Why Do Non-Union Employees Want To Unionize? Evidence From Britain

British Journal of Industrial Relations
40:3 September 2002 0007–1080 pp. 463–491
Why Do Non-union EmployeesWant to

Unionize? Evidence from Britain
Andy Charlwood
Abstract
This paper assesses the determinants of the level of support for union member-
ship among non-union employees. Using data from a representative sample of
non-union employees in Great Britain, the research confirms the importance
of job dissatisfaction, left-wing views and perceived union instrumentality as
predictors of willingness to join a trade union, union instrumentality being the
most significant.
1. Introduction
Union membership, influence and power in Great Britain fell dramatically

between 1979 and 1998. In 1979 membership stood at 12.9 million, and
collective bargaining coverage extended over 70 per cent of the work-force.
By 1998 membership stood at 7.8 million, while coverage had declined to
36 per cent (Metcalf 2001: 2–3). Membership decline has since bottomed
out, but there appears to be little sign of a revival in union fortunes (Sneade
2001). Surveying the evidence provided by successive workplace industrial
relations surveys, Millward et al. (2000: 92) argued that there has been a
‘withering of support’ for trade unionism among British employees. Towers
(1997: 206–7) took a contrary view. He argued that union decline resulted in
a ‘representation gap’. Therefore desire for representation on the part of
the non-union work-force offers the union movement the opportunity for
renewed growth. (Pencavel (2001: 40) surveys this debate and argues that the
balance of evidence supports Millward et al. rather than Towers.)
This paper will test the proposition that there is a representation gap
arising from a frustrated demand for union membership among non-union
employees. The central aim is to investigate the determinants of willingness
to join a union so that theoretical propositions about the conditions under
which employees desire unionization can be tested. This is the first time such
Andy Charlwood is at the Canterbury Business School, University of Kent, and the Centre for
Economic Performance, London School of Economics.
# Blackwell Publishers Ltd/London School of Economics 2002. Published by Blackwell Publishers Ltd,
108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
464 British Journal of Industrial Relations
an analysis has been carried out using British data. The issue of why and in
what conditions British employees want to unionize has become particularly
relevant since the introduction of a statutory procedure for trade union
recognition as part of the 1999 Employment Relations Act. (See Wood and
Godard 1999 for an explanation of the recognition procedure, and com-
parison with North American arrangements.) This article cannot predict the
effect of the recognition procedure embodied in the ERA on union mem-
bership — that depends on, among other things, the way in which the Act
works in practice, and the way in which trade unions and employers respond
to it. But it does reveal the base of support from which unions must begin
organizing attempts.
Is there a ‘representation gap’ in Britain?

There are currently around eight million employees working in workplaces
without a trade union presence. The 1998 British Social Attitudes Survey
allows us to gauge the extent to which these workers have a propensity to
unionize, and to analyse some of the factors associated with a propensity
to unionize. It asked a nationally representative sample of employees in
workplaces without a union the question, ‘How likely would you be to join a
union if one were available at your workplace?’ Respondents answered on
a four-point scale, from ‘very likely’ to ‘very unlikely’.
Table 1 shows the proportions of non-union employees who say that they
would join a union if one were available. Overall, 40 per cent of non-union
employees expressed a willingness to join a union. Manual employees are
more inclined towards unionization — 50 per cent would join — than non-
manuals, of whom 33 per cent express a willingness to join a union. The
level of support for unionization among non-union British employees is
very similar to the level of support for unionization among non-union US
employees and higher than that of Canadian non-union employees (Bryson
et al. 2002: 18). While it is possible that the appetite of British employees for
trade unionism has diminished, a significant number of employees appear to
retain a healthy appetite for the services that unions provide. Further
breakdowns by individual and workplace characteristics are provided in
Table 2.
TABLE 1
Support for Unionization among Non-union Employees in Great Britain (%)
If there were a trade union at your workplace, All Manual Non-manual

how likely would you be to join?
Very likely to join 15 21 11

Fairly likely 25 29 22
Fairly unlikely 30 27 32
Very unlikely 30 23 35
Weighted n 646 271 375
# Blackwell Publishers Ltd/London School of Economics 2002.

TABLE 2
Proportion of Employees in Non-union Workplaces Willing to Join a Union, by Individual, Job and Workplace Characteristics (%)
All Manual Non-manual

Very Fairly Not Not at Very Fairly Not Not at Very Fairly Not Not at
likely likely likely all likely likely likely likely all likely likely likely likely all likely
Perceived union instrumentality

Union will make workplace
Why Do Non-union Employees Want to Unionize?

a lot better 79.3 21.7 0 0 86 14 0 0 82 18 0 0
a little better 31.5 53.7 9.2 5.6 27 57 8 8 42 48 6 4
no different 7.9 26.3 36.7 23.8 9 31 32 28 4 25 39 32
a little worse 5 11.7 36.7 46.6 11 0 71 18 4 14 25 57
a lot worse 5.7 4.4 21.7 68.2 17 1 17 65 0 5 25 70
Job satisfaction
Very satisfied 5.5 20.3 31 44.2 7.6 33.7 31.5 27.2 3 11.5 32.1 54.5
Satisfied 17.2 29.4 31.4 22 28.8 26.3 23.7 21.2 12.8 29.4 32.8 24.9
Dissatisfied 27.4 21 29.4 22.1 34.4 18.5 31.3 15.6 24.5 26.7 26.7 22.2
Very dissatisfied 34.1 31.8 11.3 22.8 31.3 18.7 12.6 37.6 28.5 35.8 14.4 21.4
Satisfaction with pay
On the high side 6.2 7.8 34.4 51.6 15.5 15.5 38.5 30.8 4.7 4.7 27.9 62.8
Reasonable 11.2 25.3 32.1 31.4 15.9 30.4 28.8 24.8 6 23.9 35.3 24.8
A bit low 20.6 25.9 31.9 21.6 29.2 23.6 27.8 19.5 10.5 30.3 32.9 26.3
Very low 27.9 34.7 15.4 22 29.2 29.2 16.7 25 33.4 36.4 18.2 12.1
Intention to quit 24.4 28.8 26.9 19.9 29.2 22.2 27.8 20.8 19.8 26.9 26.9 20.9
Current union member 35.5 22.5 13 29 40 20 20 20 24.9 31.3 6.2 37.5
Former union member 22.8 21.9 25.6 29.7 29.7 24.2 19.8 26.4 12 21.7 30.1 36.1
Socioeconomic area
Prosperous England 11.4 13.2 46.5 28.9 8.8 20.6 23.4 20.3 7.7 12.3 46.1 33.8
Mining, manufacturing and industry 19.1 30.6 25.4 24.9 28.1 28.1 23.4 20.3 14.1 34 25.9 25.9
Coast and services 16.2 20.2 43.2 20.3 10.3 34.5 41.4 13.8 17.6 14.7 47.1 20.6
Education centres and outer London 15.7 21.6 31.3 31.4 35.4 29.4 17.6 17.6 3.9 16 44.1 36
Inner London 23.5 30 30 31.4 9 18 36.3 36.3
465
Urban fringe 15.6 27.1 19.3 38 27.5 33.3 7.3 31.9 6.6 24.2 25.3 44
466
Table 2 (contd)

Very Fairly Not Not at Very Fairly Not Not at Very Fairly Not Not at
likely likely likely all likely likely likely likely all likely likely likely likely all likely
Socioeconomic area (contd)

Rural 9 28.8 29.7 32.5 17.8 17.8 42.2 22.3 4.6 34.9 18.6 41.8
Non-union representative 9.7 29.1 33.1 27.9 9.5 33.3 28.6 28.6 7.5 27.5 35 30
Age of respondent
<25 15.9 35.5 33.7 14.9 23.8 31 16.6 28.6 11.1 33.4 51.1 4.4
25–34 12.1 26.4 31.6 29.9 16.9 35.2 33.8 14.1 8.1 22.9 25.7 43
35–44 15.1 30.8 30.1 34 22.4 32.7 25.8 19 9 29.9 28.6 28.6
45–59 20.6 17.1 28.5 33.8 28.4 16.2 28.4 27 11.3 17.9 32.1 38.7
60+ 2.8 11 16.6 69.6 8.4 16.8 8.4 66.7 0 6.6 26.7 66.5
Male 16 22.8 26.9 34.3 18.8 26.7 28.3 26.1 9.8 21.1 26.3 42.9
Female 14.6 27.4 32.7 25.3 25.8 28.3 25 20.8 9.1 25.8 35.8 29.4
Married/co-habiting 13.9 22.6 29.3 34.2 20.4 24.7 30.9 24.1 8.7 22.5 29.2 39.6
Single 17.8 30 31.1 21.1 25 32.3 19.8 22.9 10.5 27.2 38.6 23.7
Full-time employee 15.6 23.3 30.9 30.2 32 39.9 28.1 26.4 9.5 23.3 32.4 34.7
Part-time employee 14.7 31 26.9 27.4 20 38.8 23.7 17.5 8.7 26.1 31.5 33.7
White employee 14.9 24.9 30.4 29.9 21.8 27 26.6 24.6 9.7 23.8 32.3 34.3
Ethnic minority 24.3 34.1 21.9 19.7 29.9 39.9 42.8 0 0 30.8 30.8 38.4
Highest educational qualification
None 17.4 28 24.2 30.4 20.4 30.6 25 24.1 10.7 27.6 36.4 25.5
GCSE or equivalent 14.2 28.7 35.3 21.8 10.3 13.8 51.7 24.1 9 24.6 45.1 21.3
A level 12.3 25.4 34.9 27.8 10.3 13.8 51.7 24.1 12.9 33.3 22.2 31.5
Higher education 16.8 18.7 24.8 39.7 37.2 20.9 32.6 9.3 7.7 18.5 22.3 51.5
Job tenure
<1 year 14.3 28.6 28.6 28.6 20 30 23 27 5.4 26.1 35.9 32.6
>1 & <2 years 15.6 27.4 34.4 22.7 24.1 17.3 34.5 24.1 10.6 33.3 28.8 27.3
>2 & <5 years 15.7 26.5 34 23.8 22 43.9 29.3 4.9 13.9 19 37.9 29.1
>5 & <10 years 16.8 21.2 26.3 35.8 25.6 25.6 25.6 22.8 12.5 17.2 29.7 40.6
>10 years 15.4 19.7 27 37.9 22.2 15.5 28.9 33.3 3.7 24.5 24.5 47.2
Occupation
Managerial, professional 5.6 19.4 24.4 50.6 5.6 19.4 24.4 50.6
Associate professional 19.3 17.4 40.3 23 10.3 23 35.8 30.8
Clerical 11.3 27.7 39.7 21.3 25.2 12.6 50 12.6 11.5 28.3 37.2 23
Craft/skilled 15.6 26 38.6 19.8 17.8 23.3 38.4 20.5
Personal services 23.6 31.5 23.6 21.3 28.6 28.6 20.6 22.2 24.8 12.4 24.8 37.6
Sales 12.1 25.3 31.3 31.3 0 66.7 33.3 0 5.7 26.8 37.3 29.8
Semi-skilled/operative and assembly 34.7 22.6 16 63.3 28.8 23.7 18.6 28.8
Other unskilled 14.5 33.3 24.6 27.6 10.8 36.5 23.1 26.9 39.7 0 39.7 21.6

Non-manual worker 10.5 22.5 32.1 34.9
Manual worker 21.6 28.9 27 22.5
Industry
Production 17.8 19.4 30 32.8 27.1 22.9 27.1 22.7 8.9 17.9 32.9 40.3
Private services 14.9 27 29.5 28.6 21 29.3 25.8 24 7.6 34.5 30.8 27
Public services 15.6 29.4 27.5 27.5 23.9 23.9 28.5 23.9 9.9 24.9 31.2 34
Workplace size
<10 employees 9.7 27 31.9 31.4 10.5 29.8 33.3 24.7 8.4 24.2 35.8 30.5
10–24 employees 18.8 27.8 27.4 26 19.3 19.3 35.1 26.3 6.8 27.1 27.1 39
25–99 employees 12.7 23.5 31.6 32.2 28.8 31.2 17.5 22.5 11.2 26.5 32.7 29.6
100–400 employees 16.1 19.7 35 29.2 20.5 30.8 25.6 23.1 11.9 16.4 35.8 35.8
500+ employees 22 25 20.6 32.4 36 18.2 27.3 18.2 8.5 25.7 .2 48.5
Source: 1998 British Social Attitudes Survey
467
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents theories
that predict the conditions in which employees might wish to join a union,
and some testable propositions are developed. Section 3 discusses the
data and methods. Results are set out in Section 4. Section 5 discusses
these results and develops their implications for trade unions. Section 6
concludes.
2. Theory
Previous literature
There is an extensive theoretical and empirical literature on the individual’s
unionization decision. Wheeler and McClendon’s review of the literature cites
36 separate studies from the USA alone (Wheeler and McClendon 1991:
49–59). They also cite similar studies from Great Britain, Canada, Holland
and France. The three most significant are Kochan (1979), Farber and Saks
(1980) and Premack and Hunter (1988). In many respects, this article is a
British replication of Kochan’s (1979) work, for two reasons. First, the
dependent variable examines an individual’s propensity to unionize. Kochan
(1979: 25–9) analysed responses to the question, ‘Would you vote for union
representation if an election were held in your workplace?’ Second, multi-
variate analysis was used to investigate the links between a willingness to
join a union and aspects of job satisfaction, perceived union instrumentality,
political beliefs, individual and workplace controls. Kochan’s data contained
a richer set of right-hand-side variables than the British Social Attitudes
Survey, for example desire for influence and job insecurity, but the key
elements of his model — job satisfaction, perceived instrumentality and
political beliefs, plus controls — are available for analysis here. Kochan’s
(1979) work also forms the basis of the more developed theoretical frame-
work for explaining the individual unionization decision set out in the seminal
Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations (Kochan 1980: 142–9).
Farber and Saks’s (1980) study differs from Kochan’s in two important
respects. First, it is based on observed unionization decisions in the context
of NLRB certification elections rather than a hypothetical propensity to
unionize. Second, the theoretical model underlying the study is based on a
rational choice decision-making framework. However, the results are broadly
similar, in that they confirm the central importance of perceived union
instrumentality and dissatisfaction with the status quo in leading an indi-
vidual to unionize. Premack and Hunter’s (1988) social psychological study
provides a meta-analysis of previous US research on the individual union-
ization decision. It represents a significant development from Kochan (1979,
1980) because it examines the interrelationships between wage level, aspects
of dissatisfaction and perceived union instrumentality assumed to cause
individuals to unionize. It found that different dimensions of job satisfaction
have a direct relationship with unionization, but that perceived instrumen-
tality has an important mediating effect; i.e., dissatisfaction causes individuals
Why Do Non-union Employees Want to Unionize? 469
to unionize, but it also causes individuals to believe in union instrumentality,
which causes unionization.
The British literature is less extensive. Wheeler and McClendon (1991: 57)
cite a single study: Guest and Dewe’s (1988) social psychological study of
union membership among a sample of employees in the UK electronics
industry. Kerr (1992) and Waddington and Whitstone (1997) have pub-
lished similar studies in different sectors. These studies differ from the work
reported here because (1) they were not based on a nationally representative
sample of all employees, and (2) they examined union membership among
employees who were already in a union, rather than willingness to join a
union among non-union employees.
Wheeler and McClendon (1991: 51) split theoretical explanations of the
individual unionization decision into three separate models: dissonance,
utility and political views. This is a rather novel approach, because Kochan’s
(1980) and Premack and Hunter’s (1988) studies both saw these as different
stages or components in the individual’s decision, hence part of a single
model. However, the separation performed by Wheeler and McClendon is
useful for explanatory and analytical purposes (and it reflects theoretical
differences in the literature), so will be followed below. Whether or not these
models really are separate or are part of a single model is an empirical
question which the results will provide an answer to.
Theoretical framework
(a) Model A: Dissonance theories
Dissonance theories are based on the premiss that dissonance between
expectations of work (e.g. that work should be enjoyable and rewarding)
and the experience of work (e.g. that work the environment is unpleasant and
pay is low) is a trigger to unionization. Kochan (1980: 144) sees dissonance
arising from two areas: first, perceptions of the work environment covering
issues like job satisfaction, pay levels, working conditions and experience of
unfair treatment; second, desire for influence and difficulty in influencing
management under current arrangements. One caveat needs to be added
here. Premack and Hunter (1988: 232) found that those who are satisfied
were also less likely to perceive union instrumentality. Therefore, the relation-
ship between satisfaction and willingness to join a union may be fully or
partially mediated by perceived union instrumentality. If instrumentality
does act as a mediator, then there will be no relationship between satis-
faction and willingness to join a union. These insights yield the following
hypotheses which can be tested with the available data:
Hypothesis 1: Individuals who express job dissatisfaction will be more likely
to be willing to join a union than individuals who are satisfied.
Hypothesis 2: Individuals who believe that their pay is low will be more
likely to be willing to join a union than individuals who believe that their
pay is reasonable or on the high side.
Kochan (1979: 25) makes the observation (following Bakke 1945: 2) that
dissatisfaction will not in itself be enough to persuade a worker to unionize.
They will also need to believe that unionization will reduce their dissatis-
faction levels. This proposition can be tested by interacting dissatisfaction
with perceived union instrumentality.
Hypothesis 3: There will be a positive interaction between job dissatisfaction
and perceived union instrumentality.
(b) Model B: Utility theories

Utility theories are based on the premiss that the decision to join a union is
the result of a rational calculation of the costs and benefits of unionization
compared with the costs and benefits of remaining non-union (Farber and
Saks 1980: 353; Kochan 1980: 144–6). These calculations will be most directly
influenced by the individual’s perceptions of union instrumentality.
Hypothesis 4: Individuals will be more willing to join a union if they believe
that the presence of a union at their workplace will improve their work-
place, and will be less willing to join a union if they believe a union would
make no difference.
(c) Model C: Political/ideological belief theories

Model C posits that individuals will unionize if they have left-wing political
views which lead them to believe in the necessity of social solidarity between
employees (Adams 1974: 501–2). Adams himself rejected this idea as overly
simplistic, and subsequent studies have found little evidence to support it.
However, it is possible and plausible that political beliefs may cause em-
ployees to unionize for reasons that are not altruistic. Political beliefs will
shape an individual’s views on trade unions (Kochan 1980: 144) and alter
the assessment of the costs and benefits of unionization. Put simply, an
individual with left-wing political views is likely to believe that the benefits
of unionization are higher, and the costs lower, while an individual with
right-wing political views is likely to believe the opposite (Kelly 1998: 27–9).
Kochan (1979: 26) operationalized this point with a labour image belief
index. Left-wing views may also make individuals more likely to believe in
union instrumentality, so there may be a mediating relationship.
Hypothesis 5: Individuals with left-wing political views will be more likely to
be willing to join a union.
Hypothesis 6: The impact of left-wing views on willingness to join a union
will be mediated by perceived union instrumentality.
Left-wing views may also be mediated by job satisfaction. For example, it
might be expected that individuals who view the employment relationship as
‘capitalist exploitation’ would be less satisfied with their job than those who
believe that they have freely chosen to enter into a contract to supply their
labour (Kelly 1998: 27–9).
Hypothesis 7: The impact of left-wing views on willingness to join a union
will be mediated by job dissatisfaction.
Other influences on willingness to join a union

An individual’s area of residence might influence the unionization decision
because beliefs and attitudes about work and unions may be formed by the
normative attitudes of their family, community and class. (Blanden and
Machin, 2002: 14–16, find firm evidence of transmission of union member-
ship from fathers to sons.) Consequently, an employee in an area tradition-
ally dominated by unionized heavy industry may be more willing to join a
union than an employee in a predominantly middle-class and lightly union-
ized area. This is because the individual in the traditionally union area is
more likely to have close family and friends with direct experience of trade
unionism, and until recently union membership would have been seen as a
natural and desirable feature of paid employment.
Previous studies of the individual unionization decision have included
some measure of where the respondent lives. Farber and Saks (1980: 357)
hypothesized that employees from rural areas would be less likely to vote for
unionization than those from more urban areas. However, there was no
support for this proposition in the data. Kochan (1979: 27–8) found that
there was no significant difference in the level of desire for unionization
between blue-collar employees in the traditionally unionized North-east of
the USA and the traditionally lightly unionized South. However, white-
collar employees from the South were significantly less likely to want to
unionize than their North-eastern counterparts. Both of these studies
employed rather crude geographical variables. The normative attitudes of
the community and family may also influence an individual’s views of union
instrumentality and political attitudes, so political views and perceived union
instrumentality may act as mediating variables.
Hypothesis 8: Residents of areas that have traditionally been union

heartlands (mining, manufacturing and industry areas) will be more likely
to be willing to join a union than residents of lightly unionized and
predominantly middle-class (prosperous England) areas.
Hypothesis 9: The relationship between area of residence and willingness to

join a union will be mediated by perceived union instrumentality.
Hypothesis 10: The relationship between area of residence and willingness to

join a union will be mediated by political views.
(a) Previous union membership

If an individual who is currently a non-member in a non-union workplace
were formerly a union member, she might be better disposed towards unions
than an individual with no previous experience of union membership. (It
may also work the other way — previous experience of union membership
may have left the individual with a negative view.) Previous union member-
ship may also change attitudes towards union instrumentality.
Hypothesis 11: Previous union members will be more willing to join a union
than those who have never been members.
Hypothesis 12: The impact of previous experience of union membership on
job satisfaction will be mediated by perceived union instrumentality.
(b) Alternative voice mechanisms

Evidence from the USA shows that, if managers put in place effective non-
union participation and representation structures, employees no longer
desire union representation (Freeman and Rogers 1999: 83). Therefore
employees who report non-union representation at their workplace might be
expected to be less likely to want to join a union. However, case study
evidence on the effectiveness of non-union representation in Britain points
in the opposite direction: the limitations of non-union voice actually
increased a desire for unionization in the company studied by Gollan (2001:
395). Any negative relationship may be mediated by perceived union
instrumentality, because unions may be perceived as being less effective if
satisfactory channels for influencing management already exist.
Hypothesis 13: The presence of alternative forms of non-union representa-

tion in the workplace will reduce willingness to join a union.
Hypothesis 14: The relationship between non-union representation and
reduced willingness to join a union will be mediated by perceived union
instrumentality.
(c) Voice or exit?

Dissatisfied employees can either seek to change their workplace through
unionization (voice) or quit to find a new job that meets their expectations
of employment (exit) (Freeman and Medoff 1984: 94). Therefore, employees
who intend to voluntarily quit their job for reasons other than retirement
might be expected to be less likely to want to join a union.
Hypothesis 15: Employees who intend to quit their current job within the
following 12 months will be less likely to want to join a union than those
who intend to stay.
3. Data and analysis
Data
Data come from the 1998 British Social Attitudes Survey. This is the
sixteenth of an annual series designed and conducted by the National Centre
for Social Research. The survey is designed as a representative sample of
British adults aged 18 and over. Overall, 3146 interviews were carried out, a
response rate of 59 per cent, and of these, 1408 were employees in employ-
ment. Full details of the survey design can be found in Jowell et al. (1999).
The strength of the British Social Attitudes Survey is that it questions
employees on aspects of working life and industrial relations. It also
contains detailed information on employees’ social and political attitudes
and socioeconomic backgrounds, which may have an important bearing on
their attitudes and actions towards trade unions (Bryson 1999: 68–9). The
weakness of the data stems from the breadth of subjects that the survey
examines. This means that a lot of key variables are based on single items,
which makes it impossible to test the reliability of the measures. The usual
disclaimers about the limitations of cross-section data apply — it can
illuminate associations between variables, but it cannot confirm causal
relationships.
Measures
Variables used to operationalize the concepts discussed in the theory section
are described in Table 3. The nature of the area in which a respondent lives
is captured by socioeconomic geography variables which reflect the industry
and class composition of a local area. (See Table 3 for an explanation of the
variables, and Bailey et al. 1999: 55–95 for a more detailed description of the
areas and methodology involved.) Many of the previous studies in this area
have found associations between particular individual and demographic
characteristics (e.g. gender, age, occupation) and willingness to join a union.
However, with two notable exceptions (black employees and employees
aged over 60), there is little consistency between the findings of different
studies. For this reason, multivariate analysis is used to control for these
characteristics. The empirical models presented in Section 4 include controls
for age, gender, ethnicity, marital status, educational attainment, occupa-
tion, job tenure, broad industry, workplace size and current union member-
ship. (A small proportion of employees in non-union workplaces retain
union membership despite the lack of a bargaining presence for that union
at their workplace; this is the equivalent of associate membership in the
USA.) The regression coefficients of these control variables are not reported
in order to economize on space and preserve focus on the key influences
suggested by theory.
Modelling procedure
The type of regression models estimated were ordered probits using the
Huber–White robust variance estimator. This choice of regression technique
reflected the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, and ensured that the
standard errors produced were consistent in the presence of heteroscedasti-
city. All models were weighted with probability weights to allow the results
474
TABLE 3
Explanation of Key Variables and their Mean Values

Definition All Manual Non-
manual
Perceived union Respondents were asked: Do you think your workplace would be a better or worse place to work if there 2.99 3.19 2.85
instrumentality were a trade union? Answers were on a 5 point scale: 1 = much worse, 5 = much better. Responses were
standardized for inclusion in the regression analyses.
Job satisfaction Respondents were asked how satisfied were they overall with their job.
Very satisfied 0.35 0.35 0.36
Satisfied (Omitted from regressions) 0.47 0.45 0.46
Dissatisfied 0.13 0.13 0.14
Very dissatisfied 0.05 0.07 0.04
Satisfaction with pay Respondents were asked: How would you describe your wage or salary?
On the high side 0.09 0.05 0.12
Reasonable (Omitted from regressions) 0.53 0.47 0.65
A bit low 0.24 0.28 0.22
Very low 0.14 0.20 0.1
Political attitudes Respondents were asked to state their level of agreement with the following statements on a 5 point scale: 3.43 3.64 3.29
scale (standardized (1) Management always tries to get the better of employees. (2) Big business benefits owners at the expense
scores were used in of employees. (3) There is one law for the rich and another for the poor. (4) Ordinary working people don’t
the regression get a fair share of the nation’s wealth. (5) Government should redistribute wealth from the rich to the poor.
analyses) The alpha on these items was 0.87. Responses were standardized for inclusion in the regression analyses and
can be interpreted as high (+) = left-wing and low (–) = right-wing
Social attitudes scale Respondents were asked to state their level of agreement with the following statements on a 5 point scale: 3.79 3.87 3.75
(standardized scores (1) Young people don’t have enough respect for traditional values. (2) Law breakers should get stiffer
were used in the sentences. (3) Schools should teach children to obey authority. (4) The law should always be obeyed even if
regression analyses) a particular law is wrong. (5) Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards.
The alpha on these items was 0.81. Responses were standardized for inclusion in the regression analyses and
can be interpreted as high (+) = authoritarian and low (–) = libertarian.
Intention to quit Quite or very likely to leave current job in the next 12 months for voluntary reasons other than retirement 0.27 0.29 0.26
Former union 0.29 0.36 0.24

member
Socioeconomic area Local administrative areas are coded according to Office for National Statistics socioeconomic
classifications based on detailed information about the housing stock, economic activity and demographic
characteristics of residents using data from the 1991 Census; the methodology is explained in Bailey et al.
(1999)
Prosperous England The most prosperous localities in England, e.g. suburban Surrey, Buckinghamshire and rural Oxfordshire. 0.15 0.12 0.18
(Omitted variable in regressions)

Mining, Areas of traditional industrial activity, predominantly in the Midlands and North of England, Central 0.25 0.24 0.26
manufacturing and Scotland and South Wales, e.g. Manchester, Doncaster, Motherwell
industry
Coast and services Coastal towns (e.g. Eastbourne), cities (e.g. Portsmouth, Southampton) and former industrial cities that 0.1 0.12 0.09
have experienced considerable growth in service industries (e.g. Bristol, Leeds)
Education centres Outer London boroughs and university cities, suburbs mixed with areas of 20th century industry, e.g. 0.07 0.06 0.07
and outer London Oxford, Croydon
Inner London Inner London boroughs 0.02 – 0.03
Urban fringe Fairly prosperous suburban areas and areas of 20th century industrial development, predominantly in the 0.26 0.27 0.25
South and Midlands, e.g. Welwyn, Hatfield
Rural Predominantly agricultural areas 0.15 0.19 0.12
Non-union Are there any worker or staff representatives at your workplace? 0.11 0.08 0.12
representative
Weighted n 475 193 282
475
to be generalized to the population from which the sample was drawn. (This
means that standard likelihood ratio tests are not valid: Stata 2001a: 20.)
Coefficients from ordered probit models are not particularly easy to
interpret. For this reason, a second set of probit models was estimated, with
the dependent variable equal to zero if the respondent said that he was
unwilling to join a union and equal to one if he said that he was willing to
join a union. The results of the probit models were then reported as
marginal effects. This allows readers to get a better sense of the effect that
each independent variable has on an individual’s probability of being willing
to join a union. Finally, to illustrate the implications of the results for
management and unions, predicted probabilities of being willing to join a
union were calculated for four ‘typical employees’. (See Stata 2001b: 580–2
for an explanation of how this was done.)
Initially there were 646 observations of employees without a union at their
workplace who responded to the question about willingness to join a union.
(An additional 16 observations were dropped because the respondents were
police officers, for whom the Police Federation already plays a quasi-trade
union role.) Missing information from some respondents reduced this number
to 473 usable observations, or 74 per cent of the original respondents.
Hypothesis tests found only five significant differences between observations
used in the analyses and the original sample. Briefly, those aged 35–44, those
who have GCSEs or equivalent as their highest educational qualification
and those in sales occupations are over-represented in the final sample,
while residents of inner London and associate professional and technical
occupations are under-represented. The main causes of lost observations
were non-responses to items in the political and social attitudes scales.
Consequently, all regressions were re-run without the political and social
attitudes variables, first using the sample reported here, and second using
the larger sample. Key results were substantially the same when run on both
samples.
Some previous studies of non-union employees’ propensity to unionize
have split the analysis between manual and non-manual employees (e.g.
Kochan 1979: 26). The differences in willingness to join a union between
these two groups in the data analysed here was reported earlier. Scores on a
t-test on the means of willingness to join a union scores for the two groups
confirmed that this difference was statistically significant. This raises the
question, Is it appropriate to split the samples for multiple regression? To
answer this, a preliminary analysis was carried out with interactions between
all of the independent variables and the manual and non-manual dummies.
Hypothesis tests were then performed to investigate differences between the
manual and non-manual coefficients. In the majority of cases it was not
possible to reject the hypothesis that the coefficients were equal. However,
the results were definitely not equal for one of the key variables — job
satisfaction. For this reason, separate regression models were estimated for
the whole sample and manual employees and for non-manual employees
only. Results from all three analyses are reported. To test for the presence
of moderating relationships between independent variables, further models
were estimated which included interaction terms between the potentially
moderating and moderated variables. Potential mediating relationships were
tested using the procedure described by Baron and Kenny (1986: 1177).
A final issue of concern is the relationship between perceived instrumen-
tality and willingness to join a union. Table 2 shows that the relationship
between willingness to join and perceived union instrumentality is very
strong; this raises the possibility that union instrumentality is endogenous.
The following example should illustrate the problem. A shopper is going to
buy a new television. She chooses to buy one manufactured by Sony. The
reason given for this choice is that Sony is better for quality and reliability
than rival television manufacturers. Is this assessment based on an objective
assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of different televisions? Or is it
the result of a pre-existing disposition towards Sony? The same question
applies to the choice of whether or not to buy into trade union membership.
If the choice is the result of a pre-existing disposition towards trade union-
ism, then perceived instrumentality and propensity to join may be different
measures of the same underlying concept. (Kochan’s 1979 study avoided
this problem because the data contained a set of variables measuring general
attitudes towards unions. He could therefore be confident that willingness
to join and perceived instrumentality were not separate measures of general
attitudes towards unions. Unfortunately, this option is not available here
because there are no questions on general attitudes towards trade unions.)
To investigate the likely magnitude of this potentially serious problem, two
empirical tests were performed. First, the Spearman’s rank correlation
coefficient was calculated; a high score here would suggest that endogeneity
is a problem. Second, two sets of regression models were estimated, with and
without the perceived union instrumentality variable. If endogeneity bias is
a serious issue, there should be significant changes to other variables when
perceived instrumentality is introduced.
4. Results
The results of the multiple regression analyses are reported in Table 4. They
suggest that endogeneity is not a major issue. The Spearman’s rank cor-
relation coefficient test found that willingness to join a union and perceived
union instrumentality are not that highly correlated, but neither are they
independent of each other (the result of this test was 0.51***). More im-
portantly, there was little change in the multiple regression results when the
perceived instrumentality variable was added. When significant changes in
the results did occur, when perceived instrumentality was introduced, for
example when the size of the negative association between high levels of job
satisfaction and willingness to join among manual workers is reduced, and
the coefficient loses it statistical significance, there was evidence that a
mediation had taken place.
478
TABLE 4
Results of Multiple Regression Analyses on Willingness to Unionize

All All Manual Manual Non-manual Non-manual
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Perceived union 0.642 0.14 0.708 0.17 0.665 0.07

instrumentality (0.08)*** (0.11)*** (0.12)***
Job satisfaction
Very satisfied 70.528 70.06 70.433 70.06 70.477 70.07 70.313 70.04 70.782 70.05 70.746 70.04
(0.13)*** (0.13)*** (0.21)** (0.2) (0.16)*** (0.17)***
Dissatisfied 0.294 0.07 0.306 0.09 0.254 70.01 0.303 70.03 0.287 0.1 0.253 0.09
(0.18) (0.19) (0.31) (0.34) (0.25) (0.26)
Very dissatisfied 0.14 0.07 0.033 0.05 70.495 70.09 70.662 70.1 0.833 0.31 0.762 0.32
(0.3) (0.27) (0.45) (0.43) (0.43)* (0.37)**
Satisfaction with pay
High pay 70.318 70.06 70.031 0 70.223 70.08 0.338 0.08 70.202 70.01 0.064 0.03
(0.25) (0.26) (0.51) (0.51) (0.29) (0.32)
Low pay 0.051 0 0.002 70.01 0.307 0.08 0.264 0.06 70.169 70.03 70.237 70.02
(0.13) (0.13) (0.23) (0.24) (0.18) (0.19)
Very low pay 0.156 0.07 0.149 0.08 0.189 0.03 0.195 0.05 0.476 0.18 0.433 0.13
(0.19) (0.19) (0.26) (0.27) (0.26)* (0.26)*
Political attitudes 0.266 0.05 0.221 0.05 0.224 0.04 0.142 0.03 0.311 0.05 0.262 0.03
(0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.13)* (0.12) (0.08)*** (0.08)***
Social attitudes 70.126 70.02 70.067 70.01 70.208 70.05 70.08 70.01 70.06 70.01 70.017 0
(0.07)* (0.07) (0.12)* (0.11) (0.09) (0.09)
Intention to quit 0.03 0.01 70.021 70.03 0.041 0 0.085 70.02 0.058 70.01 70.014 70.02
(0.14) (0.14) (0.25) (0.24) (0.19) (0.19)
Former union 0.281 0.06 0.232 0.04 0.421 0.14 0.394 0.11 0.092 0 0.062 70.01
member (0.14)** (0.14)* (0.24)* (0.23)* (0.19) (0.21)
Socioeconomic area
(ref. Prosperous
England)
Mining, 0.449 0.2 0.436 0.19 0.729 0.18 0.634 0.08 0.554 0.35 0.576 0.33
manufacturing and (0.18)** (0.18)** (0.33)** (0.3)** (0.24)** (0.24)**
industry
Coast and services 0.381 0.09 0.471 0.14 0.624 0.15 0.707 0.21 0.352 0.06 0.397 0.03
(0.2)* (0.21)** (0.33)* (0.32)** (0.31) (0.31)

Education centres 0.619 0.25 0.657 0.22 1.394 0.53 1.458 0.44 0.558 0.2 0.621 0.11
and outer London (0.27)** (0.27)** (0.48)*** (0.44)*** (0.33) (0.34)*
Inner London 0.143 0.1 0.404 0.16 0.152 0.19 0.475 0.31
(0.43) (0.41) (0.55) (0.48)
Urban fringe 0.188 0.16 0.273 0.18 0.35 0.21 0.389 0.21 0.104 0.17 0.218 0.15
(0.17) (0.17) (0.33) (0.29) (0.22) (0.24)
Rural 0.245 0.12 0.355 0.16 0.237 0.01 0.387 0.08 0.404 0.32 0.365 0.22
(0.19) (0.2)* (0.24) (0.3) (0.27) (0.27)
Non-union 0.008 0 0.004 0 70.013 0 70.035 0 70.022 0 70.005 0
representative (0.16) (0.15) (0.29) (0.29) (0.2) (0.19)
Predicted probability 0.1 0.1 0.14 0.11 0.06 0.04

of joining for
benchmark
employeea
Cut 1 0.151 0.118 0.723 1.046 70.435 70.522

(0.34) (0.35) (0.52) (0.49) (0.4) (0.42)
Cut 2 1.09 1.15 1.587 2.034 0.721 0.719
(0.33) (0.35) (0.52) (0.49) (0.41) (0.42)
Cut 3 2.05 2.28 2.53 3.19 1.863 2.04
479
(0.34) (0.36) (0.53) (0.5) (0.42) (0.44)
480
Table 4 (contd)
All All Manual Manual Non-manual Non-manual

1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Wald test 145.3 220.5 70.21 127.55 184.6 211.65

Pseudo R2 0.1257 0.2016 0.1256 0.231 0.2008 0.2608
N 477 477 472 472 194 194 192 192 283 283 271 271
(1) Regression coefficient from ordered probit analysis. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *= significant at the 10% level, **= significant at the 5% level and
***= significant at the 1% level or better.
(2) Marginal effect from a probit model. The marginal effect can be interpreted as the change in predicted probability from the given predicted probability for the
benchmark worker if there is a discrete change in a dummy variable, or a one standard deviation change in one of the scale variables.
a
Characteristics of benchmark employee. Whole sample: views on union instrumentality and political and social attitudes set to the sample mean; satisfied; believes
pay is reasonable; does not intend to quit; never been a union member; lives in a prosperous England locality; no non-union rep at the workplace, aged 18–24, male,
been in the job less than a year, educated to GCSE level, white, married, works full-time in a workplace with fewer than 10 employees in the private service sector in
a professional and managerial occupation. Non-manual sample is the same; manual is in a craft occupation.
Controls: age, gender, ethnic minority, highest educational qualification, part-time employee, job tenure, 1-digit SOC, manual occupation, production sector,
public services sector, union membership
Dissonance
There is no statistically significant relationship between dissatisfaction and
willingness to join a union for the whole sample. However, the negative sign
is in the expected direction. Manual/non-manual breakdowns reveal that
this relationship does not hold for manual employees. However, the relation-
ship is exactly as hypothesized for non-manuals — the dissatisfied are more
likely to join than the satisfied, and the very dissatisfied are even more likely
to join. In all cases, those who report high levels of job satisfaction are
significantly less likely to be willing to join a union. So Hypothesis 1 is
partially confirmed.
There was only minimal support for Hypothesis 2 (that low paid employees
will be more willing to join a union). In general, employees who perceived
their pay to be low were no more likely to be willing to join a union than
those who thought their pay was reasonable. There is one statistically sig-
nificant exception to this: non-manual employees who perceive their pay to
be very low are significantly more likely to be willing to join a union. One
reason for the failure of Hypothesis 2 might be that the impact of low pay is
mediated by job dissatisfaction. However, when this was tested there was no
evidence of mediation.
The effect of interaction terms between perceived union instrumentality and
dissatisfaction (reported in Table 5) were small and insignificant. Employees
TABLE 5
Does Instrumentality Moderate the Impact of Dissatisfaction? a
Perceived union instrumentality 0.664 0.719 0.744

(0.11)*** (0.16)*** (0.17)***
Job satisfaction (ref. Satisfied)
Very satisfied 70.437 70.28 70.792
(0.14)*** (0.22) (0.18)***
Dissatisfied 0.365 0.464 0.291
(0.2)* (0.36) (0.26)
Very dissatisfied 70.007 70.778 0.806
(0.3) (0.5) (0.35)
Interactions
Very satisfied6instrumentality 70.087 0.134 70.207
(0.17) (0.23) (0.26)
Dissatisfied6instrumentality 70.137 70.323 70.191
(0.22) (0.31) (0.36)
Very dissatisfied6instrumentality 0.252 0.317 0.415
(0.25) (0.34) (0.43)
a
Regression coefficients from ordered probit analysis. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* = significant at the 10% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; *** = significant at the 1%
level or better.
Controls: Satisfaction with pay, political attitudes, social attitudes, former union member,
intention to quit, socioeconomic area, age, gender, ethnic minority, highest educational
qualification, part-time employee, job tenure, 1 digit SOC, manual occupation, production
sector, public services sector, union membership.

who perceive instrumentality and are dissatisfied are no more likely to be
willing to join a union than those who perceive instrumentality and are
satisfied. There was a positive interaction between high levels of dissatisfac-
tion and perceived instrumentality, although this result was not statistically
significant. Those who were very satisfied and believed in union instrument-
ality were still slightly less likely to be willing to join a union than those who
were satisfied, but not nearly as unlikely to be willing to join a union as
those who were very satisfied and who did not believe in union instrument-
ality. This means that Hypothesis 3 (that the impact of dissatisfaction on
willingness to join will be moderated by perceived union instrumentality) is
only partially confirmed. Neither is dissatisfaction mediated by perceived
instrumentality.
The pseudo R 2 of the model, which contains measures of job satisfaction,
political views and perceived instrumentality, is higher than for models that
include just one of these variables; in other words, the combined model has
the greater explanatory power. This strongly suggests that what Wheeler
and McClendon (1991: 51) call models A, B and C are in fact components of
a single model, similar to those proposed by Kochan (1980: 144) and
Premack and Hunter (1988: 232). Overall, these results differ slightly from
similar studies from the USA, and from ideas suggested by theory. Dis-
satisfaction is associated with an increased willingness to join a union only
among non-manual employees — a different result from US studies, where
dissatisfaction predicts joining intentions for all workers (Kochan 1979: 26;
Premack and Hunter 1988: 232). However, the very satisfied are significantly
less likely to be willing to join a union than everybody else. The relationship
between aspects of job satisfaction and willingness to join a union is only
partly moderated by perceived instrumentality. Contrary to the findings of
Premack and Hunter (1988: 232), the association between willingness to join
and satisfaction is not mediated by perceived instrumentality.
Perceived instrumentality
There is a very strong and statistically significant relationship between
perceived instrumentality and willingness to join a union. Other things being
equal, workers who believe that a union would make their workplace a little
better would be around 2.8 times more likely to be willing to join a union
than those who believe that a union would make no difference. Consequently
Hypothesis 4 (that perceived instrumentality will be associated with increased
willingness to join a union) is confirmed.
Political beliefs
There is also confirmation for Hypothesis 5: those with left-wing views are
more likely to be willing to join a union. This association is more pro-
nounced among the non-manual sample. There is evidence that the effects
of political views are mediated by perceived instrumentality among manual
workers only, so Hypothesis 6 is partially confirmed. The impact of political
views is not mediated by job dissatisfaction, so there is no support for
Hypothesis 7.
Area of residence
The relationship between area of residence and willingness to join was as
hypothesized. Those resident in ‘prosperous England areas’ were much less
likely to be willing to join a union than everyone else. Other things being
equal, a resident of a ‘mining, manufacturing and industry’ area would be
twice as likely to be willing to join a union as a resident of a ‘prosperous
England’ area. Contrary to expectations, these relationships were not
mediated by either perceived instrumentality or political views.
Other influences
Former union members are more likely to be willing to join a union than
those who have never been members, so Hypothesis 11 is confirmed. The
effect of previous union membership was partially mediated by perceived
union instrumentality, so Hypothesis 12 is also confirmed. However, there
was no support for Hypothesis 13 — that non-union representation would
be associated with a reduced willingness to join a union, or for Hypothesis 14
— that any relationship between non-union representation and willingness
to join a union would be mediated by union instrumentality. Nor was there
support for Hypothesis 15 — that an intention to quit would be associated
with reduced willingness to join a union.
5. Discussion
What are the implications of these findings for theory and for trade unions
and managers interested in understanding the factors that are likely to make
a worker willing to join a union? To draw out the implications, the predicted
probabilities of being willing to join a union were calculated for four com-
posite workers. The characteristics of the composite workers were chosen to
illustrate the views of some key groups of workers that unions are likely to
be interested in organizing. The predicted probabilities were then recalcu-
lated to demonstrate the effect of (1) a change from job satisfaction to job
dissatisfaction; (2) a change in political views from centrist (i.e. the same as
the sample mean) to the moderate left (i.e. one standard deviation greater
than the sample mean); (3) a change in perceived union instrumentality from
believing that a union would not make any difference to their workplace, to
believing that a union would make their workplace a little better. The full
characteristics of these composite workers and their predicted probabilities
of being willing to join a union are reported in Table 6.
484
TABLE 6
Estimated Predicted Probabilities of Willingness to Unionize for Four Composite Employeesa

Characteristics of composite employees Predicted Predicted Predicted Predicted Predicted
probability 1 probability 2 probability 3 probability 4 probability 5
Unskilled private services employee 0.68 0.68 0.77 0.92 0.93

Woman aged 25–34 in an unskilled occupation in the private services sector,
workplace has between 10–25 employees, educated to GCSE or equivalent level,
resident in a mining, manufacturing and industry area, believes own pay is low.
Sales employee 0.36 0.64 0.54 0.74 0.96
Woman aged 45–59 in a sales occupation in the private services sector, workplace
has between 25–100 employees, educated to GCSE or equivalent, resident in an
urban fringe area, believes own pay is reasonable.
Skilled production employee 0.17 0.14 0.21 0.5 0.59

Man aged 34–44 in a craft occupation, in the production sector, workplace has
more than 500 employees, educated to A level or equivalent, resident in an urban
fringe area, believes own pay is reasonable.
Technical employee 0.08 0.24 0.17 0.33 0.77
Man aged 25–34 in a technical occupation, in the private services sector,
workplace has between 100 and 500 employees, educated to degree level, resident
in a prosperous England area, believes own pay is reasonable.
a
All: characteristics that will change; satisfied with job, political views set to the sample mean, views on union instrumentality set to the sample mean.
Characteristics held constant: white; married or co-habiting; job tenure of between 2 and 5 years; does not intend to quit work in next 12 months; no non-union rep
at the workplace; social views set to the sample mean; works full-time; never been a union member.
1. Predicted probability of benchmark employee
2. Predicted probability if job satisfaction is changed from satisfied to dissatisfied and all other characteristics are held constant.
3. Predicted probability if political views are changed by one standard deviation to the left and all other characteristics are held constant.
4. Predicted probability if views on union instrumentality are changed from believing a union will make no difference to believing that a trade union would make
the workplace a little better and all other characteristics are held constant.
5. Predicted probability if job satisfaction, political views and views on union instrumentality are changed all at the same time and all other characteristics are held
constant.
The first composite employee (unskilled private services employee) is a
woman working in an unskilled job, for example a cleaner or a care
assistant, in the private services sector. She lives in an area dominated by
Britain’s declining older industries. (This last point delivers a significant
boost to her probability of being willing to join a union.) In short, she is
emblematic of the sort of employee working at what TUC General Secretary
John Monks calls the ‘rough end of the labour market’ — the type of
employee who needs union protection the most, but whose employment
conditions make it difficult for unions to organize (Monks 2001). This
employee has a baseline predicted probability of being willing to join a
union of 0.68. A change from job satisfaction to job dissatisfaction has no
impact on this figure. If her views were more left-wing, then her predicted
probability of being willing to join a union would rise to 0.77. If she believed
that a union would make her workplace slightly better, then her probability
of being willing to join a union would rise to 0.93. Overall, these results
suggest that the challenge facing unions when trying to organize unskilled
employees at the bottom end of the labour market will come not from em-
ployee indifference, but from employer intransigence and lack of employee
bargaining power. Employees who seek a better deal are easily replaced. If
unions are to reach the type of employee exemplified by this employee, they
will have to adopt novel tactics. Community unionism initiatives appear to
have had some success in reaching and protecting this type of worker in the
USA, but British unions, with their strong bias towards workplace-based
organization, appear to be wary of adopting this model (Wills 2002). (Com-
munity unionism can be defined as ‘the establishment of new geographically
focused networks and coalitions in which trade unionists, social movements
and community groups come together around issues of mutual concern
. . . [to] advance the cause of the trade union movement’: Simms and Wills
2001: 5.) However, the geographical concentration of employees willing to
join a union in areas of traditional industry that this article reveals suggests
that, if British unions were to adopt a community organizing approach, they
would enjoy considerable success.
The second composite employee (the sales employee) is a woman working
in a sales job for a medium-sized service sector employer, for example a
cashier in an out-of-town supermarket, perhaps built on brownfield land
once occupied by a unionized factory. John Monks’s view is that this type
of workplace is not dissimilar to the traditional union workplace, because
it contains ‘large numbers of people doing similar jobs who want to be
represented to their employers on a collective basis’ (Monks 2001). As such,
the sales employee represents a key organizing target for trade unions. The
baseline predicted probability of being willing to join for the sales employee
is 0.36, a figure that suggests that organizing this type of worker will not be
an easy task. However, the figures look much better for unions if the
employee’s political views move to the left, or if she becomes dissatisfied, or
if she believes that a union would make her workplace a little better. If all
three of these conditions hold, the predicted probability rises to 0.96.
The third composite employee (a skilled production employee) is a skilled
male worker in the production sector, for example a fitter in a factory
established in the 1980s and operating on a greenfield site. A generation ago
he would have been a union member as a matter of course, but because the
workplace at which he works opened at a time of union weakness the
employer simply refused to recognize a union. This type of workplace has
been most actively targeted by unions since the advent of the statutory
recognition procedure (Wood et al. 2002). This employee’s baseline prob-
ability of being willing to join is only 0.17. It rises to 0.5 only if he perceives
that a union would make his workplace a little better. (It should be noted
that the probability of his being willing to join would be higher if he were in
a semi-skilled occupation, or lived in a mining, manufacturing and industry
area.) These results suggest that unions cannot assume support, even among
the type of worker who would traditionally have been a union member.
The final composite employee (a technical employee) is a man working in
a technical occupation (for example an IT-related job) in the private services
sector, resident in a prosperous area of England. According to TUC focus
group research cited by John Monks, this type of worker is unlikely to
perceive the need for a union, because ‘unions are for blue-collar workers
with problems, not white-collar workers with opportunities’. However, unions
need to find ways of appealing to this type of employee because he works in
the type of job and type of industry where employment is set to grow most
strongly (Monks 2001). The technical employee has a baseline probability
of membership of just 0.08. However, if he were to have left-wing views, to
perceive that a union would improve his workplace and if he were dis-
satisfied, this probability would rise to 0.77. In other words, unions can
appeal to skilled white-collar workers in the services sector if the worker has
a grievance, and can be persuaded that a union would make their workplace
better.
Unions are relatively powerless to shift the political views of individuals;
however, they may be able to change employee perceptions of the way in
which their workplace is managed, and the way in which they perceive trade
unions. If unions are to have any chance of organizing most non-union
workplaces, they will need to persuade the majority of employees in each
workplace to vote for a union. Consequently, simply turning up and
attempting to ‘sell’ the union’s representation services is likely to prove
inadequate, because the results reported above suggest that most workplaces
will not have a majority of employees who want to buy. Unions will need
to offer carefully crafted narratives around specific issues of concern to
employees, which demonstrate how collective action through a union can
change the workplace for the better. The ‘organizing model’ approach being
promoted by the TUC encourages union organizers to do exactly that (TUC
1999). (The organizing model can be defined as both a philosophy of trade
unionism that emphasizes the building of collective identification and
organization among workers, and a set of best practice tactics and methods:
Heery et al. 1999: 39–40.)
However, research by Heery et al. (2000: 997) suggests that only around
half of all unions are adopting this approach. Carter (2000: 132–3) found
that, even in a union that had wholeheartedly endorsed the organizing model,
political divisions and entrenched behaviours meant that it was not always
practised. The organizing model is resource-intensive; Heery et al. (2000:
990–1) found that the overall level of resources being devoted to organizing
was low — probably too low to bring about a large influx of new members.
In short, fresh thinking and internal reform to overcome the entrenched
behaviours and greater resources for new organizing may be needed if
British unions are to make serious incursions into the non-union sector.
Just as a belief that a union will make the workplace better increases
an individual’s willingness to join, so a belief that a union will make the
workplace worse lowers willingness to join by a similar margin. This is
congruent with the findings of Dundon (2001: 14–15), who found that fear
of an adverse management reaction had a powerful inhibiting effect on
workers’ desire for unionization, and that managers were projecting anti-
union views in order to deter workers from unionizing. Similarly, Freeman
and Diamond (2000) found evidence for an ‘incumbency effect’; in general,
non-union employees like the workplace they have. Consequently, they will
value the comfortable aspects of the status quo. If unionization seems likely
to jeopardize what employees feel they already have, then support will
fall away. Gall and McKay (2001: 98–102) found significant evidence of
management intent to use aggressive anti-union tactics to prevent union
organizing attempts from succeeding. Monks’s optimistic hypothesis that
employees in non-union supermarkets and call centres will desire collective
representation has yet to be tested in practice. It is likely to prove false if
employers adopt aggressive anti-union tactics, with the result that employees
come to believe that a union would worsen conditions.
The other context in which it would be very difficult for a union to win
would be a workplace where employees express high levels of satisfaction
with their jobs. Consequently the results provide empirical support for the
intuitively obvious hypotheses that employers who wish to keep unions out
of their workplace can either prevent a demand for unionization from
building by treating the work-force well, or deter employees from union-
ization by adopting militant anti-union tactics which will raise the cost of
unionization to prohibitively expensive levels. If management does adopt
these tactics successfully, unions may find that the only option open to them
is to adopt strategies of organizing away from the workplace, either through
communities, or virtually, through the internet — a possibility discussed by
Freeman and Diamond elsewhere in this issue.
6. Conclusions
This paper has analysed willingness to join a union among non-union

employees. Overall, four out of ten non-union employees would join a union
if one were available at their workplace. If all those who wanted to join were
to do so, union membership in Britain would rise by around 3.2 million.
Theory has suggested that employees would want to unionize if they were
dissatisfied, if they believed that a union would improve conditions at their
workplace, and if they had left-wing views. The empirical analysis has broadly
supported these propositions. However, dissatisfaction does not appear to
be linked with an increased willingness to unionize among manual em-
ployees. Of these three influences on the unionization decision, perceived
union instrumentality has by far the largest effect. This finding is in line with
the results of Kochan (1979) and Premack and Hunter (1988).
Results also showed that where an employee lives is an important
influence on willingness to join a union. Workers in areas once dominated
by traditional heavy industries were more much more likely to want to
unionize than those who live in the most prosperous areas of the country.
Although this finding has little bearing on the development of theory, it does
have important practical implications, because it suggests that unions might
have some success in organizing employees in low paid, unskilled jobs if they
were to adopt community organizing strategies. These results suggest that,
if unions are to win the support of the non-union work-force, they will need
to invest considerable effort and resources in persuading employees that a
union will make a difference to their workplace. Employers attempting to
remain union-free will need to promote the opposite view — that unions will
lead to worse conditions — if they want to dissuade workers from joining.
Perhaps the most interesting question raised but not answered by this
article is, Why do some workers believe that unions will make their work-
place better while others believe the opposite? A convincing answer to this
question is probably not possible with this type of study. Answers are
needed to two separate questions if our understanding of the unionization
process is to be advanced. First, how are employees’ initial views of unions
formed? And second, how are these views changed in the context of union
organizing campaigns? Detailed observational case studies may be the best
way to generate hypotheses that can be tested with future survey data.
A further interesting question for future research is whether the intro-
duction of the statutory recognition procedure has been associated with any
change in the desire for unionization. Preliminary analysis of the British
Workers Representation and Participation Survey suggests that willingness
to unionize in fact remained fairly constant between 1998 and 2001, which is
perhaps unsurprising, given the comparatively low profile of the procedure
and associated recognition cases.
In the final analysis, the findings of this paper offer mixed news to British
unions. On the one hand, there appears to be a large body of workers who
would unionize given the opportunity. On the other hand, this support is
likely to be vulnerable to aggressive anti-union tactics by employers. If
unions are to have a hope of building on and harvesting the support they
already enjoy, they will have to become more innovative in their organizing
strategies, and back up innovation with increased investment.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Katarina Thompson from the National Centre for Social

Research for providing assistance and advice with the 1998 British Social
Attitudes Survey data. Particular thanks to Jo Blanden, Ana Lasaosa, Steve
McIntosh and Jonathan Wadsworth for invaluable help and advice with the
econometrics, to Bob Elliot, Richard Freeman, John Godard, Paul Gollan,
Steve Machin, Alan Manning, David Metcalf, Jane Wills, to participants in
workshops at the CEP and the Industrial Relations Department at the LSE,
to the International Conference on Union Growth at the University of
Toronto, and lastly to Tom Kochan, Anil Verma and Stephen Wood in their
capacity as editors, and to two anonymous referees for helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this paper. The 1998 British Social Attitudes Survey data
was provided by the National Centre for Social Research through the ESRC
Data Archive. I am grateful to both organizations for permission to use the
data. The research was funded by a PhD studentship from the Economic
and Social Research Council, and is part of the CEP’s Future of Trade
Unions in Modern Britain Programme, supported by the Leverhulme Trust.
Needless to say, I am solely responsible for the contents of the article.
Final version accepted 4 April 2002.
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British Journal of Industrial Relations

40:3 September 2002 0007–1080 pp. 463–491