER NOTES:
Fraud is of two kinds: actual or
constructive.
Actual or positive fraud proceeds
from an intentional deception
practiced by means of the
misrepresentation or concealment of a
material fact.
Constructive fraud is
construed as a fraud because
of its detrimental effect upon
public interests and public or
private confidence, even
though the act is not done
with an actual design to
commit positive fraud or
injury upon other persons.
Fraud may also be either extrinsic or
intrinsic.
Fraud is regarded as
intrinsic where the
fraudulent acts pertain to an
issue involved in the original
action, or where the acts
constituting the fraud were or
could have been litigated
therein.
The fraud is extrinsic if it is
employed to deprive parties
of their day in court and thus
prevent them from asserting
their right to the property
registered in the name of the
applicant.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, this
Court distinguished a Homestead
Patent from a Free Patent, to wit:
Homestead Patent and Free Patent are
some of the land patents granted by the
government under the Public Land Act. While
similar, they are not exactly the same. A
Homestead Patent is one issued to: any
citizen of this country; over the age of 18 years
or the head of a family; who is not the owner
of more than twenty-four (24)hectares of land
in the Philippines or has not had the benefit of
any gratuitous allotment of more than twenty-
four(24)hectares of land since the occupation
of the Philippines by the United States. The
applicant must show that he has complied with
the residence and cultivation requirements of
the law; must have resided continuously for atl
east one year in the municipality where the
land is situated; and must have cultivated at
least one-fifth of the land applied for.
On the other hand, a
Free Patent may be issued
where the applicant is a
natural-born citizen of the
Philippines; not the owner of
more than twelve (12)
hectares of land; that he has
continuously occupied and
cultivated, either by himself
or through his predecessors-
in-interests, a tract or
tracts of agricultural public
lands subject to disposition
for at least 30 years prior to
the effectivity of Republic Act
No. 6940; and that he has
paid the real taxes thereon
while the same has not been
occupied by any person.
Homestead Patent, once registered under the
Land Registration
Act, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens
Title. Verily, Section 103 of P.D. No. 1529
mandates the registration of patents, and such
registration is the operative act to convey the
land to the patentee, thus:
Sec.103.............. The deed, grant, patent
or instrument to f conveyance from the
Government to the grantee Shall not take
effect as a conveyance or bind the land
but shall operate only as a contract
between the Government and the
grantee and as evidence of authority to
the Register of Deeds to make
registration. It is the act of registration
that shall be the operative act to affect
and convey the land, and in all cases
under this Decree, registration shall
be made in the office of the Register of
Deeds of the province or city where
the land lies. The fees for registration
shall be paid by the grantee. After due
registration and issuance of the
certificate of title, such land shall be
deemed to be registered land to all
intents and purposes under this
Decree.
The Torrens system is not a mode of
acquiring titles to lands; it is merely
a system of registration of titles to
lands. However, justice and equity
demand that the titleholder should
not be made to bear the unfavorable
effect of the mistake or negligence of
the State's agents, in the absence of
proof of his complicity in a fraud or
of manifest damage to third persons.
The real purpose of the Torrens
system is to quiet title to land and put
a stop forever to any question as to
the legality of the title, except claims
that were noted in the certificate at
the time of the registration or that
may arise subsequent thereto.
Otherwise, the integrity of the
Torrens system shall forever be
sullied by the ineptitude and
inefficiency of land registration
officials, who are ordinarily
presumed to have regularly
performed their duties.
6. Jurisdiction
AMENDING AND CODIFYING THE LAWS
RELATIVE TO REGISTRATION OF
PROPERTY AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
SECTION 2. Nature of Registration Proceedings;
Jurisdiction of Courts. — Judicial proceedings
for the registration of lands throughout the
Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on
the generally accepted principles underlying the
Torrens system.
· Courts of First Instance shall
have exclusive jurisdiction over all
applications for original registration of
title to lands, including improvements
and interests therein, and over all
 petitions filed after original registration
of title, with power to hear and determine
all questions arising upon such
applications or petitions. The court
through its clerk of court shall furnish the
Land Registration Commission with two
certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits,
orders, and decisions filed or issued in
applications or petitions for land
registration, with the exception of
stenographic notes, within five days from
the filing or issuance thereof.
Agcaoili: The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts over matters involving the registration of
lands and lands registered under the Torrens
system is conferred by Section 2 of PD No. 1529,
while jurisdiction over petitions for amendments
of certificates of title is provided for by Section
108 of the Decree.
Concepcion v. Concepcion
FACTS
· The parties in this case are
descendants of the late spouses Regino
Concepcion and Concepcion Famador.
· Petitioner Emmanuel is a son of the
late spouses while the other petitioners
Betty, Jimmy, Rosario and Jernie (all
surnamed Concepcion) and the
respondents Antonio Concepcion,
Lourdes C. Watts and Ida C. Horvat are
grandchildren of the spouses.
· The deceased spouses Regino
Concepcion, Sr. and Concepcion
Famador had seven children namely:
Jose (father of respondents Antonio
Concepcion, Lourdes Watts and Ida
Horvat), Jesus (father of petitioners
Betty Concepcion and Jimmy
Concepcion), Maria, Vicente, Regino, Jr.
(father of petitioners Rosario Vda. De
Concepcion and Jernie Concepcion),
Elena and Emmanuel.
· The deceased spouses acquired a
certain property in Zulueta Street, Cebu
City.
· Regino, Sr. died in 1944. Ten (10)
years later or in 1954, his wife,
Concepcion Famador, also passed away.
Upon the latter's death, she left a will
disposing of all her paraphernal
properties as well as her share in the
conjugal partnership of gains
· Such will was subjected to a
probate in CFI of Cebu in which Jose
contested on the ground that it impaired
his legitime. Eventually, the will was
allowed probate but it was dismissed
because Jesus neglected to perform his
duties as the estate’s executor.
Consequently, the probate court was not
able to adjudicate to the heirs their
respective shares.
· As a result to this, Jose filed a
complaint of partition with damages against
his six brothers in the CFI of Cebu Branch 13.
The decision was in favor of Jose and entitled
him to his share and has become final and
executory in Aug. 10, 1978.
· Inasmuch as the herein respondents
have not yet complied with the
aforementioned August 10, 1978 decision of
CFI-Cebu, Branch 13, the same court issued
an Order dated 27 May 1987 , directing its
branch sheriff Candido A. Gadrinab to
execute a deed of conveyance covering the
Zulueta property in favor of Jose.
· Unfortunately, when Jose presented the
same deed for registration, the Register of
Deeds required him to surrender the owner's
duplicate copy of TCT No. T-52227 covering
the Zulueta property, which title was then in
the possession of the petitioners. Despite
demands, petitioners refused delivery of the
title. Hence, Jose filed in RTC at Cebu City
Branch 5 a petition for cancellation of TCT
No. T-52227 for which the Court granted
Jose’s petition and hereby ordered defendant
Jesus to surrender the copy to the Register of
Deeds.
· CA affirmed the decision.
Issue: Whether or not the cadastral court
(RTC Branch 5) had authority to order the
surrender to the respondents the copy of TCT
covering the Zulueta property
RULING
· SC Ruled in favor of the
petitioners.
· The pleadings before us
disclose that in the proceedings
before the cadastral court, petitioners
filed an opposition claiming that the
 action of Sheriff Gadrinab in
levying the Zulueta property was
with grave abuse of authority since
said property is not within the
scope of the dispositive portion of
the decision dated August 10, 1978
of CFI-Cebu, Branch 13.
· In Junio vs. De Los Santos and
Register of Deeds of Pangasinan, the
Court of First Instance (now the
Regional Trial Court), as a Land
Registration Court, can hear cases
otherwise litigable only in ordinary
civil actions, since the Court of
First Instance are at the same time,
[c]ourts of general jurisdiction
· Under Sec. 2 of P.D. 1529, it
is now provided that 'Courts of
First Instance (now Regional Trial
Courts) shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over all applications for
original registration of titles of lands.
· We must emphasize, however,
that there is nothing in the August
10, 1978 decision of said court
which authorizes the surrender
and/or delivery of the title covering
the Zulueta property.
· It merely required the
defendants therein to "contribute
proportionately to the completion of
the plaintiff's legitime
· The subsequent issuance of the
order dated May 27, 1987 which
amends the final and executory
decision dated August 10, 1978
cannot be allowed. We have
repeatedly held that a judgment that
has become final and executory can
no longer be amended or corrected
except for clerical errors and
mistakes. The 1987 decision of RTC
Branch 13 is a nullity.
De los Angeles v. Santos
FACTS
· On November 21, 1959 an
application for registration of title to 12
parcels of land in Ampid, San Mateo,
Rizal was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal by Leonor de los
Angeles and seven co-applicants. Among
other things it alleged that "applicants are
owners pro-indiviso and in fee simple of
the aforesaid land."
· This was set for an initial hearing
in May 27, 1960. However, the Director
of Lands filed an opposition stating that
the land is a portion of public domain.
· At the initial hearing, the Province
of Rizal and 11 private oppositors
appeared therein. The private oppositors,
among them Julio Hidalgo, filed a
written opposition claiming that they are
the lawful owners of the parcels of land
in question for having acquired
homestead patents over the said lots (11).
They have recommended to the Court
that the case be dismissed with respect to
lot 11 which was previously patented.
· On August 15, 1961 applicants
filed an "opposition to motion to
dismiss.” But on September 18, 1961 the
court issued an order dismissing the
application But, the motion for
reconsideration was denied and
applicants appealed to this Court.
Issue: Whether a land registration court which
has validly acquired jurisdiction over a parcel
of land for registration of title thereto could be
divested of said jurisdiction by a subsequent
administrative act consisting in the issuance by
the Director of Lands of a homestead patent
covering the same parcel of land.
RULING
· SC ruled in favor of petitioner.
Lower court erred in dismissing the
application for registration as regards to
the lot over which homestead patent was
issued by the Director of Lands during
the pendency of the registration
proceeding.
· To start with, it is well settled that
the Director of Lands' jurisdiction,
administrative supervision and
executive control extend only over
lands of the public domain and not to
lands alreadyof private ownership.
· Accordingly, a homestead patent
issued by him over land not of the
public domain is a nullity, devoid of
force and effect against the owner
 · The petitioners contended that they
were owners pro-indiviso on Nov. 21,
1959 of the aforesaid land. If they
successfully prove this and thereby show
the registrable title to the land, it would
mean that Julio Hidalgo’s homestead
patent which was issued over lot 11 on
June 12, 1961, was no longer public.
· The land registration court,in that
event, would have to order a decree of
title issued in applicants' favor and
declare the aforesaid homestead
patent a nullity.
· Case was remanded to the court
a quo.
7. Real Actions v. Personal Actions
(Google)
An action is 'real' when it affects title to or
possession of real property, or an interest therein
(Sec. 1, Rule 4, Rules of Court). All other actions
are personal action (Sec. 2, Rule 4, Rules of
Court).
In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of
real property, or, as indicated in section 2(a) of
Rule 4, a real action is an action affecting title to
real property or for the recovery of possession, or
for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure
of a mortgage on, real property. (Paderanga vs.
Buissan, G.R. No. L-49475, September 28, 1993)
An action for damages to real property, while
involving realty is a personal action because
although it involves real property, it does not
involve any of the issues mentioned. An action to
recover possession of real property plus damages
is a real action because possession of the real
property is involved.
● The distinction between real action and
personal action is important for the purpose of
determining the venue of the action. A real action
is “local”, which means that its venue depends
upon the location of the property involved in the
litigation. A personal action is “transitory”, which
means that its venue depends upon the residence
of the plaintiff or the defendant at the option of
the plaintiff.
●The venue of real actions shall be the proper
court which has territorial jurisdiction over the
area wherein the real property involved, or a
portion thereof, is situated. The venue of personal
actions is the court where the plaintiff or any of
the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant
where he may be found, at the election of the
plaintiff. (Rule 4, Rules of Court)
8. Title vs. Certificate of Title
Title is generally defined as the lawful cause
or ground of possessing that which is ours. It
is that which is the foundation of ownership
of property, real or personal. Title, therefore,
may be defined briefly as that which
constitutes a just cause of exclusive
possession, or which is the foundation of
ownership of property.
Certificate of title, on the other hand, is a
mere evidence of ownership; it is not the title
to the land itself. Under the Torrens system,
a certificate of title may be an Original
Certificate of Title, which constitutes a true
copy of the decree of registration; or a
Transfer Certificate of Title, issued
subsequent to the original registration.
Castillo vs. Escutin
FACTS
Types of Certificate of Title
(Google)
The Owner’s Duplicate Certificate is either an
Original Certificate of Title (OCT), if it is the first
title issued on the land, or a Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT), if it was issued subsequent to the
first title. A TCT is usually issued after the title is
transferred to someone from the first registered
owner, with the OCT being canceled. All
subsequent transfers (whether by sale, donation
or any other legal means) will also result in the
issuance of a TCT.