Consitutional Law I Digest Codex

Compilation by: Gilbert Augustin Ganir, JD-I (Batch 2016)
Silliman University College of Law
T ABLE OF C ONTENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES......................................................................................................................................................2
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS.................................................................................................................................................2
Date of Effectivity : De Leon vs. Esguerra (153 SCRA 602)..............................................................................2
Social Contract Character of the Charter: Marcos vs. Manglapus (GR 88211, 15 Sept. 1989)......................2
Constitutional Supremacy: Tawang Multi-purpose vs. La Trinidad Water District (GR 166471, 22 March
2011).................................................................................................................................................................2
PREAMBLE.....................................................................................................................................................................................2
Theistic Character of the Preamble : Epilogue of Justice Panganiban, People vs. Echegaray (19 January
1999).................................................................................................................................................................2
ARTICLE I. NATIONAL TERRITORY.................................................................................................................................................3
Section 1........................................................................................................................................................................................3
Philippine Intervention to the Dispute over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan: Indonesia vs. Malaysia
(2001 ICJ 5)........................................................................................................................................................3
Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan: Indonesia vs. Malaysia (2002 ICJ 3).............................3
Title Based on Contiguity or Terra Firma: US vs. Netherlands (PCA, 4 April 1926).......................................3
Acquisitive Prescription: Malaysia vs. Singapore (ICJ, 23 May 2008)..............................................................3
Constitutionality of RA 9522: Magalona vs. Ermita (GR 187167, 16 August 2011).......................................3
ARTICLE II. PRINCIPLES & POLICIES..............................................................................................................................................4
Section 1........................................................................................................................................................................................4
Classifications of Sections: BCDA vs. COA (GR 178160, 26 February 2009)....................................................4
Bangsamoro Juridical Identity as Associated State: North Cotabato vs. GRP Peace Panel (568 SCRA 402,
GR 183591, 14 October 2008)..........................................................................................................................4
Validity of RP-US Non-surrender Agreement: Bayan Muna vs. Romula (GR 159618, 1 February 2011)......4
Section 2........................................................................................................................................................................................5
Incorporation of International Laws: Pharma Health Care vs. DOTC (GR 173034, 9 October 2007)............5
Jus Cogens, Non-Derogable Obligations, & Waiver through Peace Treaty: Vinuya et al vs. Executive
Secretary (GR 162230, 28 April 2010).............................................................................................................5
Section 4........................................................................................................................................................................................5
Exemption from Military Service: Parreno vs. COA (523 SCRA 390)...............................................................5
Section 6........................................................................................................................................................................................5
Excommunication as a Non-justiciable Issue: Taruc vs. Bishop De la Cruz (GR No. 144801 March 10, 2005)
..........................................................................................................................................................................5
Section 7........................................................................................................................................................................................6
Constitutionality of VFA and Romulo-Kenney Agreements: Nicolas vs. Sec. Romulo (GR No. 175888, etc.
February 11, 2009)............................................................................................................................................6
Section 8........................................................................................................................................................................................6
International Law on Nuclear Weapons: ICJ Advisory Opinion of July 8, 1996..............................................6
Section 10......................................................................................................................................................................................6
Constitutional Policy of Social Justice: St. Mary’s Academy vs. Palacio (GR No. 164913 September 8,
2010).................................................................................................................................................................6
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Consistency of Coco-levy Fund with Social Justice: PKSMM vs. Cocofed (GR Nos. 147036-37 April 10,
2012).................................................................................................................................................................7
Section 13......................................................................................................................................................................................7
Freedom of Speech and its Limitations: Soriano vs. LaGuardia (GR No. 164785 April 29, 2009)..................7
Section 15......................................................................................................................................................................................7
Right to Pursuit of Happiness: Republic vs. Cagandahan (GR No. 166676 [565 SCRA 72] September 12,
2008).................................................................................................................................................................7
Section 16......................................................................................................................................................................................7
The Regalian Doctrine and the Constitutionality of PD 1065: DENR vs. Yap (GR No. 167707 [568 SCRA
164] October 8, 2008).......................................................................................................................................7
Impairment of Contractual and Property Rights by Section 16, Art. II: Republic vs. Pagadian City Timber
(GR No. 159308 [565 SCRA 260] September 16, 2008.....................................................................................8
Section 18......................................................................................................................................................................................8
Constitutionality of RA 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act): Serrano vs. Gallant Maritime
Services (GR No. 167614 March 24, 2009).......................................................................................................8
Sufficiency of Employee’s Passive Acquiescence: Cercado vs. UNIPROM, Inc. (GR No. 188154 October 13,
2010).................................................................................................................................................................8
Section 19......................................................................................................................................................................................9
Independent National Economy and Constitutionality of RA 8762: Espina vs. Bautista (GR No. 143855
September 21, 2010)........................................................................................................................................9
Section 20......................................................................................................................................................................................9
Free Enterprise Policy and Government Intervention: PMAP vs. FPA (GR No. 156041 [516 SCRA 360])......9
Section 22......................................................................................................................................................................................9
Constitutionality of PD 310: CMU vs. National Anti-Poverty Commission (GR No. 184869 September 21,
2010).................................................................................................................................................................9
Section 25....................................................................................................................................................................................10
Policy of Local Autonomy and the Constitutionality of RA 9355: Navarro vs. Ermita (GR No. 180050 April
12, 2011).........................................................................................................................................................10
Section 26....................................................................................................................................................................................10
Limitation of Qualified Presidential Candidates: Pamatong vs. COMELEC (GR No. 161872 April 13, 2004)
........................................................................................................................................................................10
Section 27....................................................................................................................................................................................10
Declaration of Bank Deposits in SALN: Ombudsman vs. Racho (GR No. 185685 January 31, 2011)............10
Section 28....................................................................................................................................................................................10
COMELEC’s Constitutional Duty to Disclose Detail of Preparations for Elections: Guingona vs. COMELEC
(GR No. 191846 May 6, 2010)........................................................................................................................10
ARTICLE VI. THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT.............................................................................................................................10
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES
PRE LIM INARY CO NSIDE RATIO NS
DATE OF EFFECTIVITY : DE LEON VS. ESGUERRA (153 SCRA 602)

Facts: In 1982, BP Blg. 222 (Barangay Election Act) was passed, giving petitioners barangay officials six-year terms that would commence on June
7, 1982. Before their terms expired, a series of memoranda were issued by OIC Governor on Feb. 8, 1987, designating respondents as the new
barangay officials. Petitioners opposed this since their six-year terms had yet expire, but respondents argue that on the basis of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the
provisional Freedom Constitution, their terms are rendered void.
Issue: When did the 1987 Constitution take effect? How was this case resolved in light of that?
Ruling: The 1987 Constitution was ratified by plebiscite on Feb. 2, 1987 (the day the votes were cast), invalidating certain stipulations of the
provisional Freedom Constitution such that the authority behind memoranda issued was nullified. Hence, the memoranda, issued 6 days after the
1987 Constitution took effect, cannot strip petitioners of their office.
SOCIAL CONTRACT CHARACTER OF THE CHARTER: MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS

(GR 88211, 15 SEPT. 1989)
Facts: Petitioner pray for the Court to overturn then President Aquino’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines on the basis that they have
the right to do so as duly-recognized citizens of the country. Respondent DFA Secretary argues that their return poses a great risk to national
security to the point that their right to re-entry must be withheld for the common good.
Issue: Why is the Constitution considered a “social contract?” And how does it serve as justification to bar petitioners’ return to the RP?
Ruling: It is a social contract because the Filipino people partially surrendered the direct exercise of their individual sovereignty to legislate,
execute, and judge to the government headed by Pres. Aquino, who is now duty-bound to ensure the peace of the entire nation which was
apparently endangered by petitioners’ return as evidenced by their reported efforts to stir dissension and disunity. Thus, the government is
justified in withholding petitioners’ right to return to the RP.
CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY: TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE VS. LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT

(GR 166471, 22 MARCH 2011)
Facts: Petitioner is a cooperative organized to provide domestic water services in Brgy. Tawang, La Trinidad. Respondent is a local water utility
created under PD 198. On Oct. 9, 2000, petitioner filed an application for certificate of public convenience (CPC) to the National Water Resources
Board in order to maintain its operations. This was opposed by respondent, who claimed that under Sec. 47 of PD 198, its franchise is exclusive. The
NWRB granted the certificated, which was overturned by the RTC on appeal. Hence, this petition.
Issue: What is the doctrine of constitutional supremacy? How is it key in judging the case?
Ruling: The doctrine of constitutional supremacy states that a promulgated law, presidential decree, or contracts entered by private person for
private purposes (or parts thereof) are “null and void and without any force and effect” if it so violates any norm of the Constitution, “the
fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation….” Regarding this case, P.D. 198, Sec. 47 was deemed invalid and unconstitutional because
it contradicted the 1987 Constitution, which affirmed that no franchise can be exclusive in character. Petitioner’s application for CPC was granted.
PRE AM BLE
THEISTIC CHARACTER OF THE PREAMBLE : EPILOGUE OF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN, PEOPLE VS. ECHEGARAY
(19 JANUARY 1999)
Facts: Echegaray was accused of raping his own daughter and was sentenced to death under RA 5768. In his defense, respondent said that the
death penalty is unconstitutional because the Philippines, as a Catholic country, regards a person’s right to life as inviolable.
Issue: Is the Preamble of the 1987 Constitution theistic or theocratic?
Ruling: It is theistic, in so far as it affirms the Filipinos’ general belief in a deity as expressed in the term “almighty God.” It is not theocratic, because
the Catholic Church, “to which the vast majority of our people belong, acknowledges the power of public authorities to prescribe the death penalty,”
despite its opposition to such a law, pursuant to Sec. 6 of Art. 2 of the Constitution, which affirms the state principle of separation between church
and state.
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ARTICLE I. NATIO NAL TE RRITO RY
SECTION 1
PHILIPPINE INTERVENTION TO THE DISPUTE OVER PULAU LIGITAN AND PULAU SIPADAN:
INDONESIA VS. MALAYSIA (2001 ICJ 5)
Facts: Indonesia and Malaysia requested the Court to determine which of them has sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan. On 13 March,
2001, the Philippines filed an application for permission to intervene in the case, claiming that it has legal interest because it believed that the
Court’s decision would have an effect on the legal status of Borneo, which the Philippines claims dominion over. Indonesia and Malaysia objected to
the application of the intervention, citing untimely application.
Issue: Was the Philippines able to prove its right to intervene in Indonesia vs. Malaysia over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan?
Ruling: No. Although the Court ruled that the objections raised by Malaysia and Indonesia with regards to the timeliness of the filing of the motion
to intervene, the Philippines was not able to show any legal interest that might be “affected by reasoning or interpretations of the Court” pertaining
to this case. The instruments it invoked to support its request for intervention was either irrelevant to the contentions and argument of Indonesia
and Malaysia or irrelevant to its own claim over North Borneo.
SOVEREIGNTY OVER PULAU LIGITAN AND PULAU SIPADAN: INDONESIA VS. MALAYSIA
(2002 ICJ 3)
Facts: Indonesia claims that Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan are theirs because they fall under the territorial boundaries set out 1891 Convention
between Great Britain and the Netherlands, the legal predecessor of Indonesia. On the other hand, Malaysia based their claim on legal instruments
it acquired in its relations with the Sultan of Sulu, which Malaysia claims to be the original sovereign over the said islands.
Issue: Who has titles and sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan?
Ruling: Title and sovereignty over the said islands belong to Malaysia, but not on the basis of any legal title (because the instruments they
presented were inconclusive), but on the ground of effectivites. Malaysia established and maintained jurisdiction in the said islands by passing and
enforcing ordinances such as the Turtle Preservation Ordinance of 1917 as well as constructing and operating lighthouses in the early 1960s. This
exercise of jurisdiction was not disturbed until 1969, when the conflict between the two countries crystallized.
TITLE BASED ON CONTIGUITY OR TERRA FIRMA: US VS. NETHERLANDS

(PCA, 4 APRIL 1926)
Facts: Petitioner and respondent, by a special agreement, requested the Permanent Court of Arbitration to judge which of them has sovereignty and
jurisdiction over the island of Palmas. Among the arguments of the US is title arising out of contiguity, explaining that since the island is closer to the
Philippines (a U.S. territory), then the island belongs to the U.S. The Netherlands, meanwhile, claim that they have been exercising rights over the
island since 1677 as a result of the East India Company’s conventions with the princes of Sangi.
Issue: Is there a positive international law of terra firma (title based on contiguity) where the nearest continent or island of considerable size gives
title to the land in dispute?
Ruling: There is no such law of terra firma. Thus, the argument from contiguity is untenable. The island of Palmas was awarded to the Netherlands,
because it was able to display sovereignty and jurisdiction there from 1700 to 1906.
ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION: MALAYSIA VS. SINGAPORE (ICJ, 23 MAY 2008)

Facts: Upon the request of the two parties, the ICJ is requested to resolve a territorial dispute over the island of Pedra Blanca/Pulau Batu Puteh
among others. Malaysia claims that the said island is within its territorial waters as shown in map evidences from 1979. Singapore argues that the
1979 map should be corrected because it has been exercising jurisdiction over the area unchallenged, decades beforehand.
Issue: Is there a positive international law of acquisitive prescription over neighboring territories?
Ruling: It is an internationally accepted principle of law that the country who has exercised continued sovereignty and jurisdiction over a territory
for a considerable amount of time (without the express challenge of another) has sovereign rights over it. The island of Pedra Blanca/Pulau Batu
Puteh was resolved in favor of Singapore because the respective conducts of the parties after 1953 indicate that by 1980, sovereignty over the
island had already passed on to Singapore—and this was not challenged by Malaysia.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RA 9522: MAGALONA VS. ERMITA

(GR 187167, 16 AUGUST 2011)
Facts: Petitioners question the constitutionality of RA 9522, an act passed by Congress to adjust the baselines of the Philippines as to make them
compliant to UNCLOS-III. Petitioners claim that RA 9522 undermines Philippine sovereignty and its claim over the Kalayaan Island Group,
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Scarborough Shoal, and Sabah. Respondents argue that RA 9522 does none of these. Moreover, RA 9522 is necessary for the Philippines to UNCLOS
compliant.
Issues: 1) Does RA 9522 “dismember a large portion of national territory” because it discards the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine
territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties? 2) Does RA 9522’s use of UNCLOS III’s regime of islands framework to draw the baselines,
and to measure the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), weaken our territorial claim over the area? 3) Did
RA 9522 fail to textualize the Philippines’ claim over Sabah in North Borneo? 4) Did RA 9522 unconstitutionally convert Philippine internal waters
into archipelagic waters?
Ruling: 1) No, it does not. On the contrary, it increased the Philippines’ total maritime space (internal waters, territorial sea, and EEZ) by 145, 216
square nautical miles, way beyond the demarcation set out by the Treaty of Paris, while also obeying the stipulations of UNCLOS III. 2) No. Sec. 2 of
RA 9522 expresses a committed continuation of the Philippines claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the “regime of islands” KIG and
Scarborough Shoal. 3) It did fail to textualize the claim; however, this argument against RA 9522 is untenable. The said Act did not repeal Sec. 2 of
RA 5446, which expresses the Philippine claim over Sabah. As such, the claim stands despite it not being textualized in the new law. 4) No. It is
understood in Art. 1of the Constitution and Art. 49 of UNCLOS III that the Philippines, as an archipelagic country, exercises sovereignty “over the
body water lying landward of the baselines….” As such, whether they are called “internal” or “archipelagic,” these waters are one and same and are
under Philippine sovereignty.
ARTICLE II. PRINCIPLE S & PO LICIE S
SECTION 1
CLASSIFICATIONS OF SECTIONS: BCDA VS. COA (GR 178160, 26 FEBRUARY 2009)
Facts: The Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) Board, pursuant to Sec. 10 of RA 7227, adopted a compensation scheme that
would give P30,000 worth of year-end benefits to its contractual employees, regular employees, and board members. This was consistently
approved by then President Fidel Ramos; however, on January 2, 2002, the Department of Budget and Management issued Circular Letter No. 2002-
2, which was violated by petitioner according to respondent. Thus, petitioners were disallowed of the YEB. Petitioners claim that this runs contrary
to Sec. 5 & 18 of Art. II of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue: Which of the provisions under Art. II of the 1987 Constitutions are self-executing and which are enabling?
Ruling: Art. II is a declaration of state principle and policies. Thus, most of the sections are only enabling, i.e. they require legislative action before
rights are enforced. Only sections 4,6,15 & 16 are the only ones that are self-executing. Sec. 15 & 18, which form the basis of petitioners’ legal
reasoning, are only enabling. They do not enforce any rights. Petition falls, but petitioners are not required to reimburse the YEB they had received.
BANGSAMORO JURIDICAL IDENTITY AS ASSOCIATED STATE: NORTH COTABATO VS. GRP PEACE PANEL
(568 SCRA 402, GR 183591, 14 O CTOBER 2008)
Facts: The memorandum of agreement on ancestral domain (MOA-AD) was scheduled to be signed by representatives of the Bangsamoro people
and respondents. It would allocate a large area of Mindanao to the Moro people and other indigenous tribes under the authority and jurisdiction of
the Bangsamoro Judicial Entity (BJE) as an “associate state.” Petitioners claim that the MOA-AD is unconstitutional.
Issue: Does our Constitution allow associated states? Will it recognize a Bangsamoro Juridical Entity?
Ruling: No. An associate state is remarkably different from that of an autonomous region, since the former implies a considerable amount of
sovereignty is already surrendered to it such that it undermines the overall jurisdiction of the Philippines over that area. This is against what the
Constitution has granted the ARMM, because the BJE is essentially a different state already with a permanent population, with a defined territory,
government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states that may not necessarily be in congruence to the policies of the Philippine
national government.
VALIDITY OF RP-US NON-SURRENDER AGREEMENT : BAYAN MUNA VS. ROMULA

(GR 159618, 1 FEBRUARY 2011)
Facts: Petitioners challenge the validity of the RP-US Non-surrender Agreement in light of generally-accepted principles of law. The said
Agreement, signed by respondents, prohibits the Philippines from surrendering or extraditing an American person charged of a crime to any
tribunal or third-country unless it was established by the UN. Petitioners challenge the Agreement on the grounds of it undermining the Rome
Statute and Philippine sovereignty.
Issue: Is the RP-US Non-surrender Agreement in violation of the Rome Statute and Philippine Sovereignty?
Ruling: No. Art. 1 of the Rome Statute expressly says that the ICC’s jurisdiction will be complementary to the criminal jurisdiction of the country,
which has original jurisdiction. Art. 98 of the Rome Statute also says that the ICC must first obtain the cooperation of the state before it can demand
5
the surrender of a criminal person. In light of this, the Agreement is not in violation of the Statute. Sovereignty is not undermined either, because
Sec. 1 of the Rome Statute provides the RP the option to try criminals in its own jurisdiction or defer them to the ICC.
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SECTION 2
INCORPORATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAWS: PHARMA HEALTH CARE VS. DOTC
(GR 173034, 9 OCTOBER 2007)
Facts: Respondent promulgated the revised implementing rules and regulations of the Milk Code on July 7, 2006. Petitioners claim that the DOTC
cannot promulgate Secs. 4, 11, and 46 of the said IRR because they are promulgated with excess jurisdiction. Respondents claim that they are
implemented incompliance to the generally-accepted international policies of the World Health Organization.
Issue: Are customary international laws incorporated in the domestic system?
Ruling: Yes. According to Sec. 2, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, the Philippines adopts generally-accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land. Regarding this case, however, the WHA’s policy was only recommendatory in nature. As such, it was not legally binding. The
Philippines then is not obligated to ban breast-milk substitutes. Sections 4, 11, and 46 of the said implementing rules and regulations were
promulgated beyond the legal authority of the DOTC.
JUS COGENS, NON-DEROGABLE OBLIGATIONS, & WAIVER THROUGH PEACE TREATY: VINUYA ET AL VS. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
(GR 162230, 28 APRIL 2010)
Facts: Petitioners were victims of rape by Japanese soldiers during the Second World War and they requested respondents to assist them in filing
charges against the Japanese. Respondents declined because their individual claims have already been satisfied in compliance with the Peace Treaty
between the Philippines and Japan. Petitioners further claim that the Philippines has a non-derogable duty to secure justice for its citizens by
prosecuting said criminals.
Issues: 1) What is jus cogens? 2) Is the Philippines under a non-derogable obligation to prosecute international crimes? 3) Is the general waiver of
claims (including the claims of Filipina comfort women) made by the Philippine government in the Treaty of Peace with Japan, valid?
Ruling: 1) Jus cogens is the normative status of a principle of international law, recognizing it as generally accepted by the community of nations
such that no derogation is allowed.
2) No. When the Philippines entered into a Peace Treaty with Japan, compensation for the latter’s crimes was already fully paid. The Philippines
cannot now demand more compensation for the crimes that Japan’s soldiers committed, unless there is a directive from the UN Security Council or
if Japan consents to the trial of the individuals who committed the crime. This is consistent with the jus cogens principles of pacta sunt servanda and
the co-equality of states.
3) At the time the Peace Treaty was signed, there was no appropriate legal system that would prohibit the general waiver made by the Philippines
since war crimes were not yet defined and no punishment could be rendered except for those under the provisions in treaties between nations. As
such, the waiver is valid.
SECTION 4
EXEMPTION FROM MILITARY SERVICE: PARRENO VS. COA (523 SCRA 390)
Facts: Petitioner was a former officer in the Armed Forces of the Philippines. He retired on January 5, 1982. Ever since, he received pension and
benefits. He migrated to Hawaii and became a naturalized American citizen. Pursuant to Sec. 27 of PD 1638, petitioner was removed from the list of
retirees and his pension was cancelled.
Issue: Are those who retired from military service exempted from rendering personal and military service?
Ruling: No. National defense is paramount such that Sec. 4 of Art. II of the 1987 Constitution gives the government the general right to call upon the
people to defend the state through military or civil service. In dictum, the Court said that this rule applies to citizens of the country. More
specifically, Sec. 2 of RA 7077 defines ex-servicemen as members of the reserve force. They are no less duty-bound to protect the country if called
upon just because they have previously served in the Army. With the case at hand, petitioner lost his citizenship. Thus, his obligations and benefits
(such as his pension) as a citizen of the Philippines no longer apply.
SECTION 6
EXCOMMUNICATION AS A NON-JUSTICIABLE ISSUE: TARUC VS. BISHOP DE LA CRUZ
(GR NO. 144801 MARCH 10, 2005)
Facts: Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC) of Socorro, Surigao del Norte. Petitioners requested from Bishop
dela Cruz for the transfer of Fr. Florano from the parish of Socorro to another parish. Upon inquiry as to the reason for the clamor of transfer,
Bishop dela Cruz noted that the leader of the petitioners, Taruc, belonged to a political party opposite Fr. Florano’s wife. Bishop dela Cruz noted this
7
reason was too flimsy for the transfer of Fr. Florano. This denial led to further animosity between members of the PIC and this led to petitioner
Taruc to organize an open mass to be celebrated by another priest. Bishop dela Cruz cautioned petitioner from pursuing the same. However,
petitioner did not listen to the Bishop’s words. As such, Bishop dela Cruz declared the petitioners expelled and excommunicated from the PIC on the
grounds that they disobeyed the authority of the Church, incited dissension among the members, and caused anxiety and fear among the general
membership.
Issue: Is the excommunication of members of a religious institution a justiciable issue?
Ruling: No. Excommunication is not a justiciable issue as there is no violation of a civil or property right. Therefore, due to the absence of a violated
civil or property right, the courts do not have jurisdiction over such matters.
SECTION 7
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF VFA AND ROMULO-KENNEY AGREEMENTS: NICOLAS VS. SEC. ROMULO
(GR NO. 175888, ETC. FEBRUARY 11, 2009)
Facts: Respondent Lance Corporal Daniel Smith, a member of the United States Armed Forces was found guilty of raping a Filipina. As such, in
accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement in December 4, 2006, he was temporarily committed to the Makati City Jail prior to the finalization
of the facility which the Philippines and the US agreed would be appropriate for the corporal to serve his sentence. However, on December 29,
2006, defendant Smith was taken out of the Makati jail and was detained within the US Embassy, in accordance with the Romulo-Kenney
Agreement.
Issue: Are the Visiting Forces Agreement & Romulo-Kenney Agreement, valid and constitutional?
Ruling: With regard to the VFA, yes, it is valid and constitutional. It was deemed so as such was duly concurred by the Philippine Senate and has
been recognized as a treaty by the US as attested and certified by their duly authorized representatives. In addition, the VFA was deemed valid and
constitutional in relation to it being the implementing arm of the RP-US Mutual Defense treaty of 1951. Such RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty was duly
signed and ratified by the Philippine and US Senate. Thus, such complied with our constitution.
With regard to the Romulo-Kenney Agreement, specifically on the provision for the detention of convicted offenders under US custody, such is
considered invalid and unconstitutional as such contravenes with the provisions of the VFA.
SECTION 8
INTERNATIONAL LAW ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS : ICJ ADVISORY OPINION OF JULY 8, 1996
Facts: On December 1994, the United Nations General Assembly presented a request to the International Courts of Justice (ICJ) for an opinion on
the legality of the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons. Such request was accepted by the ICJ and an advisory opinion was issued by the ICJ on
July 8, 1996.
Issue: Is there customary or conventional international law specifically authorizing the threat or use of nuclear weapons?
Ruling: No. There is no customary or conventional international law that authorizes or prohibits the threat or use of nuclear weapons. At face
value, the threat or use of nuclear weapons is against international laws of armed conflict. However, the ICJ also recognizes that the presence of
such nuclear weapons may be the means for a state to protect its very survival and existence after considering its circumstances. As such, no
international law authorizes nor prohibits the threat or use of nuclear weapons.
S E C T I O N 10
CONSTITUTIONAL POLICY OF SOCIAL JUSTICE: ST. MARY’S ACADEMY VS. PALACIO
(GR NO. 164913 SEPTEMBER 8, 2010)
Facts: Respondents were teachers serving under the petitioner. In March 31, 2000, the respondents received separate letters from the petitioner
informing them that their re-application to the school was denied due to their failure from obtaining their Licensure Examination for Teachers
(LET). This was in compliance with the Department of Education (DepEd) requirements. Due to their dismissal, respondents filed a complaint
contesting their illegal dismissal, arguing that their security of tenure was trampled upon due to their failure of registering under the Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC). In addition, they raised that their outright dismissal was illegal because some of the respondents had civil service
eligibilities, as well as, special permits to teach.
Issue: What is the policy of social justice over the working class?
Ruling: The policy of social justice relative to the working class is as follows: The law bends over backwards to accommodate the interests of the
working class on the humane justification that those with less privilege in life would have more in law.
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CONSISTENCY OF COCO-LEVY FUND WITH SOCIAL JUSTICE: PKSMM VS. COCOFED
(GR NOS. 147036-37 APRIL 10, 2012)
Facts: A Coconut Investment Fund (CI Fund) for the development of the coconut industry through capital financing was enacted under RA 6260 on
June 19, 1971. The objective of such fund was to advance coconut farmers’ interest. As such, a levy was imposed on the coconut farmers’ domestic
sales. As the years went on and after several administrations, there were various executive enactments that provided for additional levies on
farmers, as well as, on how the coco-levy funds were to be managed and appropriated.
Issue: Are the laws on coco-levy fund consistent with social justice?
Ruling: Considering that the coco-levy fund is deemed public funds, as per the meaning of the term levy. Thus, the main reason of the coco-levy
fund was similar to that of taxes. As such, the fund is considered public funds. Considering its nature as public funds, there are some provisions in
the coco-levy fund that were contrary to social justice. Such provisions included those that appropriated portions of the fund to private interests. By
doing so, these provisions violated the rights of the citizens to substantive due process and as such, were inconsistent with social justice.
S E C T I O N 13
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ITS LIMITATIONS: SORIANO VS. LAGUARDIA
(GR NO. 164785 APRIL 29, 2009)
Facts: Petitioner, while hosting his program of Ang Dating Daan, uttered cuss words during the broadcast of his program. Separate complaints were
issued against petitioner for his slanderous remarks. In response to such utterances, the MTRCB suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan for 20
days. As such, petitioner filed a motion to nullify the preventive suspension that he was issued to him.
Issue: Were the TV utterances of the petitioner covered under his freedom of speech or were those violative of Sec. 3, Article 2 of the 1987
Constitution?
Ruling: No. The TV utterances of the petitioner were beyond the rights of freedom of speech, as well as, that in Section 3, Article 2 of the 1987
Constitution. They went beyond the former right as the utterances already touched upon a private concern and such sentiments were uttered with
inappropriate regard of the rights of others. In addition, the petitioner’s speech was considered as unprotected speech considering the general
audience of the program and the reach of such utterances.
Moreover, the utterances went beyond the rights in Section 3, Article 2 of the 1987 Constitution, as such were not made in the context of the
expression of religious belief, though the same were said during a religious program. However, the utterances in a religious program do not
necessarily mean that they were made to further religious belief. The courts believed that the utterances were the petitioner’s personal opinion and
sentiments of anger.
S E C T I O N 15
RIGHT TO PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS: REPUBLIC VS. CAGANDAHAN
(GR NO. 166676 [565 SCRA 72] S EPTEMBER 12, 2008)
Facts: Respondent Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as female in her Certificate of Live Birth. However, in her early years, she developed male
characteristics and as such was eventually diagnosed with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH). This is a condition wherein afflicted individuals
possess male characteristics because of too much secretion of androgen (male hormones). Due to such affliction, the respondent alleged that she is
male, considering appearances, her mental and emotional state and other interests.
Thus, the respondent filed a petition to correct her gender from female to male in her birth certificate and to change her name from Jennifer to Jeff.
Issue: How should the Court deal with a person who has CAH, insofar as her/his human right to the pursuit of happiness and health?
Ruling: Relative to the person with CAH and with regard to his human rights to the pursuit of health and happiness, the court affirmed the person’s
choice, position and personal judgment as valid and justified absent any indication of incompetence and incapacity on his part, as well as, absent
any grave harm affecting society as a result of his choice.
S E C T I O N 16
THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PD 1065 : DENR VS. YAP
(GR NO. 167707 [568 SCRA 164] O CTOBER 8, 2008)
Facts: Boracay Mayor Jose Yap, et. al. filed a petition for declaratory relief to have judicial confirmation of imperfect title for the land they have been
occupying in Boracay. He alleged that they had been the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June
12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. Furthermore, they declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.
The Philippines, through the OSG, opposed the petition stating that Boracay Island is part of unclassified land of the public domain, and as such is
classified as public forest. Such is not available for disposition in compliance with Section 3 of PD 705 or the Revised Forestry Code.
9
Issue: Since Boracay is no longer overrun by forest, is PGMA’s PD 1065 valid and constitutional?
Ruling: Yes. PGMA’s PD 1065 is valid and constitutional considering that under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State and as such, the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership. Considering that the authority to classify lands was vested to the
executive department through the office of the President, PGMA’s PD 1065 is deemed valid and constitutional.
IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTUAL AND PROPERTY RIGHTS BY SECTION 16, ART. II : REPUBLIC VS. PAGADIAN CITY
TIMBER (GR NO. 159308 [565 SCRA 260] S EPTEMBER 16, 2008
Facts: Petitioners, via the DENR, entered into an IFMA with number R-9-040 on October 14, 1994. After numerous complaints by the Subanen
Tribe, regarding the respondent’s alleged failure to implement the CDMP, respondent ordered an investigation to evaluate and assess IFMA No. R-9-
040. The results of the investigation showed that Pagadian City Timber did not comply with the terms set out in the agreement. As such, IFMA No.
R-9-040 was cancelled. Pagadian City Timber opposed and filed a complaint.
Issue: Can the contractual and property rights of an Industrial Forestry Management Agreement (IFMA) be impaired by Section 16, Article 2 of the
Constitution?
Ruling: Yes. Firstly, the IFMA does not render contractual and property rights to the second party. The IFMA accords a privilege and such privilege
is not absolute. This privilege is limited to and is impaired by public policy and common interest as embodied in Section 16, Article 2 of the
Constitution.
S E C T I O N 18
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RA 8042 (MIGRANT WORKERS AND OVERSEAS FILIPINOS ACT): SERRANO VS. GALLANT
MARITIME SERVICES (GR NO. 167614 MARCH 24, 2009)
Facts: Petitioner was hired by the respondents under a POEA-approved contract. However, on his departure of March 19, 1998, the petitioner was
constrained to accept a downgraded contract of Second Officer with the assurance that he would be promoted to the original contract by the end of
April 1998. Respondents did not deliver on their promise of promotion and as such, petitioner refused to stay in his current position and was
repatriated back to the Philippines. The petitioner’s contract was for 12 months and thus left him an unexpired portion of 9 months and 23 days.
Petitioner prayed for the payment of his money claims amounting to USD 26,442.73, which includes the full unexpired portion of his contract, as
well as, salary differential.
Issue: From the perspective of Sec. 18, Article 2, is Section 10 of the Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act), valid and
constitutional?
Ruling: No. Section 10 of RA 8042 is invalid and unconstitutional as such provides for inconsistent application and protection of the law to the
different working classes, i.e. OFWs vs. Local workers. In a sense, Section 10 of RA 8042 alleviated the burden of one class while aggravating
another.
SUFFICIENCY OF EMPLOYEE’S PASSIVE ACQUIESCENCE: CERCADO VS. UNIPROM, INC.

(GR NO. 188154 OCTOBER 13, 2010)
Facts: In 1980, UNIPROM established a non-contributory retirement plan for its employees wherein UNIPROM at their or at the employee’s option
may retire after 20 years of service regardless of age. In 2001, UNIPROM revised their retirement plan to reserve the option to retire the employees
to the company. In December 2000, UNIPROM implemented an early retirement program for all its employees including the petitioner. Petitioner,
having 22 years of service, qualified for the program and was offered the same. Petitioner rejected the offer. As such, UNIPROM exercised its option
under the revised retirement plan and decided to retire petitioner on Feb. 15, 2001. A check was issued to petitioner but she refused. Petitioner
thus, filed a case of illegal dismissal against the company. UNIPROM on the other hand, averred that by agreeing to the compliance of the company’s
rules and regulations, petitioner was automatically covered by the retirement plan as revised.
Issue: Is an employee’s passive acquiescence to the early retirement age option, sufficient?
Ruling: No. Considering that a retirement plan is a contract between two parties, i.e. employer and employee and that the assailed revised
retirement plan was not embodied in a CBA, or any employment contract or agreement between the company and the employees, such retirement
plan could not be unilaterally and compulsorily be imposed to the employees. The law, with regard to security of tenure, demands more than a
passive acquiescence of employees relative to early retirement.
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S E C T I O N 19
INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ECONOMY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RA 8762: ESPINA VS. BAUTISTA
(GR NO. 143855 SEPTEMBER 21, 2010)
Facts: RA 8762 is being assailed as in breach of the constitutional mandate for the development of a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos, for allowing foreign nationals in engaging in the retail trade business in the country. R.A. 8762 also allows
natural-born Filipino citizens, who had lost their citizenship and now reside in the Philippines, to engage in the retail trade business with the same
rights as Filipino citizens.
Issue: Is RA 8762, aka Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000, in breach of the constitutional mandate for the development of a self-reliant and
independent national economy controlled by Filipinos?
Ruling: No. RA 8762 is not in breach of the constitution, especially relative to a self-reliant and independent national economy controlled by
Filipinos, as the constitution in Sec. 19, Article 2, only provides for the development of a self-reliant and independent national economy but does not
impose a policy of Filipino monopoly. The aim of the provision in the Constitution is to prohibit foreign powers or interest from manipulating the
economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are given preference.
S E C T I O N 20
FREE ENTERPRISE POLICY AND GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION : PMAP VS. FPA (GR NO. 156041 [516 SCRA 360])
Facts: Petitioner, an association of duly licensed pesticide handlers, questioned the validity of Section 3.12 of the 1987 Pesticide Regulatory Policies
and Implementing Guidelines, which grants the protection of proprietary data.
Issue: Does the “free enterprise policy” prevent the government from intervening in private businesses and enterprises?
Ruling: No. The “free enterprise policy” does not prevent the government from intervening in private businesses and enterprises. Such policy is not
absolute. The government has the right to intervene especially during the instances when general welfare is endangered. The government exercised
such power through the FPA in its protective clause, by regulating potentially hazardous materials.
S E C T I O N 22
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PD 310: CMU VS. NATIONAL ANTI-POVERTY COMMISSION (GR NO. 184869 SEPTEMBER 21,
2010)
Facts: Petitioner CMU is a chartered state university. It obtained 3,401 hectares of land through PD 476. Forty-five years later, President GMA
issued Presidential Proclamation 310 apportioning 670 hectares of CMU’s lands to indigenous peoples and cultural communities in Maramag,
Bukidnon.
Issue: Is Presidential Proclamation 310 that takes 670 hectares from CMU’s registered lands for distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural
communities in Maramag, Bukidnon, valid and constitutional?
Ruling: No. Presidential Proclamation 310 is void and unconstitutional as such is contrary to law and public policy wherein the land was removed
from state colleges and universities in favour of uncertain beneficiaries. The law protects state colleges and universities as these are the
government’s main vehicles in the search for the country’s scientific and technological advancement in the field of agriculture, any findings of which
would greatly advantage the general community.
S E C T I O N 25
POLICY OF LOCAL AUTONOMY AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RA 9355 : NAVARRO VS. ERMITA
(GR NO. 180050 APRIL 12, 2011)
Facts: In October 2006, President GMA issued RA 9355 establishing Dinagat Islands as a province. With the appropriate procedural requirements
as to the election of the province’s transitional officials and the subsequent officials of the province, Dinagat Islands obtained local autonomy from
its mother province Surigao del Norte. However, petitioners - the former political leaders of Surigao del Norte - challenged the constitutionality of
RA 9355 on the grounds that Congress exceeded its powers in creating Dinagat Islands as a province and that the creation of such would unjustly
deprive the people of Surigao del Norte a significant portion of territory, revenue allocations and the rich resources of the islands.
Issue: Will the invalidation of RA 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands) be consistent with the state policy on local autonomy?
Ruling: No. RA 9355 was deemed as valid and constitutional, including the creation of Dinagat Islands as a province and its provincial officers.
Section 10 of Article 10 of the Constitution mandates that in the creation of the province the Local Government Code should be followed. The
creation of Dinagat Islands as a separate province complied with the land area requirement of the IRR of the local government code and as such is
deemed constitutional.
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S E C T I O N 26
LIMITATION OF QUALIFIED PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES : PAMATONG VS. COMELEC (GR NO. 161872 APRIL 13, 2004)
Facts: Petitioner Pamatong filed his certificate of candidacy (COC) for presidency. Respondent, COMELEC, refused the petitioners COC and deemed
the candidate as a nuisance candidate as he did not have the ability to wage a nationwide campaign. Petitioner filed this petition alleging that the
respondent’s act of refusal was violative of his right to “equal access to opportunities for public services”, under Section 26, Article 2 of the
Constitution when the COMELEC limited the number of qualified candidates.
Issue: Is the act of the COMELEC in limiting the number of qualified presidential candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide
campaign and/or are nominated by political parties, violative of Section 26, Article 2?
Ruling: No. Section 26, Article 2 of the constitution does not render a right or a privilege that would become an enforceable right. As such, the act of
running for and holding public office and the presidency is subject to limitations imposed by the law.
S E C T I O N 27
DECLARATION OF BANK DEPOSITS IN SALN: OMBUDSMAN VS. RACHO (GR NO. 185685 JANUARY 31, 2011)
Facts: Respondent was alleged to be guilty of dishonesty and was ordered by the Office of the Ombudsman to be dismissed from service with
forfeiture of all benefits and perpetual disqualification from public office. The CA reversed the Ombudsman’s ruling, finding the respondent only
guilty of negligence and reduced his penalty to suspension without pay. The allegation was derived from the failure of the respondent to fully
disclose all his bank accounts in his SALN.
Issue: Must public officials declare their bank deposits in the SALN?
Ruling: Yes. As per Item C, in Section 8 of RA 6713 on the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials, etc., all other assets, including
cash on hand and in bank shall be included in the SALN.
S E C T I O N 28
COMELEC’ S CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY TO DISCLOSE DETAIL OF PREPARATIONS FOR ELECTIONS: GUINGONA VS.
COMELEC
(GR NO. 191846 MAY 6, 2010)
Facts: Petitioners, by invoking their constitutional right to information, compelled the respondent , COMELEC, to explain fully the complete details
of the preparations they undertook for the May 10, 2010 elections.
ISSUE: Does the COMELEC have constitutional duty of full public disclosure of the complete details of its preparations for the May 10, 2010
elections?
Ruling: Yes. Under Section 7 of Article 3 of the Constitution regarding the people’s right to information or full public disclosure on all of the state’s
transactions involving public interest, the COMELEC has the constitutional duty for full public disclosure of all its preparations for the May 10, 2010
elections.
ARTICLE VI. THE LE G ISLATIVE DE PARTM E NT
BANDA VS . E R M I T A , GR 166620, A P R IL 20, 2010

Facts: The National Printing Office (NPO) was established by then Pres. Corazon Aquino through EO 285, giving it exclusive printing jurisdiction of
official government documents such as the Official Gazette and ballots. On October 25, 2004, Pres. Gloria Arroyo issued EO 378, which removed the
exclusive jurisdiction that the NPO had, allowing private companies to print said documents provided that they are cheaper and higher in quality.
Petitioners claim that EO 378 is unconstitutional because: 1) only Congress can amend EO 285 since Pres. Aquino promulgated it with legislative
power given to her by the Freedom Constitution; 2) EO 378 would lead to the eventual abolition of the NPO and thus violate its employees’ security
of tenure.
Issue: Is the issuance of EO 378 an invalid exercise of legislative power?
Ruling: No. EO 378 falls well within the President’s jurisdiction since he/she is given the constitutional power to reorganize the offices and the
agencies of the executive branch. This does not change whether or not EO 285, which EO 378 amended, was promulgated with the special
legislative powers that then Pres. Aquino had. This is pursuant also to Sec. 31, Chap. 10, Title III, Book III of the Administrative Code, which says:
“The president…in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of
the Office of the President.” The Court ruled that this provision also implies that President also has the power to promulgate policies that would
ensure simplicity, economy, and efficiency. It affirmed that the NPO is still the main printing arm of the government, but it only added the option for
12
private printing services to do its job in the interest of greater economy and efficiency. Moreover, petitioners failed to substantially prove how EO
378 would lead to the abolition of the NPO.
T O L E N T I N O V S C O M E L E C , GR 148334, J A N 21, 2004

Facts: In Feb. 2001, a Senate seat for a term expiring on June 30, 2001 was vacated with the appointment of then Sen. Guingona as Vice President.
The Senate then adopted Resolution #84: 1) certified the existence of a vacancy in the Senate; 2) called the COMELEC to fill up the said vacancy
through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular election on May 14, 2001; and 3) declared the senatorial candidate garnering
the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Sen. Guingona.
Nobody filed a certificate of candidacy to fill the position of senator to serve the unexpired 3-year term in the special election. All the senatorial
candidates filed for the 12 regular Senate seats with 6-year terms. COMELEC distributed nationwide official documents. The List of Candidates did
not provide 2 different categories of Senate seats to be voted, namely the 12 regular 6-year term seats and the single 3-year term seat.
Without any COMELEC notice on the time, place and manner of the special election, the special election was held on the scheduled May 14, 2001
regular elections. A single canvassing of votes for a single list of senatorial candidates was also done. Petitioners assailed the manner by which the
special election was conducted for violating the precedents set by the 1951 & 1955 special elections, both of which were held simultaneously and
yet distinctly with the regular general elections.
Thus, they pray that the Court declare that 1) No special elections were held; and that 2) COMELEC’s Resolutions that proclaim the Senatorial
candidate who obtained the 13th highest number of votes as duly elected be declared null and void.
Issue: May a special election for the vacancy in the Senate or in the House be held on occasion of a regular election? Did the COMELEC’s failure to
make appropriate notification to the public invalidate the election of the 13th Senator?
Ruling: Yes. A special election to fill a vacant 3-yr term Senate seat was validly held on May 14 2001. Although COMELEC did not comply with the
requirements of RA 6645, it does not invalidate the special election, because although no calls for special election were made by COMELEC, Sec 2 of
RA 6645, as amended by RA 7166 already provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held
simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. The law already charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory notice and
COMELEC’s failure to give additional notice did not negate the calling of such special election, much less invalidate it. Moreover, there is no proof
that the COMELEC’s failure to give a formal notice of the Office to be filled and the manner of determining the winner in the special election actually
misled voters and thereby changed the results of the election. Our election laws do not require that a separate documentation or canvassing of
votes be made for a special election. COMELEC acted within its constitutional powers when it chose to abandon the precedents of the 1951 &1955
special elections & instead adopted the Senate’s Resolution 84, which shall award to the senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of
votes, the unexpired Senate term of Sen. Guingona. The Court shall not interfere. In fine, the Court is loathe to annul elections despite certain
irregularities unless it is impossible to distinguish which laws are lawful and which are not.
KMU VS . NEDA, GR 167798 , A P R IL 19, 2006

Facts: In April 13, 2005, President Gloria Macapagal–Arroyo issued Executive Order 420 requiring all government agencies and government-owned
corporations to streamline and harmonize their Identification Systems. The purposes of the uniform ID data collection and ID format are to reduce
costs, achieve efficiency and reliability and ensure compatibility and provide convenience to the people served by government entities. Petitioners
allege that EO 420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of legislative functions by the executive branch of the government.
Furthermore, they allege that EO 420 infringes on the citizen's rights to privacy.
Issue: Is EO 420 a valid and constitutional executive/administrative issuance?
Ruling: Yes. Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them. In issuing EO 420, the President did not make, alter or
repeal any law but merely implemented and executed existing laws. EO 420 reduces costs, as well as insures efficiency, reliability, compatibility and
user-friendliness in the implementation of current ID systems of government entities under existing laws. Thus, EO 420 is simply an executive
issuance and not an act of legislation.
LAMP vs. Budget, GR 164987-April 24, 2012
Facts: For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of
2004). The lawyers argued that the provision in RA 9206, particularly on the use and release of funds, is “silent” and, therefore, prohibits an
automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to the senators and congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not empower congressmen to
propose, select and identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF and that their act of spending of public funds for their chosen projects
“intrudes to an executive function.” The appropriation power of congress does not include proposing, selecting and identifying projects that
lawmakers intend to fund because these “essentially and exclusively” pertains to the executive branch of government.
Issue: In allowing the direct allocation and release of PDAF funds to the members of Congress based on their own list of proposed projects, did the
implementation of the PDAF provision under the GAA of 2004 violate the separation of powers?
13
Ruling: No. The court cited the principle of separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and judiciary and ruled that the said provision
is not unconstitutional. Every statute is presumed valid. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and
one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. Every presumption should be indulged in favor
of the constitutionality and the burden of proof is on the party alleging that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. (Farinas vs.
Executive Secretary). The petitioners’ allegation lack substantiation. No convincing proof was presented showing that, indeed, there were direct
releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion.
FRANCISCO VS D E V E NE C I A , N O V . 10, 2003

Facts: On June 2, 2003, Pres. Joseph Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr and seven Associate Justices of
the Court. Four months and three weeks later since the first complaint, and a day after the House Committee on Justice noted to dismiss it, a second
impeachment complaint was filed. A new set of impeachment rules was adopted by Congress which petitioners assail as unconstitutional. The
Supreme Court settled the petition.
Issue: Did the Supreme Court violate the separation of powers when it passes judgment on the impeachment of its Chief Justice?
Ruling: No. The judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or
in the excess of jurisdiction, or capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. The
Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of constitutionality of initiating the impeachment is concerned. What
lies in here is a genuine constitutional material which only the Court can properly and competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the
allocation of powers under our system of government. It is the duty of the judiciary to guard its function.
B I RA O G O V S P H I L I PP I NE T R U T H C O M M I S S IO N , G.R. N O . 192935 & G.R.

N O . 193036 D E C E M B E R 7, 2010
Facts: The birth of the foregoing cases can be drawn back to the events prior to the May 2010 Elections. It was when former Senator Benigno
Aquino III declared his strong condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, “Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap” that convinced the
mass of his stand. Thus, came his administration, President Aquino III signed Executive Number 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of
2010 dated July 30, 2010.
To note that:
G.R. No. 192935 is a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (a taxpayer) in assailing that E.O. No. 1 as an intrusion
of the power of the Congress’ legislative power under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it is a usurpation of the constitutional authority of
the legislative arm to create a public office and thereby, in appropriation of funds also. While, G.R. No. 193036 is a special civil action for certiorari
and prohibition filed by Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfdo B. Albano Jr, Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua in their capacity as legislators –
petitioners, as incumbent in the House of Representatives.
Issue: Is there a valid delegation of power from Congress empowering the President to create a public office? Is EO No. 1, creating the Philippine
Truth Commission, violative of the legislative power of Congress?
Ruling: The OSG counters that there is nothing exclusively legislative about the creation by the President of a fact-finding body such as a truth
commission. Pointing to numerous offices created by past presidents, it contends that creation of public offices within the Office of the President
has been recognized. Thus, OSG contended that similar to the two other branches of the government, the executive department has the control to
create fact – finding bodies to smooth out the mandated functions of the constitution and its administrative functions. However, it cannot be
permitted if it is irreconcilable with the Constitution even the purpose behind it is noble. Thus, the Court in its judicial review ruled that the
Constitution ever remains the supreme power and that, “All must bow to the mandate of this law.” The inclusion of recognition of the past
presidents in creating public offices should not be an upfront to the Constitution and that it is still the Judiciary who has the advanced interest in the
quest for truth and should not be retarded by any other branches. Thus, as highlighted by the Court, the search for truth must be in the fences of the
Constitution as it will always be “ours is a government of law and not of men.” This is emphasized in the judgment that E.O. 1 is Unconstitutional
and that all its provisions must be ceased in implementation, as so far violative of the protection clause of the supreme law of the land.
PIMENTEL VS. S E NA T E , GR N O . 187714, M A R C H 8, 2011

Facts: Senator Manny Villar, then Senate President, was accused of double insertion of P200 Million in for the C5 extension project in the General
Appropriations Act. Such was deemed in violation of the Constitution, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards of Public Officers. To settle such controversy, the Ethics Committee of Congress was reorganized to handle the case. However, then
Senate President Villar did not wish to answer the accusations against him in front of the Ethics Committee, alleging the lack of objectivity of the
said committee. As a compromise, the Senate as a Whole was organized to settle the case against then Senate President Villar. The petition before
the Supreme Court was made to contending that by subjecting then Senate President Villar through the Senate as a Whole, such would be in
violation of his constitutional right to equal protection and due process. One of the arguments that the respondents made was that by raising a
petition to the Supreme Court, the doctrine of separation of powers will not be upheld.
Issue: Will the invocation of the doctrine of separation of powers preclude the Supreme Court from resolving the legal issues of the petition?
14
Ruling: No. With regard to the doctrine of separation of powers, such doctrine does not prescribe absolute autonomy in the discharge of the
separate departments’ duties assigned to them by the sovereign people. As such, the power of the judiciary to perform judicial review is not so
much as a power, but rather a duty imposed by the Constitution on them. Therefore, the Supreme Court is not precluded from resolving the legal
issues raised by the petition, more so that such issues do not require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of administrative bodies for
their resolution.
PIMENTEL VS. COMELEC GR 161658, N OV . 3, 2003

Facts: Congress passed RA 9165, Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and makes it mandatory for candidates for public office, students of
secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain
offenses, among other personalities, to undergo a drug test. Hence, Senator Pimentel, who is a senatorial candidate for the 2004 synchronized
elections, challenged Section 36(g) of the said law.
Issue: Is the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office an unconstitutional imposition of additional qualification on candidates for
Senator?
Ruling: Yes. Section 36 (g) of RA 9165, requiring all candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local
government undergo a mandatory drug test is UNCONSITUTIONAL. Under Sec.3, Art. VI of the Constitution, an aspiring candidate for Senator needs
only to meet 5 qualifications: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. The Congress cannot validly amend or
otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge
the Constitution. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no
effect. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of
the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.
B E LT R A N V . DOH
Facts: In 1992, the DOH issued Administrative Order No. 118-A institutionalizing the National Blood Services Program (NBSP). The BRL was
designated as the central office primarily responsible for the NBSP. The program paved the way for the creation of a committee that will implement
the policies of the program and the formation of the Regional Blood Councils.
On June 1, 1998, petitioners filed an Amended Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction and/or status quo ante order.[18]
On May 5, 1999, petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of Expanded Temporary Restraining Order for the Court to order respondent Secretary of
Health to cease and desist from announcing the closure of commercial blood banks, compelling the public to source the needed blood from
voluntary donors only, and committing similar acts “that will ultimately cause the shutdown of petitioners’ blood banks.” The intervenors
contended that Republic Act No. 7719 constitutes undue delegation of legislative powers and unwarranted deprivation of personal liberty. In a
resolution, dated September 7, 1999, and without giving due course to the aforementioned petition, the Court granted the Motion for Intervention
that was filed by the above intervenors on August 9, 1999.
Issues: Did the National Blood Services Act unduly delegate legislative power?
Ruling: In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was
complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the Legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of the administrative body
or any other appointee or delegate of the Legislature.
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself. It is clear from the provisions of the Act that the Legislature
intended primarily to safeguard the health of the people and has mandated several measures to attain this objective.
Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and
effectuate its policies.[40] The Secretary of Health has been given, under Republic Act No. 7719, broad powers to execute the provisions of said Act.
Section 11 of the Act states: “SEC. 11. Rules and Regulations. – The implementation of the provisions of the Act shall be in accordance with the rules
and regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary, within sixty (60) days from the approval hereof…
BOCEA VS TEVES
Facts: On January 25, 2005, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9335 which took effect on February 11, 2005. RA
[No.] 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of
Customs (BOC). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.
Contending that the enactment and implementation of R.A. No. 9335 are tainted with constitutional infirmities in violation of the fundamental
rights of its members, petitioner Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA), an association of rank-and-file employees of the Bureau of
Customs (BOC) directly filed the present petition before this Court against respondents Margarito B. Teves, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Finance (DOF), Commissioner Napoleon L. Morales (Commissioner Morales), in his capacity as BOC Commissioner, and Lilian B.
Hefti, in her capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).
Issue: Was there an undue delegation of legislative power to the Revenue Performance Evaluation Board?
15
Ruling: No. R.A. No. 9335 clearly mandates and sets the parameters for the Board by providing that such rules and guidelines for the allocation,
distribution and release of the fund shall be in accordance with Sections 4 and 5 of R.A. No. 9335. In sum, the Court finds that R.A. No. 9335, read
and appreciated in its entirety, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards as to negate BOCEA’s
supposition of undue delegation of legislative power to the Board.
T R I LL A N E S IV VS . P I M E NT E L S R . GR 179817, 27 J U NE 2008, 556 SCRA

471
Facts: Petitioner Trillanes IV is on trial for coup d’etat in relation to the “Oakwood Incident.” In the 2007 elections, he won a seat in the Senate with
a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007. Petitioner now asks the Court that he be allowed to attend all official functions of the Senate,
alleging mainly that his case is distinct from that of Jalosjos as his case is still pending resolution whereas that in the Jalosjos case, there was already
conviction.
Issue: Is the case of Trillanes different from Jalosjos as would allow him to fulfill his duties as Senator of the Republic?
Ruling: The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. It cannot be opposed that a person charged with a crime is taken into
custody for purposes of the administration of justice. No less than the Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required. That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d'etat cases, both being punishable by reclusion
perpetua. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political
complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS. ERMITA, G.R. N O . 168056

S E PT E M B E R 1, 2005
Facts: Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect (July 1, 2005, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for prohibition. Petitioners argue
that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section
28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. They further contend that Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108,
respectively, of the NIRC giving the President the stand-by authority to raise the VAT rate from 10% to 12% when a certain condition is met,
constitutes undue delegation of the legislative power to tax. It states…
. . . That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to
twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%);
or
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 ½%).
Issue: Do Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, giving the President the stand-by authority to raise the VAT rate from 10% to 12% when a certain
condition is met, constitutes undue delegation of the legislative power to tax?
Ruling: There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. Congress does not abdicate its
functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority. It is simply a
delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the law is contingent. A (permissible
delegation) is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the
delegate; and (b) fixes a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. In this case, the legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a
specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the
executive. No discretion would be exercised by the President. Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate
upon the existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress.
L I BA N VS. G O RD O N , GR 175352 (25 J U L Y 2009, 18 J A NU A RY 2011)

Facts: This resolves the Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration[1] filed on August 10, 2009 by respondent Richard J. Gordon
(respondent) of the Decision promulgated by this Court on July 15, 2009 (the Decision), the Motion for Partial Reconsideration[2] filed on August
27, 2009 by movant-intervenor Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC), and the latter's Manifestation and Motion to Admit Attached Position
Paper[3] filed on December 23, 2009. In the Decision,[4] the Court held that respondent did not forfeit his seat in the Senate when he accepted the
chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, as "the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a government-owned
or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution."[5] The Decision, however, further
declared void the PNRC Charter "insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation" and consequently ruled that "the PNRC should incorporate
under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation."
Issue: By accepting the PNRC Chair, did Gordon forfeit his Senate seat?
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Ruling: No. It has been established that the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) has a sui generis character, thus it is in no way in violation of
sec.13, article 6 of the 1987 constitution. Although it is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government, nor a government-
owned or -controlled corporation or a subsidiary thereof, as succinctly explained in the Decision of July 15, 2009, so much so that respondent,
under the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion
does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a "private corporation" within the contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that must be
organized under the Corporation Code. As correctly mentioned by Justice Roberto A. Abad, the sui generis character of PNRC requires us to
approach controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.
2. BANAT vs. Comelec, GR 179271 (21 April 2009)
Facts: On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as
NBC No. 07- 041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "the Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC have recently been quoted
in the national papers that the COMELEC is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in
allocating party-list seats."
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for
reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as
stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941(R.A. No. 7941). On
the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.
Section 37 and 38 of RA 7166 are as follows:
Section 37. Appropriation. - The amount of One billion pesos (P1,000,000,000.00) is hereby appropriated out of any savings or unexpected balance in
the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated to cover the costs of holding the May 11, 1992 elections. Hereafter, the amounts necessary to fund
subsequent elections shall be included in the General Appropriations Act for the corresponding fiscal year. Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, and for purposes of the May 11, 1992 elections only, the chairman and members of the board of election inspectors shall each be paid
a per diem of Four hundred pesos (P400.00) on election day. The Commission may provide hazard pay, when warranted, incentive and merit awards to
members of the boards of election inspectors, board of canvassers and personnel of the Commission and its deputized agencies.
Section 38. Separability Clause. - If any provisions or party of this Act is declared unconstitutional such declaration of unconstitutionality will not
affect the other provisions of this Act.
Issues: 1. Do Secs. 37 & 38 of RA 7166 violate Sec. 17, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution? 2. When does the jurisdiction of the Comelec end and when
does the jurisdiction of the HRET begin?
Ruling: On the first issue, I am still looking for the relevance of the sections asked by Sir. There seem to be no connection between sections 37 and
38 of RA 7166 to Sec. 17, Article 6 of the Constitution. Will send the update file once I have the answer. However, I do not think that the appropriate
sections should be 37 and 38 but rather 17 and 18.
On the second issue, the jurisdiction of the COMELEC ends once a candidate has been proclaimed and has taken oath of office as a Member of
Congress. By then, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins. This remains true even though an allegation that the proclamation of the candidates is
invalid.
3. Vilando vs. Comelec, GR 192147 (23 August 2011)
Facts: Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong was proclaimed a member of the House of Representative during the 2007 elections. Petitioners seeked the
disqualification of the respondent on the grounds that she is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and forwarded the complaint to the HRET
by way of a petition quo warranto. The petitioners proclaimed that Limkaichong is a chinese citizen. They alleged that her father, Julio Sy, was not
able to attain finality of his naturalization as a Filipino and that her mother on the other hand who was a Filipina, acquired a chinese citizenship by
her marriage to Julio Sy. Therefore, Petitioners alleged that Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong is a chinese citizen.
Issue: Can the HRET look into eligibility of Limkaichong even if, as an incident thereto, it would mean looking into the validity of the certificate of
naturalization?
Ruling: The HRET acted well within its powers when it dismissed the quo warranto petition. The power of HRET, no matter how complete and
exclusive, does not carry with it the authority to delve into the legality of the judgment of naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong.
To rule otherwise would operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father which is not permissible by law. Because in our jurisdiction,
an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. And under the law and jurisprudence, it is the State,
through its representatives designated by statute, that may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the
appropriate denaturalization proceedings.
4. Madrigal vs. Villar, GR 183055 (31 July 2009)
Facts: On August 2007, the Senate and the House of Representatives elected their respective contingents int he Commission on Appointments (CA),
with Sen. Maria Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal as one of the contingents in the Senate under the PDP-Laban party. Sen. Madrigal of PDP-Laban, by
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separate letters to Senator Manuel Villar and Speaker Prospero Nograles, claimed that the composition of the Senate contingent in the CA violated
the constitutional requirement of proportional representation. With this claim, she requested for the reorganization of the CA and that, in the
meantime, "all actions of the CA be held in abeyance as the same may be construed as illegal and unconstitutional." Sen. Villar answered her letter
noting that he intended to have the CA Committee study and deliberate on the matter. However, he also stated that copies of the letters of Madrigal
would be transmitted to the Senate Secretary for it had better jurisdiction on the issue, as per Sen. Arroyo's comment which stated that, "if there is a
complaint in the election of a member, or members, it shall be addressed to the body that elected them, namely the Senate and/or the House. Thus,
it was just appropriate for the case presented by Madrigal to be included in the Order of Business of the Session of the Senate to be properly
addressed. However, Sen. Madrigal, by letter, reiterated her request for the actions of the CA to be held in abeyance pending the reorganization of
both the Senate and House of Representatives contingents. Thereafter, she filed for a petition (2nd to that of Drilon, G.R. 180055) for prohibition
and mandamus with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction against Sen. Villar in his capacity as Senate
President and Ex-Officio Chairman of the CA, Speaker Nograles, and the CA, alleging that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction: 1) in failing to comply with the constitutionally required proportional party representation of the members of the
CA; 2) in continuously conducting hearings and proceedings on the the appointments despite the above; 3) in failing, despite repeated demands
from petitioner, to reorganize the CA members.
Issue: Can a Senator challenge before the Supreme Court that she was denied proportional representation with the Commission on Appointments?
Ruling: No. Under Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution, party-list representatives must first show to the House that they possess the
required strength to be entitled to seats in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Commission on Appointments (CA).
Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of the Constitution on proportional representation of political parties in the HRET and the CA
can the party-list representatives seek recourse to this Court under its power of judicial review. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior
recourse to the House is necessary before any senator may bring the instant case to the court. Consequently, in the case at the bar the petitioner’s
direct recourse to this Court is premature.
5. Pimentel vs. Enrile, GR 187714 (8 March 2011)
FACTS: Sen. Villar and Sen. Lacson, each, delivered a privilege speech (on separate dates). Both of them suggested that Ethics Committee cannot
take the floor with regard to accusations against Sen. Villar. More so, Sen. Lacson suggested, that since the Ethics Committee cannot act with
fairness on Sen. Villar's case, it should be undertaken by the Senate, acting as a Committee of the Whole. The motion was approved with 10
members voting in favor, none against, and five abstentions. When the respondent Senate Committee of the Whole conducted its hearings,
petitioners objected to theapplication of the Rules of the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole, out of which three amendments
were adopted. Sen. Pimentel raised an issue that there is a need to publish the proposed amended Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole. But
responded proceeded with the Preliminary Inquiry on PS Resolution 706. The preliminary conference was then scheduled.
Petitioners contested the following: 1) transfer of complaint against Sen. Villar from the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is
violative of Sen. Villar's constitutional right to equal protection; 2) the Rules adopted by the Senate Committee of the Whole for the investigation
and complaint filed by Sen. Madrigal against Sen. Villar is violative of Sen. Villar's right to due process and of the majority quorum requirement of
Art. VI, Sec. 16(2) of the Constitution; and 3) The Committee violated the due process clause of the Constitution when it refused to publish the Rules
of the Senate Committee of the Whole in spite of its own provision which requires its effectivity upon publication.
Respondents argue that the instant petition must be dismissed for being premature, pointing out that petitioners failed to observe the doctrine or
primary jurisdiction or prior resort. It is within the power of the Congress to discipline its members for disorderly behavior. More to that, the
internal rules of the Senate are not subject to judicial review in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. With regard to the publication of the Rules
of Procedure, the Rules of the Ethics Committee have already been duly published and adopted, which allowed the adoption of the supplementary
rules to govern adjudicatory hearings.
ISSUE: Should the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole be published to be effective?
HELD: Generally, no. The proceedings before the Senate Committee of the Whole affect only members of the Senate since the proceedings involve
the Senate's exercise of it's disciplinary power over one of its members. Thus, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole are internal to the
Senate. The Constitution does not mandate internal rules of the House or Senate to be published because it only affects their members, unless such
rules expressly provide for their publication before the rules can take effect. However, Rule 15 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole
provides: "Sec. 81. EFFECTIVITY. These Rules shall be effective after publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.
Hence, in this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole must be published before the Rules could take effect. Thus, the
petition was granted in part, with reference to the publication.
6. Garcillano vs. House, GR 170338 (23 December 2008)
Facts: The case at hand is a result of the release of the so-called Hello Garci tapes, wherein then Pres. Arroyo allegedly made instructions to
COMELEC Commissioner, respondent, regarding the results of the 2004 national elections. The ponencia is that of a consolidated one between GR.
170338 and 179275. Respectively, the former is “poised at preventing the playing of the Hello Garci tapes in the House and the subsequent
inclusion of committee reports”, while the latter seeks to prohibit and top the conduct of the Senate inquiry on certain government agencies on
alleged wiretapping of the offices of public officials. An additional issue to the latter is petitioners’ claim that the Senate violated Sec. 21, Art VI of
the Constitution by not publishing its House rules.
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Issue: Does the Constitution require publication of the internal rules of the House of Senate?
Ruling: Yes. Under the 1987 Constitution, Congress is not a continuing legislative body. With the staggering of the terms of the Senators, there is
less than a majority of Senators to continue into the next Congress every three years. Because the Constitution requires the Senate to “constitute a
quorum to do business”, the Rules of Procedure of the Senate must be republished every time the term of twelve Senators expire. This non-
continuing nature of the Senate is further clarified by the fact that all pending matters and proceedings of the expiring Congress will terminate
unless otherwise taken by the succeeding Congress (Rule XLIV, Rules of the Senate). This is because the succeeding Congress, which would usually
have a different composition than the previous one, cannot be bound by the acts of legislation or business commenced by the latter. Thus, it cannot
be argued that there is no need to republish the Rules of Senate even if no changes have been made to it, as custom or tradition cannot repeal the
express provision of the Constitution (Sec. 21, Art. VI).
7. Neri vs. Senate CAPO, GR 180643 (25 March 2008)
Facts: 1. This case is about the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by then Secretary Romulo Neri questioning the show
cause Letter and the contempt order issued by the Senate Senate Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (CAPO), Trade
and Commerce, and National Defense and Security.
2. The summary of the story is that Neri was cited in contempt and was ordered arrest for his refusal to answer to the Senate these questions: (a)
whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she
directed him to approve, citing executive privilege.
3. The story behind this case is: Secretary Neri was invited for questioning by the senate and was summoned to appear testify September 18, 20,
and 26 and October 25, 2007. However, he attended only the September 26 hearing, claiming he was “out of town” during the other dates. In the
September 18, 2007 hearing, businessman Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their
influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. It appeared that the Project was initially approved as a Build-Operate-Transfer
(BOT) project but, on March 29, 2007, the NEDA acquiesced to convert it into a government-to-government project, to be financed through a loan
from the Chinese Government. Neri was then Chairman of NEDA. On September 26, Neri was questioned for 11 hours and in the process of
questioning, he narrated that there was a bribery attempt by then Comelec chairman Benjamin Abalos by the amount of 200 million. He further
noted that he informed the president about this matter and the president instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, he refused to answer the
following 3 questions: (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c)
whether or not she directed him to approve, citing executive privilege. However, the senate issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner,
requiring him to appear and testify on November 20, 2007 because it was not convinced that the petitioner can invoke executive privilege in this
matter. In his defense, then executive secretary Eduardo Ermita wrote a letter to the senate that the questions the senate begs to be answered
contains information that might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China. He further wrote that the
office of the president instructed him not to testify further on the matter because he will disclose the very information the executive privilege is
designed to protect. In view of the letter issued by the executive secretary, petitioner did not attend the November 20 hearing. Senate then issued a
show cause letter requiring Neri to explain why he should not be held in contempt to which Neri answered that it was not his intention to ignore
the hearing, and that in good faith, he did not attend because he thought that there are no other questions that needs answers except for those 3
questions which he said are covered by the executive privilege. He then said that if there are other questions, he wished to be provided of a copy in
advance for him to prepare. His lawyer also wrote a letter to the senate informing them that 1) his (petitioner) non-appearance was upon the order
of the President; and (2) his conversation with President Arroyo dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic matters relating
to the impact of the bribery scandal involving high government officials and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the
Philippines. Petitioner also filed for a certiorari before the court assailing the validity of the show cause Letter issued by the senate. Respondent
Senate Committee was not satisfied with Neri’s explanation and ordered him arrested for contempt. Neri then moved for reconsideration and file
another Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (With Urgent Application for TRO/Preliminary Injunction), seeking to restrain the implementation of
the said contempt Order.
Issue: What is the difference between Sec. 21 and 2 of Art. VI? Can a cabinet member invoke executive privilege?
Ruling: Yes. A cabinet member can invoke executive privilege but only in matters that fall under these categories:
a. The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.”
b. The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is
that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President.
c. The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the
information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
d. The invocation of the executive privilege must be done properly.
The court ruled that the case at bar falls passed the categories mentioned above and is therefore right in invoking his executive privilege not to
answer the questions. The court made mention that Neri’s case falls under Section 22 of Article 6 and not Section 21 because there was no case filed
against Neri, therefore the inquiry cannot be considered “in aid of legislation”. The court differentiated Section 21 and Section 22 of Article 6 of the
1987 Constitution. Section 21 permits Congress to require the appearance of a person if the inquiry they are doing is in “aid of legislation”.
However, Section 22 is a provision that permits Congress to “request” the appearance of committee head (subject to the approval of the President)
19
when they seek to be “informed” (key word is inquiring) on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, they can’t
make it mandatory.
8. Philcomsat vs. Senate, GR 180308 (19 June 2012)
Facts: On February 20, 2006, in view of the losses that the government continued to incur and in order to protect its interests in POTC,
PHILCOMSAT and PHC, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, during the Second Regular Session of the Thirteenth Congress of the Philippines,
introduced Proposed Senate Resolution (PSR) No. 455[5] directing the conduct of an inquiry, in aid of legislation, on the anomalous losses incurred
by POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC and the mismanagement committed by their respective board of directors. PSR No. 455 was referred to
respondent Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, which conducted eleven (11) public hearings[6] on various dates.
On June 7, 2007, respondents Senate Committees submitted the assailed Committee Report No. 312, where it noted the need to examine the role of
the PCGG in the management of POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC Committee Report No. 312 recommended, inter alia, the privatization and transfer of
the jurisdiction over the shares of the government in POTC and PHILCOMSAT to the Privatization Management Office (PMO) under the Department
of Finance (DOF) and the replacement of government nominees as directors of POTC and PHILCOMSAT. On November 15, 2007, petitioners filed
the instant petition before the Court, questioning, in particular, the haste with which the respondent Senate approved the challenged Committee
Report No. 312.
Issues: Is the power to conduct legislative inquiries vested only on the Senate or also on its committees?
Held: The respondents Senate Committees' power of inquiry relative to PSR No. 455 has been passed upon and upheld in the consolidated cases of
In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio,[10] which cited Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution, as follows: “The Senate
or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.” The Court explained that such conferral of
the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress, in this case the respondents Senate Committees, must carry with it all powers
necessary and proper for its effective discharge.
9. David vs. Arroyo, GR 171396 etc. (3 May 2006)
Facts: Pres. Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, with which she commanded the AFP and PNP to immediately carry out
necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence. This issuance was with regard to
the Philippines's celebration of the 20th anniversary of EDSA. With PP 1017, programs and activities related to EDSA People Power I celebration
were cancelled. More so, rally permits were revoked and most arrests were without warrants. Facilities, including the media, were also taken over.
Thus, assemblies and rallyists were dispersed. With the dispersal, petitioner was arrested without warrant. A week after PP 1017, PP 1021 was
issued lifting the state of emergency.
Issue: Is congressional authority needed for the President to declare "a state of national emergency" and "to exercise emergency powers"?
Held: Congressional authority is NOT needed for the President to declare "a state of national emergency". However, it is NECESSARY for the
President "to exercise emergency powers". The petitioner was found to have legal standing on the grounds that his personal rights were involved
and qualified under the direct injury test. But the Court does not declare PP 1017 totally invalid. It might have been abused and misused, but its
validity is to be determined from its general purpose. Thus, the Court partially granted the petition. PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it
allows the President to call the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. But, commanding AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence
are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. More to that, the warrant-less arrest of the petitioner and other warrant-less arrest of other rallyists in the
absence of proof were also declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
10. Ampatuan vs. Puno, GR 190259 (7 June 2011)
Facts: On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, including some news reporters, then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing “the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of
emergency.” She directed the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) “to undertake such measures as may
be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence” in the named places.
Petitioner ARMM officials claimed that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan
Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred. The deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM
constitutes an invalid exercise of the President’s emergency powers. Petitioners asked that Proclamation 1946 as well as AOs 273 and 273-A be
declared unconstitutional and that respondents DILG Secretary, the AFP, and the PNP be enjoined from implementing them.
Issues: Whether or not, in view of Section 23, Article 6 of the Constitution, President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she issued
Presidential Proclamation 1946 and called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao,
Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City.
Ruling: The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant
to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to
exercise the same. In other words, the imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to
ignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned. Progress reports also indicated that there was
20
movement in these places of both high-powered firearms and armed men sympathetic to the two clans. Thus, to pacify the people’s fears and
stabilize the situation, the President had to take preventive action. She called out the armed forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms and
dismantle the armed groups that continuously threatened the peace and security in the affected places. Ultimately therefore, President GMA did not
violate the provisions of Section 23, Article 6 of the Constitution.
1. Rodriguez –versus- Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805, Nov. 15, 2011
Facts: Petitioner, Noriel Rodriguez is a member of a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). Rodriguez claims
that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances. On September 6, 2009, Rodriguez was abducted 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army. They accused him for
being a member of the NPA, and for numerous times beaten and tortured him and made him confess the location of the NPA in the locality. He was
subsequently freed on September 17, 2009. On 7 December 2009, Rodriguez filed before this Court a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition
for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties. The
petition was filed against former President Arroyo, et al.
Issues: 1. May the President of the Philippines be sued in any civil or criminal case? 2. Should former President Arroyo be dropped as a respondent
on the basis of the presidential immunity from suit? Is the doctrine of command responsibility applicable in amparo and habeas data cases?
Ruling: The President of the Philippines may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, as long as he is in the performance of his official duty. This is
to make sure that the President will be able to exercise his duties and functions without any hindrance or distraction.
In the case at bar, the SC held that a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts committed during the latter’s tenure. It
will be wrong to hold that immunity is a protection from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials
are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.
Command responsibility pertains to the “responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other
persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict.” In the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used
to determine whether respondents are accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise remedial measures to
protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes the Court from applying the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo and habeas data cases to
ascertain responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
SUPPLEMENTARY:
To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must obtain: (a) the existence of a superior-
subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate; (b) the superior knew or had reason
to know that the crime was about to be or had been committed; and (c) the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to
prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof. The SC held, however, that aside from Rodriguez’s general averments, there is no piece
of evidence that could establish former President Arroyo’s responsibility for his abduction. Neither was there even a clear attempt to show that she
should have known about the violation of his right to life, liberty or security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish or prevent it.
In the Philippines, amparo and habeas data are prerogative writs to supplement the inefficacy of the writ of habeas corpus (Rule 102, Revised Rules
of Court). Amparo means protection, while habeas data is access to information. Both writs were conceived to solve the extensive Philippine
extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances since 1999.
2. Neri –versus- Senate Ermita, G.R. No. 180643, Sept. 5, 2008
Facts: On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and testified for about eleven hours on matters concerning the
National Broadband Project (the "NBN Project). Petitioner disclosed that then Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") Chairman Benjamin Abalos
offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on President Arroyo and petitioner's
discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executive privilege."
Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioner's answers to the questions by requiring him to appear and testify once more on November
20, 2007. However, petitioner did not appear before respondent Committees upon orders of the President invoking executive privilege on the date
set. Subsequently, the Senate cited him in contempt and ordered his arrest, Neri then filed a case against the Senate with the Supreme Court. On
March 25, 2008, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Neri and upheld the claim of executive privilege. Thus, this petition for Motion for
Reconsideration was filed by respondent Committees.
Issues: 1) Are all presidential communication presumed privileged? 2) Had the Senate controverted the presumption of privilege?
Ruling: 1) No. Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of
information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the
ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the
duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the
presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure. Moreover, the privilege being an extraordinary power must be
wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such
power.
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2) Yes, the Senate controverted the presumption of privilege when it failed to consider that those three questions which petitioner refused to
answer were covered by a legitimate executive privilege and subsequently cited said petitioner of contempt for his refusal to answer such
questions. The court ruled that the contempt order is arbitrary and precipitate because the Senate did not first rule on the claim of executive
privilege and instead dismissed Neri’s explanation as unsatisfactory. This is despite the fact that Neri is not an unwilling witness.
3. Francisco –versus- Toll Regulatory Board, G.R. 166910, Oct. 19, 2010
Facts: Acknowledging "the huge financial requirements" and the necessity of tapping "the resources of the private sector" to implement the
government’s infrastructure programs, Pres. Ferdinand Marcos implemented PD 1112 on March 31, 197, authorizing the establishment of toll
facilities on public improvements. In order to attract private sector involvement, P.D. 1112 allowed "the collection of toll fees for the use of certain
public improvements that would allow a reasonable rate of return on investments." Section 3 (e) (3) of P.D. 1112 provides: “That the toll operator
shall not lease, transfer, grant the usufruct of, sell or assign the rights or privileges acquired under the [TOC] to any person x x x or legal entity nor
merge with any other company or corporation organized for the same purpose without the prior approval of the President of the Philippines…”
Petitioners assert that the grant to the President of the power to peremptorily authorize the assignment by PNCC, as franchise holder, of its
franchise or the usufruct in its franchise is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional, so petitioners would claim, for being an encroachment of
legislative power.
Issues: 1) Has the President the power to peremptorily authorize the assignment by PNCC, as franchise holder, of its franchise or the usufruct in its
franchise? 2) Is the grant to the President of the power to peremptorily authorize the assignment by PNCC, as franchise holder, an encroachment of
legislative power?
Ruling: 1) Yes. As it stands, because PD 1112 (which gave the President the authority to approve PNCC’s assignment as a franchise holder) was a
decree made by Pres. Marcos during martial law, it is technically a legislative act. Thus, the authority is of statutory origin, which may only be
repealed or amended by consecutive acts of the legislative.
2) No. In light of the preceding considerations, there is no encroachment of legislative power, because PD 1112 was enacted when the legislative
power was itself lodged in the executive. Hence, the president’s preemptory authorization of PNNC’s assignment is neither illegal nor
unconstitutional.
4. Biraogo –versus- Phil. Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, Dec. 7, 2010
Facts: The birth of the foregoing cases can be drawn back to the events prior to the May 2010 Elections. It was when former Senator Benigno
Aquino III declared his strong condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, “Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap” that convinced the
mass of his stand. Thus, came his administration, President Aquino III signed Executive Number 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of
2010 dated July 30, 2010. To note that: G.R. No. 192935 is a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (a taxpayer) in
assailing that E.O. No. 1 as an intrusion of the power of the Congress’ legislative power under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it is a
usurpation of the constitutional authority of the legislative arm to create a public office and thereby, in appropriation of funds also. While, G.R. No.
193036 is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfdo B. Albano Jr, Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B.
Fua in their capacity as legislators – petitioners, as incumbent in the House of Representatives.
Issue: Does control power allow the President to create the Truth Commission?
Ruling: Yes. The President’s power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws – in this case, fundamental laws
on public accountability and transparency – and creating bodies to execute this power, is inherent in the President’s powers as the Chief Executive
even if it’s not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes. The President’s power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are
faithfully flows from the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution under Article VII, Section 17. As the Chief Executive, the president represents
the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has the authority to directly
assume the functions of the executive department.
The Supreme Court, though invalidating EO 1 as unconstitutional because it violates equal protection of rights, it upheld that the President can
create ad hoc committees.
5. Fornier -versus- Comelec, G.R. 161824, March 3, 2004
Facts: Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.ka. Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of the President on December 31, 2003.
He presented himself as a natural-born Filipino, born in Manila on August 20, 1939, meeting the constitutional requirement for the position.
Petitioner Victorino X. Fornier filed a petition for FPJ’s disqualification on grounds of material misrepresentation in FPJ’s certificate of candidacy
since he was an illegitimate child of a Spanish national (Allan Poe, who was the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject) and an American mother
(Bessie Kelley Poe), rendering him unable to meet the citizenship requirement of the Constitution.
Issue: Was Fernando Poe Jr. a Filipino citizen?
Ruling: Yes. Going back of FPJ’s ascendants, any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption
that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule,
and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place
of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in
1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. Thus, the 1935
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Constitution during which FPJ was born under confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of the child’s
legitimacy. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the
evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in
his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.
6. BANAT –versus- Comelec, G.R. No. 177508, Aug. 7, 2009
Facts: Petitioner assails the constitutionality of Sections 34, 37, 38 and 43 of RA 9369 on the ground that the aforementioned act is misleading for
its refers to poll automation but it contained substantial provisions dealing with the manual canvassing of election returns. Petitioners allege that
enumerated sections are neither embraced in the title nor germane to the subject matter of ra 9369. Petitioners further allege that Sections 37 and
38 violate the constitution by impairing the powers of the presidential electoral tribunal (pet) and the senate electoral tribunal (set). the
impairment was a result of congress as the national board of canvassers for the election of president and vice president (Congress), and the
COMELEC en banc as the national board of canvassers (COMELEC en banc), for the election of senators may now entertain pre-proclamation cases
in the election of the president, vice president, and senators. Petitioner concludes that in entertaining pre-proclamation cases, Congress and the
COMELEC en banc undermine the independence and encroach upon the jurisdiction of the pet and the set.
Issue: Are pre-proclamation cases involving the authenticity and due execution of certificates of canvass allowed in elections for President and
Vice-President?
Ruling: Yes. Due to the amendments introduced by RA 9369, pre-proclamation cases involving the authenticity and due execution of certificates of
canvass are now allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, and Senators. The court ruled that in the elections for President, Vice-President,
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the general rule is still that pre-proclamation cases on matters relating to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or certificates of canvass are still prohibited. However, there are recognized
exceptions to the prohibition, namely:
• correction of manifest errors;
• questions affecting the composition or proceeding of the board of canvassers; and
• determination of the authenticity and due execution of certificates of canvass as provided in Section 30 of RA 7166, as amended by RA 9369.
7. Pormento –versus- Estrada, G.R, No. 191988, Aug. 31, 2010
Facts: Private respondent Joseph ³Erap´ Ejercito Estrada was elected President of theRepublic of the Philippines in the general elections held on
May 11, 1998. He was however ousted [³resigned´ according to the decision of the Supreme Court in Estrada vs. Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, March 2,
2001] from office and was not able to finish his term. He sought the presidency again in the general elections held on May 10, 2010. Petitioner Atty.
Evillo C. Pormento opposed Erap’s candidacy and filed a petition for the latter’s disqualification, which was however denied by the COMELEC 2nd
Division.
His motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the COMELEC en banc. Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari on May 7,
2010 . However, under the Rules of Court, the filing of such petition would not stay the execution of the judgment, final order or resolution of the
COMELEC that is sought to be reviewed. Besides, petitioner did not even pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction. Hence, private respondent was able to participate as a candidate for the position of President in the May 10, 2010 elections
where he garnered the second highest number of votes.
Issue: What is the proper interpretation of the following provision of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution: ³[t]he President shall not be eligible
for any re-election?´
Ruling: [The petition was DENIED DUE COURSE and thereby DISMISSED by the Supreme Court.] Private respondent was not elected President the
second time he ran [in the May2010 elections]. Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase ³anyreelection´ will be premised on a
person’s second (whether immediate or not) election as President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal
rights exists. There is in this case no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties having adverse
legal interests. No specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in this case that will benefit any of the parties herein. As such, one
of the essential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this
case. As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract
propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In other words, when
a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable. An action is considered ³moot´ when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues
involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial
intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the determination thereof
has been overtaken by subsequent events. Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a President who has been
duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections, the same is no longer true today. Following the results of that elections, private respondent was not
elected President for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his ³reelection´ will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or
practical purpose.
8. Makalintal –versus- PET, G.R. No. 191618, Nov. 23, 2010, Makalintal –versus- PET, G.R. No. 191618, June 7, 201
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Facts: This is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal of the Supreme Court’s Decision in G.R. No. 191618 dated
November 23, 2010, dismissing his petition and declaring the establishment of respondent Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as constitutional.
Petitioner reiterates his arguments on the alleged unconstitutional creation of the PET: 1. He has standing to file the petition as a taxpayer and a
concerned citizen. 2. He is not estopped from assailing the constitution of the PET simply by virtue of his appearance as counsel of former president
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo before respondent tribunal. 3. Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET. 4. The
PET violates Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Issue: Is the Presidential Electoral Tribunal an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution?
Ruling: No. Supreme Court said, “We reiterate that the abstraction of the Supreme Court acting as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal from the
unequivocal grant of jurisdiction in the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution is sound and tenable. What we have done is to
constitutionalize what was statutory but it is not an infringement on the separation of powers because the power being given to the Supreme Court
is a judicial power. A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In
the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified in the provision, the grant of power does
not contain any limitation on the Supreme Court's exercise thereof. The Supreme Court's method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential
election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision.
Hence, the subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme Court to "promulgate its rules for the purpose.”
9. Funa –versus- Bautista, G.R. No. 184740. Feb. 11, 2010
Facts: On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista (Bautista) as Undersecretary of the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC). On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator
Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC
Undersecretary. Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging the
constitutionality of Bautista’s appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the Members of
the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any other office or employment.
Issue: Was the designation of Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport violative of
Sec. 13, Art. VII?
Ruling: While the designation was in the nature of an acting and temporary capacity, the words “hold the office” were employed. Such holding of
office pertains to both appointment and designation because the appointee or designate performs the duties and functions of the office. The 1987
Constitution in prohibiting dual or multiple offices, as well as incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the office, and not to the nature of the
appointment or designation, words which were not even found in Section 13, Article VII nor in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B. To “hold” an
office means to “possess or occupy” the same, or “to be in possession and administration,” which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of
the functions and duties of the office. The designation of respondent Ma. Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Administrator,
Maritime Industry Authority, in a concurrent capacity with her position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
10. Betoy –versus- NPC, G.R. Nos. 156556-57, Oct. 4, 2011
Facts: On June 2001, the EPIRA was enacted by Congress with the goal of restructuring the electric power industry and privatization of the assets of
the National Power Corporation (NPC). Pursuant to Section 48 thereof, a new National Power Board of Directors (NPB) was created. On February
2002, pursuant to Section 77 of the EPIRA, the Secretary of the DOE promulgated the IRR. On the other hand, Section 63 of the EPIRA provides for
separation benefits to officials and employees who would be affected by the restructuring of the electric power industry and the privatization of the
assets of the NPC. Displaced or separated personnel as a result of the privatization, if qualified, shall be given preference in the hiring of the
manpower requirements of the privatized companies. On November 2002, pursuant to Section 63 of the EPIRA and Rule 33 of the IRR, the NPB
passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-124 which, among others, resolved that all NPC personnel shall be legally terminated on January 31, 2003 and
shall be entitled to separation benefits. On the same day, the NPB passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-125 which created a transition team to manage
and implement the separation program. As a result of the foregoing NPB Resolutions, petitioner Enrique Betoy, together with thousands of his co-
employees from the NPC, was terminated.
Issue: Are Sections 11, [27] 48, [28] and 52[29] of the EPIRA unconstitutional for violating Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution?
Ruling: No. The designation of the members of the Cabinet to form the NPB does not violate the prohibition contained in our Constitution as the
privatization and restructuring of the electric power industry involves the close coordination and policy determination of various government
agencies. The concerned Cabinet secretaries were merely imposed additional duties, and their posts in the NPB do not constitute "any other office"
within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition. Mandating additional duties and functions to Cabinet members is a practice long-
recognized in many jurisdictions. It is a practice justified by the demands of efficiency, policy direction, continuity and coordination among the
different offices in the Executive Branch in the discharge of its multifarious tasks of executing and implementing laws affecting national interest and
general welfare and delivering basic services to the people.
11. PEZA –versus- Villar, G.R. No. 189767, July 3, 2012
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Facts: On September 13, 2007, the PEZA Auditor Corazon V. Españ o issued Notice of Disallowance Nos. 2006-001-101 (02-06) to 2006-021-101
(01-03) on the following payments of per diems to ex officio members of the PEZA Board for the period 2001-2006. Said disallowance was based on
COA Memorandum No. 97-038 dated September 19, 1997 implementing Senate Committee Report No. 509 and this Court’s ruling in Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary. The Notice of Disallowance was petitioned for reconsideration, but was denied multiple times; on Nov. 16, 2007 by
PEZA Auditor Corazon V. Españ o, on March 17, 2008, by the COA Cluster Director, Ma. Cristina Dizon-Dimagiba, and on September 15, 2009, by the
COA. PEZA now comes to Court seeking to annul the assailed decision on the grounds that R.A. No. 8748 allows the payment of per diems to the
members of the PEZA Board of Directors, and The ex-officio members of the PEZA BOD should no longer be required to refund the per diems
already received because they were of the honest belief that they were legally entitled to receive the same.
Issue: Does the PEZA have legal basis in granting per diems to the ex officio members of its Board? And if there is no legal basis, was there good
faith in PEZA’s grant and the ex officio members’ receipt of the per diems?
Ruling: The lack of legal basis to grant per diems to ex officio members of the PEZA Board, including their representatives, has already been settled
by no less than the Court En Banc in the case of Bitonio, Jr. where we held that the amendatory law, R.A. No. 8748, purposely deleted the last
paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7916 that authorized the grant of per diems to PEZA Board members as it was in conflict with the proscription
laid down in the 1987 Constitution. In Civil Liberties Union, this Court clarified the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution and
emphasized that a public official holding an ex officio position as provided by law has no right to receive additional compensation for the ex officio
position. This Court ruled: It bears repeating though that in order that such additional duties or functions may not transgress the prohibition
embodied in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, such additional duties or functions must be required by the primary functions of the
official concerned, who is to perform the same in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law, without receiving any additional compensation therefor.
The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to
receive additional compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the
compensation attached to his principal office. It bears stressing that the Civil Liberties Union case was promulgated in 1991, or a decade before the
subject disallowed payments of per diems for the period starting 2001 were made by PEZA. Thus, even if the Bitonio case was only promulgated in
2004 when part of the disallowed payments have already been made, PEZA should have been guided by the Civil Liberties Union case and acted
with caution. PEZA’s actual knowledge that the disbursements are being questioned by virtue of the notices of disallowance issued to them by the
COA and knowledge of the pronouncements of the Court in the Civil Liberties Union case and in other cases[21] where ex officio members in several
government agencies were prohibited from receiving additional compensation, militate against its claim of good faith.
12. De Castro –versus- JBC, G. R. No. 191002, etc. March 17, 2010 , De Castro –versus- JBC, G. R. No. 191002, etc. April 20, 2010
Facts: Chief Justice Renato S. Puno was to compulsorily retire by May 17, 2010 and prior to that retirement was the May 10, 2010 Presidential
elections. This occurrence gave way to legal questions: 1. May the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) resume the process of screening the candidates
nominated and submit the list of nominees to the incumbent President even during the period of the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII – Sec.
15, Art VII of the Constitution bans the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety ; 2. what is the relevance of Sec. 4, Art VIII of the Constitution – Any vacancy in the SC shall be
filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof; 3. Does mandamus lie to compel the submission of the shortlist of nominees by the JBC?
The petitioners then prayed that the JBC submits its list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice to be vacated by Chief Justice Puno upon his
retirement because according to them, the incumbent President is not covered by the prohibition that applies only to appointments in the Executive
Department but the Supreme Court dismissed the petitions. Still, other petitioners repeating their original arguments appeal to the principles of
interpretation and Latin maxim to pursue their points.
Issue: Was the nomination and appointment of CJ Corona covered under the ban set forth in Sec.15, Art VII?
Ruling: No. The SC ruled that the president may appoint CJ Puno’s successor because Sec.15, Art VII of the Constitution does not apply to
appointments to fill a vacancy in the SC or other appointments to the judiciary. Had the framers of the constitution intended to extend the
prohibition, contained in Sec.15, Art VII the appointment of members of the SC, they could have explicitly done so. The SC preceded its ruling in
Valenzuela (298 SCRA 408).
13. Pimentel, Jr. et. al. –versus- Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition1 with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to declare unconstitutional
the appointments issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo ("President Arroyo") through Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita ("Secretary
Ermita") to Florencio B. Abad, Avelino J. Cruz, Jr., Michael T. Defensor, Joseph H. Durano, Raul M. Gonzalez, Alberto G. Romulo, Rene C. Villa, and
Arthur C. Yap ("respondents") as acting secretaries of their respective departments. The petition also seeks to prohibit respondents from
performing the duties of department secretaries.
Issues: While Congress is in session, can the President issue acting appointments to department secretaries without the consent of the Commission
on Appointments?
Ruling: The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this executive power
except in those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere.6 Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed
strictly against the legislature.7 The scope of the legislature’s interference in the executive’s power to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe
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the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that office.
Neither may Congress impose on the President the duty to appoint any particular person to an office.8
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President,
the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the President’s confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department secretary,
the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session. That person may or may not be the
permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee.
The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that "[t]he
President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an
office in the executive branch." Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the
President deems that person competent.
14. Kida –versus- Senate, G.R. No. 196271, Oct. 18, 2011
Facts: On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled "An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes" was enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from
the 8th of August 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years thereafter, to coincide with the country’s regular national and
local elections. The law as well granted the President the power to "appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for the Office of the Regional Governor, the
Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until
the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office."
Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No. 10153 already spawned petitions against their validity; House Bill No. 4146 and Senate
Bill No. 2756 were challenged in petitions filed with this Court. These petitions multiplied after RA No. 10153 was passed.
Issue: Can the President appoint OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of RA No. 10153?
Ruling: The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, in which a classification of 4 types of appointment that the
president is allowed to make. The third class, which includes “those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint”, is where his power
to appoint OIC’s for interim officials in the ARMM, falls under. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to "appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of
the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to
the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office." This power is far different from
appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections. His
appointments are just interim in nature and are in no way appointing elective officials on said offices. These appointments are just part of the
interim process in order to synchronize ARMM elections with that of the national election.
15. Angeles –versus- Gaite, G.R. 165276, Nov. 25, 2009
Facts: The petitioner, after all his complaint petitions were dismissed by the Investigating Prosecutor Benjamin P. Caraig, as well as by the
Provincial Prosecutor‘s dismissal of all charges, undersigned filed a Petition for Review before the Office of President. The petition was dismissed
and the motion for reconsideration was denied before said forum anchored on Memorandum Circular No. 58 which bars an appeal or a petition for
review of decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Thus,
petitioner assailed the constitutionality of the memorandum circular, specifically arguing that Memorandum Circular No. 58 is an invalid regulation
because it diminishes the power of control of the President and bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a subordinate officer, almost unfettered
power. Moreover, petitioner contended that the Department of Justice (DOJ) erred in dismissing the complaint against respondent Michael Vistan
for violations of Presidential Decree No. 18(PD No. 1829) and for violation of Republic Act No. 76 (RA No. 7610).
Issue: Is the Memorandum Circular No. 58 invalid and unconstitutional?
Ruling: No, the President's act of delegating authority to the Secretary of Justice by virtue of said Memorandum Circular is well within the purview
of the doctrine of qualified political agency, long been established in our jurisdiction.
Under this doctrine, which primarily recognizes the establishment of a single executive, "all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts
of the Executive Department; the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and, except in cases
where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally,
the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the
acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by
the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
16. Biraogo vs. Phil. Truth Com. 2010, G.R. 192935 & 193036, Dec. 7, 2010
Facts: Petitioners alleged that E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and
appropriate funds for its operation. They also asserted the fact that the role of the president, as stated in the 1987 Philippine Constitution, to
achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office, which was inexistent before, the
"Truth Commission". According to them, the said Executive Order violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress
to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions.
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Issue: Does E.O. No. 1 violate the separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for
its operation?
Held: No. The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full
control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and
employees faithfully comply with the law. It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an
inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative
to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
17. Ampatuan –versus- Puno, G.R. No. 190259 , June 7, 2011
Facts: On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, including some news reporters, then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing “the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of
emergency.” She directed the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) “to undertake such measures as may
be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence” in the named places. Petitioner ARMM officials
claimed that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of
Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred. The deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid exercise of
the President’s emergency powers. Petitioners asked that Proclamation 1946 as well as AOs 273 and 273-A be declared unconstitutional and that
respondents DILG Secretary, the AFP, and the PNP be enjoined from implementing them.
Issue: Were there factual bases for the issuance of Presidential Proclamation No. 1946?
Ruling: Yes. In this case the petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat
and Cotabato City, as well as the President’s exercise of the "calling out" power had no factual basis. They simply alleged that, since not all areas
under the ARMM were placed under a state of emergency, it follows that the take over of the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no basis too.
But, apart from the fact that there was no such take over to begin with, the OSG also clearly explained the factual bases for the President’s decision
to call out the armed forces, are as follows: The Ampatuan and Mangudadatu clans are prominent families engaged in the political control of
Maguindanao. It is also a known fact that both families have an arsenal of armed followers who hold elective positions in various parts of the ARMM
and the rest of Mindanao. Considering the fact that the principal victims of the brutal bloodshed are members of the Mangudadatu family and the
main perpetrators of the brutal killings are members and followers of the Ampatuan family, both the military and police had to prepare for and
prevent reported retaliatory actions from the Mangudadatu clan and additional offensive measures from the Ampatuan clan.
18. Fortun vs. Arroyo, G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012
Facts: On November 23, 2009, heavily armed men believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family of Maguindanao gunned down and buried under
shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians. In response to this carnage, President Arroyo issued on November 24, 2009 PP 1946 declaring a state of
emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City.
On December 4, 2009, President Arroyo issued PP 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Maguindanao except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. On December 6, 2009, President Arroyo submitted her report to
Congress. On December 9, 2009, Congress convened in joint session to review the validity of the President’s action. But two days later, or on
December 12, 2009, before Congress could act, the President issued PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
Issue: Is the power to declare martial law a shared power of the President with Congress? Must the Supreme Court allow Congress to exercise its
own review powers on the martial law declaration first, before exercising its own review powers? Does the lapse of the 30-day period operate to
divest the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over the case?
Ruling: The President shares such power with the Congress. The President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim
Martial Law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after
the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain the Same based on its own evaluation of the
situation on the ground, a power that the president does not have.
Although the above vests in the President the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, he shares such
power with the Congress. Thus:
1. The President’s proclamation or suspension is temporary, good for only 60 days;
2. He must, within 48 hours of the proclamation or suspension, report his action in person or in writing to Congress;
3. Both houses of Congress, if not in session must jointly convene within 24 hours of the proclamation or suspension for the purpose of reviewing
its validity; and
4. The Congress, voting jointly, may revoke or affirm the President’s proclamation or suspension, allow their limited effectivity to lapse, or extend
the same if Congress deems warranted.
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It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President
has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the
ground, a power that the President does not have.
Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation
or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than
initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in as its
final rampart. The constitutional validity of the President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political
question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.
Notably, under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the Court has only 30 days from the filing of an appropriate proceeding to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Thus –
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty
days from its filing.
19. Kulayan vs. Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012 – Francis Filipinas
Facts: On March 2009, Gov. of Sulu (respondent) Abdusakur Mahail Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, series of 2009 (Proclamation 1-09), declaring a
state of emergeny in the province of Sulu. It cited the kidnapping incident of foreign members of the International Committee of the Redcross as a
ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency measures during man-
made and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless
violence. The provisions of the proclamation included the organizing of a group made of members of the Armed forces, the PNP and some civilians
that would serve as an executor of some provisions of the proclamation passed, one example would be "General Search and Seizure including
arrests in the pursuit of the kidnappers and their supporters" are implemented. the On April 16, 2009, a petition was passed assailing the
constitutionality of the proclamation issued by the Governor for it was issued in grave abuse of lack of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, as it threatened fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners contend that Proclamation
No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines were issued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution,
which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and
commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
Issue: Does the governor have the power to declare a state of emergency, and exercise the powers enumerated under Proclamation 1-09?
Ruling: Respondent governor has arrogated unto himself powers exceeding even the martial law powers of the President, because as the
Constitution itself declares, “A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil
courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of the jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts
are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.”
Section 21of Article XI states that, “The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the responsibility of the local police agencies
which shall be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security of the regions shall be
the responsibility of the National Government.” Taken in conjunction with each other, it becomes clear that the Constitution does not authorize the
organization of private armed groups similar to the CEF convened by the respondent Governor. The framers of the Constitution were themselves
wary of armed citizens’ groups. The Local Government Code does not involve the diminution of central powers inherently vested in the National
Government, especially not the prerogatives solely granted by the Constitution to the President in matters of security and defense.
It was found that there is nothing in the Local Government Code which justifies the acts sanctioned under the said Proclamation. Not even Section
465 of the said Code, in relation to Section 16.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition ts GRANTED. Judgment is rendered commanding respondents to desist from further proceedings in
implementing Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, and its Implementing Guidelines. The said proclamation and guidelines are hereby declared NULL
and VOID for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
20. Magdalo –versus- Comelec, G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012
Facts: Dated July 2, 2009 — Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) sought its registration and/or accreditation with COMELEC as a regional party
based in the National Capital Region (NCR) for having participated in May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. MAGDALO was represented by its
Chairperson, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, and its Secretary General, Francisco Ashley L. Acedillo. It was presented before the Second Division of
the COMELEC. The COMELEC – Second Division in its Order on August 24, 2009, directed MAGDALO to cause the publication of the Petition for
Registration and the said Order in three daily newspapers of general circulation and MAGDALO in compliance had it in HATAW (No. 1 sa Balita,
Saksi sa Balita and BOMBA BALITA (Saksi sa Katotohanan). The hearing was set and conducted on September 3, 2009. In compliance therewith,
MAGDALO (a) established its compliance with the jurisdictional requirements; (b) presented Acedillo as its witness; and (c) marked its
documentary evidence in support of its Petition for Registration. The following day, MAGDALO filed its Formal Offer of Evidence. However in
COMELEC – Second Division’s Resolution, it denied the petition by the MAGDALO (who were the participants in the take-over of the Oakwaood
incident on July 27, 2003, wherein several innocent civilian personnel were held hostage). In the instant Petition, MAGDALO claimed that it did not
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resort to violence when it took over Oakwood because (a) no one, either civilian or military, was held hostage; (b) its members immediately
evacuated the guests and staff of the hotel; and (c) not a single shot was fired during the incident.
Issue: In view of subsequent amnesty granted in favor of the members of MAGDALO, should the events that transpired during the Oakwood
incident be still interpreted as acts of violence in the context of the disqualifications from party registration?
Ruling: NO. In the present case, the Oakwood incident was one that was attended with violence. This Court founded that the COMELEC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO. However, in view of the subsequent amnesty granted
in favor of the members of MAGDALO, the events that transpired during the Oakwood incident can no longer be interpreted as acts of violence in
the context of the disqualifications from party registration.
The COMELEC has a constitutional and statutory mandate to ascertain the eligibility of parties and organizations to participate in electoral contests.
Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions that "seek to achieve their goals through violence or
unlawful means" shall be denied registration. This disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881 (Omnibus Election Code, which provides
that "no political party which seeks to achieve its goal through violence shall be entitled to accreditation."
21. Nicolas –versus- Sec. Romulo, G.R. No. 175888, etc., Feb. 11, 2009
Facts: Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith is a member of the United States Armed Forces. He was found guilty with the crime of rape
committed against Suzette S. Nicolas, and was ordered to be detained at the Makati jail temporarily. On December 29, 2006, he was taken out of the
Makati jail under the Romulo-Kenney Agreement (12/19/2006) and returned to the US military custody at the US Embassy in Manila.
Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody of Smith because, first of all, the VFA is void and unconstitutional (Art. XVIII, Sec. 25)
Issues: 1) Should the VFA be a considered a treaty if the senate of the United States did not concur thereto? 2) Are the Romulo-Kenny Agreements,
valid and constitutional?
Ruling: The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and consent of the United States Senate does not detract from its status as a binding
international agreement or treaty recognized by the said State. For this is a matter of internal United States law. Notice can be taken of the
internationally known practice by the United States of submitting to its Senate for advice and consent agreements that are policymaking in nature,
whereas those that carry out or further implement these policymaking agreements are merely submitted to Congress, under the provisions of the
so-called Case–Zablocki Act, within sixty days from ratification.
As held in Bayan v. Zamora, the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as
attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the United States government.
The Romulo-Kenney Agreements of are declared not in accordance with the VFA because such detention is not "by Philippine authorities."
22. AKBAYAN –versus- Aquino, G.R. 1710516, July 16, 2008, 558 SCRA 468
Facts: Petitioners – non-governmental organizations, Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers – seek via the present petition for Mandamus and
prohibition to obtain from respondents (Usec. Tomas Aquino, Chairman of the Phil. Coordinating Committee) the full text of the Japan-Philippines
Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent
attachments and annexes thereto prior to its finalization between the two States parties.
On Jan. 25, 2005, petitioners filed House Resolution No. 551, calling for an inquiry into the bilateral trade agreements then being negotiated by the
Philippine government, particularly the JPEPA, which later became the basis of a subsequent inquiry conducted by the House Special Committee on
Globalization into the negotiations of JPEPA.
The petition was filed on Dec. 9, 2005 and the agreement was signed by GMA and Japanese PM Junichiro Koizumi in Helsinki, Finland, following
which the President endorsed it to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Art. 7, sec. 21 of the Consti.
Issue: Does the treaty-concurrence power of Senate justify its interference on the conduct of treaty negotiations?
Ruling: No. The constitutional basis for the power to negotiate treaties is Section 21 of Article 7:
“No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.” While
this provision provides for Senate concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of the treaty under consideration, not to the conduct of
negotiations attendant to its conclusion. As held in BAYAN v. Executive Sec, echoing PMPF v. Manglapus and as reiterated in Pimentel v. Exec. Sec.,
the President, as head of State, is the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the country and the chief architect of the nation’s foreign
policy. Into the field of negotiation, the Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. In the realm of treaty-making, the
President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states. Thus, Congress, while possessing vast legislative powers, may not interfere in the
field of treaty negotiations.
23. Bayan Muna –versus- Romulo, G.R. No. 159618, Feb. 1, 2011—Stan Amistad
Facts: This petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition under Rule 65 assails and seeks to nullify the non-surrender agreement included by
and between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States. The petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to
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represent the marginalized sectors of society. The respondent Blas Ople, now deceased, was the secretary of foreign affairs during the time material
to this case. Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then executive secretary.
Issue: 1) Is the RP-US non-surrender agreement valid in form and substance? 2) Is the RP-US non-surrender agreement binding without senate
concurrence?
Ruling: 1) Petitioner’s initial challenge against the Agreement relates to its form, its threshold posture being that E/N BFO-028-03(Not sure if this
is the RP-US Agreement) cannot be a valid medium for concluding the Agreement. The Petitioners’ contention, perhaps taken unaware of certain
well-recognized international doctrines, practices, and jargons, is invalid.
2) Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a treaty as "an international agreement concluded between states in written
form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its
particular designation. International agreements may be in the form of (1) treaties that require legislative concurrence after executive ratification;
or (2) executive agreements that are similar to treaties, except that they do not require legislative concurrence and are usually less formal and deal
with a narrower range of subject matters than treaties.
1. Mendoza vs. People, GR No. 183891, October 19, 2011
Facts: Sometime during the month of August 1998 to July 1999, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, being then the proprietor of Summa Alta Tierra Industries, Inc., duly registered employer with the Social Security System (SSS),
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail and/or refuse to remit the SSS premium contributions in favor of its employees
amounting to P421, 151.09 to the prejudice of his employees. Contrary to and in violation of Sec. 22(a) and (d) in relation to Sec. 28 of Republic Act
No. 8282, as amended. After petitioner was advised by the SSS to pay the above-said amount, he proposed to settle it over a period of 18 months
which proposal the SSS approved by Memorandum of September 12, 2000. Despite the grant of petitioner’s request for several extensions of time to
settle the delinquency in installments, petitioner failed, hence, his indictment. Petitioner sought to exculpate himself by explaining that during the
questioned period, SATII shut down due to the general decline in the economy. Finding for the prosecution, the trial court, as reflected above,
convicted petitioner. Petitioner contended in his motion for reconsideration but the appellate court denied petitioner’s motion, hence, the present
petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Without violating the separation of powers, can the Supreme Court recommend to the President, the grant of executive clemency to a
convict?
Ruling: The Supreme Court said, “Upfront, we reject the petitioner's claim that the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of the crime charged.
This is a matter that has been resolved in our Decision, and the petitioner did not raise anything substantial to merit the reversal of our finding of
guilt. To reiterate, the petitioner's conviction was based on his admission that he failed to remit his employees' contribution to the SSS. We realize
that with the affirmation of the petitioner's conviction for violation of RA No. 8282, he stands to suffer imprisonment for four (4) years and two (2)
months ofprision correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, notwithstanding the payment of his
delinquent contribution. Under Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code,[12] the courts are bound to apply the law as it is and impose the proper penalty,
no matter how harsh it might be. The same provision, however, gives the Court the discretion to recommend to the President actions it deems
appropriate but are beyond its power when it considers the penalty imposed as excessive. Although the petitioner was convicted under a special
penal law, the Court is not precluded from giving the Revised Penal Code suppletory application in light of Article 10 of the same Code and our
ruling in People v. Simon.”
2. People vs. Judge Azarraga, GR No. 187117 and 187127, October 12, 2011
Facts: On Feb. 7, 2009, petitioner filed a complaint before the RTC of Iloilo City against private respondent John Rey Previnido for violation of article
II, sec 5 and 11 of RA 9165(comprehensive dangerous drugs act of 2002). The case however is raffled to branch 36, and so happened that the judge
assigned had a close family ties with Gemarino, the PDEA(Phil. Drug Enforcement Agency) whi conracted the entrapment. Thus, judge Gelvezon
issued an order dated feb. 17, 2009, inhibiting himself from trying the case. After which, the court was assigned to branch 25, which is presided by
judge Salao. But then judge Salao was a cousin of Gemarino, so again she issued an order dated feb. 24, 2009, again inhibiting herself from trying the
case; the cases were endorsed to the office of the executive Judge for reassignment. Citing ch. V, sec 9 of AM 03-8-02-SC, the executive judge
forwarded the case branch 37 presided by the public respondent.
Issue: Did the Supreme Court violate Sec. 90 of RA 9165 when it issued AM 03-8-02-SC, particularly Ch. 5, Sec. 9, which prescribes the manner in
which the executive judge reassigns cases in instances of inhibition or disqualification of judges sitting in special courts?
Ruling: No. Contrary to the assertion of petitioner, this court does not violate RA 9165 when it issued the assailed guidelines. Rather, it merely
obeyed Art. VIII, Sec.5(5) of the constitution, which mandates that the rules promulgated by this court should provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy for the speedy disposition of cases, in conformity with the right of all persons to a speedy disposition of their cases before
all judicial , quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. As the court stated in san ildefonso lines v. CA, there must be a renewed adherence to the time-
honored dictum that procedural rules are designed not to defeat, but to safeguard, the ends of substantial justice.
3. Re: Entitlement to Hazard Pay of SC Medical and Dental Clinic Personnel, AM No. 03-9-02-SC, November 27, 2008, 572 SCRA 1
Facts: The SC medical and dental services division was entitled to hazard pay through RA 7305 also known as the Magna Carta for Public Workers.
This paved the way for the issuance Of Administration Circular no. 57 – 2004 which prescribed the guidelines of the grant of hazard allowance in
favor of the SCMDS personnel. The circular initially classified SCMDS employees according to levels of exposure to health hazards and not on salary
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grades alone. But DOH abolished the classification and declared that a uniform hazard pay rate should be given without regard for the nature of the
risks and hazards to which they are exposed. Thus, SMBS personnel requested that the hazard pay must be granted.
Issue: Does the DBM have authority to review Supreme Court issuances relative to court personnel on matters of compensation?
Ruling: The role of the DBM is “supervisorial in nature.” Its main duty is to ascertain that the proposed compensation, benefits, and other incentives
to be given to officials and employees adhere to the policies and guidelines issued in accordance with applicable laws. Thus, its authority to review
SC issuances is relative to the court personnel on matters of compensation is very limited, circumscribed as it is by the constitution. Fiscal
autonomy makes freedom from outside controls pursuant to Article VIII, Section 3.The court in its ruling has to deny the request because the
subject circular cannot be amended according to the mechanism of hazard pay allocation under AO 2006 – 0011.
4. De Castro vs. JBC, GR No. 191002, April 20, 2010
Facts: This is regarding the vacancy of the position of chief justice upon the compulsory retirement of C.J. Puno by May 17, 2010. De Castro submits
that the conflicting opinions on the issue expressed by legal luminaries – one side holds that the incumbent President is prohibited from making
appointments within two months immediately before the coming presidential elections and until the end of her term of office as President on June
30, 2010, while the other insists that the prohibition applies only to appointments to executive positions that may influence the election and,
anyway, paramount national interest justifies the appointment of a Chief Justice during the election ban – has impelled the JBC to defer the decision
to whom to send its list of at least three nominees, whether to the incumbent President or to her successor.1[8] He opines that the JBC is thereby
arrogating unto itself “the judicial function that is not conferred upon it by the Constitution,” which has limited it to the task of recommending
appointees to the Judiciary, but has not empowered it to “finally resolve constitutional questions, which is the power vested only in the Supreme
Court under the Constitution.”
Issue: Did Constitutional Commission extend to the Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during the period stated in Sec. 15, Article VII?
Ruling: Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in
Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s
or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
The SC also ruled that the filling up of a vacancy in the Supreme Court within 90 days was a “true mandate” for the president.
5. League of Cities vs. COMELEC, GR No. 176951, December 21, 2009 League of Cities vs. COMELEC, GR No. 176951, August 24, 2010
Facts: December 21, 2009: The consolidated petitions for prohibition commenced by the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City
of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñ as assail the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws, each converting the municipality covered thereby into a city
(cityhood laws, hereinafter) and seek to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to subject laws.
By Decision dated November 18, 2008, the Court en banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the petitions and nullified the sixteen (16) cityhood laws for being
violative of the Constitution, specifically its Section 10, Article X and the equal protection clause. Subsequently, two motion for reconsideration
were were filed by respondent LGUs which were both denied by the court. On May 14, 2009, respondents file a Motion to Amend the Resolution.
Per its Resolution of June 2, 2009, the Court declared the May 14, 2009 motion adverted to as expunged. Respondent LGUs then file d a Motion for
reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009.
August 24, 2010: For resolution is the ad cautelam motion for reconsideration and motion to annul the decision of Dec 21, 2009.
Issue: a) Is the required vote set forth in Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII limited only to the initial vote on the petition or also to the subsequent voting on the
Motion for Reconsideration (MR)?
b) What is the effect of a tie-vote on the MR?
Ruling: a) No. Sec. 4 of Art. VIII exacts a majority vote in the determination of a case involving the constitutionality of a statute, without
distinguishing whether such determination is made on the main petition or thereafter on a motion of reconsideration.
This is as it should be, for, to borrow from the late Justice Ricardo J. Francisco: “Even assuming…that the constitutional requirement on the
concurrence of the “majority” was initially reached in the… ponencia, the same is inconclusive as it was still open for review by way of a motion for
reconsideration.”
b) The effect of a tie vote on a motion for reconsideration (MR) is laid down in Sec. 7, Rule 56 and the Complementary A.M. No. 99-1-09- SC:
Sec 7. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. – Where the court en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the
case shall again be deliberated on, and if after such deliberation no decision is reached, the original action commenced in the court shall be
dismissed; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and on all incidental matter, the petition or motion shall be
denied.
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A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC – x x x A motion for reconsideration of a decision or resolution of the Court En Banc or of a Division may be granted upon a vote
of a majority of the En Banc or of a Division, as the case may be, who actually took part in the deliberation of the motion.
If the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is deemed denied.
6. League of Cities vs. COMELEC, GR No. 176951, February 15, 2011, League of Cities vs. COMELEC, GR No. 176951, April 12, 2011
Facts: These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo,
City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñ as, assailing the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws, each converting the municipality covered thereby into
acomponent city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the
subject laws. The Supreme Court En Banc,by a majority vote, struck down the subject 16 Cityhood Laws for violating Section 10, Article X of the
1987Constitution and the equal protection clause. On 31 March 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, again by a majority vote, denied the respondents'
first motion for reconsideration. On 28 April 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a split vote, denied the respondents' second motion for
reconsideration. Accordingly, the 18 November 2008 Decision became final and executory and was recorded, in due course, in the Book of Entries
of Judgments on 21 May 2009. However, after the finality of the 18 November 2008 Decision and without any exceptional and compelling reason,
the Court En Banc unprecedentedly reversed the 18 November 2008 Decision by upholding the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws in the
Decision of 21 December 2009.
Now, the petitioners anchor their Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration upon the primordial ground that the Court could no longer modify, alter,
or amend its judgment declaring the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional due to such judgment having long become final and executory. They submit
that the Cityhood Laws violated Section 6 and Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as the Equal Protection Clause.
Issue: Did the Supreme Court violate the rules of procedure, the principles of res judicata and immutability of final judgments?
Ruling: It is worth repeating that the actions taken herein were made by the Court en banc strictly in accordance with the Rules of Court and its
internal procedures. There has been no irregularity attending or tainting the proceedings.
It also relevant to state that the Court has frequently disencumbered itself under extraordinary circumstances from the shackles of technicality in
order to render just and equitable relief.
On whether the principle of immutability of judgments and bar by res judicata apply herein, suffice it to state that the succession of the events
recounted herein indicates that the controversy about the 16 Cityhood Laws has not yet been resolved with finality. As such, the operation of the
principle of immutability of judgments did not yet come into play. For the same reason is an adherence to the doctrine of res judicata not yet
warranted, especially considering that the precedential ruling for this case needed to be revisited and set with certainty and finality.
7. De Castro vs. JBC, GR No. 191002, March 17, 2010
Facts: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occured just days after the coming presidential elections on
May 10, 2010 and prior to the actualization of such, it gave birth to many legal predicaments. The dilemma herein rooted from the consideration of
Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution which, prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments
within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. However, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial
Department) of the Constitution, which also provided that, any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within 90 days from the occurrence
thereof, to the matter of the appointment of his successor. In extraction, the question pointed to the JBC if it may resume the process of screening
the candidates nominated or being considered to succeed CJ Puno, and submit such list to the incumbent President under Section 15 of Article 7 of
the Constitution.
Issue: Prior to its vacancy, does the issue of who can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno, present an actual controversy and thus ripe for
adjudication?
Ruling: Yes. The Court spoke and ruled that the petitions fired up an actual controversy and that it is mature to the extent ready for judicial
determination. In the words of the Court: The reality is that the JBC already commenced the proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be
included in a short list to be submitted to the president for consideration of who of them will succeed CJ Puno as the next Chief Justice.” The position
was not in vacancy but it is notable that the JBC began the process of nomination and, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of
nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next steps
are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates, and the “interview of constitutional experts, as may be
needed.”
Thus, the ripeness of the controversy for judicial determination may not be doubted. There is no need to await the occurrence of the vacancy by
May 17, 2010 in order for the principal issue to ripe for judicial determination by the Court. It is enough that one alleges conduct arguably affected
with a constitutional interest, but seemingly proscribed by the Constitution. A reasonable certainty of the occurrence of the perceived threat to a
constitutional interest is sufficient to afford a basis for bringing a challenge, provided the Court has sufficient facts before it to enable it to
intelligently adjudicate the issues.
8. Pormento vs. Estrada, GR No. 191988, August 31, 2010
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Facts: Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed private respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada’s candidacy for President in the general elections
held on May 10, 2010. The petition asks whether private respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada is covered by the ban on the President from “any
reelection” since he was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines in the general elections held on May 11, 1998, thus petitioner seeks the
disqualification of the respondent.
Issue: Does the challenge on Estrada’s qualification to run again for President present an actual controversy?
Ruling: No, since private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran in which the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase
“any reelection” will be premised on, it follows that there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. Since he did not win in the elections,
there is no live conflict of legal rights exists, no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests. It has become “moot” in nature, thus, actual controversy, as the Court ruled, is of no existence.
9. Vinuya vs. Romulo, GR No. 162230, April 28, 2010
Facts: Members of MALAYA LOLAS filed a petition to the SC to compel the Philippine Government through the DOJ, DFA and OSG requesting
assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the “comfort women” stations in the
Philippines during WWII. However, officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners and took that the petitions that the
individual claims of the victims for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the Peace Treaty between the
Philippines and Japan.
Issue: Are all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions depriving the courts the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and
executive agreements?
Ruling: Certain types of cases are found to present political questions, one such category involves questions of foreign relations. However, not all
cases implicating foreign relations present political questions and courts certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and
executive agreements. But to the questions whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government
is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the
Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of the nationals for reparations against
Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951.
10. Sana vs. CES Board, GR No. 192926, November 15, 2011
Facts: On 28 May 2010, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued EO 883 granting the rank of CESO III or higher to officers and employees
“occupying legal positions in the government executive service who have obtained graduate degrees in law and successfully passed the bar
examinations” (Section 1).[3] EO 883 invoked the granting of CESO “rank to government personnel who successfully complete certain graduate
programs, such as Masters in Public Safety Administration (MPSA) and Masters in National Security Administration (MNSA)” as basis for the
granting of CESO rank to government lawyers in the executive service.[4]
On 2 June 2010, the CESB issued Resolution No. 870 finding no legal impediment for the President to vest CESO rank to executive officials during
the periods covered by the constitutional ban on midnight appointment and statutory ban on pre-election appointment.
On 30 July 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) issued EO 3 expressly revoking EO 883 (Section 1) and “all administrative
orders, proclamations, rules and regulations” that conflict with EO 3 (Section 2). As basis for the repeal, the fifth “Whereas” clause of EO 3 provides
that “EO 883 encroaches upon the power of the CESB to ‘promulgate rules, standards and procedures on the selection, classification, compensation
and career development of members of the Career Executive service… vested by law with the CESB”
On 4 August 2010, petitioner Atty. Elias Omar A. Sana filed the present petition, contending that EO 883 and the subsequent appointment of the 13
executive officials to CESO rank are void for violating the constitutional ban on midnight appointment under Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution.[10] Petitioner theorizes that appointments to positions and ranks in the CES are “executive” in nature and, if made within the period
provided under Section 15, Article VII, fall under its prohibition. Petitioner submits that CESB Resolution No. 870 circumvents Section 15, Article VII
by distinguishing the terms “appoint” and “appointment.” He contends that CESB Resolution No. 870 cannot give new meaning to presidential
issuances, laws, and the Constitution.
Issue: Does the petition assailing Executive order No. 883, series of 2010 present a justiciable controversy?
Ruling: No. Petition dismissed on the threshold ground of mootness. The petition seeks a review of the constitutionality of EO 883 and CESB
Resolution No. 870 for being repugnant to Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution. At the time this petition was filed, however, President Aquino
had already issued EO 3 revoking EO 883 expressly (under Section 1) and CESB Resolution No. 870 impliedly (under Section 2). EO 883 and CESB
Resolution No. 870 having ceased to have any force and effect, the Court finds no reason to reach the merits of the petition and pass upon these
issuances’ validity. To do so would transgress the requirement of case and controversy as precondition for the Court’s exercise of judicial review.
True, the Court had relaxed the case and controversy requirement to resolve moot issues. In those instances, however, the issues presented were
grounded on peculiar set of facts giving rise to important constitutional questions capable of repetition yet evading review or indicating intent on
the part of potential or actual parties to place a constitutional question beyond the ambit of judicial review by performing acts rendering moot an
incipient or pending justiciable controversy. These factors do not obtain here. The question whether an appointment to a CESO rank of an executive
official amounts to an “appointment” for purposes of the constitutional ban on midnight appointment, while potentially recurring, holds no
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certainty of evading judicial review as the question can be decided even beyond the appointments-ban period under Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution.
Indeed, petitioner does not allege to have suffered any violation of a right vested in him under EO 883. He was not among the 13 officials granted
CESO ranking by President Arroyo. The CESB itself stated that “no conferment of CESO rank was ever made by President [Arroyo] in relation to EO
883.” Hence, for the Court to nevertheless reach the merits of this petition and determine the constitutionality of EO 883 and CESB Resolution No.
870 despite their unquestioned repeal and the absence of any resulting prejudice to petitioner’s rights is to depart from its constitutional role of
settling “actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.”
11. Hda. Luisita vs. PARC, GR No 171101, November 22, 2011
Facts: There are many issues in this case but we will focus only on the issues raised by DAR and PARC as public respondents of this case:
On July 5, 2011, this Court promulgated a decision denying the petition filed by HLI and affirming Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC)
Resolution No. 2005-32-01 dated December 22, 2005 and PARC Resolution No. 2006-34-01 dated May 3, 2006 with the modification that the
original 6,296 qualified farmworker-beneficiaries of Hacienda Luisita (FWBs) shall have the option to remain as stockholders of HLI. DAR and PARC
being public respondents to this case argued that the doctrine of operative fact should not be applied to this case since there was no constitutional
law violated and there is a positive law which mandates the distribution of the land as a result of the revocation of the stock distribution plan (SDP).
They basically argued that whatever decisions made before the revocation of the SDP no longer applies and may not be respected because it was
repealed with a positive instruction on what to do.
Issue: Does the operative fact doctrine apply only to laws subsequently declared unconstitutional or unlawful, and not to executive acts
subsequently declared as invalid?
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the doctrine of operative fact applies to executive acts as well. Citing City of Makati v. Civil Service
Commission, the Court said that “Consequently, the existence of a statute or executive order prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to
which legal consequences are attached.”
Furthermore, the Court cited the jurisprudence in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank as cited in the Tañ ada case: “The actual existence
of a statute, prior to [the determination of its invalidity], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.”
Finally, the Court resolved the matter by saying: “Evidently, the operative fact doctrine is not confined to statutes and rules and regulations issued
by the executive department that are accorded the same status as that of a statute or those which are quasi-legislative in nature.”
12. Boac vs. Cadapan, GR No. 184461-62, May 31, 2011
Facts: Armed men abducted Sherlyn, Karen and Manuel from a house in San Miguel, Hagonoy Bulacan. The 3 were herded onto a jeep bearing
license plate RTF 597 that sped towards an undisclosed location. Spouses Asher, Erlinda, and Concepcion filed a petition for habeas corpus before
the court impleading then Generals Tolentino and Palparan, Lt. Col. Boac, Enriquez and Lt. Janson as respondents. The court issued a writ of habeas
corpus. Petitioners in moved for a reconsideration of the appellate courts decision. During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration. Erlinda
Cadapan and Concepcion Empino filed before this court a petition for writ of amparo.
Issue: Is an amparo proceeding criminal? Or does it partake of a civil or administrative suit?
Ruling: The amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature and will not determine the criminal guilt of the respondent. However, if the evidence so
warrants, the amparo court may refer the case to the Department of Justice for criminal persecution.
The writ of amparo partakes of the nature of a prerogative writ. It is not a criminal, civil, or administrative suit. Hence, it does not suspend the filing
of criminal, civil, or administrative actions.
13. Cadiz vs. Gacott, GR No. 178941, April 27, 2011
Facts: On February 23, 2003 the IBP Board of Governors received an administrative complaint against Atty. Glenn C. Gacott for gross misconduct,
deceit, and gross dishonesty. Lydia A. Navarro was designated as Commissioner to investigate the case.
Adopting Navarro’s findings but increasing the penalty to disbarment, the Board transmitted the report to Court, which remanded it back for
relying solely on the position papers and affidavits of the witnesses.
Atty. Gacott then filed a complaint for damages against the said board. IBP Board raised the defense of failure of the complaint to state a cause of
action. They filed a motion to dismiss the case; was denied; elevated it to the Court of Appeals, which denied the same.
Issue: Can the IBP Board of Governors be held liable for prematurely recommending disbarment of a lawyer based on the position papers and
affidavits of witnesses of the parties?
Ruling: No. The petitioners are correct in claiming that Atty. Gacott’s complaint states no cause of action. They merely exercised delegated powers
to investigate the complaint and submit their report and recommendation to the Court. They cannot be charged for honest errors committed in the
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performance of their quasi-judicial function. And that was what it was in the absence of any allegation of specific factual circumstances indicating
that they acted maliciously or upon illicit consideration.
Atty. Gacott submitted the disbarment case against him for resolution based on the position papers that he and the complainants presented,
without reservation, to the IBP along with the affidavits of their witnesses. The IBP Board prepared its report and recommendation to the Court
based on these papers and documents.
14. CSC vs. Andal, GR No. 185749, December 16, 2009
Facts: The respondent, Herminigildo L. Andal, a Security Guard II in the Sandiganbayan filed and was admitted, before the Civil Service Commission
(CSC), to take the Career Service Professional Examination-Computer Assisted Test (CSPE-CAT). Results afterwards shows that he passed with the
rate of 81.03%, however, when Arlene S. Vito who claimed to have been authorized by the respondent to secure the results of the respondent went
to do so, verification and comparison of the pictures attached to the Picture Seat Plan and the identification card of Andal brought dissimilarity in
the facial features. Civil Service Commission National Capital Region (CSC-NCR) rendered judgment finding the respondent guilty of dishonesty and
imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal from the service. Aggrieved, the respondent appealed, however, it was denied. He then elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals (CA), in which the CA ruled in favor of the respondent. The CSC filed a motion for reconsideration in the CA but was
denied. Hence, the present petition for reversal of the decision of the CA.
Issue: Does the CSC’s disciplinary jurisdiction extend to court personnel?
Ruling: No. The petition was denied and Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals pertaining to that of CSC’s encroachment
upon the Supreme Court’s power of administrative supervision over court personnel citing Sec. 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, “The
Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof”. Therefore, SC has the sole authority to oversee the
judiciary personnel’s (which the respondent is included) administrative compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. If any violations are made,
complaint should be raise in the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court for filing of appropriate administrative case against
him/her. In connection to this case, the SC orders the Civil Service Commission to refer the case of respondent Andal to the Office of the Court
Administrator.
15. OCA vs. Judge Usman, AM No. SCC-08-12, October 19, 2011
Facts: A letter-complaint was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao, requesting for a lifestyle check on respondent Judge Uyag P.
Usman. In the letter, the complainant alleged that respondent Judge acquired a brand new SUV—Kia Sorento.
Respondent’s financial capability to acquire said vehicle has been questioned because he is the sole bread winner in his family and he has seven (7)
children, two (2) of whom were college students at a private school.
On May 26, 2008, the Office of the Ombudsman forwarded the complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). In turn, the OCA, in its
Letter dated April 22, 2009, directed respondent to comment on the letter [2] within 10 days from receipt thereof.
In his Comment, respondent explained that he acquired the Kia Sorento vehicle in 2008 but it was a second-hand, and not a brand new, vehicle. It
was his mother, a US Veteran Pensioner, who paid the downpayment and the monthly instalment. He also denied the allegation that all his seven (7)
children depended on him for support. He claimed that only three of his children, all in the elementary level and studying in public schools, were
under his care; that his mother financially helped him in the education of his two daughters who were in college; and that his other two children
were already married and gainfully employed.
Respondent bared that, at present, he is receiving a monthly take home pay of more than ₱40,000.00 including his salary and allowances plus
honorarium from the local government. In its Report[4] dated March 16, 2011, the OCA found the explanation of respondent meritorious.
The OCA, however, held respondent liable for violation of Section 8 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees and of Section 7 of R.A. No. 3019, known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for failing
to file his Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) for the years 2004-2008.
Issue: Are judges required to file their Statements of Assets and Liabilities [SALN]? Can they be subjected to lifestyle check?
Ruling: Yes. It is imperative that every public official or government employee must make and submit a complete disclosure of his assets, liabilities
and net worth in order to suppress any questionable accumulation of wealth. This serves as the basis of the government and the people in
monitoring the income and lifestyle of public officials and employees in compliance with the constitutional policy to eradicate corruption, to
promote transparency in government, and to ensure that all government employees and officials lead just and modest lives, with the end in view of
curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service.
While every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an
individual than a seat in the Judiciary. Hence, judges are strictly mandated to abide with the law, the Code of Judicial Conduct and with existing
administrative policies in order to maintain the faith of our people in the administration of justice.
(SUPPLEMENTARY)
The Court agrees with the OCA that respondent is guilty of violating Section 7 of R.A. No. 3019 and Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713.
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Section 7 of R.A. No. 3019 provides:
Sec. 7. Statement of Assets and Liabilities. – Every public officer, within thirty days after assuming office and, thereafter, on or before the fifteenth
day of April following the close of every calendar year, as well as upon the expiration of his term of office, or upon his resignation or separation
from office, shall prepare and file with the office of the corresponding Department Head, or in the case of a Head of Department or Chief of an
independent office, with the Office of the President, a true, detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the
amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding
calendar year: Provided, That public officers assuming office less than two months before the end of the calendar year, may file their first statement
on or before the fifteenth day of April following the close of the said calendar year.
Section 8, R.A. No. 6713 states:
SEC. 8. Statements and Disclosure. – Public officials and employees have an obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of, and the
public has the right to know, their assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests including those of their spouses and of
unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households.
(A) Statements of Assets and Liabilities and Financial Disclosure. – All public officials and employees, except those who serve in an honorary
capacity, laborers and casual or temporary workers, shall file under oath their Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and a Disclosure of
Business Interests and Financial connections and those of their spouses and unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their
households.
The two documents shall contain information on the following:
(a) real property, its improvements, acquisition costs, assessed value and current fair market value;
(b) personal property and acquisition cost;
(c) all other assets such as investments, cash on hand or in banks, stocks, bonds, and the like;
(d) liabilities, and;
(e) all business interests and financial connections.
The documents must be filed:
(a) within thirty (30) days after assumption of office;
(b) on or before April 30, of every year thereafter; and
(c) within thirty (30) days after separation from the service.
The Court orders the Respondent to pay a fine of P5 000 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely.
16. Concerned Lawyers of Bulacan vs. Judge Pornillos, AM No. RTJ-09-2183, July 7, 2009
Facts: Respondent is charged with an administrative case for violating the Canons of Judicial Conduct, Code of Professional Responsibility and Rules
of Court. Petitioners allege that the respondent had a history of graft and corruption incidents from fixing cases, to selling decisions, from extortion
of money from the parties of the cases she handles, to maintaining amorous relationships with her employees. Based on the allegations, the Court
ordered a confidential investigation made. The investigative report showed that the allegations of corruption and amorous relationships with
employees were deemed hearsay as no objective evidence was obtained. However, such report included that the respondent obtained loans from
employees of the court, as well as, from other lawyers which were unpaid, condoned or paid late.
Issue: Will debt-condonation administratively absolve a judge for borrowing money from a lawyer-creditor who has pending cases before his sala?
Ruling: The Court ruled that regardless of whether the debts were paid or condoned, the fact that respondent borrowed a sum of money from her
subordinates is considered a violation under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. The court ruled that at the very least
the respondent should be admonished for such transactions with her subordinates as such transactions tinge the appearance of propriety of the
judiciary which is strictly being maintained by the same. The court further ruled that debts from lawyers whose cases are under the respondent’s
sala are worse than that from subordinates, condoned or not. The Court ruled that respondent violated Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The
objective of the code was to ensure that no financial transaction may adversely affect the court’s impartiality in the performance of its judicial
duties. As a result, because the Code of Judicial Conduct was violated, the respondent is deemed to have committed gross misconduct and as such is
dismissed from the service considering that she is a habitual offender.
17. Chavez vs. JBC, GR No. 202242, July 17, 2012
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Facts: In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eight member was added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in
the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in
separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each.
At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of
the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase “a
representative of Congress.” It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory
components of “Congress,” such that the absence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution.
Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the performance of its
mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of “a representative from Congress,” it should
mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondents further argue that petitioner has no “real
interest” in questioning the constitutionality of the JBC’s current composition. The respondents also question petitioner’s belated filing of the
petition.
Issue: Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress,
runs counter to the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
Ruling: Yes. The word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever
is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be
allowed to sit in the JBC. The seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a
stalemate in voting.
It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in government – to legislate. In the passage of laws,
the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An
inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount.
This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence,
the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7)
members only.
Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. Under the
doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.
18. Makalintal vs. PET, GR No. 191618, November 23, 2010
Facts: The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the SC’s decision dismissing the former’s petition and declaring the
establishment of the respondent PET as constitutional. Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the
Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution.
Issue: With the adoption of a separate seal, as well as the change in the nomenclature of the Chief Justices into Chairman and members of the
Tribunal, etc. is the Presidential Electoral Tribunal independent and separate from the Supreme Court?
Ruling: The Court held that the PET is not a separate and distinct entity from it even though the PET has functions peculiar only to it. It declared
that “the PET was constituted in implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, and it faithfully complies – not unlawfully defies – the
constitutional directive. The adoption of a separate seal, as well as the change in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices
into Chairman and Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was designed simply to highlight the singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunal’s
functions as a special electoral court.” Article VII, sec. 4 provides: “The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.”
“[T]he PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e.,
the Supreme Court. McCulloch v. State of Maryland proclaimed that ‘[a] power without the means to use it is a nullity.’ The vehicle for the exercise
of this power, as intended by the Constitution and specifically mentioned by the Constitutional Commissioners during the discussions on the grant
of power to this Court, is the PET,” stressed the Court.
19. In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, AM No. 10-7-17-SC, October 12, 2010
Facts: In Vinuya et al vs. Romula (GR 162230, 28 April 2010), penned by J. Del Castillo, the Court dismissed the petitioners’ demand for the
Executive Department be compelled to represent World War II victims of rape and abuse before the ICJ and other international tribunals for
damages and reparations. J. Del Castillo used material from several sources to support the Court’s reasoning in its decision. Petitioners Vinuya et al
then moved for reconsideration, later filing a supplemental motion for reconsideration, accusing J. Del Castillo of “manifest intellectual theft and
outright plagiarism” and “twisting the true intents of the plagiarized sources… to suit the arguments of the assailed Judgment.” The Vinuya vs.
Romulo decision was prejudiced towards the petitioners because J. Del Castillo twisted the material cited to suit the Court’s decision.
Vinuya et al argue that: the Court’s integrity in deliberating the case is compromised because J. Del Castillo grossly neglected his duty to explicitly
attribute the aforementioned sources to their original authors; lack of intent is not a defense in plagiarism; the standards of plagiarism are to be
more strictly applied to the judiciary as the Court itself laid down in UP Board of Regents vs. CA & Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine (GR 134625,
31 August 1999).
37
The reactions of the alleged plagiarized sources are as follows: Evan Criddle, on his blog, voiced concern over the Court’s conclusions on the matter
of jus cogens principles. Mark Ellis wrote the Court that it “may have misread the argument [he] made in the article and employed them for cross
purposes.” Ellis said that he wrote the article to argue for appropriate legal remedy for victims of war crimes. Christian Tams wrote then CJ Renato
Corona that the generic reference given to him in the footnote was inappropriate. He also said that the manner his material had been used by the
Court was not consistent with what he intended.
Issues: 1) Whether or not Justice Del Castillo plagiarized the published works of authors Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis? 2) Whether or not Justice
Del Castillo twisted the works of these authors to make it appear that such works supported the Court’s position in the Vinuya decision?
Ruling: 1) No. On occasions judges and justices have mistakenly cited the wrong sources, failed to use quotation marks, inadvertently omitted
necessary information from footnotes or endnotes. But these do not, in every case, amount to misconduct. Only errors that are tainted with fraud,
corruption, or malice are subject of disciplinary action. This is not the case here. Justice Del Castillo’s acts or omissions were not shown to have
been impelled by any of such disreputable motives. If the rule were otherwise, no judge or justice, however competent, honest, or dedicated he may
be, can ever hope to retire from the judiciary with an unblemished record.
2) No. To twist means “to distort or pervert the meaning of.” The fact is that, first, since the attributions to Criddle-Descent and Ellis were
accidentally deleted, it is impossible for any person reading the decision to connect the same to the works of those authors as to conclude that in
writing the decision Justice Del Castillo “twisted” their intended messages. And, second, the lifted passages provided mere background facts that
established the state of international law at various stages of its development. These are neutral data that could support conflicting theories
regarding whether or not the judiciary has the power today to order the Executive Department to sue another country or whether the duty to
prosecute violators of international crimes has attained the status of jus cogens.
ARCIDE
20. Is the Supreme Court bond and controlled by precedents?
De Castro vs. JBC, GR No. 191002, April 20, 2010
21. Re: Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the Maguindanao Massacre Trial, AM No. 10-11-5-SC, June 14, 2011
Facts: Almost a year after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, including some news reporters , the National Union of Journalists of the
Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network, Inc., relatives of the victims, individual journalists from various media
entities, and members of the academe filed a petition before this Court praying that live television and radio coverage of the trial in these criminal
cases be allowed, recording devices be permitted inside the courtroom to assist the working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be formulated to
govern the broadcast coverage and the use of devices. Petitioners assert the exercise of the freedom of the press, right to information, right to a fair
and public trial, right to assembly and to petition the government for redress of grievances, right of free access to courts, and freedom of
association, subject to regulations to be issued by the Court. Hence, this petition docketed as AM No. 10-11-5-SC.
Issue: Can there be live broadcast by television and radio of the trial court proceedings?
Ruling: Yes. The court ruled that there can be live broadcast by television and radio of the trial court proceeding but subject to some guidelines
which addressed also the concerns mentioned in Aquino and Estrada. Furthermore, the court held “that the impossibility of holding such judicial
proceedings in a courtroom that will accommodate all the interested parties, whether private complainants or accused, is unfortunate enough.
What more if the right itself commands that a reasonable number of the general public be allowed to witness the proceeding as it takes place inside
the courtroom. Technology tends to provide the only solution to break the inherent limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a
transparent, open and public trial.”
22. Agoy vs. Araneta Center, GR No. 196358, March 21, 2012
Facts: Agoy doubted the authenticity of the copy of the minute resolution that he received through counsel since he promptly filed a motion to
rescind the same and to have his case resolved on its merits via a regular resolution or decision signed by the Justices who took part in the
deliberation. In a related development, someone claiming to be Agoy’s attorney-in-fact requested an investigation of the issuance of the resolution
of June 15, 2011. Agoy filed a motion to rescind the same or have his case resolved by the Court En Banc pursuant to Section 13 in relation to Sec.
4(3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Agoy reiterated his view that the Court cannot decide his petition by a minute resolution.
Issue: Do minute resolutions of the Supreme Court comply with Sec. 14, Article VIII?
Ruling: Yes. With the promulgation of its Internal Rules, the Court itself has defined the instances when cases are to be adjudicated by decision,
signed resolution, unsigned resolution or minute resolution. Among those instances when a minute resolution shall issue is when the Court “denies
a petition filed under Rule 45 of the [Rules of Court], citing as legal basis the absence of reversible error committed in the challenged decision,
resolution, or order of the court below.” The minute resolutions in this case complied with this requirement. The Court has repeatedly said that
minute resolutions dismissing the actions filed before it constitute actual adjudications on the merits.
23. Stradcom vs. Laqui, GR No. 172712, March 21, 2012
Facts: Stradcom Corporation (STRADCOM) was authorized to design, construct and operate the IT system for the Department of Transportation
and Communication (DOTC)/ LTO. DTech Management Incorporated (DTECH) was another internet provider contracted by LTO.
38
A Memorandum Circular was issued by LTO terminating DTECH’s services in view of its supposed failure to interconnect with the LTO IT Motor
Vehicle Registration System (LTO IT MVRS) owned and operated by STRADCOM under a Build Operate and Own (BOO) contract with the
(DOTC)/LTO. In the same memorandum circular, STRADCOM was made to monopolize its operations, which led to the termination of other IT
companies. DTECH, one of those terminated, then filed a prayer of preliminary injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against LTO in line
with their operations involving STRADCOM.
Judge Laqui, granted DTECH’s request cancelling temporarily STRADCOM’s contract. Aggrieved, STRADCOM filed a petition for review on certiorari
but the court declared it moot and academic.
Issues: a. When does a case become an academic? b. What is its effect? c. What are the exceptions to the moot and academic principle?
Ruling: a. A case becomes moot and academic when, by virtue of supervening events, there is no more actual controversy between the parties and
no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.
b. Such case constituted to pass upon substantial rights. Since there are no actual interests involved, the courts of justice will not consider questions.
As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such cases or dismiss them on the ground of mootness.
c. The exceptions to the moot and academic principle, wherein the court the court will decide a case, otherwise moot and academic, are if: (a) there
is a grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved; (c) the constitutional
issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.
24. CJ Corona vs. Senate, GR No. 200242, July 17, 2012
Facts: Before this Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for immediate issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO) and
writ of preliminary injunction filed by the former Chief Justice of this Court, Renato C. Corona, assailing the impeachment case initiated by the
respondent Members of the House of Representatives (HOR) and trial being conducted by respondent Senate of the Philippines. The present
petition was filed arguing that the Impeachment Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it: (1)
proceeded to trial on the basis of the complaint filed by respondent Representatives which complaint is constitutionally infirm and defective for
lack of probable cause; (2) did not strike out the charges discussed in Art. II of the complaint which, aside from being a “hodge-podge” of multiple
charges, do not constitute allegations in law, much less ultimate facts, being all premised on suspicion and/or hearsay; assuming arguendo that the
retention of Par. 2.3 is correct, the ruling of the Impeachment Court to retain Par. 2.3 effectively allows the introduction of evidence under Par. 2.3,
as vehicle to prove Par. 2.4 and therefore its earlier resolution was nothing more than a hollow relief, bringing no real protection to petitioner; (3)
allowed the presentation of evidence on charges of alleged corruption and unexplained wealth which violates petitioner’s right to due process
because first, Art. II does not mention “graft and corruption” or unlawfully acquired wealth as grounds for impeachment, and second, it is clear
under Sec. 2, Art. XI of the Constitution that “graft and corruption” is a separate and distinct ground from “culpable violation of the Constitution”
and “betrayal of public trust”; and (4) issued the subpoena for the production of petitioner’s alleged bank accounts as requested by the prosecution
despite the same being the result of an illegal act (“fruit of the poisonous tree”) considering that those documents submitted by the prosecution
violates the absolute confidentiality of such accounts under Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6426 (Foreign Currency Deposits Act) which is also penalized under
Sec. 10 thereof.
Issue: Had the constitutional issues raised in this case been mooted out?
Ruling: The impeachment trial had been concluded with the conviction of petitioner by more than the required majority vote of the Senator-Judges.
Petitioner immediately accepted the verdict and without any protest vacated his office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar Council is already in the process
of screening applicants and nominees, and the President of the Philippines is expected to appoint a new Chief Justice within the prescribed 90-day
period from among those candidates shortlisted by the JBC. Unarguably, the constitutional issue raised by petitioner had been mooted by
supervening events and his own acts. An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a
determination thereof would be without practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be
entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.
39

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Compilation by: Gilbert Augustin Ganir, JD-I (Batch 2016)

Silliman University College of Law

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES

PRE LIM INARY CO NSIDE RATIO NS

DATE OF EFFECTIVITY : DE LEON VS. ESGUERRA (153 SCRA 602)

SOCIAL CONTRACT CHARACTER OF THE CHARTER: MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS

CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY: TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE VS. LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT

Issue: Is the Preamble of the 1987 Constitution theistic or theocratic?

ARTICLE I. NATIO NAL TE RRITO RY

TITLE BASED ON CONTIGUITY OR TERRA FIRMA: US VS. NETHERLANDS

ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION: MALAYSIA VS. SINGAPORE (ICJ, 23 MAY 2008)

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RA 9522: MAGALONA VS. ERMITA

ARTICLE II. PRINCIPLE S & PO LICIE S

VALIDITY OF RP-US NON-SURRENDER AGREEMENT : BAYAN MUNA VS. ROMULA

Issue: Are customary international laws incorporated in the domestic system?

Issue: Is the excommunication of members of a religious institution a justiciable issue?

SUFFICIENCY OF EMPLOYEE’S PASSIVE ACQUIESCENCE: CERCADO VS. UNIPROM, INC.

ARTICLE VI. THE LE G ISLATIVE DE PARTM E NT

BANDA VS . E R M I T A , GR 166620, A P R IL 20, 2010

Issue: Is the issuance of EO 378 an invalid exercise of legislative power?

T O L E N T I N O V S C O M E L E C , GR 148334, J A N 21, 2004

KMU VS . NEDA, GR 167798 , A P R IL 19, 2006

Issue: Is EO 420 a valid and constitutional executive/administrative issuance?

LAMP vs. Budget, GR 164987-April 24, 2012

FRANCISCO VS D E V E NE C I A , N O V . 10, 2003

B I RA O G O V S P H I L I PP I NE T R U T H C O M M I S S IO N , G.R. N O . 192935 & G.R.

PIMENTEL VS. S E NA T E , GR N O . 187714, M A R C H 8, 2011

PIMENTEL VS. COMELEC GR 161658, N OV . 3, 2003

T R I LL A N E S IV VS . P I M E NT E L S R . GR 179817, 27 J U NE 2008, 556 SCRA

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS. ERMITA, G.R. N O . 168056

L I BA N VS. G O RD O N , GR 175352 (25 J U L Y 2009, 18 J A NU A RY 2011)

2. BANAT vs. Comelec, GR 179271 (21 April 2009)

Section 37 and 38 of RA 7166 are as follows:

3. Vilando vs. Comelec, GR 192147 (23 August 2011)

4. Madrigal vs. Villar, GR 183055 (31 July 2009)

5. Pimentel vs. Enrile, GR 187714 (8 March 2011)

6. Garcillano vs. House, GR 170338 (23 December 2008)

7. Neri vs. Senate CAPO, GR 180643 (25 March 2008)

d. The invocation of the executive privilege must be done properly.

8. Philcomsat vs. Senate, GR 180308 (19 June 2012)

9. David vs. Arroyo, GR 171396 etc. (3 May 2006)

10. Ampatuan vs. Puno, GR 190259 (7 June 2011)

1. Rodriguez –versus- Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805, Nov. 15, 2011

2. Neri –versus- Senate Ermita, G.R. No. 180643, Sept. 5, 2008

5. Fornier -versus- Comelec, G.R. 161824, March 3, 2004

Issue: Was Fernando Poe Jr. a Filipino citizen?

6. BANAT –versus- Comelec, G.R. No. 177508, Aug. 7, 2009

• correction of manifest errors;

• questions affecting the composition or proceeding of the board of canvassers; and

7. Pormento –versus- Estrada, G.R, No. 191988, Aug. 31, 2010

9. Funa –versus- Bautista, G.R. No. 184740. Feb. 11, 2010

10. Betoy –versus- NPC, G.R. Nos. 156556-57, Oct. 4, 2011

11. PEZA –versus- Villar, G.R. No. 189767, July 3, 2012

15. Angeles –versus- Gaite, G.R. 165276, Nov. 25, 2009

Issue: Is the Memorandum Circular No. 58 invalid and unconstitutional?

17. Ampatuan –versus- Puno, G.R. No. 190259 , June 7, 2011

1. The President’s proclamation or suspension is temporary, good for only 60 days;

1. Mendoza vs. People, GR No. 183891, October 19, 2011

4. De Castro vs. JBC, GR No. 191002, April 20, 2010

b) What is the effect of a tie-vote on the MR?

7. De Castro vs. JBC, GR No. 191002, March 17, 2010

8. Pormento vs. Estrada, GR No. 191988, August 31, 2010

9. Vinuya vs. Romulo, GR No. 162230, April 28, 2010

11. Hda. Luisita vs. PARC, GR No 171101, November 22, 2011