CBIP Protection Guide 2016

Research Report/Publication No.
328
Manual on
Power System Protection
Editors
S.G. Patki, V.K. Kanjlia, P.P. Wahi
Central Board of Irrigation and Power

Malcha Marg, Chanakyapuri, New Delhi 110021
2016
ISBN 978-8-17-336336-8
“Reproduction of any part of this publication in any form is permissible subject to proper acknowledgement and
intimation to the publisher. The publisher/author/editors have taken utmost care to avoid erros in the publication.
However, the publisher/author/editors are in no way responsible for the authenticity of data or information given
in the book.”
Disclaimer:
Technical data presented and views expressed by the Expert Group Members are of their own and not of the
Organizations which they are representing. CBIP does not assume any responsibility for the above.
Designed and Published by: Shri V.K. Kanjlia, Secretary

Central Board of Irrigation & Power
Malcha Marg, Chanakyapuri, New Delhi – 110021
Telephone +91-11-2611 5984/2611 6567/2410 1594
Fax: +91-11-2611 6347 E-mail: cbip@cbip.org
Website: www.cbip.org
Expert Group
Manual on Power System Protection
Chairman
Shri Sanjay Patki

Chairman CIGRE National Study Committee B5 on Protection and Automation
Former Vice President, The Tata Power Company Limited
Members
Shri B.S. Palki Shri Rajiv Krishnan
Advisor – R&D Substation Automation Systems
ABB Ltd. ABB Limited
Plot Nos. 5 & 6, II Phase PS-SA Technology
Peenya Industrial Area Plot Nos. 5 & 6, II Phase
Bangalore – 560058 Peenya Industrial Area
Bangalore - 560058
Shri S.K. Ray Mohapatra
Chief Engineer Shri H. B. Mukund
Central Electricity Authority Head-Technical Support Business,
Sewa Bhavan, R.K. Puram Easun Reyrolle Limited
New Delhi 110066 Power Automation Division, 98,
Sipcot Industrial Complex, Sipcot Ph. I
Shri Rajil Srivastava Hosur, Tamil Nadu 635126
General Manager S/S
Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd. Shri M.V. Girish
Plot No 2, Sector 29 ABB India Limited
Gurgaon – 122002 PS-SAS Technology
Plot Nos 5 & 6 2nd Phase, +560058
Shri P.P. Francis Bangalore
Former General Manager,
NTPC Ltd., Noida Shri M.V. Kini
The Tata Power Co. Ltd.
Shri Abhay Kumar Corporate Engineering - QA, I & T
Addl. General Manager Trombay Station A, Mahul Road
Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd. Chembur, Mumbai - 400 074
Plot No 2, Sector 29
Gurgaon – 122002 Shri Shaik Nadeem
ABB India Limited
Shri Subhash Thakur Plot No. 5 & 6, Peenya Industrial Area Ph-II
General Manager (PE-Elect) Bangalore - 560058
NTPC Ltd.
EOC, Plot No. A-8A Shri Ritesh Bharat
Sector 24, Noida-201301 Alstom Grid
Substation Automation Solution - Applications
Shri Biswajit Bandhu Mukherjee 19/1, GST Road, Pallavaram
Dy. General Manager - Engg(HVDC), Chennai 600043
Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd.
Plot No 2, Sector 29, Gurgaon – 122002 Shri Kamin Dave
Senior Manager – BD & Application Engineering
Ms. C. Saroj ASHIDA
Additional General Manager(PE-Elect) Plot No. A-308, Road No. 21,
NTPC Ltd. Wagle Industrial Estate
EOC, Plot No. A-8A Thane (W) - 400604
Sector 24, Noida-201301 Maharashtra
Shri Kuldeep Tickoo Shri Uday Trivedi
Head – Energy Automation Products, Associate Vice President– Protection & Metering
Siemens Ltd. Adani Power Ltd.
RC-IN IC SG EA, Plot 6A, Sector 18, 8-A, ‘Sambhav,’ Opp. Judge’s Bungalow,
Maruti Industrial Area, HUDA, Gurgaon 122015 Bodakdev, Ahmadabad 380 015
Shri Deepak Kumar Saxena Shri P.P. Wahi

Vice President Director
Welspun Energy Central Board of Irrigation and Power
Malcha Marg, Chanakyapuri
Shri G.S. Papneja New Delhi 110021
OMICRON Energy Solutions Pvt. Ltd.,
Unit No. 201E / A, 2nd Floor Shri S.K Batra
D21 Corporate Park Sr. Manager
Near Dwarka Sector 8 Metro Station, Central Board of Irrigation and Power
Sector 21, Dwarka, New Delhi 110075 Malcha Marg, Chanakyapuri
New Delhi 110021
Shri V.K. Kanjlia
Secretary
Central Board of Irrigation and Power
Malcha Marg, Chanakyapuri
New Delhi 110021
Foreword
Protection and Automation systems play an important role in meeting the

challenge of providing reliable power supply. Within this, the protection for
various power system elements plays a major role. Two of the important
requirements on protection system are reliability, dependability and
security to provide reliable fault clearance and maintain stability of grid. In
the interconnected network, coordination of various protection schemes
is necessary to ensure minimal adverse impact on grid operation. Special
protection schemes are being implemented to ensure grid stability.
CBIP has brought out the first publication no. 274 on ‘Protection of
Generators, Generator Transformers and 220 kV and 400 kV Networks’ in 1998. During 2005,
CBIP brought out another publication no. 296 titled Manual on ‘Reliable Fault Clearance and
Back-up Protection of EHV and UHV Transmission Networks’. These publications have been
well appreciated and are in great demand by engineering professionals. Since then, there has
been many fast technological advances and developments in protection application during the
last decade. National standards, Regulations and Code of practice have been evolved. New
series of IEC standards are published old standards have been revised. For updating both
the publications, CBIP constituted the Expert Group during 2013 headed by Shri S.G. Patki,
Chairman CIGRE National Study Committee on Protection and Vice President, Tata Power
Company. Representatives from various sectors across the country, comprising manufacturers,
power utilities, testing laboratories, CEA who have been members of the Expert Group,
deliberated several times on the subject and based on valuable comments, this publication has
been published. The Expert Group deliberated on various topics for about three years, which
has helped CBIP in updation of this document covering all aspects of Power System Protection.
Several new topics have been added considering current technology and practices.
The manual gives the Fundamental Concepts, Location of CT PTs, Requirements, Protection
Performance Indices, Generator and Generator Transformers, Power Transformer /Auto
Transformers Shunt Reactor, Protection of AC Lines , Auto reclosure, HVDC Lines and systems,
Busbar Protection, breaker failure Protection, Special protection Schemes, Protection for
Renewable energy sources, Fault Disturbance Recorder and Event logging, DC battery and
aux Power supply system, Switching devices , Communication system for Protection, Basics
for design of Protection schemes based on IEC 61850 standard, Validation, acceptance and
Field Testing which form important elements of the protection system.
The Central Board of Irrigation & Power wishes to acknowledge the valuable contributions made
by Expert Group under the Chairmanship of Shri S.G. Patki, Chairman CIGRE National Study
Committee B5 on Protection & Automation for preparation of this important document.
We also feel indebted to Expert Group members who are specialists in their respective
fields namely Shri Rajiv Krishnan, Shri Girish and Shri Nadeem Shaik from ABB, Shri Rajil
Srivastava, Shri Abhay Kumar and Shri B.B. Mukherjee from POWERGRID, Shri P.P. Francis,
Shri Subhash Thakur and Ms. Saroj Chelluri from NTPC, Shri S.K. Ray Mohopatra, CEA, Shri
H.B. Mukund, Essun Reyrolle, Shri M.V. Kini, Tata Power, Shri Uday Trivedi, Adani Power,
Shri Kamin Dave, Ashida, Shri Deepak Saxsena, Welspun Energy Limited, Shri Ritesh Bharat,
Alstom, Shri Kuldeep Tickoo, Siemens and Shri G.K. Papneja, Omicron.
The revision of Manual could be accomplished by the untiring efforts and invaluable contribution
of all the Members of the Experts Group we are also thankful to the Special Invitees/Specialists
on the subject belonging to various organizations for their special contributions for the revision
work.
We will be failing in our duty by not making special mention of Shri B.S. Palki, Former Chairman
CIGRE National Study Committee B5 on Protection & Automation and Advisor, ABB Ltd., who
has taken the onerous responsibility of synthesizing this manual. His special contribution in
the past in helping CBIP for preparation of this manual during the year 1998 & 2005 in the first
instance is indeed laudable.
I also appreciate very sincere efforts and contribution made our officers namely Shri P.P.
Wahi, Director and Shri S.K. Batra, Sr. Manager, CBIP for their utmost dedication for getting
this document revised & updated.
It is hoped that this Manual would serve as a useful and valuable guide for all the professionals
& stakeholders including Power utilities, Industries and Educational Institutions etc.
V.K. Kanjlia
Secretary
Contents
Page No.
FOREWORD (v)
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER 2 : FUNDAMENTALS AND LOCATION OF CTS AND VTS IN SUB-STATIONS 4
CHAPTER 3 : REQUIREMENTS 22
CHAPTER 4 : PROTECTION PERFORMANCE MONITORING 26
CHAPTER 5 : GENERATOR AND GENERATOR TRANSFORMER PROTECTION 32
CHAPTER 6 : POWER TRANSFORMERS, AUTO-TRANSFORMERS AND SHUNT REACTORS 51
CHAPTER 7 : PROTECTION OF TRANSMISSION CIRCUIT-LINES & CABLES AND AUTO RECLOSING 90
CHAPTER 8 : HVDC PROTECTION SYSTEM 133
CHAPTER 9 : BUSBAR PROTECTION AND LOCAL BREAKER BACK-UP PROTECTION (BREAKER FAILURE PROTECTION) 168
CHAPTER 10 : SPECIAL PROTECTION SCHEMES 187
CHAPTER 11 : PROTECTION OF ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS WITH RENEWABLE ENERGY RESOURCES 192
CHAPTER 12 : DISTURBANCE RECORDERS, ALARMS AND EVENT LOGGING 213
CHAPTER 13 : DC AUXILIARY SUPPLY SYSTEMS 231
CHAPTER 14 : SWITCHING DEVICES 236
CHAPTER 15 : PROTECTION SCHEMES USING TELECOMMUNICATION 238
CHAPTER 16 : BASICS FOR DESIGNING PROTECTION SCHEMES BASED ON IEC 61850 256
CHAPTER 17 : VALIDATION, ACCEPTANCE AND FIELD TESTING TECHNIQUES FOR TESTING OF PROTECTION RELAYS 302
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The Indian power system is growing steadily. In last decade (10th and 11th Five year plan) the installed
capacity has almost doubled. To match with the growing demand, transmission system is also expanding
with 765 kV and 400 kV AC lines , new long distance HVDC links and series compensation including TCSC
wherever feasible on existing 400 kV and 220 kV lines. With the development of regional grids and
interregional ties resulting into national grid, the power system is becoming more and more complex.
The complexity in the power system has further increased on account of high penetration of renewable
resources specially wind and solar plants of MW scale.
Along with this growth, requirement of high availability and reliable operation of large generating plants
with EHV and UHV transmission network assume tremendous importance in maintaining power system
stability for better grid operation. To realize the vision of “Reliable, Affordable and Quality Power for All”
some changes will be required in our approach towards integrated protection and automation system
planning.
The protection and automation system used in the network plays an important role in meeting this
requirement, preventing system collapse during major system disturbances, reducing outage time and
minimizing the possibility of damage to the machines and equipment. Utilities should install protection
systems that are dependable. Here, dependability is the probability of not failing to clear a power system
fault or abnormality.
There are very significant technology changes in the area of Protection and control. From Electronic static
relays, there was shift to digital microprocessor based relays and then further to modern Numerical relays.
The numerical technology has improved the protection functionality as well as protection schemes. This
has contributed to improve reliability as well as dependability of Relays. The information and data
communication capabilities of numerical relays provides vital inputs for operation of the grid subsequent to
a fault or power system disturbance. Configuration of the relays has become vital to ensure above objectives.
Recommendations contained herein for protection of E.H.V. system of 220 kV, 400 kV and 765 KV are
intended to be used by utilities in India, as a guide for minimum provisions at different voltage levels. The
manual also contains a section on Generator and Generator Transformer, HVDC, FACTS and Renewable
Energy protection. Additional or superior provisions can always be made by concerned utilities at their
discretion. Detailed specifications of each protection will have to be drawn by individual utilities while
framing purchase specifications. Major functional requirements and general setting criteria for various
protections have also been dealt with in this document. It may be noted that wherever setting ranges of
relays have been mentioned in this manual, these are intended to be indicative.
Following considerations have been taken into account while making these recommendations:
(i) Prevailing practices of various utilities in India and information about practices followed elsewhere in
the world.
(ii) Experiences with the prevailing protection practices. Special reference was taken to the recommendation
of the Protection Subcommittee of the Task force fromed by CEA subsequent to Major grid collapse of
North India in July 2012.
(iii) The state-of-art in the protection field and features of the presently available relays such that the
specified requirements may be complied with, by reputed manufacturers with their proven products
without any deviation and at reasonable costs Enhancing dependability of fault clearance system is
another objective of a protection scheme.
2 Manual on Power System Protection
When a fault occurs in the network a protective relay may fail to operate or a circuit breaker may fail to
open and interrupt the fault current. Such failures of a protective relay or a switching device may prevent
proper clearance of the fault.
The addition of a second main protection increases the availability and dependability of fault clearance
system. In addition, the provision of back-up protection that operates independently of specified devices in
the main protection system enhances this further. It can be generally said that provision of second main
protection and back-up protections enhances the dependability of the fault clearance system.
While the provision of second main protection and back-up protection enhances the dependability of fault
clearance system it increases the costs. Therefore there is often a tendency to choose to run the power
system without a reserve protection and adequate back-up protection in the network. At voltage levels of
220 kV and below this is often the case. Since the number of shunt faults is high, consequences of failure
to clear a fault may be serious and results in high disturbance costs that are far greater than the costs
involved in providing additional protections.
The disturbance costs include the following:
• Costs associated with the risk of injury to people and damage to third party property
• Costs associated with the risk of damage to power lines and other power apparatus
• Costs associated with the customer outages
• Costs associated with the voltage disturbances

• Costs associated with the customers’ complaints and ill will.
Therefore the utilities should base the decisions for provision of additional protection and back-up protection
considering the costs involved in terms of disturbances leading towards uncleared faults. Recommendations
made in this manual have been done considering the above. It is further suggested that the protection
engineer should keep this aspect in mind while reviewing protection system in any given case. Numerical
technology and IEC 61850 standard is revolutionalising the Protection and Automation applications. The
protection and control schemes previously deployed using wire based philosophies can be implemented
using IEC61850 mechanisms with improved performance, reliability and operational benefits.
The manual is structured as under :

• Chapter 2 defines some fundamental concepts of back-up protection.
• Chapter 3 describes briefly the protection requirement arising internally for Power system performance
and requirements for protective systems from external authorities, governmental and other agencies,
equipment manufacturers, insurance companies, standardization organizations, utilities and customers.
• Chapter 4 defines some performance indices for protection devices and switching devices.
• Chapter 5, 6, 7 deals with the different power system components such as: transmission circuits
(overhead lines and underground cables) power transformers and shunt reactors. Each chapter contains,
requirements on the protection system, practices of protection and a final section on back-up protection.
• Chapter 8 deals with Protection aspects of FACTS Elements like TCSC,FSC,SVCs, STATCOMs
• Chapter 9 deals Protection and control aspects of HVDC. This is new chapter.
• Chapter 10 deals with Busbar protection and breaker failure protection
• Chapter 11 deals with special protection schemes which have been applied as system protection to
prevent wide spread disturbances.This is new addition to protection manual.
Introduction 3
• Chapter 12 deals with protection and control aspects of Grid connected renewable generation that has
become very significant in size to Indian Power system.
• Chapter 13 deals with modern fault disturbance recording devices.

• Chapter 14 deals with CT/VT and CVT requirements.
• Chapter 15 deals with DC battery and auxiliary power supply system.
• Chapter 16 deals with the performance of switching devices.

• Chapter 17 deals with reliability and redundancy of telecommunication systems for protection schemes.
• Chapter 18 deals with Basics of designing protection schemes based on IEC61850 standard. This is
new additional to protection manual.
• Chapter 19 deals with Testing of protection schemes at factory and at sites.

While preparing the manual expert group referred to Reports of various working groups on Protection
under CIGRE SC B5.
The manual gives the state of art in the protection field and gives features of the presently available relays
such that the specified requirements are complied and objective of enhancing dependability of fault clearance
system can be achieved.
Finally it is hoped that the manual will help the protection engineers of various utilities in India in managing
the availability and reliability of the Protection.
CHAPTER 2
FUNDAMENTALS AND LOCATION OF CTS AND VTS IN

SUB-STATIONS
Section 2 (A) : FUNDAMENTALS
Primary protection is intended to operate when any fault or abnormal operating condition takes place in the
power system.
The provision of adequate protection is to detect and disconnect elements of the power system in the
event of fault and is an integral part of power system design.
Separation of the faulty section of the power system from the healthy section and minimizing the isolated
area prevents a wide spread system disturbance and minimizes shutdown of power supply.
The protection scheme actions will prevent expansion of the fault or minimize the consequences of the
fault including effects arising from failure of a relay or breaker. The abnormal phenomenon originated by
failure to operate a relay or a breaker to operate correctly, a sudden change of power flow, or splitting of
the system during the process of fault clearance, any of which may cause the expansion of the fault, and
the deterioration of the power system stability.
Requirements for the protection relays

(1) Fault clearance performance in respect of
– Speed;
– Selectivity;
– Sensitivity;
(2) Reliability; and
(3) Cost
SENSITIVITY : Sensitivity is a term used when referring to the minimum operating level (current, voltage,
power etc.) of relays or complete protection schemes. Relays or protection schemes are said to be sensitive
if their primary operating parameters are low.
SELECTIVITY : When a fault occurs, the protection scheme is required to trip only those circuit breakers
whose operation is required to isolate the fault. This property of selective tripping is also called ‘discrimination’.
SPEED : The function of protection systems is to isolate faults on the power system as rapidly as possible.
One of the main objectives is to safeguard continuity of supply by removing each disturbance before it
leads to widespread loss of synchronism and consequent collapse of the power system.
The additional functions that have been become available with the numerical technology
• metering, oscillography, sequence of events capture with time tagging,
• remote setting and monitoring through communications,

Fundamentals and Location of CTS and VTS in Sub-stations 5
• user configurability of tripping schemes and other control logic.
• Multiple setting groups for easy adaptability to network changes

• In spite of these additional functions, the required panel space and wiring is less than needed with the
previous technologies,
• the burden on the VTs and CTs is substantially reduced
• the systems have an ability for continuous self-checking.
Protective Zone
Protective zone is an important factor that determines selectivity among the performances in which a
protection relay should be required.
Unit protection provides a protective zone by the location of the CTs to detect faults only between the CT
locations as a well defined zone according to the sensitivity of the settings.
Non-unit protection (excluding directional comparison) has a zone which changes in accordance with the
setting values and is not constrained by other CT locations.
The coordination between protection relays is the procedure to ensure that all the protection relays operate
systematically to minimize the power system outage area against any fault, considering the operation
limits or restriction conditions. On the other hand, when a fault occurs in equipment
which the protective zone does not cover, it may not be cleared, or it may take longer time for the fault to
develop into the protective zone and then be cleared. Therefore a fundamental principle of protection is
that at least two different devices are capable of detecting any fault anywhere on the power system.
CT Arrangement
There are three kinds of arrangement of CTs.

In arrangement (1), a CT for busbar protection and a CT for line protection are installed at the line side
from the breaker. In this case, the busbar protection will operate for a fault between the CT and the
breaker, which should essentially be a line fault, so a part of the busbar will be blacked out. However, as
the fault is not totally cleared by the busbar protection, the fault will also need to be cleared by the remote
backup protection.
In arrangement (2), CTs for busbar protection and CT for power line protection are installed at the busbar
side of the CB. In this arrangement, when a fault occurs between the CT and the CB, which is originally a
busbar fault, the line protection will operate and therefore, the line will be out of operation. However, as the
fault is not totally cleared by the line protection, it will also need to be cleared by the remote backup
protection or locally by CBF if used.
In arrangement (3), the CTs are installed at both sides of the CB; that is the CT for line protection is
installed at busbar side of the CB and the CT for busbar protection is installed at line side of the CB. As
both the line protection and the busbar protection will operate against the fault between the CT and the CB
will be cleared at high speed.
The third arrangement is generally considered the best arrangement, because there is no dead zone for
fault detection between the CTs and the breaker as in the first two arrangements. However, each must
be considered in regards to the type of CT to be used (e.g. bushing or post), or the substation space.
Fault clearance scheme and Special Protection scheme :
Protection schemes are classified into two categories:

1. Fault clearance scheme : This comprises of Primary /Main Protection and Back up protection that
carries out isolation of faulty element of Power system
2. Special Protection Scheme: These are special schemes that prevents spread of disturbance and ensures
that all operating parameters are kept within allowable operating limits.
Primary /Main Protection : Main protection is installed for every equipment unit, such as a transmission
line, a busbar, a transformer etc
When a fault occurs on any part of the power system, the main protection closest to the fault must operate
faster than the other protection to minimize the extent of the power system that must be isolated to clear
the fault. As the protection zones must overlap, consideration must be given to how the selectivity is
achieved to not cause both zones to be tripped
Main protection is generally provided as independent duplicate protection at higher Power system voltages
where the risk of one system failing to operate correctly in the intended high speed would cause widespread
consequential damage or power system instability. This is generally referred to as Main 1 and Main 2, or X
and Y protection.
Main I and main II protection is therefore provided using:

• two independent CT cores at the same location
• two VT signals on independent circuits from the VT although may be derived from the same VT core
due to the difficulty of duplicating VT posts
• two relays of different operating principles or vendors e.g. distance and differential, two distance from
different vendors or two differential relays from different vendors
• two independent trip coils in a common circuit breaker
A back-up protection is intended to operate when a power system fault is not cleared, or an abnormal
condition is not detected, in the required time because of failure or inability of main protections to operate
or failure of the appropriate circuit-breakers) to trip. The back-up protection, by definition, is slower than
main protection. Back-up protection is installed to improve the dependability of the fault clearance system.
Here, dependability is the probability of not failing to clear a power system fault or abnormality.
Back-up protection shall operate when main protection fails to clear a fault. In such a case, the protection
may not operate correctly, the circuit breaker may not receive any tripping command or the circuit breaker
may fail to open and interrupt the fault current. Such failures of a protective relay or a switching device
may prevent proper clearance of the fault.
Sometimes a second main protection or duplicate protection, intended to operate if the main protection
system fails to operate or is temporarily out of service is provided. This, however, should not be mixed up
with back-up protection. The second main protection is there to increase the dependability of normal fault
clearing mechanism and it must always operate very selectively, while the back-up protection may operate
with less selectivity because it operates after some time delay.
The requirements on back-up protection cannot be independent of the requirements on the entire fault
clearance system.
Use of elementary form of the single-failure criterion is often done while planning protection system
arrangement. It requires that the failure of any one component in a fault clearance system should not
result in a complete failure to clear a power system fault or abnormality.
Back-up protection is an important function of the protection system, and its design needs to be coordinated
with the design of the main protection. In this process, it is suggested that the protection engineer should
work closely with the power system planners and designers.
The system planner should inform the protection engineer regarding assumptions made during system
design and requirements on fault clearance system at various voltage levels in the system. He must
inform him of the needs of the protection system that must fulfill, as for example, the total fault clearance
time.
The protection engineer must also be familiar with the following :
• System requirement and The system design criteria
• The plant specifications

• The failure rates of the protected plant
• The requirements of performance indices of the fault clearance system
• The requirements of reliability of protection equipment

• The probability that a switching device fails to interrupt the fault current.
The power system planner should help the protection engineer in formulating the requirements of the fault
clearance system. Points to be considered are the stability of the power system and the type of bus bar
arrangement and switching scheme. Protection engineers and the power system designers must co-ordinate
the demands on fault clearance system, as also the performance of station equipment and strike a balance
between technical and economical benefits and the risks associated with making the protection system
more complex.
2.1 FAULT CLEARANCE SYSTEMS
The basic task of any fault clearance system is to detect a specified class of power system faults and
abnormalities and to disconnect the associated item of substation or plant from the rest of the power
system. Figure 2.1 shows the components of a fault clearance system. Here TE stands for teleprotection
equipment.
The faulty component should be disconnected as fast as possible and with minimum disturbance to the
consumers and minimum damage to the power apparatus. An essential property of the fault clearance
system is reliability. Reliability of protection includes dependability and security of protection. Fault analysis
and relay co-ordination are important issues for the reliability of protection systems.
A power system fault is a power system abnormality that involves, or is the result of, failure of primary
equipment and normally requires the immediate disconnection of the faulty equipment from the rest of the
power system by tripping of the appropriate circuit breakers. Power system faults can be shunt, series or
combination faults.
A non-power system fault tripping is an unwanted tripping of a circuit breaker as a result of faults, other
than the power system faults. The unwanted operations of a protection in the absence of a power system
fault or the tripping of a breaker due to other secondary equipment failure or due to human error are
examples of non-power system fault.
Fig. 2.1 : The fault clearance system
2.2 BACK-UP PROTECTION
All elements in the fault clearance system do not always operate correctly. Protection relays may fail to
operate or may operate when they are not required to operate. Switching devices may fail to interrupt the
fault current. Common practice is to use several protection systems operating in parallel. Back-up protection
is intended to operate when a power system fault is not cleared, or abnormal condition is not detected, in
the required time because of failure or inability of other protections to operate or because of some other
fault in the main fault clearance system e.g., broken wire in cable from PT, broken wire in the cable from
relay to the CB trip coil or failure of the appropriate circuit breaker(s) to trip.
By providing back-up protection, it is possible to reduce the risk arising out of situation when a protection
relay or a switching device fails to operate.
The back up protections can be classified as under.

• Remote back-up
The main protection and the back-up protection may reside in different substations. It is installed at the
remote substation primarily to protect its own substation and the power line, but is also to able to detect
faults that would normally be expected to be cleared by the local protection. The remote back up relay
will therefore have a slower operating time for faults in the local substation but will operate if the local
protection system (relay and breaker) fail to clear the fault.
• Local back-up
It is installed locally in the same substation and operates when the main relay fails to operate for a
fault. These relays generally have a slower operating time than the main protection perhaps due to
different operating characteristics or due to grading between the relays.
The local back up protections can be further classified as under.
Circuit local back-up protection

The protection senses the same current and voltage as the main protection.
Substation local back-up protection
The protection uses current different from the one used by the main protection.
Ideal back-up protection should be completely independent of the main protection. Current transformers,
voltage transformers, auxiliary tripping relay, trip coils and auxiliary DC supply systems should be
duplicated. This ideal condition is rarely attained in practice. The following compromises are usually
made:
• There is only one current transformer but it has several cores. One core and its associated secondary
winding energise each protection. Some times one CT secondary winding feeds more than one
protection.
• Common voltage transformers are normally used because duplication would involve a considerable
increase in cost, because of the voltage transformers themselves, and because of the increased
space that would have to be provided. Since security of the VT output is vital, it is desirable that the
supply to each protection is either from separate cores or separately fused as close to the VT as
possible and continuously supervised by a relay that will give alarm on failure of the supply and, where
appropriate, prevent an unwanted operation.
• Trip supplies to the two protections should be separately fused. Duplication of tripping batteries and of
trip coils on circuit breakers is sometimes provided.
2.3 REMOTE BACK-UP PROTECTION
Remote back up protection is the ideal form of back-up protection, in systems where it can function
properly. Second and third zones of distance relays are examples of remote back up. Sometimes
variations of the in feed at the remote bus bars may virtually prevent the application of remote back-
up protection.
The advantage of remote back-up is that it is completely independent of the protection relays, current
transformers and voltage transformers of the main protection system. It is also independent of the auxiliary
DC supply system and the breakers in the substation. There are hardly any hardware failures that can
affect both the main protection and the back-up protection. The setting of Remote Back-up protection
relays to cover the fault outside the first zone of protection beyond the remote bus bars due to infeeds to
the fault from other parallel sources are quite complicated and sometimes less selective.
2.4 CIRCUIT LOCAL BACK UP PROTECTION
The circuit local back up protection uses the same current and voltage as the main protection. Delayed
directional or non directional over current and earth fault relays that are provided in the same circuit are
examples of circuit local back up protection.
2.5 SUBSTATION LOCAL BACK UP PROTECTION
A substation back up protection is a time-delayed protection provided in the same substation but
normally fed by a CT different from the one feeding the main protection. Over current protections
provided in the incoming feeders providing back up to protections in the outgoing feeders in a substation
is one example of substation local back-up protection. It must be noted that in a meshed network it
may be difficult to obtain back up protection of EHV lines by means of substation local back up
protection.
In EHV substations it is possible to provide substation local back up protection by reverse looking elements
of distance relay.
2.6 DUPLICATED MAIN PROTECTIONS
In EHV and UHV networks it is common practice to use duplicated line protections, viz.: Maini, Main 2
protections. Since the current transformers, the voltage transformers and the breakers are the expensive
components in the fault clearance system it may be difficult to justify the cost for their duplication. Figure 2.2
shows example of modern line protection arrangement suggested.
• Block-1 in Figure presents the first main protection, Main-1

• Block-2 represents the second main protection, Main-2.
Block-3 represents the teleprotection equipment for Main-1 Block-4 represents the teleprotection equipment
for Main-2 Block-5 represents the telecommunication equipment for Main-1 Block-6 represents the
telecommunication equipment for Main-2.
Fig. 2.2 : Duplicated main protections
2.7 BREAKER FAILURE PROTECTION
Breaker failure protection is part of the local back-up protection. The breaker failure protection has to trip
the adjacent breakers when the main breaker does not interrupt the fault current. The most common, and
simplest, breaker failure protection consists of a timer, which the protection starts when it operates. If the
fault current persists for longer time than the setting of the timer, the breaker failure protection gives a trip
command to adjacent breakers. Figure 2.3 shows the basic decision process in any breaker failure protection.
The retrip signal shown here is optional.
Fig. 2.3 : Flow diagram for breaker failure protection

2.8 RECOMMENDATION FOR APPLICATION OF SINGLE FAILURE CRITERION
It is recommended to apply the single- failure criterion in the planning of the fault clearance system. An
elementary form of the single-failure criterion requires that the failure of any one component in a fault
clearance system should not result in a complete failure to clear a power system fault or abnormality. The
single-failure criterion can be applied as follows:
• Assume that the power system is either in its normal switching state or that one line is out of service.
Assume that a power system fault occurs on the power system. Consider the following types of faults.
Three-phase fault
Phase-to-earth fault
Phase-to-phase fault
Open conductor or broken conductor fault
Assume that there is a fault in the fault clearance system (in substation elements). Consider one of the
following types of faults in the fault clearance system.
Loss of input from a voltage transformer,
Loss of input from a current transformer,
A failure to operate of a protection relay,

A blown DC fuse,
An interruption of a tripping circuit
A failure of remote end communication (especially line differential protection)

A failure to operate of a switching device.
• Check if with the above fault(s), the fault clearance system clears the power
system fault at pre-defined locations considering the following types of faults on system elements:
A line fault
A bus bar fault
A fault in power transformer

A fault in the shunt reactor
Add second main protection or back-up protection until the fault clearance system clears al the faults.
• Check if the healthy lines and healthy items of plant can withstand the fault current for the above
cases. Add second main protection, back-up protection or reinforce the primary equipment until it
withstands the fault current during the fault clearance time.
The protection engineer must carry out a more detailed analysis to check the above cases under different
outage conditions for which the system has been planned. Examples of outages to be considered are
outage of a line, outage of a power transformer, outage of a generator etc.
GUIDELINES FOR PROTECTION SYSTEM ENGINEERING
2.0 GENERAL
Some broad guidelines for Engineering of Protection System in addition to engineering recommendations
made in various sections, are given below and could be refined if felt necessary by the Utility according to
its specific needs and practices.
2.1 GR. A AND GR. B PROTECTION
Wherever two sets of DC sources are available, to obtain redundancy and to be able to take protection out
for maintenance, while equipment is in service, the relays are electrically and physically segregated into
two groups. Grouping is done to the extent possible in such a way that each group can independently carry
out protective functions with near equal redundancy. Interconnection between these two groups shall not
generally be attempted. However if found absolutely necessary such interconnection shall be kept to the
bare minimum.
Even in cases when only one set of battery source is available segeration of protections and trip circuits in
two groups may be considered by giving DC supplies through separate fuses.
2.2 TRIP UNIT
In case of segregation being made as indicated above, scheme associated with each circuit breaker is
provided with two sets of trip units, one in Gr A and one in Gr.B. Each set consists of one unit for 1/3 phase
tripping and another for 3 phase tripping only. 1/3 phase tripping unit and 3 phase tripping units are initiated
by functions as described below. However, in case the protection relay itself is having sufficient number of
trip duty contacts, then separate trip units will not be necessary.
2.2.1 1 ph & 3 ph trip (Protections which start auto recloser)
– Main I Line Protection

– Main II Line Protection
These units shall be applicable for line circuits only and shall be with self reset type contacts
2.2.2 3 ph trip (Protections which block auto reclosure)
– Direct trip receive

– Line reactor protection
– Bus bar protection
– Transformer protection
– Overvoltage protection
– Back up protections
These units shall be hand reset type

2.2.3 Direct Trip of Remote End Breaker
In line with the present 400 kV practice it is recommended that direct trip signal is sent to remote end under
following conditions.
(i) When LBB relay operates

(ii) Reactor protection and 0/V protection
2.3 DC DISTRIBUTION
Since the availability of even the best engineered protection depends upon the integrity of the DC auxiliary
supply, considerable care has to be given to the design of a system which will retain the reliability of the
protection system as a whole, under all conditions. Secondly from an operational point of view, it is essential
that it is possible to work on any part of the protection system with full security, while not disturbing the rest
of the protective system.
Arising out of these considerations, following guidelines for designing a suitable DC distribution system
have been set forth.
2.3.1 For EHV stations there shall be two separate battery systems available for protection, control and
tripping/closing operations.
2.3.2 Distribution of DC supply shall be done bay wise to feed the following:
(a) Protection
(b) CB functions
(c) Isolator/earth switch functions

(d) Annunciation/Indications
(e) Monitoring functions (Disturbance Recorder, Fault Locator, Event Logger etc.) when these are not
integral part of protection
2.3.3 (a) Protection Function
For each group of protection (i.e. Group A and Group B relays) separate DC sources are recommended.
(b) CB Functions
Trip coil 1&2 shall be fed from separate sources. Closing coil can be from either of these two sources.
(c) Isolator/Earth switch

These associated with any one circuit shall be fed from one of the two DC sources. In the case of a 1
& 1/2 CB arrangement, the Isolator/Earth switch associated with the tie CB can be fed from either
Source 1 or 2.
(d) Annunciation & Indication
For each bay, these functions can be fed from either one of the 2 sources. Each function shall be fed
however through separate feeds.
(e) Monitoring Functions
These shall be grouped in 3 groups
(i) Disturbance Recorders

(ii) Fault Locators
(iii) Event Loggers
All the three groups shall be fed through separate feeds from either of the two sources. This is to enable
the full availability of these equipment irrespective of that of the protections.
2.3.4 General Notes
1. As to how the separate D.C. feeds are to be taken from the sources, there are two alternatives.
(a) Through separate feeds from the board to each circuit panel
(b) Through a limited no of feeds to a separate panel of the relay or control board (Exclusively meant
for marshalling the DC circuits for the various relay panels).
The choice between (a) or (b) is left to the utilities as per their individual practices.
2. Sub-fusing of the DC circuits shall be done with care since blowing of the fuse will have to be monitored.
Also such sub-fusing shall be kept to the minimum and can be augmented with isolating links as
required.
3. Selection of sources in the event of one supply to a function failing is to be done with care, because if
the fault lies downstream one may lose both supplies.
4. As a rule every DC supply going through fuse should be supervised with a no-volt relay. For trip circuits
where separate trip circuit supervision relays are provided it is not necessary to provide separate DC
supervision relays.
5. MCBs of adequate break-up capacity can also be used instead of fuses.
2.4 CABLING
It is recommended that:
(i) Separate cables are used for AC & DC circuit
(ii) Separate cables are used for DC 1 & DC 2 circuits
(iii) For different cores of CT & CVT separate cables shall be used.
15
Section 2 (B)
LOCATION OF CTS AND VTS IN SUB-STATIONS
2B.0 GENERAL
Instrument transformers (CTs and VTs) are used to obtain measured quantities of current and voltage in
appropriate form for use in control, protection and measuring equipment such as Energy meters, indicating
instruments, protective relays, fault locators, fault recorders, synchronizers. These are installed in different
bays such as line, transformer, bus coupler bays and also at the busbar.
2B.0 LOCATION OF CTS AND VTS IN DIFFERENT SUB-STATION ARRANGEMENTS
2B.1 Given below are some examples of different bus configurations showing suitable location of CTs
and VTs.
Fig. 2B.1 : Double busbar arrangement

Fig. 2B.2 : Double Main with Transfer bus arrangement
mmm
3-Phas
Fig. 2B.3 : Double breaker arrangement

Location of CTS and VTS in Sub-stations 17
Fig. 2B.4 : One and half breaker rrangement
Fig. 2B.5 : One and half breaker arrangement (alternative arrangement with 5 CTs)
B2.2 CURRENT TRANSFORMERS
Some explanatory notes and comments with reference to above are given below regarding location of
CTs.
B2.2.1 Double Bus Arrangement (Ref. Fig.4)
The CTs shall be placed near the circuit breakers (CBs) and on the line side. The detection zones of line
relays and busbar relays start at the CTs. It is advantageous if these two points are close to each other. In
the improbable case of a fault between the CT and CB the busbar protection will detect and clear the fault.
B2.2.2 Double Main and Transfer Bus Arrangement (Ref:Fig.5)
It is advantageous to locate the CTs on the line side of the disconnectors for Line and Transformer bays. In
this way the protective relay connected to the CT will remain connected to the line or Transformer when it
is switched over to the transfer busbar.
A separate CT is required to be provided in the Transfer bus coupler bay to obtain selective tripping for
faults on Transfer bus.
B2.2.3 Bus Coupler and Bus Sectionalizer Bays (Ref. Fig.4 and Fig.5)
A set of CT is necessary to enable different busbar protection zones to be formed. The protection can be
arranged to give complete fault clearing with a short time-delay (L.B.B. time) for faults between CB and
CT. Sometimes CTs on the two sides of CB are employed by some utilities but are usually not considered
necessary. Therefore, only one set of CTs is recommended.
B2.2.4 Double Breaker Station (Ref: Fig.l)
It is usual to locate the CTs on the line side after the CBs. The two CTs shall be identical. To get the line
current the secondary currents of the two CTs are summated.
B2.2.5 One and a Half Breaker Station (Ref. Fig. 2 and Fig.3)
Like the double breaker station, the CTs are located close to the CBs. At the central CB (Tie CB) two CT
sets are shown. This arrangement utilizes 4 CTs however it is also possible to use a single set of CT. with
the tie CB thus reducing number of CTs to 3 per diameter. The centre CT in this case will have to be a non-
standard one and therefore 3 CT arrangement is not recommended at present but can be reviewed at a
later date.
Fig.3 shows alternative way of locating the CTs. This arrangement requires 5 CTs. The advantages with
this arrangement are:
– Paralleling of two CTs to the main line protection is not required. This gives better transient response.
– Separate stub protection can be connected
Presently there are many installations with 4 CT arrangement and performance has been satisfactory.
Therefore, it is recommended that 4 CT arrangement is continued to be adopted.
B2.3 VOLTAGE TRANSFORMERS
B2.3.1 Line CVTs
CVTs are used for metering, protection and synchronization. Located at the line entry theyalso enable
indication of voltage on a line energized from the opposite end. CVTs can also be used as coupling
capacitors for power line carrier (PLC). They are then to be located at the line side of the line traps and line
earthing switches, as shown in Fig. 5.
For 400 kV level it is recommended that each line bay is provided with CVTs all the three phases. Even for
220 kV substations it is preferable to provide three phase CVTs in each phase for each line bay. However,
depending on utility practice CVTs in one phase may also be provided in which case protections will have
to be connected to Bus VTs.
B2.3.2 Bus CVTs
Three phase VTs/CVTs on the busbars provide input for directional relays and reference voltage for
synchronization. These VTs will have to be selected by using voltage selection scheme.
B2.4 CT/VT EARTHING
CT/VT secondary neutrals should be earthed at one point only. VT secondary neutral earthing is done at
equipment itself. However, it is preferable to earth the CT secondary neutral in the control/protection
cubicle in order to provide maximum security to the operating personnel.
B2.5 CT POLARITY
As a practice the PI terminal of the CT shall be towards the bus and P2 away from the bus.
3.0 EXAMPLES OF CT, VT LOCATION
Examples of a double main and Transfer bus configuration showing line, Transformer, Main Bus coupler
and Transfer bus coupler bays and another of one and half bus configuration for a Line with reactor and
Transformer diameter are shown in figs. 6 & 7 to illustrate location of CTs and CVTs and utilisation of
various cores based on the above recommendations.
CHAPTER 3
REQUIREMENTS
The protection engineer has to understand requirements that are expected from the protection system
before deciding the arrangements for it. Here the requirements can be grouped under two categories:
• External requirements
• Power system requirements
3.1 EXTERNAL REQUIREMENTS
External requirements for protective systems encompass a wide range of non-technical considerations put
on the protection engineer by some external authorities. These considerations fall in the following six categories:
• Requirements imposed by various governmental and other agencies regarding safety.

• Requirements imposed by manufacturers of the primary equipment in order to validate equipment
warranties.
• Requirements by insurance companies who underwrite equipment failures.
• Legal requirements to meet “prudent utility practice and industry standards” in the event that primary
equipment failures result in personal injury or property damage and legal action is taken against the
utility by the parties incurring damage.
• Requirements for the safety grounding systems.
• General power quality requirements from the customer
• Grid codes for Transmission connectivity - Indian Electricity Grid Code 1st April 2010 and Transmission
planning criterion
Some of these requirements may not be imposed or felt at present by the protection engineers in India. But
as and when these are introduced by the concerned authorities to meet the requirements of the system as
a result of deregulation and restructuring coming into force, the appropriate protection application
commensurate with the changed environment will have to made by the concerned authorities. The following
paragraphs give some more details of these requirements.
3.1.1 Safety Regulations
Electrical Safety Regulations may require some back-up protections. These requirements are intended to
meet the minimum requirements associated with public safety.
3.1.2 Equipment Warranties
Utilities may obtain warranty as a part of purchase agreements. The manufacturer has the responsibility to
replace damaged equipment and may require the utility to provide a minimum level of protection.
3.1.3 Insurance Requirements
Devices may be covered by insurance. The insurance companies pay the cost of replacing failed equipment
and may require minimum levels of protection.
Requirements 23
3.1.4 Industry Standards
In some cases personal injury and property damage liabilities are decided in court. The court’s decision
may be based on a review of protection standards. If the utility has not met the minimum levels of protection,
they may be held liable for the appropriate damages.
3.1.5 Prudent Utility Practice
Another common case against the utility is based on a review of prudent utility practice. If one utility uses
lower levels of protection than other utilities, it is argued that the utility is not following prudent utility
practice and they may be held liable for the appropriate damages.
3.1.6 Safety Grounding
Care is to be taken to provide for appropriate step and touch potentials during ground faults as also control
circuit transients associated with fault switching or even normal operations. Short clearance time is
advantageous because the risk of electric shock is greatly reduced and the risk of severe injury or death is
greatly reduced if the duration of a current flow through the body is very brief.
3.1.7 Power Quality
Power quality requirements are changing as competition increases. Potential customers will start asking
for reliability data of the electricity supply before they establish new plants. Some process industries
cannot tolerate even very short system disturbances.
3.2 POWER SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
In general protection system criteria must meet the planning and operating criteria requirements while
meeting the specific requirements of the power system element being protected and preventing damage
to other power system elements supplying fault current.
Over tripping of protective system must be limited to events where more than (n-1) dimensioning can be
tolerated by the system. Failure of the protective system to operate during fault events must be eliminated
by using appropriate back up protection to fulfill the requirement of planning criteria.
Duplicate protection and back-up protection must meet all of the design requirements of the planning
criteria at a minimal cost.
3.3 NORMS USED TRANSMISSION PLANNING IN INDIAN POWER SYSTEM
The planning and operational requirements and security standards for the purpose of transmission planning
for Indian power system are brought out in the Document titled “Manual on Transmission Planning
Criteria” issued by Central Electricity Authority, New Delhi in January 2013 and this may be referred for
more details. This document may be further subjected to revisions for updating in view of system
expansion.
Following requirement has been spelt out pertaining to special Protection schemes:
– To ensure security of the grid, the extreme/rare but credible contingencies should be identified from
time to time and suitable defense mechanism such as Load shedding, Generation rescheduling, Islanding,
special Protection schemes (SPS) etc may be worked out to mitigate adverse impact application of
series capacitors, FACTs devices and phase shifting Transformers (PSTs) in existing and new
Transmission systems to increase Power Transfer Capacity
Further, appropriate Protection schemes are required for specific design/specifications pertaining to…
– Reconductoring with High ampacity conductors

– Use of Multi voltage ,multi circuit transmission towers
– Use of HVDC
– Use of GIS
– Meet N-1 criterion without system parameters crossing allowable limits
– N-2 contingency with SPS to restore operation within allowable limits within one and half hour
– System should survive faults in 400KV system for 100ms and 220/132KV system for 160ms.
3.4 PROTECTION CRITERIA
Protection criteria are developed and derived from the Planning and Operating Criteria. The purpose is to
meet the dimensioning requirements associated with faults so as to prevent loss of stability, loss of
synchronism, voltage collapse, undesired load shedding or unacceptable frequency and voltage excursions.
Some utilities may want to do preventive maintenance with the primary equipment in service.
Utilities may desire to provide for loss of one system element (such as equipment failure) during peak load
conditions. If this be the case such planning criteria should be made known to the protection engineer. It is
vital that there is very close collaboration between the planning and protection engineers at the very early
stages of the projects to identify the protection requirements for the envisaged projects.
There are three types of criteria, as mentioned below, that the protective system must meet.
• Criteria specific to the equipment within the protective zone must be met. These are construction
specific requirements such as tank rupture requirements of capacitor cans.
• Criteria specific to other equipment supplying fault current to the faulted element. These are fault
current withstand requirements such as the maximum fault current duration of a power transformer.
• Criteria specific to the stability of the network. These are topology specific time limits associated with
voltage and transient stability.
Power system faults subject the power generating units to voltage excursions and dips. If the power system
fault occurs close to the large power stations, there is a risk that many power generating units could get
disconnected from the transmission networks. This means that a correctly cleared fault may cause an
outage if the power-generating unit does not withstand severe voltage dips. Back-up delayed clearance of
a power system fault close to the power plant may cause a severe outage. General voltage stability
requirements determine the duration of the fault and are system configuration dependent.
3.5 FAULT CURRENT WITHSTAND CAPABILITY
No utility can specify that the power system elements specially CT, Isolators and circuit breakers besides
the power transformers shall withstand only fault currents associated with normal fault clearance and take
the risk of circuit breaker failures. The system elements are usually specified to withstand the fault currents
associated with back-up clearance times of 1.0 and 3.0 seconds.
The power system elements must withstand both normal rated load currents and fault currents specified.
The rated peak withstand current and the rated short time withstand current characterize the components.
Fault currents are usually small in the initial stages of development of power system. Normally, the magnitude
of the fault current increases as the system develops. The magnitude of fault currents influences the
dimensioning of the power system components like transformers, circuit breakers and other primary
Requirements 25
equipment. High short circuit currents affect primarily the mechanical and thermal dimensioning of the
power system components.
The fault clearance system cannot normally influence the peak value of the fault current. The properties of
the fault clearance system can, however, influence the duration of the fault current. Thus, the fault clearance
time influences the heating of conductors during disturbances. The protection engineer must know how
long the power system components can withstand the fault currents without permanent damage. In general,
the components of the power system are specified to withstand the fault current duration associated with
back-up fault clearance as specified in national and international standards. For example, transformer
through fault capability is outlined in ANSI/IEEE C57.12.00 and IEC Publications 76-5.
The requirements in respect of Indian Power System for fault withstand currents of the power system
elements are brought out in the document entitled “Manual on Transmission Planning Criteria” of Central
Electricity Authority, New Delhi, January 2013. Some details from this are reproduced below.
Table 3.1 Rated breaking current capability of switchgear at different voltages
System voltage Fault level Duration
132 kV 31.5 1 sec.

220 kV 40 1 sec.
400 kV 40/50/63 kA 1 Sec.
765 kV 40 kA 1 Sec.
3.6 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SYSTEM PLANNERS AND PROTECTION ENGINEERS
For reasons brought out above, it is recommended that the system planners and designers assess the
requirements for 132 kV, 220 kV, 400 kV and 765 kV systems and coordinate with the protection engineers
to ensure that these requirements are fulfilled. Sometimes such requirements may have to be studied on
case-to-case basis where general guidelines may not be sufficient to meet the system requirements and
suitable measures taken. In view of rapid generation expansions there could be certain locations in generation
complexes where fault level may exceed the specified short time current rating. In such cases suitable
measures are required to be taken by the system planners to contain and limit the fault current through
effective use of Fault Current Limiters.
CHAPTER 4
PROTECTION PERFORMANCE MONITORING
The task of fault clearance system is to detect power system faults and abnormalities, identify the faulty
item of the plant, and interrupt the fault currents as quickly and reasonable. In order to assess quantitatively
the reliability of fault clearance systems, there have to be a set of performance indices. For this purpose,
certain indices for protection devices and switching devices are recommended and these are described
below.
4.1 CORRECT PERFORMANCE
To describe what is meant by correct performance and what is incorrect performance by a protective
system consider the following three cases :
• Consider a fault in the power system for which the protection system provided should operate. If the
protection system operates and issues a correct tripping command, it should be taken as correct
performance and if it does not issue tripping command then it should be taken as incorrect performance
(non operation)
• Consider a fault in the power system for which the protection should not operate. In this case if the
protection system operates and issues a trip command then it is considered as incorrect performance.
• Consider a case when neither a power system fault nor an abnormality exists and therefore the protection
should not operate. In this case the protection system operates incorrectly & if it issues a tripping
command then it is considered as incorrect performance (mal-operation).
4.2 DEPENDABILITY OF PROTECTIONS
The dependability of protection is defined as the probability for a protection of not having a failure to
operate under given conditions for a given time interval. An index of dependability should measure the
ability of the protection system to operate when there is a power system fault for which the protection shall
operate.
Index, D of dependability is defined as follows:
Here
Nf is the number of failures to operate at internal power system faults
Ns is the number of internal power system faults
Nc is the number of correct operations during the given time interval.

The performance index D is to measure the performance of protection when there is a power system fault.
Protection Performance Monitoring 27
4.3 SECURITY OF PROTECTIONS
The Security of protection is defined as the probability for a protection of not having an unwanted operation
for a given time interval. An index of security should measure the ability of the protection not to operate
when it should not.
Index, S of security is defined as follows:
Where
Nc is the number of correct operations
Nu is the number of unwanted operations of the protection during the given time interval.
Here Nu is sum of Nus and Nuu, where Nus is the number of unwanted operations of the protection in a given
time interval without any power system fault or abnormality and Nuu is number of operations of a protection
in a given time interval when there is a power system fault or abnormality for which protection should not
have operated.
The performance index, S is to measure the ability of protection of not having an unwanted operation in a
given time interval. It measures the performance of protection both when there is a power system fault or
abnormality and when there is no power system fault.
4.4 RELIABILITY OF PROTECTIONS
The reliability of a protection system is defined as the probability that a protection can perform a required
function under given conditions for a given time interval. The reliability of protection is the ability of not
having an incorrect operation. It is the combined ability of not having a failure to operate and of not having
an unwanted operation.
Index, R of reliability is defined as follows:

where,
Nc is the number of correct operations
Nf is the number of incorrect operations during the given time interval.

Here N, is sum of Nf and Nu, where Nf is the number of failures to operate on internal power system faults in a
given time interval and Nu is the number of unwanted operations of the protection during the given time interval.
4.5 DEPENDABILITY OF SWITCHING DEVICES
The dependability of a switching device is defined as the probability of not having a failure to interrupt the
fault current when the device has received a trip command.
The dependability of a switching device is defined as follows:

where
Nc is the number of correct responses when the device has received an operate command.
Nf is the number of failure to respond.
4.6 FAULT CLEARANCE TIME
The performance indices described above measures the probability of not having a failure to operate, the
ability of not having an unwanted operation and the probability of breaking or making the fault current. The
performance indices do not explicitly measure the speed of operation. For measuring the speed of operation
following is suggested:
Fault clearance time, T, is defined as:

Tf = Max {Tfi }
Where ,i =
l....N
Here, Tfi Is the fault clearance time at terminal (i) of the protected section, and N is the number of terminals
of the protected section.
Equation below defines the fault clearance time, Tf.i at terminal (i) of the protected section:
Here, Tri is the operating time of the protection system at terminal (i), and Tbi is the operation time of the
switching device at terminal (i). When necessary, Tr., includes the operating time of the teleprotection
channel.
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate the concept of the fault clearance time, Tf and the fault clearance time, Tfi at
the terminal (i) of the protected section.
4.7 TYPICAL EXAMPLE FOR CALCULATION OF VARIOUS PERFORMANCE INDICES
Performance of Transformer and Reactor protections during a given time interval
Type of operation Number of operation

Correct operation (Nc) 130
Incorrect operation (Nuu) 3
Failure to operate (Nf) 0

Operation causing non-power system
fault tripping (Nus) 17
Fig. 4.1 : Single-line diagram for three-terminal line
200 -20 0 20 40 60 100

Fig. 4.2 : The fault clearance times, 1, and TM
4.8 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MEASUREMENT OF PERFORMANCE INDICES AND ACTIONS FOR

IMPROVEMENT
It is recommended that utilities have a system of measuring and keeping record of the performance indices
for:
• Protection devices
• Switching devices
This can be valuable data for taking decisions regarding maintenance, modernizing and retrofitting of
switching and protection system.
It is recommended that once this practice is adopted and sufficient data is collected, a system of
benchmarking the Indices be introduced by utilities and actions be taken for improvement as considered
necessary. The approach should be to compare the indices collected in a particular period with the targets
set, analyse why there are differences and what actions can be taken to bridge the gaps and then take
actions for improvement. These actions can be regarding revision in relay settings, better maintenance
practices, modernizing and retrofitting of switching and protection system etc., as felt appropriate. The
targets can then be set higher and further actions be taken for improvement.
While evaluating this data apart from looking at protection devices and switching devices, attention should
also be given to remaining part of the fault clearing system viz., D.C. supplies, teleprotection signaling,
healthiness of tripping cables, termination etc. This will help to improve the design of fault clearance system.
In view of large scale deployment of Numerical Relays in the system, the tripping on account of Relay
algorithm problem, Configuration Problem, Relay Setting Advice & Adoption problem are on rising trend.
Hence, it is essential to track these tripping so as to initiate appropriate corrective action.
Following the Power system collapse of North and North-east India in July 2012, the sub-committee on
Protection coordination had made following recommendations to ensure reliable protection performance.
4.9 ADOPTION OF RELAY SETTING AND FUNCTIONAL VERIFICATION OF SETTING AT SITE
Protection application department shall ensure through field testing group that the final relay settings are
exactly adopted in the relays at field. There should be clear template for the setting adoption duly authorized
and approved by the field testing in charge.
No relay setting in the field shall be changed without proper documentation and approval by the protection
application department.. Protection application department shall periodically verify the implemented setting
at site through an audit process.
4.10 STORAGE AND MANAGEMENT OF RELAY SETTINGS
With the application of numerical relays, increased system size & volume of relay setting, associated data
to be handled is enormous. It is recommended that utilities shall evolve proper storage and management
mechanism (version control) for relay settings.. Along with the relay setting data, IED configuration file
should also be stored and managed.
4.11 ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS OF MAJOR PROTECTION TRIPPING (MULTIPLE ELEMENT

OUTAGE) ALONGWITH CORRECTIVE & IMPROVEMENT MEASURES
The routine trippings are generally analysed by the field protection personnel. For every tripping, a trip
report along with associated DR and event logger file shall be generated. However, for major tripping in
the system, it is recommended that the protection application department shall perform the root cause
analysis of the event.
The root cause analysis shall address the cause of fault, any mal-operation or non-operation of relays,
protection scheme etc.
The root cause analysis shall identify corrective and improvement measures required in the relay setting,
protection scheme or any other changes to ensure the system security, reliability and dependability of the
protection system.
Protection application group shall keep proper records of corrective and improvement actions taken.
4.12 PERIODIC PROTECTION AUDIT
Periodic audit of the protection system shall be ensured by the protection application team.
The audit shall broadly cover the three important aspect of protection system, namely:
• the philosophy,
• the setting,
• the healthiness of Fault Clearing System.

The sub-committee also recommended a model checklist that can be followed for carrying out the Protection
Audit.
CHAPTER 5
GENERATOR AND GENERATOR TRANSFORMER

PROTECTION
5.1 GENERAL
5.1 Generators are designed to run at a high load factor for a large number of years and permit certain
incidences of abnormal working conditions. The machine and its auxiliaries are supervised by monitoring
devices to keep the incidences of abnormal working conditions down to a minimum. Despite the
monitoring, electrical and mechanical faults may occur, and the generators must be provided with
protective relays, which, in case of a fault, quickly initiate a disconnection of the machine from the
system and, if necessary, initiate a complete shutdown of the machine.
5.2 Recommendations contained herein for electrical protective systems of generator and generator
transformer are intended to be used for generators of 10 MVA and above. It describes the requirements
of various protections, special comments to help in determining application of these protections, for
units of various types and sizes, setting criteria and tripping principles.
5.3 Generator protection system has evolved from standalone discrete electromechanical relays to static
relays and now to multifunction generator protection (MFGP) relay. Because of its distinctive advantages,
MFGP, are being retrofitted even in older machines. As most of the protection functions are available in
both Main I and II relays, Main I and Main II relays may be specified to be on different hardware platform.
The protection requirements of machines used in pumped storage schemes need further attention and
the recommendations given below do not cover these details.
5.4 Generator can be connected to the primary transmission system in following two ways:
(i) Unit Scheme
In this scheme no switchgear is provided between the generator and generator transformer which are
treated as a unit. A unit auxiliary transformer is tapped off at the interconnection, for the supply of
power to the auxiliary plant.
(ii) Generator Circuit Breaker Scheme

In this scheme, a generator circuit breaker is provided between the generator and generator transformer:
5.5 In view of generator unit being a complex system, various electrical hazards-require consideration.
These are given below:
– Stator insulation failure

– Overvoltage
– Rotor faults
– Loss of synchronism
– Over/under frequency
– Overload
– Unbalanced loading
Generator and Generator Transformer Protection 33
– Loss of excitation
– Reverse power/Low Forward Power
– Inadvertent energization of generator
5.6 Following are the various protections recommended for the generator and generator transformer
protection.
Type of Fault ANSI Device No. Protection Functions
GENERATOR STATOR
Short Circuits 87 G Generator differential
87 GT Overall differential
21 G Minimum impedance (alternatively
51/27 G Over current/under voltage)
Asymmetry Stator 46G Negative sequence
Overload Earth fault 51G Overload
Stator 64Gl 95% stator earth fault
64G2 100% stator earth fault
Loss of excitation 40 G Loss of excitation
Out of step 98 G Pole slip
Monitoring 32 G/37 G Low forward power/reverse power
(Double protection for large generators)
Blade fatigue 81 G Minimum frequency
Inter turn fault 95 G Over voltage or over current
Mag. Circuits 24G Over fluxing volt/Hz
Higher voltage 59 G Over voltage
Accidental energization 27/50 G Dead machine
Monitoring 60 G PT fuse failure
GENERATOR ROTOR
Rotor ground 64 F Rotor earth fault
GENERATOR TRANSFORMER
Short circuits 87 51GT Overall Generator –
87 T Transformer differential
Overcurrent Transformer differential
Ground fault 51 NGT Earth fault over-current
87 NT Restricted earth fault
Overhang 87 HV HV winding cum overhang differential.
UNIT AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER
Short circuit 87 UAT Transformer differential
51 UAT Over-current
Ground fault 51 NUAT Residual over-current
64 UAT Restricted earth fault
The transformer guards like Buchholz protection, Winding temperature high, Oil temperature high,
etc. are also important and shall be provided as per transformer manufacturer’s recommendations.
5.7 Recommendations regarding selection of the generator protections for units of different types and
sizes are summarized in the table given below:
RECOMMENDED PROTECTIONS FOR GENERATORS
Functions Steam/Gas Turbines Hydro Turbines

Small Medium Large Small Medium Large
(< 10 MVA) (10-100 MVA) (> 100 MVA) (< 10 MVA) (10-100 MVA) (> 100 MVA)
Differential Y Y Y Y Y Y
95% Stator E/F Y Y Y Y Y Y
100% Stator E/F N O Y N O Y
Inter turn Faults N Y Y Y Y Y

Backup Impedance N Y Y N Y Y
Voltage Controlled O/C Y N N Y N N
Negative Sequence Y Y Y Y Y Y
Field Failure Y Y Y Y Y Y
Reverse Power/Low
forward Power Y Y Y Y Y Y
Pole Slipping N N Y N N Y
Overload N N N Y Y Y
Over voltage Y Y Y Y Y Y
Under frequency Y Y Y Y Y Y
Dead Machine N N Y N N Y
Rotor Earth Fault N Y Y Y Y Y
Over fluxing N Y Y N Y Y
Y-Recommended N-Not Recommended O-Optional
DETAILED REQUIREMENTS (For Multi Function Generator Protection System)
5.2 GENERATOR STATOR
5.2.1 Duplicated Generator Differential Protection (87 G)
This is a unit type protection, instantaneous in operation, covering the stator winding for phase to phase
faults.
The generator differential relay is not sensitive to single phase to earth faults due to the high neutral
earthing resistance arrangement.
As this protection operates for generator internal faults, opening the generator breaker in class-A or non-
sequential mode eliminates the system in-feed to the fault (if the unit is synchronized).
For all machines of ratings 10 MVA and above, this protection shall be provided.
Requirements:
(i) Have operating time less than 30 milliseconds at 2 times setting
(ii) Be low impedance principle based

(iii) Operating current 5 to 10% of nominal current
(iv) High stability against maximum through fault condition, CT saturation, harmonics and DC transients
5.2.2 Overall Generator-Transformer Differential Protection (87)
This is a unit type protection with coverage from the generator terminals up to the HV breaker and the
generator transformer HV terminals. For GCB scheme duplicated transformer differential and generator
differential scheme may be provided instead of overall Generator-Transformer differential. Alternately,
Overall differential Zone may be restricted up to GT bushing and Zone of Teed protection may be extended
to cover up to GT bushing by providing additional bushing CTs.
It will detect phase faults on both sides of the generator transformer and single phase to earth faults of
the HV side only (the earth fault current on the LV side is very small, due to the high neutral earthing
resistance).
Generator transformer differential relays have harmonic restraint circuits to prevent incorrect operation
when the generator and unit transformers are energized from the system.
This shall be provided for all machines of rating 5 MVA above. The protection need not include Unit
Auxiliary Transformer (UAT) in its zone and UAT should be covered by a separate protection.
Requirements:
(i) Have through fault restraint features for external faults with an adjustable or multi-bias setting
(ii) Have, magnetizing inrush restraint features and also be stable for inrush under normal over fluxing
conditions, magnetizing inrush proof feature shall not be achieved through any intentional time
delay e.g. use of timers to block relay operation
(iii) Shall have unrestrained instantaneous high set overcurrent unit operation which is unaffected by
inrush
(iv) Have one bias winding per phase and per CT input CT secondary shall not be paralleled in order to
avoid false operation due to dissimilar transient responses.
(v) Have an adjustable operating current

(vi) Have an operating time not greater than 30 milli seconds at 5 times setting
(vii) Have facility for ratio and phase angle correction through in built provisions.
5.2.3 Backup Protections for Short Circuits
This shall be provided for all machines of 10 MVA and above. Voltage restrained over current relay may be
used in place of minimum impedance relay in case of machines with rating less than 10 MVA.
5.2.3.1 Backup Impedance Protection (21 G)
This operates for phase faults in the unit, in the HV yard or in the adjacent transmission lines, with a
suitable delay, for cases when the corresponding main protection fails to operate.
The impedance measured by the relay is influenced by the relay connection, the fault type and generator
and system source impedance for faults on the high voltage side of the delta-star connected generator
transformer. A circular characteristic the center of which corresponds to connection position of VT or
compensation for star delta transformer should be used for this reason. To avoid spurious tripping, Load
Encroachment logic should be used.
The impedance relay shall have fuse-fail interlock.
Requirements:
(i) Have facility for at least two impedance zone with load encroach feature
(ii) Shall have two adjustable definite time delay relays of 0.5-5 seconds
(iii) Be suitable for measuring two and three phase faults within a set distance from the point of installation
(iv) Shall be able to operate for fault currents down to 0.3 In.
Setting Recommendations
The impedance relay shall have reach setting to cover the longest HV outgoing line or 70% of rated
generator load impedance.
– Time relay of step 1 -0.5 sec.

– Time relay of step 2 shall be set to coordinate with third zone time of distance relay or back up o/c relay
of the outgoing line
5.2.3.2 Overcurrent/Under Voltage Protection (51/27) G for Small Generators
This protection is recommended for small generators as protection against phase faults. For grid connected
generators, overcurrent protection should be fed from CTs located on phase side or HV Bushing CT of
Generator transformer.
(i) Shall be able to operate when the fault current from the generator terminals becomes
(ii) Low due to excitation system characteristic
(iii) Shall have under voltage criteria
(iv) Shall reset to de-energized position if under-voltage criteria disappears
5.2.4 Negative Phase Sequence Protection (46G)
The negative phase sequence protection safeguards the generator rotor against overheating caused by the
induced double frequency (100 Hz) currents when negative phase sequence currents are present in the
stator. The negative phase sequence current can appear due to unbalanced single phase loads or transmission
line unsymmetrical faults. This shall be provided for all machines of ratings 10 MVA and above.
Requirements:
(i) Have an alarm unit and a trip unit

(ii) Have a continuously adjustable negative sequence current setting
(iii) Have alarm unit range covering negative phase sequence current of 5-10% of generator
(iv) Rated current continuously adjustable
(v) Have a definite time setting range of 1-10 secs, associated with an alarm unit
(vi) Have a trip unit with a variable time current characteristics matching with the generator I22t
characteristic
The relays should be set to the NPS capability of the generator. The NPS capability of the machine varies
considerably from one machine to another.
Alarm unit shall be set at 70-80% of continuous withstand capability value of the machine and time delay
for alarm can be 3 Secs.
5.2.5 Generator Overload Protection (51G)
Overload relay is used as an additional check of the stator winding temperature.
This may be provided for hydro units where there are high head variations and connected for alarm. It may
also be connected for run back.
In case of thermal set there is no chance of thermal overloading as the machine is provided with number
of limiters and therefore is not recommended.
Requirements:
(i) Be of definite time & IDMT over-current type

(ii) Have a continuously adjustable setting range of 50-200%
(iii) Have a drop-off/pick-up ratio greater than 95%
(iv) Have an adjustable time setting range of 2.5 to 25 sec.
5.2.6 Generator Stator Earth Fault Protection
The high neutral earthing resistance arrangement limits the generator earth fault current to less than 10
amperes, thus minimizing damage to the core laminations. Although a single phase to earth fault is not
critical, it requires clearance within a short time, due to the following:
– It may develop into a phase to phase fault (due to presence of ionized air).
– If a second earth fault occurs the current is no longer limited by the earthing resistor.
– Fire may result from the earth fault arc.
Two different types of stator earth fault relays are recommended both installed in the secondary circuit of
the generator.
5.2.6.1 Duplicated 0-95% Stator Earth Fault Protection (64G1)
This protection zone is limited to approximately 95% of the stator winding due to the danger of false
tripping. This shall be voltage relay monitoring the voltage developed across the earthing resistor by the
neutral return current.This is normally used as back up protection. It also covers the generator bus, low
voltage winding of the unit transformer and the high voltage winding of the UAT. When connected to open
delta winding of generator PT, the protection shall be blocked for PT fuse failure.
For faults within 10% of the generator neutral, the resulting current is not enough to operate the relay.
This shall be provided for all machines of ratings 10 MVA and above.
Requirements:
(i) Single pole type
(ii) Shall have independently adjustable voltage and time setting

(iii) Suitable to protect 95% of stator winding
(iv) Be suitable for operation from broken-delta voltage transformers or neutral grounding transformer
secondary
(v) Shall be insensitive to 3rd harmonic voltage

Pick up voltage of the relay -5% of maximum neutral voltage Time delay -0.3 to 0.5 secs.
5.2.6.2 100% Stator Earth Fault Protection (64G2)
This protects the whole stator winding and the generator neutral. The relay generally operates on the
principle of signal injection into the secondary of the earthing transformer, detecting the corresponding
current if an earth fault occurs. The relay is set in terms of insulation resistance. This is normally used as
the main protection.
This protection shall always be provided for machine above 100 MVA. The option is left to the utility
depending upon the importance of the machine for machines of smaller sizes. Injection based relays are
recommended for machines of 100 MVA and above.
Requirements:
(i) Be suitable to protect 100%) of stator winding

(ii) Be insensitive to external faults, transients and inherent harmonic currents.
(iii) Shall be based on injection principle.
(iv) Have continuously adjustable time delay

(v) Relay based on injection principle
Setting Recommendations :
100% stator earth fault relay (Injection Principle)

Pick up level of the relay = 1000 ohms
Time delay –1-10 secs seconds
5.2.7 Loss of Excitation Protection (40G)
A complete loss of excitation may occur as a result of unintentional opening of the field breaker, an open
circuit or a short circuit of the main field or a fault in AVR.
When a generator with sufficient active load loses the field current, it goes out of synchronism and starts
to run asynchronously at a speed higher than the system absorbing reactive power for the excitation from
the system. Under these conditions the stator end regions and part of the rotor get over heated.
This is recommended for machines of all sizes above 10 MVA.
Requirements:
(i) Two stage mho characteristic lying in 3rd and 4th quadrant of impedance diagram with adjustable
reach and off set. Alternatively, protection based on admittance principle may also be considered.
(ii) Shall have an under voltage relay and/or over current relay as an additional check
(iii) Shall have timer with adjustable range of 1-10 seconds to distinguish loss of excitation from power
swings
Suggested Setting:
For offset mho type relay:
Recommended setting Stage I Stage II

Diameter 1pu ( generator Base) Xd
Off Set 0.5-0.75Xd’ 0.5-0.75Xd’

Time Delay Time Delay with UV – Instantaneous Time Delay-10 Sec
Time Delay without UV – 2 Sec
5.2.8 Pole Slipping Protection (98G)
The loss of field protection shall be supplemented by an additional out of step function which detects all
pole slips. Pole slipping of generators with respect to the system, can be caused by a number of conditions
leading to an increase in rotor angular position beyond the generator transient stability limits. Some of the
causes of pole slipping are:
(a) Large network disturbances

(b) Faults on the electrical network close to the generator
(c) Weak tie between the network and the generator (tripping of transmission lines)
(d) Loss of generator field (field winding or excitation supply failure)

(e) Operating the generator in an excessive under excited mode
This is recommended for machines of 100 MVA and above. For hydro machines utilities can decide
depending on machine parameters.
Requirements:
(i) Shall be capable of detecting a power swing which can lead to instability in addition to, Being able
to detect an actual pole slip
(ii) By varying size of the characteristic it shall be possible to ensure that a trip command is given to the
circuit breakers in such a way that separation of the poles occurs at a controlled angle at any time.
(a) If the source of oscillation lies within a generator/transformer unit, the machine has to be isolated
from the network after the first slip.
Forward reach of relay characteristics shall cover generator/generator transformer. Tripping in this zone
shall be in the first pole slip. The reach of this zone is 0.7 XT.
5.2.9 Reverse Power /Low Forward Power interlock Relays (32G/37G)
The reverse/Low Forward Power interlock is recommended for thermal machines and reverse power
protection may be used for hydro machines to protect against motoring. However, recommendation of
OEM (Turbine Manufacturer) needs to be taken into consideration as well.
When the steam flow through turbine is interrupted by closing the ESVs or the governor valves, the
remaining energy stored in the set is delivered to the system and the machine enters into a motoring
condition drawing power from the system to supply its losses while keeping the turbo alternator shaft at
synchronous speed.
– The reverse power relay detects that the unit is motoring and must therefore be shutdown
– Tripping for mechanical faults and abnormal conditions
For faults in the turbine or boiler, the turbine protection closes the ESVs. For abnormal conditions, the
generator protection closes the ESVs. When the generator develops low forward power, the relay after a
short time delay trips the generator breaker.
A protection field suppression signal may also be required if the AVR does not have a built-in facility to
reduce the generator field current as the speed decreases, to avoid over fluxing conditions.
Requirements:
(i) Be single phase power measuring type

(ii) Have a power setting of approximately 0.5% -1% of rated active power of generator unit
(iii) Have independent time delay relay with setting range of 1-10 seconds and 0-30 seconds respectively
on pick up
(iv) Have one more common timer with a pick up setting range 5-50 seconds for annunciation that the
Turbo generator set has started motoring
(v) Have suitable arrangement for preventing the operation of this protection during start up and
synchronizing of the unit
(vi) Shall be provided with possibility of angle correction to facilitate measurement of power accurately
Setting Recommendations:
For Sequential Tripping
– power relay pickup < 0.05 x Pn

– timer t1 -2 seconds,
– For Anti Motoring Tripping
– power relay pickup < 0.05 x Pn

– t2 – 20-30 seconds
5.2.10 Under-frequency Protection (81G)
The Under frequency protection
– Prevents the steam turbine and generator from exceeding the permissible operating time at reduced
frequencies
– Ensures that the generating unit is separated from the network at a preset value of frequency that is
less than the final stage of system load shedding
– Prevents the AVR from exciting the machine at reduced speeds when some protective relays may not
perform at all
– Prevent over fluxing of the generator. The over fluxing relay is used to protect against small over
fluxing for long periods while the over voltage and under frequency relays also protect against large
over fluxing for short times
The stator under frequency relay measures the frequency of the stator terminal voltage
Though under frequency tripping is recommended by turbine manufactures, care should be taken by grid
operating personnel in ensuring that machines are not run at lower frequencies and instead resort to
means like load shedding in the event of overload.
Requirements:
(i) Have one alarm stage and two tripping stages
(ii) Shall have setting of range of 45 Hz -55 Hz with a least count of 0.1 Hz for each stage
(iii) Timer for alarm stage have a range of 0.5 to 5 second with a least count of 0.5 second. Timers for
each tripping stage shall have range of 1 to 10 seconds with a least count of 0.1 second
(iv) Shall have under voltage blocking
Setting Recommendations (Recommendation of OEM needs to be taken into consideration)
– Stator under frequency relay pick up level = 48.5 Hz

– Time delay for alarm -2 Sec.
For time delay setting of tripping stages recommendations of turbine manufacturers may be followed.
5.2.11 Inter Turn Fault Protection (95G)
It is generally considered difficult to obtain reliable protection against short circuit of one turn if the stator
winding has large number of turns per phase. Generator protections will not be able to detect such faults
unless faults evolve and convert into Earth Fault.
Inter turn fault protection is recommended only for machines where there is a split winding and all the six
terminals are brought out on the neutral side.
For generator with split neutrals, conventional inter-turn fault protective scheme comprises a time delayed
low set over-current relay which senses the current flowing in the connection between the neutrals of the
stator winding. In generators with two or more identical windings in parallel, transverse differential protection
may be used. Inter-turn protection based on zero sequence voltage drop across winding may also be used.
Alternatively a split phase differential protection may be used.

Requirements
(i) Over current relay with time delay
(ii) Over current relay shall have built in filters to reject higher harmonics
(iii) Range of over current shall be selected depending on maximum spill current for external fault
Overcurrent relay shall be set to maximum unbalanced current in case of external fault.
Time delay 0.2 - 0.4 seconds

5.2.12 Generator Transformer & Generator Over Fluxing Protection (24 GT/24G)
Over fluxing protection is provided to safeguard the generator, generator transformer and unit auxiliary
transformer against operation at flux densities which may cause accumulative damage to the core. Separate
over fluxing protection is to be considered for generator circuit breaker scheme
From the fundamental equation V = 4.44 x f x n x φ, the level of flux is proportional to the ratio of terminal
voltage to frequency (v/f). This ratio is monitored by the protective relay.
An over fluxing condition is more likely to occur while the generator is separated from the system and the
speed is allowed to drop, but it can also happen with the machine on load if the tap changer of the
generator transformer (HV side) is on a low tap position and the excitation of the generator is manually
increased. In this case the increased generator terminal voltage may cause over fluxing tripping at nominal
frequency.
The over fluxing protection operates with a time delay after which the tripping functions are executed.
This protection must be provided for generator-transformers of size 10 MVA and above.
Requirements
(i) Shall be phase to phase connected.
(ii) Shall operate on the principle of measurement of voltage to frequency ratio.

(iii) Have inverse time characteristics compatible with generator transformer over fluxing Withstand
capability for tripping.
(iv) Provide an independent alarm with a definite time delay of value of V/f between 100% to 130% of
rated value.
(v) Have a high resetting ratio of 98% or better.

The over fluxing capability of the transformer must be checked and the characteristic matched accordingly
for both alarm and trip.
5.2.13 Generator over Voltage Protection (59G)
An over voltage on the terminals of the generator can damage the insulation of the generator, bus ducting,
breakers, generator transformer and auxiliary equipment such as voltage transformers, excitation transformer
etc.
This should be provided for machines of all sizes, hydro and thermal
Requirements:
(i) Be single pole type/or triple pole type

(ii) Shall have two separately adjustable stages
(iii) Have a continuously adjustable setting range of 100 – 140% of rated voltage
(iv) Have a drop off to pick up ratio greater than 95%

(v) Have a continuously variable time delay setting range of 0.5 – 5 seconds for one relay and 2 to 20
seconds for the other relay.
Stage 1 -Over voltage relay pick up - 1.15 x Vn

Timers t1 -10 seconds
Stage 2 -Over voltage relay pick up -1.3 x Vn
Timer t2 -0.5 seconds

However, machine dielectric rating and other overvoltage protection should also be considered.
5.2.14 Dead Machine Protection (27/50G)
Despite existence of interlocking schemes, a number of generators have been inadvertently energized
while at stand still or on turning gear. The generator and rotor may get damaged beyond repair under this
condition. Other protective relays like loss of excitation, back up impedance, reverse power would operate
with delays and this is not admissible. The dead machine protection permits fast tripping.
This should be installed in switchyard panel rather than in generator panel to ensure that protection is
available during maintenance periods when the generator protection can be rendered inoperative by switching
off the DC supply to the panel.
This protection is recommended for all machines of size 100 MVA and above. The protection is connected
to trip generator breakers, generator transformer breaker and the HV Bus.
Requirements:
(i) Shall consist of 3 high speed over current relays of range (0.02 -20 In) to initiate Instantaneous
tripping if generator terminal voltage is below set value.
(ii) Shall have under voltage relays of range (0.2-1 Un) to permit operation of over current relays when
voltage is low
(iii) Shall have timers with adjustable range (0-60s) to avoid operation of protection for Nearby fault
when the machine is in service.
(iv) Shall be secure against voltage transients at closing

For Weak System For Strong System
Overcurrent relay 1-2 pu 3-4 pu

Under voltage relay 20% to 40% rated voltage 50% to 70% of rated voltage
Activation of relay 20 Seconds after dead time 20 Seconds after dead time
5.2.15 Generator VT Fuse Failure Monitoring (60G)
This has to be provided for all the machines since it is required for blocking of relays which can mal-
operate in the event of PT fuse blowing in primary side or secondary side.
Requirements:
(i) Be triple pole type
(ii) Be able to detect fuse failure in both primary and secondary side of VT
(iii) Have a fixed setting of 70% of rated voltage and have a time delay of 40 to 50 milliseconds on pick
up
(iv) Be of voltage balance or equivalent (Algorithm based on Voltage comparison method) type. Fuse
Failure algorithm based on rate of change of voltage and current should not be used for high
impedance grounded system of generator.
5.2.16 Rotor Ground Fault Protection
This protection shall be provided for machines of all sizes.

Requirements:
(i) Shall be based on AC injection principle

(ii) Shall be two stages
(iii) Shall have built-in time delay to prevent unwanted operation of the relay
Incase tripping is applied, Setting Recommendations are:

– alarm level -25 K ohm
– pick up level -5 K ohm
– timer tl -1 seconds
– timer t2 -5 seconds
5.3 GENERATOR-TRANSFORMER PROTECTION
For short circuit protection, transformer-differential relay and over-current relay connected to different
groups are recommended. For ground faults, earth fault o/c relays and restricted earth fault relay connected
to different groups are recommended.
In case an overhang protection is required, the same may be combined with REF protection on HV side of
generator transformer.
5.3.1 Generator Transformer Differential Protection (87 GT/87 T) Requirements
(i) Be triple pole with individual phase indication

(ii) Have unrestricted instantaneous high set over current units which shall not operate during inrush
(iii) Have an adjustable or multi bias setting
(iv) Have second harmonic or other inrush proof features and also shall be stable under normal over
fluxing conditions. Magnetizing inrush proof feature shall not be achieved through any intentional
time delay
(v) Have one bias winding per phase and per C.T. input
(vi) Have an adjustable operating current
(vii) Have an operating time not greater than 30 milli seconds at 5 times of setting
(viii) Shall have facility for ratio and phase angle correction either through auxiliary transformer or through
in built provisions.
5.3.3 Generator Transformer Back Up Earth Fault Protection (51 NGT)
This relay monitors the current in the generator transformer neutral. It can detect faults in the transformer
HV side or in the adjacent network.
Requirements:
(i) Be of single pole type
(ii) Be of IDMT characteristic (IEC standard inverse).
(iii) Have an adjustable setting range of 10 to 100% of rated current
5.3.4 HV Winding cum Overhang Differential Protection (87 HV/87 NT)
This is a unit type protection which operates for earth faults on the generator transformer HV side and also
covers a large portion of the HV winding and the HV terminals up to the HV current transformers. Alternately,
Zone for Teed protection may be extended to include transformer HV winding as well.
Requirements:
(i) Be triple pole type (Single pole if used as Restricted E/F Protection)
(ii) Have operating time less than 30 milliseconds at 2 times setting
(iii) Be high impedance or low impedance type
(iv) Operating current shall be 0.1-0.4 In
(v) High stability against maximum through fault condition, CT saturation, harmonics and DC transients
(vi) Be provided with suitable nonlinear resistors across the relay to limit the peak voltage to 1000 volts,
in case of high impedance type
(vii) Be provided with faulty phase identification
5.4 UNIT AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER PROTECTIONS
For short circuit protection, unit auxiliary transformer differential relay, overload relay for alarm and over
current relay connected to different groups are recommended. However a utility may carry out an application
check and decide not to have a separate differential relay for UAT.
For ground faults residual 0/c relay and Restricted E/F relays connected to different groups shall be provided.
The type of connection may be either current based or voltage based depending on the grounding system.
5.4.1 Unit Transformer Differential Protection (87 UAT)
This is a unit type protection covering the unit transformer and the cable connection to the unit board.
This protection operates for phase faults, but not for single phase to earth faults as this current is limited by
the neutral earthing resistance.
The unit transformer differential relay initiates a general trip and unit shutdown.
Requirements:
(i) Have unrestricted instantaneous high set over current unit which shall not operate during inrush
(ii) Have an adjustable or multi bias setting
(iii) Have second harmonic or other inrush proof features and also should be stable under normal over
fluxing conditions, magnetizing inrush proof feature shall not be achieved through any intentional
time delay e.g. use of timers to block relay operation or using disc operated relays.
(iv) Have one bias winding per phase and per C.T. input
(v) Have an adjustable operating current
(vi) Have an operating time not greater than 30 milli seconds at 5 times of setting
(vii) Shall have facility for ratio and phase angle correction either through auxiliary transformer or through
in built provisions.
5.3.2 Unit Transformer back up over current protection (51 UAT) Relay
(i) Be of definite time / IDMT over current type
(ii) Have an adjustable setting range of 50-200% of rated current and 0.5 to 5 seconds time delay
5.3.3 Unit Transformer back-up earth fault protection (51 NUAT)
(i) Be of definite time / IDMT over current type

(ii) Have a setting rage of 10-100% of rated current and time setting range of 0.5-5 seconds
5.3.4 Unit transformer restricted earth fault protection (64 UAT)
(i) Have operating time less than 30 milli seconds at 2 times setting
(ii) Be high impedance or low impedance type
(iii) Operating current shall be 0.1 -0.4 In
(iv) High stability against maximum through fault condition, CT saturation, harmonics and DC transients
(v) Be provided with suitable non-linear resistors across the relay to limit the peak voltage to 1000
volts, in case of high impedance type
(vi) Be provided with fault indication
5.4. ENGINEERING RECOMMENDATIONS
5.4.1 Redundancy
The protection functions shall be subdivided into two groups each being independent and capable of
providing uninterrupted protection even in the event of one of the protection groups failing. With application
of multifunction generator protection relays, most generator protection functions shall preferably be
duplicated. Given below is recommendation for dividing the protections in two groups:
Sl. Protection Function Class of TRIP Remark on Grouping

No. of Protection
1. Duplicate Generator Differential A
Protection, (87 G).
2. Overall Differential Protection A
(87GT).
3. Generator Transformer Differential A 87 T shall be in a different

Protection (87 T). channel than 87 OA.
4. Duplicate Over hang differential A These relays shall preferably be
Protection (87TT). located in GT bay Relay panel.

No. of Protection
5. Stator Earth Fault Protection A

Covering 100% of winding (64G1).
6. Duplicated Stator Standby Earth A 64 G1 and 64 G2 shall be on two
Fault Protection covering 95% of different channels of protection.
winding (trip) (64 G2)
7. Inter-turn Fault Protection (95 G1) A If applicable
8. Duplicate Loss of field protection A

(40G/1/2).
9. Duplicate Back up Impedance A
Protection 3 pole (21 G)
10. GT HV Overcurrent(50/51GT) Alarm
11. Backup Earth Fault Protection on A 87GT and 50/51GT shall be no

Generator Transformer HV neutral different channels
(51NGT)
12. Duplicate Negative Sequence A
Current Protection ( 46 G)
13. Duplicated Low- Forward Power/ 37/32 G1 and 37/32 G2 shall be
reverse power Interlock for steam in two different channels of
turbine generator (37/32G1 & 37/32 protection
G2), each having two stages,
a) short time delayed interlocked B

with turbine trip (0-5 sec)
b) long time delayed independent A
of turbine of turbine trip. (0-30s)
14. Two Stage Rotor Earth Fault A
Protection (64F).
15. Duplicate Definite Time Delayed A

Over Voltage Protection (59 G)
16. Duplicate Generator Under C Over Flux function (24) shall

Frequency Protection (81G) with be in a different channel than
df/dt elements. O/V and U/F functions
17. Duplicate Over Fluxing Protection A
(24) for Generator / Generator
Transformer
18. Duplicate Accidental Back A 50 GDM based on the two
Energization Protection (50 GDM) principle shall be on two
different channels.
19. Instantaneous and time delayed Over A
Current protection to be used on HV
side of excitation transformer.

No. of Protection
20. Duplicate Generator Pole Slipping A
Protection (98 G)
21. Unit Transformer Differential
Protection, 3 Pole (87UT)
22. Unit Transformer LV back-up earth A A 87 UT & 51 NUT can be one

fault protection (51 NUT). channel and 64 UT LV& 51 UT
shall be in another channel.
23. Unit Transformer LV REF (64 UT LV) A

24. Unit Transformer back-up over current A
protection ( 51 UT)
25. Gen Transformer OTI/WTI trip Turbine Trip After Turbine trip through class B
other breakers are tripped.
26. Gen Transformer Buchholz PRD / A Buchholz and PRD shall be on

other mechanical Protections different channels.
27. Unit Transformer OTI/WTI trip UT LV CB Trip OTI & WTI trip shall be on
& signal for different channels.
changeover of
unit board.
28. Unit Transformer Buchholz PRD/ other A Buchholz and PRD shall be on
mechanical Protections different channels.
5.6. TRIPPING PRINCIPLES
The generator Protection Relays initiate three modes of Trips

(i) Class A Trips
The non-sequential trip or class-A Trip is initiated for all electrical faults, in which the turbine, generator
Breaker & field Breaker are tripped simultaneously.
(ii) Class-B Trip

The sequential trip or Class-B trip is normally initiated for mechanical faults or those faults where a
delayed generator trip will not result in damage to the Turbine, generator or other equipment. The
reason for providing sequential trip in thermal power plants is to avoid over speeding of turbine that
may result on trip of the unit Breaker while the steam is entrapped in Turbine. Turbine Trip signal is
given first. The generator gets isolated from the grid when the active power measured by low forward
relay /Reverse power Relay (32/37G) is less than 0.5% of nominal power for typically 2 secs approx..
(iii) Class C trip
For system abnormalities, only the Unit breaker is tripped and the Generator and the auxiliaries are
kept charged to facilitate the fast reconnection. However, few protections which are basically for
system related abnormal conditions, are still connected to Class A as the operation of these protection
indicates the persisting un cleared faults in the EHV system which has to be viewed seriously.The
various protective functions and its mode of tripping has to be as given below:
CLASS TYPE OF FAULTS

A (Non-Trip) Sequential All electrical trips with in the HVCB, UT LV CB, Excitation system,
Generator/GT/UT TURBINE (All the system tripped)
B Tripping) (Sequential Mechanical protections HVCB, UT LV CB, Excitation system
(Turbine tripped as a first stage and
electrical system trip through 37/32.)
C System abnormality HVCB (Generator Under House Load)
In case of GCB scheme, Class A tripping shall further subdivided into Class A1 and A2. Class A1-Trips
EHV CB, GCB, Field CB, Turbine Trip and UAT Incomer Class A2 Trips GCB Trip, Field CB, and Turbine
Fig. 5.1 : Recommended Protection System for Generator-Transformer with GCB

Fig. 5.2 : Recommended Protection System for Generator-Transformer without GCB

Power Transformers, Auto-transformers and Shunt Reactors 51
CHAPTER 6
POWER TRANSFORMERS, AUTO-TRANSFORMERS

AND SHUNT REACTORS
Section A : POWER TRANSFORMERS & AUTO-TRANSFORMERS
6.1 BASIC PRINCIPLES
A transformer is an electrical device that transfers electrical energy between two or more circuits through
electromagnetic induction. Commonly, transformers are used to increase or decrease the voltages of
alternating current in electric power applications.
Ideal Transformer Equation will be as per following:
Vp Is N p
= = = a =Turns Ratio
Vs I p Ns
VS
By Ohms law, Load Impedance, ZL = I
S
Apparent Load Impedance ZL’ (ZL referred to Primary)
ZL’ = VP/IP = (a.VS) / (IS/a) = a2ZL (Square of Turns Ratio multiplied by ZL)
Transformers will always have Leakage flux as shown in Figures 6.1 & 6.2, which will not aid
Transformation of Voltage, hence represented as Leakage Reactance in the Transformer Equivalent
Circuit shown below:
Fig. 6.1 : Showing the Ideal Transformer & Induction Law and the leakage flux
Fig. 6.2 : Real Transformer Equivalent Circuit
RP = Primary Winding Resistance, XP = Primary Winding Leakage Reactance
RS = Secondary Winding Resistance, XS = Secondary Winding Leakage Reactance

RC = Resistance representing the Transformer Core or Iron Loss
XC = Reactance corresponding to the Flux which aids in Magnetic Transformation of Voltage
from Primary to Secondary Winding.
6.2 USE OF TRANSFORMERS IN TRANSMISSION SYSTEM
Power Transformers, as they are most widely called, are used in Transmission EHV, HV & Sub-Transmission
system for Interconnection the different Voltage systems for Transfer/Exchange of Power. They are mostly
used as Auto Transformers in interconnecting EHV systems (765KV to 220KV) and as Two and Three
winding transformers such as 400 kV/33 kV, 220 kV/33 kV and 132 kV/33 or 11 kV.
6.3 TRANSFORMER DESIGN
6.3.1 Transformer Core
As explained in the Basic Principle, the Transformer Magnetic core plays an important part in the Transformer
of Voltage from Primary to Secondary Winding.
The EMF (In RMS) induced in the primary Winding is governed by the following Equation: ERMS = 4.44fNø,
where f = Supply frequency, N = Number of Turns & ø = Flux in the Magnetic Core encompassing the
Primary & Secondary Winding.
6.3.2 Winding & Oil
The Windings with its insulation is enclosed/installed in a Transformer Tank filled with Oil. The Oil acts as
insulating medium as well as cooling medium. Heat is generated in the Transformer core by Hysteresis of the
magnetizing flux and the eddy currents flowing in the Transformer core. The loss due to this heat is called
Core loss and is generally constant for a Transformer at its rated Voltage & frequency. Transformer winding
also generates heat due to the currents flowing through them, this loss is called “Copper loss” or “I2R loss”
and varies with the load currents flowing through the Transformer. The Transformer heat generated due to
Core loss & Copper loss is controlled by Oil circulation by natural convection or by forced Oil circulation.
6.3.3 Tap Changer
Most power transformers are fitted with tap-changers to enable the transformation ratio to be changed so
that the system voltage can be maintained as the power flow in the transformer changes. The tap changers
may be of off-circuit type if frequent operation is not required or onload type if operating conditions change
more often and different tap settings are needed at different times of a day.
Of Circuit Tap Changer: Off-circuit tap-changers also called de-energized tap-changers can only be
operated while the transformer is switched off. They are sometimes incorrectly called off-load tap-changers,
but it is not just sufficient for the transformer to be on no-load; it has to be completely de-energized before
it is safe to change its taps.
On-Load Tap Changer: On-load tap-changers are used to enable the transformation ratio to be varied
while the transformer is energized and may be supplying power to loads connected to it. At the top end of
the range, on-load tap-changers have a separate tap-selector and a diverter-switch for each phase. The
diverter-switch is capable of switching rated load current at the “step voltage”, that is the voltage between
taps. It cannot switch fault current, so over-current blocking is provided to inhibit tap changing when the
through current exceeds the rated switching current. The tap selector is designed to carry, but not to make
or break, rated load current.
6.3.4 Auto Transformer
An autotransformer, shown in Figure 6.3, has a single winding with two end terminals, and one or more
terminals at intermediate tap points, or it is a transformer in which the primary and secondary coils have
part or all of their turns in common. The primary voltage is applied across two of the terminals, and the
secondary voltage taken from two terminals, almost always having one terminal in common with the
primary voltage. The primary and secondary circuits therefore have a number of windings turns in common.
Since the volts-per-turn is the same in both windings, each develops a voltage in proportion to its number
of turns. In an autotransformer part of the current flows directly from the input to the output, and only part
is transferred inductively, allowing a smaller, lighter, cheaper core to be used as well as requiring only a
single winding. However the voltage and current ratio of autotransformers can be formulated the same as
other two-winding transformers:
V1 N1
= =a
V2 N2
(0 <V2 <V1)
The ampere-turns provided by the upper half:
FU = (N1-N2)I1 = N1I1
The ampere-turns provided by the lower half:
N1
FL = N 2 (I2 − I1 ) = (I 2 − I1 )
a
For ampere-turn balance, FU = FL:
Therefore: h = i
Fig. 6.3 : Auto Transformer
One end of the winding is usually connected in common to both the voltage source and the electrical load.
The other end of the source and load are connected to taps along the winding. Different taps on the
winding correspond to different voltages, measured from the common end. In a step-down transformer the
source is usually connected across the entire winding while the load is connected by a tap across only a
portion of the winding. In a step-up transformer, conversely, the load is attached across the full winding
while the source is connected to a tap across a portion of the winding.
As in a two-winding transformer, the ratio of secondary to primary voltages is equal to the ratio of the
number of turns of the winding they connect to.
Applications & Limitations
An autotransformer does not provide electrical isolation between its windings as an ordinary transformer
does; if the neutral side of the input is not at ground voltage, the neutral side of the output will not be either.
A failure of the isolation of the windings of an autotransformer can result in full input voltage applied to the
output. Also, a break in the part of the winding that is used as both primary and secondary will result in the
transformer acting as an inductor in series with the load (which under light load conditions may result in
near full input voltage being applied to the output). These are important safety considerations when deciding
to use an autotransformer in a given application. Because it requires both fewer windings and a smaller
core, an autotransformer for power applications is typically lighter and less costly than a two-winding
transformer, up to a voltage ratio of about 3:1; beyond that range, a two-winding transformer is usually
more economical.
In three phase power transmission applications, autotransformers are used to interconnect systems operating
at different EHV voltage classes, for example from 765 kV to 220 kV. They have the limitations of not
suppressing harmonic currents and as acting as another source of ground fault currents. A large three-
phase autotransformer may have a “buried” delta winding, not connected to the outside of the tank, to
absorb some harmonic currents.
6.4 TYPICAL TRANSFORMER ARRANGEMENTS IN A SUBSTATION
Transformer arrangements are usually independent of the type of transformer being used. Mostly these
are decided by substation cost and operating reliability needs. Arrangements are more a product of substation
costs and system operating reliability needs. Figure 6.4 covers some of the typical transformer arrangements.
Figure 6.4 A is the simplest with dedicated high and low side breakers.
Figure 6.4 B adds a breaker and a half or a ring bus configuration to allow breaker maintenance and
switching flexibility on high voltage side.
Figure 6.4 C adds a breaker and a half or a ring bus configuration to allow breaker maintenance and
switching flexibility on high voltage as well as low voltage side.
Fig. 6.4 : Typical transformer arrangements
6.5 TRANSMISSION SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
The transmission transformer is a major component in the bulk power system and is normally held to a
single contingency failure requirement. Based on the types of failures and the basic design of the transformer
and the requirements of the power system, the protective relaying schemes must meet the following main
requirements:
6.5.1 Maintain transient stability of the power system.
6.5.2 Prevent unwanted operation by load currents or by inrush currents or OLTC operation
6.5.3 Maintain required quality of power

6.5.4 Provide for maintenance of protective equipment with primary equipment energized by providing
two groups of protections.
6.6 TYPICAL FAULTS IN TRANSFORMERS AND PROTECTION SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
6.6.1 Transformer faults are generally classified into six categories:
(a) Winding and terminal faults

(b) Core faults
(c) Tank and transformer accessory faults
(d) On–load tap changer faults

(e) Abnormal operating conditions
(f) Sustained or un-cleared external faults
6.6.2 Failure Rates of Power Transformer
The failure rates of power transformers range from 1% to 4% per year for 132 kV to 400 kV class and
reported to be around 6 % for 765 kV systems. The number of through faults may influence the failure rate.
Table 6.1 IEEE 1975-1982 can be taken as typical of transformer failure modes.
Table 6.1
S. No. Mode Number %
1 Winding Failures 615 51

2 Tap Changer Failures 231 19
3 Bushing Failures 114 09
4 Terminal Board Failures 71 06

5 Core Failures 24 02
6 Miscellaneous Failure 72 13
Winding failures still represent the major exposure to transformer failure with tap changers being a distant
second. Two characteristics of transformers that cause problems for protection schemes are low magnitude
turn-to-turn faults and high magnitude magnetizing inrush current during energizing. Some internal faults
can result in less than 10% of a transformer rated current. On the other hand maximum fault current can
flow for a high side transformer bushing failure.
6.7 TRANSFORMER PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS
The protection system must satisfy the following requirements specific to the transmission transformer:
(a) Protect for internal tank faults to ground or to alternate phases.
(b) Protect for external tank faults to ground or to alternate phases.

(c) Protect for internal partial winding or turn-to-turn faults.
(d) Limit through fault magnitude and duration within transformer mechanical and thermal ratings.
(e) Limit top oil temperature to maximum temperature limit

(f) Limit hot spot winding temperature to maximum temperature limit
(g) Prevent rupture of transformer tank during internal fault h. Provide for failure of a switching device
(i) Limit overload as per thermal capability of the transformer

(j) Provide for tertiary winding protections over voltages caused due to transferred lightning surges or
switching surges from high voltage sides
(k) Provide protection of winding insulation by suitably dimensioned and monitored surge arresters
(l) Provide for over-excitation of transformer core

Most transmission transformers are located in critical areas of the power system where either utility voltage
stability or transient stability is a problem. Providing high-speed clearing to meet generator voltage and
stability limits is essential.
One of the key problems in security of a transmission transformer is tripping during a through fault current
flow. In many cases, this means that the faulted element (usually a transmission line) will be properly
tripped by the protection provided for it, failing which the back-up protection of the transmission transformer
will trip the transformer. This common mode failure where both line and transformer gets disconnected can
be disastrous to a single contingency designed power system. In many systems the single contingency
limit only exists during the peak load of the power system, which greatly increases the possibility of cascading
failures. It does identify a serious potential problem if through fault trips are allowed to happen.
Turn-to-turn faults challenge the dependability of the transformer protection. The fault current is high, and
sometimes very high, but the changes in the phase currents may be less than 10% of the rated current.
Maintaining the quality of the power supply for sensitive industrial customers as well as for general customers
is a concern of transformer protection. The transformer can withstand a very long duration of low magnitude
through fault current but even this may cause severe problems for motor driven industrial processes,
unless the fault is cleared in a short number of cycles with due care for additional reactive power support.
Another requirement is that transformer relay protection need be taken for maintenance while the transformer
is energized, for critical installations. Because of this it is required that the protection schemes requirements
have adequate redundancy built in to provide protection during maintenance. Normally this is done by
grouping the protections in two groups Gr I and Gr II that are not exactly duplicated but provide redundant
protection groups.
6.8 PROTECTION SCHEMES
This section covers the main types of transformer protection schemes. Each scheme is reviewed to see its
advantages and disadvantages as well as how they meet the protective relaying requirements. These
types are as follows:
6.8.1 Differential protection
6.8.2 Restricted Earth Fault Protection
6.8.3 Differential & REF Protection of Transformer (Earthing Transformer inside the Protection Zone)
6.8.4 Differential & REF Protection of Auto-Transformer, Protection of unloaded Tertiary Winding.
6.8.5 Over Fluxing Protection
6.8.6 Under Impedance Protection

6.8.7 Directional or Non-directional phase over current protection
6.8.8 Ground fault protection (Directional or Non-Directional Earth Fault Relay tank ground over current
relays)
6.8.9 Mechanical type fault detectors (Buchholz, Oil level indicators, Pressure relief devices for
transformer & OLTC chamber)
6.8.10 Overload protections (Oil temperature winding temperature relays for transformer and for OLTC,
Over load relays current and/or Thermal replica based)
Above relay Protection elements are detailed below:
6.8.1 Differential protection
Basic principle of Differential Protection is based on Kirchoff’s law (Sum of currents flowing through a node
is zero), i,e the currents into the Transformer is equal to the currents flowing out of the Transformer.
In practical case, the following need to be taken into consideration, to make the Transformer Differential
Protection Relay, highly reliable:
(a) CT polarity
(b) CT Ratio mismatch as the CT ratios do not exactly match the Transformer Voltage ratios
(c) Difference in CT characteristic due to different CT manufacturer’s CT.
(d) Vector grouping of the Transformer
(e) CT remnance
(f) Inrush current during charging of the Transformer (Predominant 2nd harmonic and of significant value
flowing in only from the energized side of the Transformer while the other winding currents are zero)
(g) Over excitation of the Transformer (Significant current of predominantly 5th harmonic).
With present day numerical relays, it is possible to achieve CT ratio & Vector group matching in the relay
software itself, without the use of external Auxiliary CTs. Also the relays are provided with Inrush restraint
features during Transformer charging as well as during over excitation conditions.
Illustrated below in Figure 6.5 is the flexible bias characteristics, the relay provides to take care of CT
remnance, accuracy errors, difference currents due to change in Transformer taps and CT saturation
during through fault.
Slope S1 represents the threshold sensitivity at low current taking into account sensitivity at low current, CT remnance
– This slope is generally set between around 10% and generally takes care up to 20% Transformer load.
Slope S2 is set higher than S1 to take care of max. current mismatch for Transformer tap change operations as well
as CT transformation errors – This slope is generally set between 20% to 35% as per the requirement and takes care
of transformer load from 20 to 100%.
Slope S3 is to take care of through fault condition when differential current can occur due to CT saturation. Setting
is generally around 70% for currents higher than transformer rating.
ID> = Operating or Differential Current

ID>> = Highset unrestrained Differential Current
IR = Restraint Current
IR1 = Restraint Current Setting for Slope S2 Start
IR2 = Restraint Current Setting for Slope S3 Start
Fig. 6.5 : Differential Relay Operating Characteristics with Flexible Bias (SLOPE) Setting
For the differential relay operation, the following equation is used:

ID > Set Value
ID/IR > Set Slope
Consider Aph (2 Winding Transformer)
Idiff = |IA1 + IA2|
Ires = |IA1| + |IA2 |, some manufacturers use Ires = 0.5 [|IA1| + |IA2 |] to achieve same scaling as Idiff
Where A1 is current is Transformer winding 1 (Or High side) and A2 is current in Transformer winding
2 (Or Low side)
Fig. 6.6 : Typical Differential protection (Electro Mechanical Relay) scheme for Dy11 Transformer
Fig. 6.7 : Typical Differential protection (Numerical Relay) scheme for Dy11 Transformer
Differential Protection relay specification would be as per following:

(a) Triple pole with individual phase indication
(b) Have unrestrained instantaneous high set over-current units which should not operate during inrush.
(c) Have an adjustable or multi bias setting to take care of (a) CT errors due to remnance at low
currents (b) Stability during through faults (c) Stability during CT saturation.
(d) Have second harmonic or other inrush proof features and also should be stable under normal
overfluxing conditions, Magnetizing inrush proof feature shall not be achieved through any intentional
time delay e.g. use of timers to block relay operation or using disc operated relays.
(e) Have one bias winding per phase and per C.T. input
(f) Have an adjustable operating current with min. setting at 10%
(g) Have an operating time not greater than 30 milliseconds at 5 times of min. current setting
(h) The scheme shall have facility for ratio and phase angle correction through in-built provisions.
(i) Have a fault recording feature to record graphic form of instantaneous values of analogue channels
during faults and disturbances for the pre fault and post fault period as well as record external digital
channels apart from digital channels pertaining to the differential relay.
6.8.2 Restricted Earth Fault Protection
Zero-sequence differential relays (Restricted earth fault relay) provide best protection against phase-to-
ground faults in wye connected transformers connected to solidly grounded systems or resistance grounded
transformers. The vector sum of residual current and the neutral currents are utilized to energize the relay.
The relay discriminates faults in the transformer zone (Total zero sequence flowing in the relay) from the
faults outside the transformer protection zone (Practically no zero sequence current in the relay).
These relays are more sensitive than the transformer differential relays in detecting faults that involve part
of the transformer winding.
Restricted Earth Fault relay can be (a) High Impedance Type or (b) Low Impedance or Biased differential type:
(a) High Impedance REF
The high impedance restricted earth fault protection is similar to the high impedance differential protection of
busbars. Its application to a delta-wye transformer for detecting faults on the wye winding is shown in Figure 6.7;
it is assumed in this application that the ratio of the line CTs and the neutral CT are the same. The relay (87 G)
in this application is a high-impedance overcurrent relay. The flow of zero-sequence currents shown in this
figure are for an external fault. It is obvious that there is no current in the relay because it circulates between the
phase and neutral CTs. If the faulted phase CT saturates, it acts like a short circuit for the flow of currents in the
secondary circuit as shown in Figure 6.8 and the current out of the neutral CT divides among the relay and the
saturated CT. Since the impedance of the relay is substantially high compared to the leads to the saturated CT,
most of the output of the neutral CT is routed through the saturated CT and very little current flows in the relay.
Fig. 6.7 : Restricted earth fault protection using a high impedance relay
Fig. 6.8 : REF high impedance relay, Current flow with one saturated CT
(b) Low Impedance (Biased) REF
The Low Impedance REF is in a way similar to Transformer Biased differential Relay. For Numerical REF
relay, Relay Manufacturers use different methodology depending on the Algorithm for detection & operation
for Ground fault within the protected zone. Few of the calculation of the Operating current (ID0) & the
Restraint Current (IR0) is detailed below:
Method 1
The Operating (Differential) current, ID0 = |3I01 + 3I02 + 3I03|

Restraint Current, IR0 = Max {|3I01|, |3I02|, |3I02|}
3I01, 3I02, 3I03 are the Zero sequence currents on the HV, LV & Neutral side of the Transformers as the case
may be.
Method 2
ID0 = |k1Ó[IA+IB+IC]+k2IN|
IR0 = |k1Ó[IA+IB+IC]| OR ½[k1max(|IA|, |IB|, |IC|) + k2|IN|] ——— k1 and k2 are constants
For the REF to operate, the following equation should be satisfied

ID0 > ID Set
IDO/IR0 > SD, the Set slope.
ID0 = Operating or Differential Zero sequence

Current
IR0 = Zero Sequence Restraint Current
IR = Restraint Current Setting for start of Slope SD

Fig. 6.9 : REF Slope Characteristic
In Low Impedance REF, the Phase side & Neutral CT ratios can be different. The Ratio compensation will
be performed inside the relay.
Additionally, the following requirements will be addressed for the proper operation of the relay:
(i) Directionality of 3I01, 3I02 with respect to Transformer Neutral current 3I03 (Whether they are in phase
or in opposite directions)
(ii) In the event of one CT saturation which will result in differential current, condition 1 will decide
whether the fault in the REF zone or otherwise.
Fig. 6.10 : Low Impedance REF (Numerical) relay

Typical Differential & REF protection scheme using Numerical Relay is shown below (Figure 6.11). Ratio
matching, Vector group compensation & Zero sequence compensation is done internally in the relay software.
Fig. 6.11 : Biased Differential & REF (Numerical) relay
REF Protection specification would be as per the following:

(a) Shall be high or low impedance type.
(b) Shall be single pole type in case of high impedance principle.

(c) Have an operating current sensitivity of at least 10% of nominal current with current setting range of
10-40% of 1 Amp/Have a suitable voltage setting range.
(d) Be tuned to the system frequency
(e) Have a suitable non-linear resistor to limit the peak voltage during in-zone faults in case of high
impedance type
(f) Have a slope characteristic in case of low impedance principle in order to provide stability during
external fault.
(g) Low impedance principle shall be complemented with directional or phase angle measurement to
ensure stability during external fault with CT saturation.
6.8.3 Differential & REF Protection of Transformer (Earthing Transformer inside the Protection Zone)
A delta-connected winding cannot deliver any zero sequence current to an earth fault on the connected
system, any current that does flow is in consequence of an earthed neutral elsewhere on the system and
will have a 2-1-1 pattern of current distribution between phases. When the transformer in question represents
a major power feed, the system may be earthed at that point by an earthing transformer or earthing
reactor. They are frequently connected to the system, close to the main supply transformer and within the
transformer protection zone. Zero sequence current that flows through the earthing transformer during
system earth faults will flow through the line current transformers on this side, and, without an equivalent
current in the balancing current transformers, will cause unwanted operation of the relays. The problem
can be overcome by subtracting the appropriate component of current from the main CT output. The
earthing transformer neutral current is used for this purpose. As this represents three times the zero
sequence current flowing, ratio correction is required. This can take the form of interposing CT’s of ratio 1/
0.333, arranged to subtract their output from that of the line current transformers in each phase, as shown
in Figure 6.11 below. The zero sequence component is cancelled, restoring balance to the differential
system.
Fig. 6.11 : Differential Protection Scheme with in-zone Earthing Transformer with or without REF
As an alternative to the above scheme, the circulating current system can be completed via a three-phase
group of interposing transformers that are provided with tertiary windings connected in delta.
This winding effectively short-circuits the zero sequence component and thereby removes it from the
balancing quantities in the relay circuit; Figure 6.12.
Fig. 6.12 : Differential Protection Scheme with in-zone Earthing Transformer with or without REF
6.8.4 Differential & REF Protection of Auto-Transformer
Autotransformers are designed either as three-phase units or are made up of three single-phase units.
They are used for interconnecting solidly earthed EHV and HV networks if the rated voltages of both
networks do not differ by more than a factor of two to three. Use of autotransformers saves material and
consequently weight as well as losses compared with the use of transformers with separate windings for
each voltage level. Autotransformers with wye connected primary and secondary windings (serial and
common winding) are usually equipped with a delta-connected tertiary winding that is rated about one third
of the throughput rating. The serial, common and tertiary winding arrangements of an autotransformer with
REF protection are shown in Figure 6.13.
Fig. 6.13 : Auto-Transformer, REF Protection
(a) Differential Protection, Tertiary not connected to any load
Unloaded Tertiary winding (Figure 6.14) is used for stabilization purpose as it offers low impedance for
zero sequence currents. In this case two winding differential relay will sufficient for protection of the Auto
Transformer. In this case, differential relay sensitivity to Earth faults will be low & the Tertiary winding is not
protected.
Fig. 6.14 : Auto-Transformer, Differential Protection, Unloaded Tertiary

(b) Neutral grounding with phase-segregated CTs
In case of neutral grounding with phase-segregated CTs (Figure 6.15) the ideal solution is to apply a three-
end differential protection. Sensitivity to Earth faults will be high in this case, however Tertiary winding will
be unprotected.
Fig. 6.15 : Auto-Transformer, Differential Protection (Three-end Differential)
(c) CTs in series with phase windings of delta-connected tertiary
Information on the coupling between the autotransformer winding and the tertiary winding is available if the
current through the tertiary winding is measured instead of the neutral-to-earth current per phase (Figure
6.16). Sensitivity to Earth faults will be high and Tertiary winding will be protected.
Fig. 6.16 : Auto-Transformer, Differential Protection with Tertiary included (CTs inside Delta winding)
(d) CTs outside delta tertiary winding
In many cases, CTs of the tertiary winding are not located in series with the phase windings but are located
outside the delta winding as shown in Figure 6.17. A three-end differential protection may be applied in this
case. This differential protection offers the largest protection zone in comparison to other Auto Transformer
differential protection applications described above. However, the requirement of zero-sequence current
filtering leads to reduced earth fault sensitivity. The setting of the differential protection corresponds to the
setting of a separate-winding transformer.
Fig. 6.17 . Auto-Transformer, Differential Protection with Tertiary included (CTs outside Delta winding)
(e) Protection of Unloaded Tertiary
Unloaded delta-connected tertiary windings are often not protected; alternatively, the delta winding can be
earthed at one point through a current transformer that energises an instantaneous relay. This system
should be separate from the main winding protection. If the tertiary winding earthing lead is connected to
the main winding neutral above the neutral current transformer in an attempt to make a combined system,
there may be ‘blind spots’ which the protection cannot cover.
Alternative scheme would be to connect the Tertiary winding to a VT whose secondary is connected in
open delta to detect ground fault. This type of scheme is usually used in case of Three phase banks where
chances of earth fault in Tertiary forming bus cannot be ruled out.
6.8.5 Overfluxing Protection
Excessive flux density (Overfluxing) arises principally from the following system conditions:
(a) high system voltage
(b) low system frequency
(c) geomagnetic disturbances

(c) Geomagnetic disturbances may result in overfluxing without the V/f threshold being exceeded, which
do not warrant the Transformer to be disconnected (Tripped). Today’s differential relays provide a 5th
harmonic detection/restraint feature, which can be used to detect such a condition, as levels of this harmonic
rise under overfluxing conditions. (a) & (b) leads to a higher flux in the core resulting in higher magnetizing
currents. This happens due to the non-linear magnetizing characteristics of the core. The core flux increases
and the magnetic losses increase for either of conditions (a) & (b). The magnetizing flux enters in other
structural parts of the transformer as well; this results in additional eddy current losses. Because of increased
losses, the temperature of the iron winding and some structural parts increases, which subsequently lead
to deterioration of the Transformer Core.
Basics
A critical situation occurs in a transformer if the flux exceeds the rated value. The flux, , in the core of
a transformer is given by the following equation.
f is the frequency of the voltage

N is the number of turns in the winding
U is the voltage applied to the winding
The above equation shows that the flux is directly proportional to U/F in a transformer.
Either the absolute values or percentage values of the voltage and frequency can be used for calculating
flux. The flux is more than the rated value if U/F is more than one per unit.
Transformer manufacturers give a limiting curve [U/F = F(t)] for each transformer. Typical curve for two
types of Transformer is shown below (Figure 6.18):
Most Transformers are rated for continuous operation at 1.1 V/f. Beyond this value, depending on the
Transformer V/f limiting curve, the required setting can be adopted in the relay for alarm as well as trip.
Both IDMTL as well as definite time characteristics are available in today’s Numerical relay, for the Utilities
to take corrective measures.
Fig. 6.18 : Permissive over-fluxing in two power transformers

The transformer overfluxing protection is generally recommended on both sides for interconnecting transformers.
This is to cover all possible operating conditions, e.g. the transformer may remain energized from either side.
For other transformers overfluxing relay shall be provided on the high side winding of the Transformer.
Overfluxing Protection relay specification would be as per following:

(a) Overfluxing protection shall be phase to phase connected.
(b) Operate on the principle of measurement of voltage to frequency ratio.
(c) Have inverse time characteristics compatible with transformer overfluxing withstand capability.
(d) Provide an independent alarm with a definite time delay continuously adjustable between 0.1 to 6.0
seconds at values of ‘v/f between 100% to 130% of rated values.
(e) Have a set of characteristics for Various time multiplier settings. The maximum operating time of
the relay shall not exceed 3 seconds and 1.5 seconds at ‘v/f values of 1.4 and 1.5 times, the rated
values, respectively.
(f) Tripping time shall be governed by ‘v/f vs time characteristics of the relay.
(g) Shall have an accuracy of operating time within the tolerance of + 10% h. Have a high resetting
ratio of 98% or better
6.8.6 Under Impedance Protection
Under Impedance relays can be used as back-up protection for the transformer. It consists of a multi-
zone impedance relay on the HV side or on LV side of the transformer looking into the transformer as
shown in Fig 6.19.
Fig. 6.19 : Under Impedance relay protection application
The main advantages of the Under Impedance relay is, it provides back-up for Primary protection in
Zone-1 looking into the Transformer & as remote back up in Zone-2. It also provides overlapping protection
with the bus protective zones by its reverse zone (Zone-3). This can be beneficial if the bus protection is
not duplicated and failure of bus protection to operate results in delayed clearance of fault by over current
relays on the other side of the transformer.
Under Impedance Protection will be more suitable than Overcurrent protection in an interconnected EHV
S/S with 3 or 4 Transformers operating in parallel. For any short circuit on the HV side of the Transformer,
the fault current feed from LV side may not reach the overcurrent set level due to sharing of the fault
currents by the paralleled Transformers. Co-ordination of Back up Under Impedance Protection may be
easier than Over current protection in this case.
It has not been a practice to use this protection by utilities in India; however, it can be considered on
case-to-case basis.
Coordination of Zone 2 / Zone 3 timers with transmission line relays can be problem and has to be taken
care of. It must be noted that the Under Impedance relays cannot provide sensitive ground fault protection.
Under Impedance Protection relay specification would be as per following:
(a) Triple pole type with faulty phase indication

(b) Single step polarized ‘mho’ or impedance distance relay suitable for measuring phase to ground
and phase to phase faults.
(c) Have an adjustable characteristic angle between 30-80 degrees
(d) Have a definite time delay relay with continuously adjustable setting range of 0.2. to 2.0 Sec.
(e) Have a suitable Ohmic range for covering the Transformer impedance and shall be continuously
variable.
(f) Include VT failure function to block tripping during VT fuse failure condition.
6.8.7 Directional, Non-directional Phase Over Current Protection
Phase Overcurrent relays are extensively used as Back Up protections for the Transformers. In most
cases overcurrent relays are applied on all sides of network transformers. Overcurrent relays are needed
on both sides of a two-winding transformer if there are fault current in-feeds from the network connected to
both sides of the transformer. It is still a good practice to provide overcurrent relays on both sides of a
single transformer if there is no source connected to the LVside. The backup relay on the low side of the
transformer in this case should provide backup protection for the low-side bus and line protection devices.
Overcurrent relays can be inverse time or definite-time delay types. Sometimes instantaneous overcurrent
relays are also provided. Instantaneous trip units are set at a level that is higher than the maximum inrush
current that might be experienced by a transformer as well as higher than the maximum short circuit current on
the low voltage bus. These units are typically set in the range of 8 to 13 times the rated current of the transformer.
Because of their short operating time, they provide high speed protection for severe internal faults.
The relay shall be equipped with inrush restraint feature, so that the setting can be effective and avoid
unwanted tripping during transformer energization. Numerical over current relays provide upgraded
performance for transformer back-up protection. The digital filters remove the DC component and harmonics
from the inrush current. Numerical back-up over current relays can therefore be set much more sensitive
than conventional types and are recommended to be used.
The need for directional overcurrent relays arise depending on the specific requirement. Figure 6.20 below
explains the requirement. Both the Transformers have overcurrent on the HV as well as on the LV side. If
the sources on both HV & LV are strong, the fault current ID = IC + IE + IF will be much greater than IC. In
this case selectivity can be achieved with non-directional inverse time relays. If the source on the LV side
of the transformer is weak, IE & IF would be small making ID H” IC, selectivity will not be achieved unless the
LV relays are directional overcurrent relays.
Fig. 6.20 : Directional Overcurrent protection application

6.8.8 Ground fault protection (Directional or Non-Directional Earth Fault Relay tank ground over
current relays)
Various ground fault protections used are described below. Generally, these protections are meant to
provide the grounded winding with a low sensitivity ground fault protection only. They do not provide other
types of protection.
(a) Directional or Non-Directional Earth Fault Relay
This type of protection is also specific to transformers with at least one directly grounded or resistance
grounded winding. The protection is specialized to protect for winding faults to ground.
Sensitive Earth Fault protection is provided on the Transformer to provide Back-up protection for the
following applications:
(i) For Busbars if there is no Busbar protection; this would constitute main protection for these faults,
(ii) For Transmission Lines connected to the transformer

(iii) For the Transformer winding in the form of differential or restricted earth fault protection.
(iv) As ultimate Back up for un-cleared ground faults on the downstream side of the
Transformer. This function is usually set with long time delay to co-ordinate with Earth fault Relays in the
Network.
When used for protection of power transformer circuits, input currents used for the earth-fault protection
function are one of the following two types.
(i) Residual current calculated from the CTs provided in the connection between the power transformer
and the bus as shown in Figure 6.21; this arrangement detects ground faults on the delta winding of
the transformer.
(ii) Measured current in the connection between the neutral point of a winding and earth for detecting
faults in the wye connected windings of the Transformer.
Fig. 6.21 : Directional Earth fault protection application

The function can be directionalized with zero sequence or residual voltage as the polarizin element. This
voltage can be derived by either having VT secondary connected in open delta (Figure 6.21) or by deriving
the zero sequence voltage in the case of Numerical Relays.
The sensitivity to the harmonic and inrush currents can be one of the main problems with back-up ground over
current relays. Settings must be able to allow inrush, which usually means desensitizing the back-up relay.
Static relays that do not have restraint for these harmonics usually can have problems. Numerical relay offers
the best characteristic since digital filters remove harmonics and DC offset currents from the inrush and is,
therefore, recommended. An inrush restraint feature shall allow sensitive settings for earth fault detection.
(b) Tank Ground Fault Protection
This type of protection is specific to transformers with at least one grounded or resistance grounded
winding. The protection is specialized to protect for winding faults to ground. The tank ground fault protection
or tank leakage protection is a ground-connected relay, which is connected in series with the main tank
ground. The tank is insulated from ground except for one path which has a current transformer around it
connected to the tank ground relay. The relay will see any current flowing from the tank to the ground such
as bushing failures, winding to tank failures, and core to winding failures. Since minimum current flows
through this path during normal operation it can be set very sensitive. The problem with this protection is
that it requires a single path to ground through at most 1 ohm resistance. This creates a high voltage to
remote earth from the transformer tank during ground faults, which may cause safety problems. The path
can easily be shorted out by inadvertent control or metallic paths to the transformer case. Also care must
be taken to prevent mal-operation from transformer tank capacitance currents.
In general this protection is meant to provide a grounded winding with a low sensitivity ground fault protection.
It does not provide any other type of protection.
It is not normal practice to use this protection by utilities in India but in some cases, particularly where French
practices are adopted, it has been used. According to French practice normally any transformer winding fault
other than inter turn fault will invariably involve earth. And the probability of having phase-to-phase fault in 3
phase transformers is also quite remote. As such Tank Leakage protection relay along with fire protection
system (Drain and Stir Method) quite uniquely becomes the main protection for the transformers.
Fig. 6.22 : Tank Ground fault protection application

Back-up overcurrent & Earth-Fault protection relay (on HV side and MV side) specification would be as per
the following:
(a) Shall have three over current and one earth fault element(s) which shall be either independent or
composite unit(s).
(b) The scheme shall include necessary VT fuse failure relays for alarm purposes
(c) Over current relay shall
• Have directional IDMT characteristic with a definite minimum time of 3.0 seconds at 10 times
setting and have a variable setting range of 50-200% of rated current
• Have low transient, over reach high set instantaneous unit of continuously variable setting range
500-2000 % of rated current
• Have an adjustable characteristic angle of 30 to 60 degree lead
• Shall have high set unit having low transient overreach & variable setting typically 500-2000% of
rated current.
• Include hand reset flag indicators or LEDs.
(d) Earth fault relay shall
• Have low transient, over reach high set instantaneous unit of continuously variable setting range
200-800 % of rated current
• Have an adjustable characteristic angle of 30 to 60 degree lag
• Shall have high set unit having low transient overreach & variable setting typically 100-800% of
rated current.
• Include hand reset flag indicators or LEDs
• Include necessary separate interposing voltage transformers or have internal feature in the relay for
open delta voltage to the relay
(e) Transformer Neutral Current Protection Relay (For Single Transformer Bank)
6.8.9 Mechanical type fault detectors (Buchholz, Oil level indicators, Pressure relief devices for
transformer & OLTC chamber)
Transformer Buchholz protection, OLTC Buchholz Protection, Pressure Relief devices, etc., fall in this class of
protections. They are all designed to provide protection for low magnitude turn-to-turn faults. These types of
faults are not covered by any of the other protection schemes. In addition to this specialized protection they all
provide some limited protection for insulation failure faults inside the transformer tank. None of these protection
schemes can detect faults outside the transformer or inside the transformer bushings. All the schemes work on
some type of pressure differential or pressure rise of the oil or gas inside the transformer. The pressure from the
internal tank fault is used to identify the fault and provide fast tripping before a major fault occurs.
(a) Buchholz Relay
The gas accumulator relay (Buchholz Relay) operates on pressure accumulated due to sudden oil or gas
surge. It also operates due to long-term accumulation of gasses associated with overheating of various
parts of the transformer conductor and insulation systems. This will detect faults in their early incipient
stages and prevent significant damage. Generally these protections are mainly aimed at meeting external
safety requirements.
Fig. 6.23 : Buchholz Relay
Large quantities of gas are produced when an arc due to an electrical fault occurs in the transformer. The gas
surges up towards the conservator tank and on its way, it drops two hinged floats, one at the top and other at
the bottom in the chamber. Each float is accompanied by a mercury switch. The mercury switch on the upper
float is connected to an alarm circuit and that on the lower float is connected to an external trip via Trip relay.
These relays also detect excessive loss of cooling oil in the conservator tank of the transformer in addition
to the detection of gases produced in the transformer. Most recent designs of Buchholz relays are equipped
with facilities for collecting samples of the accumulated gases so that they may be analyzed and the
nature of fault may be estimated. A provision for injecting dry air in the Buchholz relay is also made so that
the operation of the relay may be tested. Another provision that exists in Buchholz relays is to allow a
technician to take a sample of the oil and test it for the integrity of its insulating properties.
For higher reliability, duplicating of the initiating contacts is sometimes done and may be considered on a
case-to-case basis.
To avoid common failures and to allow optional gas collection from different places in the tank, one of the
utility provide in their system two Buchholz relays in each tank, which are located in separate pipes from
different areas of the tank to the conservator. Further there are two PRDs on each tank. This is because
they feel that these protection functions for sensitive internal fault detection cannot be diversely covered
and therefore need to be duplicated.
(b) Pressure relief device (PRD)
The transformer tank filled with cooling liquid is a container subject to internal pressure and has to be
provided with one or more safety valves suitably calibrated for the maximum allowed pressure (This
depends on the design of the Transformer Tank), so that overpressure caused by internal faults can be
instantaneously relieved through the valves, thus avoiding greater damages such as the deformation or
even the burst of the tank and the spraying of hot oil with subsequent fire risks. It is necessary to protect
the transformer tank with a suitable equipment capable of almost instantaneously discharging overpressure
already at the development, before the structure integrity is damaged, PRD provides just this function. The
PRD schematically consists of the following:
• A valve base comprising the valve opening venting area with its specially profiled gasket and a seat
for an O-ring gasket on the flanged end towards the transformer.s tank
• A valve cap pressed against the profiled gasket by calibrated helical spring, thus making the valve
completely tight up to the rated pressure;
• A splash diverter to avoid damages caused by hot oil sprinkles
• A single or a double electrical contact for alarm/operating a trip relay.
6.8.10 Overload protections (Oil temperature, Winding temperature relays for transformer and for
OLTC, Overload relays Current and/or Thermal Replica based)
Thermal stress due to heat accumulation is one of the factors that cause insulation damage in Transformers.
Heat produced in the Transformers due to Transformer core & copper losses ages the Transformer winding
insulation. The heat emanating from the Transformer core & winding is transferred to the oil which in turn
heats up and can cause decomposition as well reduction of its dielectric strength. Though the Transformer oil
is continuously cooled either by natural convection cooling or by forced cooling, there will always be instances
when Transformers are overloaded and feed remote faults (Increase in current). Hence it is necessary to
monitor the Transformer oil & winding temperatures and take remedial measures, if the setting limits are
crossed.
(a) Oil Temperature Sensors
The top oil temperature sensors can detect overheating. The temperature limit settings vary from utility to
utility and also depend upon manufacturer’s recommendations. Typical settings are 95°C for alarm and
100°C for trip. Because of the heating and cooling requirements of a transmission transformer some
specialized temperature protection is required to provide protection over the full range of operating limits
of the transformer. The transformer temperature depends upon the ambient temperature, the cooling
system condition, the excitation voltage and the transformer load. To provide for temperature protection a
sensor is usually provided to indicate top oil temperature. The power transformers have a large thermal
heat sink and can withstand overloads for certain limited time. Selective protection, monitoring and load
management are considered necessary. The tripping of the transformer should be the last action.
(b) Winding Temperature Sensors
Winding temperature sensors can detect overheating. The temperature limit settings vary from utility to
utility and also depend upon manufacturer’s recommendations. Typical settings are 100°C for alarm and
105°C for trip. To simulate the winding temperature, a resistor sized to approximate the heating in the
transformer winding at full load is used. The resistor is fed by a current transformer from one of the phase
currents. To add oil temperature, the top oil is circulated in to a well within the resistor. This combined
heating of the resistor from transformer current and top oil, is used to simulate the winding temperature.
Sensors (presently adopted) techniques is to measure the temperatures directly: Direct measurement
sensors are placed in the windings at locations where the highest temperature is expected to occur. The
sensors are connected to the measurement device that is mounted outside the tank through a hole in the
tank wall with liquid-tight optical connectors. Accurate placement of sensors depends on the ability to
predict sites where the hottest spot is likely to occur.
Optical probe: Optical probes are widely used for temperature measurement. They have fast response
times and are very accurate. Most optical probes that have been used inside transformers can be divided
into two types, intrinsic fiber optic sensors and extrinsic fiber optic sensors. In both types, the fiber optic
probe is constructed of appropriate materials that allow the probe to be installed directly inside the transformer
tank and into the transformer windings. Generally, this is best done during initial construction of the
transformer or during major winding renovations.
RTD Probe: Commonly used RTD probes are located in dry wells at different locations in the transformer
tank, have been effectively used for decades to have a reasonable measurement of the oil temperature in
the area of the dry well.
The above temperature sensors do not meet any of the other requirements but are again the only (Connected
to trip relay through their initiating contacts) relays which meet the over load temperature limit requirements.
For higher reliability duplicating of the initiating electrical contacts is sometimes done and may be considered
on a case-to-case basis.
(c) Overload Relays
Current based Overload Function

It is also a practice to use a simple over current relay with a time delay arranged to give alarm to warn the
operator of any overloading of the transformer. Some features such as, adaptive protection settings that take
into account winter and summer transformer loadings, may not be possible based purely on current measurement.
Sometimes economic consideration necessitates measurement of only one phase current to detect overload.
Current Overload Protection relay specification would be as per the following:

(i) Be of three pole type
(ii) Be of definite time over-current type
(iii) Have one set of over-current relay element, with continuously adjustable setting range of 50-200%
of rated current
(iv) Have adjustable time delay relay each for trip & for alarm, having setting range of 1 to 10.0 seconds,
continuously.
(v) Have a drop-off/pick-up ratio greater than 95%.
Thermal Overload Function
The use of Numerical Relays and the facility to monitor the winding temperature of all the windings, make
Thermal Overload Relays a superior Back up Protection compared to Plain Current Overload relays. The
Transformer Thermal content (è) is a function of Transformer Thermal Time Constant (ô) and Transformer
Load Current (I). The Thermal image is created in the relay and the Thermal content is continuously
monitored. The Alarm & Trip setting of the Thermal content è can be set in the relay.
Some features such as, adaptive protection settings that take into account winter and summer transformer
loadings, automatic load shedding and early warning for possible overload tripping is achieved by Thermal
overload function.
Thermal Overload Protection relay specification would be as per the following:
(i) Shall be of three pole type
(ii) Shall be based on the thermal characteristics of the transformer by setting the time constant of the
transformer
(iii) The trip level shall be settable from 110 % to 150% iv. An alarm shall be settable for thermal levels
from 80 % to 110%
6.9 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM
When a transformer fault has developed in to an oil fire, then the transformer is in most cases destroyed.
The aim is therefore to protect adjacent asset and minimize cost of collateral damage and not to “save” the
transformer. A short description of some of the available Fire Suppression systems is listed below:
6.9.1 Deluge Systems
A deluge system is a fixed fire protection system in which the pipe system is empty of water and kept
pressurized with dry air, until the a fire condition is detected and the deluge valve is operated to distribute
pressurized water to the nozzles or sprinklers directing the water onto the protected object(s). Various
types of sensors can be used in the detection systems.
Deluge systems are typically used where quick application of large quantities of water is required to control
a fire and protect high value adjacent assets, such as on generator and unit transformers in power stations,
bulks supply transformers at industrial plant and major transmission or substation transformer in city locations.
The deluge system can quench a fire externally to a transformer by cooling the fire and the fuel and also
by reducing the oxygen available for the combustion. It can also cool the transformers tank, oil pipes and
the cooler bank to prevent rupture form being caused by the fire and possible against explosion caused by
heat from the fire. It does not prevent tank rupture caused by internal arcing from the initiating fault. Foam
can be added to a water deluge system. In such systems an air- or water-foam concentrate is introduced
into the deluge water at a controlled rate. Foam water systems are used to control and/or extinguish fires,
which require both smothering and a cooling agent. It can be effective on transformer fires as it can cover
horizontal surfaces such as the top of the transformer and the bund floor area where it reduces the risk of
a pool fire. It also adheres better to vertical surfaces than pure water. The disadvantage of foam is that the
fire fighting water is contaminated with the foaming agent and may require decontamination before it can
be released to the drains or nearby streams.
6.9.2 Water Mist Systems
Water Mist is also an efficient fire-fighting medium. The difference between Water Mist and a traditional
water based fire fighting systems is that the Water Mist systems require much less water as they uses
have smaller water droplet. As heat absorption is a function of surface area and not volume, smaller
droplets mean more surface area are available and therefore faster heat absorption for same quantity of
water or equal heat absorption with much less water. When a droplet of water vaporizes to steam, it
expands by approx 1,600 times. Water mist is quickly converted to steam that smothers the fire and
prevents further oxygen from reaching it. At the same time, the evaporation creates a significant cooling
effect of combustion gases and blocks the transfer of radiant heat.
Water Mist combines the fire suppression properties of both conventional water-based deluge or sprinkler
systems and gaseous fire suppression systems.
6.9.3 Fire Suppression using Inert Gas
Compared with water spray system, gas injection system has advantages such as reducing civil work at
installation, no necessity of securing water, reducing piping installation, and so on. It should be noted that
for an Inert Gas for Oxygen Displacement or a Hypoxic enclosure to provide effective fire protection, the
enclosure must remain intact. So pressure venting may be required to ensure that the enclosure is not
breached by the transformer failure event. The inert gas applied for fire protection of power transformers
is now mainly nitrogen and also sometimes a mixture gas of Nitrogen, Argon and CO2, Nitrogen is a cost
effective and readily available gas.
For application on power transformers where sound insulation panels are installed the panel enclosure can
be used as outer enclosure for the gas containment for the fire suppression.
6.10 MONITORING OF TRANSFORMER CONDITION THROUGH THE TRANSFORMER OIL
The oil used in transformers performs three essential functions; these are thermal transfer of heat, dielectric
insulation and transport information about the health of the transformer.
A transformer may be considered as a chemical reactor to understand the process of physics and chemistry
for assessing the health of the transformer. The oil is the messenger that holds vital information on the
physical condition of the transformer. Normal practice consists of obtaining oil samples from the transformer
and OLTC compartment, if it is used, for testing. Standard tests on the oil samples include determining the
absolute water contact in oil, particle count in the oil, IFT, colour, and most importantly perform dissolved gas
analysis.
After completing the tests, the results are compared with the results from the previous tests of the same
unit to determine if any change has taken place, and more importantly, at what rate the change is taking
place. The rate of change and standard diagnostics techniques provided in IEC and IEEE Guides for
interpretation of the results can be used to determine the actions that should be taken.
Dissolved Gas Analysis
Many gradually evolving incipient faults in transformers have detectable symptoms that indicate problems.
One of these symptoms is the production of dissolved gases in oil. Dielectric oil and cellulose dielectric
insulation (paper) break down under thermal and electrical stresses in the transformer. This process produces
gases of varying concentrations depending on the stresses applied to these materials. The gases dissolve
in the oil. The oil is sampled and analyzed; the composition of the gases and their concentrations that are
indicative of the nature and severity of the fault in the transformer are determined. The changes in the
production of each gas and its rate of production are important factors in determining the fault(s) and their
evolution. Some specific gases are recognized as being indicative of certain types of faults.
The key gasses usually looked for are Hydrogen, Acetylene, Methane, Ethylene, Ethane, Carbon monoxide,
and Carbon dioxide. The breakdown of the key gasses and the associated fault types are listed below
(Table 6.3):
Table 6.2
Key Gas Associated Fault Type

Hydrogen (H2) Arcing, Corona, Overheated oil
Acetylene (C2H2) Arcing
Methane (CH4) Corona, Overheated oil, Cellulose breakdown

Ethylene (C2H4) Arcing, Corona, Overheated oil, Cellulose breakdown
Ethane (C2H6) Corona, Overheated oil
Carbon monoxide (CO) Cellulose breakdown

Carbon dioxide (CO2) Cellulose breakdown
The level of the above key gasses and the ratio helps in determining the condition of the Transformer. In
order for the DGA analysis to be truly effective, the DGA need to be performed on a very regular basis,
alteast once every three months. It should be noted however, it does not guarantee that a good report
means status quo until the next DGA is performed.
6.11 RECOMMENDATION OF PROTECTION & SETTING CRITERIA
6.11.1 Transformer Protection scheme implementation

Duplication of transformer protection, in terms of having True Main 2 protection is not considered necessary,
but the protection and monitors shall be divided in two groups viz. Gr I and Gr II at 765/400 kV/ 220 kV.
Substations at the referred voltage levels shall be provided with two station batteries (DC 1 & DC 2). Gr I
and Gr II protections shall be connected to DC 1 & DC 2 respectively with their own Master Trip Relays.
Each of the DC supplies to Gr I & Gr II shall be separately supervised.
In Substations where Voltage levels are below 220KV, where two separate DC sources are not provided, it
is recommended that the protections be grouped in two groups, connected to separately fused DC sources.
One gets to use two trip relays in this case, which is advantageous.
Given below (Table 6.3) is one possible way of grouping the Transformer protections:
Table 6.3
GROUP I GROUP II
Transformer Differential Protection REF Protection
Overfluxing Protection, HV Overfluxing Protection, IV/LV
Directional Overcurrent and Earth Three Phase Impedance protection (If Auto Transformers)
Fault Protection, HV
Thermal Overload Protection Directional Overcurrent and Earth Fault Protection, IV/LV
Neutral or Residual Overcurrent Neutral Current Protection (Single phase Transformer bank)
Protection (Connected in Transformer
Neutral)
Buchholz (Main Tank) Protection Current Overload Protection

PRD (Pressure Relief Device) Protection Buchholz (OLTC) Protection
Oil Temperature (OTI) Protection Winding Temperature (WTI) Protection
Tertiary (Delta) Winding protection Oil level High/Low Protection/Monitor

(If Auto Transformers)
Fire Protection Fire protection
With usage of Numerical relays, many of the Protection functions in Gr I can be accommodated in one
relay designated as Main 1 relay and similarly majority of Gr II protection functions accommodated in Main
2 relay. A typical Auto Transformer Protection scheme with Numerical relays is shown in Figure 6.25.
6.11.2 Special Comments
(a) The transformer overfluxing protection has been recommended on both sides for interconnecting
transformers. This is to cover all possible operating conditions, e.g. the transformer may remain
energized from either side. For other transformers overfluxing relay shall be provided on the HV
winding of the Transformer.
(b) In case of breaker and half switching schemes, the differential protection C.Ts. associated with
Main and Tie breakers should be connected to separate bias windings and these should not be
paralleled in order to avoid false operation due to dissimilar C.T. transient response.
(c) Whenever separate phase-wise C.Ts are available on neutral side of transformer, triple pole high
impedance relay may be provided instead of single pole R.E.F. relay.
(d) In case of autotransformers, a 3-phase high impedance relay, which also acts as restricted earth
fault relay is used some times instead of a single element relay.
(e) The non-directional over current relays are used when they could be coordinated with the over current
protection on connecting lines. Coordination requirements usually require the clearing times to be longer
than the other types of back-up protection. Directional over current relay improves the co-ordination by
being set to look through the transformer impedance. For this reason they are normally used for all
interconnecting transformers. When applied on both sides of the transformer, the current levels where
coordination with line relaying is required is limited by the transformer impedance which greatly improves
the tripping times for higher current faults in the transformer. The directional ground over current relay
can be set much more sensitive and with very short time delays. For all interconnecting transformers
use of directional over current and ground over current relays with high set units are recommended.
(f) There a number of general problems with back-up relay viz., the sensitivity to the harmonic and
inrush currents. Setting must be able to allow inrush, which usually means de-sensitizing the back-
up relay. Numerical relays offer the best characteristic since digital filters remove harmonics and
DC offset currents from the inrush. Numerical back-up over current relays can therefore be set
much more sensitive than conventional types and are recommended to be used.
(g) Harmonic restraint may be required to obtain sensitive settings in case of zero sequence over
current relays.
(h) In case of mechanical type of fault detectors like Buchholz and PRDs, for higher reliability, duplicating
of the initiating contacts may be considered on a case-to-case basis.
(i) The power transformers have a large thermal heat sink and can withstand overloads for certain
limited time. Selective protection and monitoring and load management is necessary. The tripping
of the transformer should be the last action
6.11.3 Setting Criteria
(a) The current setting of the back up O/C relay shall be set above the expected maximum load current
so as to allow possible overload on account of loss of one of the parallel transformers.
(b) Overload relay shall be set at 110% of rated current with delay of 5 seconds. This shall be connected
to give only alarm and not for tripping.
TYPICAL PROT. SCHEME OF DELTA WYE TRANSFORMER
Fig. 6.24 : Protection of a delta-wye transformer

TYPICAL PROT. SCHEME OF AN AUTO-TRANSFORMER USING NUMERICAL RELAYS
Legend
87T Transformer differential protection
64 REF Restricted earth fault protection
24T Overfluxing protection
21T Impedance protection
51N Neutral overcurrent protection
51G Earth fault protection
50BF Breaker failure protection
63 T Buchholz relay (Main Tank)
63 TC Buchholz relay (Tap changer chamber)
49 WT Winding temperature
49 OT Oil temperature
PRV (T) Pressure relief valve (Main Tank)
PRV (TC) Pressure relief valve (Tap changer chamber)
OLA Oil level alarm
Fig. 6.25 : Typical Protection scheme for an Auto-transformer
One numerical relay has been identified as Main 1 and the other identified as Main 2 in this figure. The
main protection and backup functions can be distributed among these relays in different combinations.
One of the possible combinations is shown in this example.
The following protection functions are activated in the Main 1 multifunction relay.
• Circulating current differential protection with phase segregated measurement of the current in the
neutral.
• Distance protection
• Earth fault protection

• Breaker failure protection for the HV side
• Breaker failure protection for the LV side
• Fault data recorder
The following protection functions are included in Main 2 multifunction relay.
• Biased differential protection two windings type
• Restricted earth fault protection
• Earth fault protection on the HV side
• Restricted earth fault protection for the tertiary winding
• Breaker failure protection for the HV side
• Breaker failure protection for the LV side
• Fault data recorder
Many mechanical protection functions and alarms are provided on transformers. Out of all possible
systems the following are listed:
• High winding temperature
• High oil temperature
• Oil level alarm
• Pressure relief valve for the transformer
• Pressure relief valve for the tap changer
TYPICAL PROT. SCHEME OF AUTO-TRANSFORMER WITH DELTA CONNECTED TERTIARY LOAD
Notes 1: Only those CTs used for transformer protection are scheme in the diagram
Notes 2: Over current functions, 50/51 and 51N P can be programmed in the multifunction relay.
Notes 3: These CTs (4000/5) inside the tertiary are connected in parallel to provide the zero sequence current, 3IC.
Fig. 6.26 : Typical Protection system for an Autotransformer with delta connected loaded tertiary winding
Section B : SHUNT REACTORS
Main Power System parameters are System Voltages and Frequency which normally indicate the healthiness
level (they indicate the level of Generated active and reactive Powers against the load power requirement).
In a healthy system, Voltage and frequency are close to the rated system values. Increased active and
reactive power load tends to decrease the system frequency and voltage levels respectively. It then becomes
essential to generate additional active and reactive power. Synchronous Generators respond to the demand
by means of Governor/AVR control systems In order to preserve MVA capability of Generators (stator
thermal limit) it is preferred to have reactive load support from other sources of reactive power like fixed
Capacitor banks or other FACTS . However, during system light load condition, in HV and EHV Systems,
often voltages increase beyond the normal operating levels due to Line Capacitance to Earth. Such a
condition demands additional inductive loads to maintain system voltage levels within the normal range.
Generators have limited capacity with regard to under and over excitation operation. Typical Generators
have rated power factor (pf) between 0.8 to 0.85 (lead and lag) at rated MVA. There is risk of system
instability due to generated VAr larger than system can absorb. When system VAr generation is higher
than the required VAr load, Generators tend to go to under-excitation.
To prevent instability, external Inductive loads are required. Shunt Reactors are Inductive device commonly
used in HV and EHV Systems for compensating the excess capacitive VArs in a power system.
Figure 1 below, three different Shunt Compensations are shown namely:
Fig. 1 : Shunt reactor application in power systems
(a) By Line connected Shunt Reactors (POS. 2), used on EHV Lines, directly connected to the Line as
shown, also called Un-switched reactors. The Line reactor may be provided with its own Circuit
Breaker, if the requirement is a Switched Reactor.
(b) Bus connected Shunt Reactors (POS. 1), connected via its Circuit Breaker.
(c) Shunt Reactor connected on Transformer Tertiary side bus (POS. 3), either 11 kV or 33 kV and is
provided with a Circuit Breaker of suitable TRV rating.
6.B.1 REACTOR CONSTRUCTION
Dry-type shunt reactors of 11 kV and 33 kV ratings are considered very effective and widely used in Static Var
Systems or Compensators and also for absorbing reactive power during light load conditions that cause
higher voltage levels. The primary advantages of dry-type air-core reactor, compared to oil-immersed types,
are lower initial and operating costs, lower weight, lower losses, and the absence of insulating oil and its
maintenance. The main disadvantages of dry-type reactors are limitations on voltage and kVA rating and the
high-intensity magnetic field. There is no magnetizing inrush current when the reactor is energized.
Oil-immersed Shunt reactors used in India are predominantly oil-immersed design. They are either coreless
type (air core design) with linear characteristics at least up to 1.5 pu or gapped iron-core type with linearity
restricted to 1.2 -1.3 pu. Both designs are characterized by low frequency long time constant current when
de-energized, which is determined by the parallel combination of the reactor’s inductance and the line
capacitance. The gapped iron-core design has a more severe energizing inrush than the air core or core-
less type. Both designs are constructed to provide linearity of inductance and to reduce residual or remnant
flux when compared to a transformer or reactor without gapped core. Both designs are constructed for
either self-cooling or forced cooling. Normally most of the reactors used in India are natural cooling type.
It may be mentioned that in air core design there is no iron core in the main circuit flux path but liberally
designed strong tank shields of either CRGO or sometimes copper are usually provided. For control of
switching surge over voltages, gapped core reactors with knee-point voltage of 1.2 or 1.3 provide better
results. While shunt reactors of coreless type with linearity 1.5 pu are used for reactive power absorption.
The shunt reactor construction has been quite complicated in view of control of core or tank vibrations
within stringent limits and the duties to be performed to withstand the severe over voltages during switching-
on or load rejections. There has been good statistics of failures of shunt reactors attributable to either
construction complications or system operational severity.
Dry-type shunt reactors of 11 kV and 33 kV ratings, connected on Transformer tertiary bus are considered
very effective and widely used in Static Var Systems or Compensators and also for absorbing reactive
power during light load conditions that cause higher voltage levels. The primary advantages of dry-type
air-core reactor, compared to oil-immersed types, are lower initial and operating costs, lower weight, lower
losses, and the absence of insulating oil and its maintenance. The main disadvantages of dry-type reactors
are limitations on voltage and kVA rating and the high-intensity magnetic field. There is no magnetizing
inrush current when the reactor is energized.
6.B.2 SHUNT REACTOR FAILURE MODES AND RATES
Before discussing the reactor failure rates it is important to understand the modes of reactor failure. The
oil-immersed reactor faults can be broken into four categories:
• High current phase-to-phase and phase-to-ground faults.

• Turn-to-turn faults within the reactor winding.
• Miscellaneous failures such as loss of cooling or low oil
• Failure due to increased core and tank vibrations beyond the permissible limits
Because of the proximity of the winding with the core and tank, winding-to-ground failures can occur. The
magnitude of this fault decreases as the location of fault moves closer to the neutral side of the reactor.
Turn-to-turn faults cause only small change in phase currents. The current in the short-circuited fault path
would be quite high but will obviously not show as increase in the line current. This increases rapidly the
operating oil and winding temperature, increases the internal pressure, and causes accumulation of gas. If
these are not quickly detected they will evolve into a major fault.
The failure rates of oil-immersed reactors are quite high ranging from 3% to 5% per year.
6.B.3 TYPICAL SHUNT REACTOR ARRANGEMENTS
There are three main arrangements for shunt reactor connection.
1. Line Reactors
Shunt reactor is to connect it to one or both ends of a long transmission line or cable. These reactors are
usually Y-connected with either a solidly grounded neutral or grounded through a reactor of suitable
impedance value. The neutral reactor connected between the star point of EHV shunt reactor and the
ground limits the secondary arc current to a low value of around 10 amperes typically for 400 kV system to
ensure complete de-ionization of arc path when EHV system develops a single line to ground fault. Arc
extinction during line single-phase auto-reclose dead time is assisted by this neutral reactor. In the event
of a fault in the un-switched shunt reactor itself, transfer trip command will be required to trip the remote
end breaker.
2. Bus Reactors
Bus reactor is connected between two buses or two sections of the same bus in order to limit the voltage
transients on either bus. It is installed in a bus to maintain system voltage when the load of the bus
changes. It adds inductance to the system to offset the capacitance of the line which varies due to load,
humidity, weather, generator excitation and temperature.
3. Tertiary Connected Reactors
Shunt reactors of 11 kV and 33 kV ratings are considered very effective and widely used in Static Var
Systems or Compensators, wherein Reactive Vars are adjusted by Thyristor circuits. These reactors are
also used for absorbing reactive power during light load conditions that cause higher voltage levels.
6.B.4 SHUNT REACTOR PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS
Protection requirements for shunt reactors fall into four areas: high magnitude phase-to-phase faults, low
magnitude phase to ground faults, turn-to-turn faults, and other miscellaneous failures.
High magnitude phase faults in shunt reactors are required to be cleared based on the same criteria used
for the primary equipment supplying the reactor. For the tertiary supplied reactor the fault-withstand of the
transformer must be considered the limit for the clearance time. The tertiary winding is quite sensitive to
phase-to-phase or three phase faults. As such efforts should be made to ensure that tertiary does not suffer
such faults. It is important to note that all the faults external to tertiary must be contained as always to a
single phase to ground fault. For the direct connected oil-immersed reactors, that are un-switched EHV
reactors, the critical clearance time shall of the same order of magnitude as applicable to EHV Lines.
The single phase to ground fault in the system external to tertiary terminals shall normally be of very low fault
current amplitude. Such faults must, however, be detected and isolated to ensure that this does not lead to
phase-to-phase or three phase faults. The detection of turn-to-turn fault in the shunt reactor is rather tricky
and cannot be detected by conventional differential protection. The gas pressure increase or rate of gas
generation or the fall in reactor impedance gives a better indication and criteria for such protection.
Miscellaneous failures such as low oil level, high winding temperature or oil temperature are usually set to
alarm at a set level and to trip once the oil level or the reactor temperature reaches the next level of setting.
The reactors, whether un-switched type provided on lines or switched type on bus bars or on tertiary of the
transformers, play a very important role to control the over voltages on switching or on load rejection or for
enabling black-start of the network or for controlling the voltage profile of both the up-stream or down-stream
system.
The reactors therefore play a very active role to ensure satisfactory operation of the power system. Based
on the types of failures described above and the basic design of the shunt reactors to satisfy the requirements
of power system, the protective relaying schemes for the shunt reactors should meet the following key
requirements.
• Maintain transient fault and voltage stability of the power system
• Prevent unnecessary false tripping of the transmission reactor during critical load periods.
• Maintain required quality of supply

• Provide for maintenance of protective equipment with primary equipment energized by providing two
groups of protections
Shunt reactors have to remain in service with active protection remaining vigilant and fully operational.
The direct tripping command to trip the remote breaker has to be through coded and secure signal via
information link. The power system cannot tolerate false trip command resulting in outage of the line.
For smooth control of voltage profile during peak and off peak hours frequent switching of shunt reactors
provided on the bus bars or on transformer tertiary will be required and the system should not fail on
account of such frequent operation of shunt reactors. The tough duty of circuit breakers for control of
switched shunt reactors with good margin in TRV requirements and switching cycle should be recognized.
The provision of Gr I and Gr II Protection system for the Shunt Reactors must meet the same criteria as
provided for the transformers.
The protection system must address the following types of faults specific to the Shunt Reactors:
• Protect for internal phase to ground or phase to phase faults
• Protect for external tank faults to ground or phase to phase faults

• Protect for internal partial winding or turn-to-turn faults.
• Limit top oil temperature to maximum allowable temperature.
• Vibration monitoring of core and tank wall.

• Prevent rupture of reactor tank during internal fault.
• Provide protection for failure of an interrupting device.
• Provide protection for over-excitation of reactor core.

The switching device TRV should match with specific requirement of reactor current switching. The knee-
point voltage of shunt reactor and linearity selected should match with the requirement of the system
where the reactor is located for adequate protection against over voltage and consequent overloads.
6.B.5 SHUNT REACTOR PROTECTION SCHEMES
Reactors being subset of Transformers, the provision of Protection & Monitoring of Shunt Reactor will be
similar to Transformers. These are described in Section A of this Chapter:
(a) Differential Protection

(b) REF Protection
(c) Back up Protection (Impedance or Overcurrent)
(d) Mechanical Protection (Buchholz, Winding & Oil Temperature, Pressure Relief Device, Oil Level
monitor, Fire Protection)
In addition to the above, Shunt Reactors may be provided with peak to peak amplitude of vibration and
Tank monitoring.
6.B.6 RECOMMENDATION OF PROTECTION & SETTING CRITERIA
6.B.6.1 Shunt Reactor Protection scheme implementation
Duplication of Reactor protection, in terms of having True Main 2 protection is not considered necessary,
but the protection and monitors shall be divided in two groups viz. Gr I and Gr II. In Substations where
two station batteries are provided (DC 1 & DC 2), Gr I and Gr II protections shall be connected to DC 1
& DC 2 respectively with their own Master Trip Relays. The DC1 & DC2 sources shall be separately
supervised.
In Substations where two separate DC sources are not provided, it is recommended that the protections be
grouped in two groups connected to separately fused DC sources.
Given below (Table 6B.1) is a possible way of grouping the Shunt Reactor protections:
Table 6.B.1
GROUP I GROUP II
Differential Protection REF Protection
Back Up Protection (Impedance or overcurrent Buchholz Protection
as the case may be)
Oil Temperature (OTI) Protection Winding Temperature (WTI) Protection

PRD (Pressure Relief Device) Protection Oil level Low/High Protection/Monitor
Fire Protection Fire protection
6.B.6.2 Special Comments
(a) It may be noted that the connection of Restricted Earth Fault protection on the neutral side shall be
from residually connected bushing CTs (in case of bus reactor) or from the ground side CT in the
neutral grounding reactor (for line shunt reactor). The latter is to ensure that the protection covers
the neutral earthing reactor as well in the protected zone.
(b) The impedance or overcurrent backup protection may not be able to detect inter-turn fault in the
reactor, for which the buchholz may be the only answer, unless the number of turns involved is very
high. Manufacturers of reactor and relays may be consulted in this regard.
6.B.6.3 Setting Criteria
The magnitude and nature of the switching-in currents should be considered when determining settings of
reactor protections.
(a) Typical settings for o/c relays are:
Current Setting - 1.3 x Rated current Time setting - 1 sec.
(b) Typical setting of impedance type relays are:
Reach- Zone 1, 60 % of Reactor Impedance Time setting – 1 sec.
TYPICAL PROT. SCHEME FOR LINE REACTOR WITH OWN CB

TYPICAL PROT. SCHEME FOR BUS REACTOR

CHAPTER 7
PROTECTION OF TRANSMISSION CIRCUIT-LINES &

CABLES AND AUTO RECLOSING
Section 7 (A) : PROTECTION OF TRANSMISSION CIRCUIT-

LINES AND CABLES
In protection of transmission lines both dependability and security of protection are of paramount importance.
Any uncleared fault may create unwanted widespread tripping and lead to grid disturbances. On the other
hand, unintended operation of protection relay and tripping of transmission line during a stressed power
system condition may cause cascaded tripping and lead to grid disturbances
Transmission circuit Main protection is required to provide primary protection for the line and clear all type
of faults on it within shortest possible time with reliability, selectivity and sensitivity.
Transmission circuit back-up protection caters for failure of any main protection system to clear any fault
that it is expected to clear. A protection function that offers back-up for most faults may also provide main
protection for some fault conditions. However there could be some known limitations of the operating
principles of the main protection having restrictions in relay settings that could be applied to the main
protection. Back-up protection might be provided in one or more of the following forms.
• Circuit local back-up.
• Substation local back-up.

• Remote back-up.
Two main protections could be justified on the basis of being able to keep an important transmission circuit
in service with one set of protection remaining in service while second set of protection is taken under
maintenance. Where two main protection systems are justified one may take the opportunity to select
main protection systems that cover each other’s limitations.
The requirements of overhead line and cable protection systems vary greatly, due to the exposure of
transmission circuits to a wide variety of environmental hazards and are subjected to the wide variations in
the format, usage and construction methodologies of transmission circuits. The type of protection signaling
(tele-protection) or data communication systems required to work with the protection systems will also
influence protection scheme requirements.
7.1 TYPICAL TRANSMISSION CIRCUIT ARRANGEMENTS
This section offers a brief overview of common transmission circuit arrangements and physical construction
factors which might have some influence on the exposure of transmission circuits to faults and therefore
on the selection of back-up protection schemes. Transmission circuit construction can be considered in
three main categories.
• Overhead construction.
• Underground cable construction.

• Composite construction.
Prodection of Transmission Circuit-lines and Cables & Auto Reclosing 91
7.1.1 Overhead Transmission Circuits
Physical arrangements for overhead conductor support vary depending on voltage level and cost
considerations.
The electrical parameters of resistance, reactance and capacitance are mainly influenced by the size and
type of conductors, conductor configuration and geometry with respect to each other and with respect to
ground along with the earth wires on top of towers
The thermal balance of electrical heat input and heat dissipation governs circuit load current capacity.
Heat inputs are from l2R losses, solar radiation and solar conduction. Heat dissipations are through radiation
and conduction, which depends on ambient temperature, wind velocity and chill factors.
Use of correct line parameters is important for proper setting of protective relays. Calculation of overhead
line electrical parameters at nominal system frequency and line surge impedance are usually performed
using dedicated computer software. These calculations may then be verified by carrying out measurements
on final installations that could be subjected to field testing, as ground conduction effects influence the
zero sequence surge impedances. This information may then be used by protection engineers to determine
optimum relay settings. The CIGRE WG 34.04 report titled “Application guide on protection of complex
transmission network configurations” gives details of how the measurements of line impedance for the
setting of distance protection and fault locators can be carried out.
7.1.1.1 Ground Wires
Ground wires help to reduce the apparent tower footing resistance. It may be noted that all HV, EHV and
UHV lines need one or more than one ground wires at a certain height above the conductors to provide the
desired shielding The tower footing impedance parameters are required to be kept as low as practically
feasible and may need special measures like counterpoises and other known methods of reducing the
footing impedances.
The economic justification for ground wires, the number of ground wires required and their geometry is
mainly determined by ground flash density, keraunic levels and severity of lightning surges as also topology
of the line profile and tower heights.
Besides reducing the number of lightning induced faults, ground wires also help to reduce the apparent
tower footing resistance seen during conductor flashover to ground causing ground faults. They provide
multiple ground fault current return paths through many tower footings, which helps in this. The annual
outage rate of the transmission line is required to be as low as possible
As said earlier, individual tower footing resistances can be substantially reduced by the use of counterpoises,
which are generally of steel conductors buried under each tower with several configurations in crowfoot
layout or continuous counterpoises connecting two or more number of towers in a row. This is usually done
where soil resistivity is very high.
Even with ground wire shielding, a lightning strike to conductors or to earth wire or to tower peaks of a line
may cause an insulator back-flash over leading to line outage. This is due to discharge current flowing
through tower impedance and tower footing resistance, which will result in a transient tower voltage rise
with respect to power line conductors. Such voltage rise could be sufficiently high to cause a single or a
multi-phase back-flash from a tower to its power conductors. It is important to appreciate that where a high
transmission tower is erected on high profile ground with high tower footing resistance, ground wires may
increase the lightning outage rates. The transmission line designers cover this aspect while designing the
tower and conductor configuration and BIL of insulator strings. To minimize the risk of outages there
should be good coordination between BIL of insulator strings and tower footing resistance.
7.1.2 Underground Transmission Circuits
The electrical characteristics of HV and EHV cables for underground transmission circuits to carry a given
load are set by the physical configuration of the conductors and the properties of the insulating media,
which materially affect the capacitance of the cable. The materials used and the voltage rating determines
the external diameter and the weight of a cable. Heat dissipation within a cable is predominantly through
l2R load current losses and this is normally dissipated by conduction through the dielectric to the soil in
which the cable is buried. Cooling may be enhanced by special back-fills in cable trenches. Internal cooling
for EHV Cable may be obtained by circulating oil through hollow conductors or through other ducts within
the cable. Cables are assigned a continuous load current rating at reference environmental conditions.
Cable shunt capacitance per unit length is much higher than for overhead lines. Charging currents increase
with cable voltage ratings. This means that inductive shunt compensation is commonly required for EHV
cables and also for unusually long HV cables. A good example of such a scenarios could be seen from the
parallel cable rings at 400 kV in Berlin provided by Power Utility BEWAG and also in the National Grid of UK.
Being less prone to fault-inducing environmental hazards than overhead lines, cable faults are almost
exclusively permanent faults. Consequently, automatic reclosing is not used for underground transmission
circuits. In cable circuits, faults can also occur in associated switchgear and cable joints. The level of
incidence of faults in these is often comparable to faults in the cable itself.
Cables do not withstand fault currents for long periods of time; consequently they demand the use of
protection without any intentional time delay. This is a feature of unit protection, such as current differential
protection, through pilot wires or fibre optic cables, which is often applied to cable circuits.
7.1.3 Composite Transmission Circuits
Planning strategies and design requirements sometimes demand the creation of composite transmission
circuits. The typical composite circuit is a mix of overhead and underground circuit.
Although less frequent, there are cases of non-homogeneous radial overhead lines, with different types of
conductor or varying conductor geometry along their route. This is often the case where a sub-transmission
line supplies many teed transformers, since it is possible to economize on conductor size as the circuit
loading decreases from the primary substation up to the most remote substation.
With non-homogeneous series impedance for a composite circuit, especially where cable sections are
involved, there may be some difficulty in setting optimum impedance settings for distance relays and in
setting optimum residual compensation for ground faults.
Although the transmission lines are originally planned to interconnect two substations after a period they
are altered to suit changing requirements in the transmission system. Often, the presence of multi-circuit
lines, multi-terminal lines and transformer tee-off’s, are due to these reasons.
In some cases, planning strategy may lead to a gradual implementation of complex transmission
arrangements. With long intervals between successive stages of implementation, it is not always possible
to engineer protection systems at each stage that will suit the final configuration. When such changes take
place it is recommended that changing, refurbishing or upgrading of protection systems harmonizing with
the power systems already in operation, be carried out.
7.2 COMPLEX TRANSMISSION CIRCUITS
The following types of lines can be classified as complex transmission circuits that often present special
protection difficulties:
• Parallel transmission lines where two or more three phase transmission circuits are arranged on the
same tower or follow the same right of way on adjacent towers.
• Multi-terminal lines having three or more terminals with substantial generation behind each.
• Tapped lines having one or more terminals with substantial generation behind them and taps feeding
only the load. The tap is done through a step-down transformer and do not have sufficient current
feedback to operate the relays.
• Composite lines where system elements like transformers, overhead lines or cables are connected
together without intermediate circuit breakers.
• Series Compensated lines
The protection of these complex transmission lines is very well described in the document produced by
CIGRE WG 34.04 in 1991 titled - “Application guide on protection of complex transmission network
configurations”.
7.2.1 Parallel Transmission Circuits
Often, for reasons of economy, two or more circuits are run in parallel on the same towers. Transmission
reliability is reduced in the event of multiple circuit faults caused by lightning and certain common mode
events, such as a tower collapse, which result in sustained faults. If insulation back-flash occurs with a
direct lightning strike to a tower, it could result in multi-circuit faults resulting into outages.
The possibility of multiple faults occurring simultaneously on more than one circuit of a transmission
network imposes special demands on protection in terms of phase selection for single-pole tripping, that
may affect high speed single phase auto-reclosing.
With double circuit tower construction, there is relatively strong inter-circuit magnetic coupling between
conductors, which is expressed in terms of various inter-circuit mutual impedances for the purposes of
short-circuit calculations and analysis of protection performance. It is usually acceptable to neglect the
positive and negative sequence mutual impedances, since they are only a fraction of the positive sequence
self impedances. It is sometimes necessary to consider the coupling from the positive sequence network
to the zero sequence network when setting sensitive residual over current protections. Zero sequence
mutual impedance should not be ignored, because of its relatively high value and its possible influence on
proper ground fault protection of lines.
The mutual coupling permutations that result from multiple circuits, which share a common right-of-way,
are complex in nature.
Mutual coupling is not restricted to parallel circuits at the same voltage level or to circuits which have two
common terminals. In some cases circuits may run in parallel for part of their route. Where there is a
parallel run, two circuits might use common, double-circuit support towers.
There are some cases of circuits at different voltage levels sharing the same tower. This may lead to inter-
system faults. Despite their severity, it may be very difficult to discriminatively detect such faults with
protection functions that are dependent on voltage measurement. The appropriate phase selection difficulties
are even greater for these lines. Phase-segregated unit protection based on current measurement is the
best option for both circuits when it is economically and technically feasible.
The main consequence of the magnetic coupling between parallel overhead lines is the modification of the
zero sequence voltage profile during a ground fault on one circuit. The zero sequence voltage profile along
any circuit will not be entirely dependent on the zero sequence current flowing in that circuit. Instead it will
depend on zero sequence current flowing in the parallel circuit(s).
It follows that protection functions based on voltage measurement are those most likely to be affected by
zero sequence mutual coupling, as highlighted below :
• Directional ground fault protection
Zero sequence voltage and current signals are those most commonly employed by ground fault
directional control elements. A ground fault on one circuit may cause operation of directional ground
fault protection on a partially parallel circuit due to partial zero sequence mutual coupling. This problem
does not exist for parallel circuits between common substation bus bars.
• Distance protection reach accuracy

The reach of distance protection ground fault elements is adversely affected by modification of power
system zero sequence voltage profile through zero sequence mutual coupling. If zero sequence currents
flowing in parallel circuits are of similar phase to the current in the protected circuits, ground fault
distance elements will under reach. If the currents are virtually in anti-phase, the distance elements
will tend to over reach.
The tendency for distance protection to over reach is of no consequence for distance elements, which are
intended to overreach a protected line, such as Zones 2 or 3. Any tendency to under reach can be
compensated for, when setting the over reach elements. Consequently, all tele-protection schemes based
on over reaching elements are suitable for protection of magnetically coupled circuits, when set to take
into account under reaching during ground faults. However, where common impedance settings exist for
phase and earth fault impedance elements, it should be noted that any compensatory increase in distance
element over reach may make it necessary to employ current reversal guard logic in a teleprotection
scheme. Where the over reaching elements are also used to provide Zone-2 back-up protection for end
zone faults, a compensatory increase in reach may also create discrimination problems with phase to
phase fault protection for short adjacent lines.
A potentially problematic case of Zone-I overreach to be noted is when a parallel circuit is switched out and
grounded at both terminals. In such an instance, the Zone-1 reach security margin may be greatly reduced
or it may even become negative in some applications.
One of the methods to compensate for the effect of zero sequence mutual impedance is to take zero
sequence current signal from the parallel circuit and use it to provide compensation. This technique is not
effective when parallel circuit is disconnected and grounded at both ends. For this reason this method is
not used for protection but used for fault location.
In general, it is not advantageous to introduce mutual compensation for distance protection schemes. The
advantages, if any, are usually far outweighed by the problems and operational complexities that would be
introduced. Most distance protection schemes can be set to provide fast tripping for faults along a multi-
circuit line and be stable for external faults without employing mutual compensation. There are also
applications where it is impossible to access the current from a magnetically coupled circuit at one or both
terminals. In all such cases the maximum reach of first zone setting fixed as 80% or less could be
advantageous.
An alternative to implementing mutual compensation is to apply individual zero sequence compensation

factor for each zone of ground fault distance protection. Another option is different groups of setting
parameters for different operating conditions of the double circuit line.
From the above it transpires that correct calculation of the transmission line impedance matrix with zero
sequence parameters be carried out and proved by field tests before using them in setting the relays.
7.2.2 Multi-terminal Transmission Circuits
Whenever a transmission circuit has three or more terminals, its protection may be subject to adverse
effects within the protected line due to the effects of in feeds. Depending on the protection operating
principle, these effects may be a cause for concern. Additional in feed can increase impedances seen by
distance relays and out feed can cause directional protection at one terminal to identify an internal fault as
external. Carrier-aided protection with efficient information links with judicious application of correct
measurands and protection relays should be applied
7.2.3 Shunt Compensated Transmission Circuit
The distributed shunt capacitance of a transmission line can cause a voltage rise when load is lower than
normal load. This is termed as Ferranti Effect.
Switched or non-switched shunt reactors are often used to compensate for high levels of shunt capacitance
for long overhead lines or for underground cables. The shunt compensation is invariably located at terminal
substations, where it may be connected to the associated circuit by an isolator switch or by a circuit
breaker. The former option is less expensive, but it may be necessary to de-energise the line to insert or
switch-off the reactor. Sometimes shunt reactors controlled by circuit breakers are connected to EHV bus
bars. In many other cases, shunt reactors (and many times Static Var Compensators with inductive and
capacitive compensation range are also connected to the tertiary windings of Interconnecting auto-
transformers (ICT) for control of downstream voltage profile. With expansion of power network, many
times the line lengths get shortened and intermediate stations are connected with loop in and loop out
(LILO) connections. Under such conditions the non-switched line reactors provided on the long lines are
removed or replaced by bus reactors. Under certain conditions it may be advisable to use the controlled
shunt reactor that could remain on the line for all conditions of operation. Such application could be kept in
view to provide minimum changes in reactor shifting.
Shunt compensation equipment must have its own protective gear. Where a shunt reactor is connected to
a transmission circuit only by isolator switch, its protection requires a fast and reliable transfer-tripping
scheme in order to remove remote-end fault current in feed.
Shunt reactors do not have a great influence on the selection of line protection, except where differential
or directional comparison protection might be responsive to live-line switching of reactors. In such cases,
reactors may have to be excluded from the zone of line protection through the use of reactor CT’s in
parallel with line CT’s. It may also be necessary to inhibit any reactor back-up ground fault protection
during single-pole auto reclose sequences.
When single-pole tripping and autoreclosure is applied, capacitive and inductive coupling may delay the
extinction of the secondary arc and the faulted phase voltage decay may be delayed. This is due to
resonance between shunt reactor inductance and the capacitance coupling to live phases after the
breaker is tripped. This may delay arc extinction for a transient fault and so single-pole autoreclose
dead-times may need to be extended for limiting the parameter of secondary arc current to a practical
value of about 10 amperes. A Surge Protected Neutral Reactor usually of 0.2 to 0.4 pu ohmic value is
connected between neutral of EHV shunt reactor and the ground. This requires the ratio of zero to
positive sequence impedance of shunt reactor be around 0.9 to limit the BIL of shunt reactor to around
550 kV in a 400 kV network.
7.2.4 Series Compensated Transmission Circuit
As stability constraints limit the maximum value of power angle for long lines, the full load current capacity
can only be utilized if the transmission circuit impedance is reduced. The surge Impedance Loading (SIL)
of a transmission line, say 400 kV, is around 515 MW (twin moose ACSR conductor per phase) while the
thermal limit of the same line could be around 800 to 1200 MW under various operating conditions. This is
further complicated by shunt reactors directly connected on the lines that modify the SIL to about 70% of
original value. Such conditions always need extra capacitive vars if more power to the level of its thermal
capacity is required to be pushed into the line. The application of series compensation on transmission
lines is provided for such relief. Some of the other reasons for applying series compensation could be to
avoid voltage collapse, to optimize load distribution or to improve quality of supply apart from improving
transient stability.
Sometimes Thyristor Controlled Series Capacitor (TCSC) is used. Some of the reasons for this could be
power oscillation detection, prevention of sub synchronous resonance or load flow control.
Series compensation has been universally applied to lines at all the known voltage level right from 11 kV
to 800 kV The protection relaying of such lines are quite complicated and need to be evolved after detailed
system studies.
The combined effect of series capacitors and their protective current diversion devices on line protection
performance and the impact of series compensation on protection of adjacent lines require detailed
discussion and is not covered within this document. Document produced by CIGRE WG 34.04 titled
“Application guide on protection of complex transmission network configurations” may be referred for
this.
7.3 TRANSMISSION CIRCUIT FAILURE MODES AND RATES
The failure rate of transmission lines range from 0.2 to more than 10 faults per 100 km per year. The failure
rate is a function of keraunic level, the insulation level and the existence of many environmental factors
such as vegetation proximity, fouling with over-grown trees air pollution levels, vandalism and bush fires or
fires on crops waste created by the farmers below or very close to lines. Some of these are described
below.
7.3.1 Arcing Faults
Many types of fault-inducing events result in the creation of an arcing fault between phases of a line,
between phases and tower structures or between phases and ground. Fault arcs present non-linear fault
resistance. Estimates of fault resistance based on arc length can be obtained using well-known Warrington
formulae or various other empirical formulas used in Europe.
7.3.2 Smoke Hazard
Accidental or deliberately initiated bush fires are quite common during certain seasons. Burning of sugarcane
waste close to transmission line is one such example. Smoke from such fires may induce arcing faults as
a consequence of air ionization. Some faults may be located across insulators or between a pair of phases
and these will not differ much in nature from those initiated by lightning. Others may be located at the mid-
span between towers, from the lowest conductor to ground. Such mid-span faults can be highly resistive,
not only as a result of long arc lengths, but also as a result of the ground resistance between the point of
arc and the nearest support towers.
It may often be necessary to provide high resistance ground fault protection as supplementary main protection
in order to detect such faults, which may also act as back-up protection for solid faults and is therefore
recommended.
Faults resulting from bush fires are usually non-damaging faults, with a good chance of successful
autoreclosure following fault clearance. But the effectiveness of autoreclose schemes is frequently defeated
by the intense ionization of the insulating air in the vicinity of the fire, leading to new developing faults
following line re-energisation.
7.3.3 Vegetation Faults
There can be many line faults to ground, which are caused by rapidly growing vegetation. Bamboo plant is
one such example. From operational experience, such faults are known to be of high-resistance. The fault
presents itself as a very high resistance to earth (of the order of several kilo Ohms), until the steam and
smoke produced by thermal energy dissipation in the tree resistance results in a tree-length flashover. This
occurs after several seconds.
Ground fault elements of distance relays may not detect the high resistance faults and the sensitive
ground fault protection mentioned in the previous paragraph can also take care of high resistance faults
due to growing vegetation.
7.3.4 Forms of Overhead Line Faults
The failure rates of power lines vary from utility to utility and from year to year. The most common type of
fault is phase to ground fault (of the order of 75% or more) and most faults are transient in nature. Since
most faults involve ground, consideration must be given to the levels of ground fault resistance that might
be encountered for particular applications and whether the main protection will be able to detect all such
ground faults. If not, supplementary protection may be required to cover high resistance faults. The ground
fault elements of distance relays should be supplemented by a sensitive residual over current relay.
7.4 TRANSMISSION CIRCUIT PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS
To determine the protection requirements for transmission circuits it is necessary at the first instance to
identify the main protection requirements for each of the system voltage level and then to identify application
specific requirements in relation to the protected circuit. Examples of possible main requirements are
listed below:
• Maintaining transient stability of the power system
• Maintaining operation of power station auxiliary system
• Avoiding loss of supply to bus bars

• Quality of supply
Examples of application specific requirements are listed below:
• Allow for failure of a protection signaling/communication channel

• Allow protection testing with the circuit in service
• Protect a transformer feeder
• Protect a tapped line through a step-down transformer

• Protect a circuit with more than two terminals
• Protect a circuit in series compensated network
• Detection of broken conductors/jumpers of overhead lines.

• Detection of high resistance faults on overhead lines
• Operate within short-time thermal ratings of overhead lines and cables
• Fault detection with weak or zero in feed from one circuit terminal
Combinations of main and back-up protection systems should be used to address the main and application
specific requirements for transmission circuits.
7.4.1 Maintaining Transient Stability
Common requirements for circuits at primary transmission voltages are the maximum permitted fault
clearance time in order to maintain system transient stability. A single time limit is often quoted for a
particular transmission voltage level, but separate limits might be quoted for different fault types. On the
basis that most protection arrangements rely on a single protection system to clear different types of solid
fault, a single time limit is usually used as a main design requirement. An exception sometimes exists to
allow slower clearance of high resistance ground faults that may not be severe in nature.
It must be recognized that the maximum permitted fault clearance times declared for a primary transmission
system will not remain fixed. Power systems undergo constant evolution. In particular, the changes in the
location, capacity and design of generating plant that occur on most power systems demand constant
reviews by system planners of the maximum permitted fault clearance times for existing transmission
circuits. For EHV system the desired fault clearance time of 5 cycles that include the relay time, breaker
time and carrier times is generally applied. It may be desirable for EHV lines to have a maximum total-
break time of circuit breakers as 2 cycles (40 milliseconds) giving freedom to optimize the time of protective
relay and information links.
When applying the single-failure protection design criterion, and where there is a potential transient stability
problem, a second protection system should be provided which will clear faults within the maximum permitted
time to maintain transient stability. The back-up protection should also be fully discriminative, so that tripping
of more than one circuit does not further impair the power transfer capability of the transmission system.
This means that the second form of protection must be circuit-local and it must have similar operating
speed and discrimination qualities to those offered by the main protection. This form of protection is
referred to as second-main protection or Main-2 protection.
As discussed earlier, Main-2 protection is not generally regarded as being back-up protection. The cost of
this form of protection is easily justified in terms of the single failure design criterion and the costs of
possible system collapse resulting from inadequate back-up protection performance. Any additional
protection provided as back-up to two main protection systems (M1 and M2) would be back-up protection
for a dual failure criterion, where longer operating time limits would be allowed.
7.4.2 Maintaining Operation of Power Station Auxiliary System
Depression of power supply voltages for auxiliary plant in some generating stations may reduce the station
output. Maintenance of full generation output may be a critical power system security factor. In the case of
nuclear plant, auxiliary power supplies are also a major factor in providing full nuclear plant safety and
security.
The potential loss of system generation or the potential challenges to nuclear plant safety systems may be
factors which will dictate the longest acceptable clearance times for transmission circuit faults in the
vicinity of a power station.
7.4.3 Avoiding Loss of Supply
Where remote back-up protection or substation local back-up protection operates for an un-cleared fault
on one transmission circuit, there will be a complete loss of supply to the bus, which supplies the faulted
circuit. In the case of multi-bus substations (Double Bus, Breaker-and-Half bus bars, Double Main and
Transfer bus or single bus or main and transfer bus substations), there will be loss of supply to some step-
down transformers, which may or may not result in loss of supply to consumers. There will also be loss of
supply to any radial fed downstream substations. In the case of a single bus arrangement, there will be a
complete loss of supply to local consumers. The costs of reduced supply capacity or total loss of supply
must be considered in relation to the cost of providing effective circuit local back-up protection to avoid
loss of bus supply.
7.4.4 Quality of Supply
A utility may enter into agreement with a large industrial consumer to limit the duration of severe voltage
depressions in order to secure a power supply contract to industries like mining industry or costly continuous
process industry. Quality of supply considerations may influence decisions not only about the form of
back-up protection to be applied to a power system but also other add-ons such as dynamic voltage
supports and needs to be reviewed as and when these demands are made by consumers on a case-to-
case basis.
7.5 TRANSMISSION CIRCUIT PROTECTION SCHEMES
Listed below are schemes that are normally applied in India. Some of the main attributes and limitations in
the schemes are also listed under them. When applying these schemes it is essential that the main attributes
and limitations of are fully examined and understood.
7.5.1 Distance Protection (Without signaling channel)
7.5.1.1 Multizone Distance Protection (With Three or More Zones) Attributes
• Fast tripping at both ends for about 60% of the protected line
• Offers remote back-up protection
• Offers substation back-up (Offset Z3 or reverse Z4)
• Can be phase selective
• Communications independent tripping
• Application to multi-terminal lines
• Suitable for large in-zone loads
• Suitable for transformer feeders
• Suitable for composite circuits (lines/cables) Limitations
• Delayed tripping at ends of the line (for about 40% of protected line)
• Limited resistive fault coverage
• Dependent on VT signals
• No weak end in feed / open terminal tripping
• No detection of series faults
• Many designs can be directionally unstable for series compensated lines
• Zone 1 reach problems for series compensated lines
• Lack of discrimination for faults between circuits of different voltage levels
7.5.2 Distance Protection (Signal Aided)
7.5.2.1 Accelerated under reach distance protection Attributes
• Communication independent fast tripping at both ends for about 60% of the protected line
• Accelerated tripping at one end for faults in about 40% of the protected line
• Suitable for composite circuits (lines/cables)
Limitations
• Delayed tripping at ends of the line with 80% Zone 1 reach setting (for about 40% of protected line) in
case of communication failure
• Resistive fault coverage limited by Zone 1

• Not always suitable for multi terminal lines
• No trip acceleration signal from weak end in feed / open terminal tripping

7.5.2.2 Permissive under Reach Distance Protection
Fig. 7.1 : Permissive underreach distance protection

Attributes
• Offers substation back-up (Offset Z3 or Z4)

Limitations
• Delayed tripping at ends of the line (for about 40% of protected line) in case of communication failure
• Not always suitable for multi terminal lines

• No trip acceleration signal from weak end in feed / open terminal tripping


7.5.2.3 Intertripping under Reach Distance Protection Attributes
• Offers substation back-up (Offset Z3 or reverseZ4)


• Suitable for multi-terminal lines where all faults can be seen by Zone-1 from at least one terminal
Limitations

• No intertripping signal from weak end in feed / open terminal tripping


7.5.2.4 Permissive Overreach Distance Protection
Attributes


• Suitable for multi-terminal lines where all faults can be seen by Zone-2 from all terminals (no out feed)
• Open terminal signal echo logic possible
• Suitable for series compensated lines with special designs provide directional discrimination
Limitations
• No permissive trip signal from weak end in feed / open terminal

7.5.2.5 Permissive overreach distance protection with weak in feed logic
Fig. 7.2 : Permissive overreach distance protection with weak infeed logic
Attributes


• Suitable for multi-terminal lines where all faults can be seen by Zone-2 from all terminals (no out feed)
• Open terminal signal echo logic possible
Limitations
• Delayed tripping at one end for about 40% of protected line in case of communication failure

7.5.2.6 Blocking Overreach Distance Protection Attributes
• Communication independent tripping with small delay at one end for faults in about 40% of the protected
line


• Suitable for multi-terminal lines where there is no out feed for an internal fault
• No degradation of performance at other terminals with weak-infeed at one terminal
• Dependable scheme for use with PLC (where in-zone fault attenuates PLC)
Fig. 7.3 : Blocking overreach distance protection

Limitations

• Loss of external fault security with undetected communication failure

• No tripping at weak in feed terminal

7.5.3 Phase Comparison Protection
7.5.3.1 Modulated Power Line Carrier Communication Attributes
• Fast tripping for 100% of line

• Communication independent tripping

• Tripping with one weak/ open terminal
• Tripping not affected by PLC attenuation
• Moderate resistive fault coverage
• Not dependent on VT signal

• Often suitable for series compensated lines with spark-gap capacitors and no internal fault current
inversion
• Can discriminate for faults between conductors at different voltage levels
Limitations
• Loss of external fault security with undetected communication failure

• No remote back-up protection
• No tripping at weak in feed terminal
• Needs additional units for phase selection

• Not usually suitable for multi terminal lines
• Not suitable for transformer feeders

• Not suitable for series compensated lines with current reversal or large deviations in internal fault
current angle at one relay terminal for resistive faults
7.5.4 Current Differential Protection
7.5.4.1 Digital Communication Attributes
• Fully discriminative without time delays
• Independent of VT signals
• Moderate to high resistive fault coverage
• Can be inherently phase- selective
• No problems with parallel circuits

• Suitable for composite circuits
• Tripping at all ends for internal faults without in feed from all ends
• Possible application to multi-terminal lines (some designs)

• No problems with series compensation
• No problems with power swings
• Variety of communications media possible

• Sophisticated supervision of communication links included
• Communication error checking for security
• Discriminatively detects faults between conductors at different voltage levels

• Operational during single pole A/R
• Single phase tripping possible for simultaneous faults on parallel lines Limitations
• Dependent on communication
• Does not inherently offer remote back-up protection
• Commissioning difficulties for long lines
• Sensitivity varies with load

• Shunt capacitance may limit sensitivity
• Unstable with large in zone loads
• No detection of series faults (Broken conductors etc.)
7.5.4.2 Pilot Wire Communication
Attributes
• Fully discriminative without time delays

• Independent of VT signals
• Moderate to high resistive fault coverage

• No problems with parallel circuits
• Tripping at all ends for internal faults (some designs)

• No problems with series compensation
• No problems with power swings
• Discriminatively detects faults between conductors at different voltage levels

• Supervision of pilots is possible (For security and dependability)
• Operational during single pole A/R
• Relatively low cost relays

• Single phase tripping possible for simultaneous faults on parallel lines Limitations
• Not phase selective

• In feed terminal trip only
• Protection dependent on healthy pilots
• Requires metallic pilots

• Commissioning difficulties for long lines
• Limited to relatively short lines
• Insulation required for induced voltages in parallel and differences between substation ground potentials
• Sensitivity varies with load (Biased schemes)
• Shunt capacitance may limit sensitivity

• No detection of series faults (Broken jumpers etc)
7.5.5 Directional Protection
7.5.5.1 Directional Comparison Protection (Permissive)
Attributes
• Variety of communication media possible
• Fully discriminative with short time delays

• Suitable for long lines
• Can be phase selective (by design)
• Moderate-high resistive fault coverage

• Weak-infeed / open-terminal logic possible
• Possible application to multi-terminal lines
• Protection of parallel circuits

• Possible detection of series faults
• Some special designs are suitable for series compensated lines

• Discriminative detection of faults between conductors at different voltage levels
Limitations
• Protection dependent on communication

• Some standard designs e.g., DEF are not universally suitable for series compensated lines
• Pick up for external faults with no reach control elements

• Directional ground fault protection must be inhibited during single pole dead times
7.5.5.2 Directional Comparison Protection (Blocking)
Attributes
• Variety of communication media possible

• Fully discriminative with short time delays
• Communications independent tripping
• Suitable for long lines
• Can be inherently phase selective (by design)

• Moderate-high resistive fault coverage
• Protection of parallel circuits

• Possible detection of series faults

• Some special designs are suitable for series compensated lines
• Discriminative detection of faults between conductors at different voltage levels
Limitations
• Security is dependent on communication

• Some standard designs e.g., DEF are not universally suitable for series compensated lines
• Pick up for external faults with no reach control elements
• Directional ground fault protection must be inhibited during single pole dead times
7.5.6 Protection scheme Considerations for Cable Circuit
The attributes and limitations of individual protection schemes described above are mainly made with respect
to overhead or hybrid transmission circuits. For pure cable circuits, which are generally relatively short in
length, the most common and favoured form of protection is current differential protection. Here again, it
should be preferably current differential protection using digital communication and not pilot wires as the
experience with the latter has not been satisfactory, especially where pilots are laid in the same trench in
which power cables are laid. This is often the case in city areas where distances are more than a kilometer.
Remote back-up protection can be provided by time-delayed directional phase over current and ground
over current protection or by overreaching time-delayed zones of distance protection.
The relatively low impedance of cables per unit length, together with the relatively short length for a cable
circuit has traditionally precluded the application of distance protection in view of the low impedance
setting which would be required for under reaching zone of protection. However, distance relays have
been applied in blocking overreaching or permissive overreach signaling channel-aided schemes, without
under reaching zones.
With the advent of modern numerical distance relays, with lower impedance setting ranges, better accuracy
at low impedance settings and with the necessary range and accuracy of neutral impedance compensation
available it is now more feasible to apply under reaching distance protection schemes to cable circuits as
short as 2 km in length.
The distance relay when applied should preferably be as other Main (Main-2) protection.
7.6 RECOMMENDATION FOR LINE PROTECTION RELAY
GENERAL
• The line protection relays are required to protect the line and clear all type of faults on it within shortest
possible time with reliability, selectivity and sensitivity.
• Provision of independent Main-1 and Main-2 protection is important to ensure clearance of all faults in
the shortest possible time. As per the current practice this is followed for all lines at 765 kV, 400 kV
level and in some cases for lines at 220 kV level. No change is proposed in this practice.
• With growing interconnections fast fault clearance in 220 kV lines is becoming important to avoid grid
disturbances. Therefore it is recommended that for all 220 kV lines too Main 1 and Main 2 protections
be provided.
• For 132 kV lines it is felt that provision of one Main protection and directional over current and earth fault
protection as back-up protection is adequate. However if in any given part of the 132kV network, failure
of fault clearance by primary protection is going to create wide spread disturbance and consequences of
such disturbances are too costly, provision of Main 2 protection should be considered here too.
• If only one main protection is used, the back-up protection should be provided in a separate hard ware
unit. Distance relays have inherent features for providing back-up protection. When a distance protection
is provided as Main protection the Zone 2 element of the distance relay provides circuit local back-up,
the Zone-3 element provides remote back-up and reverse reach element of Zone 4 provides substation
local back-up.
• Distance relay as Main protection should always be complemented by Directional ground protection to
provide protection for high resistive line faults.
• In case a line differential/phase comparison/directional comparison protection is used they do not
have inherent features to provide back-up protection. Therefore, it is recommended that they should
preferably be provided with additional elements that can provide back-up protection. Usually these
features are achieved by supplementing the unit protections with additional impedance elements.
• The potential loss of system generation or the potential challenges to nuclear plant safety systems
may be factors which will dictate the longest acceptable clearance times for transmission circuit faults
in the vicinity of a power station. This should be kept in mind while designing protection system close
to these locations.
• Cables do not withstand fault currents for long periods of time. Unit protection should be used as main
protection and distance protection shall be used as Main-2.
Recommendation for provisions of line protection at different voltage levels are summarized as follows:
7.6.1 765 kV, 400 kV & 220 kV Voltage Lines
There should be two independent high speed main protection schemes called Main-I and Main-II with at
least one of them being carrier aided non-switched three zone distance protection. The other protection
may be a phase segregated current differential (this may require digital communication) phase comparison,
directional comparison type or a carrier aided non-switched distance protection. Further, if Main-I and
Main-II are both distance protection schemes, then they should be preferably of different types. However,
they need not necessarily be of different make. Both the protections should be suitable for single and three
phase tripping. In addition to above following shall also be provided:
(i) Two stage over-voltage protection. However in such cases where system has grown sufficiently or
in case of short lines, utilities on their discretion may decide not to provide this protection.
(ii) Auto reclose relay suitable for 1 ph/3 ph (with deadline charging and synchro check facility) reclosure.
(iii) Sensitive IDMT directional E/F relay (standalone or as built-in function of Main-I & Main-II relay)
7.6.2 132 kV Lines
There should be atleast one carrier aided non-switched three zone distance protection scheme. In addition
to this, another non-switched/switched distance scheme or directional over current and earth fault relays
should be provided as back up. Main protection should be suitable for single and three phase tripping.
Additionally, auto-reclose relay suitable for 1 ph/3 ph (with dead line charging and synchro-check facility)
reclosure shall be provided. In case of both line protections being Distance Protections, IDMT type Directional
E/F relay (standalone or as built-in function of Main-I & Main-II relay) shall also be provided additionally.
7.6.3 REQUIREMENTS
7.6.3.1 Distance Protection
Distance Protection scheme shall have the following attributes:
(i) Numerical relay with at least Four independent zones

(ii) Non-switched type with separate measurements for all phase to phase and phase to ground faults.
And having Career aided scheme logic like PUR, POR etc.
(iii) Capable of single and three phase tripping
(iv) Directional (mho or quadrilateral or other suitably shaped) characteristics for zone 1, zone 2 and
zone 3
(v) Capable of operation for close-up three phase faults and switch on to faults
(vi) Adjustable characteristic angle to match line angle wherever applicable
(vii) Accuracy of better than or equal to 5% of set value for reach measurement in zone 1 and better than
or equal to 10% of set value for zone 2 and zone 3
(viii) Accuracy of better than or equal to 5% of set value for time measurement of zone 2 and zone 3
(ix) Variable residual compensation
(x) Shall include power swing detection feature for selectively blocking, as required.
(xi) Shall include suitable fuse-failure protection to monitor all types of fuse failure and block the protection.
(xii) Shall include load encroachment prevention feature like Load blinder
(xiii) Shall include Out of Step trip function
(xiv) Maximum operating time under given set of condition shall be as follows:
SIR 4 15
Relay setting 10 Ohms 2 Ohms
Fault location (as % of relay setting) 60% 60%
Trip duty Contacts per phase* 4 4
Fault resistance Zero Ohms Zero Ohms
Max. Operating Times 45 ms for all 45 ms for 3 phase faults 60
Including trip relays (if any) and with CVT faults ms for other faults
These trip duty contacts can be provided either in-built in the distance relay or through additional relay.
Making capacity of trip contracts shall be 30 A for 0.25 S with an inductive load of L/R > 10 ms
The line protection relays shall be suitable for use with capacitive voltage transformers having passive
damping and transient response as per IEC 186/ IEC61869.
7.6.3.2 Directional Comparison Protection
(i) Shall be a unit system of protection

(ii) Shall be directional comparison type suitable for operation with one signalling channel, e.g., PLCC
(iii) Shall have high speed fault detection based on principles like detection of post fault travelling
wave, superimposed components, etc.
(iv) Shall have high sensitivity for all types of faults
(v) Shall be suitable for 1 and 3 phase tripping
(vi) Shall not be affected by heavy load transfer, power swings, CT saturation, CVT transients, VT fuse
failure, line charging currents, distorted primary currents and voltages, external switching activities,
sudden power reversal, zero sequence, mutual coupling, shunt reactor “in-zone” switching etc. and
lightning strokes
(vii) Shall have features like switch on to fault, weak end infeed, echo system
(viii) Shall have feature to cover nearby fault at high speed in the event of channel fail
7.6.3.3 Phase Segregated Line Differential Protection
(i) The relay shall be all digital multi microprocessor based, designed for use with modern digital
telecommunication system multiplexer conforming to ITU-T (CCITT) specifications and Fibre Optic
medium.
(ii) Each phase current shall be separately evaluated at both ends for both amplitude and phase.
(iii) Shall be suitable for single phase tripping and autoreclosing.
(iv) The message transmitted by the relay to other end shall include information on currents, supervision
information, CT saturation detection, synchronisation of terminals etc.
(v) The measurement shall be stabilised phase by phase for CT saturation.
(vi) The communication delay shall be continuously measured and automatically compensated for in
the differential measurement.
(vii) Communication telegram shall have error detection and correction feature.
(viii) Suitable programmable evaluation algorithm will be provided to ensure proper security and
dependability of the message.
(ix) The connection equipment from the relay to the communication shall be a 64 kbps Channel.
(x) An optional electrical or optical port shall be provided to directly connect the signal to auxiliary
channel of OLTE (optical line terminal equipment) by passing the multiplexer or for redundancy
purpose.
(xi) The relay shall have communication port for remote monitoring, programmaing and control.
(xii) The direct intertrip signal also shall be transmitted as part of telegram.
(xiii) The sampling frequency for analog signals shall be minimum 2 kHz. Filtering and measuring
techniques shall be used to ensure correct performance during all operating and transient conditions.
7.6.3.4 Phase Comparison Protection
(i) Shall be Current phase comparison type.

(ii) Shall be suitable for operation with one signal channel.
(iii) Shall have high sensitivity for all types of faults.
(iv) Shall be capable of single and three pole tripping.

(v) Shall have facility for blocking/permissive trip modes
(vi) Shall have facility for direct transfer tripping
(vii) Shall have comprehensive alarm and test facilities

(viii) Shall not be affected by heavy load transfer, power swings, CT saturation, CT phase errors,
Propagation delays, Capacitance current etc., as is typical of unit protections.
7.6.3.5 Over Voltage Protection
The relay shall have following features:
– Have a high drop off to pickup ratio

– Have adjustable setting range for voltage and time
– Have two stages
– Low set stage shall monitor any one phase to phase voltage and shall have associated timer
– High set stage shall monitor all three phase to phase voltage and shall have associated timer
7.6.4 Special Comments
(i) If found necessary, at certain locations, out of step tripping relays shall be provided for islanding the
system during disturbances
(ii) For short line application distance relays should have shaped characteristics for ground faults and
be used in permissive over reach mode with weak end infeed logic. Further, if it is a double circuit
line, current reversal logic should also be available.
(iii) O/V relay for 400 kV lines shall be connected to trip concerned line breaker(s), start LBB, block auto
reclosure and send direct trip command.
(iv) The directional earth fault relay recommended along with the distance relay should be seen as a
supplement to it and not as a back up. It helps to detect very high resistance fault which distance
relay cannot.
(v) HVDC Systems connected to AC networks with low short circuit levels can influence AC line
protections in it vicinity. This aspect needs to be looked into on case to case basis.
(vi) Distance relays employed on lines in the vicinity of Series compensated network shall be suitable
for Series compensated lines.
(vii) For details concerning protection of complex transmission lines reference may be made to CIGRE
WG 34.04 report titled “Application guide on protection of complex transmission network
configurations”. Use of correct line parameters is important for proper setting of protective relays.
Calculated values of overhead line electrical parameters ought be verified by field-testing and this
information then be used for relay setting.
7.7 TRANSMISSION CIRCUIT PROTECTION SETTING CRITERIA
This section provides guideline for protection setting for both uncompensated and series compensated
lines.
7.7.1 Uncompensated Transmission Lines
7.7.1.1 Main Distance Relay Zone-1 Reach Setting
Zone-1: To be set to cover 80% of protected line length. Set zero sequence compensation factor KN as
(Z0 – Z1) / 3Z1.
Where:
Z1 = Positive sequence impedance of the protected line

Z0 = Zero sequence impedance of the protected line
Note: With this setting, the relay may overreach when parallel circuit is open and grounded at both ends.
This risk is considered acceptable.
7.7.1.2 Zone-2 Reach Setting
Zone-2: To be set to cover minimum 120% of length of principle line section. However, in case of double
circuit lines 150% coverage must be provided to take care of under reaching due to mutual coupling effect.
Set KN as (Z0 – Z1) / 3Z1.
The 150% setting is arrived at considering an expected under reach of about 30% when both lines are in
parallel and a margin of 20%. The degree of under reach can be calculated using equation K0M /
1+K0 Where K0M = Z0M/ 3Z1 and K0 = (Z0 – Z1) / 3Z1. It is recommended to
check the degree of under reach due to mutual coupling effect to be sure that setting of 150% is adequate.
Sometimes impedance so selected might enter the next voltage level. However, un-selectivity in the
Zone-2 grading is generally not to be expected when in-feeds exist at the remote sub-station as they
reduce the overreach considerably.
This holds good for majority of the cases, however, for certain cases, where in-feed from other feeder at
the local bus is not significant, Zone-2 of remote end relay may see the fault at lower voltage level. Care
has to be taken for all such cases by suitable time delay.
7.7.1.3 Zone-3 Reach Setting:
Zone-3 distance protection can offer time-delayed remote back-up protection for an adjacent transmission
circuit. To achieve this, Zone-3 distance elements must be set according to the following criteria where
possible.
Zone-3 should overreach the remote terminal of the longest adjacent line by an acceptable margin (typically
20% of highest impedance seen) for all fault conditions.
Set KN as (Z0 – Z1) / 3Z1.
However, in such case where Zone-3 reach is set to enter into next lower voltage level, Zone-3 timing shall
be coordinated with the back-up protection (Directional over current and earth fault relay) of power
transformer. Where such coordination cannot be realized, it is recommended to carry out simulation studies
for relay reach & time coordination and suitable solution may be devised. Some of the typical solution can
be like application of back up distance protection for power transformer, duplicated protection for downstream
220 kV feeders or special protection scheme logic. Similar issues, if encountered for Zone-2 reach setting,
should also be addressed in the above manner.
7.7.1.4 Resistive Reach Setting
For phase to ground faults, resistive reach should be set to give maximum coverage considering fault
resistance, arc resistance & tower footing resistance. It has been considered that ground fault would not be
responsive to line loading.
For Zone-1 resistive reach, attention has to be given to any limitations indicated by manufacturer in
respect of resistive setting vis-a-vis reactance setting to avoid overreach due to remote in-feed. It is
recommended to study the impact of remote end infeed for expected power flow & fault resistance on the
extent of overreach. This is particularly important for short lines.
In case of phase to phase fault, resistive reach should be set to provide coverage against all types of
anticipated phase to phase faults subject to check of possibility against load point encroachment considering
minimum expected voltage and maximum load expected during short time emergency system condition.
It is recommended that all the distance relays should have quadrilateral / polygon characteristic. For relays
having Mho characteristic, it is desirable to have load encroachment prevention characteristic or a blinder.
In the absence of credible data regarding minimum voltage and maximum load expected for a line during
emergency system condition, following criteria may be considered for deciding load point encroachment:
• Maximum load current (Imax) may be considered as 1.5 times the thermal rating of the line or 1.5
times the associated bay equipment current rating (the minimum of the bay equipment individual
rating) whichever is lower. (Caution: The rating considered is approximately 15minutes rating of the
transmission facility).
• Minimum voltage (Vmin) to be considered as 0.85pu (85%).

Due to in-feeds, the apparent fault resistance seen by relay is several times the actual value. This should
be kept in mind while arriving at resistive reach setting for Zone-2 and Zone-3.
7.7.1.5 Zone-2 Timer Setting
A Zone-2 timing of 0.35 seconds (considering LBB time of 200mSec, CB open time of 60ms, resetting time
of 30ms and safety margin of 60ms) is recommended. However, if a long line is followed by a short line,
then a higher setting (typically 0.6second) may be adopted on long line to avoid indiscriminate tripping
through Zone-2 operation on both lines.
For special cases, following shall be the guiding philosophy:

Since Zone-2 distance protection is set to overreach the circuit it is intended to protect, it will also be
responsive to faults within adjacent power system circuit. For this reason the time delay for Zone–2 back-
up protection must be set to coordinate with clearance of adjacent circuit faults, within reach, by the
intended main protection or by breaker fail protection.
The following formula would be the basis for determining the minimum acceptable Zone-2 time setting:
tz2 > tMA + tCB + tz2 reset + ts

Where:
tZ2 = Required Zone-2 time delay

tMA = Operating time of slowest adjacent circuit main protection or Circuit Local back-up for faults
within Zone-2 reach
tCB = Associated adjacent circuit breaker clearance time
tZ2reset = Resetting time of Zone-2 impedance element with load current present
tS = Safety margin for tolerance (e.g. 50 to 100 ms)
Unequal lengths of transmission circuit can make it difficult to meet the Zone-2 secondary reach setting
criterion. In such cases it will be necessary to co-ordinate Zone-2 with longer time delay. The time tMA in
equation must be the adjacent circuit Zone-2 protection operating time.
7.7.1.6 Zone-3 Timer Setting
Zone-3 timer should be set so as to provide discrimination with the operating time of relays provided in
subsequent sections with which Zone-3 reach of relay being set, overlaps. Typical recommended Zone-3
time is 0.8 to 1.0 second.
For Special cases, where co-ordination between long and short lines is required, following formula would
be the basis for determining the minimum acceptable Zone-3 time setting:
tz3 > tMA + tCB + tz3 reset + ts
Where:
tZ3 = Required Zone-3 time delay
tMA = Operating time of slowest adjacent circuit local back-up protection
tCB = Associated adjacent circuit breaker clearance time

tZ3reset = Resetting time of Zone-3 impedance element with load current present
tS = Safety margin for tolerance (e.g. 50 to 100 milliseconds)
7.7.1.7 Load Impedance Encroachment
With the extended Zone-3 reach settings, that may be required to address the many under reaching
factors already considered, load impedance encroachment is a significant risk to long lines of an
interconnected power system. Not only the minimum load impedance under expected modes of system
operation be considered in risk assessment, but also the minimum impedance that might be sustained for
seconds or minutes during abnormal or emergency system conditions. Failure to do so could jeopardize
power system security.
Ideal solution to tackle load encroachment may be based on the use of blinders or by suitably setting the
resistive reach of specially shaped impedance elements or by use of polygon type impedance elements.
It is recommended that all the distance relays should have quadrilateral / polygon characteristic. For relays
having Mho characteristics, it is desirable to have load encroachment prevention characteristics or a
blinder.
In the absence of credible data regarding minimum voltage and maximum load expected for a feeder
during emergency system condition, following criteria may be considered for deciding resistive reach/blinder
setting to prevent load point encroachment:
• Maximum load current (Imax) may be considered as 1.5 times the thermal rating of the line or 1.5
times the associated bay equipment current rating ( the minimum of the bay equipment individual
rating) whichever is lower. (Caution: The rating considered is approximately 15 minutes rating of the
transmission facility).
• Minimum voltage (Vmin) to be considered as 0.85pu (85%).

• For setting angle for load blinder, a value of 30 degree may be adequate in most cases.
For high resistive earth fault where impedance locus lies in the Blinder zone, fault clearance shall be
provided by the back-up directional earth fault relay.
7.7.1.8 Zone-4 Substation Local Backup Protection Settings
Zone-3 distance protection is usually targeted to provide only remote back-up protection. In such a case,
the distance relay may be provided with an additional zone of reverse-looking protection (e.g. Zone-4) to
offer substation-local back-up protection. The criterion for setting Zone-4 reverse reach would be as under.
• The Zone-4 reverse reach must adequately cover expected levels of apparent bus bar fault resistance,
when allowing for multiple in feeds from other circuits. For this reason, its resistive reach setting is to
be kept identical to Zone-3 resistive reach setting.
With a reverse reach setting of less than the Zone-1 reach of distance protection for the shortest line
connected to the local bus bar, the Zone-4 time delay would only need to co-ordinate with bus bar main
protection fault clearance and with Zone-1 fault clearance for lines out of the same substation. For this
reason this can be set according to the Zone-2 time setting guidelines.
7.7.1.9 Use Of System Studies To Analyse Distance Relay Behaviour
Often during system disturbance conditions, due to tripping of one or more trunk lines, some lines get
overloaded and the system voltage drops. During such conditions the back-up distance elements may
become susceptible to operation due to encroachment of impedance locus in to the distance relay
characteristic.
While the ohmic characteristic of a distance relay is independent of voltage, the load is not generally
constant-impedance. The apparent impedance presented to a distance relay, as the load voltage varies,
will depend on the voltage characteristic of the load. If the low voltage situation resulted from the loss of
one or more transmission lines or generating units, there may be a substantial change in the real and
reactive power flow through the line in question. The combination of low voltage and worsened phase
angle may cause a long set relay to operate undesirably either on steady state basis, or in response to
recoverable swings related to the initiating event.
The apparent impedance seen by the relay is affected by in-feeds, mutual coupling and therefore the
behaviour of distance relay during various system condition needs to be studied wherever necessary to
achieve proper relay coordination.
It is desirable and hence recommended that system studies are conducted using computer-aided tools to
assess the security of protection by finding out trajectory of impedance in various zones of distance relay
under abnormal or emergency system condition on case-to-case basis particularly for critical lines / corridors.
In addition, the settings must be fine-tuned, simulating faults using Real Time Digital Simulator on case-to-
case basis particularly for critical lines / corridors.
Such facilities available at CPRI, POWERGRID or elsewhere in the country should be used for protection
related studies.
7.7.1.10 Directional Phase Over Current Protection
Directional phase over current relays are still being used as back-up protection for 220kV transmission
lines by many utilities. In view of time coordination issues and increased fault clearance time in the event
of failure of main distance protection, it is recommended that for all 220kV lines also main-1 and main-2
protections similar to 400kV lines be provided.
7.7.1.11 Directional Ground Over Current Protection (DEF) Settings
Normally this protection is applied as a supplement to main protection when ground fault currents may be
lower than the threshold of phase over current protection. It might also be applied as main protection for
high resistance faults.
The ground over current threshold should be set to ensure detection of all ground faults, but above any
continuous residual current under normal system operation. Continuous residual current may arise because
of following:
• Unbalanced series impedances of untransposed transmission circuits
• Unbalanced shunt capacitance of transmission circuits.

• Third harmonic current circulation.
Various types of directional elements may be employed to control operation of ground over current (zero
sequence over current) protection response. The most common approach is to employ Phase angle
difference between Zero sequence voltage and current, since the relaying signals can easily be derived by
summing phase current signals and by summing phase voltage signals from a suitable voltage transformer.
However this method is not suitable for some applications where transmission lines terminated at different
substations, run partially in parallel. In such cases following type of directional control is recommended to
be used for the directional earth fault relay.
• Relative phase of negative sequence voltage and current
To ensure proper coordination, operating time must be set according to following criteria:
The DEF protection should not operate when the circuit local backup protection of remote end clears a
fault in an adjacent circuit i.e DEF should be coordinated with the remote end LBB.
7.7.1.12 Power Swing Blocking and OOS Function
Large interconnected systems are more susceptible to Power Swings in comparison to the erstwhile smaller
stand alone systems. Inter-area Power Swings can be set up even due to some event in far flung locations
in the system. During the tenure of such swings, outage of any system element may aggravate the situation
and can lead to instability (loss of synchronism). It is hence extremely important that unwanted tripping of
transmission elements need to be prevented, under these conditions. Distance protection relays demand
special consideration under such a situation, being susceptible to undesirable mis-operation during Power
swings which may be recoverable or irrecoverable power swings.
Figure-7.1 shows the trajectory of the swing impedance in the R-X plane, along with the Zone-1 fault
detection characteristic, during a recoverable Power Swing and an irrecoverable Power Swing, as seen by
the distance relay, located at the electrical centre of the system. While the distance relay trips for irrecoverable
swings may be acceptable to some extent, tripping in the case of a recoverable swing will be simply
unacceptable. Unfortunately, the Power swing detection techniques themselves cannot distinguish between
the two. Thus, there is no option but to block distance relay from tripping in either case, if undesirable
tripping is to be positively avoided.
Having blocked distance relays from tripping on Power Swing, it may be desired that the line must be tripped
in the case of irrecoverable Power Swing (Instability). This can be positively achieved by the introduction of
Out Of Step (OOS) relaying. In the conventional relaying technology, this would have required the use of a
twin blinder type Pole Slip protection. In the state of the art numerical relays this option is readily achievable,
by detecting the opposite ‘sign’ of the ‘Resistance’ as the impedance trajectory enters and leaves the Power
swing detection characteristic. The principle is evident from Figure-7.1. In the event of an irrecoverable
swing (loss of synchronism), the impedance trajectory entering the detection characteristic from the positive
resistance side will exit on the negative resistance side and vice-versa. In the case of recoverable swings, on
the other hand, the ‘sign’ of the ‘Resistance’ at entry and exit will remain the same.
Fig. 7.1 : Power Swing Impedance trajectory
While the above philosophy is simple, it is often difficult to implement it in a large power system because
of the complexity of the system and the different operating conditions that must be studied. There are a
number of options one can select in implementing power-swing protection in their system. Designing the
power system protection to avoid or preclude cascade tripping is a requirement of modern day power
system. Below we list two possible options:
7.7.1.12.1 Block all Zones except Zone-I
This application applies a blocking signal to the higher impedance zones of distance relay and allows Zone
1 to trip if the swing enters its operating characteristic. Breaker application is also a consideration when
tripping during a power swing. A subset of this application is to block the Zone 2 and higher impedance
zones for a preset time (Unblock time delay) and allow a trip if the detection relays do not reset.
In this application, if the swing enters Zone 1, a trip is issued, assuming that the swing impedance entering
the Zone-1 characteristic is indicative of loss of synchronism. However, a major disadvantage associated
with this philosophy is that indiscriminate line tripping can take place, even for recoverable power swings
and risk of damage to breaker.
7.7.1.12.2 Block All Zones and Trip with Out of Step (OOS) Function
This application applies a blocking signal to all distance relay zones and order tripping if the power swing
is unstable using the OOS function (function built in modern distance relays or as a standalone relay). This
application is the recommended approach since a controlled separation of the power system can be achieved
at preselected network locations. Tripping after the swing is well past the 180 degree position is the
recommended option from CB operation point of view.
Normally all relay are having Power swing Un-block timer which unblocks on very slow power swing
condition (when impedance locus stays within a zone for a long duration). Typically the Power swing un-
blocking time setting is 2sec.
However, on detection of a line fault, the relay has to be de-blocked.
7.7.1.12.3 Placement of OOS trip Systems
Out of step tripping protection (Standalone relay or built-in function of Main relay) shall be provided on all
the selected lines. The locations where it is desired to split the system on out of step condition shall be
decided based on system studies.
The selection of network locations for placement of OOS systems can best be obtained through transient
stability studies covering many possible operating conditions. Based on these system studies, It is
recommended to exercise the option-7.6.1.12.2 & 7.6.1.12.3 above.
7.7.1.13 Line Overvoltage Protection
For 400 kV LINES: Low set stage (Stage-I) may be set in the range of 110% - 112% (typically 110%) with
a time delay of 5 seconds. High set stage (Stage-II) may be set in the range 140% - 150% with a time delay
of 100 milliseconds.
For 765 kV LINES: Low set stage (Stage-I) may be set in the range of 106% - 109% (typically 108%) with
a time delay of 5 seconds. High set stage (Stage-II) may be set in the range 140% - 150% with a time delay
of 100 milliseconds.
However, for over voltage Stage-I protection, a time grading of 1 to 3 seconds may be provided between
overvoltage relays of double circuit lines. Grading on overvoltage tripping for various lines emanating
from a station may be considered and same can be achieved using voltage as well as time grading.
Longest timed delay should be checked with expected operating time of Over-fluxing relay of the transformer
to ensure disconnection of line before tripping of transformer.
It is desirable to have Drop-off to pick-up ratio of overvoltage relay better than 97% (Considering limitation
of various manufacturers relay on this aspect).
7.7.1.14 Line Differential Protection
Many transmission lines are now having OPGW or separate optic fibre laid for the communication. Where
ever such facilities are available, it is recommended to have the line differential protection as Main-I
protection with distance protection as backup (built-in Main relay or standalone). Main-II protection shall
continue to be distance protection. For cables and composite lines, line differential protection with built in
distance back up shall be applied as Main-I protection and distance relay as Main-II protection. Auto-
recloser shall be blocked for faults in the cables.
7.7.1.15 Maintaining Operation Of Power Station Auxiliary System Of Nuclear Power Plants:
Depression of power supply voltages for auxiliary plant in some generating stations may reduce the station
output. Maintenance of full generation output may be a critical power system security factor. In the case of
nuclear plant, auxiliary power supplies are also a major factor in providing full nuclear plant safety and
security.
The potential loss of system generation or the potential challenges to nuclear plant safety systems may be
factors which will dictate the longest acceptable clearance times for transmission circuit faults in the
vicinity of a power station. This should be further taken up with utilities of nuclear plants and this and any
other requirements should be understood and addressed.
7.7.1.16 Coordination Between System Study Group and Protection Engineers
For quite a few cases where system behaviour issues are involved it is recommended that power system
study group is associated with the protection engineers. For example power swing locus, out of step
tripping locations, faults withstands capability, zone2 and zone3 overlap reach settings calculations are
areas where system study group role is critical/essential.
7.7.2 Series Compensated Transmission Lines
Following phenomenon associated with the protection of Series compensated lines require special attention:
7.7.2.1 Voltage and Current Inversion
7.7.2.1.1 Voltage Inversion on Series Compensated Line
In this case the voltage at the relay point reverses its direction. This phenomenon is commonly called as
voltage inversion. Voltage inversion causes false decision in conventional directional relays. Special
measures must be taken in the distance relays to guard against this phenomenon.
7.7.2.1.2 Current Inversion on Series Compensated line
Fault current will lead source voltage by 90 degrees if XC> XS +XL1
Current inversion causes a false directional decision of distance relays (voltage memories do not help in
this case). [Here XC is reactance of series capacitor, XS is source reactance and XL1 is reactance of the line]
Current inversion influences operation of distance relays and therefore they cannot be applied without
additional logic for the protection of series compensated lines when possibility of current inversion exists.
Performance of directional comparison protections, based on residual (zero sequence) and negative
sequence currents are also affected by current inversion. It is therefore, recommended to check the possibility
of current inversion through system studies at the planning stage itself.
7.7.2.2 Low Frequency Transients
Series capacitors introduce oscillations in currents and voltages in the power systems, which are not
common in non-compensated systems. These oscillations have frequencies lower than the rated system
frequency and may cause delayed increase of fault currents, delayed operation of spark gaps as well as
delayed operation of protective relays.
Low frequency transients have in general no significant influence on operation of line current differential
protection as well as on phase comparison protection. However they may significantly influence the correct
operation of distance protection in two ways:
• They increase the operating time of distance protection, which may in turn influence negatively the
system stability
• They may cause overreaching of instantaneous distance protection zones and this way result in
unnecessary tripping on series compensated lines.
It is recommended to reduce the reach setting by a safety factor (Ks) to take care of possible overreach
due to low frequency oscillations.
7.7.2.3 Mov Influence and Apparent Impedance
Metal oxide varistors (MOV) are used for capacitor over-voltage protection. In contrast to spark gaps,
MOVs carry current when the instantaneous voltage drop across the capacitor becomes higher than the
protective voltage level in each half-cycle. Extensive studies have been done by Bonneville Power
Administration in USA to arrive at a non-linear equivalent circuit for a series connected capacitor using an
MOV. The composite impedance depends on total fault current and protection factor kp .
The later is defined by equation.
UMOV
kp =
UNC
Where UMOV is voltage at which MOV starts to conduct theoretically and UNC is voltage across the series
capacitor when carrying its rated nominal current
This should be considered while relay setting.
7.7.2.4 Impact of SC on Protective Relays of Adjacent Lines
Voltage inversion is not limited only to the buses and to the relay points close to the series compensated
line. It can spread deep into the network and this way influence the selection of protection devices (mostly
distance relays) at remote ends of the lines adjacent to the series compensated circuit, and sometimes
even deeper in the network. Estimation of their influence on performances of existing distance relays of
adjacent lines must be studied. In the study, it is necessary to consider cases with higher fault resistances,
for which spark gaps or MOVs on series capacitors will not conduct at all.
If voltage inversion is found to occur, it may be necessary to replace the existing distance relays in those
lines with distance relays that are designed to guard against this phenomenon.
7.7.2.5 Multi Circuit Lines
Two parallel power lines both series compensated running close to each other and ending at the same busbar
at both ends) can cause some additional challenges for distance protection due to the zero sequence mutual
impedance. The current reversal phenomenon can also raise problems from the protection point of view,
particularly when the power lines are relatively short and when permissive overreach schemes are used.
Influence of Zero Sequence Mutual Impedance
Zero sequence mutual impedance ZM0 will not significantly influence the operation of distance protection
as long as both circuits are operating in parallel and all precautions related to settings of distance protection
on series compensated line have been considered. Influence of parallel line switched off & earthed at both
ends, on the operation of distance protection on single operating circuit is well known.
The presence of series capacitor additionally exaggerates the effect of zero sequence mutual impedance
between two circuits. The effect of zero sequence mutual impedance on possible overreaching of distance
relays is increased further compared to case of non-compensated lines. This is because while the series
capacitor will compensate self-impedance of the zero sequence network the mutual impedance will be
same as in the case of non-compensated double circuit lines. The reach of under reaching distance protection
zone 1 for phase to earth measuring loops must further be reduced for such operating conditions.
Zero sequence mutual impedance may also disturb the correct operation of distance protection for external
evolving faults during auto reclosing, when one circuit is disconnected in one phase and runs in parallel
during dead time of single pole auto reclosing cycle. It is recommended to study all such operating conditions
by dynamic simulations in order to fine tune settings of distance relays.
7.7.2.6 Directional Residual Overcurrent Protection
All basic application considerations, characteristic for directional residual over-current protection on normal
power lines apply also to series compensated lines with following additions. Low fault currents are
characteristic of high resistive faults. This means that the fault currents may not be enough to cause
voltage drops on series capacitors that would be sufficient to start their over-voltage protection. Spark
gaps may not flash over in most cases, and metal oxide varistors (MOVs) may not conduct any significant
current. Series capacitors may remain fully inserted during high resistive earth faults.
7.7.2.7 Local end Directional Residual OC Protection
The directional relay operates always correctly for reverse faults. VT located between bus and capacitor
generally does not influence directional measurement. But in case VT is located between line and capacitor
it may influence correct operation: While reverse faults are detected correctly the forward operation is
dependent on system conditions. Additional zero sequence source impedance can be added into relay
circuits to secure correct directional measurement.
7.7.2.8 Remote end Directional Residual OC Protection
In this case the current can be reduced to extremely low values due to low zero sequence impedance at
capacitor end. Further the measured residual voltage can be reduced to very low value due to low zero
sequence source impedance and/or low zero sequence current. Zero sequence current inversion may
occur at the capacitor end (dependent on fault position). Directional negative sequence OC protection too
may face very similar conditions.
Adaptive application of both the above OC protection principles can be considered wherever required to
get the desired result.
7.7.2.9 Distance Protection Settings Guidelines
Basic criteria applied for Z1 & Z2 reach settings are :

• Zone-1 should never overreach for the fault at remote bus
• Zone-2 should never under reach for fault on protected line
• Permissive overreach (POR) schemes are usually applied

Distance protection Zone 1 shall be set to
Zone-1 is set usually at 80% of Ks x XZ1 = KS (X11 + X12 – XC) Where X11 is reactance between CT and
capacitor and X12 is reactance between capacitor and remote end Bus, Xc is reactance of capacitor and KS
is safety factor to prevent possible overreaching due to low frequency (sub-harmonic) oscillations. These
setting guidelines are applicable when VT is installed on the bus side of the capacitor. It is possible to
remove XC from the above equation in case VT is installed on line side, but it is still necessary to consider
the safety factor.
• Alternatively, Zone-1 is set at 80% of line impedance with a time delay of 100millisecond. POR
Communication scheme logic is modified such that relay trips instantaneously in Zone-1 on carrier
receive. ( For remote end relay of the line looking into series capacitor)
• Zone-2 is set to 120 % of uncompensated line impedance for single circuit line. For double circuit
lines, special considerations are mentioned at Section B-5 above.
• Phase locked voltage memory is used to cope with the voltage inversion. Alternatively, an intentional
time delay may be applied to overcome directionality problems related to voltage inversion.
• Special consideration may be required in over voltage stage-I (low set) trip setting for series compensated
double circuit lines. It has been experienced that in case of tripping of a heavily loaded circuit, other
circuit experience sudden voltage rise due to load transfer. To prevent tripping of other circuit on such
cases, over-voltage stage-I setting for series compensated double circuit lines may be kept higher at
113%.
7.7.2.10 Simulation Studies
System studies, Use of real Time digital simulators, Tests using EMTP files are very important when
applying protections for series compensated lines. It is recommended to carry out such studies specific to
each line.
7.8 SETTINGS DOCUMENT FOR MULTIFUNCTION IED
The numerical terminals referred as IED (Intelligent electronic device) contain apart from main protection
functions several other protection & supervision functions which may or may not be used for a particular
application. Many of these functions are having default settings which may not be suitable and may lead to
mal-operations. Thus, It is important that the recommended setting document should contain all the settings
for all functions that are used and indicate clearly the functions not used (to be Blocked / Disabled). This
shall be followed not only for Line protection IEDs but also for other IEDs like Generator, Transformer,
Reactor, Bus bar protection and Control functions.
It is also recommended that graphical representation of distance relay zones on R-X plane including phase
selection, load encroachment & power swing characteristics should be done showing exact setting calculated.
Section 7 (B) : AUTO-RECLOSING
7.B.1 GENERAL
The auto-reclosing of power lines has become a generally accepted practice. Reports from different parts
of the world show that in certain networks in regions subject to a high lightning intensity only about 5 per
cent of the faults are permanent. Auto-reclosing therefore provides significant advantages. Outage times
will be short compared to where station personnel have to re-energise the lines after a fault. Additionally,
in interconnected networks, auto-reclosing helps in maintaining system stability.
Following different arrangements of auto-reclosing are possible:

High speed single pole reclosing (HSAR)
High speed three pole reclosing (HTAR)
Delayed three pole reclosing (DAR)

DAR with dead line (DL) and synchronism check(SC)
HTAR with DL and SC
HTAR with parallel line check (PC)

In case of HSAR and HTAR without check, the two ends can be reclosed at about the same instant.
In case of DAR and HTAR with DL and SC the C.B. at one end recloses first after the set dead time and
with a check of dead line condition. After a successful line re-energization from one end the voltage, phase
angle and possibly frequency on the line and station side are compared. At acceptable synchronous in-
phase conditions the C.B. at the second end is reclosed.
The typical A/R cycle for a transient fault is given below:
Fig. 7.5 : The typical A/R Cycle for a Transient Fault

The typical A/R cycle for a permanent fault is given below:
Fig. 7.6 : Typical A/R Cycle for a Permanent Fault
Above figures explain some of the basic parameters of an auto-reclose function like Dead time, Reclaim time
& no. of shots of A/R function, fault duration, deionistaion time, arcing time & opening time of circuit breaker.
7.B.2 BASIC PARAMETERS OF AN AUTO-RECLOSE SCHEME
7.B.2.1 The fault duration
It is the time delay between the fault instant and the moment when the CB is opened and arcing is
extinguished.
7.B.2.2 Dead Time
The dead time of A/R function is the time delay between the moment when the A/R function is started and
the moment when the A/R relay (IED) closes its output contact and energises the closing coil of the CB.
The dead time setting should be sufficient to allow for complete deionization of the arc to prevent re-strike
of the arc on closing.
7.B.2.3 Reclaim time
The reclaim time of A/R function is the time delay following the moment when the A/R functions issues the
reclosing command and the moment when the A/R function resets, and it is ready for a new reclosing cycle.
The reclaim time should be sufficiently long to allow the CB operating mechanism to reset and to prepare
for another reclosing cycle.
7.B.2.4 The Number of Shots
A/R operating cycle that provides only one reclosing command is referred to as “Single-shot”. whereas A/
R operating cycle that provides a sequence of reclosing commands is referred as “Multi-shot”.
Single-shot A/R mode is normally applied to transmission lines. Thus it prevents repeated reclosing on to
fault with relatively high current levels that may endanger system stability.
Multi-shot A/R mode is more common on sub-transmission and distribution level where there is low probability
of losing system stability.
7.B.2.5 Closing Pulse Duration
The closing command pulse duration allows the CB to properly energise its internal relays and execute the
command. Common settings are 0.1 to 0.2s.
7.B.2.6 Auto Reclose Operating Mode Requirements
It is a common requirement that the AR function shall provide single-pole AR, three-pole AR, Single &
Three pole AR, Non-Auto mode and a mode selector.When the single-pole (only) mode is selected, single-
phase-to-ground faults result in trippingof only the faulted phase, followed by AR. Multi-phase faults result
in final three-pole tripswithout AR.Selecting the three-pole (only) mode results in a three-pole trip for any
fault type and a three-poleAR which may, as appropriate, be subject to synchro-check conditions.In the
combined single and three-pole mode, a single-phase-to-ground fault results a single-poletrip and AR
without any control condition; and a multi-phase fault results a three-poletrip and three-pole AR which may,
as appropriate, be subject to synchro-check conditions.Normally single shot AR is applied on Transmission
system.
7.B.2.7 Operating Mode- Single Phase auto Reclosing
Single-phase tripping is the least damaging to the power system and the most common. Theadvantages
are related to the fact that this type of tripping allows power transfer over the tworemaining phases and has
a lower impact on stability.One of the disadvantages is that more complex protection is required in order to
distinguishbetween single-phase-to-ground and multiphase faults. However modern numerical relays
(IEDs)easily deal with thisproblem without additional hardware. IEDs provide AR initiation signal to AR
function only in case of single phase trip on single phase to ground fault condition. Multiphase faults results
into three phase tripping and it may additionally send AR Block signal to AR function in case of evolving
faults i.e single phase fault evolving into multiphase fault.
In single-pole (only) operating mode, AR is allowed only for single-phase-to-ground faults,and multi-
phase faults result in a final three-pole trip. Thus, both ends of the transmission lineremain connected by
two phases improving system stability. However, the induced voltagefrom the other two energised phases
and certain environmental conditions could lead to acontinued secondary arc, resulting in a failure of the
AR cycle. Hence, setting of single-poledead times on long transmission lines requires some attention to
manage such conditions if transmission line is not having line reactor with neutral grounding reactor
(NGR).
An example of single–phase single shot AR cycle is shown below for a successful reclosing with dead time
of one second.
Fig. 7.7 : Single–Phase Single Shot AR Cycle is Shown
7.B.2.8 Operating mode – Three phase
In this operating mode, any fault type results in a three-pole trip, which is then followed byAR which may
be either rapid AR (RAR) without any check conditions, or delayed AR (DAR)which may be subject to
dead-line or synchro-check conditions.Where AR with synchro-check is applied, one end of the line must
first reclose either rapidlywithout any check condition, or subject to a dead-line condition. With the line
voltage reestablished,the remaining line-ends may be reclosed with synchro-check. This may
requirestaggered dead-time settings between ends; however, where a separate synchronization timer is
available, uniform dead-time settings may be applied.
An example of a synchro-check supervised three-pole AR is shown below:
Fig. 7.8 : Synchro-check Supervised three-pole AR

7.B.2.9 Other Important Requirements of AR Function
(a) Prepare three phase trip: In single or two-pole tripping applications, it may be necessary, in certain
circumstances, totrip three-pole. Some examples include when the AR function is disabled or blocked,
or if anew trip issues after the last programmed shot. The “prepare three pole trip” condition forcesall
trips to issue as three-pole trips. For permanent faults, the time of release of the conditionis, in
some AR functions, simultaneous with the close command of the last programmed shot.If the device
tripping function does not have a facility to trip three-pole for evolving faults,then the AR function
can help by releasing the condition for a short while after the protectiontrip gets reset.
(b) CB Ready condition: The AR function requires a fast open-close-open (O-C-O) operating cycle of
the CB andtherefore the operating mechanism must be ready for such a duty. In the event of
themechanism not being ready, the AR cycle should be blocked and protection functions shouldissue
final three-pole trip commands because an AR cycle cannot be completed. The “CBready” condition
is dependent on the operating mechanism and could indicate a pressurewithin the limits for a hydraulic
mechanism, or a charged close-spring for a spring operatingmechanism. Normally AR ready status
of the CB is indicated by the CB by means of a binary signal that is monitored by AR function.
(c) CB Close/Open positions: CB position is monitored at the start of AR cycle by AR function and the
position of CB contacts is critical for the operating logic of the AR function. The CBposition indication
is given by the CB’s auxiliary contacts and in many applications it is usedto block AR or to start the
AR dead time. If the three poles of the CB are opened for morethan a certain time then, usually, the
AR function is blocked and the CB is deemed to be out-of-service to avoid an unwanted AR close
command. In this case, the discrimination timeshould avoid AR blocking during the three-pole dead
time for three-pole AR. Some IEDs usethe three-poles-closed indication to enable the AR cycle
rather than using the three-polesopenindication. In the case of single-pole (only) AR, if the CB
opens more than one pole,then a three-pole trip is forced and the AR cycle is blocked, based on the
position of the CB.
(d) AR BLOCK condition: Several other functions of the protection scheme requires blocking of the AR
function. Protection functions that should block AR are as under:
(i) Bus Bar protection trip.

(ii) Breaker failure trip.
(iii) Line trip on Switch on to fault (SOTF)
(iv) Direct transfer trip receive

(v) Complete carrier failure of tele-protection scheme.
(vi) Manual CB close command
(vii) Over voltage trip

(viii) Line reactor trip of Non-Switched line reactor
(ix) Circuit Breaker problems
(x) Zone-2/3 of distance protection

(e0 Sequential closing of CB ( CB Priority closing): In situations where two CBs at a local end are
tripped and reclosed (e.g. breaker-and-a-half),the CBs are typically reclosed insequence to reduce
the wear and tear on the second CB forreclosing onto permanent faults (in particular where this is
the common CB on a breaker -and-a-half diameter). This requires an additional feature which delays
the reclosing of thesecond CB until the first CB has closed. This is done using an output “Delay
Follower” or a”Wait from Master” condition which picks up at the start of AR cycle of first CB and
resetsafter a set time delay after the closing command is issued to the first CB. This time delay is
toascertain whether AR was successful or not. If the fault persists, the “AR Unsuccessful”signal
blocks the AR cycle of second CB. If the fault was transient, the second CB issues itsclose command
either immediately after release from the first CB or after its own set deadtime, in accordance with
the design of the AR function itself.
7.B.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROVISIONS OF AUTO-RECLOSING.
7.B.3.1 AR Mode
Presently, 1 phase high speed auto-reclosure (HSAR) at 765kV, 400 kV and 220 kV level is widely practiced
including on lines emanating from Generating Stations and the same is recommended for adoption. If 3-
phase auto-reclosure is adopted in future the application of the same on lines emanating from generating
stations should be studied and decision taken on case to case basis.
7.B.3.2 AR Function Requirements
It shall have the following attributes:

(i) Have single phase and/or three phase reclosing facilities.
(ii) Have a continuously variable single phase dead time.

(iii) Have continuously variable three phase dead time for three phase reclosing.
(iv) Have continuously variable reclaim time.
(v) Incorporate a facility of selecting single phase/three phase/single and three phase auto-reclose and
non-auto reclosure modes.
(vi) Have facilities for selecting check synchronising or dead line charging features.
(vii) Be of high speed single shot type
(viii) Suitable relays for SC and DLC should be included in the overall auto-reclose scheme if three
phase reclosing is provided.
(ix) Should allow sequential reclosing of breakers in one and half breaker or double breaker arrangement.
7.B.3.3 AR Scheme Special Requirments
(i) Modern numerical relays (IEDs) have AR function as built-in feature. However, it is recommended
to use standalone AR relay or AR function of Bay control unit (BCU) for 220kV and above voltage
lines. For 132kV lines, AR functions built-in Main distance relay IED can be used.
(ii) Fast simultaneous tripping of the breakers at both ends of a faulty line is essential for successful
auto-reclosing. Therefore, availability of protection signalling equipment is a pre-requisite.
(iii) Starting and Blocking of Auto-reclose Relays:
Some protections start auto-reclosing and others block. Protections which start A/R are Main-I and
Main-II line protections.
Protections which block A/R are:

– Breaker Fail Relay
– Line Reactor Protections
– O/V Protection
– Received Direct Transfer trip signals
– Busbar Protection
– Zone 2/3 of Distance Protection
– Carrier Fail Conditions
– Circuit Breaker Problems.

When a reclosing relay receives start and block A/R impulse simultaneously, block signal dominates.
Similarly, if it receives ‘start’ for 1-phase fault immediately followed by multi-phase fault the later one
dominates over the previous one.
7.B.3.4 Requirement for Multibreaker Arrangement
Following comments are for multi-breaker arrangements of one and half breaker ordouble breaker
arrangement
(i) In a multi-C.B. arrangement one C.B. can be taken out of operation and the line still be kept in
service. After a line fault only those C.Bs which were closed before the fault shall be reclosed.
(ii) In multi-C.B. arrangement it is desirable to have a priority arrangement so as to avoid closing of
both the breakers in case of a permanent fault. This will help in avoiding unnecessary wear and tear.
(iii) A natural priority is that the C.B. near the busbar is reclosed first. In case of faults on two lines on
both sides of a tie C.B. the tie C.B. is reclosed after the outer C.Bs. The outer C.Bs. do not need a
prioriting with respect to each other.
(iv) 3.3.3 In multi-breaker arrangement it is necessary to trip two C.Bs. to clear a line fault and also auto
reclose these two. Basically two types of arrangement for C.B. associated relays are possible i.e.
– C.B. Oriented
– Line Oriented
(v) With C.B. oriented arrangement co-operation between C.Bs, Synchrocheck relay etc. is straight
forward and autoreclose mode can be selected separately for each breaker. With line oriented
arrangement interconnections between line relays and reclosure relay is simpler, but cooperation
with circuit breakers schemes becomes complicated. For the above reasons C.B. oriented
arrangement is recommended.
7.B.4 In case of bus bar configuration arrangement having a transfer breaker, a separate auto-reclosure
relay for transfer breaker is recommended.
7.B.4 SETTING CRITERIA
7.B.4.1 Dead Time
Auto-reclosing requires a dead time which exceeds the de-ionising time. The time required for the de-
ionising of the fault path depends on several factors including the arcing time, fault duration, wind conditions,
circuit voltage, capacitive coupling to adjacent conductors, etc. The circuit voltage is the factor having the
predominating influence on the de-ionising time.
Single phase dead time of 1.0 sec. is recommended for 765 kV, 400 kV and 220 kV system.
7.B.4.2 Reclaim Time
The reclaim time is the time during which a new start of the auto-reclosing equipment is blocked. If
reclosing shot has been carried out and the line is energised and a new fault occurs before the reclaim time
has elapsed, the auto-reclosing equipment is blocked and a signal for definite tripping of the breaker is
obtained. After the reclaim time has elapsed, the auto-reclosing equipment returns to the starting position
and a new reclosing sequence can occur. The reclaim time must not be set to such a low value that the
intended operating cycle of the breaker is exceeded, when two fault incidents occur close together. If the
breaker is closed manually, the auto-reclosing equipment is blocked and cannot start again until the reclaim
time has elapsed.
For the breaker to be used for auto-reclosing, it is essential that it has the operating mechanism and
breaking capacity necessary for it to be able to perform the auto-reclosing sequences required.
7.B.4.3 Circuit Breaker Requirement
According to IEC Publication 56.2, a breaker must be capable of withstanding the following operating cycle
with full rated breaking current:
0 + 0.3 s + CO + 3 min + CO
The recommended operating cycle at 765kV, 400 kV and 220 kV is as per the IEC standard. Therefore,
reclaim time of 25 Sec. is recommended.
133
CHAPTER 8
HVDC PROTECTION SYSTEM
8.1 HVDC SYSTEM OVERVIEW
8.1.1 Principle
The fundamental process that occurs in an HVDC system is controlled conversion of electric current from
AC to DC at the transmitting end (Rectifier) and controlled conversion from DC to AC at the receiving end
(Inverter).
The term controlled rectification and inversion means that the DC output voltage can be precisely controlled
electronically. The principle of HVDC System is illustrated in Figure 8.1. Here, the control of DC side
quantities (i.e. Ud1, Ud2 and Id in Figure8.1) is achieved by varying the firing angle of converter valves,
which decides the instant at which the conduction starts in converter valves. By controlling both converters,
the desired magnitude of voltage and current can be achieved and consequently the desired amount of
power can be transmitted in the desired direction.
Fig. 8.1: Principle of HVDC System

8.1.2 Applications
The first application for HVDC converters was to provide point to point electrical power interconnections
between asynchronous AC power networks. There are other applications which can be met by HVDC
converter transmission includes following:
• Interconnections between Asynchronous Systems
Some continental electric power systems consist of asynchronous networks such as the East, West,
Texas and Quebec networks in North America and island loads such as the Island of Gotland in the
Baltic Sea make good use of HVDC interconnections.
• Deliver energy from remote energy sources
Where generation has been developed at remote sites of available energy, HVDC transmission has
been an economical means to bring the electricity to load centers. Gas fired thermal generation can
be located close to load centers and may delay development of isolated energy sources in the near
term.
• Import electric energy into congested load areas
In areas where new generation is impossible to bring into service to meet load growth or replace
inefficient or decommissioned plant, underground DC cable transmission is a viable means to import
electricity.
• Increasing the capacity of existing AC transmission by conversion to DC transmission

New transmission rights-of-way may be impossible to obtain. Existing overhead AC transmission lines
if upgraded to or overbuilt with DC transmission can substantially increase the power transfer capability
on the existing right-of-way.
• Power flow control
AC networks do not easily accommodate desired power flow control. Power marketers and system
operators may require the power flow control capability provided by HVDC transmission.
• Stabilization of electric power networks.
Some wide spread AC power system networks operate at stability limits well below the thermal capacity
of their transmission conductors. HVDC transmission is an option to be considered to increase utilization
of network conductors along with the various power electronic controllers which can be applied on AC
transmission.
8.1.3 HVDC Converter Arrangements
HVDC converter bridges and lines or cables can be arranged into a number of configurations for effective
utilization. Converter bridges can be arranged either in monopolar or bipolar configuration as shown in 12
pulse arrangement in Figure 8.2. The monopolar configuration can be further subdivided into monopolar
ground return and monopolar metallic return based on the type of return conductor.
Various ways in which HVDC transmission is used are shown in simplified form in Figure 8.3 and include
the following:
8.1.3.1 Back-to-Back HVDC System
There are some applications where the two AC systems to be interconnected are physically in the same
location or Converter station. No transmission line or cable is required between the converter bridges in
this case and the connection may be monopolar or bipolar. Back-to-back DC links are used in Japan for
interconnections between power system networks of different frequencies (50 and 60 Hz). They are also
used as interconnections between adjacent asynchronous networks.
8.1.3.2 Point to Point or Two Terminal HVDC Transmission System
When it is economical to transfer electric power through DC transmission or cables from one geographical
location to another, a two-terminal or point-to-point HVDC transmission is used. In other words, DC power
from a DC rectifier terminal is dedicated to one other terminal operating as an inverter. This is typical of
most HVDC transmission systems.
HVDC Protection System 135
8.1.3.3 Multi-Terminal HVDC Transmission System
When three or more HVDC converter stations are geographically separated with interconnecting transmission
lines or cables, the HVDC transmission system is defined as multi-terminal. If all HVDC converter stations
are connected to the same voltage then the system is called parallel multi-terminal HVDC. If one or more
converter bridges are added in series in one or both poles, then the system is called series multi-terminal
DC. Parallel multi-terminal HVDC transmission has been applied when the HVDC converter station capacity
exceeds 10% of the total rectifier capacity. It is expected that a series multi-terminal HVDC converter
station would be applied when its capacity is small (less than 10%) compared to the total rectifier capacity.
A combination of parallel and series connections of converter bridges is a hybrid multi-terminal system.
Multi-terminal HVDC systems are more difficult to justify economically because of the cost of the additional
HVDC converter stations.
From the protection point of view, there is no major difference compared to two terminal HVDC system
when multi-terminal configuration is used. Basically the protections remain the same for a multi-terminal
transmission as for a normal two terminal transmission and are provided in each converter/bipole. However,
the scenarios which are required to be adequately taken care of in protection coordination of multi terminal
operation are following:
• One of the key requirement in a multi terminal operation is fast disconnection of a faulty converter.
There is a necessity to block and disconnect a specific converter with minimum impact or disturbance
on the other converters. For optimized operation, a fast telecommunication link between stations is
used to transmit and receive the orders between the paralleled converters.
• There is a possibility that there is a fault in a converter which may require permitting the parallel
healthy converter to remain in operation while the fault is being cleared in the faulty converter. Protective
switching action may be co-ordinated with parallel healthy converter.
• There is another possibility of a fault in common area of the parallel Converters requiring forced
retarding in both parallel converters for fault clearing, thus having impact on all parallel converters on
the same polarity DC line.
For a DC line fault, all the rectifiers must be de-energized until the faulty converter has been disconnected
from the DC line. After fault clearance with suitable de-ionisation time, parallel rectifiers shall be connected
in staggered manner with proper co-ordination between the rectifiers.
Fig. 8.2 : Monopolar and Biploar HVDC Configurations

Fig. 8.3 : HVDC Converter Arrangements
8.1.3.4 Unit Connection
When DC transmission is applied right at the point of generation, it is possible to connect the converter
transformer of the rectifier directly to the generator terminals so the generated power feeds into the DC
transmission lines. This might be applied with hydro and wind turbine driven generators so that maximum
efficiency of the turbine can be achieved with speed control. Regardless of the turbine speed, the power
is delivered through the inverter terminal to the AC receiving system at its fundamental frequency of 50
or 60 hz.
8.1.3.5 Diode Rectifier
It has been proposed that in some applications where DC power transmission is in one direction only, the
valves in the rectifier converter bridges can be constructed from diodes instead of thyristors. Power flow
control would be achieved at the inverter, and in the case where the unit connection is used, AC voltage
control by the generator field exciter could be applied to regulate DC power. This connection may require
high speed AC circuit breakers between the generator and the rectifier converter bridges to protect the
diodes from overcurrents resulting from a sustained DC transmission line short circuit.
8.2 PURPOSE OF PROTECTION SYSTEM
The protection system is required to limit the equipment damages caused by system abnormalities or
excessive fault currents and thereby minimize fire risk and hazard to the people. In some cases, it enables
reduced power transfer in the grid and helps to avoid complete collapse of the HVDC system, which may
cause grid disturbances.
Following are the main functions of HVDC protection system:
8.2.1.1 Fault Isolation
The protection system is intended to detect the faults or any abnormal conditions and thereby isolate the
faulty equipment or section from healthy sections. In some cases it is also required that complete HVDC
system shall be tripped.
8.2.2 Co-ordination with Converter Control
Whenever the protection system operates, it is a necessity that control system acts so that the stress on
protected section or part of HVDC station can be minimised. Hence, it is required that protection system
sends the information regarding detection of fault and trip to the control system. In case of EHVAC
transmission protection, it is the task of protection system to detect the fault and trip the circuit breaker
whereas in case of HVDC, both control & protection systems are integrated with each other and are
assigned the task of protecting the HVDC system.
8.3 PROTECTION PHILOSOPHY
The HVDC protection system is designed based on the following general requirements:
8.3.1 Act Fast
The protection system is designed to act fast i.e., to detect the permanent fault or abnormal condition and
isolate the faulty equipment or section, typically within three fundamental frequency cycles. In case of
non-permanent faults, the protection system is designed to recover the system up to 90% of pre-fault
power typically within two to five fundamental frequency cycles.
8.3.2 Selectivity
Each equipment or section is protected by its own zone of protection so as to avoid unnecessary tripping
due to external zone fault. The overlapping with its adjacent zone is provided in each zone so that no part
is left unprotected. A local breaker backup / breaker failure function is also provided to protect in case the
associated circuit breaker fails to open even though the protection has issued a trip command. In that
case, a tripping command is issued to the next infeed zone circuit breaker.
8.3.3 Redundancy
The protection system redundancy is achieved by using any of the following principles, depending upon
the equipment or plant section:
(i) Main & Backup, in which different algorithms are used. Now-a-days, utilities are not opting this
redundancy option in DC protection system.
(ii) Main 1 & Main 2, in which different manufacturers of protection devices are used.
(iii) System A & System B, in which duplicated protection devices of identical design and functionality
are used. In this case, both System A & System B remains in Active mode which means that both
systems receive same inputs and gives necessary output signals in parallel.
The control system redundancy is achieved by System A and System B principle; however, unlike the
protection system redundancy of System A & System B type, in this case only one system remains in
Active mode and other in Standby mode. It means, both systems receive same inputs but only the System
which is in Active mode gives necessary output signals. In case the normal Active system becomes faulty
or is unavailable due to maintenance purpose, then Standby system is changed into Active mode
automatically and gives necessary output signals.
8.3.4 Hardware Availability
The protection system availability is achieved by providing different source of power supply and utilizing
different measuring equipment for redundant protection device.
8.3.5 Self-Monitoring
Each protection device is capable of self-monitoring through its own watch-dog feature. In case of protection
device hardware fault, the tripping is not issued.
However, if hardware fault arises in both redundant control & protection devices, then complete HVDC
system is tripped.
8.4 PROTECTIVE ACTIONS
Following actions are employed in the control and protection system for protecting the sections or part of
a complete HVDC station:
8.4.1 Circuit Breaker Tripping
The objective of this action is to isolate the HVDC equipment from the AC system, thereby clearing the
fault and reducing stress on the equipment. For an urgent converter fault such as a valve short circuit
where the converter is in immediate danger, the rated withstand of the valve should be greater than the
operating time of the circuit breaker, inclusive of the detection time. This is typically, three fundamental
frequency cycles.
For a non-urgent converter fault where the converter is not in immediate danger, it is desirable to wait
until the control system has reduced the load current to a low level before tripping the feeder circuit
breaker.
In case of converter feeder circuit breaker tripping, the filters should be opened at the same instant, or
earlier, to assist the opening of the feeder circuit breaker.
8.4.2 Block
Protective blocking is used to stop the flow of both AC and DC current in order to limit the effect of the
fault. This is achieved by simply removing the firing pulses to all the valves in the converter. Normally a
protective block is followed by a trip of the circuit breaker, as only removing the firing pulses may not
always stop conduction.
8.4.3 Valve Refire
The entire valve should be refired to prevent possible valve damage caused by partial blocking if more than
a certain number of thyristors (taking into account the number of redundant levels) are protectively triggered.
8.4.4 Inhibit Raise
For moderate overvoltages the tapchanger is inhibited from tapping up to ensure that the overvoltage
condition is not worsened due to tapchanger action.
8.4.5 Force Lower
For more severe overvoltages the tapchanger is forced to tap down to alleviate the stress on the equipment
due to the overvoltage.
8.4.6 Block and Bypass (Bypass)
This action provides a DC short circuit across the converter bridge. It consists of blocking four valves in the
six-pulse bridge and firing the remaining two as a bypass pair. In each 6-pulse bridge there are three
possible bypass pairs. Under some circumstances, for example an external flashover across a valve, it is
necessary to select the pair containing the flashover valve. Once the DC current has been stopped, the
converter valves can be blocked and the converter AC feeder breaker tripped.
8.4.7 Forced Retard
This action forces rectifier firing at a high firing angle into the inversion region, to extinguish the current
flowing on the DC side.
8.4.8 DC Line Fault Recovery Sequence
When a DC line fault has occurred the pole or converter control attempts to restart the power transmission
after a de-ionisation time. The purpose of this sequence is to restore operation as soon as possible after a
DC line fault.
8.4.9 Electrode Line Current Reduction
In case one electrode line is not available, the DC Protection System sends an “Electrode Line Current
Reduction Request”. In the Control System, this signal limits the maximum current reference values and
therefore the Poles Current Capability of both poles to 50%. Caused by this limitation the ground current in
the remaining electrode line cannot exceed the selected limitation.
8.4.10 Balanced Bipolar Mode
In this mode, both poles are operated with very small electrode currents, independently of their operation
mode.
8.5 ZONES OF PROTECTIONS
A complete HVDC station consists of AC busbars, AC lines, AC filter banks (comprising of AC filter sub-
banks and/or Shunt capacitor/Shunt reactor) & connecting AC busbar section, Converter transformer &
connecting AC busbar section, Converter or Pole, DC filter, DC busbar, DC line and Electrode line.
The protections of AC busbars and AC lines are not explained here because the configuration of AC
busbars and AC lines comprises of conventional components and are generally protected by the use of
standard numerical relays; however, whenever these components are adjacent to the HVDC components
or sections, the overlapping of the protection zones is always provided.
These protection of HVDC system comprises of several protection zones such as AC Filter Protection, AC
Filter Connection Protection, Converter Transformer Protection, Converter or Pole Protection including
equipment within valve hall, dc Switchyard including smoothing reactors, DC Filter Protection, DC Busbar
Protection, DC Line Protection and
Electrode Line Protection, metallic return conductor protection. The zone of each protection is illustrated
in the Figure 8.4.
Fig. 8.4
8.6 DC PROTECTIONS
8.6.1 Converter Protection

The Converter protection is realised through System A and System B principle. The zone of Converter
protection is shown in the Figure 8.4. The Figure 8.5 shows possible fault cases and a typical CT and VT
arrangement for realising Converter Protections.
Fig. 8.5
The Measuring Equipments of the above typical schematic are as per below:
IdlH Pole Side DC CT in Valve Hall

UdlH Pole side DC Voltage Divider in DC yard
IdCH Pole side DC CT in DC Yard
IacY Valve side AC CT for Y-Y Converter X-Mer

IacD Valve side AC CT for Y-D Converter X-Mer
Uac AC side Capacitive Voltage Transformer
IdcN Neutral side DC CT in Valve Hall

UdN Neutral Side DC Voltage divider
Idee1 DC CT in Electrode line
Idee2 DC CT in Electrode line

IdlN Neutral Side DC CT in DC yard
HSNBS High Speed Neutral Bus Switch
HSGS High Speed Grounding Switch

MRTB Metallic Return Transfer Breaker
MRS Metallic Return Switch
IdMRS DC CT in MRS circuit

IdSG DC CT in HSGS circuit
Following protections (duplicated) are provided per Converter:
8.6.1.1 AC>DC Differential or Valve Short Circuit Protection
This protection is provided to protect against a valve short circuit and other phase-to-phase short circuits
which give rise to high AC currents and low DC currents (refer all Fault 1 to Fault 9 in Figure 8.5). The
protection is provided for both upper valve group and lower valve group. This protection is a Main protection
within each system.
Evaluating Principle (refer Figure 8.5):
(IacY – MIN(IdCH, IdCN)) > Threshold OR

(IacD - MIN(IdCH, IdCN)) > Threshold
Typical Settings
Threshold = 1.5 to 2.5 p.u. and Operating time t = 0-1 ms.

Since very high short circuit current can flow through the Thyristor Valve and converter transformer, the
protection activation time as fast as it can.
Initiated Actions
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
• Tripping of converter circuit breakers
8.6.1.2 DC Differential Protection
DC differential protection is used to detect ground faults on the dc side of the converter terminal. Typically,
it is implemented separately for several protection zones.
Evaluating Principle (refer Figure 8.5):
(IdCH - IdCN) > Threshold (for Converter level)

(IdLH - IdLN) > Threshold (for Pole level)
Typical Settings:
Threshold = 0.04 to 0.1 p.u.; t = 5 ms.
Initiated Actions:
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
8.6.1.3 Asymmetry Protection or DC Harmonic Protection
This protection is provided to detect the persistent presence of fundamental and 2nd harmonic voltages or
current between the DC terminals of the pole cause by a valve misfire or successive commutation failure
due to distorted ac voltage or due to control malfunctioning. This protection is a Backup protection within
each system.
Evaluation Principle (refer Figure 8.5)
For fundamental frequency protection: IdLH(50 Hz) > Threshold

For 2nd harmonic protection: IdLH(100 Hz) > Threshold
Typical Settings
For fundamental frequency protection: Threshold = 0.05IdL and Operating Time t = 700 ms.
For 2nd harmonic protection: Threshold = 0.05IdL and Operating Time t = 2000 ms.
Necessary co-ordination with ac system fault clearing time and commutation failure, such that it shall not
activate pre-maturely in case of transient events.
Initiated Actions
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
8.6.1.4 DC Under voltage Protection
This protection is used in case of inverter faults while telecommunication is not available. It also acts as
back up to DC line faults protection for remote DC line faults. Sometimes it may be activated for persistent
very low ac voltage in either end of HVDC terminal station.
This protection is provided to protect the converter against high voltage converter faults to neutral or
ground. This protection is a Backup protection within each system.
Evaluation Principle (refer Figure 8.5): UdL < Threshold
Typical Settings:
Threshold = 0.2 p.u. and Operating time t = 1 s.
Initiated Actions:
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
8.6.1.5 Group Differential Protection or Commutation Failure
Inverter station may be subjected to single or multiple commutation failures. It may be due to ac network
commutation voltage disturbance or firing angle problem. Group differential protection is provided to protect
the converter against DC faults that are bypassing the inverter (refer Fault 4 and Fault 5 in Figure 8.5).
This protection is a Main protection within each system.
This is detected if dc current is higher than valve side ac current than the commutation failure is indicated
in the bridge. In some philosophy valve conduction status is being monitored. Along with valve gate pulse
which indicate valve conduction status. Commutation failure is indicating current flowing with irregular
combination of valve conduction cycle which is not in the correct sequence of valve firing.
(MAX(IdCH, IdCN) - MAX(IacD, IacY)) > Threshold
Typical Settings
Threshold = 0.04 to 0.1 p.u. and Operating time t = 0.1 to 1 s
Threshold = 1 p.u. and Operating time t = 10 to 50 ms
Initiated Actions
The control system shall acts to avoid the occurrence of more commutation failures. It is generally achieved
by increasing the commutation margin angle. In case of multiple commutations inverter is going to block.
• Block inverter
• Tripping of associated circuit breakers

AND
Bridge Differential Protection
This protection is provided to protect the converter against commutation failure of six pulse group and firing
malfunction (refer Fault 1, Fault 3, Fault 6 to Fault 9 in Figure 8.5). The protection is provided for both upper-
six-pulse-valve group and lower-six-pulse-valve group. This protection is a Main protection within each system.
(MAX(IacY, IacD) - IacY) > Threshold OR

(MAX(IacY, IacD) - IacD) > Threshold
Typical Settings:
Threshold = 0.4 p.u. and Operating Time t = 100 to 200 ms.

Threshold = 0.04 to 0.1 p.u. and Operating Time t = 0.2 to 1 s.
Initiated Actions
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
8.6.1.6 Overcurrent Protection
This protection is provided to protect against the overcurrents in any of the valve winding connections of
converter transformer which can result from insulation failures within the converter or as a consequence of
a control system failure (refer Fault 1 to Fault 4, Fault 6 to Fault 9 in Figure 8.5). This protection is a
Backup protection within each system.
Evaluating Principle (refer Figure 8.5)
Activated in case Valve side star and delta side current are higher than some threshold value. One threshold
is triggered a faster protection to block the converter and trip ac side breaker. Another Thresholds is co-
ordinated with the thermal loading of the valve, and protection activated, if this excessive current persisting
for specified time leads to higher Thermal stress on Thyristor junction, it shall issue block /trip signal.
Max(IacY,IacD) > Threshold
Typical Settings:
Threshold = 1.25 to 3.5 p.u. (4 stages) and Operating time t = 30 s to 5 ms (4 stages).
Initiated Actions
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
8.6.1.7 Open Converter or DC Overvoltage Protection
This protection (refer 59/37DC in Figure 5) is provided to stop the rectifier operation against open DC line
or a blocked inverter. This protection is a Main protection within each system.
UdH > Threshold1

UdH > Threshold2
UdH > Threshold3 AND IdCH < Threshold4
Typical Settings
Threshold1 = 1.024 p.u. and Operating time t = 1000 ms

Threshold2 = 1.4 p.u and Operating time t = 10 ms
Threshold3 = 1.024 p.u., Threshold4 = 0.01 p.u. and Operating time t = 20 ms
Initiated Actions
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
8.6.1.8 Sub-Synchronous Resonance Protection
This protection is provided to protect the converter against sub synchronous resonance (SSR) conditions.
This protection acts as Main protection within each system. SSR protection trips when the absolute value
of SSR content of neutral side DC current is exceeding a threshold value and the SSR current is not
decreasing with at least a threshold slope.
IdCH(fResonance) > Threshold1

Delta(IdCH(fResonance)] < Threshold2
Typical Settings:
Depends on the AC system: fResonance typically 17 to 35 Hz

Threshold1 = 0.01 to 0.02 p.u., Threshold2 = 0.001 to 0.002 p.u.
Initiated Actions
• Force retard rectifier
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
8.6.1.9 AC Overvoltage Protection
This protection is provided to detect the overvoltages which could not be cleared using the AC filters and
shunt reactors. This protection is a Main protection within each system. This zone is bus bar and connected
equipment. This is due to execessive reactive power generation at bus bar short circuit capacity reduction
or load throw of due to blocking of converter. The concept is to trip the filter banks in case of blocking of
converters to take corrective measure of the surplus reactive power unnecessary connected at bus.
MAX(UacL1, UacL2, UacL3) > Threshold OR

MAX(UacL1, ULac2, UacL3) > Threshold OR
Uac magnitude > Threshold
Typical Settings
Threshold = 1.1 to 1.5 p.u. and

Operating Time t = 5 s to 100 ms
Initiated Actions
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
8.6.1.10 AC Voltage Stress Protection of Converter
Ac over-voltage protection is used to prevent excessive voltage stress on the dc side of the converter
equipment that is exposed to connected AC voltage. This mainly the equipment of converter transformer
secondary and valves. The combination of primary side ac voltage and tap changer position can produce
excessively high voltages on the secondary windings.
The protection monitor the primary side of AC voltage and tap position and calculate no load voltage
secondary voltage (valve side) exceeding threshold
Evaluation Principle
Udi0 > Threshold
Typical Settings
Threshold = To be co-ordinated with voltage withstand capability of valve, secondary winding and Operating
Time t = Equipment withstand capability with time
Initiated Actions
Inhibit tap changer movement

• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
8.6.1.11 AC Undervoltage Protection
This protection is provided to protect the converter against loss of AC voltage for longer duration than AC
Fault clearing times. This protection is a Main protection within each system.
MAX(UacL1, UacL2, UacL3) < Threshold
Typical Settings
Threshold = 0.3 p.u. and

Operating Time = 1.5 s to 2 s
Initiated Actions
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
8.6.1.12 AC Valve Winding Ground Fault Supervision
This protection is provided to protect the converter against phase to ground fault on the valve windings
while in the Blocked status of operation (refer Fault 7 to Fault 9 in Figure 5). This protection is a Main
protection within each system.
MAX(UsumY, UsumD) > Threshold1 and IdCH < Threshold2
Typical Settings:
Threshold1 = 0.25 p.u.
Initiated Actions
> Deblock inhibit
8.6.1.13 Excessive Delay Angle Protection
This protection is used to protect the stress on snubber circuit element in thyristor valves. The protection
function monitors firing angle, extinction angle and operate to prevent tap changer action. If the angles is
greater than threshold it shall stop the converter.
8.6.2 DC Filter Protection
Dc filter protection is similar to ac filter protection explained later in the section. The protection is going to
detect mainly High Voltage capacitor cans. It also detects any excessive harmonic current flowing through
the resistor and reactor.
In case bank is equipped with suitable isolator, the protection initiates automatic isolation of the filter bank. Any
ground faults in the DC filter, High voltage (pole bus) Differential protection initiated necessary switching action.
The DC filter protection is realised through System A and System B principle. The zone of DC filter protection
is shown in the Figure 4. The Figure 6 shows a typical CT arrangement for realising DC Filter Protections.
Following protections (duplicated) are provided:
8.6.2.1 Capacitor Differential Over current Protection
This protection is provided to protect the DC filter against short circuits, faults to neutral or ground within
capacitor. This protection acts as Main function within each system.
ABS(IT11 - IT12)> Threshold
Typical Settings
Unbalance of one capacitor unit
Initiated Actions

• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
• Pole isolation
Fig. 8.6
8.6.2.2 Capacitor Unbalance Supervision
This protection is provided to protect the healthy capacitor units from stress caused by faulty units. It
detects short circuiting of capacitor element rows whilst allowing a continuous “natural” balance error of
the capacitor bank. The protection acts as Main function within each system.
(IT11 + IT12) < Threshold1

(IT11 + IT12) > Threshold2
Typical Settings:
Trip in case of faulty capacitor element group
Instantaneous trip when whole unit is faulty
Initiated Actions
If (IT11 + IT12) < Threshold1, then open DC filter HV side disconnector

If (IT11 + IT12) > Threshold1, then

• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
8.6.2.3 Inverse Overcurrent Time Protection
This protection is provided to protect the DC filter against excessive harmonic currents and overheating of
the reactor. The protection acts as Main function within each system.
Int(Isum-Imax_continious) > Threshold
Typical Settings:
Depends on the overload characteristic of the inductance
Initiated Actions

• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
8.6.2.4 DC Filter Differential Protection
This protection is provided to protect the DC filter against faults to ground or neutral within protection zone.
The protection acts as Main function within each system.
Abs(Isum - IT2) > Threshold
Typical Settings
Threshold = 0.3 x MAX(Isum - IT2) and Operating Time t = 10 ms
Initiated Actions
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
• Open neutral bus switch
8.6.3 DC Line Protection
The DC line protection is realised through System A and System B principle. The zone of DC line protection
is shown in the Figure 8.4. The Figure 8.7 shows a typical CT(DCCT) and VT(Dc Voltage divider) arrangement
for realising DC Line Protections.
When a dc line to ground fault occurs, the dc voltage drops to a lower level at a certain rate, which is a
function of traveling waves initiated by the fault. The dc line fault detection makes use of this traveling
wave concept and generally uses both the rate of change of dc voltage, dV/dt, and the dc voltage level.
Through UdH to detect and distinguish a dc line fault. The rate of change is measured under a selected
time window to discriminate any voltage drop on the healthy pole of a bipolar line, induced by the traveling
wave on the faulted line.
DC line fault protections are implemented at the rectified terminal. Generally, fast and slow fault detection
schemes are provided to cover the entire line. The fast protection detects a high rate of change of voltage
in a small time interval, indicating a low impedance fault or a fault close to the rectifier. The slower part of
protection responds to a dc depression over a larger time interval, to detect high impedance faults or faults
closer to the inverter terminal. Use of low dc voltage is generally made to minimize any false detection on
the healthy line. The dV/dt thresholds need to be carefully selected during system studies and/or field tests
to not only avoid false triggering on the un-faulted pole, but also to avoid activation for ac faults near the
inverter terminal. It may be noted in case of low ac voltage in HVDC terminal, the DC voltage reduction is
going down in a sluggish rate due to presence of smoothing reactor on DC side provide necessary
discrimination of DC line fault and low ac voltage.
The dc line fault protection function initiates a sequence of operations that is intended to extinguish temporary
faults and resume normal operation. On detection of a fault, the rectifier retards its firing angle (into the
inverting region), thereby stopping the flow from of current from the rectifier into the fault. Simultaneously,
the inverter increases its margin angle to a very high value as its control system tries to maintain current
flow under the fault condition (very low dc voltage). These actions combine to extinguish the fault current.
The dc controls then block firing to totally stop operation of the converters. Then, after a preset delay time
(typically about 0.2 to 0.5 seconds to allow deionization of the fault), the control systems at the rectified
and inverter terminals restart and restore power transfer to the pre-fault level. The post fault recovery
usually required about typical 100 ms on a strong ac system, and may require as much as 500 ms on a
very weak ac system. This sequence of actions is called a temporary dc line fault sequence. Typically,
arcing faults caused by lightning strikes are cleared by this sequence.
If the fault restrikes during or shortly after the recovery process, the protection sequence is triggered
again. Normally, the same sequence is followed, but the deionization delay in longer (approximately 0.5
to 1.0 second). The protection system may be programmed to attempt as many as three restarts, following
progressively longer deionization delays. If the final restart is unsuccessful, the converters are tripped.
Recognizing that dc line faults can be caused by insulator degradation (contaminated or physically damaged
insulators), HVDC systems generally utilize a scheme where the last restart attempt is with a reduced dc
voltage. Such a scheme may permit post fault operation at a reduced power transfer as reduce voltage
operation, even with degraded insulation on the line.
8.6.3.1 Travelling Wave Front Protection
This protection is provided to protect against DC line faults to ground (refer Fault 2 and Fault 3 in Figure
8.7). The evaluation principle for WFPDL is detection of the discharge wave by evaluating the rate of
change of voltage and current. The zone of each station overlaps with other station so that no part of the
DC line is remaining unprotected. The protection acts as Main function within each system.
d(UdH)/dt > Threshold1 OR

Delta UdH > Threshold2 OR
d(IdLH)/dt > Threshold3
Typical Settings
Depends on the AC grid and DC line characteristic
Initiated Actions
• DC line fault recovery sequence
• If numbers of restarts are reached, then block rectifier, then block inverter and then trip converter
circuit breakers
Fig. 8.7
8.6.3.2 Under voltage Sensing Protection
This protection is provided to protect against DC line faults to ground or neutral (refer Fault 1 to Fault 3 in
Figure 8.7). The protection acts as Main function within each system.
d(UdH)/dt > Threshold1 and UdH < Threshold2
Typical Settings
Depends on the AC grid and DC line characteristic
Initiated Actions

circuit breakers
8.6.3.3 Under voltage Operation Protection
This protection is provided to detect the high impedance DC line faults (refer Fault 1 to Fault 3 in Figure 8.7).
The protection acts as Main function within each system.
Threshold1 < UdH < threshold2
Typical Settings

Threshold2 = 0.6 p.u. and
Opeating Time = 0.5 s
Initiated Actions

circuit breakers
8.6.3.4 DC Line Differential Protection
This protection is provided to protect against DC line faults to ground (refer Fault 2 in Figure 8.7). The
protection acts as Main function within each system
ABS(IdL-IdL(other station)) > Threshold
Typical Settings

Operating Time t = 0.5 s
Initiated Actions
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
8.6.3.5 Remote Station Fault Detection or AC-DC Conductor Contact Protection
This protection is provided to protect the converter against AC line contact to DC line and in adverted
Block of Inverter.
IdLH(50Hz) > Threshold1 & IdLH > Threshold2 OR

UdLH(50Hz) > Threshold3 & IdLH(50Hz) > Threshold4
Typical Settings

Operating time t = 500 ms
Initiated Actions
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
8.6.4 Electrode Line Protection
The electrode line protection is realised through System A and system B at bipole level. The zone of
electrode line protection is shown in the Figure 8.4. The Figure 8 shows a typical CT arrangement for
realising Electrode Line Protections.
8.6.4.1 Electrode Bus Differential Protection
This protection is provided to protect against earth faults at electrode bus (refer Fault 1, Fault 2 and Fault
7 in Figure 8.8). The protection acts as Main function within each system.
ABS((IdE-IdE_op)-(Idee1+Idee2)-IdSG) > Threshold
Typical Settings:
Threshold = 0.05 ... 0.07 p.u. and

Operating Time t = 300 to 500 ms
Initiated Actions:
In case of bipolar operation, warning is generated

In case of monopolar operation:
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
8.6.4.2 Electrode Current Balance Protection
This protection is provided to protect against earth faults at electrode line (refer Fault 5 and Fault 6 in
Figure 8.8). The protection acts as Main function within each system.
ABS(Idee1-Idee2) > Threshold
Typical Settings:
Operating Time t = 2000 ms
Initiated Actions

• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
Fig. 8.8
8.6.4.3 Electrode Over Current Protection
This protection is provided to protect against electrode overcurrent. The protection acts as Main function
within each system.
ABS(Idee1) > Threshold1 OR

ABS(Idee2) > Threshold2
Typical Settings:

Operating Time t = 0.5 s to 5 s
Operating Time t = 2 s to 10 s
Initiated Actions
• Electrode line current reduction sequence

• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
8.6.4.4 Electrode line open circuit Over voltage Protection
This protection is provided to protect against Open electrode line. The protection acts as Main function
within each system.
UdN > Threshold
Typical Settings
Threshold = 90 kV. (Depending on BIL selection of Neutral bus)
Initiated Actions
• Close ground switch
• Balanced bipolar mode operation
8.6.4.5 Station Ground Overcurrent Protection
This protection is provided to protect against station ground overcurrent and earth fault in metallic return
operation. The protection acts as Main function within each system.
IdSG > Threshold
Typical Settings:

Initiated Actions
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
8.6.4.6 Open Conductor Electrode Line Protection
This protection is provided to protect against open electrode line conductor fault. The protection acts as
Main function within each system.
Evaluation Principle (refer Figure 808)
(Idee1 > Threshold1; Idee2 < Threshold2) OR

(Idee1 < Threshold2; Idee2 > Threshold1)
Typical Settings
Initiated Actions
• Electrode line current reduction sequence.
8.6.5 DC Busbar Protection
The DC busbar protection is realised through System A and system B. The zone of DC busbar protection
is shown in the Figure 8.4. The Figure 8.9 shows a typical CT arrangement for realising DC Busbar
Protections.
8.6.5.1 HV Side DC Bus bar Differential Protection
This protection is provided to protect the DC busbar in case of faults to ground or neutral within protection
zone. The protection acts as Main function within each system. Zone covering Bus bar, Air core smoothing
reactor, HV side of DC filter in this protection.
ABS(IdL - IdH) > Threshold
Typical Settings

Initiated Actions
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
8.6.5.2 Neutral Side DC Busbar Differential Protection
This protection is provided to protect the DC busbar against earth faults or faults to neutral between the low
voltage side of IdCN DC current measuring and the IdLN DC current measuring. The protection acts as
Main function within each system. Neutral DC bus bar, air core smoothing reactor equipment located in
this zone.
ABS(IdN - IdE) > Threshold

Typical Settings
Operating Time t = 50 to 1000 ms
Initiated Actions
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter
Fig. 8.9
8.6.5.3 DC Differential Backup Protection
This protection is provided to protect the DC busbar against Earth faults or faults to neutral on the HV or LV
side between the IdLH DC current measuring and the IdLN DC current measuring. The protection acts as
Main function within each system.

Abs(IdL - IdE) > Threshold
Typical Settings
Threshold = 0.05 to 0.25 p.u. and Operating Time t = 50 to 1000 ms.
Initiated Actions
• Block rectifier
• Block inverter

8.6.5.4 Valve Protection
Thyristor failure protection: It monitors the number of thyristor has failed in a valve If it exceeds some pre-
set number, necessary alarm and tripping of the converter is initiated. Thyristor monitoring is done through
fibre optic check back signal from thyristor level to Valve control/ valve base electronics
Several types of thyristor-valve protections are used in HVDC systems. Some of the more common ones
are following:
Thyristor failure protection monitors the number of failed thyristor in every valve. Voltage across each
individual thyristor is monitored within the valve system. If the voltage is zero when the thyristor should be
in a blocked state, then the thyristor is considered to be failed. This voltage monitoring (no voltage or
voltage across the each thyristor device) function is performed at the valve and a signal is transmitted
from each thyristor level to the control system through fibre optic light guides. The control system counts
the number of failed cells in each valve. Normally, valves have redundant thyristor levels and can continue
to operate with one or more failed thyristor levels. Hence, failure of thyristor levels up to the redundant
number is only alarmed. If the number of failed thyristor exceeds the redundancy, then a protective action
is triggered, normally stopping operation of the converter.
The Series connection of thyristors and the protection to be considered in HVDC application
Modern Thyristors for HVDC application have blocking voltage in the range of 5 to 8.5 kV; Depending upon
the DC voltage level of 12 pulse converter bridge, the number of thyristor is in series required of the order
of 100 or more. It may be noted that Thyristors is not an ideal switch. difficulties arise from the multiple
series connection, some of which are also attributable to manufacturer inadequacies of the components.
Turn on which must take place simultaneously for all elements in series circuit. A prerequisite for this would
be that the gate pulse would be applied simultaneously to all thyristors. This is not case in real world. It
may further be noted that turn on delay time and may not be identical and may be dependent on the
damping circuit (R-C snubber) connected in parallel to each thyristor level. Turn on protection is also
dependent upon selection of saturable reactor, generally connected in series of each thyristor module
/valve section (number of thyrsitor levels are connected in series to form thyristor module or valve section).
Turn off protection is also included for each thyristor; This may be given in each thyristor level or each
valve section basis
Voltage break over (VBO) protection or Protective firing protects the thyristor under conditions when it
is subjected excessive overvoltage. This protection acts to …thyristor when the voltage is above a set
threshold. It is implemented within the valve itself on each thyristor level, in the electronic packages
associated with each of them.
Valve base-electronic protection detects problems related to firing pulses problem in the opto interface
control.
Valve cooling protection detects problems in the valve cooling system. For example, a water cooling
system may monitor water inlet/outlet temperatures, water conductivity, water pump outlet pressure, water
flow rate, etc. Alarm and protective actions are triggered when the monitored parameters exceed or
deteriorate the normal operating ranges.
8.7 AC PROTECTIONS
8.7.1 Converter Transformer Protection
The converter transformer protection is realised through standard principles which are generally applied in
a power transformer of any EHVAC switchyard and comprises of differential protection, high impedance
restricted earth fault protection, ground earth fault overcurrent protection, thermal overload protection,
over-fluxing protection, directional definite time / inverse-time overcurrent protection and directional earth
fault overcurrent protection.
Fig. 8.10
The protection scheme includes the use of separate numerical relays for Main 1, Main 2 and Backup protections.
It means that some protections are duplicated as Main 1 & Main 2 and these protection relays can send
tripping commands to the circuit breakers without any intended time delay. The protection system also
incorporates some backup functions through a separate relay which can provide tripping commands to the
circuit breakers after a defined time delay. The zone of Converter Transformer Protection is shown in the
Figure 8.4. Figure 8.10 shows the CT arrangement in a typical Converter Transformer protection scheme.
Initiated Actions
Switch off converter transformer by sending trip commands to its all associated circuit breakers.
8.7.2 Converter Transformer Connection Protection
This protection is provided to protect the part or section of the AC busbar which connects the Converter
Transformer with the main AC busbars. Generally the protection is realised through Main 1 and Main 2
principle by using separate numerical relays for both. The zone of Converter Transformer Connection
Protection is shown in the Figure 8.4.
The differential protection is provided as Main 1 and Main 2 protections. It means that the duplicated differential
protection is provided and both protections give tripping commands to the circuit breaker without any intended
delay. Refer Figure 8.11 for possible fault case (Fault 2) and CT arrangement to realise the scheme.
ABS(IT2(50Hz) – IT12(50Hz) > Threshold OR

ABS(IT3(50Hz) – IT12(50Hz) > Threshold

Typical Settings: Typical differential protecting of the Relay
Initiated Actions
Switch off converter transformer by sending trip commands to its all associated circuit breakers.
8.7.3 AC Filter Connection Protection
This protection is provided to protect the part or section of the AC busbar which connects the AC Filter bank
with the main AC busbars. Generally the protection is realised through Main 1 and Main 2 principle by using
separate numerical relays for both. The zone of AC Filter Connection Protection is shown in the Figure 8.4.
The differential protection is provided as Main 1 and Main 2 protections. It means that the duplicated
differential protection is provided and both protections give tripping commands to the circuit breaker without
any intended delay. In this scheme, the protection relay uses multiple CT inputs. Refer Figure 8.11 for
possible fault case (Fault 1) and CT arrangement to realise the scheme.
ABS(IT1(50Hz) – SUM(IT11(50Hz)sub-bank1..n) > Threshold OR

ABS(IT3(50Hz) – SUM(IT11(50Hz)sub-bank1..n) > Threshold
Typical Settings: Typical differential protecting of the Relay
Initiated Actions
Switch off complete AC filter bank by sending trip command to its associated circuit breakers.
Fig. 8.11
8.7.4 AC Filter Sub-bank Protection
The AC filter sub-bank protection is realised through Main and Backup principle. The AC filter sub-bank
protection zone is shown in Figure 8.4. The Figure 8.12 shows possible fault cases and CT arrangement in
a typical AC Filter Sub-bank.
Following protections are generally provided for each AC filter sub-bank protection:
8.7.4.1 Differential Protection
This protection is provided to detect the ground faults (refer Fault 1 in Figure 8.12) within a sub-bank.
Generally, a low impedance type differential protection is provided and acts as a Main protection. A similar
protection as a Backup can also be provided for the sake of redundancy.
ABS(IT1(50Hz) – IT3(50Hz)) > Threshold
Typical Settings

Operation time t = 0 ms
Initiated Actions
Switch off AC filter sub-bank by sending trip command to its associated circuit breaker.
8.7.4.2 Overcurrent Protection
This protection comprises of two functions: the instantaneous overcurrent which protects the sub-bank
against thermal overstress and the inverse-time overcurrent to detect the short circuits faults (refer Fault
1 in Figure 8.12) within a sub-bank. This protection basically protects from the overcurrent which could
destroy or damage the AC Filter Sub-bank and acts as a Main protection. A similar protection as a Backup
can also be provided for the sake of redundancy.
For instantaneous overcurrent: IT1(50Hz) > Threshold

For inverse-time overcurrent: IT1(rms) exceeds overcurrent-time curve
Typical Settings
For instantaneous overcurrent: Threshold > 1 to 4 p.u. and

Operating Time T = 1 to 10 ms
For inverse-time overcurrent: The setting depends on thermal overload curve of the components.
Initiated Actions
8.7.4.3 Overload or Overvoltage Protection of AC Filter Sub-bank Capacitors
This protection is provided to protect the AC filter sub-bank capacitors against voltage overstress. For
each phase the protection determines the capacitor voltage by integrating measured line current to give a
signal representing the voltage waveform applied to the capacitor. The peak values of the signal are
evaluated according to an inverse voltage-time withstand curve. This function acts as a Main protection.
Typical Settings
Depends upon the overload curve of capacitor.
Initiated Actions
Fig. 8.12
8.7.4.4 Unbalance Supervision of AC Filter Sub-bank Capacitors
This protection is provided to detect the faulty capacitors and short circuit of capacitor elements in H-type
capacitor bank (refer Fault 5 in Figure 8.12) within AC filter sub-bank. The function basically protects
healthy capacitor units from being overstressed caused by faulty units. Also, it supervises the de-tuning of
AC Filter Sub-bank. This function acts as a Main protection. A similar protection as a Backup is also
provided for the sake of redundancy.
Evaluating Principle
The evaluation algorithm calculates the changes in calculated fundamental frequency current of each
phase. The change of magnitude indicates the change in capacitance whereas change in phase angle
denotes the leg in which the change in capacitance has occurred.
In alternative evaluation algorithm, this function compares the rate of change of current, measured in
between two arms of H configured capacitor bank with respect to the circuit current.
Typical Settings
The tripping command can be issued instantaneously or delayed depending upon the failure of number of
capacitor elements within a capacitor unit.
Initiated Actions:
8.7.4.5 Overload Protection of AC Filter Sub-bank Resistors
This protection is provided to protect AC filter sub-bank resistors against thermal overstress (refer Fault 3
in Figure 8.12). This protection contains two functions: the instantaneous and inverse-time overcurrent
protection. This function acts as a Main protection.
Evaluating Principle (refer 8.Figure 8.12)
For instantaneous overcurrent: I42(50Hz) > Threshold.
For inverse-time overcurrent: I42(rms) exceeds overcurrent-time curve
Typical Settings
The setting depends on time-overcurrent curve of resistor and short circuit current through resistor.
Initiated Actions
8.7.4.6 Overload Protection of AC Filter Reactors
This protection is provided to protect AC filter sub-bank reactors against thermal overstress (refer Fault 4
in Figure 8.12). This protection contains two functions: the instantaneous and inverse-time overcurrent
protection. This function acts as a Main protection.
For instantaneous overcurrent: I41(50Hz) > Threshold.
For inverse-time overcurrent: I41(rms) exceeds overcurrent-time curve.
Typical Settings
The setting depends on time-overcurrent curve of reactor and short circuit current through reactor
Initiated Actions
Switch off AC filter sub-bank by sending trip command to its associated circuit breaker
8.7.4.7 Zero Sequence Overcurrent Protection
This protection is provided to detect the earth current flowing through grounding, caused by ground faults,
conductor interruption or circuit breaker malfunction. This function acts as a Backup protection.

(IT3(50Hz)Phase L1 + IT3(50Hz)Phase L2 + IT3(50Hz)Phase L3) > Threshold
Typical Settings
Threshold = 0.2 p.u. and Operating Time t = 100ms
Initiated Actions
8.7.5 Shunt Capacitor Protection
The shunt capacitor is generally provided as a part of AC Filter and serves as a sub-bank. In some cases,
it is possible that the shunt capacitors are connected directly to the AC busbar as a separate branch / arm.
The Shunt Capacitor Protection zone is shown in Figure 8.4. The Figure 8.13 shows possible fault cases
and CT arrangement in a typical Shunt Capacitor branch / arm.
Due to the less number of components as compared a typical AC filter sub-bank, the protections are also
less. The shunt capacitor protection comprises of differential protection (generally a low impedance type),
overcurrent protection, overload / overvoltage protection of capacitors units, unbalance supervision of
capacitors units and a zero sequence overcurrent protection. The evaluation principle of protection and
redundancy is same as that of AC Filter Sub-bank protection.
Initiated Actions
Switch off shunt capacitor by sending trip command to its associated circuit breaker
Fig. 8.13
8.7.6 Shunt Reactor Protection
The shunt reactor is generally provided as a part of AC Filter and serves as a sub-bank. In some cases, it
is possible that the shunt reactors are connected directly to the AC busbar as a separate branch / arm.
The protection of shunt reactor is realised through standard principles which are generally applied in shunt
reactor of any EHVAC switchyard and comprises of differential protection (in this case generally a low
impedance type), restricted earth fault protection and impedance protection.
The Shunt Reactor Protection is realised through Main and Backup principle. Its protection zone is shown
in the Figure 8.4. The Figure 8.14 shows possible fault cases and CT arrangement in a typical Shut
Reactor branch / arm.
Initiated Actions
Switch off shunt reactor by sending trip command to its associated circuit breaker.
Fig. 8.14
Hvdc Protection System 167
REFERENCES
Ake Ekstrom (1990) High power electronics HVDC and SVC
Kimbark- Direct Current Transmission

J Arrillaga,_Y._H._Liu,_N._R._Watson(auth.) Flexible Power Transmission-The HVDC options
ChanKi_Kim,_Dr_Vijay_K._Sood,_GilSoo_Jang,_Seon HVDC TRANSMISSION Power Conversion
Applications in Power Systems
IEC 60919 -1, IEC 60919-2

EPRI, HVDC hand book
Technical Specification of PowerGrid
ABB, Siemens, ALSTOM websites

www.eceuidaho.edu
CHAPTER 9
BUSBAR PROTECTION AND LOCAL BREAKER BACK-

UP PROTECTION (BREAKER FAILURE PROTECTION)
Section 9A: BUSBAR PROTECTION
9.1 INTRODUCTION
Bus bars are the node points of a power system at which large amounts of electrical energy is concentrated.
Some bus bars have often been left without dedicated local protection, since the occurrence of faults in the
bus-zone is commonly considered as being of low probability, and the fear of unwanted operation has
outweighed its advantages. The unplanned or nonselective outage of bus bar can lead to the loss of power
supply to a widespread area. The effect of a fault within a bus-zone can however be potentially far more
damaging than faults on other items of primary plant. The failure to clear a bus fault can lead to considerable
equipment damage and system instability.
In case where no local bus bar protection is employed, bus-zone faults would be cleared by the back-
up or system protection. In some cases this may indeed suffice, e.g., at lower voltage levels, but for
higher transmission voltages where security of supply is of paramount importance and fault current
levels are high, the non-discriminative fault clearance and relatively slow clearance times would be
unacceptable.
Where local bus bar protection is employed, the zone of protection will include switching devices (bus
selector, bus section disconnectors, circuit breakers, grounding switches), parts of the CT on the bus side
of the core used for bus bar protection, other connecting parts of the bus, in addition to the bus bars
themselves.
Bus bar protection is expected to detect and clear all shunt faults i.e., phase to ground and phase-to-phase
faults within the assigned bus bar zone bounded by the respective locations of the current transformers.
Faults can be caused by the failure of an item of primary system plant or human error, e.g., a forgotten
grounding clamp following maintenance work. Flashover due to external causes and electrocution of birds
and monkeys are major causes for bus faults.
The busbar protection is not normally required to clear open phase faults, i.e., an unbalance in the phase
impedances usually caused by the interruption of one or two phases. Detection and clearance of such
series faults are to be done by protections provided for other power system objects.
Four key issues (reliability, operability, maintainability and cost) need to be addressed while designing a
substation and selecting a busbar configuration. At EHV/HV levels, solutions that provide a high degree of
reliability can be justified. The modern busbar protection system are capable of dynamically replicating the
bus topology and also has design flexibility to protect all existing busbar arrangements. It also offers
flexibility in engineering, testing, commissioning and maintenance of the scheme and substation.
Some of the factors considered while designing the busbar protections scheme are security, dependability,
speed, sensitivity, selectivity, flexibility and cost of the scheme.
All the above requirements are interrelated; therefore, it is not possible to satisfy one without affecting the
other. The design solution should meet the requirements that correspond to the importance of the substation
within the network.
Busbar Protection and Local Breaker Back-up Protection (Breaker Failure Protection) 169
Back-up protection is provided by either by

(a) duplicating the local scheme (for preserving fast fault clearance)
(b) reverse zone of line distance protection
(c) time delayed distance relays in the remote stations
(d) directional back-up over current relays.
9.2 FAILURE STATISTICS
The probability of bus bar faults is generally low. Detailed failure rate statistics for faults on bus bar are
usually not kept by the utilities. The worldwide survey shows that dependability figures vary from 92 to 99.8%
and security figures from 84 to 91.8%. The failure rates range from 0.5 to 2 faults per 100 bays per year.
9.3 FUNDAMENTALS
Substations are either air-insulated (AIS) or metal-clad. Metal-clad switchgear is nowadays mainly gas-
insulated (GIS) using SF6 as the insulating medium. There are various types of substation construction. This
depends partly on the bus bar arrangement as well as other specific considerations such as the available
space. The bus bars in air-insulated substations are either made from ACSR conductors or for higher current
levels from tubing made of aluminium but rarely copper. SF6 gas-insulated switchgear may house all three
phases together in a three-phase enclosure, or for voltage levels (above typically 132 kV) separately in
single-phase enclosures. In the latter case the faults in the bus-zone can only be ground faults.
9.3.1. Typical Busbar Arrangements
Many different bus bar arrangements have evolved over the years, but the most common bus bar
arrangements are as follows:
• Single bus – single breaker

• Single bus – single breaker (also with bus-section circuit breakers)
• Double bus – single breaker
• Double bus – double breaker
• Main and transfer bus (one or several main buses)
• Double bus – one and a half breaker
• Ring bus bar / four-breaker mesh
Single Bus – Single Breaker

Single bus – single breaker (with bus section breaker and CT on both side of bus section)
Double bus single breaker
Main and transfer bus arrangements

Double busbar with transfer bus arrangements
Double bus double breaker arrangements
Double bus: One and half breaker arrangement

Ring busbar / four breaker mesh
9.3.2 Location of Current Transformers
The location of a current transformer in relation to its circuit breakers in a station partly determines the
limits of protected zone, and all breakers falling within this zone must be tripped in the event of a fault.
Usually, the CT is located after the circuit breaker in order to cover faults in the breaker and bay equipment’s
by the bus bar protection. In this case (Fig.a), faults between the CT and the circuit breaker will be detected
by the bus bar protection. After tripping of the circuit breakers associated with the measurement zone, the
fault will continue to be fed from the remote end of the feeder. Further tripping is required in order to clear
the fault. Usually this is through circuit breaker failure protection relay (LBB) initiating remote trip, or in its
absence by back-up protection. In case of a line feeder, a transfer trip command is sent to remote station
to open the circuit breaker and to block autoreclosure.
If the circuit breaker is situated on feeder side of the current transformers (Figure,b), faults between the
breaker and CT will be outside the measurement zone of the bus bar protection. Such faults must therefore
be cleared by protection system of respective feeder, and appropriate arrangements are required to trip
the other circuit breakers connected to the bus. It is usually done by a circuit breaker-failure protection.
Fig. 9.1 : Location of current transformer in feeder

In double bus-bars scheme with bus coupler, the CTs are located on both sides of bus section breaker,
which facilitates overlapping of the two zones of protection and avoid blind zone. However it is also
common to provide CT on only one side of the circuit breaker to reduce costs. In such cases, the fault
between the CT and the circuit breaker will have to be cleared by breaker fail relay. Modern busbar relays
can extend the differential zone up to CB by including or excluding the bus coupler CT depending upon the
circuit breaker status. In these relays, the fault between the CT and the circuit breaker will be cleared by
bus differential function.
9.3.3 Basic Principles of Busbar Protection
For bus bars of strategic importance at 220, 400 kV and 765 kV levels, a dedicated bus bar protection is
provided. These bus bar protection schemes can generally be categorized as high-impedance and low-
impedance bus bar protection schemes.
9.3.3.1 High Impedance Circulating Current Protection
High impedance bus bar protection is widely used due to its simplicity and inherent through-fault stability
during CT saturation. The operating signal is created by connecting all CTs in parallel.
The equivalent circuit of high impedance circulating system is as shown below,
The current transformers are replaced in the diagram by ideal current transformers feeding an equivalent
circuit that represents the magnetising losses and secondary winding resistance.The resistance of the
connecting leads are mentioned as Rlg and Rlh. These circuits can then be interconnected as shown, with
a relay connected to the junction points to form the complete equivalent circuit.
Saturation has the effect of lowering the exciting impedance, and is assumed to take place severely in
current transformer H until the shunt impedance becomes zero and the CT can produce no output. This
condition is represented by a short circuit, shown in broken line, across the exciting impedance. It should
be noted that this is not the equivalent of a physical short circuit, since it is behind the winding resistance
Rcth.
Applying the Thevenin method of solution, the voltage developed across the relay will be given by,
The current through the relay is given by,

If Rr is small, IR will approximate to If, which is unacceptable. On the other hand, if Rr is large IR is
reduced. If Rr is very high compared to (Rlh + Rcth), the above equation can be rewritten, with little error,
as follows:
It is clear that, by increasing Rr, the spill current IR can be reduced below any specified relay setting. Rr is
frequently increased by the addition of a series-connected resistor which is known as the stabilising resistor.
The relay can be designed for measuring either current IR (through the stabilizing circuit) or voltage Vf
(across stabilizing circuit).
The current transformers will have an excitation curve which has not so far been related to the relay setting
voltage, the latter being equal to the maximum nominal voltage drop across the lead loop and the CT
secondary winding resistance, with the maximum secondary fault current flowing through them. Under in-
zone fault conditions it is necessary for the current transformers to produce sufficient output to operate the
relay. This will be achieved provided the CT knee-point voltage exceeds the relay setting. In order to cater
for errors, it is usual to specify that the current transformers should have a knee-point e.m.f. of at least
twice the necessary setting voltage; a higher multiple is of advantage in ensuring a high speed of operation.
In the case of CT saturation caused by high through-fault current, the CT secondary impedance is reduced
to the resistance of its secondary winding. The measuring circuit comprises a high impedance-stabilizing
resistor connected across the circulating current arrangement of all the CT’s in parallel. The value of the
stabilizing resistor is chosen such that the voltage drop across the relay circuit is insufficient to operate the
relay for faults outside the protection zone.
If CT secondary switching is applied, a check zone measurement connected to separate CT cores is

usually added. The check zone measurement is an overall measurement taken over the whole substation
and is, by definition, independent of the isolator’s positions and auxiliary contacts. A trip command is only
given when both discriminating and check systems operate. Sometimes the relay setting is increased to
value higher than the heaviest loaded feeder current and check zone is dispensed with. It should be noted
that this would raise the minimum operating current.
An advantage of this scheme over low impedance scheme is that the primary operating current can be set
much below the circuit load resulting in a high sensitivity.
Disadvantages of this scheme are that the relay setting must take the CT secondary winding and wiring
resistances into account, which must be kept low, and the CT knee point voltage must be known and is
generally required to be high. All CT’s should have the same ratio (no turn correction) and should be of the
same type and performance (low stray impedance and of class PS or TPS). Furthermore, the stability of
the protection is dependent on the fault level.
For the above reasons high-impedance bus bar protection cannot be used when CT ratios are different and
for complex bus bar arrangements.
9.3.3.2 Low Impedance Protection
Low impedance protection is the general name given to those schemes that do not employ a stabilizing
resistor, rather utilize current directly from the CT’s. A number of different measurement principles are
employed in low impedance schemes.
9.3.3.2.1 Current Differential Protection
This type of protection is also known as current comparison with current restraint, biased or percentage
differential relaying. The operating current is the phasor sum of all feeder currents and the restraint current
is the arithmetic sum. A trip command is given when the operating current is greater than its pick-up level
(calculated from the minimum bus bar short-circuit current) and the stabilizing factor, the ratio of operating
current to restraint current, exceeds its setting (typically 0.7 to 0.9).
In the case where CT ratios differ, the currents have to be balanced by using interposing CT’s. In newer
numerical protection equipment this is accomplished internally.
Depending upon the architecture, the low impedance busbar scheme are categorized into,
• Centralized busbar protection scheme
• Decentralized (Distributed) busbar protection scheme
Centralized bubar scheme
The architecture of centralized busbar solution is as shown below,

In a numerical centralized busbar solution, the cables for CT, Isolator and breaker are wired up to the bus
bar protection panel. The tripping is routed from busbar panel to respective feeder protection panel.
The main benefits of centralized busbar scheme are,
• Reduction in cost
• Reduction in space
• Less hardware required
Followings are some of the disadvantages of centralized busbar solution
• Increased cabling ( Not recommended for Kiosk based substation architecture)

• Difficult to test, upgrade and maintain once the substation is energized
• Individual bay cannot be taken out of service
• Limited number of zones
Decentralized Busbar Scheme
The architecture for centralized scheme is as shown below,
In a numerical decentralized busbar solution, the cables for CT, Isolator and breaker are wired up to the
respective bay units installed in respective feeder protection panel. The tripping of central unit (for bus
fault) is routed through fiber optic panel to respective feeder protection panel.
Following are some of the advantages of decentralized busbar solution,

• Reduction in inter panel wiring (simple engineering)
• Easy to test, upgrade and maintain, even if the substation is in energized condition
• Individual bay can be taken out of service

• Support higher numbers of differential zones
The disadvantages of decentralized schemes are,
• High cost
• More hardware involved (More no of IED’s)

Many a times, periodic testing of bus bar protection to check the healthiness of the relay and associated
circuits is difficult since shutdowns of the substations or bus bars are not easily available. Thus the problems,
if any, in the protection or in the associated circuits, gets discovered only when a fault takes place and
either the relay fails to operate or has operated inadvertently. With modern numerical distributed busbar
relays, the task of testing and maintenance gets simplified considerably and these may be preferred for
this reason.
Either of the schemes can be selected considering importance of substation within network and the layout
of the substation.
9.3.3.2.2 Phase Comparison Protection
The measuring principle for phase comparison protection is based on the assumption that the feeder
currents are phase coincident during a bus bar fault. The duration of phase coincidence of all feeder
currents is checked for positive and negative half-cycles. In addition the non-coincidence is used as a
blocking signal. The differential current can also be included in the phase comparison, thereby further
improving stability. The pick-up level is set above the load current.
9.3.3.2.3 Gas Density Detectors in GIS Switchgear
Gas density detectors are normally used to activate alarm under low gas density conditions. These are
used for protection purpose by providing several levels of detecting SF6 gas density. Stage 1 gives alarm
when SF6 pressure comes below a certain value. When gas density falls further (Stage 2), it may not be
possible to extinguish an arc in the SF6 gas in the event of a fault. Therefore in such case a trip command
is sent to that circuit breaker. In stage 3 where the SF6 gas density is so low that it is unsafe even to trip the
circuit breaker, a trip signal is sent to the adjacent breakers and to the remote station (inter trip).
9.3.3.2.4 Busbar replica, Supervision and Alarm Functions
The correct operation of bus bar protection employed in complex bus bar arrangements relies on the
protection having a faithful reproduction of the station configuration. If this is not the case, false tripping or
unselective tripping can occur.
For this reason, the position of the bus selectors is ideally given by the combination of two auxiliary
contacts, one reporting “isolator open’, the other “isolator closed’. For conventional busbar scheme, the
voltage from these two contacts were supervised by an auxiliary relay and a timer combination to ensure
that an alarm is raised if, for example, the isolator does not reach its end position or a wire from the
auxiliary contacts becomes detached. In modern numerical relays the same functionality can be achieved
by the logic implemented inside device.
In the case of such an alarm, no further switching should take place, since this could under some
circumstances lead to false tripping. The alarm is often used to block the protection.
Protection schemes using differential current as the operating quantity also use it to supervise the current
transformer secondary circuits. The corresponding alarm can also be used to block the protection.
In high impedance schemes, a low set voltage relay with time delay, connected across the main relay is
used to detect a CT open circuit. It is made to short the secondary bus wires, with a time delay to prevent
malfunction of the total scheme during through faults. The defective zone relay alone cannot cause tripping
due to the presence of check zone relay, the contact of which is wired in series with the main zone relay.
The time delay set on this low set relay ensures that it does not give unwanted alarm in the event of an
internal fault.
9.4. BUSBAR PROTECTION SCHEME DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
9.4.1 Requirements from Busbar Protection Relay
Following are some of the requirements from busbar protection relay/scheme,

• It should have minimum operating time, typically less than 20ms.
• It must remain stable for through fault conditions
• It must have dynamic bus replica to station primary configuration

• It shall be of 3 phase type and operate selectively for each bus bar section
• It shall operate on differential principle and provide independent zones of protection for each bus
• It shall provide zone indication

• It shall be stable for through fault condition up to max fault current of station.
• It shall incorporate continuous supervision for C.T. secondaries against any possible open circuits. In
case of detection of any open circuiting of CT secondaries, after a time delay, the affected zone of
protection shall be rendered inoperative and an alarm will be initiated.
A bus bar protection must be capable of clearing all phase to ground faults, and also phase-to-phase faults
where they can occur. Due to the fact that the short-circuit levels of bus bar are often very high, bus bar
fault clearance times are required to be as short as possible. In many cases the required fault clearance
times are always kept at the minimum, rather determined by the fault withstand capability and by considering
the stability requirements.
In SF6 gas insulated switchgear; there is the possibility that an uncleared arcing fault could cause a rupture
(burn-through) of the enclosure wall. This happens once the arc becomes stationary. The total “burn-
through time’ is influenced by a number of factors, e.g., how long the arc was mobile before becoming
stationary, fault current, gas pressure, and thermal diffusivity of the wall material.
The protection must remain stable during through-faults (outside the bus-zone) especially in the case of
CT saturation and switching operations. Due to the high ratio of through-faults to bus faults, bus bar
protection is called upon to stabilize many more times than it has to operate.
Bus bars are divided into zones, the boundaries of which are defined by the disconnectors or circuit
breakers and their associated current transformers. Each zone therefore requires an independent zone of
protection so that fault clearance is selective, that is, only those circuit breakers defining the boundary of
the protected zone are tripped. With the exception of simple bus bar configuration (single bus bar and
breaker and a half), these boundaries are not fixed and rather depend on the position of the bus selection
isolators. For this reason, the bus bar protection must possess an accurate replica of the station’s primary
bus configuration.
Information regarding the position of bus selection isolators is taken from their auxiliary contacts and used
in a logic, which ensures that the correct currents are combined for each zone of measurement and the
correct breakers are tripped in case of a fault in that zone.
To avoid malfunctioning of the scheme during on-load circuit switching from one bus to another, the
isolator auxiliary contacts should ‘make before’ and ‘break after’ the main contacts during the isolator
making and breaking operation respectively. The position of the isolator making must be stored in case
auxiliary contact voltage supply fails. Such arrangements require very sturdy and reliable isolator contacts.
9.4.2. Current Transformer Requirements
Theoretically, it is possible to dimension a CT so that it will not saturate for any fault conditions, but this
would result in an unreasonably large CT. Depending upon the implemented scheme (High/Low impedance),
the CT parameters are required to be specified.
For high impedance scheme, it is required to have identical CT ratio, magnetizing characteristic and knee
point voltage. The knee point voltage of CT can be derived as shown below,
Vk > 2Vs
Vs > If (Rl + Rct)
If = Staeady stae through fault current

Vs = relay circuit voltae setting
Rl = CT lead loop resistance
Rct = CT secondary winding resistance
Low impedance busbar protection scheme implemented in modern numerical relays can tolerate substantial
CT saturation, while providing high speed operation. Manufacturer use different algorithms to achieve
relay stability during CT saturation. For internal faults, the relays are designed to operate in the presence
of distorted waveform, or prior to CT saturation. For external faults, the protection scheme should remain
stable for all types of faults for the time needed to clear the faults. The typical operating time for busbar
protection is below one cycle.
As the algorithm implemented in busbar protection device varies from manufacturer to manufacturer, it is
recommended to use manufacturer guidelines while selecting the current transformer parameters.
9.4.3 Dedicated or Shared CT Input
Today, modern numerical relays represent low burden for CTs. Sharing the CTs can result in reduction of
cost and also space in case of GIS substations. However sharing the CT may not be justified if desired
dependability and security cannot be achieved. In case of shared CTs an erroneous CT secondary current
may affect proper operation of both the protection system connected to the same CT core and can result
in nonselective tripping. Also, if the scheme is not properly designed it is impossible to perform maintenance
work on one device without interfering with the others. In high impedance schemes, sharing of CTs is not
recommended.
9.4.4 Dedicated or Shared Status Input
In some instances where there is a shortage of digital input/output in the relay, it may be required to share
the digital input status from isolator and breaker and tripping commands. Since zone formation in the relay
depends upon the isolator and breaker position, It is preferable to have dedicated status input and output.
9.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROVISION OF BUS BAR PROTECTION
If left uncleared, the effect of a fault in a bus-zone can be potentially far more damaging than faults on
other items of primary plant. The unplanned or unselective outage of the bus bar can lead to the loss of
power supply to a widespread area. The failure to clear a bus fault can lead to considerable equipment
damage and system instability. Therefore bus bar protection has an important role to play.
In the above paragraphs some important application aspects connected with bus bar protection and some
recommendations have been brought out, and these should be considered. A few of these are brought out
below.
• A dedicated bus bar protection shall be provided where security of supply is of paramount importance,
fault current levels are high, and the non-discriminative fault clearance and relatively slow clearance
times are unacceptable.
• Busbar protection must be provided in all 765 kV, 400 kV, 220 kV and critical 132 kV substations as
well as all generating station switchyards.
• It shall include IN/OUT facility for each zone
• For substations of high strategic importance or where the bus arrangements are complex, the complete
bus bar protection should be fully duplicated.
• In cases where the burn-through time of SF6 switchgear is considered to be shorter than the tripping
time from remote back-up protection, then also the bus bar protection must be duplicated.
• High-impedance bus bar protection is not recommended when CT ratios are different and for complex
bus bar arrangements.
As per the current practice bus bar protection is provided for all substations at 765 kV, 400 kV, 220 kV and
for generating station switchyards.
For critical 132 kV substations too, it is recommended that bus bar protection be provided, since failure to
clear a bus fault in a short time may lead to wide spread tripping. The type of bus bar protection scheme
recommended for 132 kV system will depend upon the quantum of power handled and the attendant risks
for loss of power supply and consequential revenue loss.
9.6 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DUPLICATING BUS BAR PROTECTIONS
Duplication of bus bar protection is recommended in all substations where failure to operate may cause
disturbances in the grid.
For the 400 kV and 765 kV substations that fall in this class of substations, duplication of bus bar protection
is strongly recommended. It may be noted that even those 220 kV substations, which do not fall in this
category initially, may become critical in future as the system grows. In view of constraints in adding a
second bus bar protection at a later date, duplication may be considered desirable from the initial stage
itself.
In view of continuing thrust on station automation and SCADA application, the preference towards Numerical
Protection schemes for all the elements of a substation becomes quite beneficial.
9.7 PROTECTION SCHEMES
Local main bus bar protection is employed in the high voltage substations. Where clearance time and
selectivity requirements are not critical, especially at lower voltage level such LESS THAN 132 kV, bus
bars can be protected by distance relays in the remote stations, or by reverse looking zone of local distance
protections. Such protection scheme has longer time of operation, of the order of 300 to 500 milliseconds.
9.8 BACK-UP PROTECTION
It is possible to provide back-up protection of bus bars by duplicating the dedicated protection or by using
elements of line protections like reverse zone of local distance protections or Zone 2 of remote end
protections.
9.8.1 Duplication of Local Bus Bar Protection
For substations of high strategic importance or where the bus arrangements are complex, the complete
bus bar protection can be fully duplicated. This is the preferred approach at bulk transmission voltage
levels.
In cases where the burn-through time of SF6 switchgear is considered to be shorter than the tripping time
from remote back-up protection, then also the local bus bar protection must be duplicated.
Duplicated protections invariably employ separate DC circuits and CT cores. They send trip impulses to
separate trip coils and use separate isolator position auxiliary contacts. Cross tripping of both trip coils is
also done.
9.8.2 System Protection
Where clearance time and selectivity requirements are not critical, bus bars can be protected by overreaching
(Zone-2) element of distance relays in the remote stations. Tripping is therefore at the remote stations,
thereby disconnecting more transmission lines and loads than is actually necessary, and tripping times are
typically from 300 to 600 ms.
For the majority of substations, especially those at lower transmission voltage levels, back-up protection is
provided by the system protection, i.e., remote-end distance relay overreaching elements (second zone).
A reverse looking element of the local distance relay may be arranged to provide substation local back-up
protection.
Where the main bus bar protection is provided by the second zone elements of distance relays (i.e., when
no bus bar protection is provided), back-up protection can be considered as being provided by the 3rd zone
elements of distance relays in the more remote stations.
9.9. SETTING CRITERIA FOR BUS DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION
Following are some of the parameters required to set for bus differential function
1. Differential pickup
2. Setting of bias characteristic
3. CT supervision
The pickup for differential element should be set below the maximum expected fault current and above the
heaviest loaded feeder current with a safety margin.
The objective of the bias characteristic is to provide stability against external fault condition. Higher value
of slope has an adverse effect on reducing the sensitivity for detecting internal busbar faults. The bias
calculated inside the relay is manufacturer dependent and it is recommended to refer manufacturer manual
for setting the value.
CT wire supervision relays should be set with a sensitivity such that they can detect secondary open circuit
even in case of least loaded feeder.
Section 9 (B) : LOCAL BREAKER BACK-UP PROTECTION

(BREAKER FAILURE PROTECTION)
9.B.1 FUNDAMENTALS
There is always a risk, however small, that a circuit breaker may fail to obey the trip command given by
protective relays. It would however be possible to assure successful operation of the circuit breaker to
interrupt the load or fault current, by the duplicate trip coil operation.
It is to be seen that in the entire substation all the substation elements except the circuit breaker could be
duplicated to ensure successful operation through back-up operation provided by the redundant system.
Unfortunately circuit breaker is the only item of equipment that does not have any similar element to act as
a back-up to interrupt the fault current in the event of failure of main circuit breaker. As such breaker back-
up is provided by other means through the use of the local breaker back-up protection to give trip commands
to adjacent breakers and breakers at the remote end. This is usually done through trip logic provided in bus
bar protection, which trips all the breakers connected on the bus in the substation to which the stuck
breaker is connected. Circuit breaker failure protection is used to detect when circuit breakers fail to open
or break. The breaker failure protection belongs to the back-up protections because it needs some time
delay to detect a breaker failure and is therefore a delayed protection.
The probability of breaker failure is no doubt quite low. Only about 0.01% of all normal switching operations
result in a breaker failure. About 0.1% of all fault clearance operations may result in a breaker failure. This
means that the breaker failure must possess extreme security to avoid mal-operation when the breaker
operates correctly. At the same time, the breaker failure protection must be very fast to reduce the back-
up fault clearance time. Finally, the breaker failure protection must be very dependable to clear the fault in
case of breaker failure. Several grid failures in India and abroad leading to blackouts have taken place due
to malfunctioning of Local breaker back-up protection.
9.B.2 THE BASIC PRINCIPLE
Breaker failure protection is part of the local back-up protection. The breaker failure protection has to trip
the adjacent breakers when the main breaker does not interrupt the fault current. The most common, and
simplest, breaker failure protection consists of a timer, which the protection starts when it operates. If the
fault current persists for longer time than the setting of the timer, the breaker failure protection gives a trip
command to adjacent breakers. Figure below shows the basic decision process in any breaker failure
protection. The retrip signal shown here is optional.
Any circuit breaker failure protection works as follows. The main protection issues a single-pole or three-
pole trip command to one or more circuit breakers. At the same time, the main protection starts and primes
the associated circuit-breaker failure protection system in one or more phases in all these circuit breakers.
At this point, the main protection issues a trip command to the breaker controlling the faulty circuit. In the
event of stuck breaker not following the command, the LBB relay already primed with fault current still
flowing, issues a command to the trip relay logic in bus bar protection for removing all the breakers on the
bus. There is one fault detector per phase. A fault detector comprises a single-phase over current relay and
may use information from the auxiliary contacts of the breaker. The fault detector may use several criteria
to detect a breaker failure. The most obvious criterion is that the phase current is higher than a predetermined
value. There is one timer per phase or a common timer for the three phases in each breaker failure
protection. The timer starts when the main protection operates and starts the breaker failure protection.
The setting of the timer should allow the breaker to open and interrupt the fault current. The breaker failure
protection operates when the timer has operated and the fault detector has identified a breaker failure.
However, there could be a case of stuck breaker not being removed when the circuit current is quite low
and the LBB could not be primed. The operation of a Buchholz relay when a faulty transformer is energized
from one terminal only is one such example. In such case the current may be far below the operating value
of the fault detector. Tripping of a generating unit from a reverse power relay is another case. The current
may be as low as 1% of rated current and well below the operating value of the fault detector. In such
cases the best option is that the fault detector should be provided with information from auxiliary contacts
of circuit breaker, in addition to the current criterion. This will help detect breaker-failures accompanied
with low currents. Information from auxiliary contacts of circuit breaker without any other criterion will not
provide reliable fault detection.
It is recommended that for operation of Buchholz protection and Reverse power protection additional
criteria from breaker auxiliary contact be provided.
Setting of the Timer
The back-up fault clearance time depends on the setting of the timer in the breaker failure protection and
the operating time of the back-up circuit breakers. The setting of the timer must be longer than the total
interruption time of the main breaker plus the decision time for the fault detector. Figure 10.1 illustrates the
make up of the total back-up fault clearance time.
One may decide to plan and operate the power system to avoid transient instability at shunt faults with a
stuck breaker. The back-up fault clearance time then determines the transfer capability of the transmission
network. This means that it is very important to have a fast breaker failure protection.
It is desirable that the back-up fault clearance time is shorter than the operating time of the remote protections.
This is more or less a requirement in case of multi bus bar substations. One would lose the advantages
with the expensive bus bar configuration if Zone-2 of the distance protection in the remote substations
operates faster than the breaker failure protection.
Main Main Breaker Fault Timer Margin Back-up

Protection Interruption Detector Relay Breaker
Operate Time Reset Error Interruption
Time Time
Breaker Failure Timing

Relay Operate Time
Total Back-up Fault Clearance Time
Fig. 9.1 : Total back-up fault clearance time

It is also possible to use one delay for single-phase faults and a shorter delay for multi-phase faults. This
is done to avoid transient instability at multi-phase faults in combination with a stuck breaker. The critical
fault clearance time is much longer for single-phase faults than for multi-phase faults. One utility who have
adopted this practice, allow bus tripping in the event of breaker fail, in 120ms for multi-phase faults and in
240 ms for ground faults.
For single-phase faults, single-pole tripping and autoreclosing as well as three-pole tripping and autoreclosing
are practiced by utilities in India. It should be noted that the use of single-pole tripping and reclosing gives
higher value of critical fault clearance time in comparison with the use of three-pole tripping and reclosing
on single-phase faults. It may however be noted that the dead time of high speed single phase auto-
reclosure will be of the order of 1.2 to 1.5 second in order to ensure successful de-ionisation of secondary
arc in the event of multiple lightning strokes on the line.
Fault Detector
It is necessary to use a fault detector with short and consistent decision time to obtain a short back-up fault
clearance time.
The main requirements upon the fault detector are as follows. The fault detector must have -
• A very high security

• A short and consistent operating time
• A high pick up to drop off ratio
• A lower setting than any protection that starts the breaker failure protection
The fault detector is, therefore, the most important part of the breaker failure protection. The fault detector
must satisfy stringent requirements under very adverse conditions. They include: fault current with large
DC offset and saturated current transformers.
Usually, the fault detector uses an instantaneous over current relay. It is, however, not necessary that the
over current relay distinguishes between fault current and load current. This is the task of the main protection
and it controls the starting of the breaker failure protection. The over current relay checks whether current
is flowing on the line when the timer has operated.
In most cases the auxiliary energizing quantity, the DC voltage, is applied to the over current relay when
the main protection has started the breaker failure protection. The circuit breaker will fail to operate or
break if this current relay has not reset.
The current detector should have short reset time of the order of 3 to 4 ms. The reset time can be much
longer when a saturated current transformer energizes the over current relay. The secondary current of the
current transformer will not drop to zero immediately when the circuit breaker interrupts the primary current.
The current transformer generates a DC current when the flux decays from the saturation flux to the
remnant flux. Further the current transformer can go in to saturation and this may affect the operating time
of the breaker failure relay due to pick up and drop off of current relays in the presence of saturated current
wave forms. The current relay should be designed to take care of these situations.
Thus the requirements of the current relay can be summarized as under
• A very high security,

• A short and consistent operating time
• Short resetting time
• High reset ratio

• Insensitive to the dc component in the secondary current
• Insensitive to CT saturation
• A lower setting than any protection that starts the breaker failure protection
Another requirement on the breaker failure relay is for lines employing single phase auto reclosing. The
current relays should be started on a single-phase basis from the trip relays for proper operation.
10.B.3 RECOMMENDATION FOR PROVIDING LBB PROTECTION:
Recommendations for providing LBB protection at different voltage levels are as follows:
1. In all new 765 kV, 400 kV and 220 kV substations as well as generating stations switchyards, it must
be provided for each circuit breaker.
2. For existing switchyards, it is considered a must at765 kv, 400 kV and also at 220 kV switchyards
having multiple feed. In case of radially fed 220 kV substations, provision of LBB protection is
desirable but not essential.
9.B.4 REQUIREMENTS FROM RELAYS
LBB protection shall have following features:

• Have short operation and drop off times.
• Have three phase current elements with facility for phase wise initiation.
• Have current setting range such that these can be set at minimum 200 mA for line and 50 mA for
generators (for 1A C.T. Secondary).
• Have one common associated timer with adjustable setting.
9.B.5 SETTING CRITERIA
(i) Current level detectors should be set as sensitive as the main protections. A general setting of 0.2
A is commonly practiced for lines and transformers.
(ii) Current level detector for generators may be set at 50 mA (for 1A C.T. secondaries).
(iii) Timer setting should be set considering breaker interrupting time, current detector reset time and a
margin. Generally a timer setting of 200 ms has been found to be adequate.
9.B.6 SPECIAL COMMENTS
(i) The relay is separate for each breaker and is to be connected in the secondary circuit of the CTs
associated with that particular breaker. This CT secondary may be a separate core, if available.
Otherwise it shall be clubbed with Main-I or Main-II protection core.
(ii) For line breakers, direct tripping of remote end breaker(s) should be arranged on operation of LBB
protection. For transformer breakers, direct tripping of breaker(s) on the other side of the transformer
should be arranged on operation of LBB protection.
(iii) For lines employing single phase auto-reclosing, the LBB relays should be started on a single phase
basis from the trip relays. This is to avoid load currents in the healthy phases, after single phase
tripping, leading to unwanted operation of the breaker failure protection, since the current setting is
normally lower than the load current.
(iv) It is considered a good practice to have DC circuits of Gr.A and Gr.B protections and LBB relay
independent. A separately fused supply should be taken for LBB relay in this case.
(v) LBB cannot operate without proper initiation. It is good practice to provide redundant trip output and
breaker fail input where other forms of redundancy does not exist. One way of doing this is by
providing separate aux. relay in parallel with trip unit and using contacts of these for LBB initiation.
(vi) Separation should be maintained between protective relay and CB trip coil DC circuit so that short
circuit or blown fuse in the CB circuit will not prevent the protective relay from energising the LBB
scheme.
(vii) In addition to other fault sensing relays the LBB relay should be initiated by Busbar protection, since
failure of CB to clear a bus fault would result in the loss of entire station if LBB relay is not initiated.
(viii) Whenever used in combination with busbar protection scheme, tripping logic of the same shall be
used for LBB protection also.
(ix) For breaker-fail relaying for low energy faults like buchholz operation, special considerations may
have to be given to ensure proper scheme operation by using CB. contact logic in addition to
current detectors.
REFERENCES
CIGRE 34 WG: 01 report “Reliable fault clearance and back up protection”
“Back-up protections on the ESKOM transmission network: philosophy review and considerations”. CIGRE
SC 34 colloquium South Africa 1997
Papers on preferential subject#2:Back-up Protection. CIGRE SC 34 colloquium South Africa 1997
CIGRE WG 34.04 in 1991 “Application guide on protection of complex transmission network configurations”
CIGRE: SC-34 WG report “Transformer Over fluxing Protection” ELECTRA (No31), 1973
I EC 60834-1 “Teleprotection equipment of power systems Performance and Testing ( Parti :Command
Systems)”
I EC 60663 “Planning of (Single -Side band) Power line carrier systems”
CBIP manual No 274 “Protection of Generators, Generator Transformers and 220 kV and 400 kV Networks”
Central Electricity Authority New Delhi report “Manual on transmission planning criteria”
187
CHAPTER 10
SPECIAL PROTECTION SCHEMES
Special protection schemes (SPS), are designed to detect abnormal system conditions and take
predetermined, corrective action (other than the isolation of faulted elements) to preserve system integrity
and provide acceptable system performance.
10.1 REQUIREMENTS OF SPS
A fault which occurs in a power system will be usually cleared at high speed and with the minimum
blackout area by the selective tripping by fault clearance relays to maintain stable operation in the power
system and localising the section of the network to be isolated.
However, if the initial fault is followed by further or consequential events such as breaker failure or
unsuccessful reclosing the network outage may extend to the whole power system, which may cause a
wide area and/or long duration blackout. It is rare that such consequential events occur independently but
rather two or more of these events occur sequentially or in parallel. An example of the process to wide-
area blackout is shown in Fig.10.1. Introduction of SPSs is one of the solutions to mitigate the influence of
consequential events in the network.
Fig. 10.1 : Typical Process to Wide-Area Blackout (ref 1)
According to Mr P M Anderson (ref 2) SPS is defined as “A protection scheme that is designed to detect a
particular system condition that is known to cause unusual stress to the power system and to take some
type of pre-determined action to counteract the observed condition in controlled manner. In some cases
SPS are designed to detect a system condition that is known to cause instability, overload or voltage
collapse. The action prescribed may require opening of one or more lines, tripping of Generators, ramping
of HVDC power Transfer, load shedding or other measures. (ref 4 and 5)
SPS is used as the acronym for Special Protection Scheme, which has the same meaning as the “System
Protection Scheme”. IEEE uses the term System Integrity Protection schemes (SIPS)
10.2 ABNORMAL PHENOMENON TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE SPS
(a) Out-of-Step
In some cases power system faults may evolve into “cross country faults” affecting more than one transmission
line simultaneously or sequentially causing significant changes in power flows on the network. Power flows
may also be affected by sudden load changes or loss of generators on the grid. When these events occur,
possibly in combination, the mechanical power input and electric power output of generators may become
unbalanced leading to under/over frequency or under/over voltage on the network. In such conditions the
generators will lose synchronization with the power system. If this out-of-synchronism or out-of-step condition
is sustained for too long, cascading trip of the generators will be caused, and it has a possibility of causing
islanding of the power system network or widespread blackout of the whole power system.When such an
event occurs, the suitable controls which stabilize the power system by various kinds of protection relays or
SPSs are necessary to be executed in the power system including the generators which fall into out-of-step.
The SPS detects out-of-step near the electrical centre, performs system splitting and prevents the extension
of the event. When a severe fault occurs in the system, the latter predicts out of synchronous, and conducts
the proper control such as a part of power shedding or system splitting to stabilize the power system at an
early stage.
(b) Abnormal Frequency
Severe fault on the power system sometimes causes cascaded tripping of the lines or generators. The
unbalanced condition of generation of active power and consumption of power will cause fluctuation of the
frequency. If the supply is less than the demand, frequency will fall, whilst if the supply is in excess of the
demand, frequency will rise.
If the cascaded tripping of heavily loaded lines along with a power station outage causes the frequency to
drop, a SPS scheme will initiate controlled tripping such as load shedding or tripping of a pumped storage
generator during pumping in order to maintain the frequency. SPS schemes may also try to maintain the
correct frequency in an islanded part of the system until it can be reconnected to the rest of the system.
Following actions could be initiated...
• Tripping of generators
• Fast generation reduction (runback) through fast valving or water diversion
• HVDC Power transfer control
• Load shedding
• Controlled opening of interconnection to neighbouring system to prevent spread of disturbance
• Controlled islanding of local system into spate areas with matching Generation and Load
(c) Voltage Instability
When voltage instability results in voltage collapse, capacitors or shunt reactors are controlled by a SPS
and maintenance and recovery of voltage are performed so that it may not expand to the whole system.
Some actions are…
• Change of voltage set point of Generator Voltage regulator
• Automatic shunt switching
• Control of series compensation
• Blocking of tap changer of Transformers
• Under voltage load shedding
Special Protection Schemes 189
(d) Overload
When transmission lines, bus bars, transformers or even the switchgear are overloaded above their rated
limits, it may be necessary to use an SPS to initiate load shedding or generator shedding to prevent
damage to the overloaded item that may otherwise lead to a more significant power system fault. As one
example, such overloads may be caused by a fault on one of two parallel lines is cleared by tripping of the
faulted line which subsequently causes overload on the unfaulted line. This may be avoided for example
by the use of autoreclose on the faulted line to prevent sustained overload of the healthy line. Wide area
blackout can be triggered due to line overload.
Overloads may also occur due to specific operator action. For example simultaneous outage of two parallel
lines may be given for certain construction requirement.With these two lines out of service, the power flow
will be transferred to other lines which could consequently get overloaded. This overload can cause
consequent cascading line tripping throughout the system. The black out of July 2012 in North and north
eastern India was also triggered by overloading of critical 400 kV line while otherlines were simultaneously
out of service for control of overvoltages and other reasons.
“n-1” Criterion and SPS
There are three kinds of measures against the prevention of wide area blackouts as a result of fault
expansion throughout the network;
(1) The use of parallel lines and mesh grid arrangements of the power system
(2) Operator controlled switching of the power system to manage power flows
(3) The use of protection relays to minimise consequential power system damage to permit fast
restoration of supply
Service reliability of the power system is maintained by giving the suitable priority for these measures.
Whereas normal general protection schemes are designed to deal with one fault event as an “n-1” criteria,
the introduction of SPS also deals with an “n-2” fault or an “n-3” fault. The use of SPSs is generally more
economical than significant power system network development to create parallel lines or mesh grids.
As per section 3.5 of the Indian Electricity Grid Code, the ‘Planning Criteria’ is based on the security
philosophy on which the Inter State Transmission System (ISTS) in India has been planned. It states that
as a general rule, the ISTS shall be capable of withstanding and be secured against a certain credible
contingency outages without necessitating load shedding or rescheduling of generation during steady
state Operation. This criterion is better known as the N-1 criterion for planning.
The general structure of a typical SPS is shown in Fig 10.2.
SPS consists of three main parts:

• Inputs which is the level of magnitude of system parameters and status of circuit breakers
• Decision making system which initiates some action
• Control actions that are pre-determined and can be armed or disarmed depending upon system condition.
One of the vital element of SPS design is a reliable and secure communication infrastructure for data
exchange amongst monitoring and controlling action devices.
Synchro-phasors have now been deployed in Indian Grid for realtime monitoring of network, disturbance
analysis and model validation. Further schemes can be developed to achieve Wide re Monitoring and
control through actions initiated through SPS based on data from synchro phasors.
Fig.10.2 : General Structure of a System Protection Scheme
According to their control variables SPS can be classified as response-based or event-based. Response-based
SPS are based on measured electric variables (such as voltage, frequency, etc.) and initiate their protective
actions when the contingency has caused the measured value to hit the trigger level.
The two most common response based types of SPS are under-frequency load shedding and under-
voltage load shedding
• Event-based SPS are designed to operate upon the recognition of a particular combination of events
(such as the loss of several lines in a substation). Examples of event-based SPS are below:
• Generation rejection
• Load rejection
• System separation
• Turbine valve control
• Load and generator rejection
• Out-of-step relaying
• Discrete excitation controls
• Generator runback
• VAR compensation
• Combination of schemes
Islanding Scheme
When power system disturbance takes place, several Special Protection schemes initiate actions to limit the
spread of disturbance. Inspite of such action, the system parameters may further start deviating adversely. In
such situation it is recommended to isolate the region or area from neighbouring power system in order to
save part of the grid from total collapse. The power system island thus formed is expected to remain stable
by maintaining Load and Generation balance within the Islanded area through several control actions. The
island may have different types of generating plants. Thermal steam turbine driven generation will need fast
governing controls to control the frequency variations during islanded operations. The power number is very
small during islanded condition, The frequency is very sensitive to Load and generation changes during
islanded operation. It is desirable to select one of the units to control the frequency. Gas turbine generators
are more suited for such duty since it permits wider control on generation with fast response.
Special Protection Schemes 191
Islanding scheme may consist of set of relays that detect Rate of change of frequency, Under frequency,
direction of Power flow, Under voltage, phasors etc or combination of such sensors connected on Tie
points.
As the frequency starts dropping, prior to islanding point, it is necessary to carry out adequate Load
shedding so that post disconnection, island is generation surplus and frequency will start recovering
immediately. Load shedding is usually initiated by df/dt and under frequency relays.
The quantum of load shedding is pre-decided based on day’s schedule of import or export of power from
island and feeders are manually enabled for load shedding accordingly. Actual interchange is monitored
on scada system and load shedding schedule corrected.
The fall in frequency can be very high, in excess of 2 Hz/sec. Frequency can touch very low value
momentarily before it starts recovering after islanding. It is necessary that Generating units ride through
very low frequency through suitable time delay provided on under frequency protection.
Pre-islanding load shedding is further supplemented by specially set of relays for under frequency condition
during islanded operation.Distress load shedding for a block of load may be necessary by single manual
command from control centre (independent of scada system).
If the frequency starts rising, Automatic load restoration scheme may also be necessary.
Isolated grid condition is detected by all the generating units based on frequency criterion and Governors
start correcting speed as per set droop.
For each island there should be a pre-decided reconnection point with synchronization facility of island
with main grid.
Wide voltage variations are also expected during islanded operations. Excitation system is normally kept
in AVR mode. AVR will try to maintain voltage within the allowable band.
Oscillations and Power swing can cause undesirable tripping that can lead to collapse of island. Measures
such as PSS, Pole slip, PSB, back up impedance protections need to be set carefully.
REFERENECES:
CIGRE TB 432 Protection Relay coordination
Power system Protection - P M Anderson, IEEE press 1999
CIGRE TB 187 System Protection schemes in Power network

Deployment of SPS for enhancing reliability of Power system by Mr. V. K. Agrawal et all, POSOCO
Special Protection schemes in southern Region Power system by S. K. Sonee et all, SRLDC
CHAPTER 11
PROTECTION OF ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS WITH

RENEWABLE ENERGY RESOURCES
BACKGROUND ON DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES AND CURRENT PRACTICES
As a general practice protection concepts for electrical systems are designed and implemented to provide
protection of people against electrical hazards, prevent damage to installations and limit stress on
equipments. Additionally they uphold stability and reliability in the power system. Specific requirements for
protection systems are selectivity, speed and sensitivity. With an increasing number of distributed energy
resources, basic assumptions for the design and implementation of protection systems are becoming
complicated and protection concepts need to be adapted accordingly. CBIP along with experts is looking
into these developments and hence tried to bring this new topic for the book.
The usage of Renewable energy Resources (DER) in utilities in India is expected to increase significantly
in next decade. Further especially with the realization DERs the move to smart grids is inevitable. The
renewable energy injections are generally at medium voltage levels or sub transmission levels. However
there is going to be huge injection at LT level with rooftop solar and net metering concepts becoming
reality in next few years. The existing distribution systems or sub transmission level have been generally
designed for unidirectional power flows, and feeders are opened and locked out for any fault within system.
However, it has been observed that this practice leads to a loss of significant generation where each
feeder may have significant DER penetration.
The progressive increase in penetration levels and generator sizes, as well as the fluctuating nature of
power and its dispersed locations pose a number of technical challenges for the DNO/TSO relating to:
• Stability
• Voltage profile and voltage transients
• Congestion
• Losses
• Fault Ride Through (FRT) capability
• Short circuit levels
• Power Quality
• Control and monitoring
• Protection co-ordination
• Islanding Detection
• Synchronization
• Balancing of active and reactive power (reserve requirements)
Utilities have to start operation of distribution systems with DER as a way to improve the reliability of the
power system however, the difference between short circuit levels for cases where the distribution system
is connected to the DER system may vary. This may result in malfunctioning of over current (OC) protection
or other protection schemes. In addition, the operation of renewable DERs on-grid and off-grid changes
the short circuit level and thus may impact overall protection schemes. Furthermore, the short circuit
power contribution varies with the DER technology adopted for e.g. Wind turbines contribute less current
Protection of Electrical Systems with Renewable Energy Resources 193
when their internal protection (crowbar protection) is activated but if crowbar protection is not available the
fault feeding ability of WTGs increases. Similarly the wind turbines use different technologies and each
has different impacts on fault feeding capabilities. The conventional WTGs based upon induction generators
and excitation system had huge capability to both absorb and inject reactive power and feed fault current
due to inherent rotating inertia available. The conventional rules of electro-mechanical energy conversions
were applicable. With the support of power electronics the present generation of WTGs has been developed
on totally new concepts. The new generation wind turbines mainly used two technologies (i) Double fed
Induction generators (DFIG) and (ii) Full converter-inverter variable speed synchronous generators. For
DFIGs conventionally only 70% capability is available as rotating inertia that too have much faster control
due to power electronics and balance through complete power electronics. Thus the fault feeding capability
of DFIGs is much less than conventional equivalent wind turbine. The variable speed synchronous machines
have 100% connection with two levels of power electronics and the fault feeding depends much upon the
circuit response and the conversion-inversion power electronic components. These do not contribute much
to the fault levels. The famous Chinese grid collapse of 2011 is attributed to these typical features of wind
turbines and non availability of regulation for any corrective action. The solar inverters also do not contribute
as much fault current as conventional synchronous generation systems.
It is commonly acceptable to establish different DER connection criteria for distribution networks generally
radial up to 66 kV (30 MW generators) and for (sub-) transmission meshed networks of voltage levels
110/132 kV and above. (50 MW and above generators) Thus, this technical chapter primarily focuses on
radial networks topologies.
Regardless of a precise definition for LV, MV, HV and EHV terms, as they can vary from country to country,
it is commonly accepted the following network structure and the associated generation size.
• LV distribution network (< 1 kV). Small DER
• MV distribution network (1 to 35 kV radial). Medium DER.
• Regional MV sub transmission network (35 to 66 kV mainly radial, but also meshed in some cases).
Large DER
• HV sub transmission network (100 to 170 kV). Large DER.
• HV transmission network (170-345 kV). Large concentrations of DER (Wind Farms & Solar Parks)
BASIC CONSIDERATIONS
As the share of DER is increasing the fundamental principles of protection systems are going to be changed.
The system source impedances are going to increase with DERs. This leads to lower fault current and poor
voltage regulation and higher voltage unbalance. Source of power will be more but source of current for
faults will be far less. The power sources will be hugely distributed therefore protections coordination will
be very difficult. A coordinated protection with remote ends and islanding can be achieved only by seamless
integration of protection, communication and control devices over wide area network. Huge investment in
secured and reliable communication (SCADA system) in dedicated corridor will be required. Broadly a
paradigm shift in protection philosophy will be required.
Generally, the short circuit current contribution of DER differs from these “conventional” energy resources
in many ways:
(i) The location of DER is different, i.e. distributed rather than central. Thus, short circuit contributions
from DER originate from directions not necessarily considered in conventional protection schemes.
This issue is similar to unexpected load flows under normal conditions and can result in phenomena
such as “blinding” or “sympathetic tripping”.
(ii) Many DER are not directly connected synchronous or asynchronous machines, but coupled to the
network via inverters. The magnitude of the short circuit current of these inverters is usually limited
to values not much higher than the nominal current to protect the inverter itself. Accordingly, the
short circuit capacity of grids dominated by inverter current sources is significantly lower than that
of grids with rotating machines of the same rating.
(iii) The lower short circuit contribution is also connected to a different time characteristic of the short
circuit current. While rotating machines behave like a voltage source under short circuit conditions,
inverters act more like a current source limited to nominal current, and the time characteristic of the
current determined by the control scheme of the inverter.
(iv) The capability to operate during and after faults in the system has not been a strong requirement for
decentralized generation on the contrary, it was and is often required that DER immediately disconnect
under faulty grid conditions so that the well established protection schemes can be maintained. However,
with a growing number of DER and an increasing importance of DER to provide short circuit capacity
both during and after the fault, the Fault Ride through (FRT) capability is of major concern.
(v) Some distributed generation connected to low voltage level especially the rooftops may be mostly
hidden to the network operator, i.e. not officially declared and announced by the users. If the amount
of hidden LV DER is high, its impact to LV level protection and safety may be critical.
PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS
This section aims to describe the different aspects concerning protection as a consequence of the connection
of DER to the network.
System Considerations
A proper understanding of the characteristics of the power system, including steady state and dynamic
system performance, is essential in ensuring the correct arrangement of protection and control of the
DER/Utility interface. A selection of appropriate protection and control philosophy is determined by factors
such as:
• Electrical characteristics of the network at the connection point (fault level, network structure, etc.).
• Voltage profile and power transfer capability at the connection point.
• Type of connection to the network (radial/tapped, dedicated or non dedicated line, etc.).
• The prospective fault current contribution from the DER to the utility network and vice versa.
• The dynamic response of the DER units to the utility network faults
• Disturbances and the ability of the DER units to maintain stability on loss of the utility connection.
• Backup protection policy of the utility network at connection point (clearance time requirements).
• Auto-reclosing policy on the utility network.
• Co-ordination requirements with the utility protection.
• Grounding arrangement of the DER when operated in an islanded
Dynamic Response of Generation Sources
The generating plant is defined as stable in steady state if, following a small disturbance, the system
returns to the stable steady state operating condition. Small disturbances arise frequently as a result of:
• Load fluctuations
• Switching operations
• Un-damped power oscillations which result in sustained voltage and power swings.
Generating units are transiently stable if, following a large system disturbance, each generating unit settles
to a new steady state operating condition. Large system disturbances arise following a severe or close up
electrical faults as a result of major load or generation loss. During severe electrical faults the output of the
generating unit can be substantially smaller than the mechanical input from the prime mover and the rotor
will accelerate and start to swing against the system. Provided the fault is cleared quickly, the generating
unit controllers respond rapidly and adequate network connections are maintained following the fault, the
oscillations are damped and the stability can be maintained. If the swing is not contained, large cyclic
power exchanges will occur between generating units and the network, potentially resulting in damage to
the generating units, mal operation of protection systems and unacceptable voltage depressions in the
utility supply network. It has to be appreciated that the DER generating plant should be considered an
integral part of the overall transmission or distribution system to which it is connected. The design of the
system should aim to maintain system stability and prevent the loss of synchronism of generating plant
under all operating conditions.
Generating plant which does become unstable should be rapidly disconnected from the network. Protection
equipment provided for the disconnection of generating plant should, however, be designed to ensure that
unnecessary tripping does not occur for conditions of transiently stable operation. In the event that system
stability studies show a risk of instability, suitable protection should be provided to detect the condition and
disconnect the DER generating unit(s) from the utility network. This may be achieved either by tripping the
generating plant, or by tripping the interface circuit breaker(s) and retaining islanded operation of the DER
plant. In bigger plant the tripping of DERs is not desirable and DERs are required to stay connected to the
system. This is called the Fault Ride through capability of DERs.
Power Electronics Interfaced Machine
Power electronioucs can be used as an interface for a wide variety of energy sources. They convert the DC
energy for connection to the AC system or decouple small rotating machines from the network and thus
provide more flexibility in terms of machine rotational speed and efficiency of energy capture (e.g. wind).
Other benefits of power electronic interfaces are their fast control of active and reactive power as well as
voltage regulation, which can potentially enhance the operation of a weak remote network or support
intentional islanding. The typical arrangements of using a power electronics interface for DER installations
are presented in Figure When interfacing with the DC power sources (fuel cells, batteries, etc.), a DC-AC
inverter is used to regulate the AC output of DER into the grid. When used with a rotating machine, an AC-
DC rectifier is added to rectify the uncontrolled AC power source. DC-DC converters are almost always
found in photovoltaic battery charging systems to regulate and optimize the power input.
Fig. 11.1
The fault behavior and capability of the inverter is a function of the control design and the size of the power
electronic components (which are usually influenced by cost). This area is currently not completely
understood or standardized and there are only limited guidelines as to the minimum or recommended fault
contribution of an inverter interfaced DER. A number of publications demonstrate that the fault current
from inverter based DER can be up to two or three times the inverter’s full load current for one cycle or
less. But by far it lot depends upon the output filter component values. In a highly optimized solutions there
can be as low as 1.2 to 1.3pu only for a very short period of 0.06 - 0.25 cycles. This is within the transient
or maximum sub transient period for synchronous generators and such currents would have little impact
on the operation of traditional over current relays. Therefore during grid-connected mode there is no
defined impact on the existing protection strategies due to the variation in fault current contribution. During
intentional islanding mode, however, alternative schemes which are not based on the fault to load current
ratio may be required. Furthermore, there may be a problem with inverter’s internal protection reacting too
quickly and too sensitively to faults on the network; in some cases, a network fault could lead to unnecessary
tripping of many inverters and, in an islanded system, this could have severe consequences.
Requirements of Fault Ride Through Capability
First designs of wind turbines disconnected quickly when a voltage drop occurred. This was done both to
comply with utility regulations that aimed at preventing islanding, and to protect the power electronics
converter in variable speed turbines. However, as the wind penetration has increased, generators have
been required to remain stable and connected to the network when faults occur on the transmission network.
Otherwise the power system would be exposed to a great loss of generation with the consequent danger of
the system frequency dropping too rapidly and load shedding becoming necessary. A generator shall
remain connected without tripping to the system during external faults when system voltage measured at
the HV terminals of the network transformer, remains above the corresponding curve. Recent Grid codes
require increased network supporting functionalities during normal (parallel with utility network) operation
from connected DER units to prevent unnecessary disconnection of DER units and to ensure for example
the stability of the network.
Under voltage protection should be set to meet the requirements described above. This is known as fault
ride-through capability (FRT) and is included recently in the Grid Codes as a requirement.
The detailed requirements of voltage level and duration of the fault are defined by codes of various countries,
however Indian code at present do not mandate the settings and it is more dependent of the application
engineers of the generators who need to coordinate the same with local grid voltage settings. In addition to
the previous requirement, the generators should not consume reactive power during and after faults or do
it under restricted conditions. In some grid codes, even reactive support has to be provided to the network
during and after faults, (e.g BDW code of Germany) contributing to the voltage recovery of the system.
Likewise, wind farms should provide its maximum available active power as quickly as the technology
allows with a minimum gradient.
Figure shows a typical fault ride through capability curve. It is obvious that DER following this requirement
will have an impact on protection scheme applications and settings. Similar settings are now done for the
solar PV inverters.
Fig.11.2 : Typical fault Ride Trough curve

Dynamic Performance of Wind Turbines
The main factors potentially having an impact on transient stability are:
• Wind power plants are constructed at locations with a good wind resource and are usually integrated
through radial connections, which is not necessarily favorable from the perspective of grid voltage
control.
• Power flows are considerably different in the presence of a high wind or no wind conditions.
• Wind turbines are relatively weakly coupled to the system because they are usually connected to lower
voltage levels (sub transmission and distribution systems) compared to the conventional power plants.
• The intermittent nature of wind power is not seen to be relevant to transient stability, but because of
limited predictability of wind speed, systems with high amounts of wind power usually require higher
spinning reserve than conventional power systems.
• Wind generators do not contribute to the system inertia as conventional generators so the frequency
fluctuations after disturbances or with loss of generation are greater when there is a high proportion of
wind power generation.
• It is possible to assess the impact of the three main wind turbine types on power system dynamics and
stability in a qualitative sense by analyzing their properties.
• Squirrel-cage induction generators used in constant-speed turbines cause significant power and torque
fluctuations, but offer good inertial contribution. They can lead to voltage and rotor-speed instability.
During a fault, they accelerate due to the unbalance between mechanical power extracted from the
wind and electrical power supplied to the grid. During voltage restoration, they consume high amounts
of reactive power, impeding voltage restoration. This eventually leads to voltage and rotor-speed
instability. Voltage recovery process, squirrel-cage induction generators tend to slow down voltage
restoration. In such cases capacitor banks are normally used for reactive power control. (However
such generators are now not used in grid)
• Doubly-fed induction generators (DFIG) became popular from last 4-5 years have little impact on the
transient stability performance of the system. They are capable of providing sufficient reactive power
support and voltage control.
• Full converter generators have even less impact on the transient stability performance of the system
than the DFIG. The converter’s fast control of active and reactive power or of the AC voltage at the
generator terminals can provide reactive power to the network both during steady-state conditions as
well as during disturbances. Although full converter generators can potentially be beneficial for system
operation and stability (for example contributing to system frequency regulation), the full extent of the
added benefits is not sufficiently understood at the moment.
With variable-speed turbines, the sensitivity of the power electronic devices to over currents caused by
system faults can have serious consequences for the stability of the power system. When the penetration
level of variable-speed turbines in the system is high and they are all set to disconnect at relatively small
voltage drops, this could lead to a large generation deficit. To prevent this, now grid companies and
transmission system operators facing a high contribution of wind power in their control area are currently
proposing and demanding Low Voltage Ride through and manufacturers are implementing new solutions
to reduce the sensitivity of variable-speed wind turbines to grid voltage.
Inverter Converter Based Short Circuit Contribution
As the solar generation and more and more full controlled low speed synchronous wind generators will
increase the use of convertors and invertors in the distribution grid will become a trend. The fault current
contribution of DER is strongly technology dependent. Distributed generators based on rotating generators
(conventional synchronous or induction machine) will produce a relatively high current during a fault (a
current level of about 200 to 400% of nominal current in a few cycles after the fault inception); while
generators interfaced through power electronics will limit the DER current magnitude to a maximum of 1 to
2 p.u. during the fault. Therefore coordination problems during normal operation are less likely with DER
interfaced through inverters and with a strong main substation. Voltage support by converter-coupled
generation for unbalanced faults (single-phase-to-ground, phase-to-phase, and two-phase-to-ground) differs
from the “expected” voltage support of directly-coupled synchronous generators in terms of magnitude
and unbalance. This is because the converters involved are often current-controlled voltage sources whose
contribution is, in most cases, balanced by control design and as required by current grid codes, resulting
in positive-sequence contributions only. DER units coupled by full converters allow injecting negative-
sequence current if required. This behavior would make the fault detection easier. Negative-sequence
control of the DER as described it allows for reduction of the overvoltage in the healthy phases and
increase of the unbalanced current for easier fault detection. It can be expected that the future grid codes
will specify asymmetrical current injection. Furthermore, strict over-current limits are applied in order to
protect the converters. These limits can reach 1.3 pu for stator reactive current and 0.4 pu for the line side
converter reactive current. State-of-the-art balanced fast voltage control of converter coupled generation
for unbalanced faults might impact network protection, either by hindering fault detection/clearance (impact
on sensitivity of the protective system) or by triggering undesired disconnection of the generation (impact
on security of the protective system) due to:
(i) small resulting short-circuit phase currents

(ii) reduced short-circuit power of the network which leads to deeper voltage dips in faulted phases
(iii) Overvoltage in healthy (non-faulted) phases.
As a result the need for secure operation of the power system, provided by protection based on three-
phase over and under-voltage, over-current, distance (impedance, angle) and differential protection relays
or any combination of those, then state-of-the-art balanced fast voltage control of converter-coupled
generation for unbalanced faults requires further investigation and implementation.
A further difference between conventional networks and DER connected networks is the behavior of the fault
transient. For instance, different transients generated by inverter controllers could affect some relays, e.g.
the direction determination. Short circuit calculation programs normally use traditional generator models,
with a voltage source behind impedance. These programs may not be able to give reliable results for Converter-
based generators. It might be very difficult to model inverter control in this type of programs, especially if
they do not include the functionalities of electromagnetic transient calculation programs. Moreover, the
control algorithms, including operation and control of the crowbar in certain wind generator units will significantly
differ between different converter manufacturers and these algorithms will not always be available for modeling
due to intellectual property rights. Further the behavior of Current and Voltage Transformers (additional VA
burden) on account of harmonics may never be simulated in present simulators available in market.
Fig. 11.3 : Inverter Short Circuit

Power Flow, Short-circuit Power and Fault Current
Turbines based on the doubly fed induction generator (DFIG) also contribute to the fault current. However,
due to the sensitivity of power electronics to rotor over currents, they are quickly disconnected when a fault
is detected. The ability to support the grid in case of voltage dips is an area that is now well developed and
is being incorporated in the machines and grid codes. The protection method is often based on the so-
called crowbar protection. During severe voltage dips due to grid faults, the rotor side power electronic
converter is quickly disconnected from the grid in order to protect it against possible large current peaks
during such events. In order to achieve this, the three-phase rotor winding is short circuited via the crowbar
switch and consequently the DFIG generator behaves like a normal SCIG generator. For limiting the rotor
current and for influencing the speed torque characteristic of the machine, the rotor can preferably be
bypassed through impedance. The crowbar is released in a short time usually before the fault clearance.
The units have thus the capability to provide reactive power support to the system during sustained faults
and contribute to the voltage recovery of the system.
Wind turbines with a direct-drive generator (full converter) and other converter based generation such as
PV have a limited capacity to contribute to the fault current because the power electronic components of
the converter are normally not capable of supplying a fault current. The short-circuit current is usually
limited to 10-20% above the rated current and converters are normally equipped with under-voltage relays
and over-current limiting in case of disturbances on the distribution system. Therefore, they are quickly
disconnected in case of a fault. However, recent designs offer ride through capability, which is achieved by
applying specific control strategies to the inverter so that the converter fault current can be limited in a
controlled way.
DER leads to fundamental changes in power flows, which requires re-consideration in voltage profile and
voltage stability. Under certain circumstances of Wind generation the power flow may change quite suddenly
due to wind shifts. Additionally, the direction of short-circuit currents may change in case of very large wind
plants causing non-selective tripping and different transient phenomena can be observed. At transmission
level less problems regarding power flow and short-circuit current patterns are expected as transmission
grids are predominantly used to connect large generators. Short-circuit currents are normally much higher
and faults are cleared much faster than in distribution networks.
System Grounding
In most utility networks, the HV transmission system is solidly grounded. Accordingly, DER connections to
the system are generally grounded. However may utilities force the vector groups at interconnection points.
There are few utilities in India where HV transmission system remains grounded at one end only and if the
utility line terminals are opened at the interconnection point the system may become ungrounded. This is
mainly dominant in southern part of India. In the evaluation of the DER installation, the consequences of
ungrounded operation must be evaluated. The inverter topology generally demands the ungrounded star
connection at transformers. The above two conditions together put limitation in the system grounding
topology. Three possible scenario of grounding are shown in figure. A determination must be made as to
whether or not the transmission system can be temporarily ungrounded. The classic situation where this
can occur is when the utility end of the transmission line has tripped but the DER units remains connected
through a power transformer with an HV delta connection.
UNGROUNDED MV CONNECTION
The ungrounded MV system is generally not a preferred option as it increases the cable rating from U0/UE
to UE/UE which increases the cost of vast cabling networks. The MV system is grounded by zigzag
Transformers. The DERs are generally located in areas of very high ground resistivity and hence the
selection of impedance for grounding transformer should be done carefully to facilitate the ground return
current flow during fault conditions. It ensures very high impedance in Zero sequence isolation between
DER and Grid ensures.
SOLIDLY GROUNDED MV & HV CONNECTION
Grounded transformer connection in MV system and the HV transmission system keeps to potential rise
under limits. No isolation between Grid and DER, e.g. DER faults can be seen by the utility grid. Often,
there can be a conflict between the system requirement for grounded operation and protection requirements.
Few spurious trappings due to poor selectivity characteristics of relaying system are unavoidable. The
discriminatory fast tripping from the utility end of the transmission system also does not damage the
system. This is appropriate considering that transmission equipment ratings (e.g.: surge arresters) are
sized for grounded operation. The selection may perform poor from harmonic mitigation point of view and
the harmonic injects into the grid needs to be monitored carefully. No isolation for third harmonics.
SOLIDLY GROUNDED MV AND DELTA HV
In many instances the installations will be HV delta, LV grounded star. This connection may be satisfactory
for loads but may present overvoltage problems as discussed above. If ungrounded operation is to be
considered, studies need to be performed to determine whether resizing of surge arresters or other equipment
needs to be made. The conditions of remote end tripping with DER connected create lot of high voltage
disturbances. This ensures Zero sequence isolation between DER and Grid ensures no fault current in-
feed from utility side for DER winding faults.
Option-I Option-II Option-III
Fig. 11.4 : Various Grounding Methods
PROTECTION OF THE DER INTERCONNECTION
The protection of DER interconnection is generally requirements imposed by the grid utilities. It detect
faults within the DER plant that can be fed by the utility system or abnormal operating conditions that lead
to voltage or frequency excursion out of statutory limits. The issues include the reduction of protection
reach and sensitivity, coordination problems, automatic reclosing voltage supervision, check synchronizing
and out of step protection.
Besides conventional over current protection, neutral voltage displacement (NVD) protection is required
as a back-up earth fault protection. When it comes to the DER and its interface protection, however, it is
the DER owner’s responsibility. In addition to standard generator protection, the DER owner must ensure
that islanding detection is applied. Generally, loss of grid protection application should be mandatory for
small DER.
Regarding the strategy for DER protection, small power units say upto 5 MW are traditionally operated in
such a way that for any disturbance in the network, they are immediately switched off by very sensitive
instantaneous relays of utilities. Few years back the DER units which wanted protection against anti islanding
use to prefer this. As the DER sizes and number started increasing the grid code and utilities started
demanding for medium and large power plants, to contribute to the stability of the network by remaining
connected during external disturbances. This requirement termed as “fault ride through” (FRT) capability
as explained earlier. To achieve the FRT capability the DER power electronics should be operational
during the voltage variation period. This requires the especial power supplies within the DER capable of
power up electronics circuits during voltage dips or supported by external uninterrupted auxiliary sources.
Thus each inverter should have UPS system to support grid by FRT operation. The setting of FRT is
generally defined in the grid codes by utilities of many countries. The protection settings of Feeder and
external line system is achieved by coordinating (delaying) the relays with the network protection so the
FRT revival system becomes effective.
Due to the increasing penetration of distributed generation in recent years, in a number of countries including
India utilities tend to put forward similar requirements even for the smaller power generating plants. However,
it can sometimes be in conflict with the need of the owner to protect the unit from damage. The greater
capability to withstand faults should not affect the sensitivity for the islanding detection, so a compromise
between sensitivity for islanding detection and stability under external disturbances is needed. It is preferable
that all conversion-inversion devices should have a IEC 62116 compatible anti islanding devices.
Interface Protection
Firstly, interface protection considers those protection elements which are applied for a DER installation at
the utility/DER interface to provide coverage for DER faults that may be fed by the utility system. In fact,
such protection has to be provided not only for DERs but for any load connected to the utility grid. Secondly,
the interface protection in case of DERs should also include detection of abnormal voltage or frequency
conditions caused either by the utility or by an out of range operation of the DER.
Most DER interfaces include the following protection functions:
• Over current relays (51-51N) to protect against overloads and short-circuits inside the DER installation.
Depending on the size of the transformer, short-circuit protection may be assumed by a transformer
differential relay.
• Over and Under-frequency relays (81O-81U), which disconnect the plant under unstable conditions of
the network and prevent undesirable islanded operation and self-excitation of the generator.
• Over and of Under-voltage relays (59, 27), which prevent the islanded operation of the generator with
an abnormal voltage or a malfunction the electronics There can be several instances when an under
voltage is detected but should not cause disconnection of the generator, such as a fault outside the
protective zone; a fault on adjacent lines or even remote lines; increased loading and power swings.
To maintain stability and reliability of the power supply, and to reduce the chances of nuisance DER
tripping, a two-stage under voltage strategy is recommended for all LV and HV connected generation.
Conversely, to meet Fault-Ride-Through (FRT) capability requirements a single stage of delayed under
voltage is applied in some cases.
• Over voltage conditions are usually more hazardous compared to under voltage conditions. Hence,
the time delay settings for over voltage relays are shorter.
• Another important issue is that the interface protection must be coordinated with the remote utility
protection. Co-ordination means:
• Fully selective clearing – the DER’s protection will clear all faults in the DER’s installation before the
utility’s relaying initiates tripping for such faults.
• Simultaneous clearing – the DER’s protection will clear all faults in the DER’s installation coincidentally
with utility clearing of such faults.
Fig. 11.5
Line Protection
Line protection is required to remove the DER in-feed to transmission line faults. Line protection requirements
are driven by:
• Transformer connections of the DER
• Transmission line relaying practices for the utility grid

• Critical fault clearance time
• Form of connection to the DER (tapped connection or radial circuit)
• Size of connected DER and main transformer

Generally the DERs are radial connected from the utility GSS in Indian practices. There are exceptional
cases when the DERs are given connection by making the LILO arrangement in existing Transmission
networks.
TRANSFORMER CONNECTIONS
The primary consideration is whether the main power transformer is a source of zero sequence current or
not. The HV star – LV delta connection delivers ground fault current to the utility for transmission phase-to-
ground faults. The logical protection choices with this transformer connection would include residually
connected ground over current relays and ground distance protection. Occasionally, an HV delta – LV
grounded star connection is used. For this situation neither ground over current detection nor ground
distance protection will work. Typically, the HV VT open delta secondary voltage should be measured. This
will detect the zero sequence voltage for a single phase to ground fault on the transmission system.
Transmission Line Relaying practices for line protection
The type of network to which the generator is connected, the philosophy and practices of protection of the
utility network determine the type of protection. Coordination with other network protections has to be
studied to prevent unnecessary trips. For example, under voltage settings must consider the co-ordination
with other network relays under external faults but also the FRT requirements of DERs.
Additionally, the short circuit current contribution of the converter based generators can affect the protection
performance. The impact on the performance of the current line protection needs to be assessed, especially
for those connection schemes in which current detected by relays is exclusively supplied by DER, i.e.
direct line connections, tapped connections or connections to a substation with a few lines.
The utility line protection practices of similar line protection setting of local and the remote end protection
may not fulfill the co-ordination requirements with DERs as sources of fault feeding. For example it is
easier to coordinate two distance relays with each other than an over-current relay with a distance relay.
Secondly, it is likely that the protection clearance speed requirements for faults fed from the DER are kept
similar to those for the utility line relaying. Generally this may conflict or remain non- coordinated with the
FRT capability of DERs.
In HV (sub) transmission networks: The distance protection on radial feed will not be effective or off any
effective use for DER ends. This is truer in solar PV inverter based technology and Wind parks using 100%
converter-inverter based turbines. For inverter based PV solar plants fault current contribution varies very
widely based upon instant solar radiation. It is observed that in most of the fault incidents the distance
protection on the plant side will not start. The grid source side distance protection should be set in independent
mode with time delay for FRT element to DERs to be effective. The FRT characteristics should be finalized
in coordination with grid operators. If the Redundant protection based on distance protection with a tale-
protection aided tripping scheme (POTT or PUTT) is available it should be used as line differential protection.
With communication channel the weak end in-feed protection logic should be set carefully at DER ends.
As practice a weak-in feed scheme at plant end is a good solution to preserve the single pole reclosing
cycle in case of the generator is off-line.
In double circuit lines dedicated line connections to DERs, line protection should be also provided at the
generator end. This is required as the in feed will come from un-faulted lines. The DFIG end conventional
wind plants have enough fault feeding capability and the feeders should have normal distance protection
schemes. The short-circuit current of DFIG wind turbines with crow-bar protection is reduced to the rated
current level typically in 9 cycles (150-180 millisecs). This gives the opportunity for the first zone of distance
relays or communication aided tripping distance schemes to operate, but not for time delayed distance
zones. DER generators based on converters do not provide enough short circuit current in any time so
distance relays are expected to mal operate.
Line differential protection is most preferred but not very cost effective provision for the DERs. Some
solutions to overcome the limitations of distance relays for fault detection could be overcome by using line
differential protection instead or a hybrid tele-protection scheme with weak-in-feed and echo logic. The
performance of line differential is not affected by local conditions of plants like wind and solar insolation
but the current threshold for tripping should be set very low at the generator end.
Ground directional over current relays are expected to mal-operate or operate slower, so line differential
protection should be set with enough sensitivity to detect high resistance faults.
RECOMMENDED DER INTERCONNECTION REQUIREMENTS
The protection challenges and priorities for integration of DER into the power network also depend on the
level of DER penetration which will differ from region to region. For integration of small scale DER the
main priority is the safe and secure operation of the utility network. One of the main priorities is that
islanding is not allowed which is the situation today in most countries. In most DER installations outside
India voltage and frequency protection is required at the point of common connection which is relied upon
to provide some level of anti-islanding protection. Islanding and survival is still not a common practice in
Indian utility sector. However it is recommended that the relaying at the interconnection point should be
ready with above two protections and should be used for standby protection for anti islanding which is at
present a part of Power electronics protection.
For the integration of medium scale DER the main priority is protection co-ordination to avoid large scale
tripping of generation. High DER penetration makes it desirable to involve DER units in the power balance
on the highest system level. Instead of tripping DER units for remote system disturbances, it is desirable
for DER to withstand much greater variations in voltage and frequency. Voltage protection settings must
co-ordinate with FRT characteristics and frequency relay must do it with system load-shedding protection.
Operation at the wider frequency band, between 47 to 52 Hz, and the wider voltage range may help the
integration of medium scale DER. However, this approach entails difficulties for the distribution networks
as wider frequency operation could severely limit the islanding detection capabilities of the present protection
practices. As a practice for any FRT functionality minimum time required is 500-800 millisecs. The line
over current relay should be coordinated as per prevailing FRT settings of the region.
The change in the nature of the generation mix has pushed most of the network operators (transmission
and distribution) in different countries to develop rules and other technical requirements regulating the
integration of DER into the power system to ensure security of supply, reliability and power quality. This
information can either be included in the utilities rules, or is required by the regulation authority under
codes or laws, or both, depending on the country.
There should be specific interconnection rules for small DER units, generally connected to MV system with
stricter requirements on protection than for the bigger generators because of less control and monitoring
over the small generating installations by the network operator. For medium and large generation, technical
requirements are normally included in the Grid Codes.
Until recently, wind and solar generators were exempted from technical requirements and system services
capability. However, due to the increasing penetration of wind farms in some regions which result in equivalent
large size power plant, this exemption was found to jeopardize the system security and power quality,
CEA/CERC have developed and issued additional grid codes that impose technical requirements on wind
generators to enable system operators to have control over wind farms.
The grid codes of several countries require mandatory voltage and frequency operating ranges and fault
ride through capabilities. Additionally, in some countries have made it mandatory for large DERs to have
capabilities to contribute to frequency and voltage/reactive power control during steady state operation
and it is bound to be mandated in Indian grid codes also in future. To meet these requirements new wind
generators generally include power electronics with reactive power controls in various modes.
Frequency Operating Range
European grid codes, generators, including wind farms, are required generally to be capable of operating
continuously at full power output between 47.5 Hz and 52 Hz and time (or power). Indian grid codes are
more governed by ABT regulatory guidelines and the latest regulation requirements for wind generators to
operated from ?????? Hz. The present regulations in India considerers the DERs as must run generators
hence no backing downs are considered but the situation may not remain same for years to come.
Blinding and Sympathetic Tripping
In conventional distribution networks, the fault current is only provided by the connection point to the
transmission network, which is a strong source. DERs connected to the distribution system, the short
circuit current contributions may originate from different paths than the central connection point and may
result in “blinding”. Blinding is caused by the fact that DER fault currents have an impact on the voltage at
their connection point. Thus, while the overall fault current at the fault location increases due to the DER
fault current contribution, the fault current provided via the central connection point decreases. Blinding
may result in delayed or unselective tripping, especially of over current protection, and may also negatively
affect distance protection as it can cause under reaching due to the in feed. Sympathetic tripping may be
overcome by the application of directional relays.
Fig. 11.6 : Fault currents without distributed generation
Fig. 11.7 : Fault currents with distributed generation
In addition to the effect of “blinding”, with a significant increase of DER, the short-circuit capacity of the
transmission system will probably decrease because the number of large conventional power stations that
provide the high fault levels will be reduced. This would negatively impact the protection coordination in
distribution networks with high DER penetration.
PROTECTION OF DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM WITH DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES
One of the most important changes caused by the massive integration of DER into the distribution network
is the bi-directionality of fault currents. This implies the need to develop more complex protection systems
on the distribution network, which are able to deal with several contributions to fault current.
All protection schemes where DERs are involved must be checked. There must be a large enough fault
current to start the relevant protective devices:
• in all situations, e.g. low wind or sun

• other methods for starting protection must be considered (e.g. U-I-starting, under-impedance)
• HV neutral displacement voltage protection: additional decoupling protection in order to avoid the risk
of islanding in case of phase faults at HV level.
• islanding detection (tale-decoupling): detection of the opening of the MV feeder and communication to
the DER facility decoupling protection
• directional phase protection: protection which detects the sense of the fault current, in order to locate
the fault and avoid unintentional tripping (i.e. when the fault occurs on another MV feeder)
• DER facility protection: protection against faults occurring within the installation
• DER facility decoupling protection: disconnection of the DER facility from the network when a MV
network fault occurs.
Fig. 11.8
TRENDS IN PROTECTION SYSTEMS
Use of Nested Settings and Custom Curves
Many manufacturers of numerical protection relays have provided the ability to implement different relay
settings on the same relay and to be selected by remote means. This functionality is little used and yet
provides the ability to re-protect the affected network after a circuit reconfiguration or in different operating
conditions of DERs like wind speed or solar insolation. If the facility is used then normally manual selection
is required by an operative at the device. These facilities could provide the first step in pseudo adaptive
protection if used in an automated manner for example if controlled islanding is allowed to adapt the
settings to the different conditions during island operation. The custom curves are usually in the form of a
points table that can be input to create a user configurable curve. This will make the protection relays more
flexible and adaptable to possible future solutions for adaptive protection and to meet the many current
customer specific curves for fault ride through protection for example.
Adaptive Protection
Today it can be clearly stated that adaptive protection is not available on a commercial basis. The more
adventurous designers of future protection devices are considering the use of real-time adaptive protection
curves that could adapt to different network conditions. E.g. to manage wind farms in a micro-grid application,
to keep generation connected even during a fault condition would require protection to “hold-off” while
fault-ride through and other network actions are tried before disconnection of the generation. Similarly in
extra large solar plant the fault current contribution proportional to solar insolation is a requirement. This
application would lend itself to real-time adaptive protection.
Dynamic Thermal Protection
Wind & solar farms tend to be located at the extremes of the distribution system where overhead lines may
not be rated to carry the full output of the wind farm in all circumstances. Often a line has been designed
originally to supply a relatively small load, and the installation of new wind generation may cause a large
reverse power flow, causing the standard winter and summer line ratings to be exceeded. The worst case
in this respect is with maximum wind generation and minimum local load which is a common phenomenon
in Indian monsoons season. Rather than applying fixed summer and winter line ratings, load management
based on a dynamically derived line rating can be adopted. Use of a dynamic thermal rating or a real time
thermal rating of transmission lines can avoid unnecessary and costly network reinforcement and add
extra capacity to the DER project. Some methods that could be used to determine the real time rating are
described below.
The line thermal rating can be calculated dynamically in real time from the local weather measurements
such as wind speed and ambient temperature to co-ordinate allowed generation automatically. As this
method takes into account the cooling effect of the wind it is expected that such a dynamic line rating
method could facilitate connection of up to 30% more generation as compared to fixed winter/summer
ratings. As a back-up system, in case for some reason the wind farm power output is not reduced on
command by the control system, tripping of the overhead lines can be initiated.
Islanding
There is an increased need for high performance anti-islanding protection. The greater capability to withstand
external faults without nuisance tripping should not affect the sensitivity for the islanding detection, so a
compromise between sensitivity for islanding detection and stability under external disturbances is required.
Growing DER penetration levels of all sizes and connection voltages causes an increased need for high
performance anti-islanding protection.
Both intended and unintended islanding situations must be detected by a loss of mains protection reliable
islanding detection method of the DER units. The most onerous situation is during an island operation (i.e.
in micro grid mode), where the fault current could assimilate the load current. In these circumstances, over
current protection could become insufficient. In islanded micro grids, load current and inverter current
capabilities cannot be neglected in the design of the protection system. The change of fault levels introduces
a change in protection philosophy where the faults are less likely to damage network components but are
still a danger to individuals. Moreover, the fault behavior of the network will change over time if the
distributed generators are switched or if the topology is altered to minimize the losses or prevent voltage
problems. In a micro grid, the change of fault behavior is very large when the micro grid switches from the
grid-connected mode to the islanded mode of operation. The inertia and short-circuit capacity of these
islanded systems is much lower. Permanent relay settings will become less effective in some situations
and methods for adaptive resetting of protection characteristics may be needed.
In a micro grid, most of the sources are connected via power electronic converters. These converters do
not supply sufficient currents to operate current based protective devices in islanded mode because they
have been designed to limit the fault current. Therefore protecting a converter dominated micro grid is a
challenging technical issue under the current limited environment.
As mentioned above, due to the low thermal inertia of semiconductor switches, inverters are actively
current limited and, because of their small fault current contribution, they lead unavoidably to various
problems that have to be considered by the protection system:
• Characteristics of the inverters under fault conditions may not be consistent with the existing protection
devices;
• Throughout the whole micro grid, there may be different inverters with different characteristics;
• Even in the case of an individual inverter, its basic characteristics may differ depending on its design
or application;
• There may be difficulties in characterizing inverter behavior for short-circuit studies, since this depends
on the control strategy applied;
• There may be a significantly reduced fault current level when changed from grid connected to islanded
mode of operation.
Based on the above, one of the most important issues is to ensure that the behavior required from DER
units, including fault-ride-through needs, is compatible with the developed LV micro grid protection system
during faults in micro grid. In other words this means that when the protection of a microgrid operated in
island mode is designed, one of the most important questions to answer is how converter based DER units
will contribute to the fault current
PROTECTION SCHEMES FOR FUTURE DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS WITH DER
The purpose of this section is to highlight in a few words the new challenges of distribution network protection
related to new grid code requirements, active network management schemes and island operation. Medium-
voltage (MV) and low-voltage (LV) distribution networks as well as both directly connected rotating generator
based DER units and converter interfaced DG units are covered.
New Challenges for Protection
One of the key protection functionalities in the Smart Grids will be reliable detection of islanding. Although
the trend in new grid codes is to require fault-ride-through (FRT) capability from DER units and possibly
also to allow island operation, there is still a need to reliably detect the islanding situation in order for the
operator to make the correct decisions, e.g. change the setting group of DER interconnection IED or
change the control principles and parameters of DER.
It is now evolving idea that islanding detection should not be based only on the network operator’s switchgear
opening/closing position signals. Moreover, if high-speed communication is used as a primary islanding
detection method, the passive local islanding detection method is still needed as a back-up.
Larger non-detection zone (NDZ) and unwanted DER trips due to other network events (nuisance tripping)
have been the major challenges with traditional, passive local islanding detection methods based on
frequency (f), df/dt, vector shift (VS) or voltage (U).
If the number of DER units in distribution networks increases, as expected, in the future, the possibility of
achieving power balance in the distribution network will also increase. Therefore, the risk of distribution
system segments operating in the NDZ of the traditional passive islanding detection methods will increase,
too. In addition, the use of f, U and rate-of change-of-frequency (ROCOF) for defining DER units’ FRT
requirements in the new grid codes, to enable utility grid stability supporting functionalities from DER units,
will increase.
Recent and forthcoming grid code requirements, such as the active power/frequency (P/f) may become
important. Regulation during over-frequency for all DER units and during under-frequency for larger
DER units will enable DER units connected to MV and LV networks to control their active power even
after islanding. This means that frequency deviations are instantly corrected and islanding may not be
detected with the traditional, passive islanding detection methods. Therefore, the use of the traditional
parameters for reliable and selective islanding detection may become even more difficult in the future
than it is today.
Due to the above-mentioned reasons, a new, future-proof, passive islanding detection algorithm and scheme
has been proposed by many application engineers, which is able to detect very fast and selectively islanding
situations even in a perfect power balance without NDZ, and is also applicable to different type of DER
units. In the future, it is possible that different active network management functionalities, like voltage
control, island operation coordination, minimization of losses, etc. will be realized through centralized
solutions at primary (HV/MV) and secondary (MV/LV) substations. Active network management may
simultaneously affect to protection settings if for instance network topology is changed. Therefore, adaptive
protection may be required.
Traditionally, active network management and adaptive protection functionalities have been developed
and operated independently. However, in the future increasing attention should be paid to understand the
level of active network management and protection functions coupling to be able to create future-proof
solutions for the Smart Grids.
New Applications of Teleportation, Use of Communication
The new communication technologies are providing new opportunities for the development of the Smart
Grids. In order to define the requirements for these technologies it’s important to notice that protection
schemes are also designed in order to protect the network from unsolicited islanding. In general it’s possible
to distinguish between wired technologies and radio technologies.
Prominent Wired technologies:

• Copper Pair communications technologies
• Power Line communications technologies
• Fibre Optic communications technologies
Promising Upcoming Radio technologies:

• VHF/UHF
• TETRA
• WIFI
• ZigBee
• Z-WAVE
• WIMAX
• Cellular data services and Satellite
Brief Summary of advantages-disadvantages of wired technologies
Advantages Disadvantages
PLCC Existent infrastructure with TSOs Possible interference Hostile communication

Massive coverage in TSO networks channel (attenuation, fading, noise) Repeaters
Shared channel for multicast Multiple needed Possible coupling problems.
services.
Copper Good transmission characteristics No full coverage in Rural sector Connection
communication Efficient bandwidth use IP technologies availability not guaranteed no point-to-multi-
(xDSL) well extended and tested High point protocols Costly.
penetration in Urban areas Multiple
service providers Open standards.
Fibre optic Good transmission specifications Point-to-point links (demanding for
(bandwidth, attenuation, …) Mature communication with LV consumers)
technology Open standards Scalable Gateways required for medium change If
Multiple services. not available, costly deployment.
xDSL: High bit rate Digital Subscriber Line (HDSL), Single-Pair High-speed Digital Subscriber Line (SHDSL)
,Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL), Very high bit rate DSL (VDSL).
Future Communication technologies – comparative evaluation
Technology Operator/ Cost Frequency Data rate Area Applications

owner band Network
VHF/UHF Licensed low 150 MHz / Narrow RAN Voice,
radio agency 400 MHz band DA, AD
PMR (TETRA) Utility high 400 MHz Narrow RAN Voice;

band DA, AD
WiFi Utility low (only) 2,4 GHz Broadband (NAN) AMR, Home
consumer HAN Automation
ZigBee Utility low (only) 2,4 Ghz Narrow HAN Home
consumer band AMR, Automation
WiMAX utility 3rd party low 5 – 60 GHz Broadband RAN DA, AD, AMR
Public cellular 3rd party Medium 900/ 1800 Narrow/ WAN, Voice; DA,
data services MHz GSM broadband NAN AD, AMR
Satellite 3rd party low/ 2, 6, 12 Narrow WAN AD, AMR
communication medium GHz band
RAN: Radio Area Network; NAN Neighbourhood Area Network; HAN home Area Network; WAN: Wide Area network
With the assumption that, in case of islanding, the protection system has to act in the minimum possible
time, the table below shows the appropriate technology to use in MV network.
Appropriate technology to use in MV networks
Data Delay Copper PLC Fiber VHF/ TETRA WiFi ZigBee Wimax Public Satellite
Rate Pair Technology Optic UHF data
Technology Radio Service
>1Mbps – Yes No Yes Yes* No * No Yes Yes no

With the assumption that, in case of islanding, the protection system have to act in a time up to 100ms,
the table below show the appropriate technology to use in LV network.
Data Delay Copper PLC Fiber VHF/ TETRA WiFi ZigBee Wimax Public Satellite
Rate Pair Technology Optic UHF data
Technology Radio Service
1Mbps 100ms No Yes No No No Yes/no** No Yes Yes yes
WiFi does not apply to long range links between DSO to HV/MV Substation (MV/LV Substation) and
between HV/MV substations and MV/LV substations since for these links, very high power is used, compared
to other wireless technologies such as VHF/UHF radios. WiFi is applicable in the scenario NAN of the
architecture, especially in those areas where there are high concentrations of nodes. In areas like cities
where there are a moderate concentration of nodes, deployment of a wireless mesh network based on
WiFi can be a great solution. WiFi is also applicable in the scenario HAN architecture.
Protection Schemes for Future Distribution Networks with DER
One of the key protection functionalities in the Smart Grids will be reliable detection of islanding. Although
the trend in new grid codes is to require fault-ride-through (FRT) capability from DER units and possibly
also to allow island operation, there is still a need to reliably detect the islanding situation in order for the
operator to make the correct decisions, e.g. change the setting group of DER interconnection IED or
change the control principles and parameters of DER unit.
In the forthcoming grid codes for DER generators it will be there that islanding detection should not be
based only on the network operator’s switchgear opening/closing position signals. High-speed communication
are expected to be used as a primary islanding detection method, the passive local islanding detection
method may still be needed as a back-up. Larger non-detection zone (NDZ) and unwanted DER trips due
to other network events (nuisance tripping) have been the major challenges with traditional, passive local
islanding detection methods based on frequency (f), df/dt, vector shift (VS) or voltage (U).
If the number of DER units in distribution networks increases, as expected, in the future, the possibility of
achieving power balance in the distribution network will also increase. Therefore, the risk of distribution
system segments operating in the NDZ of the traditional passive islanding detection methods will increase,
too. In addition, the use of f, U and rate-of change- of-frequency (ROCOF) for defining DER units’ FRT
requirements in the new grid codes, to enable utility grid stability supporting functionalities from DER units,
will increase. Recent and forthcoming grid code requirements, such as the active power/frequency (P/f)
regulation during over-frequency for all DER units and during under-frequency for larger DER units will
enable DER units connected to MV and LV networks to control their active power even after islanding. This
means that frequency deviations are instantly corrected and islanding may not be detected with the traditional,
passive islanding detection methods. Therefore, the use of the traditional parameters for reliable and
selective islanding detection may become even more difficult in the future than it is today.
Due to the above-mentioned reasons, a new, future-proof, passive islanding detection algorithm and scheme
has been proposed by many application groups in utilities, which is able to detect very fast and selectively
islanding situations even in a perfect power balance without NDZ, and is also applicable to different type
of DER units.
In the future, it is possible that different active network management functionalities, like voltage control,
island operation coordination, minimization of losses, etc. will be realized through centralized solutions at
primary (HV/MV) and secondary (MV/LV) substations. Active network management may simultaneously
affect to protection settings if for instance network topology is changed. Therefore, adaptive protection
may be required.
Traditionally, active network management and adaptive protection functionalities have been developed
and operated independently. However, in the future increasing attention should be paid to understand the
level of active network management and protection functions coupling to be able to create future-proof
solutions for the Smart Grids.
Standardized Communication and Adaptive Protection for Islands
The present trend is for more standardized communications between protection relays of different
manufacturers and refers to the IEC 61850 communications standards. Furthermore, it suggests that
intelligent protection schemes which can adapt their protection settings will play an important role in enabling
stable operation and protection especially for island concepts. Currently protection settings are seen to be
very rigid for the changing conditions in the network so new adaptive solutions will be required in the future
for DERs. Various protection considerations in relation to intentional islanding will be evolved in future with
possible need for adaptive protection when transition to islanded operation takes place. It has also happen
that the technology used in anti-islanding protection will also be used to activate the appropriate change of
protection settings.
The usage of IEC61850 in protection circuits as well as adaptive protection schemes will gradually increase,
because in the future both short-circuit and earth-fault protection settings of MV feeder Intelligent Electronic
Devices (IED) may need to adapt to changes in network topology resulting from increased utilization of
active distribution network management schemes to support improved supply reliability. The protection
has to deal with topology changes and to disconnect faulted sections rapidly, directional OC, distance and
differential protection with high-speed communication based blocking schemes will be utilized increasingly
in the short-circuit protection of future Smart Grids. The required future performance for transmitting
blocking signals and voltage and current data from sensors could be achieved by utilization of IEC 61850
GOOSE and sampled value (SV) services, with increased usage of wireless 4G technologies in addition to
fiber-optic based communication.
CONCLUSION
The chapter has presented a review of the issues surrounding the impact of increasing levels of DER on
the generator and network protection and the resulting necessary improvements in protection practices.
Particular focus was placed on ever increasing inverter-interfaced DER installations and the challenges of
utility network integration. In terms of practices emphasis was made on the understanding importance of
dynamic behavior of DER equipments for which development of real time simulators will be challenge in
future. Integrated substation automation infrastructure and flexible, inverter-equipped microgrid needs to
be integrated in future for islanding operations. The combination of the emerging flexible network operation
and new DER technologies underline the importance of utilizing the existing assets for Excellence. This
not only informs the shaping of new protection testing and network integration practices by end users but
also enables the process of de-risking new DER protection technologies.
This chapter only highlights the difficulties associated with standardization and approval mechanisms to
be adopted by different utilities for grid connections of DERs. It reinforces the need for better standardization
solutions in the near future.
213
CHAPTER 12
DISTURBANCE RECORDERS, ALARMS AND EVENT

LOGGING
12.1 INTRODUCTION
Disturbance Recorders
Recording devices have existed for many years, from the first ink chart recorders, often referred to as
perturbographs, to the digital recording equipment available today. Modern digital equipment has the
capability to monitor a larger number of analog and binary inputs that could not be monitored in the earlier
disturbance recording devices. The introduction of microprocessor relays provided another method of
disturbance recording. The increased capability of disturbance recording devices and microprocessor relays
with disturbance recording capability, have created analysis challenges for the engineer.
There are a number of considerations when installing disturbance recording and monitoring equipment
that an engineer must consider. First the type of event to be monitored must be identified. Is the equipment
to be used for recording power system faults to verify protection system performance or is the device to be
used to monitor power swings on the system. Once the type of power system event is identified the
engineer must then consider the sampling frequency, type of event triggers, record length, and the analog
and binary inputs that are to be monitored in order to select the best disturbance recording device. The last
thing an engineer must consider is the limitations and errors that may be introduced into the records due to
the characteristics of the sensing equipment.
This chapter discusses the application of Integrated Disturbance Monitoring Equipment.
12.2 PURPOSE
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a general understanding of the considerations required for the
selection and application of disturbance recording equipment. In addition, the required inputs necessary to
effectively capture a power system event will be presented. Examples of records illustrating the types of
data displays are provided to help the reader understand the concepts presented.
Application of Disturbance Recorders provides the following:

Better understanding of the behavior of Power network before, during and after the occurrence of a power
system fault or disturbance.
Useful power system information to improve the power system stability and reliability by improving the
existing equipments / infrastructure and helps in better power system planning for designing new installations.
12.3 DEFINITIONS
Digital Fault Recorder (DFR) – records instantaneous values (waveforms) of current and voltages, sampled
many times per cycle, for time periods on the order of a second. DFR may also record computed quantities,
specifically developed for the purpose of analyzing system protection operations and circuit breaker
performance.
Sequence-of-Events Recorder (SER) – records sequence and time-of-day of digital events, such as
contact operations. Developed for the purpose of analyzing operations of control and protection systems.
Dynamic Swing Recorder (DSR) – records frequency, phase angle, and or rms values of power system
quantities such as voltage magnitude, current, MW, MVAR, etc., sampled or calculated many times per
second, e.g. 6 to 60 samples per second or more. Record duration is generally on the order of a minute or
more. Developed for the purpose of analyzing complex power system events and for recording the dynamic
response of power systems to disturbances.
Due to the many terms that have been applied to such devices, it has been found necessary to include the
word “swing” to insure understanding.
Trend Recorder (TR) – A long term recorder of the system parameters of interest.
Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) – Device that records phasor quantities and accurately references
them to a standard time signal. (See IEEE Standard 1344-2006 for more details).
Fig. 12.1
12.4 BRIEF HISTORY
The capability of disturbance monitoring equipment has improved due to advances in technology. The
number of data inputs has increased with the advances in increased processing power of modern digital
technology. The amount of information available to the engineer today from the types of recording devices
and associated analysis tools allows for a more thorough analysis of power system disturbances. Prior to
the advent of fault recording equipment, utility engineers relied on limited data such as relay targets and
visual evidence of fault damage to determine whether the protective systems worked correctly.
Early fault recorders, or light beam oscillographs, provided valuable information for analysis of faults and
the protective systems; however, they were limited in that they could only monitor a few analog channels.
However, the engineer had more information to compare with target data and visual evidence of fault
damage. As technology advanced, the digital fault recorders of today evolved to capture analog and
binary inputs.
Early disturbance (power swing) recorders were in the form of the continuous monitoring equipment using
magnetic tape media. These units captured data anywhere from several seconds up to three hours,
depending upon the location of the data on the tape relative to the end of the reel.
Disturbance Recorders, Alarms and Event Logging 215
Retrieval of the records (paper charts or film) from the early fault and disturbance records required a
technician to visit the substation or power plant to collect the records. Modern digital fault recorders now
have communications capability allowing for remote retrieval of the records, reducing the time it takes to
get a record back for analysis and allowing the protection engineer to perform a disturbance investigation
quicker. The ability to retrieve the records remotely and the technology advances in disturbance monitoring,
i.e. larger electronic records have increased the storage and communications time requirements for the
retrieved records.
Time stamping and time synchronizing of records is a necessary task of today’s disturbance recorders.
Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites provide in the GPS IRIG-B (and other) time code formats the
ability to synchronize and time stamp the disturbance records of DFRs, protective relays and other recording
equipments.
12.5 TYPES OF DISTURBANCES
There are typically four types of disturbance or event records of interest to a protection engineer. These
are categorized by the event duration as follows:
Transient – These are very short in duration and typically include faults that are cleared immediately by
circuit breaker operation. These events are generally no longer than 8 cycles for high speed clearing and
16 cycles for sequential line clearing. These events are usually analyzed to determine correct protection
operation, fault location, or verification of system model parameters.
Short Term – These generally include all other time-delayed fault clearing and reclosing events where
the system operation (stability) is not affected. These events are typically 20 to 60 cycles in length but
may be longer if multiple protection operations are required to clear the fault. These events are usually
analyzed to determine correct protection operation, fault location or verification of system model
parameters.
Long Term – These include those events that affect system stability such as power swings, frequency
variations and abnormal voltage problems. These events are usually analyzed to determine causes of
incorrect system operations. Data management techniques are employed to process a number of samples
and record the value for the parameter of interest. Record length parameters may be defined.
Steady State – There are steady state disturbances where system operation is not threatened, but power
quality is affected. This may include harmonics or sub-harmonics produced by the load and/or the interaction
between power system’s components. Depending upon the type of phenomena being analyzed, higher
sample rates may be required to capture the events and data of interest. Record length parameters may
be defined.
12.6 DISTURBANCE RECORDING CONSIDERATIONS
As microprocessor technologies are applied to the power system in the forms of protective relays,
energy management devices, digital fault recorders and phasor measurement units, the amount of data
collected that can be available for use to analyze the operation of the power system grows due to the
number and increased capabilities of these devices. For example, protective relays monitor current(s)
and voltage(s) to make decisions based on the settings to clear faults on the power system by opening
associated protection equipment. The microprocessor relay of today is also capable of recording the
fault and event data, collecting and continuously transmitting the instantaneous analog quantities to an
energy management center.
Issues relating to the application of disturbance recording equipment are:
• The specific event to capture
• The available data sources; analog and binary

• Characteristics of sensing equipment
• Required sampling rate to capture desired events

• Application of triggers necessary to capture the desired event
• The storage capacity of each device.
• Communication method associated with each recording device.

• Frequency of record retrieval necessary to minimize losing records.
The above issues are important whether an engineer is interested in determining the cause and severity
of a fault and if the associated protective devices functioned as required, or desires to measure the
dynamic response of the system during power swings, obtain power quality information, or analyzing
records to determine the cause of a wide area disturbance such as the blackout that occurred in Northern
& Eastern India on 30 & 31 July 2012. The engineer needs to consider the issues for any type of event
to capture.
The three primary types of recording are:

• High-speed disturbance recording
• Low-speed disturbance recording
• Steady State (continuous) recording

These types of recording allow the engineer to capture data for analysis of most events on the power
system and are discussed in the following sections.
12.6.1 High Speed Recording
High-speed recording is used to capture the individual samples of the currents and voltages measured by
the device with a sampling frequency high enough to display power system faults and transients. A recording
is typically initiated when the magnitude of an analog quantity increases above or decreases below a
specific value. High-speed recording is used to capture transient events, which are short in duration, with
the recorder record length typically set for one to two seconds. Sampling frequency is important when
selecting a high-speed recording device. If an engineer desires the ability to detect a breaker re-strike
condition then a high sampling rate is needed.
High-speed recording is available in disturbance recorders, and microprocessor based protective relays.
Care must be taken when choosing the appropriate device to capture high-speed data, as significant
differences exist between DFRs and relays in terms of triggering methods, types of triggers, the sampling
rate at which records are stored, the length of the record, and the filtering applied in the capture of the
relay.
Microprocessor based protective relays with recording capabilities are being used for fault analysis. These
records provide valuable information about the protective functions of the relay. However, when considering
using a microprocessor relay as a fault recorder the engineer must evaluate the sampling rate at which
records are stored, the length of the record, and the filtering applied in the capture of the relay. Many early
relays filtered the analog data so that only the 50 hertz component of the waveform was captured, then is
displayed using a smooth curve fitted algorithm.
Figure 12.2 is a transient event captured by high-speed recording, showing analog voltage and current
waveforms and the change of state information for selected equipment operations as signified by a contact
transition.
Fig. 12.2 : Transient record including binary state change information
12.6.2 Low Speed Recording
Low-speed recording is typically used to capture short term and long term disturbances, such as a power
swing. Data is typically captured at a rate between 2 times per cycle and 1 every 2 cycles. The data
captured is phasor or RMS data, not sampled data. Recording length is typically in the range of 60 to 180
seconds, but can be as long as 1 hour. Examples of these records are shown in Figures 12.3 and 12.4.
Figure 12.3 shows a low-speed recording of 10 seconds in length, and Figure 12.4 shows a series of the 30
second data scans from SCADA remote terminal units over the period of 1 hour. Typical triggers for these
functions include frequency rate-of-change triggers, power rate-of-change triggers, and system frequency
oscillation triggers.
Fig. 12.3 : Low-speed disturbance record, short duration
Fig. 12.4 : 30 second scans of SCADA data from 4 locations
12.6.3 Steady State Recording OR Continuous Disturbance Recording (CDR)
Trigger-less continuous disturbance recording and some inbuilt memory storage facility is recommended
for power system recorders, so that any power system information is not lost even if the operators fail to
set the recording triggers properly.
12.6.4 Distributed Recording
The increasing population of recording devices makes available more records for the analysis of a disturbance.
These devices include digital fault recorders, dynamic swing recorders, protective relays, and multi-function
meters. The number of available recording devices leads to the idea of a distributed recorder that collects
data from multiple analog inputs and recording devices to combine into one record for a specific location.
Distributed recording takes on two basic forms. One form involves the physical design of the recorder,
which places modules for analog inputs and possibly digital inputs at various locations in the substation,
and connects these input modules to a central unit. The central unit then operates in the same manner as
any recording device. The second form of distributed recording is a virtual form, with a central unit retrieving,
and combining recorded data from a variety of recording devices. The virtual form of recording provides
some challenges in creating a combined record, as the individual devices will use different triggers and
triggering methods, time synchronization, record length, sampling rate, and storage capability. Also, there
will be duplication of analog channels for the same event.
12.7 TYPES OF RECORDING EQUIPMENTS
The following descriptions are of equipment types that may be used to record and collect data about
disturbances as they occur on the power system.
12.7.1 Fault Recorder (FR)
Fault recorders have been in use for a number of years and have evolved from analog recording devices
which utilized light sensitive paper to digital signal processing and recording techniques to produce digital
records that can easily be collected, transmitted, stored, printed and analyzed. This report focuses on the
digital techniques used by modern equipment to obtain and analyze disturbance data. The term fault
recorder encompasses both analog and digital techniques as well as other devices that are capable of
capturing and recording a disturbance on the power system. These devices are also referred to as Transient
Recorders (TR).
A fault recorder typically contains directly measured analog channels, as well as event or binary channels.
This allows the recorder to capture the time sequence of analog power system quantities, along with
breaker contacts, logic state changes, event contacts, etc. Modern recorders typically include calculated
analog quantities and logic functions to ensure pertinent power system information is captured during an
event. Triggering to start the capture of data can typically be directly based on changes in analog quantities,
digital inputs, or logic.
Information from fault recorders can be used to confirm the occurrence of a fault, determine the duration
of a fault, measure the magnitude of fault quantities of current and voltage, determine the location of a
fault, define the nature or type of fault, assess performance of relays, and assess circuit breaker performance.
An engineer experienced with fault recorder records can often recognize faults due to lightning strikes,
insulator contamination, tree faults, restrikes and other common faults causes, from their distinctive
“signature” on a fault record.
A typical fault recorder installation may not include all of the currents for a specific line. However, analysis
software may provide the ability to replicate the missing channel from other monitored sources.
Triggering of the fault recorder may be by internal triggering measurements, contact inputs or Boolean
expressions of a combination of direct, or calculated measurements, and the status of the contact inputs.
12.7.2 Sequence of Event Recorder (SER)
A Sequence of Event Recorder’s function is to gather and time tag operational data from substation
equipment (e.g., relays, circuit breakers, transformers), control schemes (manual and automatic) as they
react to a system event. This series of sequential, individual events can be from a switching operation,
fault, or misoperation and can be contained within a single substation, a line and associated substations, a
utilities system, or several interconnected systems. This data allows the chain of events to be studied for
the cause (or causes) of the misoperation and the linkages between individual actions and effects.
Sequences of Events Recorders have improved over the years by becoming smaller, less expensive,
while increasing their capacities for data points and storage. This allows them to be applied in stations that
are smaller, both in terms of KV and equipment, than was considered economically practicable in the past.
Time tagging has improved with the widespread use of Global Positioning Satellites (GPS) and Universal
Time Code (UTC). One area that has not changed however is the time resolution of SER’s beyond a
millisecond.
Many modern Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) include sequence of events functions that record the
triggering sequence of individual elements or commands specific to the device. However, without an
overall (i.e. substation level) SER it is often difficult to piece together all of the information from these
individual devices, especially for a large disturbance. For that reason alone, SER’s that monitor an entire
substation will continue to be useful devices.
12.7.3 Fault Locator (FL)
DRs can calculate and output fault location details similar to the function of Numerical IEDs.
12.7.4 Power Quality Monitor (PQM)
Power Quality Monitors are designed to record power quality parameters such as voltage dips, flicker, and
harmonic content. They often compute and record industry standard measures for power quality. Power
Quality monitors often are normally set up for continuous recording at a relatively low sample rate. They
may be configured to switch to a higher sampling rate when triggered to do so.
12.7.5 Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU)
Introduction to Synchrophasor Measurement (PMU) Functionality:

Definition: A Phasor measurement unit (PMU) measures the electrical waves on an electricity grid to
determine the health of the power system. In power engineering, these are also commonly referred to as
synchrophasors and are considered one of the most important measuring devices in the future of power
systems.
A phasor is a complex number that represents both the magnitude and phase angle of the sine waves found
in electricity. Phasor measurements that occur at the same time are called a “synchrophasors”, as are the
PMU devices that allow their measurement. In typical applications, phasor measurement units are sampled
from widely dispersed locations in the power system network and synchronized from the common time
source of a Global Positioning System (GPS) Radio Clock. Synchrophasor technology provides a tool for
system operators and planners to measure the state of the electrical system and helps in the grid management.
Synchrophasors measure voltages and currents, at diverse locations on a power grid, and can output accurately
time-stamped voltage and current phasors. Because these phasors are truly synchronized, synchronized
comparison of two quantities in real time is possible. These comparisons can be used to assess system
conditions. The technology has the potential to change the economics of power system & the way we operate
them. For example, by understanding the limits of stability of the multiple interconnected systems & ensuring
the optimized power transfer over the existing networks thereby resulting in cost savings.
Phasor Network: A phasor network consists of phasor measurement units (PMUs) dispersed throughout
the electricity system, Phasor Data Concentrators (PDC) to collect the information and a SCADA system
at the central control facility. Such a network is used in Wide Area Measurement Systems (WAMS). The
complete network requires rapid data transfer within the frequency of sampling of the phasor data. GPS
time stamping can provide a theoretical accuracy of synchronization better than 1mico second “Clocks
need to be accurate to ± 500 nanoseconds to provide the one microsecond time standard needed by each
device performing synchrophasor measurement & is possible with IRIG-B Time code synchronization.
PMUs must deliver between 10 and 50 synchronous reports (frames) per second depending on the
application. The PDC correlates the data, and controls and monitors the PMUs. At the central control
facility, the real time Wide Area Monitoring & Measurements System presents system wide data and
visualization in real time.
Applications of PMU
• Provide early warning for potential unstable conditions in the power system, through power system
automation as in Smart Grids.
• Load Shedding & Other load control techniques such as demand response mechanisms to manage a
power system. (i.e. Directing power where it is needed in real-time)
• Increase the reliability of the power grid by detecting faults early, allowing for isolation of operative
system, and the prevention of power outages.
• Intelligent islanding to maximize customer continuity.
• Increase power quality by precise analysis and automated correction of sources of system degradation.
• Improve system planning through real-time state estimation.
• Wide Area measurement and control, in very wide area super grids, regional transmission networks,
and local distribution grids.
Standard
The IEEE 1344 standard for synchrophasors was completed in 1995, and reaffirmed in 2001. In 2005, it
was replaced by IEEE Standard C37.118-2005, which was a complete revision and dealt with issues
concerning use of PMU’s in electric power systems. The specification describes standards for measurement,
the method of quantifying the measurements, testing & certification requirements for verifying accuracy,
and data transmission format and protocol for real-time data communication.
The above described synchophasor measurements (PMU) function can be an integral part of the
modern power system recorders.
12.7.6 Dynamic Swing Recorder (DSR)
DSRs are useful for disturbance analysis, investigating system oscillations, quantifying sudden changes in
power system parameters, and obtaining data for verifying stability models. Since the data of interest is
changes in power system over time, DSRs normally store data in as RMS or phasor values, as opposed to
directly sampled data as found in digital fault recorder. DSRs generally capture data from twice a cycle, up
to once every 10 cycles. DSRs are normally used for low-speed disturbance recording, and capture records
that are typically from 1 minute to 1 hour in length.
DSRs may be a separate device, or integrated with a modern digital fault recorder. The phasor data
capture by the DSR may be synchrophasor data, as defined by the IEEE Std. C37.118 [20], or a phasor
measurement unit (PMU) may also function as a DSR. To meet the requirements of C37.118, the DSR
must be time synchronized to a with a microsecond resolution as opposed to the typical millisecond
resolution used for most DFR applications.
Longer term recorders also have particular applications within a power plant location to capture those
cascading or trending events that might evolve over many seconds or hours that would otherwise be lost
until the fault actually operated normal triggers.
12.7.7 Protective Relays with Fault Disturbance Recording and Event Recording
Numerical digital relays can also generate sequence of events based on their individual relay elements
and digital or contact inputs. They may also be programmed to recognize and record events in situations
where they do not initiate a trip.
A drawback to relays as recording devices is having the data distributed in many devices instead of
combined in one device. Time synchronization of all the relays, and other recording devices, is a significant,
gathering and combining all data from these individual sources is a manual activity. There are likely also
differences in the triggering method, sampling rate, and record length to consider.
Triggering of the recording function within the relay is programmable and based on the internal measuring
elements within the device. Typically these records are limited to the “zone of protection” associated with the
device.
12.8 TIME SYNCHRONIZATION
Several vendors manufacture master time devices (GPS clocks) which support different standardized
time synchronization protocols. IRIG-B is the more commonly supported standard time code format that
has been widely accepted by the electric utilities and is supported by most modern electronic devices with
recording capability.
There are two common ways of synchronizing various devices to the same GPS clock source:
• Synchronization over direct connection
• Network synchronization
Synchronization of IEDs utilizing a direct connection requires each device to have a GPS or IRIG-B
communications port in order to connect it to the master clock. Having a permanently connected GPS/
IRIG-B source provides an accurate reference for the device’s internal clock
In the past, GPS clocks with uncertainties of 1 millisecond were common, but at the time of this report, GPS
clocks with accuracies of 1 microsecond are the standard offering. At the 1 microsecond level, the uncertainty
introduced by the GPS clock is negligible compared to other uncertainties. However, an IRIG-B network can
introduce an uncertainty (delay) of up to 1 millisecond. With careful design the uncertainty of the IRIG-B
network can be kept to a minimum. The largest contributor to uncertainty and delay in recorded observations
is the response of the recording devices themselves. Internal device delays are primarily due to filtering, and
may be 4 milliseconds or more. At the time this report was being written, the PSRC working group I11 Timing
Considerations for Event Reconstruction is investigating this area and will produce a report.
The network synchronization method eliminates the problem of dedicated interconnection with the master
clock by allowing the individual device’s internal time clock to be synchronized over the substation LAN
with the network time-synch master using the methods specified by the protocol. This method however
introduces a potential error due to the processing delays within the LAN.
12.9 DATA SOURCES, PROCESSING AND STORAGE
12.9.1 Data Sources
There are three major categories of input sensors or transducers required for DR. Two of these are analog
– current and voltage, and the other is digital, which reflects the status and change-of-state information for
selected equipment operations.
Analog Inputs
DR can take Inputs from the Primary CT & VT and reduce their magnitude by an appropriate transformation
ratio and converted to millivolts for use by its secondary devices.
Modern day DRs also uses clamp on CTs which can be directly clamped over the main protection/control
circuits. The output of the clamp on CTs are connected to the secondary devices of the DR. Since the
output of the interposing CT is in millivolts, shielded cables are used to connected the clamp on CT output
to the DR. The main advantage of the clamp on CTs are when DR are installed in an already existing
Substation, which greatly reduces the wiring modifications.
The other type of analog signals is from DC transducers (Milliamps, Low DC Voltages).
Digital Inputs
Digital inputs are usually added to the disturbance recorder data in addition to, or instead of, the sequence-
of-events recorder data. These signals in the disturbance record may be from either external contacts or
internal element status indications. Although this input can be a simple contact, it is deserving of considerable
attention because of the importance it can assume in the analysis process. Some of the items to be
considered are: Main Protection relays, Important Aux. relays which may be multiplying the main relay
contacts or may refect the condition of Mechanical Protections, Lock out relays, Circuit Breakers,
Disconnects, Trip send/Receive etc.
Modern day Disturbance Recorder with IEC 61850-8-1 Station Bus Protocol Compliance can subscribe the
GOOSE Signals published by various 61850 Compatible IEDs throughout the Substation as GOOSE
Virtual Inputs over Ethernet Communication & these GOOSE Virtual Inputs can be used to Record Sequence
of Events and to trigger the Transient & Swing Recordings.
12.9.2 Processing
Sampling Rate
The sampling rate of the recording device impacts the accuracy of the data captured for later analysis. The
sampling rate also affects the performance of the analog and digital filters, and the input magnetics, of the
recording device.
DFRs typically use a sampling rate of 64-128 samples/cycle, with some devices permitting sampling rates
of up to 384 samples/cycle.
Measurement Windows
Some devices use a measurement window or the equivalent of a measurement window to capture transient
waveform samples. This means that at minimum the first sampled value in the first window at the beginning
of the record is not accurate (ramp up value). Likewise, the last sampled value in the last window of a
transient waveform record is not accurate (ramp down value). Depending on the sample rate and window
length, it is recommended that the first two (or more) samples at the beginning of the record be ignored
and the last two (or more) samples at the end of the record be ignored for each analog input quantity. This
makes slower sample rates less desirable because; (1) during analysis of all analog quantities, it is necessary
to ignore the ramp up time of the quantity and the ramp down time of the quantity and (2) if data is
analyzed from more than one device, it is necessary to keep up with the ramp up and ramp down times for
the different devices and use the proper one with the proper device. The use of faster sample rates
minimizes the ramp up and ramp down times, therefore making it no longer necessary to ignore these
times in the analysis.
In other devices, a measurement window is associated with a group of samples over a period of time that
is required by a measurement algorithm to calculate a value or series of values relative to the intended
measurement. Examples of such measurement or calculation windows may be power at the fundamental
frequency with all harmonic contributions excluded, rate of change of system frequency, the determination
that a voltage sag exists, or the determination of which harmonics present on the monitored signal.
Triggering Methods
Triggers cause a disturbance recorder to capture waveforms for specific power system conditions. Recording
events may be triggered by changes in measured analog values, calculated analog values, Rate of change
of analog values, internal logic statements, operation of protection elements, or by the change in state of
an external input. Triggers typically include both a threshold setting to indicate an operating condition to
start a recording, and a time delay setting to ensure this event is truly a power system condition to record.
Triggers can also be caused by subscribing to GOOSE signals in Disturbance Recorder with IEC 61850-8-1
Station Bus Protocol Compliance
12.9.3 Storage
Methods
There are a variety of methods for storing data on recording devices, retrieving data from recording devices,
and storing this data for the system. Consideration needs to be given to the type and size of memory at the
recording device and at a central archiving location. The type of memory may impact the decision on the
power supply for the recorder, and the size of the memory may dictate the retrieval method and timing.
Disturbance recorder memory is designed to store records on the recorder, to give users adequate time to
retrieve the records. Users may need to store records on the recorder for a long period (Could be 60 days
as an example). Therefore, the memory size of a disturbance recorder must be large enough to store
records to meet these requirements, based on the file size of a typical recording.
Writing records to memory uses one of two methods. One method is to use a first-in, first-out buffer. Once
the memory is full, the recorder begins over-writing the oldest records as new triggers occur. The second
method is to stop writing to memory, once the memory is full. This method requires the issuing of storage
limit alarms, and requires users to manually remove stored records to permit the creation of records on
new triggers. DRs tend to allow user choice between methods.
Some DRs allow user configuration of the oscillography records to be stored in memory. Configuration
choices may include: Triggering Conditions, Recording Rate, Content, Length of the pre- and post-trigger
data, Number of duration of records, treatment of old record, Clearing of Records, Record classification
and Continuous Recording.
Records Extraction
Data retrieval from recording devices can be performed locally, by directly communicating to the device
while in the substation, or remotely, by using telecommunications access to the device from a central
location. With microprocessor based recording devices, the user often has the ability to select how the
device will transmit the record for analysis. These units may be selected to operate in an autopolling
(central PC calling the recorders periodically) mode, auto-calling mode (recording device automatically
initiates the call to transfer data) or a manual mode. Installation of a “mini-master” at the substation can
also be set up to retrieve the records from individual recording devices with limited storage, alleviating the
memory constraints at the recorder itself.
Comtrade
COMTRADE defines a common format for the data files and exchange medium needed for the interchange
of various types of fault, test, and simulation data. The rapid evolution and implementation of digital
devices for fault and transient data recording and testing in the electric utility industry have generated the
need for a standard format for the exchange of data. This data are used with various devices to enhance
and automate the analysis, testing, evaluation, and simulation of power systems and related protection
schemes during fault and disturbance conditions. Since each source of data may use a different proprietary
format, a common data format is necessary to facilitate the exchange of such data between applications.
This facilitates the use of proprietary data in diverse applications and allows users of one proprietary
system to use digital data from other systems.
The COMTRADE standard C37.111 defines a format for files containing transient waveform and event
data collected from power systems or power system models. Equipment manufacturers typically use a
proprietary file format to manage several issues. The most important of these is the need to compress the
file size to maximize storage capabilities of the device, and to reduce the transmission time when retrieving
records from the device, and to ensure the reliable transmission of data. The COMTRADE format is
intended to provide an easily interpretable form for use in exchanging data. As such, it does not make use
of the economies available from data encoding and compression that proprietary formats depend upon for
competitive advantage. The standard is for files stored on physical media such as digital hard drives,
compact disks, and diskettes. It is not a standard for transferring data files over communication networks.
All records – waveforms, disturbances or trends - should be saved in their native file format. This provides
an original record of the data as recorded by the device and the starting point for later review should it
become necessary.
12.10 PRESENT DAY DISTURBANCE RECORD AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE
Modern day Disturbance Recorder is a microprocessor based real time operating Multifunction Equipment
as described in section 13.3. This equipment encompasses all required types of recording as described in
section 13.7.
A typical DR described in the paragraph above, is a central recorder monitoring the state of the System
Equipments in a Substation including the Transmission and Distribution Lines during Pre/Post fault and
System disturbances. To facilitate the Fault Analysis/System Disturbance Analysis and verify the Protection
System performance, the following inputs are connected to the Disturbance Recorders.
1. Three phase currents and voltages of each bay (Additional derived channels like residual current/
Voltage and sequence quantities are calculated from the measured currents/Voltages)
2. Bus Voltages
3. Digital inputs in the form of contacts from the Substation Equipments like Circuit Breakers, Isolators,
Main/Auxiliary contacts, Pilot channels (Carrier send/Receive, Direct Trip send/Receive etc)
4. Goose virtual Inputs

For a Generating Station with its associated Substation, monitoring of additional equipments (Turbine,
Generator, Exciter, Regulator etc.) will be required so that all the Generating & Substation Equipments
status are available on a common time base to help determine if and how the Turbine-Generator-Exciter
system is responding to an external disturbance, generating a disturbance internally, or contributing to an
external disturbance. For stations that have several generators, it can also help determine how the different
generators are responding to the same event. Many times, the tripping of a generator is the result of
several events that evolve into the actual tripping event. As such, the generator fault recording system
may have the need for both short term and long term recording capability.
Record length requirements are different for distribution, transmission, and generation events. As pointed
out in previous sections, records for transmission events tend to be cycles long, while distribution records
may be seconds long. In addition, a recorder with system swing recording capabilities can be several
minutes long. The record length and sampling frequency have a major impact on the recording capability
of the device with regard to memory constraints, maximum duration of a record, number of records that
can be recorded, etc. In the present day DRs which have adequate memory, there is typically some form
of memory management that allows for many records to be recorded or transferred to a storage disk.
12.11 COMPARATIVE SPEC OF DR VS MICROPROCESSOR RELAY
Given below is a typical comparative table. In this respect it is significant to remember the origins of DFR
and Microprocessor Relays and their function in their main role:
Microprocessor Relays’ main role is to provide protection to the equipment (and power system) by using
sophisticated techniques. To perform such work, the relay may have other optional features including
control, monitoring and recording; remember though, that the relay is intended mainly to protect devices in
the electrical system.
DR’s main role is to provide recording of transient faults and swing disturbances by using sophisticated
techniques for record capture, record compression, record extension, and continuous recording. Although
a DR may have extra features to alarm or trip the system under fault conditions, its main role is the capture
of sophisticated records for complete analysis, including supervision of the relay’s performance during
abnormal power system conditions.
Table showing typical comparative specs of DRs and Microprocessor relays
Description Typical Recorder Typical Relay

Sampling Rate 32-384 samples/Cycle 4-32 Samples/Cycle
CDR (Continuous Digital Yes No
Recording)
Record Quantity Very High Limited

Harmonics Typically till 100th Typically till 16th
Recorder Memory Size Typically over 3Gb Limited
Frequency Response 23.06KHz 3.6KHz

Trigger Options V, I, P, Q, f, Z, I1, I2, I0, V1, V2, V0, V, I, f, Z, I1, I2, I0, V1, V2, V0, df/dt,
Summations, dv/dt, dp/dt, dq/dt, THD, Harmonics, External inputs
df/dt, THD, Harmonics (All
spectrum), Extension inputs,
Relay activation etc.
Analog Channels 0-144 0-12
Digital Channels 0-288 0-30

PQ Monitoring Yes No
Record Length
– Pre-Trigger 60 Cycles 10 Cycles

– Post-Trigger 1800 Cycles 30 Cycles
Record Length (Swing)
– Pre-Trigger 60 Secs 30 Secs

– Post-Trigger 1800 Secs 120 Secs
Recording:
– Edge type Yes Yes (Typical)

– Duration type Yes Comparatively less
– Record Extension Yes No
– Transient Yes Yes

– Swing Yes No (To very limited)
PMU Channels 10 (Minimum) 2
12.12 ANALYSIS OF DISTURBANCE RECORDS FOR POWER SYSTEM OPERATIONS
Historically disturbance records have been used to analyze a power system incident, the most common
being to verify protection system performance. However, fault recorders are not the only tool available to
the protection engineer. Sequence-of- Event (SER) data, and relay event data are also used regularly. In
addition, due to incomplete monitoring restrictions for DFR or SER equipment, data from SCADA
(Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Equipment) is also used in the analysis. The protection engineer
responsible for a fault investigation will typically use all of these resources in the analysis especially if a
mis-operation of the protection system has occurred. All available information should be time-synchronized
to the GPS system making it easier to align the information collected from multiple devices located in
several different locations within the power system.
Before starting the analysis of a disturbance it is recommended that a backup copy of the original data be
made in the event that the records being used for analysis become corrupt for any reason.
The manufacturer’s of disturbance recording equipment and microprocessor relays provide software for
display and analysis of the records captured with their equipment. There are third party software packages
available that are able to read multiple manufactures original files and provide the tools to perform the
analysis.
To date most post-fault analysis is done manually by the engineer, however, the work is ongoing by
universities and some businesses to automate the analysis of fault records.
12.12.1 Fault Location
Many microprocessor relays and some disturbance recorders produce a fault location output which is
available as soon as the record is processed without any manual analysis. Some of these devices can
send the fault location and fault type to the System Control Center via the SCADA/EMS system. Immediate
access to the fault location allows power system dispatchers to make decisions about system restoration.
However, the relay and recorder fault location information may be only an estimate due to infeed, mutual
coupling, and nonhomogeneous line construction. The dispatcher using this information should be made
aware of these inaccuracies or provided a means of compensating for them.
12.12.2 System Oscillations
Power system disturbances, in some cases, initiate a period of oscillations which may continue for many
seconds. There also have been occasions when system oscillations began without any apparent initiating
event. The frequency of these system oscillations is often in the range of 0.2 to 1 Hz. These oscillations
are of great interest to power system operators. DSRs can help determine some important answers to the
following questions:
• Where is the oscillation magnitude highest?
• What are the natural frequencies in different areas?

• Under what system conditions are oscillations likely to occur?
• What is the relationship between system conditions and damping?
Note that DSRs must be located across the system to answer these questions.
12.12.3 System Conditions and Loading
Pre-event system conditions and particularly transmission loading are important in disturbance analysis.
These parameters can be obtained from DSRs, provided that the DSRs trigger for the disturbance of
interest.
12.12.4 Loss of Generation or Load
In power system operations or operations planning it is frequently necessary to determine the change in
frequency, voltage, or MW flow that occurred on a contingency, such as loss of a generator tie. DSR
records are frequently employed for such purposes. These evaluations are important for validation of
contingency analysis studies and for calculating various system parameters. As an example, Figure 12.5
shows upon the loss of a large generator at UTZ 07:26:23 on 15 January 2006, the example record showed
that the Eastern Interconnection frequency decline was 46 mHz.
Fig.: 12.5 : Change in Frequency Due to Loss of a 1300 MW Generating Unit
12.12.5 Real-Time Phasor Output
Some disturbance recorders provide a real-time voltage phasor output. This signal, when time stamped
with microsecond accuracy can be coupled to a state estimator to provide an indication of the power flow
and stability of the system. In fact with PMUs, state estimation may be replaced with state measurement.
12.12.6 Wide Area Event
With an installed base of disturbance recording equipment that is time synchronized it is possible to
analyze a wide area event. When considering the start of a wide area disturbance, it is usually caused by
a short circuit fault, followed by protective relay operation and tripping of one or more system elements.
For example a cross-country line fault that results in tripping of two transmission lines may lead to a more
involved system disturbance.
The analysis will require the recordings of the current and voltage waveforms at different locations around
the system, as well as accurate capturing of the change of state of breakers auxiliary contacts and the
protection system’s “Trip” outputs. These records need to include a time stamp, accurate to one millisecond,
to chronologically align the records for analysis.
Experience gained from the analysis of the August 14, 2003 blackout demonstrates the need for accurate
time synchronization and the ability to quickly collect and align records from a large number of locations
throughout the affected system area. Over a thousand records from several utilities were submitted to the
NERC task force for analysis. The use of the IEEE-PSRC file naming convention [2] was also mentioned
as a very valuable method for quickly finding related files for the event analysis.
The records from a wide area can be used to identify the specific events that resulted in the deterioration
of the situation that ended in the final several seconds of the blackout. Shutdown of generators, operation
of under- frequency load shedding, tripping of transmission lines during faults or power swings can be
analyzed using simulation of the system dynamics or directly replaying the records through protection test
devices.
The analysis of the behavior of special protection systems or primary system elements during the next
phase of a wide area disturbance imposes recording requirements that are quite different. Figure 12.6
illustrates the power system frequency as measured and collected by 99 sites for the August 14, 2003
event.
Fig. 12.6 : Frequency plot from NERC August 14, 2003 Blackout Report
Since the records can be used for different purposes, the user should be able to select the recording of the
current sample of the monitored quantity, or to record and display the minimum, maximum, and average
values that occurred during the previous interval recorded.
12.13 SPECIAL COMMENTS
1. Start function to disturbance recorder is to be provided by change in state of one or more of the events
connected and/or by any external triggering so that recording of events during a fault or system
disturbance can be obtained. List of typical signals recommended to be recorded is given below:
(i) Recommended Analog Signals(Typical)
From CT : Ia, Ib, Ic and In (The residual Neutral current 3I0 can be derived internally from
3-phase measurements)
From VT : Va, Vb, Vc and 3V0 (The residual voltage 3V0 can be derived internally from
3-phase measurements)
(ii) Recommended Digital Signals(Typical)
Main 1 Carrier receive

Main 1 Trip
Line O/V Stage I/Stage II
Reactor Fault Trip

Stub Protection Optd.
Main II Trip
Main II Carrier Receive

Direct Trip CH A/B
CBIStatusAPH
CB I Status BPH
CB I Status CPH
CB II Status A PH
CB II Status B PH
CB II Status C PH
Bus bar trip
Main/Tie CB LBB Optd.

Note : These may need modification depending upon Protections chosen and the contact availability
for certain functions.
2. In Substations where stand alone DR is not available, Numerical relays with DR & FL facility shall be
provided. In substations where DR is recommended, DR with FL facility can complement the Numerical
Relays.
3. In case of DR being part of main protection, it should be possible to connect external binary inputs.
Reference for reading : IEEE-PSRC report “Considerations for use of disturbance recorders”
231
CHAPTER 13
DC AUXILIARY SUPPLY SYSTEMS
In substations and power plants, DC batteries are used to provide back-up to control power supply to all the
protection, control and automation equipment for fail safe operation of the plant. They form a reliable,
dependable and secured DC Power Supply Block and form essential part of the protection and control
system in the substation or the power plant and are essential for the reliability of fault clearance.
13.1 CHARACTRISTICS OF DC AUXILIARY SOURCES
Redundantbatteries, usually of 220 DC voltage are used for protection and control of all 220 kV and above
substations and plant (while 48 volt Battery system is used for communication purposes) are connected
via dedicated chargers fed by secure, dedicated duplicated auxiliary system AC power supply. The auxiliary
supply system is often provided with duplicated feeders (from different auxiliary transformers). The charger
feeds the DC load and the battery (in float / boost mode). The battery instantly takes over the load on
failure of charger or AC supply. The main parameters of sizing the battery are:
• The required autonomy in case of unavailability of the charger varies considerably. This can be 1-10
hours in a power plant to several days in inaccessible or remote substations. It depends a lot on the
intervention delay of the maintenance team in charge of the auxiliary supply system.
• The maximum discharge current required related with 10-hour discharge rate.
• Maximum current drawn by all the equipment functioning together and connected simultaneously to
the same battery in normal service conditions.
• It is always desirable to have the load profile indicating the various loads related with the hours of
service when the AC supply is not available
• The voltage of the cell at the end of discharge that corresponds to the lowest voltage permitted by the
various equipment for their proper operation after taking in to account the voltage drop in the leads.
This voltage is often taken equal to 80% of the rated voltage Un.
• The maximal charge voltage with recommended charge rate and boost charge rate up to gassing
voltage: This value is linked to the maximum voltage acceptable to the various equipment connected,
before they start malfunctioning.
Two classes of battery voltage are mainly used: 110-127V and 220-250V. Generally the 48-52 V supply is
used only for telecommunication system.
13.2 STATION BATTERY TECHNOLOGY USED IN SUBSTATIONS
13.2.1 Non-sealed Lead Batteries
There are three types of batteries that are normally used:
• Accumulators with long life duration plates (Plante plate).

• Accumulators with pasted plates (Faure type).
• Accumulators with tubular positive plates (Ironclad plates).
13.2.2 Sealed Lead Batteries with Recombination of Gas
Sealed lead batteries with recombination of gas are sometimes called glass-mat Valve Regulated Lead
Accumulator (VRLA). These accumulators need less maintenance since the emitted gasses (02 and H2)
are recombined to reform the electrolysed water.
These batteries have to be operated within certain temperature range in order to have longer operating
life.
13.2.3 Nickel-cadmium Battery
These batteries are lighter than lead batteries for the same capacity and have better performance with
respect to variations in external temperature. Their life duration is superior to the lead batteries. They
require reduced maintenance. However these are expensive compared to other types of batteries. These
batteries are of two types.
• Accumulators with “pockets” type plates, an old technology.
• Accumulators with sintered plates, new technology, whose life duration is superior to the old technology.
13.2.4 Types of Batteries and their Selection
Selection of battery is governed by several factors. Key factors, which generally decide the type of battery
set to be used, are as follows.
• Application and its criticality
• Type of load, its duration and its nature (Cyclic, continuous, intermittent)
• Location, manned or unmanned
The practices vary from utility to utility.
13.3 DUPLICATION OF AUXILIARY DC SUPPLY SYSTEMS
With high quality DC batteries and good supervision the availability and reliability of the batteries are
satisfactory during their life cycle. The replacement of the battery is essential when the symptoms defined
for the end of their life cycle are observed.
Each battery is connected to a dedicated charger. The failure of these chargers is another cause for loss of
auxiliary supply. Generally it is supervised and when a charger fault occurs, an alarm is sent out to control
room to inform the maintenance staff. The current technology trend is towards the use of microprocessor
for the control of battery chargers. In the long term, data on charging rates and self-diagnostics shall be
available via control system of the substation. This shall then increase the availability of the auxiliary
supply.
The following combinations are used for charging the batteries :
• Single Charger with each Battery

• Two chargers with each Battery (redundancy in charger considering higher failure rate)
• Twin sets of charger and battery.
The battery capacity is often sufficient to allow the charger replacement or repairing in time. Thereby the
probability of DC auxiliary supply lost by malfunction of charger is generally very low. The duplicated DC
supply is considered essential for all the substations at 220 kV and above.
DC Auxiliary Supply Systems 233
Other causes of loss of auxiliary DC supply such as unwanted opening of DC circuit breaker or human
error during manual intervention exist and its consequences should be considered while planning the
system despite of their low probability.
Generally duplication is used on high voltage substations of 220 kV and above (and some times at 132 kV
substations of strategic importance and in 132 kV substations in generating stations), where redundant
protection schemes, each powered by independent aux power supply are provided. This arrangement
rules out common mode failures.
13.4 DUPLICATION OF DC FUSES ON AUXILIARY SUPPLY
At voltage levels below 220kV, where only one battery is used, the general practice is to provide at least
two DC circuits individually protected by supervised fuse (or suitably rated DC MCB) to supply the main
protection and back-up protection; each supplying its own trip coil separately. Other arrangements, where
more DC feeders are provided, are described below. Each of these feeders is protected by fuse or a
miniature circuit breaker (MCB).
• One circuit for Main-1 protection.
• One circuit for back-up protection or Main-2 protection.

• One circuit for the trip coil 1
• One circuit for trip coil 2
The reliability of fuses, when their rating is chosen correctly with respect to the load and grading required,
is quite high. The blowing of fuses is often induced by human error during an intervention. It is a good
practice to supervise each separately fused circuit with a no volt relay and an alarm sent to the control
room.
Even though reliability of fuses is high, availability of the right fuse element when replacement is required
could be a problem and for this reason use of miniature circuit breakers of adequate breaking capacity
instead of fuses is recommended.
The auxiliary contact of such MCBs should be used to send alarm to control room to indicate their operation.
If an auxiliary contact is not available use of no volt relay shall be made for this purpose.
13.5 DUPLICATION OF TRIP COILS
The battery duplication associated with two main systems of protection completely independent of each
other, implies most of the time, the duplication of trip coils in order to ensure the complete redundancy of
the protection system. This means each primary system is associated with its own circuit breaker trip coil.
Even when the relay system consists of a high-speed main protection and a low speed back-up protection,
normal practice is to energize one set of trip coils with the main relaying system and second set with the
back-up protection.
In order to avoid an unwanted breaker failure relay operation, possible solutions are:
• The breakerfailure protection relay reissuesthetrip signal through instantaneous trip feature to both the
trip coils.
• Both trip coils are energized from each relay system i.e., Main-1 and Main-2 trip both trip coils (cross
tripping)
In case of modern circuit breakers the probability of trip coil failure is low and its contribution in total failure
rate of the circuit breaker is generally negligible.
Energising the trip coil for too long a time can cause this failure. Human error and auxiliary contact failures
are the main causes for this. The human error is generally detected and the damaged trip coil is replaced.
To take care of failures due to other causes it is necessary to supervise the trip coil circuit continuously by
providing a trip circuit supervision relay. If there is no supervision of the trip coil circuit, and such failures
are not detected, it might lead to circuit breaker failure.
In EHV/UHV circuit breakers, though this failure risk is low, it is recommended to duplicate trip coil on each
circuit breaker, with each trip coil being supplied from different batteries or from a separately fused common
battery. Monitoring and supervision of both trip coils should also be carried out.
13.6 BATTERY GROUND FAULT DETECTORS
Battery ground fault detectors are often used to detect ground faults on either bus/rail of the battery. The
battery ground detector reduces the likelihood of simultaneous ground faults on both the negative and
positive rails, and consequent loss of the battery supply due to operation of fuse or MCB. Very effective
digital protection and supervision schemes are available for detection of ground faults in DC system.
13.7 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DUPLICATION OF DC SUPPLY SYSTEMS AND DC DISTRIBUTION

SCHEMES
The following guidelines for designing a suitable DC distribution system have been set forth.
13.7.1 For 400 kV stations there shall be two separate battery systems available for protection, control and
tripping/closing operations. For 220 kV stations where only one set of battery source is available
segregation of protection and trip circuits in two groups may be considered by giving DC supplies
through separate fuses.
13.7.2 Distribution of DC supply shall be done bay wise to feed the following
(a) Protection
(b) CB functions
(c) Isolator/earth switch functions
(d) Annunciation/Indications
(e) Monitoring functions(Disturbance Recorder, Fault Locator, Event Logger etc.) when these are not
integral part of protection
13.7.3 (a) Protection Function
For each group of protectionfie Group A and Group B relays) separate DC sources are recommended.
(b) CB Functions
Trip coil 1&2 shall be fed from separate sources. Closing coil can be from either of these two sources.
(c) Isolator/Earth switch
These associated with any one circuit shall be fed from one of the two DC sources. In the case of a 1 & 1/
2 CB arrangement, the Isolator/Earth switch associated with the tie CB can be fed from either Source 1 or
2.
(d) Annunciation & Indication

For each bay, these functions can be fed from either one of the 2 sources. Each function shall be fed
however through separate feeds.
DC Auxiliary Supply Systems 235
(e) Monitoring Functions if not part of the protection relay, can be grouped in 3 groups
(i) Disturbance Recorders

(ii) Fault Locators
(iii) Event Loggers
All the three groups shall be fed through separate feeds from either of the two sources. This is to enable
the full availability of these equipment irrespective of that of the protections.
236
CHAPTER 14
SWITCHING DEVICES
Circuit breakers are primarily used to interrupt fault currents. In this chapter, the reliability of circuit breakers
the practice of duplicating the trip coils are discussed.
A circuit breaker is required to clear the faults in the system or remove the abnormalities by isolating the
defective system. Circuit breakers interrupt the fault current when it receives a trip command from the
protection system that has detected the abnormality or power system fault. But the circuit breaker is also
vulnerable to faults and can fail to open and break the fault current. These can then cause abnormalities
in the power system.
It is therefore necessary to distinguish between two sets of reliability data for circuit breakers. Firstly, the
number of power system faults that a circuit breaker clears and secondly, the probability when the circuit
breaker fails to clear the fault or fails to follow the command to open. These two aspects are often put
together.
14.1 TYPES OF CIRCUIT BREAKERS
The circuit breaker type is identified by the type of dielectric media used to interrupt the fault or load
current. The types of dielectric used for the EHV circuit breakers are Oil, Air and SF6 gas. Vacuum circuit
breakers are used mainly in medium voltage applications. From the construction point of view, both for air
insulated substations (AIS) and gas insulated substations (GIS), the various types of circuit breakers in
service are dead tank circuit breakers and live tank circuit breakers. SF6 circuit breakers are of the most
recent technology and have been used extensively since 1975 in the transmission networks.
The operating mechanisms used are either pneumatic, hydraulic, spring charged or their combinations.
14.2 REQUIREMENTS ON CIRCUIT BREAKERS
For protection purposes the following requirements are relevant:

• Operating time
• Breaking capacity
• Stuck breaker probability
• Operating sequence /duty cycle
For the design purpose, the following requirements are relevant:

• Circuit breaker trip coil burden
• Circuit breaker auxiliary switch contacts to give position indications to the protection system
14.3 RELIABILITY OF CIRCUIT BREAKERS
It is important to know the failure rate for switching devices because uncleared faults, due to failure of
circuit breaker to follow the trip command, would cause extensive damage in the power system. It is also
important to know the failure rate probability of a circuit breaker to fail to open (stuck breaker) and interrupt
the fault current.
Switching Devices 237
The table below shows probabilities of circuit breaker not opening on command or not breaking the current,
during manual or automatic opening to perform switching or to remove a fault. This could be considered as
stuck breaker probability. The probability has decreased from 0.95 to 0.24 stuck breakers per 10,000
commands between 1974-77 and 1988-91. This shows that as technology of breaking has improved, the
probability of stuck breaker has come down.
Table 14.1 CIGRE WG 13.06 survey data on probability of circuit

breaker to open or break carried out in 1988-91
System voltage Probability of failure to open or break per 10,000 demands
1974-77 survey 1988-91 survey
63-100 kV 0.18 0.077

100-200 kV 0.92 0.204
200-300 kV 1.49 0.3
300-500 kV 3.8 0.637

500 kV 9.95 0.842
All Voltages 0.95 0.240
The third survey was carried out from 2004 to 2007 and included single pressure SF6 circuit breakers of all
ages. 26 countries from 83 utilities worldwide participated and data from 281,000 circuit breaker years was
utilized. This survey revealed that 54% of the HV circuit breakers are applied to overhead line bays, 24%
in transformer bays, 10% as bus couplers and 6% connected to cables. Interestingly shunt reactors and
capacitor banks represented only 1.5% and 3% respectively of the total population, but were responsible
for more than 20% of major failures; because they were operated more frequently than others. The positive
outcome of this survey was that the major failure per 100 circuit breaker years, which was 1.58 in the first
survey and 0.67 in the second, dropped to 0.3. The change from first to second survey was mainly due to
change from old technology to single pressure SF6 technology, whereas the change from second to third
can be attributed to more efficient design with respect to mechanical energy consumption (which means
less mechanical stress on the circuit breakers)
It is important to limit the damage to circuit breakers from switching transients due to capacitive currents
in long transmission lines. There are various options which can be considered such as insertion of full time
inductor, pre insertion inductor, zero crossing breaker mechanism and pre insertion resistor (PIR). Out of
the above, PIR not only reduces the capacitive current transients but also reduces voltage transients. The
PIR involves momentary insertion of a resistive device into the circuit before full energization of the
circuit. It involves two stages – the initial circuit is made through PIR and then the resistor is shunted as the
main circuit breaker contacts close. It is recommended to use PIR for 400kV and above lines which are
more than 200kms long.
It is also recommended that the utilities maintain the circuit breaker performance data through appropriate
fault reporting procedure and maintenance of records of circuit breaker operation. This will be useful in
planning back-up protection and other actions pertaining to circuit breaker performance and maintenance.
14.4 DUPLICATION OF TRIP COILS
Most modern EHV systems have duplicated main protections as a standard feature and the requirement of
circuit breakers to have two trip coils. The speed of operation of circuit breaker will dictate the wattage of
trip coils and type of trip coil arrangements. A larger wattage may not be desirable from security point of
view. The trip current to the trip coil will be disconnected by the reliable auxiliary contact of circuit breakers.
CHAPTER 15
PROTECTION SCHEMES USING

TELECOMMUNICATION
Protection systems must meet sensitivity, time response, selectivity and reliability requirements in order to
meet fault clearing requirements. Protection schemesapplied to geographically separated terminals such
as cables or lines, very seldom meet all these requirements without using telecommunications.For example,
stand-alone step-distance schemes, provide very reliable and sensitive protection capable of clearing
faults without using telecommunications, but time response for end zone faults is longer and high-speed
auto-reclosing is not possible without telecommunication. Telecommunications aretherefore needed to
ensure that time response and selectivity requirements are met for all power system fault conditions.
Telecommunications is also essential for some types of protection schemes, like analog comparison
schemes, to operate.
15.1 PROTECTION SYSTEMS
There are two methods of using telecommunication in protection schemes:

• Non unit protection:A protection whose operation and section selectivity are dependent on the
measurement of electrical quantities at one end of the protected section by the measuring relays and,
in some cases, on the exchange of logic signals between the ends.
• Unit protection:A protection whose operation and section selectivity are dependent on the comparison
of electrical quantities at each end of the protected section
15.2 BASIC METHODS
The basic methods of using telecommunication for line protection schemesmay be broadly classified as
follows:
• Analog Comparison Schemes: Analog comparison protection is based on the transmission and
comparison of electrical parameters such as currents (amplitude and/or phase) between the various
terminals. It is also called unit protection
• State Comparison Schemes: State comparison protection schemes use communication channels to
share logical status information between the terminals. It is also called non unit protection
15.2.1 Analog Comparison Schemes
In analog comparison protection terminals at each end sends its sample currents to each other and compares
them with the remote ones.When an internal fault occurs, the result of the comparison will be a differential
value, so that, if it ishigher than a threshold, the relay will initiate the trip.
It is applicable to any overhead line or cable at all voltage levels and for any type of system
neutralarrangement.It is particularly suitable where:
• Distance relays (without acceleration schemes) have limitations, for example.

Very short lines and cables due to their low impedance, which makes it difficult to find an adequate
setting to get an instantaneous trip for faults on the main part of the line
Protection Schemes Using Telecommunication 239
Multi-terminal lines, since the intermediate in feeds modify the impedance seen by the distance relays,
which depends not only on the distance to the fault, but also on the infeedfrom the remote terminals,
making difficult for an accurate measure of the impedance
• No potential transformers and only current transformers are installed at each end of the line
Analog comparison protections have the following advantages:
• Not responsive to system swings and out-of-step conditions
• Unaffected by inadvertent loss-of-potential (i.e., due to a blown potential fuse)

• No mutual coupling problems from parallel lines.
• Not subject to transient problems associated with coupling capacitor potential devices.
• With segregated current differential there are no problems of phase selection for single pole auto-
reclosing at simultaneous faults on different circuits and phases close to one line end, because it
operates only for faults between current transformers in each phase.
• Some relaying problems in EHV transmission lines due to applying series capacitors are also overcome,
e.g. voltage reversal, current inversion or phase imbalance.
Analog comparison protection are of the following types:
15.2.1.1 Current Differential Line Protection
It is based in the principle of current comparison. The Figure 15.1 shows a basic scheme of the differential
line protection.Current differential relaysmeasure the current of the protected line at both ends. A local
relay sends the current values (iA)to the remote end and receives the currentvalues from the remote end
(iB) via a telecommunication system.In each relay, an evaluation circuit compares the sum of the local and
remote current values, i.e. the differential current (iD), with an operation threshold value Iop. For a fault on
the protected line the differential current value will exceed the operation threshold value,a trip signal is
sent to the local circuit breaker.
The current values used in the differential protection must be taken at the same instant at all ends of the
line for comparison, so a delay compensation circuit is needed for the localvalues to compensate the
transmission time of the remote values.
Fig. 15.1 : Principle of differential line protection.

15.2.1.1.1 Telecommunication Systems used for Differential Line Protection
Differential Protection Systems Using Pilot Wires
Pilot wires consist of a pair of metallic wires normally embedded in an aerial or underground cable. Pilot
wires connect both ends electrically and establish a differential circuit where the secondary quantities may
be in the form of current signals or voltage signals, which are proportional to the primary current. The
application of differential protection using pilot wires is restricted on lines up to 10-25 km depending upon
the scheme used. Although the tendency is to replace pilot wires by optical fibers which are free from
electromagnetic interference, their use may still be justified for economic reasons. Traditionally,
electromechanical pilot wire differential relays are used. It is possible to use pilot wires for the digital
communications channel. It may be used to replace aging and sometimes obsolete pilot wire relays with a
modern numerical line differential relays using proper interfacing modems.
Differential Protection Systems Using Modulation or Coding Techniques
Modulation or coding techniques that are compatible with analog and digital telecommunication circuits
are used to overcome some of the shortfalls experienced with direct pilot wires coupling. Typical techniques
that are used:
• Frequency modulation (FM) for analog voice frequency (VF) channels. The instantaneous current values
at each terminal are transmitted as analog quantities to the other terminals in a voice frequency band
using frequency modulation. Whatever transmission media for analog voice channels may be applied.
• Numerical coding for digital telecommunication systems The instantaneous current values at each
end of the power line are sampled, converted to digital data and transmitted towards the other terminals
through a digital telecommunication system.
• Dedicated optical fibers. Direct optical fiber links between protection terminals are also used. A higher
reliability is achieved because intermediate devices are eliminated.
Multi-terminal Configuration
The differential principle may be applied to multi-terminal lines. The protection relies on the sum of the
inflowing currents, which are added geometrically. For this purpose, the measuring circuits have to be
so arranged that at each end of the line, the local current and the currents from each of the others ends
of the line are available for comparison. Generally, the most recent designs allow up to five terminals
applications.
Fig. 15.2 : Five terminal line with master-slave system

In master-slave system, the current samples are sent from all slave relays to one master relay where the
evaluation is made, and trip signals are sent to the remote ends when needed. In this system, communication
channel is only needed between the master, and each one of the slave relays as shown in Figure 15.2.
Fig. 15.3 : Five terminal line with master-master system
In master-master system, current samples are exchanged between all relays, and an evaluation is made
in each relay. This means that a communication channel is needed between every relay included in the
same line differential protection zone as shown in Figure 15.3.
For a two-terminal system, the master-slave configuration can be used, but a master-master, where the
current information is exchanged between both terminals and evaluated at both ends is normally preferred,
since this gives a shorteroperating time than that in a master-slave configuration.
Current samples from relays located geographically apart from each other, must be time coordinated so
that the current differential protection operates correctly.
15.2.1.2 Phase Comparison Protection
Phase comparison compares the phase angle of the fault current at the two terminals of the protected line.
If the two currents are essentially equal and 180degrees out of phase, the relays detect an external fault
and do not initiate a trip. If these two currents areessentially in phase, the relays detect it as an internal
fault and initiate a trip to the appropriate breakers.
15.2.2 State Comparison Schemes
Protection systems in this class are based on the transmission of simple two-state information, “Yes/No” command,
from one end of the protected circuit to the other. The protection equipment sends a command when it detects
power systemabnormality and faults. The protections that send commands can be grouped as under:
• Those which send a command to trip

• Those which send command to block
The former includes those that perform direct tripping (as for isolation of un-switched shunt reactor on line)
from the received signal, and those that perform tripping dependent on the conditions of relays at the
receiving end after receipt of the command “to trip”.
In the second case, a block command is in itself sufficient to block the tripping at the receiving end.
The choice of protection scheme, e.g., tripping or blocking, and the method by which the command is
transmitted, depends upon a number of factors that include the type of information links and their
susceptibility to interference. The following sections give typical examples of protections in this class.
15.2.2.1 Systems Based on a Command “To Trip”
The main forms of protection that fall under this type are:
• Direct inter-tripping (sometimes called transfer tripping)
• Direct tripping command e.g.: for shunt reactor faults. (Such commands are usually coded for security
reasons)
• Accelerated distance protection
• Permissive under reaching transfer tripping (PUTT)
• Permissive overreaching transfer tripping (POTT)
In all the cases, the transmission of information from one end to another indicates that a fault in the
forward direction has been detected at the sending end.
The transmission of information takes place on a faulty line and thus they face attenuation problems.
15.2.2.2 Systems Based on a Command “To Block Tripping”
In this class of protection, communication signal (CS) is sent to remote end when the fault is detected in
the reverse direction. Tripping is carried out when this blocking signal is not received within a certain time
(20-40 ms) and the local relay has detected a fault in the forward direction. To allow for this time, the
tripping is delayed by the time required to receive the signal from remote end.
Thus the receipt of a signal, blocks the local protection from initiating tripping. Therefore, in a blocking
scheme no tripping signal is transmitted along the faulted line, instead the signals are transmitted to the
remote ends on healthy lines.
In blocking schemes, the transmission of signal is an essential requirement for avoiding unwanted tripping
on external faults. Any failure of information link does not generally affect the ability of the protection to trip
correctly for internal faults but can permit unwanted tripping for external faults. Therefore a short transmission
time and good dependability are more important than security.
15.3 COMMON TELEPROTECTION SCHEMES
The different schemes, together with associated zone settings, permissive criteria and tele-command
mode, are summarized in Table 15.1. Depending upon the requirements of the systems, there are many
variations and combinations of the basic categories given below:
15.3.1 Permissive Schemes
As mentioned earlier in permissive schemes the communication signal (CS) is sent to remote end when
the fault is detected in forward direction. Tripping is carried out when the communication signal carrier
receive (CR) is received and the local relay has detected a forward fault.
• In a permissive under reaching scheme the communication signal is sent from a zone that under
reaches the remote end.
• In a permissive overreaching scheme the communication signal is sent from a zone that overreaches
the remote end.
Table 15.1: Properties of command protection systems

Operating mode Under Over-reaching Permissive criteria General requirements
reaching sending receiving
sending
Permissive Zone-1 Under impedance Secure and fast
Under reach Under voltage Over
current Distance
and direction
Permissive Zone-2 Distance and direction Secure and Fast

overreach
Direct Trip Zone-1 None Secure & Dependable
Accelerated
Under reach Zone-1 Zone-2 Secure and Fast
Blocking Reverse Distance and direction Fast and Dependable

overreach looking
15.3.1.1 Permissive under Reach Schemes
In a permissive under reaching scheme, the communication signal is sent from a zone that under reaches
the remote end. Receipt of the signal at the other end initiates tripping, if the remote end protection at the
other end has detected the fault.
In order to have high security, the receiving end must not be sensitive to false signals coming from adjacent
lines. These false signals are usually generated when faults occur, or when circuit breaker or isolators
operation takes place. Because of the overreaching of the permissive device, a false signal received can
lead to a non-selective tripping.
In a double circuit power line, a noise signal can easily be transmitted from the faulty to the healthy power
line due to the mutual coupling between the two circuits. Precautions must be taken against such non-
selective tripping.
15.3.1.2 Permissive Overreach Schemes
In a permissive overreaching scheme, the communication signal is sent from a zone that overreaches the
remote end. Receipt of the signal at the other end initiates tripping, if the remote end protection has
detected the fault.
The permissive overreaching schemes are advantageous for the protection of short transmission lines.
The reason being the overreaching zones can be set to detect larger fault resistances compared to under
reaching zones and this helps in detecting high resistance faults in short transmission lines. It can be
generally said that they have the following advantages for short transmission lines.
• Better performance for high resistance faults

• Superior to pilot wire as digital decisions are exchanged instead of analogue signals.
• Superior to phase comparison relays which requires faithful communication of phase Information
Teleprotection requirements are similar to those described under section permissive under reach.
The operating time of the protection system for all positions of faults on the protected line circuit includes
the overall transmission time, and this should be relatively short, i.e. of the order of 15-30 ms or less.
15.3.2 Direct Trip
Typical applications for direct transfer tripping are remote tripping for operations of protections like breaker
fail protection and reactor protection intertripping. Underreach with direct transfer tripping, (line protection)
is an exception.
In the case of direct tripping, the tripping command from the teleprotection equipment goes directly to the
circuit breaker tripping coil. Thus a spurious tripping signal resulting either from interference or human
error will cause unwanted, usually three-phase, tripping of the line and will block the operation of any auto-
reclosure relay. A genuine transfer tripping signal, on the other hand, must on no account be lost, whether
there is interference on the communications channel or not, otherwise the line fault would not be isolated
resulting in serious consequences.
Extremely high security and high dependability are therefore more important than transmission time for
direct transfer tripping. In order to fulfill these requirements, coded tripping is used. Coded signals (Frequency
shift signals) provide the necessary additional security against incorrect interpretation of speech, audio
signals coupled into the system and incorrect manipulations on the equipment. Coded frequency can
provide adequate reliability in respect of both dependability and security with fast overall operating times.
Normally a redundant channel is used in all cases where direct tripping is used.
15.3.3 Accelerated Under Reach
This is generally a distance protection using telecommunication, with under reach protection at each section
end, and in which a signal is transmitted when a fault is detected by the under reach protection. Receipt of the
signal at the other end permits a sequential measurement by an overreach zone to initiate tripping.
The acceleration scheme in which the basic zone is switched to extend beyond the basic transmission line
protected is not quite as fast in operation as the other permissive under reach distance schemes. This is
because an extra time is required for the directional measuring unit to make a new measurement and
operate after the range has been extended from Zone-1 to Zone-2. However when the security requirements
(to avoid a non-selective operation due to the receipt of a spurious signal) is dominant, this scheme
although slightly slower than the other permissive schemes, is safer from unwanted operation.
Reliability requirements on the teleprotection are about the same as for other permissive schemes, with
the difference that the security requirements are slightly less severe.
15.3.4 Blocking Overreach
Blocking schemes are used when communication signals are not to be transmitted over faulty line or when
boosting of signal is not permitted.
In this class of protection, communication signal (CS) is sent to remote end when the fault is detected in
the reverse direction. Tripping is carried out when thisblocking signal is not received within a certain time
(20-40 ms) and the local relay has detected a fault in the forward direction. For a fault on the line, the
reverse-looking directional units at the two ends do not send blocking signals and the overreaching first
zones trip their respective circuit breakers.
Thus the receipt of a signal blocks the local protection from initiating tripping. In a blocking scheme no
tripping signals are transmitted along the faulted line, instead the signals are transmitted along the
healthy lines to the remote ends for faults in the reverse direction to prevent tripping of the overreaching
protections.
In blocking schemes, the transmission of signal is an essential requirement for avoiding unwanted tripping
on external faults. Any failure of information link does not generally affect the ability of the protection to trip
correctly for internal faults but can permit unwanted tripping for external faults. An incorrect signal for a
fault on the protected line cannot prevent tripping, but only delay it. The loss or appreciable delay of the
blocking signal for an external fault will, however, cause false tripping of the protected line. Since the
overreaching first zone of the relays have to be delayed sufficiently long to allow time for a blocking signal
to be received, a short and consistent transmission time for the blocking signal is essential. It is important
that the transmission time should not increase due to interference.
Therefore it follows from these considerations that a short transmission time and good dependability are
more important than security.
In blocking systems, the transmission of a command is not required in the case of an internal fault. Thus,
internal faults that might delay or interrupt the telecommand are not a problem, and the additional attenuation
normally introduced by the fault path need not be considered while defining the requirements of PLC link unlike
in the case of permissive systems mentioned under permissive under reach and accelerated under reach.
Because of the possibility of a non-selective operation in the case of failure of the teleprotection, supervision
features may be included to change the settings of the overreaching zones of relays to the normal 70-80%
of the protected circuit in such a cases. Thus it is necessary to monitor the signals continuously both ways
or to provide some forms of automatic self-checking facilities for the channels.
15.3.5 Echo Policies
It could be useful in some teleprotection schemes to return the received signal as a way to accelerate
tripping at the other end. Examples of this application can be found in weak end in feed condition which
can occur on a transmission line, either when the circuit breaker is open, so there is no current in feed from
that line end, or when the current in feed is low due to weak generation behind the protection. The following
will happen in various schemes of teleprotection described above.
• In permissive overreach schemes both circuit breakers may fail to trip instantaneously due to no
carrier send signal and no relay operation in weak end.
• In permissive under reach schemes fast fault clearance of the whole line section will not be there
because no signal will be sent from the weak end.
• In blocking scheme or permissive under reach scheme the low in feed end will fail to trip instantaneously.
To overcome these problems in lines connecting a strong and a weak station and in permissive overreaching
scheme, the weak end has to be equipped with a weak in-feed logic and a step of the protection relay will
be reverse looking. If a teleprotection signal is received at the weak end and if the protection does not see
the fault backwards or forwards and there exists an under voltage condition, an internal fault is assumed
and the signal is echoed back allowing tripping. The logic also sends trip signal to CB on the weak end
side. Due to implementation of weak end in feed logic described above the following will happen.
• In case of permissive under each scheme the last 10-20% towards weak end will be cleared in Zone 2
time. If this is not acceptable overreach scheme should be used.
• In blocking scheme weak end circuit breaker cannot be tripped. In such case direct tripping from Zonel
and accelerated zone must be used.
• When operating with one end disconnected or open, it may be useful to continuously send
permissive/acceleration signal. With this method, the trip will be faster as the connected end does not
have to wait for the echoed signal.
It is recommended that, on case-to-case basis, utilities consider using echo signals in the protection systems,
as, for example, weak end in feed tripping logic. Such features are usually available in the modern numerical
relays.
15.4 NOISE AND INTERFERENCE CREATED BY THE POWER SYSTEM
Telecommunication systems may fail to perform correctly because of interference from the power system.
Equipment failure and human errors by maintenance staff are a few other reasons for failure of the system
to operate.
The interference from the power system may exist during normal operation or may arise at power system
faults. The severity of the interference depends on the signal-to-noise ratio, the spectrum, and the duration
and time of interference.
15.4.1 Perturbations During Normal Operation
15.4.1.1 Corona
The level of noise due to Corona depends on the power system voltage, the climatic conditions and the
type of information link. The presence of Corona does not generally affect protection, except possibly in
some cases of very low power (1W or less) Power Line Carrier equipment on 220 kV circuits and above.
It may be noted that the PLC transmitters used in India normally have peak envelop power capabilities in
the range of 20-80 watts. It may, however, be noted that for most of the lines the carrier strength of 20 watts
meets all the requirement of adequate signal to noise ratio.
15.4.1.2 Isolator Operation
The operation of an isolator (with total opening time of 6 seconds or so) causes re-striking arcs at least
for 3 seconds for 400 kV systems. They generate high amplitude bursts of high frequency current. The
repetition frequency of the bursts is in the order of 1kHZ or more. The duration of the pulse-train exceeds
0.5 to 6s. The pulse train constitutes a high-energy broadband noise source that gives rise to poor signal-
to-noise ratios.
15.4.1.3 Switching by Circuit Breakers
The switching in or out of a circuit, e.g., a line or a transformer, produces high frequency oscillation, which is
coupled to the equipment in a similar manner as mentioned under isolator operation. The duration of this
type of noise is however limited to the arcing time of the circuit breaker, and is typically around 20 ms or less.
15.4.2 Perturbations During Power System Disturbances
15.4.2.1 Arcing Faults
At the onset of fault arc and before the arc is fully established, the noise levels are relatively high and have
duration of up to 5ms. When the arc is established, the noise falls to a lower level. The arc and the noise
level remain unaffected until the circuit breaker operates.
15.4.2.2 Interruption of Fault Current
A breaker generates high-frequency noise at the interruption of fault current. The duration of such noise is
of the order of 1-3 ms and the frequencies lie in the range up to at least 50 kHZ. The short duration of the
noise compared to the response time of the protection system reduces its significance.
15.4.3 Effect of Different Forms of Interference on Teleprotection
The importance of the different forms of interference depends on the signal-to-noise ratios, the frequency
spectrum, duration of the interference and the time at which it takes place. Generally, the type of interference
generated under isolator operation is the most serious because of its high amplitude, wide frequency
spectrum, duration and frequency of occurrence. Because it occurs under normal conditions, it is important
in relation to causing unwanted operation of systems based on a “command to trip” where permissive
features are not used.
Interference caused during power system faults and their clearance, although less severe than in case of
isolator operation, are important because they occur at the time during which the teleprotection is in active
operation. Furthermore, protective relays on other circuits may at this time be activated. Interference from
normal circuit-breaker operation and corona are generally the least severe.
15.5 RELIABILITY OF THE INFORMATION LINK
The main parameters of an information link are:

• Transmission Time
• Dependability
• Security
• Availability
The optimum compromise between these parameters differs according to the particular application (blocking,
permissive tripping, direct transfer tripping). A protection-signaling concept is always a compromise; the
application defines the best compromise.
15.5.1 Transmission Time
The transmission time of a teleprotection system is the time elapsed between the instant of change in state
at the command input and the instant of the corresponding change in state at the command output, excluding
propagation time.
The nominal transmission time T0 is the time that elapses from the instant a signal is applied to the input
of the teleprotection transmitter until it appears at the output of the teleprotection receiver. The nominal
transmission time T0 is the transmission time measured under noise-free transmission conditions. The
measurement is carried out with the transmitter and receiver connected back-to-back and there is no
interference on the channel.
The maximum actual transmission time Tac is the maximum transmission time encountered under noisy
conditions for a defined dependability and signal-to-noise (S/N) ratio or bit error rate (BER). The actual
transmission time is measured withcontinuous white noise or with random bit errors applied to the
transmission path depending upon the type of teleprotection system.
Since a longer transmission time enhances signal reliability with respect to mal-operation, the transmission
time should not be chosen shorter than really required for the application.
15.5.2 Dependability
Dependability relates to the ability to issue and receive a valid command in the presence of interference
and/or noise.
Noise may disrupt a teleprotection channel by delaying a genuine command signal or by preventing the
receiver from delivering a command.
Dependability is a measure of the system’s ability to receive output trip commands during adverse signal
conditions. It characterizes the receiver’s ability to recognize a genuine tripping signal within a given time
in spite of interference on the communications channel.
15.5.3 Security
Security relates to the ability to prevent interference and noise from generating a command state at the
receiving end when no command signal is transmitted.
Security is a measure of the communication system’s ability not to trip falsely under adverse signal conditions.
Security is the property of the receiver not to generate spurious tripping signals in the presence of interference
on the communication channel.
15.5.4 Availability
The availability of equipment is also very important. This will depend on the mean time between failure,
MTBF, and the mean time to repair, MTTR, which is the time it takes to repair a fault.
15.5.5 Recommendations for Measurement of Security and Dependability
Reliability is always a concern for teleprotection systems. Reliability is a compromise between security and
dependability. Security is the ability to properly restrain from tripping when not called for and dependability is
the ability to trip when required. While security is not improved by increased redundancy, dependability is.
It is recommended that utilities measure dependability and security of each teleprotection equipment and
keep a record. The data may be based on time stamped data from teleprotection devices or event loggers.
This may be valuableinformation to monitor the performance of the telecommunication equipment and the
data can be used in taking decisions regarding maintenance, retrofitting and modernization. It may also be
desirable to carry out field tests as a part of acceptance tests to measure the security and dependability of
the carrier signals.
For detailed definitions of these parameters, reference may be made to IEC 60834-1 Teleprotection
equipment of power systems - Performance and Testing (Part 1: Command Systems).
15.6 OUTPUT POWER OF POWER LINE CARRIER SETS
While planning a carrier system it is recommended that, the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is calculated
considering the noise level for the various system voltages, weather conditions, line attenuation at the
operating carrier frequencies. If the calculated SNR is not adequate the output power of the carrier set may
have to be increased. For long power lines this check is particularly important.
A typical SNR calculation takes in to account the following parameters into consideration.
• Line voltage
• Line length
• Line configuration (e.g: conductor diameter, number of bundles and transpositions)

• Frequency band used
• PLC transmit power
• Mode of Coupling
IEC 60663 “Planning of (Single -sideband) Power line carrier system” gives details of these calculations.
The available SNR for PLC links should be better than the limits specified in this IEC standard, for speech,
data and teleprotection signals.
For a given transmission line, the SNR can be improved by increasing output power of the carrier set.
Better SNR will help the link to perform properly during adverse and uneven weather conditions.
For teleprotection, it is recommended to use single tone and the maximum power for the commands
during its transmission. This maintains good SNR for the commands during interference in the lines and
increases the reliability that the command be received at the other end, thereby improving security and
dependability figures.
15.7 COUPLING MODES OF TELEPROTECTION CHANNELS
PLC equipment are most commonly used in relaying communication channels protecting high voltage
transmission lines.
Where phase-to-ground coupling is used for teleprotection channel, it has to be kept in mind that the phase
used for coupling could be seriously affected by a fault, in which case the efficiency and reliability of the
channel will be drastically reduced.
Phase-to-phase or inter-circuit or intersystem coupling involves double the number of coupling elements
and consequently more expensive, but it has the following advantages:
• The line attenuation will be lowerthan the phase-to-ground coupling arrangement.
• There is less radiation with phase-to-phase coupling.
• Greater security, since even if one phase conductor breaks, the other coupling continues to work as
phase-to-ground system.
Inter-phase or phase-to-phase coupling provides success probability up to 92%. Though the cost of this is
more compared to phase to ground coupling cost, it is strongly recommended to use this mode of phase-
to-phase coupling or intercircuit coupling when fault clearance time is critical. Therefore the following are
recommended wherever carrier protection is used.
• Phase-to-phase coupling for 765 kV and 400kV lines.
• Phase-to-Phase coupling or intercircuit coupling for 220 kV and 132 kV lines.
15.8 ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THEMOST COMMONLY USED LINKS
All communications systems are subject, in varying degrees, to interference and noise of various forms.
These can corrupt the information arriving at the receiver, either by simulating a signal when no real signal
exists, or by preventing or delaying operation of a real signal. When the signal-to-noise ratio falls to less
than some critical value, the probability of the correct transmission of a message decreases rapidly and
the probability of incorrect and unwanted operation increases. The critical value is a complex function of
the properties of the particular telecommunication system. There are four possible states of a
telecommunication system when used for protection and these have to be considered in relation to the
transmission and reception of information. They are shown in the Table 15.2.
Table 15.2 : Response of a teleprotection channel
Condition of communication n channel at receiving end State of protection
at sending end
(a) If a command is generated The command is received and “Wanted action”, i.e., correct Trip
obeyed or Block is ensured
(b) If a command is generated The command is not received “Missing action” i.e. either
or obeyed failure to trip or failure to block (Unwanted operation)
(c) A command is not generated A command is present received “Unwanted action” either unwanted
and obeyed tripping or unwanted blocking
(d) A command is not generated A command is not present “No action”correct

The design of teleprotection systems, and the ways in which information links are used, need to take
account of practical limitations arising from the fact that influence of interference cannot be completely
avoided. In many cases it is possible to choose design criteria giving emphasized importance to producing
“wanted tripping” compared with avoiding “unwanted tripping”, or vice versa, in relation to the effects of
interference and/or failure of the telecommunication system. The balance between these i.e. risk of
“unwanted tripping” and reliability of “wanted tripping” depends largely on basic considerations such as the
requirements of the power system and the characteristics of the protection system.
The following are the most commonly used teleprotection equipment used by utilities in India:
• Power line carrier (PLC) equipment. This is based on a capacitive connection of signals with frequency
in the range 32- 500 kHz on the power line.
• Fiber Optic Links. Optical fibers have the advantage to be insensitive to noise and can transmit a huge
amount of information.
Radio / Microwave links are other modes of communication but are not used for various reasons in India
for teleprotection application. Tables 15.3 and 15.4 summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of
these.
Table 15.3 : Properties of power line carrier links
• The overhead power line is normally a • Prone to highimpulsive noise level

very reliable transmission medium. generated by line faults, lightning and isolator
breaker operation.
• Long distances, many hundreds of • Limited frequency band available. This limits
kilometers can be covered by each link the number of PLC links that can work within a
without repeaters. given network.
• Transmission takes place between the two • Limited bandwidth (4 kHz) restricting the
stations, which are interconnected for minimum transmission time for a teleprotection
teleprotection purpose. command system to approximately 12 ms.
• The equipment is situated at the • Additional attenuation in case of line faults.
substation, giving easy access for control
and maintenance.
• PLC equipment is reliable with a high • Limited power due to national regulations.
MTBF (100 000 to 200 000 hours).
• It is the most pervasive infrastructure and • Difficulties in getting the necessary

therefore has high availability frequencies from the concerned government
authorities.
• Existing power lines are used and no
additional cables need to be laid. Therefore
tangible cost reduction in network development,
deployment and management
Table 15.4 : Properties of fiber optic links
• Insensitivity to electric and magnetic • For long distances, repeaters have to be used.
interference fields, produced by isolator
sparks, corona discharge, lightning,
radio transmitters etc.
• Fibers also pose no threat in dangerous • A break in the fiber will result in the
environments such as chemical plants loss of a huge amount of information.
where a spark could trigger an explosion.
It doesn’t corrode and is unaffected by most
chemicals.
• Potential isolation between high-voltage • Installation costs are high.
equipment and telecommunication equipment.
• The terminations of a fiber optics cable

are complex and require special tools.
• Transmission time is very low • Requires highly skilled labor to
terminate. Optical fibers cannot be
joined /spliced together as easily as
copper cable and requires additional
training of personnel and expensive
precision splicing and measurement
equipment
• No cross-talk problems. • They are more fragile than coaxial cable
• Large bandwidth.
• High transmission speed.
• Low signal loss and extraordinarily low bit
error rate.
• Their light weight and small size also make

them ideal for applications where running
copper cables would be impractical
• Reduced system costs in terms of available
band width & Reduced maintenance costs
• Last but not least is the security aspect, it is
very, very difficult to tap into a fiber cable to
read the data signals-secure communications
system.
15.9 REDUNDANCY REQUIREMENTS
Redundancy is defined as ‘the existence of more than one means for performing a given function’. It is
obvious that protective relay system dependability can be increased by added redundancy and if one of
the systems does not trip for an in-zone fault, a redundant system may. Security on the other hand, is
generally decreased by increased redundancy, as there are added devices in the system that may trip
when not called upon to do so. However, redundancy does not influence dependability and security to the
same degree.
A teleprotection scheme consists of relays, communications interface device and a communications channel.
For relaying, the preferred method of meeting reliability requirements has been to use physically separate,
redundant devices.
It is generally understood, that teleprotection redundancy will increase the dependability of the whole
system, though it will also increase the possibility of reduced security, caused by added protection relays
and not necessarily due to the new teleprotection.
If fault clearance time is critical, back-up teleprotection should be installed taking into account the following
considerations:
• Dual output contacts and input relays in distance protections.

• Separate DC battery supply or common DC battery supply separately fused for each teleprotection
equipment.
• Separate communication path for redundant audio tone channel.
• Cross-connection between channels used for Main-l and Main-2 protection.

It is recommended that redundant channels be provided for very important lines at 132 and 220 kV level as
well as for all lines at 400 kV and 765 kV utilizing PLCC channels for teleprotection.
Redundancy in telecommunication equipment may be enhanced as follows:
15.9.1 Redundancy In PLCC Equipment
• Complete PLC equipment working on the same coupling (balanced combiner which splits the signal
between the phases) or Ph-Ph coupling.
• Another PLC equipment coupled to a parallel power transmission line i.e., inter-circuit coupling can
also be considered.
15.9.2 Redundancy in Fiber Optic Equipment
15.9.2.1 Redundancy in Fiber Cable
• Two fibers from the same cable
• Two separate cable routes
15.9.2.2 Redundancy in Fiber Optic Equipment
• Two sets of equipment through different fibers of the same cable

• Two sets of equipment through fibers of different cables
• Card level redundancy (Power supply card, protection card, CPU board)
• Use of dual direction fiber optic terminal equipments FOTEs (Type SDH)
15.9.2.3 Example of Fiber Optic in Three-terminal Line Applications
Figure 15.3 shown below gives how redundant communication paths can be provided in case of three-
terminal line application. If a fiber pair already exists between each line terminal, this is accomplished
without any additional communication interfaces. The pass-through function is using the same
communication heads as the direct communication path. Similar to the double circuit line application, data
from A to B is sent both directly from A to B and on the redundant channel from A to C to B.
Fig. 15.4 : Redundant communication paths in case of three-terminal line
15.10 INTERFACES BETWEEN TELEPROTECTION AND MULTIPLEXER EQUIPMENT
The standard IEEE C37.94 describes the interconnection details for N, where N = 1, 2…12, times 64 kilobit
per second connections of teleprotection equipment to digital multiplexers using optical fiber. Requirements
for both physical connection and the communications timing are also included.
The frame structure is designed to allow the passage of information in packet format from the multiplexer to
the teleprotection equipment and from the teleprotection to the multiplexer equipment. The format was
chosen so:
(a) The frame is a valid International Telecommunications Union (ITU-T) recommendation G.704 pattern
from the standpoint of framing and data rate. However, the data structure is not a standard data format.
(b) The bit pattern would have approximately equal ones and zeroes (for transmission through accoupled
optical circuits).
(c) The frame would have an easily detected bit pattern for frame synchronization.
(d) The frame structure is identical in both directions. The frame is the same size and format regardless of
the number of 64 kilobit per second timeslots being utilized.
15.11 USE OF IEC 61850 FOR THE COMMUNICATION BETWEEN SUBSTATIONS
IEC 61850 was devised for communications within the substation, on a substation LAN. However, recognizing
the need for teleprotection in addition to the standard was made in 2009, published as a Technical Report:
IEC 61850-90-1. The Technical Report presents a number of use cases-applications requiring information
exchange between substations. The report describes the communication requirements for these applications
and gives guidelines for communication services and communication architecture to be used.
In summary, there are two methods to be used for GOOSE (Generic Object Oriented System Event)
communications between substations:
• Tunneling: When Ethernet networks are available between the substations, thecommunication service
uses an Ethernet device that provides a bridge to the remote substation LAN.
• Gateway: A teleprotection device that, while interacting with the IEC 61850 LAN, extracts the teleprotection
information from the GOOSE message and delivers it over any conventional communication link.
15.11.1 Tunneling
Tunneling is a method for connecting multiple substation networks and allowing direct access to functions in
remote stations. For IEC 61850, the relevant kinds of traffic for teleprotection are multicast GOOSE messages
on Ethernet Layer 2. The tunnel accepts the message and passes it through unchanged, and does not care
about the actual information content of the messages. Consequently, the tunnel does not need to be reconfigured
if the information exchanged between functions changes, or if additional functions exchange information.
The station network becomes extended to include the remote station. Devices (servers) in the remote stations
become addressable. Technically speaking, a route is provided for the IP addresses in the remote station.
In practice, tunnels will be established by means of network switches or routers.
Fig. 15.5 : Substation to substation communication using tunneling
15.11.2 Gateway
Gateways connect multiple substation networks by establishing indirect access to functions in remote
stations. Gateways can be used if the communication link between substations does not fully support
Ethernet communication (e.g., power line carrier, copper, radio or SONET/SDH).
Fig. 15.6 : Substation to substation communication via a Gateway

Explicit teleprotection equipment is needed. The teleprotection device on the sending side filters and
recodes information for the actual communication media used to transfer the information. On the receiving
side, the teleprotection equipment re-creates the information from the remote end to provide it in a form
that is usable for the functions in thesubstation. The teleprotection equipment on the receiving side acts as
a proxy for the function on the sending side. As far as the communication is concerned, Proxy B2 looks like
Function B2 from the view of Function A2 as shown in Figure 15.6.
15.12 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SELECTION OF COMMUNICATION CHANNELS
Security of a teleprotection system can go down if the communication channel is not of high security. In
most cases power line carrier (PLC) is widely used. As brought out earlier Fiber optic is superior to PLC
and is quite versatile. Therefore it is recommended that wherever possible Main-I protection should be
equipped with the best of teleprotection equipment, for example Fiber Optic communication using OPGW.
Especially for lines and cables it is also very important that Main-I protection and Main-2 protections cover
part of the protected equipment zone, independent of the communication channel, to provide fast opening
of the local circuit-breaker. Thus use of a non-unit protection like distance relay as one of the main protection,
is a must. This action is very useful to accomplish system stability, though, generally, time of clearance will
be greater under some conditions (one end open).
In this chapter some important aspects connected with the communication system and some recommendations
have been brought out and these should be considered. Few of these are brought out below:
• It is recommended that redundant channels should be provided for very important lines at 132 and 220
kV level and for all lines at 400 kV and 765 kV utilizing PLCC channels for teleprotection.
• Utilities should measure dependability and security of each teleprotection equipment and keep a record.
This may be valuable information to monitor the performance of the telecommunication equipment
and the data can be used in taking decisions regarding maintenance, retrofitting and modernization.
• While planning a carrier system it is recommended that, the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is calculated
considering the noise level for the various system voltages, weather conditions, line attenuation at the
operating carrier frequencies. If the calculated SNR is not adequate the output power of the carrier set
may have to be increased. For long power lines this check is particularly important.
• In case of PLCC, Inter-phase or Phase-to-Phase coupling provides high success probability. Therefore,
Phase-to-phase coupling for 765 kV and 400kV lines, Phase- to- Phase coupling or inter circuit coupling
for 220 kV and 132 kV lines is recommended to be used
• In case of short transmission lines, when distance protections are applied, the permissive overreaching
schemes are advantageous for detection of high resistance faults and are therefore to be used.
• On case-to-case basis, utilities should consider using echo signals in the protection systems, as, for
example, week end in feed tripping logic.
REFERENCES
CIGRE report, Protection using Telecommunications, CE/SC 34 34/35.11, 2001, Ref. No. 192
IEC/TR 61850-90-1, Communication networks and systems for power utility automation – Part 90-1: Use
of IEC 61850 for the communication between substations
IEC 60834-1 Ed.2, Teleprotection equipment of power systems – Performance and testing Part 1: Command
systems
IEC 60834-2 Ed.1, Teleprotection equipment of power systems – Performance and testing Part 2: Analogue
comparison systems
IEEE Std. C37.236-2013, IEEE Guide for Power System Protective Relay Applications Over Digital
Communication Channels
CHAPTER 16
BASICS FOR DESIGNING PROTECTION SCHEMES

BASED ON IEC 61850
16.1 PREFACE
Since being published in 2004, the IEC 61850 communication standard has gained more and more relevance
in the field of substation automation. It provides an effective response to the needs of the open, deregulated
energy market, which requires both reliable networks and extremely flexible technology – flexible enough
to adapt to the substation challenges of the next twenty years. IEC 61850 has not only taken over the drive
of the communication technology of the office networking sector, but it has also adopted the best possible
protocols and configurations for high functionality and reliable data transmission. Industrial Ethernet, which
has been hardened for substation purposes and provides a speed of 100 Mbit/s, 1 Gigabit,10 Gigabit and
hence enough bandwidth to ensure reliable information exchange between IEDs (Intelligent Electronic
Devices), as well as reliable communication from an IED to a substation controller. The definition of an
effective process bus offers a standardized way to digitally connect conventional as well as intelligent CTs
and VTs to relays. More than just a protocol, IEC 61850 also provides benefits in the areas of engineering
and maintenance, especially with respect to combining devices from different vendors.
The IEC 61850 international standard for communications in substations brings a new era in the development
of substations. It affects not only the design of the substation protection, monitoring and control system,
but also the design of the substation secondary circuits. High-speed peer-to-peer communications using
GOOSE messages and Sampled Analogue Values (SAV) allow development of distributed applications
based on status, current and voltage values communicated between devices connected to the substation
local area network.
IEC 61850 is a promising toolbox for communication inside a substation and outside of the substation in
the forthcoming years. It is expected to progressively replace the existing protocols and facilitate inter-
operability between vendors. The standard is a means to build substation automation projects more than a
goal in itself.
Fast automation scheme is one of the main benefits expected from the IEC 61850. One aim is initially to
replace the conventional wiring between devices. New protection schemes will appear that are not easily
feasible with the conventional technology. This might be within a substation or between substations. It is
essential not only to identify the communication requirements, but also the capability of the subscribing
devices to be configured with the right logic. Such arrangement minimizes the hardware needs between
IEDs since many hardwired signals can be replaced by communication messages. This will improve
substation design and maintenance, aid standardization of hardware communication interfaces and focuses
on version control.
Logical dataflow needs to be analysed carefully in order to avoid a bottleneck on the Ethernet network.
GOOSE messages, used to transmit peer-to-peer data are continuously repeated, so just subscribing to
any data might consume too many resources for fast automation. Defining abnormal conditions is also
essential such as the cases when some devices are missing, when the communication is broken, when an
IED is out of service or fails, etc. Special attention to redundancy and self-healing mechanisms should be
given with the communication system when used to exchange critical messages between IEDs.
Interoperability between protective IED s from different vendors in the substation becomes a necessity in
order to achieve substation level interlocking, protection and control functions, and improve the efficiency/
use of microprocessor based relay applications. Substation integration and automation can help a utility to
Basics for Designing Protection Schemes Based on IEC 61850 257
achieve reduced installation, maintenance and operational costs. This is possible because of the integration
of microprocessor-based devices (particularly protective relays) into complex transmission substation
schemes or even System Integrity Protection Scheme (SIPS). Protection functions based on exchange of
signals between multiple protection devices exist today in the form of wiring between outputs and inputs of
the different IEDs. The future goal is to replace expensive hardwired systems with ones based on the
exchange of digital signals between IEDs over a substation LAN.
The biggest obstacle in this integration process is the fact that IEDs from different manufacturers or even
from the same vendor use different communication protocols, profiles and user interfaces for real time
data acquisition, data archiving, substation control and fault record extraction. This can greatly reduce the
benefits of integration because of the need for additional hardware (such as protocol converters), software
(multiple user interface programs) and, increase engineering and staff training costs. The industry is currently
in the process of developing a universal platform according to IEC 61850 standard that will allow a “plug-
and-play” technology to replace today’s proprietary devices.
This requires a significant joint effort by experts, who until recently came from completely different fields
such as power system protection, metering, information systems, communications, energy control systems,
etc. One solution to this problem is the object-oriented approach to the client-server and peer-to-peer
communication between IEDs in the substation and across the power system.
The development of user-friendly graphical interfaces to allow the configuration of the protective device to
send and receive data over the network is also required.
16.2 INTRODUCTION TO IEC 61850
Introduction
IEC 61850 is the international standard applicable to substation automation systems (SAS) that defines
the communication between intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) in the substation, and the related system
requirements. The standard defines and offers much more than only a protocol. It provides:
(a) Standardized object oriented data models for primary plant and IED functions within the substation.
(b) Standardized communication services (the methods used to access and exchange dat((a)
(c) Standardized formats for configuration files-the Substation Configuration Language (SCL).
(d) Requirements for system engineering processes and tools) Peer-to-peer (e.g. IED-to-IE(D)
communication.
(e) Definition of conformance testing) Process Bus.
The standard currently includes mapping of data onto Ethernet. Using Ethernet in the substation offers
many advantages, most significantly including:
(a) High-speed data rates (currently 100 Mbit/s, rather than 10’s of kbit/s or less used by most serial protocols)
(b) Multiple client/server connections
(c) Ethernet is an open standard and widely used
(d) Fibre Ethernet is suited to the substation environment as it is not susceptible to EMI IEC 61850 offers
a full automation and communication solution for the substation.
16.3 HISTORY
The industry’s experiences have demonstrated the need and the opportunity for developing standard
communication protocols, which would support interoperability of IEDs from different vendors. Interoperability
in this case is the ability to operate on the same network or communication path sharing information and
commands.
The IEC 61850 standard was based partly on UCA2.0, a substation automation concept developed in the
USA under EPRI. In 1997, IEEE/EPRI and IEC TC57 decided to merge both standards to provide a global
and unique substation automation solution. The IEC 61850 standard was first issued in 2004 and comprising
14 parts. Edition 2 of the IEC 61850 standard has been released in 2010.
16.4 CONCEPTS
As seen in Figure 16.1, it enables integration of all protection, control, measurement and monitoring
functions within a substation. In order to allow a free allocation of functions to IEDs, interoperability is
provided between functions to be performed in a substation but residing in equipment (physical devices)
from different suppliers. The functions may be split physically into parts performed in different IEDs but
communicating with each other (distributed function). Therefore, the communication behaviour of such
parts called logical nodes (LN) supports the requested interoperability of the IEDs. The functions (application
functions) of a SAS are control and supervision, as well as protection and monitoring of the primary
equipment and of the grid. Other functions (system functions) are related to the system itself, for example
supervision of the communication.
The IEC 61850 standard defines the information and information exchange in a way that it is independent
of a concrete implementation (i.e., it uses abstract models). The standard also uses the concept of
virtualization. Virtualization provides a view of those aspects of a real device that are of interest for the
information exchange with other devices. Only those details that are required to provide interoperability of
devices are defined in the IEC 61850 series.
Fig. 16.1
16.5 INTEROPERABILITY
A major benefit of IEC 61850 is interoperability. IEC 61850 standardizes the data model and services
required to interface with substation IEDs. This responds to the utilities’ desire of having easier integration
for different vendors’ products, i.e. interoperability. It means that data is accessed in the same manner in
different IEDs from either the same or different IED vendors, even though, for example, the protection
algorithms of different vendors’ IED types remain different.
One of the main objectives of IEC 61850 is to allow IEDs to be directly configured from a configuration file
generated at system configuration time. At the system configuration level, the capabilities of the IED are
determined from an IED capability description file (IC(D) which is provided with the product. Using a
collection of these ICD files from varying products, the entire protection and automation of a substation
can be designed, configured and tested (using simulation tools) before the system is even installed into the
substation.
16.6 THE DATA MODEL
To ease understanding, the data model of any IEC 61850 IED can be viewed as a hierarchy of information.
The categories and naming of this information are standardized in the IEC 61850 specification. The levels
of this hierarchy can be described as follows:
Physical Device
It identifies the actual IED within a system.
Logical Device
It identifies groups of related Logical Nodes within the Physical Device. The allocation of Logical Nodes to
specific Logical Devices is not defined in the standard.
Logical Node
It identifies the major functional areas within the IEC 61850 data model. Logical Nodes are instantiated in
an IED or computer using prefix characters and/or an instance number.
Common Data Class
A Common Data Class is a composite set of data attributes, defined by the standard to relate to substation
applications. In particular, it specifies common data classes for:
Fig. 16.2
(a) Status information
(b) Measured information
(c) Controllable status information
(d) Controllable analogue set point information
(e) Status settings,

(f) Analogue settings.
(g) Specifies the data attribute types used in these common data classes.
Data Attribute
This is the actual data (measurement value, status, description, etc.). For example, stVal (status valu(e)
indicating actual position of circuit breaker for Data Object type Pos of Logical Node type XCBR. The data
model for a server is described in the Model Implementation Conformance Statement (MICS) document.
The Communication services
The communication services are the methods used to access and exchange data throughout the system.
The IEC 61850 standard defines the services for the following functions.
Client-server associations
It permits communication to be established between a client and a server.
Data model interaction
It permits retrieval of data model information (allows self-description of an IE(D) and allows writing of data
values (for example for IED configuration).
Dataset
It permits the grouping of data and data attributes. Used for direct access, GOOSE and for reporting and
logging.
Substitution
It supports replacement of a process value by another value.
Setting Group Control
It defines how to switch from one set of setting values to another one and how to edit setting groups.
Buffered Report, Unbuffered Report and Log
Generating reports and logs based on parameters set by the client. Reports may be triggered by changes
of process data values (for example, state change or dead ban (d) or by quality changes. Logs can be
queried for later retrieval. Reports may be sent immediately or deferred. Reports provide change-of-state
and sequence-of-events information exchange. The difference between buffered and un-buffered reporting
is that the former is able to store events during communication breaks and continue the sequence of
events once the connection to the client is re-established.
Control
It describes the services to control, for example, devices. Direct and Select Before Operate control types
are specified.
Generic Substation Event (GS(E)
It supports a fast and reliable system-wide distribution of input and output data values; peer-to-peer exchange
of IED binary status information, for example, a trip signal. The GOOSE messages are not command
signals. They are multicast reports of the change of state of a protection element used in a distributed
protection scheme.
Tripping model in IEC 61850
Depending on the protection scheme, one or more protection functions can operate on a Circuit Breaker.
All operate signals coming from protection LN are combined to a trip command in one protection trip
conditioning LN (PTR(C). PTRC handles the trip signal conditioning (minimum trip command duration,
single/three-pole decision, et(c).
Therefore, in general, there shall be a PTRC LN between every protection LN and the circuit breaker node
(XCBR).
Transmission of Sampled Values
Fast and cyclic transfer of sampled analogue values, for example, from instrument transformers.
Time Synchronization
It provides the time base for the device and system, using SNTP.
File Transfer
It defines the exchange of large data blocks such as disturbance record files.
The communication services for a client or server (or publisher or subscriber) are described in the Protocol
Implementation Conformance Statement (PICS) document.
16.7 IEC 61850 BASIC ARCHITECTURE
IEC 61850 Standard introduces a view of a substation automation system comprising three hierarchical
levels (station, bay and process), and hence two levels of communication network connecting these
hierarchical levels – the station bus and the process bus.
A simplified diagram with the communications architecture of an IEC 61850 Substation and Process Bus
based substation automation system is shown in Figure 16.3.
Fig. 16.3
The Merging Units (MU) interfacing with conventional or non-conventional instrument transformers multicast
sets of measured sampled values (currents and voltages) to multiple IEDs in the substation over the
substation local area network.
A “Process Bus” normally will support services defined in IEC 61850-9-2 for sampled analogue values,
but may also provide information such as the status of breakers and switches and possibly trip commands
through an input/output unit (I/OU) using the services defined in IEC 61850-8-1. In some cases the Merging
Unit and the Input/output unit can be combined in a single device.
The IEDs interface with the process bus via the Ethernet network and make decisions regarding fault
detection, faulted phase selection and protection elements operation etc., and can take action based on
their functionality. This is typically to operate their IED outputs in order to trip a breaker or to initiate some
other protection or control function (e.g. BF Breaker Failure or AR Auto-Reclose functions).
Interaction between different IEDs and the clients in the IEC 61850 based protection systems is achieved
based on the exchange of communication messages over the “Station Bus”
Fig. 16.4
The IEC 61850 Standard does not prohibit the station bus and process bus from being combined in one
physical Ethernet network. Today, however, concerns about sufficient bandwidth for sampled analogue
values mean that in practice they are often separate physical Ethernet networks. When 1 Gbit/s or 10 Gbit/
s Ethernet networks are deployed for IEC 61850 applications, it is more likely that station bus and process
bus will be combined.
A Proxy Server is a network entity located between a client application and one or multiple physical
devices, and acts as a client/server.
For Client-Server communication, the data model of each physical device can be re-created by the proxy
server to serve the transmitted information (e.g., when a device that is not IEC 61850 compliant is to be
integrate(d). For GOOSE and SAV, the messages are published by the proxy server with the same format
as from the physical device. A separate logical device is used to represent every legacy device.
Logical Devices enable the building of proxy servers, in such a way that Logical Devices are – from a
functional point of view – transparent. Each Logical Device can be identified independently of its location
(whether in a separate physical device connected to the network or in a proxy server).
Parts 8-1 and 9-2 of the IEC 61850 Standard specify exchanging time-critical and non-time-critical data
through local-area networks (LAN) using ISO/IEC 8802-3 frames over 10/100TX or 100FX physical media
– i.e. Ethernet.
16.8 TRAFFIC PATTERNS FOUND IN IEC 61850 SUBSTATIONS
Most traffic in IEC 61850 automation systems is based on TCP/IP/Ethernet, as depicted below.
In the station bus, we may find:
(a) Control and monitoring traffic
(b) Reports and commands, which are based on MMS over TCP/IP,
(c) Protection traffic based on GOOSE messages, which are multicast Ethernet frames,
(d) Synchronization information, based on SNTP/UDP/IP and IEEE1588,
(e) Management information, being the most common used protocols
(f) FTP for exchanging SCD/CID files and HTTP for accessing IED’s configuration parameters
In the process Bus:
(a) Sample analogue values, which are multicast Ethernet frames,
(b) Position Status and Breaker Tripping/Closing
(c) Traffic based on GOOSE messages, which are multicast Ethernet frames
(d) Synchronization information, based on IEEE1588.
Fig. 16.5
As shown in Figure 16.5, it is clear that an IEC 61850 will face the same security challenges as any TCP/
IP/Ethernet based automation system. For that reason, we will focus right now on understanding the main
threats we will face for TCP/IP/Ethernet networks. From a protection point of view, the Ethernet based
traffic for GOOSE messages and Samples Analogue Values is more critical, more details are provided
related to the security threats.
16.9 PERFORMANCE
Performance of the communication is discussed in Part 5 of the IEC 61850 standard. Part 5 defines both
performance classes and message types, and states the maximum transfer times applicable to each.
For protection, Part 5 defines three performance classes: ((a) Performance class P1 applies typically to a
distribution bay or to bays where low requirements can be accepted. ((b) Performance class P2 applies
typically to a transmission bay or if not otherwise specified by the customer. (c) Performance class P3
applies typically to a transmission bay with top performance synchronizing feature and breaker differential.
Part 5 defines various message types:
(a) Type 1A Fast messages for “Trip”
(b) Type 1B Fast messages for …”Close”, “Reclose order”, “Start”, “Stop”, “Block”, “Unblock”,
“Trigger”, “Release”
(c) Type 2 – Medium speed messages

(d) Type 3 – Low speed messages
(e) Type 4 – Raw data messages
(f) Type 5 – File transfer functions

(g) Type 6 – Time synchronization messages
(h) Type 7 – Command messages with access control
In order to perform protection schemes that are time-critical, certain performance levels are required for
the high-speed peer-to-peer (GS(E) messaging. It should be noted that ,where messaging for protection
schemes are routed through proxy servers, lower performances will result.
16.10 APPLICATIONS
Most applications to date have concentrated on client server data exchange for substation automation
purposes. Applications of GOOSE have been limited by the opportunities to retrofit and user confidence in
replacing hardwired solutions with communication-based solutions. There are today some pilots or advanced
projects to demonstrate the use of Process Bus IEC 61850-9-2. Nevertheless, some valuable experience
is being gained both in GOOSE and SAV schemes.
Modelling of Multifunctional IEDs in IEC 61850
The modelling of complex multifunctional IEDs from different vendors that are also part of distributed
functions requires the definition of basic elements that can function by themselves or communicate with
each other. These communications can be between the elements within the same physical device or in the
case of distributed functions (such as substation protection schemes) between multiple devices over the
substation local area network. The basic functional elements defined in IEC 61850 are the Logical Nodes.
A Logical Node is “the smallest part of a function that exchanges data”. It is an object that is defined by its
data and methods and when instantiated, it becomes a Logical Node Object. Multiple instances of different
logical nodes become components of different protection, control, monitoring and other functions in a
substation automation system. They are used to represent individual stages in a protection function. A
multifunctional protection IED has a complex functional hierarchy that needs to be modelled according to
the definitions of the IEC 61850 model.
Fig. 16.6
Logical nodes are grouped in logical devices, usually to represent specific functions that are part of a
server. Sometimes if the IED has a more complex hierarchy, it is necessary to introduce intermediate
layers in the model – sub-functions.
Fig. 16.7
The above-described IED functional hierarchy needs to be appropriately represented based on the modelling
hierarchy presented in Part 7 of IEC 61850.
The standard does not only model the IEDs, but also the communications architecture and the primary
substation equipment. The substation model is based on CIM.
Configuration Language
An IEC 61850 based Substation Automation System is described using the Substation Configuration
Language (SCL). SCL is based on the eXtensible Markup Language (XML) and allows the exchange of
configuration data between different tools, possibly from different manufacturers. Depending on the purpose
of the SCL file, four types are distinguished:
(a) IED configuration description (.icd fil(e): provides LN capability and data-model of an IED not yet
used in any application;
(b) System Specification Description (.ssd fil(e): consists in the single line diagram and the LN requirements
only on a functional point of view;
(c) Substation Configuration Description (.scd fil(e): defines all the specific substation automation system
details, from the communication to the LN allocation – which IED performs which function;
(d) Configured IED Description (.cid fil(e): is the part of .scd file concerning a specific IED. From this file
the IED configuration tool can get the necessary parameters that are needed to make the device work
in the system (e.g. address, name values assigned according to the specific project names).
Fig. 16.8
16.11 CYBER SECURITY
A critical aspect to look at when cyber security is deployed to comply with national requirements such as
NERC CIP and international requirements such as IEC 62351, is to identify the critical assets and critical
cyber assets in a substation.
Typical critical assets and critical cyber assets are all the hardware and software installed in a substation
which would affect the reliability or operability of the substation and consequently the power system if one
of them is compromised or destroyed.
Every critical cyber asset within a substation should be included in an electronic Security Perimeter. The
Responsible Entity within the Utility shall identify and document the Electronic Security Perimeter(s) and
all Access Points to this/these Perimeter(s).
Typically a physical security perimeter and an electronic security perimeter are defined to protect all
critical assets and critical cyber assets in a substation. The physical security perimeter could be the wall or
the fence of the substation.
The access points in the substation automation architecture are:
(a) Ethernet Links to SCADA,

(b) Ethernet links to configuration and maintenance software,
(c) Serial links to SCADA
It is important to emphasize that IEC 61850 was initially designed for communication within the substation.
When IEC 61850 is used outside the substation, then there are further issues to be considered.
16.12 SECURITY TOOLS
Having sound TCP/IP protocol stack implementations is desirable to mitigate security problems. In addition
to it, there are tools that may help the administrator handle security issues. Some of these tools are briefly
described in the following paragraphs:
Vulnerability scanners work at different layers of the OSI reference model. Many of them have a client-
server structure. They scan all the ports of a system, searching for open ports and using known exploits to
see how vulnerable the system is. This in fact is the same approach that attackers use. New vulnerabilities
are found and their corresponding exploit developed almost every day. Therefore scanners will require
updating their vulnerability databases, which is usually done via Internet (some tools require a subscription
fe(e).
An Intrusions detection system, often called IDS, looks for intrusion attempts in the systems. An IDS
can use different information sources, a network IDS analyses network traffic to detect intrusion attempts
while a host based IDS uses the system logs of a host. An attack detection engine will process the data and
will register, alert and/or react in accordance to a predefined strategy. Like vulnerability scanners, they
keep a database with attack patterns that can be updated from the Internet.
Networks monitoring tools analyse and make reports of the captured data. They are composed by a set
of modules and scripts that capture network activity data and format the information to be stored and
displayed on screen or printed. They can generate graphs that can be used in web sites to show the
network traffic in real time. There are several tools for network auditing and penetration testing. They can
also facilitate the interception of network traffic normally unavailable to an attacker. They may also perform
man-in-the-middle attacks against redirected SSH and HTTPS sessions.
Layer 2 packet filters can act as layer 2 firewalls and also permit MAC address translation. They are
included in the standard Linux kernel since version 2.4 and may be present in some “traditional” firewall
systems too. There are also ARP traffic filters that set rule tables to filter ARP packets. These tables can
be configured and modified in the Linux kernel.
There are many layer 3 and 4 packet filters. Some of them are software tools to be installed in PC like
machines while others are special purpose devices. They usually perform Network Address Translation
and have logging capabilities too. They can intercept and manipulate network packets.
Honeypots and honeynets are software pieces or devices that attract attackers as they pretend to be
vulnerable systems. They are tools that allow administrators to gather information about the attackers and
their techniques. They can also distract attackers from relevant real services and alert administrators
about such situations.
It should be noted that many of these tools are often offered together as a single security bundle and
include other additional features such as VPN, etc.
Security Effective Architecture for IEC 61850 Substations
Working Group 15 of Technical Committee 57 of the International Electrotechnical Commission (IE(C)
develops standards for end-to-end cyber-security of the electric system, in particular for the communication
protocols defined within TC 57. No general key management system has been specified, but related
design choices for security mechanisms partly define key management aspects.
Security measures in IEC 62351 include SSL/TLS with specific parameters for TCP/IP profiles, electronic
certificates for MMS profiles, challenge-response authentication for 60870-5 profiles, digital signatures for
61850 profiles. The main impairment of the security measures proposed in IEC 62351 are the extra
computing requirements for the devices in the network and especially key management requirements. The
need for a X.509 PKI infrastructure and certificate management may delay the deployment of IEC 62351
and increase its cost.
Message Monitoring of IEC 61850 GOOSE and Samples Analogue Values
GOOSE messages in IEC 61850 contain data objects that if properly used by the subscribing IED can
significantly reduce the probability for a successful cyber attack. By monitoring the state and sequence
numbers in the message, the subscribing IED can detect messages from a remote intruder that are out of
order or duplicated due to the latency caused by the Internet transmission from a remote location. The
same applies to sampled values messages but in this case the criterion for monitoring is the sample
counter number.
16.13 BENEFITS OF IEC 61850
In an open market, power transmission and distribution network operators need to run the power systems
reliably and efficiently at minimum operating cost. There is a world-wide incentive to achieve these
operational objectives by taking advantage of the capability of substation automation systems. It becomes
important that there is only one standard protocol moving to the future so as to allow the elimination of the
diversity of protocols that exist today. The standard must be for an open communication system which
permits equipment from different manufacturers to operate seamlessly together. With the aging of the
workforce and the introduction of such new technology, there is also a need to develop tools that are easy
to use, facilitate the better engineering, commissioning and maintenance practices.
Reduction in Costs
One important goal for the utilities today is to improve efficiency and, therefore, to cut costs wherever
possible. However, this must not endanger the safety and reliability of the grid performance and by no
means lower the grid transmission capacity or availability.
The use of IEC 61850 can lead to a reduction in both capital expenditure and the costs associated with
asset maintenance. Examples of potential savings include:
(a) By making use of signalling through process and station busses within a substation, the amount and
complexity of wiring can be considerably reduced leading to significant cost savings. This brings less
cabling and potential savings both inside the control building using a station bus and, furthermore,
between the switchyard and the building when using process bus.
(b) The application of non-conventional instrument transformers such as Optical CTs/PTs could bring
further cost benefits as they are more lightweight and may be less expensive than conventional ones.
(c) Hardware savings follow due to the fact that the number of IO in the IEDs can be reduced.
(d) Less wiring also leads not only to less installation costs, but also less testing and maintenance costs
during the lifetime of the substation automation system.
(e) Furthermore, any subsequent modifications to schemes involving connections between IEDs will also
become less expensive as changes to hardwiring will be minimized.
(f) The costs associated with primary equipment outages on e.g. heavily used transmission circuits can
be significant and any reduction in their duration or frequency would be of value to utilities. Outages
are sometimes necessary due to a requirement to modify certain aspects of the protection installed for
a feeder. This is particularly the case if changes are required to the wiring involving measurement
transformers and one or more relays. If it is permissible to continue to operate a circuit with one of the
main schemes out of service, the use of a process bus to send sampled values representing the
secondary circuit measurements will permit other schemes to continue to reliably function without
interference as secondary wiring is not disturbed. Moreover, another relay could potentially be brought
into service if required to meet specific company operating regulations.
(g) IEC 61850 specifies the use of an open and common protocol stack containing for example TCP/IP
facilitating the access to public and private data networks. Using the same physical layer, remote
interrogation of substation equipment is becoming easier, alleviating maintenance and reducing the
number of site visits.
(h) The use of a common international standard also opens up the substation automation market to more
competition – potentially giving the user a larger selection of IEDs, suppliers and system integrators.
It also allows users to avoid common mode failures by using different vendor equipment.
(i) Through the WAN, it will be possible to more easily get hold of any equipment data. This applies for
non time critical data (disturbance records, event reports, setting parameters, etc.). Better use of data
will lead to improvements in asset management and a reduction in device count … assuming that is it
is correctly integrated with asset databases!
Higher Performance
The substation automation system solutions should improve performance regarding e.g. capacity, speed
and efficiency in fault tracing, maintenance and re-energization after grid faults.
The capability of Ethernet components is expected to increase every year, and it will be possible in a few
years’ time for the utility to have one single communication infrastructure, making the flow of data more
streamline in the organization. Nevertheless, for Cybersecurity reasons, an intelligent structure and the
positioning of appropriate firewalls are needed.
The major advantage of IEC 61850 is the interoperability of IEDs’ of different manufacturers and the
elimination of gateways. The absence of gateways means less equipment, no unnecessary communication
delays and no additional errors caused by protocol conversions. The use of Ethernet communications for
all the substation automation functions means standardized and simpler cabling in comparison with the
use of serial communications. This is an advantage in project execution, equipment installation and
equipment testing.
Process bus implementation gives further advantages by using non-conventional CT instrument transformers
are also not affected by CT saturation and the opening of secondary CT circuit conditions like the conventional
ones.
Simplifying Engineering
The standard must provide means to support updating, modifying, extending and maintaining the substation
automation system and its communication system, over the whole lifetime of the substation.
IEC 61850 defines also the Substation Configuration description Language (SCL) which allows the
configuration of an automation system to be defined and the setting of the standardized parameter of IEDs
from different manufacturers to be fixed by the user or any of the manufacturers involved.
Due to less hardwiring in the substation, engineering is simpler and less expensive both in the initial
phase, when the substation is built, and in any modifications made later due to changes needed for any
reason.
Using IEC 61850, it is expected to reduce project time, simplify system integration with all related engineering
and reduce maintenance and, after a time, probably also training efforts.
Flexibility
The standard must be flexible and it shall allow changes in user’s preferences and requirements like
extensions as well as changes due to the manufacturers’ innovations e.g. there will be functions tomorrow
which are not thought of today.
IEC 61850 offers solutions to the abovementioned requirements. It provides interoperability of equipment
from different manufacturers, and leads to minimum change solutions for interoperability of equipment
from different generations. It covers all the automation functions in substations. A communication can
exist within the Station Level or the Bay Level, and can also exist between two levels, for example between
the Bay Level and the Process Level.
IEC 61850 does not specify any mandatory system topology, the use of both station bus and process bus
at the same time, or if station and process bus should be separated or not.
The utility has the flexibility to specify the system topology according to the criticality of the substation
(reliability, redundancy requirements). Nevertheless, the implementation of process bus between the primary
equipments (instrument transformers, disconnectors, breakers) and bays looks promising for the future by
removing most of the wires within the yard.
If non-conventional CTs can easily be constructed to have better accuracy than conventional ones and if
they can be made more flexible, e.g. by introducing a programmable ratio, this will also be of advantage.
Process bus can be used also with conventional instrument transformers, as the merging units can be
made to interface with either new technology or conventional equipment.
Reliability
The reliability of station signalling in a communication system is improved compared to the hardwired
systems as the communication system can be continuously monitored and an alarm can be given
immediately when some problems occur in the communication system. In hardwired systems less problems
can be automatically detected as for example trip circuit supervision.
Other advantages of IEC 61850 compared with other standards
IEC 61850 is a standard which covers the communications at all the three levels of equipment in a substation,
namely at Station Level, Bay Level and Process Level. Other communication protocols such as DNP3,
Modbus, etc. cover the communications at only one or two of these three levels because most standards
were developed for specific purposes.
Such advantages are:
(a) IEC 61850 specifies high speed communication based on GOOSE message (time critical dat((a) and
use of report by exception rather than polling as used in master-slave serial communication protocols.
For this it uses publisher / subscriber and client / server mechanisms respectively.
(b) The Ethernet topology also allows to have more than one client which eases the implementation of
redundancy in comparison with a master/slave architecture.
(c) In case of failure of one client or server, the IEC 61850 communication between the other clients and
servers is not affected which is not the case of a conventional master-slave communication architecture.
(d) The use of multicasting (i.e. one device sending a message simultaneously to several devices inside
one logical LAN-segment) improves the performance of time-critical messages (GOOSE messages).
It reduces network message traffic and communication time by eliminating the need to repeat messages
to each individual device sequentially.
(e) TCP/IP is the transmission control protocol of the Internet. IEC 61850 facilitates data transfer through
public or private data networks by using TCP/IP also. Data of other protocols based on Ethernet and
TCP/IP, such as web-services data for remote maintenance, can be transmitted in parallel via the
same communication infrastructure.
(f) Any changes in communication technology in the future will cause minimum changes in the abstract
models and services and may require mapping to a new profile.
(g) In IEC 61850, the data model is clearly defined and is also easy to extend without losing the
interoperability.
(h) The IEC 61850 defines a series of data names and associated rules for extension (Logical Nodes and
their attributes) that avoid the interpretation between the different projects actors and facilitate the
integration of the different components of the system as well as the integration of the system with its
environment (primary devices, remote control).
(i) Unlike legacy protocols such as Modbus, IEC 61850 devices can self describe themselves to client
applications without any manual configuration of the data objects. Self description facilitates automatic
configuration.
(j) Unlike legacy protocols, IEC 61850 specifies a standard configuration language based on XML and
using the Logical Nodes described above. This allows to formally exchange configuration data between
system tools and avoids the manual association of data references between tools.
(k) Time sync methodologies such as SNTP are a key component of IEC 61850. SNTP time synchronization
accuracy in the range of 1 ms is sufficient for event reporting but not for process bus. Development of
an IEEE 1588 profile is on-going and will allow time sync over Ethernet in future IEC 61850 based
substation, ensuring a time synchronization accuracy better than 1 microsecond.
(l) The transmission rate of 100 Mbits/s allows fast data transfer, for example faster disturbance recorder
extraction than serial protocol can do.
m) IEC 61850 uniquely provides data with a quality attribute and a time stamp which improves the reliability
of information as such as validity (good, invalid, reserved, questionabl(e) and test.
(n) In conventional substation automation systems, data concentrators and protocol gateways are required
between different IED’s, HMI and RTU. With IEC 61850 and substation LAN, all data is transmitted in
one standard format and such data concentrators and protocol gateways are only needed for SCADA
communication links.
(o) IEC 61850 provides a standardized reporting capability that will be invaluable in the development of
automated analysis and diagnostic tools.
16.14 CHALLENGES IN IEC 61850 IMPLEMENTATION
Since the release of the new IEC 61850 standards in 2004, many utilities consider the implementation of
IEC 61850 station bus to replace the existing hardwired protection and control schemes as for example CB
failure initiation/trip, bus blocking scheme, A/R scheme, load shedding, automatic restoration, control
interlocking, etc.
However the main obstacles and barriers for the acceptance of IEC 61850 and its wide spread
implementation/application could be summarized as follows:
(a) Needs for more skilled personnel,
(b) Needs of new tools to support IEC 61850 implementation for engineering, testing and maintenance,
(c) Lifetime of additional electronic components, for example switches, merging unit, etc,
(d) Doubts in GOOSE signal reliability and security,
(e) Some substation IEDs are still using legacy protocols which can represent a significant investment,
(f) Lack of a standard method for presenting GOOSE messages in AC/DC schematics,
(g) Different implementation of IEC 6150 services by vendors,
Despite many of the Challenges IEC 61850 offers many incentives as follows:
(a) Brings new possibilities of information sharing and exchanging between devices and applications in
the substation,
(b) The wide range of services and detailed models can make it acceptable as a worldwide communication
standard in power system application,
(c) Monitoring of the GOOSE messages (copper wired signals are not!) and LAN devices,
(d) Easier to design, maintain and expand with the right tools …,
(e) Less wiring, bay standardization, overall cost reduction during lifetime of the substation (engineering,
installation, maintenanc(e)
(f) Live testing can be made without outage,
(g) Improve self-monitoring of the complete substation automation IEDs and system,
(h) Improve the substation safety by replacing analogue circuits with communication links,
(i) Maintenance simplified due to interoperability and hopefully one day, interchangeability!
16.15 REQUIREMENTS FOR NETWORK COMMUNICATION AND PROCESSING
A networked communications system can be leveraged to support rather sophisticated capabilities, such
as the ability of a system to continue operation in spite of failures.
When implementing a protection scheme based on IEC 61850, it is important to check what happens when
any system component, for example IEDs, merging unit, a switch or a fibre fail:
(a) Is a contingency mode of operation feasible, whereby the scheme operation can continue, even with
acceptable degradation? What would this require in terms of programming and wiring?
(b) If any system component fails, what are the consequences?

• Are too many critical resources associated with the same IED?
• Is distributing them among several IED the right approach?
• Can critical functionality be replicated in two IEDs, so that it is still available if one of the IEDs fails?
This would require that IEDs and their applications be able to tell when other system components fail (for
example, through interlocks, watchdog monitoring, etc.) and that they be able to subscribe to messaging
from non-failed devices with the same capabilities when redundancy exists. Otherwise, the system needs
to adapt its behaviour because there is a missing message. In some cases, where the criticality is not such
an issue, no contingency requirement will be defined.
16.16 SPECIFYING IEC 61850 BASED PROTECTION SCHEMES
The general procedures for specifying IEC 61850 protection schemes consist of the following steps:
STEP A: Determine functional requirements based on:
(a) the layout of the substation from an electrical point of view

(b) the identification of the types of equipment,
(c) the identification of the protection and control philosophy,
(d) The performance requirements,

(e) The identification of what data is available or required.
(f) The consideration of protection schemes – identify what events will cause what actions by what
equipment,
(g) The determination of information flow requirements – identify

(h) Information required from each substation device
(i) Information to be sent to each substation device
(j) The determination of information security requirements and the contingency operation.
STEP B: Users will determine which logical nodes and data are needed for which applications.
STEP C: Check availability of required IEC 61850 logical nodes and data in the approved devices.
STEP D: Develop IEC 61850 data exchanges within the substation.
STEP E : Data to be exchanged between devices and applications to be defined such as GOOSE based
messages, Samples Analogue Value messages, Client / Server messages.
These steps define explicitly what IEC 61850 data items are sent, where, and under what conditions within
the substation. Therefore, it is important to ensure that the actual data exchanges are clearly defined: ((a)
the maximum transfer times, ((b) the maximum response times, (c) the maximum size of messages, (d)
security, (e) availability f) backup and/or redundancy and other performance criteria.
Logical dataflow needs to be analysed carefully in order to avoid a bottleneck on the Ethernet network and
IED itself. The use of managed switches and VLAN is essential to reduce the traffic on the LAN when
necessary. Defining abnormal conditions is also essential such as devices missing, communication broken,
or when an IED is out of service or fails, etc. Special attention to redundancy and self-healing mechanisms
to be taken into account with the communication system when used to exchange critical messages between
IEDs.
16.17 GOOSE FOR IEC 61850 IMPLEMENTATION
The use of GOOSE messages provides high-speed communication mechanisms between IEDs, thus
enabling the implementation of substation level protection, interlocking or distributed control systems. The
GOOSE service model defined in the standard provides a possibility for a fast and reliable exchange of
data between IEDs.
GOOSE Publishing
Fig. 16.9
A published GOOSE message may contain multiple data objects or attributes. If no attribute value has
changed from the previous message it will be published after a relatively long time interval of T0 (for
example, 1 to 10 seconds). When any value contained in the data set changes, the updated message will
be published with no intentional time delay. Then, the next time interval will be the minimum set time T1
(for example 1 or 2 milliseconds), and then increase to T2 (for example with a time interval twice of T1),
and so on, according to the configured repetition mechanism.
Each GOOSE message carries StNum and SqNum parameters (shown in the standard section 15.2.3.1,
part 7-2, Ed1). StNum indicates the change of a GoCB data set value. SqNum indicates the message
sequence for the same data values. Any new data change in the data set will cause the GOOSE publisher
to increment StNum, reset SqNum and change the repeat time interval to T1.
By establishing a proper relationship between the fast repetition of messages following a change of data
set value and cyclic stable repetition intervals, the GOOSE message flow in the network can be decreased
while achieving high speed and reliability levels.
GOOSE Subscribing and Processing
The subscriber needs a mechanism to deal with the GOOSE messages. Besides the data content in the
GOOSE message, it also contains additional information, such as the two parameters of StNum and
SqNum. Based on these two parameters, the subscriber can be aware if the current GOOSE message
contains new data or not, which can help it to filter GOOSE messages, saving time and processing resources
for the subscriber.
Special attention needs to be paid to the processing of GOOSE messages in which the Test bit value is
True, however, this is not clearly interpreted in Ed 1 of the standard.. It has to be well understood by the
user what is its implementation and configuration is in a specific IED.
GOOSE Performance
One of the important differences between IEC 61850 and other communication protocols is the introduction
of high-speed peer-to-peer communications defined as IEC GOOSE (Generic Object Oriented Station
Event). These messages are used for the exchange of a wide range of possible common data organized
by a DATA SET.
The peer-to-peer communications in an integrated substation protection and control system are based on
what is defined as a GSE. This is a Generic Substation Event (GS(E) and it is based upon the asynchronous
reporting of an IED’s functional elements status to other peer devices enrolled to receive it during the
configuration stages of the substation integration process. It is used to replace the hard-wired control
signal exchange between IED’s, as seen in the previous sections, for interlocking and protection purposes
and, consequently, is mission sensitive, time critical and must be highly reliable.
The associated IEDs, receiving the message, use the contained information to determine the appropriate
response for the given state change. The decision of the appropriate action to GSE messages and the
action to take, should a message time out due to a communication failure, is determined by local intelligence
in the IED receiving the GSE message.
Considering the importance of the functions performed using GSE messages, IEC 61850 defines very
strict performance requirements. The idea is that the implementation of high-speed peer-to-peer
communications should be equal to or better than what is achievable by existing technology. Thus the total
peer-to-peer transfer time should be less than 4ms.
For GSE messaging, the transfer time means the complete transmission of a message including necessary
handling at both ends. The time counts from the moment the sender puts the data content on top of its
transmission stack up to the moment the receiver extracts the data from its transmission stack, as shown
below.
Fig. 16.10
Another key requirement for the GSE messages is very high reliability. Since the messages are not
confirmed, but multicast, and considering the importance of these messages, there has to be a mechanism
to ensure that the subscribing IED’s will receive the message and operate as expected. To achieve a high
level of reliability, messages will be repeated as long as the state persists. To maximize dependability and
security, a message will have a time-to-live, which will be known as “hold time”. After the hold time expires,
the message (status) will expire, unless the same status message is repeated or a new message is received
prior to the expiration of the hold time. The repeat time for the initial GSE message will be short and
subsequent messages have an increase in repeat and hold times until a maximum is reached. The GSE
message contains information that will allow the receiving IED to know that a message has been missed,
a status has changed and the time since the last status change.
GOOSE data exchange is based on a Publisher/Subscriber mechanism-using multicast. The GOOSE
messages are repeated until there is a new change of state. The time between the consecutive transmissions
of GOOSE messages immediately after the change of state are very short (a few milliseconds), followed
by an increase in repeat and hold times of subsequent messages until a maximum is reached.
In the case where legacy devices exist, these devices do not support GOOSE messages. This function will
be performed by the gateway. The gateway will continuously poll the legacy devices for status changes,
and will form and send the appropriate GOOSE messages to the network. One GOOSE message is sent
for each individual logical device in the gateway, i.e. there will be one GOOSE message for each legacy
IED.
If a GOOSE message has to be processed by a legacy device, the gateway will subscribe to this message,
and after processing it, will send a control signal to the appropriate legacy IED for further action. This
approach allows the interface of legacy devices with IEC 61850 compliant devices on the substation LAN.
However, since the messages between the legacy and the IEC 61850 IED will always go through the
gateway, it will be affected by its characteristics and will always be slower than the pure peer-to-peer
communications between IEC 61850 IEDs. The control system designer has to evaluate the degradation
in performance and determine if this is acceptable. If not, the legacy IEDs have to be replaced by IEC
61850 compliant IEDs.
Fig. 16.11
Comparison between the performance of hard wired and GOOSE based accelerated schemes
Numerous tests performed by different IED manufacturers and test companies show that GOOSE based
distributed applications consistently outperform hard wired schemes with the same functionality. This may
look strange at the beginning, but as can be seen from the careful analysis of the factors that determine
the overall operating time of a distributed protection function, it is what should be expected.
If we consider that the breaker tripping and the communications exchange between the two ends of the
protected line is performed in the same manner by the IEDs in both cases, we will have to analyze the time
from the operation of the directional element in the sending relay and the resulting detection of the operation
of the opto input of the teleprotection IED at the sending end of the line, as well as the time from the
receiving of the accelerating signal and the resulting detection of it by the relay at the receiving end.
In the conventional hard wired scheme this will include the operating time of two output relays (each about
3 ms) plus the two detections of the energization of opto inputs (depending on the availability or lack of
filtering and the scanning of the opto inputs this time for each can be from 2 to 8 ms).
If we assume an average time of opto input with filtering of about 5 ms, the total time at each end for the
hard wired interface between the relay and teleprotection IED will be about 8 ms, giving us a total of about
16 ms for both ends.
If we look at the time between the directional element output and the communication device detection of
the GOOSE message, according to IEC 61850 it should be less than 4 ms at each end of the line, giving
us a total of about 8 ms for both ends. When we compare the two solutions, we see that the GOOSE based
scheme will be about 8 ms (half a cycle at 60 Hz) faster than the hard-wired equivalent.
16.18 TOPOLOGY CONSIDERATIONS
Parts 8-1 and 9-2 of the IEC 61850 Standard specify exchanging time-critical and non-time-critical data
through local-area networks (LAN) using ISO/IEC 8802-3 frames over 10/100TX or 100FX physical media.
Ethernet based technology is flexible and with its devices is able to connect via different communication
systems. Communication links are possible between different substations located in different geographical
locations over a Wide Area Network (WAN). The Standard does not define how the physical network is
built for Ethernet based station or process bus and in this chapter, a few simple examples are given.
Modern Ethernet systems are switched networks where network devices such as Ethernet switches have
knowledge of connected devices and therefore are able to route the unicast messages (in IEC 61850
typically reports and controls) in a Point-To-Point manner without distributing the traffic to all nodes in
network. GOOSE and SAV are based on Ethernet Multicast messages and these types of messages are
forwarded within a subnet simultaneously to all its nodes.
Redundancy of communication in IEC 61850 based systems is not required by the standard, but it is often
used as it increases the availability of the applications themselves, and so may also be specified by the
customer or end user. It especially improves the safety when using GOOSE services between IEDs, as
failures in communication links are not tolerated when using GOOSE for protection purposes. Even though
the first edition of the standard does not include any selected technology, the second edition does reference
IEC 62439 that serves to reference and define some different methods of redundancy.
Station Bus Topologies
Star Topology
Star Network is the basic Ethernet topology in today’s switched networks. All devices are connected with
single point-to-point links to switch and network devices routes the traffic between IEDs in substation. This
type of topology is straightforward as it uses only standard Ethernet functionality and it does not necessarily
need any configuration.
Fig. 16.12
If a substation is large and consists of several IEDs and switches, the backbone connections between
Ethernet switches can be made redundant using a mesh or ring. IEDs have one link to Ethernet station
bus. In this topology, switches typically require management possibilities and support of redundancy protocol,
e.g. RSTP, to be able to handle loops in network.
RSTP is an IEEE standard, and is referenced from IEC 62439. In RSTP when communication is interrupted
between switches, an alternative path is established to link switches in the network. However recovery
times from communication failures could be between hundreds of milliseconds to several seconds, and
therefore may not be suitable for fast distributed automation applications.
Fig. 16.13
Loop Topologies
This is a network topology in which each device acts as a repeater with two communication ports, one for
data input and the other for data output. The devices are then daisy-chained to form the loop. Management
functions and a redundancy protocol e.g. RSTP are needed to manage the network loop and reroute paths
in disturbance situations. IEDs need to be able to forward Ethernet traffic from one port to another if the
traffic is not dedicated to it. The loop topology requires an Ethernet switch to logically open one point in the
network, to inhibit the circulating of Ethernet messaging in network.
Fig. 16.14
Redundant Ring Topology
The redundant ring topology among switches and IEDs is a network topology which uses a redundant ring
to communicate between network nodes. IEDs with a single Ethernet port may be connected to switches
on the ring, or IEDs with suitable redundant Ethernet ports may be connected directly onto the ring.
Today’s redundant ring implementations are proprietary, but in the future, redundant rings can be implemented
conforming to the HSR method defined in IEC 62439 in order to provide both recovery times suitable for fast
distributed automation applications and interoperability between different vendors’ equipment.
Fig. 16.15
Redundant Star Topology
Redundant Star topology is basically doubled star topology where every IED has point-to-point connections
to different backbone networks. This type of network also requires double amounts of Ethernet switches for
redundant paths. Redundancy logic must be implemented in all IEDs connected to station bus.
Today’s redundant star implementations are proprietary, but in the future, redundant stars can be implemented
conforming to the PRP method defined in IEC 62439 in order to provide both recovery times suitable for
fast distributed automation applications and interoperability between different vendors’ equipment.
Fig. 16.16
Switch on loop with IEDs connected to 2 adjacent switches
This type of IED connection is the same as for redundant star. Additionally, in both redundancy networks
the backbone is redundant forming loop between Ethernet switches. In this topology switches typically
require management possibilities and support of redundancy protocol, e.g. RSTP, to be able to handle
loops in network. Redundancy logic must also be implemented in all IEDs connected to station bus.
Fig. 16.17
The new IEC 62439 gives some performance comparison between the different redundancy methods /
protocols. While designing an IEC 61850 based protection scheme, such considerations should be taken
into account to ensure the required performance of the protection scheme.
Table : IEC 62439 Standard
Protocol Solution Fram e Redundancy End node Network Recovery tine

loss protocol attachment topology fault or repair
IP IP routing Yes Within the Single Single >30 s typical
network meshed not deterministic
STP IEEE Yes Within the Single Single >20 s typical

802.1D: 1998 network meshed not deterministic
RSTP IEEE Yes Within the Sinqle Single >2 s typical
802.1D:2004 network meshed not deterministic
CRP [EC 62439, Yes In the end Single and Connected, 1 s worst case
Clause 7 nodes double doubly for 512 end nodes
meshed
MRP [EC 62439, Yes Within the Single Ring 200 ins worst case
Clause 5 network for 50 switches
BRP [EC 62439, Yes In the end Double Connected, 4,8 ms worst case
Clause 8 nodes doubly for 500 end nodes
meshed
PRP [EC 62439, No In the end Double Independent 0s
Clause 6 nodes double
meshed
Process Bus Topologies
Typically, in today’s systems the process bus is separated from the station bus. As the process bus is also
based on Ethernet technology, any of the topologies mentioned in this chapter could be used. Issues to be
considered carefully for the process bus include reliability and availability, time synchronization, and testing.
The process bus may have a different topology to the station bus. Process bus traffic could also be sent in
the same physical network as station bus traffic, thus forming a single unified network for all substation
data.
16.19 ENGINEERING TOOLS
Engineering tools include tools that allow the integration of documentation generated from the conception
of an installation during the engineering stage (plans, manuals, et(c) for the duration of its life. These tools
should also integrate intermediate stages of modifications and extensions, and also facilitate the
commissioning and maintenance of protection and control systems. Basically, engineering tools should
cover the following issues:
(a) Integration of protection and control systems’ information
(b) Integration of electrical, electromechanical and civil systems
(c) Protection logic and settings management

(d) Control logic and settings management
(e) Configuration, execution and documentation of commissioning and maintenance tests
(f) Integration with protection management systems

(g) SCADA configurations management
Therefore, several types of tools may be considered for the management of the configuration of the IEDs
of a given substation. An initial classification of the type of tool could be:
A. Standard Tools: These are tools for modifying any function of the IED that has been modeled as an
IEC 61850 function. These tools are, or are based on, SCL editors and MMS clients.
B. Proprietary Tools: These are tools provided by each vendor and are required for editing the
proprietary part of a device configuration. Ideally, the objective should be to reduce the need of these
proprietary tools to a minimum.
Moreover, and depending on the different needs of modification, we may distinguish between three
fundamental types of tools:
(a) Parameterization Tools: These are tools for “online” change and change management, basically the
IED settings.
(b) Configuration Tools: These are tools for the implementation and management of “offline” changes.
They can also be classified in two types:
System level: These can be used for the complete engineering of one or several substations. This
type of tool works with and outputs SCD files.
IED level: Simpler tools, optimized to facilitate maintenance and oriented to modifications at the IED
level. This type of tool can import ICD and SCD files and outputs CID files. This may be the same tool
as for parameterization of the IED.
(c) Testing Tools: These are tools for both control and protection maintenance personnel and engineering
personnel, and facilitate the tests on the IED, client and server, allowing simulating equipment and
performing automations. This type of tools can be divided into:
Oriented towards IED testing: These are tools that allow automating the tests of the functionality of
the IEDs. This may include, analysis e.g. spying and monitoring, Performance evaluation and Simulation
Oriented towards Client testing: These are server emulation tools, which allow testing the behaviour
of station level clients, such as station computers and gateways.
16.20 TESTING AND MAINTENANCE
The IEC 61850 standard for communication networks and systems allows the development of high-speed
peer-to-peer communications based distributed protection applications that result in significant changes in
the ways protection functions are implemented. This replacement of functions implemented in a single
device with equivalents using exchange of analogue and status information over the substation local area
network (LAN) requires new technology for their testing.
In order to properly define the methods for testing of complex IEC 61850 substation automation systems
it is important to properly define what a system definition is and to consider what existing methods for
system testing are known. Complex systems are not specific to only the electric power systems domain.
They exist in industry, communications, computing and many other fields. Software development can be
considered the development of complex systems that exchange information between different functional
modules. Modern substation automation systems in reality are complex distributed software applications
based on exchange of information over the substation local area network. That is why there are application-
functions performing some overall task like “management of a substation”, via logical nodes.
The physical system is composed of all devices hosting these functions and the interconnecting physical
communication network. The boundary of a system is given by its logical or physical interfaces. Within the
scope of the IEC 61850 series, ‘system’ always refers to the Substation Automation System (SAS), unless
otherwise noted”.
Depending on the complexity of the system, its components can be simple functional elements, subsystems
or a combination of the two. A subsystem is then defined as a set of elements, which is a system itself, and
also a part of the whole system. In the substation protection and automation domain we can consider
different functions performed by the system as subsystems. The system can contain one or many functions
that can have several layers of one or many sub-functions and at the bottom – a sub-function can contain
one or many functional elements (logical nodes in IEC 61850).
System Testing
System testing is testing conducted on a complete, integrated substation automation system, subsystem
or distributed function. Its goal is to evaluate the system’s compliance with its specified requirements.
When we do commissioning or maintenance testing we assume that the individual functional elements are
operating properly, especially if there are no alarms in any of the IEDs that are included in the system test.
In this case a top-down approach is suitable, since we are interested in the overall performance of the
tested system function and not in the behaviour of the components of the system. This fits the Black Box
approach, which means that we take an external perspective of the test object to derive the test cases and
analyze the results.
Functional Testing
Functional testing of any function or sub-function requires from the test designer to select a set of valid or
invalid inputs and determine the correct expected output for each test condition defined in the test plan.
The purpose of functional element testing is to determine if the tested element has the expected behaviour
under different realistic test conditions. The functional elements in system testing are considered units, i.e.
the smallest testable parts of any system.
System testing looks at the overall performance of the system from an external observer point of view.
Bottom-up or top-down testing methods can be used depending on the type of test performed. In all cases,
it is important to clearly identify the system or function boundary that will define the requirements for
simulation by the test system and monitoring the behaviour of the tested function.
Fig. 16.18
Fig. 16.19
Testing of IEC 61850 Systems
The method for testing of both types of systems is proposed based on the following order of system
components tests:
(a) Testing of IEC 61850 protocol compliance of the individual components of the system
(b) Testing of Merging Units
(c) Testing of IEC 61850 compliant IEDs

(d) Testing of bay level distributed applications
(e) Testing of substation level distributed applications It is assumed that all components of the system
have already passed conformance testing, i.e. that IEC 61850 with all its models and services is
properly implemented.
IEC 61850 Test System Components
A test system designed for IEDs or distributed applications based on IEC 61850 have multiple components
that are needed for the testing of the individual functions, as well as a complete application.
Fig. 16.19
Test Configuration Tool takes advantage of one of the key components of the IEC 61850 standard – the
Substation Configuration Language. The Configuration Tool is used to create the files required for
configuration of different components of the test system. It imports or exports different configuration files
defined by Part 6 of IEC 61850.
The test system Configuration Tool reads the information regarding all IEDs, communication configuration
and substation description sections. This information is in a file with .SCD extension (for Substation
Configuration Description) and is used to configure the set of tests to be performed.
The overall functionality of any IEC 61850 compliant device is available in a file that describes its capabilities.
This file has an extension .ICD for IED Capability Description.
The IED configuration tool sends to the IED information on its instantiation within a substation automation
system (SAS) project. The communication section of the file contains the current address of the IED. The
substation section related to this IED may be present and then shall have name values assigned according
to the project specific names. This file has an extension .CID (for Configured IED Description).
Power System Simulation Tool generates the current and voltage waveforms. The specifics of each
simulated test condition are determined by the complete, as well as the configured functionality of the
tested device or application. The simulation tool requirements will also be different depending on the type
of function being tested. For example, if the tested function is based on RMS values or phasor measurements,
the simulation tool may include a sequence of steps with the analogue values in each of the steps defined
as Phasors with their magnitude and phase angle. Based on these configuration parameters the simulation
tool will generate the sine waveforms to be applied as analogue signals or in a digital format to the tested
components or systems.
If the tested functions are designed to detect transient conditions or operate based on sub-cycle set of
samples from the waveform, an electromagnetic transients simulation will be more appropriate.
Virtual Merging Unit simulator: While under conventional testing the waveforms generated by the simulation
tool will be applied to the tested device as current and voltage analogue signals, a Virtual Merging Unit will
send sampled measured values as defined in IEC 61850 over the Ethernet network used for the testing.
The Virtual Merging Unit simulator should support sampling rates as agreed in IEC 61850 9-2 LE. For
protection applications the simulator should send 80 samples / cycle in 80 messages/cycle. Each message
contains one sample of the three phase currents and voltages (WYE class).
Virtual IED simulator that is used to represent components of the system that are not available at the
time of testing, for example during factory acceptance testing. During the testing this module send GOOSE
messages that the function or Sub-function under test uses as inputs that determine its behaviour under
the test conditions applied.
The fifth component of the testing system is a tool that can simulate network traffic, remote and local
operator or system engineer.
Test Evaluation Tool that includes the monitoring functions used to evaluate the performance of the
tested elements within a distributed sampled analogue value based system. Such evaluation tool requires
multiple evaluation sub-modules that are targeted towards the specifics of the function being tested. They
might be based on monitoring the sampled measured values from a tested merging unit, GOOSE messages
from a tested IED, as well as reports or waveform records from the tested device.
Reporting Tool that will generate the test reports based on a user defined format and the outputs from the
simulation and evaluation tools.
Functional testing of IEC 61850-9-2 Based Merging Units
Since Merging Units are an essential component of any IEC 61850 process bus based application, they
have to be tested to ensure that they provide the required sampled measured values. The currents and
voltages applied to the Merging Unit will be based on current and voltage waveforms produced from the
network simulator in order to simulate different system conditions, such as high current faults or low
current minimum load conditions.
At the same time the Test Evaluation tool will need to receive the sampled analogue values from the
tested merging unit and compare the individual sampled values from the Merging Unit with the samples
coming from the network simulator. The testing of Merging Units will require first of all a very accurate time
synchronization of both the test device and the tested MU.
It is necessary to analyze the phase (tim(e) and magnitude differences of the individual samples and
compare these to the calibration specifications of the MU. Proper documentation and reporting is required
in the same manner as meter testing is performed today.
Fig. 16.20
Functional testing of IEC 61850 GOOSE Based IEDs
The testing of different functions in IEDs that are based on publishing and subscription of GOOSE messages
can be achieved in a way similar to the testing of conventional hardwired devices. The difference is that in
this case there may be no hard wiring between the test device and the tested IED for status signals. The
test devices needs to be configured as a GOOSE publisher to simulate different signals required by the
test object for the testing, as well as it needs to be a GOOSE subscriber in order to receive messages from
the test object and evaluate its performance. In many cases it is recommended to simulate and monitor
also hardwired signals.
Fig. 16.21
Functional testing of IEC 61850-9-2 Based IEDs
The testing of different functions in IEDs that are based on sampled measured values can be achieved in
a couple of different ways depending on the requirements of the specific test. One approach is acceptable
when testing the IED only, while another can be used if the testing includes the complete MU/IED system.
The difference is that in the first case there is no hard wiring between the test device and the tested IED –
i.e. the test system can be communications based only.
The key component of this module is the Merging Unit simulator described earlier in the paper. It will have
to take the waveforms generated from the Network Simulator and then format them in the required 80
samples/cycle and multicast the individual sampled values to the LAN 80 times per cycle (e.g. 80 messages/
cycl(e).
The testing of different types of functions available in the IED will be similar to what was described earlier
for the hybrid device. This applies to both the configuration and analysis modules of the test system.
The test system needs to subscribe to and monitor the GOOSE messages received from the tested IED
that represent the operation of the tested functional elements in order to determine if the devices operated
as required. If the tested device has relay outputs as well, they will have to be wired into the test device
and their operation (time tag) will be compared with the received GOOSE messages to determine if the
performance of communications based solutions is analogous to the hard-wired case.
The test system may also retrieve the waveform records from the tested device and again compare them
with the original waveforms from the simulation tool.
Fig. 16.22
Functional testing of Distributed Applications
The testing of distributed bay and substation level functions that are based on communications only will be
similar functionally to the testing of individual IEDs. The main difference is that in this case there will be
multiple test devices with virtual simulators or analog outputs. The simulation of the substation and system
environment required for the functional testing of bay and system level functions will require the simulation
of multiple merging units (IEC 61850 9-2 interfac(e) and other IEDs (IEC 61850 8-1 interfac(e).
The evaluation of the performance of the distributed functions is based on the subscription of the test
system components to the GOOSE messages from the different IEDs participating in the tested distributed
applications. If these devices also have relay outputs hardwired to the test devices, their operation will
have to be monitored as well in order to evaluate the performance of the tested system and if necessary
compare the communications based to hardwired solutions
Fig. 16.23
IEC 61850 Testing Related Features
The methods for testing described in the previous sections of the article are predominantly used for type,
acceptance, commissioning, factory and site acceptance testing. In order to support the testing of IEC
61850 system components in energized substations, Edition 1 of the standard already had many different
features that could be used for testing. These features included:
(a) The possibility to put a function or a functional element (logical nodes or logical devices) in a test
mode
(b) The possibility to characterize a GOOSE message as a message being sent for test purpose
(c) The possibility to characterize a service of the control model as being sent for test purpose
(d) The possibility to flag any value sent from a server in the quality as a value for test purpose
However, Edition 1 was not very specific on how to use these features. As a consequence, they were not
supported by all vendors since interoperability could not be guaranteed.
This has been improved with Edition 2. Besides more detailed specifications on how to use the existing
features, additional features have been added.
16.21 EDITION 2 OF IEC 61850
The Edition 2 of IEC 61850 will introduce many new features that will further enhance the power of the
standard. There are new features that should make the life of the end user easier – assuming the features
are supported by future products. It is expected, that interoperability between engineering tools will be
improved something that is urgently needed. New features supporting functional and system testing should
facilitate the ways a IEC 61850 based installation needs to be tested – during commissioning, in case of
problems but as well for routine testing.
At the same time, the backward compatibility should exist to a large extent thus safeguarding the investments
already made.
GOOSE Control Point for Maintenance
Fig. 16.24
When a project with a of lot of GOOSE messages is implemented, there is a need to check each
GOOSE message during the internal system validation, Factory Acceptance Test and Site Acceptance
Test.
To check the validity of the GOOSE messages and its related function, and knowing that GOOSE
messages are virtual input or output signals in comparison with hardwired copper signals, a new
mechanism should be built for engineers to test, change and notify the status of each GOOSE message
in a convenient way.
For example, a GOOSE message is exchanged between two IEDs: IED1 being the Publisher and IED2
being the Subscriber. A GoCB in the Publisher side IED1 controls the related GOOSE message. The
parameter of “GoEna” in Publisher is applied to control the GoCB function such as sending GOOSE
messages or not.
The “GoEna” in the GoCBs has been always “Enabled”. One solution is like that, for each GOOSE message,
the Publisher and the Subscriber message are both implemented with a Single CONTROL Point (SP(C) to
permit/block the sending or receiving of a GOOSE message.
In the Subscriber side, the connection form Publisher may be lost because of some physical or unknown
reasons, while the loss of communication may be easily detected in the Subscriber side, and a SPS
(Single Point Status) can be used to identify the status change for the communication from the Publisher.
If the GOOSE connection fails, a warning report will be sent to the HMI via MMS communication to get the
corresponding attention.
During maintenance or routine tests, on one hand, the status of the related GOOSE message between
Publisher and Subscriber is always expected to be active, while on the other hand, we may expect the data
sent by the Publisher being testing data. So we use a SPC in the Publisher IED1 to implement the control
function which means that when the control point is enabled, IED1 will send real data in the GOOSE
connection, otherwise it will send virtual zero. And in Subscriber IED2 side, a similar SPC can be applied
to permit itself to receive the real data from the GOOSE message. So if the control point is disabled, the
subscriber IED2 will discard all data received, the data in processing will be replaced by virtual zero, which
will be in need of the test logic function in Subscriber side.
All the GOOSE Connection Status (SPS) and Control Points (SP(C) can be totally monitored and controlled
from a central HMI. This will help the customers and engineers to implement a GOOSE related function
test in a more easy and convenient way.
Fig. 16.25
Fig. 16.26
REFERENCES
Standards
IEC 61850-1: Communication networks and systems in substations – Part 1: Introduction and Overview
IEC TS 61850-2: Communication networks and systems in substations – Part 2: Glossary
IEC 61850-3: Communication networks and systems in substations – Part 3: General requirements
IEC 61850-4: Communication networks and systems in substations – Part 4: System and project
management
IEC 61850-5: Communication networks and systems in substations – Part 5: Communication requirements
for functions and device models
IEC 61850-6: Communication networks and systems in substations – Part 6: Configuration description
language for communication in electrical substations related to IEDs
IEC 61850-7-1: Communication networks and systems in substations – Part 7-1: Basic communication
structure for substation and feeder equipment – Principles and models
structure for substation and feeder equipment – Abstract communication service interface (ACSI)
structure for substation and feeder equipment – Common data classes
structure for substation and feeder equipment – Compatible logical node classes and data classes
IEC 61850-8-1: Communication networks and systems in substations – Part 8-1: Specific Communication
Service Mapping (SCSM) – Mappings to MMS (ISO 9506-1 and ISO 9506-2) and to ISO/IEC 8802-3
Service Mapping (SCSM) – Sampled values over serial unidirectional multidrop point to point link
Service Mapping (SCSM) – Sampled values over ISO/IEC 8802-3
IEC 61850-10: Communication networks and systems in substations – Part 10: Conformance Testing
IEC 61850-90-1: Use of IEC 61850 for the Communication between Substations
IEC 60050-441 IEV Switchgear, control gear and fuses
IEC 60050-448 IEV Power system protection
IEC 60050-605 IEV Generation, transmission and distribution of electricity – Substations

IEC 60044-1 Ed. 1.2 2003-02
ANSI C57.13-1993
IEC 60044-2 Ed. 1.2 2003-02

IEC 62439-3 (FDIS): High availability automation networks -Part 3: Parallel Redundancy Protocol (PRP)
and High-availability Seamless Redundancy (HSR)
IEC 62351-6: Power systems management and associated information exchange -Data and communications
security -Part 6: Security for IEC 61850
Cigré & Other Publications
Document basedon CIGRE WG 5.36Report (Abridged and Summarize(d)

CIGRE Brochure 401, Functional Testing of IEC 61850 Based Systems. SC B5 WG B5.32, 2009.
CIGRE SPECIAL REPORT 8 FOR GROUP B5 Protection and Automation, CIGRE 2008 session.
CIGRE Paper B5-106 Process communication in switchgear according to IEC 61850 – architectures and
application examples, CIGRE 2008 session.
ISA 99WG01, “Security for Industrial and Automation Control Systems – Terminology, Concepts and Models,”
Standard ISA-99.01.01,2007.
WG B5.38 “The Impact of Implementing Cyber Security Requirements using IEC 61850”
Security assessment of the transmission control protocol (TCP), CPNI technical note, February 2009.
Cryptographic Key Management for SCADA Systems, Issues and Perspectives. L. Piètre-Cambacédè, P.
Sitbon. International Journal of Security and Applications, July 2008.
Functional Testing of IEC 61850 Based Systems -Christoph Brunner, Alexander Apostolov, 2011
APPENDIX I
IEC 61850 Protocol has brought in the flexibility to create the protection schemes as required for the
specific application. A protection scheme with soft logics built within an IED will require the skill and
experience to create the perfect Protection scheme with optimised response times and the correct
coordination. The detail design of protection schemes shall be dealt in the separate manual; however, an
example of designed 400 KV line protection scheme using IED logics is illustrated as below.
Example 1: Substation: NTPC KUDGI : LINE 1: NARENDERA LINE
Fig. 16.27
Typically,each 400kV Line are provided with the Main-I and Main-II: Numerical differential scheme suitable
for digital communication through direct Fibre optic medium/OPGW medium. These two protections are of
equal performance capability. Further, the Main-I and Main–II distance protection IEDs are connected to
two different protection groups for reliability. Other Protections are:
(i) Local Over voltage Function: The over voltage function shall have adjustablevoltage and time settings.
It shall monitor all phases and be tuned to power systemfrequency. The over voltage function shall
have two independent voltage and timestages.
(ii) Back-up IDMT Earth fault Function: A back-up IDMT Directional earth faultprotection function shall be
provided in each Main protection system. The functionshall measure zero sequence current and have
a current/timer setting range.
(iii) Open Jumper Protection: The open jumper protection function operatesupon detecting negative
sequence current and shall provide an alarm. The protective relays is suitable for use with capacitor
voltage transformers(CVTs) having non-electronic damping and transient response as per IEC.
(iv) Back-up over-current Protection: Distance protection is disabled, in case ofits connected VT fuse
failure. Consequently, a back-up over-current functionis activated in the respective distance relay.
Logic Matrix
Typical Configuration Setting in an IED

Typical Protection Scheme Configured in the IED

CHAPTER 17
VALIDATION, ACCEPTANCE AND FIELD TESTING

TECHNIQUES FOR TESTING OF PROTECTION RELAYS
Background
Modern numerical relays and systems can have a large number of integrated functions and impose additional
test requirements over older, more traditional and simpler static and electromechanical relays. Such systems
and relays would be difficult and time consuming to test using traditional test equipments. At the same
time, test equipments have also become much more sophisticated and higher functionality software driven,
enabling much faster and comprehensive testing. New communication capabilities added to the numerical
relays and the data that must be sent to Substation control system systems under fault conditions adds
new possibilities for relay testing.
Introduction
Why do we use protective relays?

Relays are frequently found device in high voltage or medium voltage power system. Their main duty is to
isolate a faulty section within few cycles but by ensuring minimum interruption to healthy sections. Therefore
an ideal relay is a unit which would act by compromising costs of damage to imperfect section and cost
interferer the perfect. Since the protection relay technologies are evolving for past 5 decades, it is require
to test/validate devices on various stages with different ways. This chapter describing general criteria to
test and validate numerical protection relays and scheme on various stages.
Introduction about Digital Relay
The developments in computer relaying that use a digital processor to compute and make decisions can
be traced back to the 1960’s. The extensive research effort on development of digital relays experimented
with various technological changes. These efforts are worthwhile because the digital technology has several
advantages over the analogue technology. Some of the advantages of digital technology are;
(1) The characteristics of digital components do not widely drift with temperature, supply voltage changes
or aging
(2) The performance of digital components do not change from part to part (as long as numerical value,
say 2 stored in memory remains 2 irrespective of where the number is stored)
(3) The relay designs based on digital technology use fewer parts and connections
(4) The resolution of the solutions provided by digital relay depend on the number of bits per word used in
the arithmetic calculations
(5) The digital relays are not required to be tuned individually to obtain consistent results
(6) Most design changes can be made by changing the software only
(7) A digital relay can perform both logic and arithmetic functions while controlling a process
(8) Least chance for corruption of data recorded by a digital relay except when an equipment failure is
experienced
Validation, Acceptance and Field Testing Techniques for Testing of Protection Relays 303
The multi functions digital / numerical protection relay integrate voltage and current information to provide
protection, metering, disturbance, fault and event reporting data. These data can be used for breaker trip
and close, power system control operations, and analysis. Universal auxiliary power supply given to energize/
powerup relay hardware. Digital relay shall be communicated with desktop/laptop PC via front or rear
communication ports. Communication ports can be USB/SERIAL/RJ45/FO.
Fig. 17.1 : Inputs & Outputs of digital relays
The relay firmware is stored in a “read only” (ROM) section of the relay. The relay firmware is a program
running inside the relay that defines the relay operation. As relay manufacturers improve algorithms or
make changes to a relay operation characteristic, firmware upgrades are made available to the customer
(Normally call it as a field upgradable relay). Disturbances, Events & Fault recording normally stored in
EEPROM (non-volatile memory). There is flash memory to use for continuous data update.
Fig. 17.2 : Basic structure of digital relay
The relay algorithm is a set of mathematical operations implemented in a low level program (C/C++
compiler). These operations are performed over the last samples of the sampled input signal. The relay
makes the decision whether or not to trip the circuit breaker based on the result of this algorithm. The
algorithm presented on the slide is one particular example.
The below block diagram showing, routines are as follows:

• Reading Routines (Read Last Sample). This part of the program is in charge of reading the last sample
of the input signals.
• Digital Filtering Routines. When required, the digital filters smooth the signal by eliminating dc and
frequency components that are different than the fundamental.
• Phasor Calculation Routines. These routines determine Phasors V and I from the sampled signals.
• Protection Method Routines. These routines implement the protection function, such as overcurrent,
directional, distance, and differential.
• Relay Logic Routines. Using the results of the protection method routines, the relay logic routines
make the final decisions for tripping and other relay functions. In some modern relays, the user can
program the logic.
Sometimes the digital filtering and phasor calculation routines are considered the same module.
Fig. 17.3 : routines
Single Architecture for Micro-Processor based Relay:

The block diagram (figure 17.4) showing how the ac signals are processed. After the instrument transformer
reduces the currents and voltages to acceptable levels, the signals are filtered with a low-pass analog filter, then
digitized and refiltered with a digital filter. The digital filter smoothes the signal by eliminating dc and frequency
components that are different than the fundamental (shown in figure 17.5). Each filter has a specific purpose that
complements the other filter. The filtered samples are processed to phasor values (shown in figure 17.6). Relay
operates on these phasor values. Numerical operating quantities are then calculated from the processed waveforms.
Fig. 17.4 : Single architecture of digital relay

Fig. 17.5 : Digital filtering through Digital filter
Fig 17.6 : Phasor estimation
Programmable Logic & Control in Micro-Processor based Relay:

In the past, relay engineers have been limited to combining elements outside the relay using external
contacts and interconnected wiring. Programmable logic is an extraordinary digital relay feature (figure
17.7&8). Programmable logic & control equations allow the relay engineer the freedom to combine elements
and build entire control schemes inside the relay. Control schemes are logically constructed using +, *, and
/ symbols to combine relay elements. Micro processor relays offer many timers for output controls, and
inputs that make control scheme implementation easy
Fig. 17.7 : Programmable logic

Fig. 17.8 : Programmable logic
Typical connections of distance protection relay are shown in below figure 17.9. It shows the analogue
inputs CT/VT given to relay. Digital output of relay connected to CB circuit. CB closing/opening status
connected to digital input of relay. Digital inputs/outputs (Virtual signals) connected to communication
device through communication report
Fig. 17.9 : Typical connection of digital relay

Type of Tests
We have seen the features of multi functions numerical relays, it is require to validate/tests this product in
various manner in various stages for various applications. Tests of protection devices, which are performed
by the buyer and device manufacturer, can be generally divided in two different parts:
1. Individual Tests (Production Tests/SAT or Commissioning Tests / Periodic Maintenance Tests / Application
Tests)
• of each manufactured device
• as part of the production process
• to ensure the quality, functionality and performance of each delivered device at site/field area
2. Type Tests
• of devices manufactured in the series production
• as part of the R&D process

• to ensure the quality and functionality of all hardware and software components
The figure below shows duration, objectives, test location and targets of routine tests and type tests of
protection devices.
Individual Tests
The intention of individual tests is to verify different aspects of the specific relay in its life cycle: production
tests, inspection tests, commissioning tests, periodic tests etc. Sometimes, the tests are also called as
routine tests. To evaluate the performance of multifunction relays and systems appropriate to the factory
acceptance, site acceptance and commissioning tests and practices that are needed. At this moment,
there are no confirm standards for acceptance testing and commissioning tests for protective relays.
Buyer and vender have many variations for testing and commissioning tests.
The list below shows steps of the routine of protection devices. All steps will be executed as part of the
Individual tests process.
• Test of all binary input channels
• Test of all output relays

• Test of all analog output channels
• Test of all communication interfaces and protocols and scheme
• Calibration of all analog input channels

• Verification of calibration factors (gain, offset, phase)
• Verification of the accuracy of measuring data
• Verification of the accuracy of timers, thresholds, calculated impedances, etc.

• Verification of event & disturbance recording functionality
• Verification of product against delivery at site/field area
• Verification of protection scheme

• Verification of settings according to power system scenario
• Verification of algorithms for suitable applications
Individual Tests can be described in following way;
Production Tests
These are conducted to prove that relays are free from defects during manufacture. Testing will take place at
several stages during manufacture, to ensure problems are discovered at the earliest possible time and
hence minimise remedial and re-work. Each device has to be tested, before it will be delivered out of the
production. The extent of testing will be determined by the type of the relay and past manufacturing experience.
Tests to be conduct during production stage: Protection function accuracy & calibration, Verifications
of Digital inputs/outputs, pushbutton, HMI & target LEDs, Metering parameters, Hardware communication
with application software etc.
Test Duration: Related with manufacturing process. Time duration shall be reduced with automated testing
by using computerized relay testing kit/setup
Test Frequency: Not Applicable
Test location: Manufacturing floor at Factory

Test Instruments: Depends on manufacturing set up
Certification: No specific certification require for these tests. Manufacturer specify their manufacturing
quality process (Quality assurance/check plan)
Documentation: Quality assurance/check plan. User/Customer can ask vender to submit their QA/QC
plan during buying stage
Factory Acceptance Tests (FAT)
Factory Acceptance Tests are done at the factory to make sure that certain requirements are met, which
results in high quality products. The tests are normally done with the customer, and also, in certain more
demanding cases, with a third party inspection agency. These tests are sometime call as an inspection
tests where the product quality and performance can be validated in front of customer/user. One of the
objective of the FAT is the problems found during FAT shall be corrected before despatch product to site.
There are some preparation require before conducting FAT as listed below;
• Purchase order specification

• Quality control plan of C&R panel including painting procedure
• Concept of FDS (Functional design specification)
• FAT document
• Approved Drawing and Layout (specially in case of relay along with C&R panels/Automation system)
• I/O lists and control circuit drawing
• Progress report (in case of medium and large size project)

• Instruction manual & Catalogue
• Technical specification of product versa require specification from user/customer
• Application software (i.e. programming software / SCADA software / GSE software etc.)
• C&R panel preservation, packing, marking, delivery schedule and shipping procedure
• C&R panel packing list
At a FAT, installations are double checked so that they match the drawings for the specific project. Functions
that should work when cabins are installed at site are also simulated to check the automation functionality.
All possible faults, deviations and wishes are also noted.
Example of Test Activities During FAT
The FAT is normally performed at manufacturer’s workshop/warehouse/factory. All the control panel &
relay inspection and testing to be conducted against approved FDS, drawing, purchase order and
specifications. During the FAT the manufacturer checks as far as possible that;
• Physical inspection, Verification of Dimesions and Nameplate details & Marking
• The used relays/panels/accessories/communication devices are according to the specification (i.e.

compatible HW and SW version)
• The used relays/panels/accessories/communication devices are installed according to manufacturer’s

specification
• The analogue & digital inputs/outputs are connected according to the drawing approved by customer/
user
• The calibrations of the relay are correct
• The programmable logic and associated application software operate according to the requirement
• The logic input/output and their action behave according to requirement

• The annunciation/relay reset/LED functions operate accordingly to requirement
• The disturbance recording/event recording/fault recording/functioning of SCADA etc according to
requirement
• IEC61850 interoperability between devices and logic verifications and inter locks
• Safety standard followed
• Panel & equipment Grounding
• Training to make awareness about operation and maintenance of equipment/relays

Test Duration: Project specific
Test Frequency: Not Applicable
Test location: Tests to be performed at factory before despatch/ship product to site/field area
Test Instruments: Numerical secondary injection test kits, multi-meter etc.
Certification: FAT tests to be conduct up to customer satisfaction level to ensure the product/panel/
station controller etc manufactured as per their requirement of quality, specifications & performance
Documentation: All the relevant documents related with FAT can be prepared by manufacturer along with
the approved by user/customer. FAT report can be submit to user along with product despatch to site/field
area
SAT/Commissioning Tests
Site acceptance tests / commissioning tests are performed before the protection scheme is put into service
at site/field. These tests are designed to prove that a particular protection scheme has been installed
correctly prior to setting to work.
It involves all aspects linked with the specific use of the relay: verification of all inputs and outputs (also
alarms), verification of application conformance, verification of the protection functioning, breaker control
schemes & logics functioning, communication scheme functioning. SAT can also be known as an installation
acceptance testing. Testing at this stage provide the base line data for trouble shooting & periodic
maintenance stage. Physical/Visual inspection at site require to verify the product received at site in good
condition (ensure no damages/lose during transit)
There are Two Main Principles During Commissioning Stage
Primary injection: High current is injected to primary side of the CT. Test carried out covers CT, conductors,
relay and circuit breaker circuitry. Primary side of CT/CVT require to be disconnect from rest of the network
during test.
Secondary injection: Relay is disconnected from CT/CVT/CB and the stepped down current (secondary
current) is directly injected to relay. Therefore no need the primary side of CT to be disconnected from the
rest of the system.
Tests to be conduct during commissioning stage: Primary Injection test, CT polarity check, station
battery healthiness check, Secondary injection test (protection function test, programmable logic test used
for tripping/closing circuit/interlocks, LED & Metering parameter, event & disturbance recording checks
etc.), IEC61850 interoperability test, SCADA communication etc.
There are some preparation require before conducting SAT as listed below;
• Commissioning check list & format
• Electrical scheme
• Catalogue & Manuals for relay/circuit breaker operation etc.
• Application software
Test Duration: Depends on protection and control scheme (i.e. 15 minutes to 6 hours)
Test Frequency: Normally tests require to be conducted on initial stage when the protection scheme
installed. Tests can be carried out repeatedly if the problem find in schematic logic, wrong operation of
scheme, protection settings change, communication mapping change etc.
Test location: Tests to be performed at site/field area

Certification: No specific certificate is require for these tests. Tests can be conducted by user/customer at
site/field area
Documentation: User/Customer should conduct commissioning tests and prepare commissioning tests
report as per their own format
Periodic Maintenance Tests
Periodic tests are the tests performed on the protection at specific moments during its installed lifetime.
On older protection, this was called maintenance testing. However, there is virtually no real maintenance
required on numerical protection, so these are now called periodic tests. If tests are still necessary, they
concentrate on the verification of the scheme performance, verification of the supervision system, verification
of the setting conformance and verification of those components that are not supervised.
Example of Periodic Maintenance Tests: Visual inspection, Spot test of protection function and it’s
calibration, digital input & output checks, LED operation & pushbutton checks etc.
Test Duration: Depends on protection functions (i.e. 15 minutes to 2 hours). Time shall be reduced with
automated testing by using computerized relay testing kit
Test Frequency: It is depends on the age of relay, but normally tests require to be conducted on every
three years for digital relays to check the software (firmware) performance, programmable logic, LED
performance etc. It is require to conduction tests, if the false operation observes at site/field area. Auxiliary
relays require to be test on every one year.
Test location: Tests to be performed at site/field area
Certification: No specific certificate is require for these tests, but sometimes, it is a mandatory requirement
to test and calibrate product under supervision of third party (i.e. third party should have capability to
validate and certify the product)
Documentation: Period maintenance test report should be prepared by user/customer or third party who
conducted/validated tests. Maintenance tests and check list should be prepared by user/customer
Application Tests
Application tests are user-driven and it is the user’s decision to perform a unique test or to accept another’s
test results. The results are not often shared with other users because they are “subjective”. They depend
on many user-specific parameters: the type of network, network operation and reliability requirements
(protection demands). With the emphasis on the application, the test programme consists mainly of
performance tests.
The user generally requests these tests and the results are application dependent (i.e. Verification of
Protection Setting based on power system conditions). Sometimes, the user/customer used to call Dynamic
tests on power system scenarios.
Sometimes, this test can also be conducted as a part of trouble shooting test. This kind of test comes in to
effect after a power system disturbance had occurred and relay acted in an unanticipated way. Assuming
the relay which is responsible is known further information is needed to be evaluated
• Exact time at which relay created the disturbance & cleared it

• Fundamental frequencies if currents and voltages during above times
• Occurrences of relay trip signal, breaker opening, send/receive transfer signals etc.
Thereafter the data can be manipulated using an expert system to find the causes.
Example of Application tests: 87T element trip during transformer energization, 87T element trip during
external fault and one of the CT get saturate severe. Wrong operation of distance protection on CVT
transient, Behaviour of 87T element on arcing faults, directional determination and relay co-ordination
problem, relay operation slower, co-ordination of protection functions of motor protection etc.
Test Duration: Depends on protection functions (i.e. 15 minutes to 2 hours)
Test Frequency: Normally tests require to be conducted, if the false operation observes at site/field area.
Sometimes, it is require to conduct at site to adopt specific settings for power system condition. Application
testing is also a part of R&D process and it can be conducted frequently for validating performance of
product on applications.
Test location: Some specific tests to be performed at site/field area. Details tests to be performed at
Factory
Test Instruments: Numerical secondary injection test kits, EMTP/ATP/PSCAD/Power system model/RTDS,
multi-meter etc.
Certification: No specific certificate is require for these tests.

Documentation: Dynamic tests report should be prepared by user/customer/manufacturer or third party
who conducted/validated product. Sometimes, the document should be scrutinized during buying stage to
confirm the product performance suitable on applications.
Type Tests
Type tests are not elaborated in details, but all the tests have to be performed as part of the R&D process
during development stage. Type tests are required to prove that a relay/protection device meets the published
specification and complies with all relevant standards (IEC/ANSI). Since the principal function of a protection
relay is to operate correctly under abnormal power conditions, it is essential that the performance be
assessed under such conditions. The primary object of protection relay testing is to tests protection functions
properly on power system scenarios, but it is also require to tests controls, metering, reporting (Disturbance/
Event/Fault recording) & communication functions available in modern digital relays too. Comprehensive
type tests simulating the operational conditions are therefore conducted at the manufacturer’s works during
the development and certification of the equipment.
The standards that cover most aspects of relay performance are IEC 60255 and ANSI C37.90. However
compliance may also involve consideration of the requirements of IEC 61000, 60068 and 60529.
Type tests are those tests performed once on a type of protection. This could be certification tests performed
by a certification organization demand of a user. Certification tests, are generally considered to be objective
and are accepted by a wide range of users.
For numerical protection, it should be noted that the “type” specification covers hardware as well as software,
so each software version of a relay could be a different type.
The objectives of type tests can be divided in three main parts;
1. Hardware Type Tests
Test of all hardware modules and the complete device

• Accuracy tests as per IEC60255 / C37.90
• Functional tests as per IEC60255 / C37.90

• EMI / EMC type tests as per IEC60255 / C37.90
• Radio frequency tests as per IEC60255 / C37.90
• Safety test as per IEC60255

• CE conformity (require in Europe, but not mandatory in Indian subcontinents)
• Environmental tests as per IEC60255 / C37.90
• Bump and Vibration tests as per IEC60255 / C37.90

• Surge and Immunity tests as per IEC60255 / C37.90
• Insulation tests as per IEC60255 / C37.90
• Thermal and mechanical durability tests as per IEC60255 / C37.90
2. Functional Type Tests
Test of one function independent from other functions

• Individual Protection functions (Detail testing of each and every parameter and block)
• Control functions (Detail testing of each function block)

• Communication functions (front communication / rear communication, protocol verifications)
• Data acquisition functions
• Measurement functions (Front HMI / Through application software)

• Programmable scheme logic
• HMI (Human Machine Interface)
3. System Type Tests
• Test of the protection device as black box in case of realistic network situations (Application tests)
• Test of the interaction of functions

• Test of the accuracy of the measurement system in case of transient phenomena
• Test of the real-time behaviour depending on different microprocessor load situations
• Test with steady state and dynamic faults (Application tests)

• Test with faults superimposed by transient phenomena (Application tests)
Test Duration: More than one month
Test Frequency: Normally type tests can be conducted once for product on initial stages, but it require to
conduct relevant type tests, if something is changes inside hardware or major changes in software (firmware)
Test Instruments: Dedicated test instrument/s are require for each type test. It is require to be ensured
the calibration and accuracy of test instruments to be used for specific type test
Test location: Details tests to be performed at Factory or Third party accredited laboratory
Certification: Certificate of each test must from third party or manufacturer (Normally recommend from
third party national/international accredited laboratory)
Documentation: Test report & Certificate should be prepared by third party who conducted/validated
product. Third part should have national/international accreditation with traceability of standards. These
documents should require to be scrutinize during buying stage
Certification Tests
Certification type tests are those tests that lead to an “objective” evaluation of a type of protection. The
results of Certification Tests are acceptable to a wide range of users, independent of the application. It
concerns, therefore: normalised tests under normalised procedures and with normalised equipment. But in
order to have an idea of the functional behaviour of the relay, “standard” performance tests are added.
Independent laboratories, on demand of the manufacturer, generally perform certification tests. The result
is a “Yes” (certification) or a “No” for the type of protection.
Test location: Details tests to be performed at third party accredited laboratory

Certification: Certificate of each test must from third party (national/international accredited laboratory)
Documentation: Test report & Certificate should be prepared by third party who conducted/validated
product. Third part should have national/international accreditation with traceability of standards. These
documents should require to be scrutinize during buying stage
Few NABL Laboratories in India: CPRI / ERDA / EQDC / ERTL / SAMEER

Flow chart of Protective relay testing cycle/sequence on various stages;
→ Product on Prototype stage
↓
Product development testing
stage
Application testing at factory
Functional testing at factory

Hardware testing at factory
Software testing at factory
↓
Type Testing / Certification testing
Hardware type testing
Software type testing

System type testing
Application testing
↓
YES Major Problems / Issues found
NO
↓
Product released commercially
↓
Negative feedback Installed at field area and get
feedback from user
←
Find out remedial action
Positive feedback
↓
Product approval process
↓
Get purchased order of goods
from customer
↓
Order raw materials.

→
Get QA/QC plan from vender.
Check sample. Material received
from store
↓
Failures Inspection and physical
verifications of raw materials
↓
Manufacturing / assembling
process / Engineering process
→ in case of C&R panel
manufacturing
↓
Production testing
Failures Functional tests/Spot tests
↓
Goods moved from product
floor to store/ware house
Remedial action
↑
↓
Prepared FAT document
Modifications in hardware Call user/customer for FAT

Factory acceptance testing
↓
Ready for shipment
↓
Packing, Handling & Transportation
of goods
↓
Goods received at site/field
Physical inspection & verification
Erection of equipment OR
Remedial action Installation of relays at site
↑
↓
SAT & Commissioning tests
Failures Application tests
↓
Product in service at site / field
Remedial action
↑
↓
Fail in under warranty Periodic Maintenance tests
Fail out of warranty

↓
Remedial action
Role and Responsibility
Description Development Production FAT SAT Application Type tests Certification

tests tests tests tests
How the Manufacturer Manufacturer Customer Customer Customer/ International International /

tests are specific specific specific specific Manufacturer standards National
defined? specific standards
Who define Manufacturer Manufacturer Manufacturer Customer Manufacturer International International

tests? & Customer & Customer committee committee /
Customer
Who prepare Manufacturer Manufacturer Manufacturer Customer Manufacturer Manufacturer Manufacturer

test in front of & Customer
procedure? customer
Where to Factory Factory Factory Site Factory / Site Factory / Third party
conduct test ? Third party laboratory /
laboratory Factory
Who prepare Manufacturer Manufacturer Manufacturer Customer Manufacturer Manufacturer Manufacturer

report alongwith & Customer / Third party / Third party
document? customer laboratory laboratory
Who Manufacturer Manufacturer Manufacturer Customer Manufacturer Manufacturer Manufacturer

maintain & Customer specific & Customer & Third party & Third party
report laboratory laboratory
document?
Role and responsibility of “Periodic maintenance tests” complete comes under customer/user.
Methods to Test Protection Devices
Testing Equipment Required for Secondary Injection Tests:
A good set of testing equipment and relay tools are important. Computerized relay testing kits (Doble/
Omicron/Megger/ISA/PONOVO make or equivalent) are available that can do the steady state, dynamic &
transient testing of relays. Normally, the computerized relay test kit should have 4 Voltages & 6 Currents
outputs (Analogue outputs) to conduct test for protection functions. 3 Voltages and 3 Currents use for three
phase injection and 6 Currents use for three phase differential relay testing purpose.
Fig. 17.11
Computerized relay testing kit should have capability to conduct automated testing and validate the relay
in effective way. Amplifiers should have capability to inject the current without distortion. There are basic
capabilities to have in computerized relay testing kit;
(1) AUTO/MANUAL RAMPING for Pick up and Dropout test of various protection functions
(2) State sequence / State simulation for Dynamic state testing and operating time test of various protection
functions. It should have a capability to simulate DC OFFSET in state sequence
(3) Test module for Directional/non-directional over current characteristic operating time of curve. Forward/
reverse Directional fault test
(4) Test module for differential protection relay testing (pick up test/slope test/harmonic blocking test/
stability test etc.)
(5) Test module for distance protection relay testing (zone reach test, zone time test, power swing test,
SOTF test, Auto reclose test etc.)
(6) Test module for transient testing (Playback software/module to replay waveform). Playback software
should have capability to replay six current for three phase differential relay testing
Calibration of Testing Equipments
Testing equipment / instrument should be calibrated before testing / validating relays and protection scheme
at site/field area. It should be calibrated periodically at NABL laboratories / In-house. There should be
adequate facility for in-house calibration.
Testing Precautions
Before starting to test any relay on equipment in service, the person testing should become familiar with
the relays/protection scheme & logic. Where test blocks are used, the person testing must make sure that
in removing or inserting plugs that a current transformer circuit will not be opened, resulting in a voltage
being built up which may be dangerous to personnel, property, or equipment, or cause an important circuit
to trip out. In old installations where test block are not available, current transformer circuits must be short
circuited by jumper having reliable clamping devices which will not come loose, before the relay current
circuit is opened.
Grounding CT and VT Circuits
The CT and VT circuits should be grounded at only one point. Relay misoperation can be caused by
grounding the neutral at two points, such as one ground at the switchyard and another at the relay panel.
At least once three years with the primary deenergized, the known ground should be removed and the
overall circuit should be checked for additional grounds and simulation breakdowns.
Test Records
A complete record should be kept/manage of all test data and observations made during tests and
inspections, including identifying numbers of test equipment used. Test records can be store either in soft
form or hard form. It can also stored in some application software (Database management software) in
proper way.
Test procedure/plan can be prepared by vender/user/customer as per their time schedule and practice, but
in general, methods to test protection devices can be identified:
1. Steady State Testing
Steady state testing simulate protection devices using voltages and currents represented by sine variables
using the fundamental frequency of the electrical power network only. One signal/phasor (either voltage or
current) shall be varying at time. Amplitude and phase angle of voltages and currents are defined for a
fixed test period. Different test periods can be combined to a test sequence. Steady state tests consist
typically of pre-fault, fault and post fault periods.
Disadvantages of Steady State Testing
(1) Voltages and currents are calculated as sine variables only without transient signal components.
(2) A sudden change of amplitudes will be realized using an absolute amplitude shift.
(3) A sudden change of phases will be realized using an absolute phase shift.
(4) The DC-component is calculated based on a mathematical equation, but not as the result of a network
simulation.
(5) No transient signal components can be used e.g. for ground faults in insulated or Peterson coil grounded
networks.
It is not mandatory to do automated tests, but still it is recommended several benifits that to do with
automated tests against manual tests by using computerized relay testing kit. It can be stated that steady
state tests calculate voltages and currents using linear ramp. Such equations cannot take into account the
transient behaviour of electrical power networks.
Steady state tests can be used to test the behaviour of the protection device e.g. accuracy of pickup/
dropout tests, operating time test, etc. But transient phenomena cannot be taken into account. On this
point of view steady state tests are only a poor representation of electrical power networks.
Steady state testing can be applied for production tests, FAT, SAT/Commissioning tests, Periodic
maintenance tests, Functional type tests etc.
Steady state testing can be conducted by using Ramping module in modern computerized relay test kits.
Example shows pickup & drop out test for differential current element by using linear RAMP:
Fig. 17.12
2. Dynamic Steady State Testing
Dynamic Steady state testing simulate protection devices using voltages and currents represented by sine
variables using the fundamental frequency of the electrical power network. Both the signals/phasors (voltage
& current) are varying at simultaneously on fundamental frequency. Number of power system states
can be created sequentially and evaluate performance of protection relay.
Fig. 17.13
State1 set as a prefault, State 2 set as a AB fault
Pre-fault, Fault & Post fault condition applied for Dynamic steady state tests
Evolving Faults
Performance of protection relay is very important on evolving faults occurs in EHV lines. Sometimes, it
can be operated in wrong manner or sometimes it may not detect faults if the relay algorithms are not
properly works. Evolving faults (shown in below figure) can be simulated on relay by using dynamic state
simulation.
Example:
State Procedure:
State 1: Pre-fault duration (i.e. 1s)
State 2: Phase to Ground fault for 1cycle duration

State 3: Three phase to Ground fault (i.e. 3cycles)
Dynamic state testing can be applied for Application tests (i.e. power swing test, steady state fault
current apply to relay and check performance, Evolving faults, Power system scenario on fundamental
frequency etc.), Functional type tests & Commissioning Tests.
Dynamic state testing can be conducted by using State sequence/State simulation module or Steady state
power system model (simulate faults on fundamental frequency) in modern computerized relay test kits
Disadvantages of Dynamic State Testing
(1) Voltages and currents are calculated as sine variables only without transient signal components.
(2) A sudden change of amplitudes will be realized using an absolute amplitude shift.
(3) A sudden change of phases will be realized using an absolute phase shift.
(4) The DC-component is calculated based on a mathematical equation, but not as the result of a network
simulation.
(5) No transient signal components can be used e.g. for ground faults in insulated or Peterson coil grounded
networks.
3. Transient Testing (Dynamic Testing)
Transient testing are based on network simulation systems. It simulates fundamental and non-fundamental
components simultaneously based on network configurations. A network simulation system calculates
voltages and currents by solving the differential equations of the electrical network. This method takes into
account the dynamic characteristic of the electrical network. Transient phenomena e.g. mutual coupling
are taken into account, too.
1. Voltages and currents contain transient signal components
2. Amplitudes and phases will be changed continuously on fundamental and non-fundamental frequency
3. Voltages and currents depend on the characteristic of the electrical power network.
A transient testing consists of voltages and currents using components of the power frequency and high
order frequencies experienced during system operating conditions. The signals used in these tests can be
calculated analyzing computer models of a electrical power systems using electromagnetic transient analysis
programs (i.e. ATP/EMTP/PSCAD/RTDS).
Different dynamic network and fault situations can be simulated depending on the structure of model of the
electrical network like:
• Insulated and Peterson Coil Grounded Networks

• Networks with Two Infeeds
• CT Saturation with Hysteresis and Remanence
• Capacitive Voltage Transformers (CVT)
• Transformers with Overfluxing, Saturation, etc.
• Evolving Faults
• High Impedance Faults
• Faults with Arc Resistance
• EHV Lines with Series Compensation
• Underground Cables
• Untransposed Lines
• Double-Circuit Lines with Mutual Coupling in the Zero Sequence System
Transient testing shall be conducted in following methods;
(1) By using network simulation program (i.e. ATP/EMTP/PSCAD/RTDS etc.)
Create Electric Network in ATP
↓
Simulate test cases of faults
↓
Create COMTRADE
(.cfg/.dat)/PL4 file
↓
Import in to Playback software
↓
Apply to relay by using
numerical relay test kit
Example shows Network simulation done in ATP software:

Step1:
Create & modelling of power system network in ATPDraw
Step2:
Simulate faults on various contingencies. Oscillography (waveform) of fault.
Step3:
Import fault waveform in playback software (.PL4 / IEEE COMTRADE file)
Disadvantage: There are no such major limitations for transient testing by applying this method, but it
requires high skill power system engineer who can have correct understanding of power system network &
modelled network precisely with accurate power system data. It will surely give wrong results/misleads, if
the network components are not modelled in correct/proper way. The capabilities of most of the relay
engineer have good understanding about their product configuration but least understanding about the
network modelling and electrical machines.
(2) By Replaying Disturbance Recorded File (IEEE COMTRADE File)
Disturbance recorded file save as

a IEEE COMTRADE file
↓
Import COMTRADE file in
Playback software
↓
Replay same file on relay by
using numerical relay test kit
Example shows imported disturbance recorded file (DR) in playback software
In this case, the relay should have adequate functionality to record disturbances and save/export in IEEE
COMTRADE format.
Transient testing can be applied for System type tests, Application tests (i.e. specially in case where the
relay wrong operate on disturbance and need to verify it’s performance) & Relay development tests (i.e. to
develop relay internal algorithms).
Further the dynamic/transient testing can be carried by following way;
Open loop automated relay testing: Open loop automated testing is widely popular and shall be done by
using computerized relay testing kit along with their application software. Open loop testing can be use for
production tests, FAT, SAT, periodic maintenance tests, application tests, functional type tests & system
type tests. Manufacturer & user can validate protection relay on various power system scenarios with the
help of electromagnetic transient program (EMTP/ATP/PSCAD). Such types of application testing are also
known as dynamic/transient testing of relay. Protection engineer can create power system network in
electromagnetic transient program and generate number of faults on various contingencies. Now, same
waveform shall be replayed by computerized relay testing kit. Method to test transient testing of relay has
explained on page
Close loop automated relay testing by using RTDS: Close loop real time digital simulator testing
(dynamic/transient testing) is also one of the fastest way to evaluate the protection relays on various
power system scenarios. More than 50 nos. of contingencies on protection relays shall be simulating faster
by using RTDS. It is also call it as an application tests. Functional and System type tests (refer type tests
section) shall be done effectively faster by using close loop RTDS testing. It uses high speed processors to
solve system performance equations, advancing time by a few microseconds in each iteration. It is highly
recommended to precisely validate dedicated controller through RTDS like HVDC link controller, Generator
excitation controller, Load shedding/Sharing and Grid islanding scheme of generator, Generator ramp up
and down scheme, special protection scheme etc.
Disadvantage: There are no such major limitations for RTDS testing, but by knowing RTDS operation will
not help to conduct testing in effective way. It requires high skill power system engineer who can have
correct understanding of power system network & modelled network precisely with accurate power system
data.
APPENDIX-A
Example for tests to validate distance protection relay at site/field:
User/Customer can conduct tests in their way but some of the following tests can be conducted at site;
(1) Physical inspection
(2) Check Metering parameters (Voltages & Currents, Symmetrical components, Power etc.)
(3) Zone reach tests on 50Hz frequency

(4) Zone time tests on 50Hz frequency
(5) Zone reach tests on 50Hz frequency and Auxiliary power supply 70% of rated
6) Zone time tests on 50Hz frequency and Auxiliary power supply 120% of rated
(7) Zone reach tests on off nominal frequency (i.e. 47.5Hz to 52.5Hz)
(8) Zone time tests on off nominal frequency (i.e. 47.5Hz to 52.5Hz)
(9) Zone reach tests on SIR=1 and SIR=5

(10) Zone time tests on SIR=1 and SIR=5
(11) Power swing detection and blocking zone test
(12) Power swing detection and tripping test

(13) Switch on to fault test
(14) Auto reclose test
(15) Load encroachment and zone blocking test

(16) VT supervision test (i.e. Verify conditions like real VTS, real under voltage of network, under voltage
during faults)
(17) Broken conductor test
(18) PUTT/POTT scheme test

(19) Back up protection (Directional phase & ground over current) test
(20) Time delay/System protection (Over voltage) test (i.e. pickup/dropout test, time test)
(21) Verification of Distance protection scheme logic (i.e. inputs/outputs/LEDs/pushbutton etc.)

(22) Dynamic/Application tests (i.e. Create line model and simulate faults-AN/BN/CN/AB/BC/CA/ABC/
Cross country faults etc in EMTP, Play disturbance recorded file)
(23) Disturbance recording test (i.e. remove internal battery and see DR is available in relay or erase!,
Analogue and digital channel recording, Analysis functions etc.)
(24) Event recording in proper way (i.e. proper tagging of sequence of events etc)
(25) Fault recording on HMI display in proper way (i.e. Zone1 trip on AN fault etc.)
(26) IEC61850 interoperability test
(27) Check communication with SCADA

APPENDIX-B
Example for tests to validate differential protection relay at site/field:

(2) Check Metering parameters (Voltages & Currents, Symmetrical components, Power, Restrain and
Differential Currents etc.)
(3) Differential element - Winding pick up & Dropout tests on 50Hz frequency
(4) Operating time test on 50Hz frequency
(5) Restrain characteristic (Slope characteristic) test
(6) 2nd & 5th Harmonic blocking test
(7) Stability test (External faults and Internal faults create through power system model)
(8) On load verification of stability (i.e. charge transformer & take 10 to 20% loads and check restrain
/ differential currents)
(9) High set Differential element – Pick up & Dropout tests
(10) High set Differential element – Operating time test
(11) Over fluxing test
(12) REF function – Pick up & Dropout test
(13) REF function – Operating time test
(14) REF function – Slope characteristic test
(15) REF function – Stability test on secondary circuit
(16) Back up protection (Phase & ground over current) test for each winding
(17) Time delay protection (Over voltage) test (i.e. pickup/dropout test, time test)
(18) Verification of Differential/REF protection scheme logic (i.e. Primary injection, stability test on primary,
inputs/outputs/LEDs/pushbutton, Inter-trips etc.)
(19) Dynamic/Application tests (i.e. Create line & transformer model and simulate faults-AN/BN/CN/AB/
BC/CA/ABC in zone/out zone faults etc in EMTP, Play disturbance recorded file)
(22) Fault recording on HMI display in proper way (i.e. Differential trip on A phase etc.)
APPENDIX-C
Example for tests to validate feeder protection relay at site/field:
(2) Check Metering parameters (Voltages & Currents, Symmetrical components, Power, Restrain and
Differential Currents etc.)
(3) Directional/Non-directional over current pick up & Dropout test on 50Hz frequency
(4) Directional test for Directional over current function
(5) Directional/Non-directional over current minimum operating time test
(6) Directional/Non-directional over current operating time test according to IEC/IEEE inverse curve
(7) Over voltage function – Pick up & Dropout test
(8) Over voltage function – Operating time test
(9) Zero sequence over voltage function – Pick up & Dropout test
(10) Zero sequence over voltage function – Operating time test
(11) Negative sequence over voltage function – Pick up & Dropout test
(12) Negative sequence over voltage function – Operating time test

(13) Under voltage function – Pick up & Dropout test
(14) Under voltage function – Operating time test
(15) Under frequency function – Pick up & Dropout test

(16) Under frequency function – Operating time test
(17) Over frequency function – Pick up & Dropout test
(18) Over frequency function – Operating time test

(19) Directional power function – Pick up & Dropout test
(20) Directional power function – Operating time test
(21) Broken conductor function – Pick up & Dropout test

(22) Broken conductor function – Operating time test
(23) Negative sequence over current function – Pick & Dropout test
(24) Negative sequence over current function – Operating time test according to inverse curve, if inverse
curve set for this function in relay
(25) Zero sequence over current function – Pick up & Dropout test
(26) Zero sequence over current function – Operating time test
(27) Verification of over current protection scheme logic (i.e. Relay co-ordination verification test, inputs/
outputs/LEDs/pushbutton, Inter-trips etc.)
(28) Dynamic/Application tests (i.e. Create line/under ground cable feeder model and simulate faults-
AN/BN/CN/AB/BC/CA/ABC faults etc in EMTP, Play disturbance recorded file)
(31) Fault recording on HMI display in proper way (i.e. I> trip on A phase etc.)
APPENDIX-D
Example for tests to validate Generator protection relay at site/field:
Typical generator protection scheme shown in figure

(2) Check Metering parameters (Voltages & Currents, Symmetrical components, Power, Frequency,
Restrain and Differential Currents etc.)
(3) Directional/Non-directional over current pick up & Dropout test on 50Hz frequency
(4) Directional test for Directional over current function
(5) Directional/Non-directional over current minimum operating time test
(6) Directional/Non-directional over current operating time test according to IEC/IEEE inverse curve
(7) Over voltage function – Pick up & Dropout test
(8) Over voltage function – Operating time test
(9) Zero sequence over voltage function – Pick up & Dropout test
(10) Zero sequence over voltage function – Operating time test
(34) Negative sequence over voltage function – Pick up & Dropout test
(11) Negative sequence over voltage function – Operating time test
(12) Under voltage function – Pick up & Dropout test
(13) Under voltage function – Operating time test
(14) Under frequency function – Pick up & Dropout test
(15) Under frequency function – Operating time test
(16) Over frequency function – Pick up & Dropout test
(17) Over frequency function – Operating time test
(18) Over flux function – Pick up
(19) Over flux function – Operating time test
(20) Directional power function – Pick up & Dropout test
(21) Directional power function – Operating time test
(22) Negative sequence over current function – Pick & Dropout test
(23) Negative sequence over current function – Operating time test according to inverse curve, if inverse
curve set for this function in relay
(24) Zero sequence over current function – Pick up & Dropout test
(25) Zero sequence over current function – Operating time test
(26) Voltage control over current function – Pick up and Dropout test
(27) Voltage control over current function – Operating test according to IEC/IEEE inverse curve set in to
relay
(28) REF function – Pick up and Dropout test

(29) REF function – Operating time test
(30) Phase Differential function – Pick up and Dropout test
(31) Phase Differential function – Operating time test
(32) Phase Differential function – Slope characteristic test (for Low impedance scheme)
(33) High set Differential function – Pick up test and Operating time test
(34) Back up impedance function – Impedance zone reach test
(35) Back up impedance function – Impedance zone operating time test
(36) Loss of excitation function – Impedance zone reach test
(37) Loss of excitation function – Impedance zone operating time test
(38) Pole slip function – Power swing detection and tripping test (i.e. detection will be done through dz/
dt or dr/dt in blinder scheme)
(39) VT fuse fail / VT loss of potential scheme verification
(40) Verification of generator protection scheme logic (i.e. inputs/outputs/LEDs/pushbutton, Inter-trips,
inter locks etc.)
Figure: Typical example of Generator protection scheme

Figure : Typical example of GT protection scheme
Figure : Typical example of High impedance generator differential protection scheme

APPENDIX-E
Typical motor protection scheme shown in figure
Example for tests to validate Motor protection relay at site/field:

(2) Check Metering parameters (Voltages & Currents, Symmetrical components, Power, Frequency,
Thermal states/contents etc.)
(3) Thermal over load function – Pick up test
(4) Thermal over load function – Operating time test according to thermal over load curve set in to relay
(5) Prolong start function – Pick up test and operating time test
(6) Locked rotor (load jam) function – Pick up test and operating time test
(7) Short circuit over current function – Pick up test and operating time test
(8) Ground over current function – Pick up test and operating time test
(9) Negative sequence function – Pick up test and operating time test
(10) Phase reversal function – Operating time test
(11) Cold load pick up function – Pick up test (i.e. starting current and CB status close)
(12) Under voltage function – Pick up test and operating time test
(13) Loss of excitation function – Pick up test and operating time test (for synchronous motor protection)
(14) Under frequency function – Pick up test and operating time test (for synchronous motor protection)
(15) Directional power function – Pick up test and operating time test (for synchronous motor protection)
(16) Phase Differential function – Pick up and Dropout test
(17) Phase Differential function – Operating time test

(18) Phase Differential function – Slope characteristic test (for Low impedance scheme)
(19) VT fuse fail / VT loss of potential scheme verification
(20) Verification of motor protection scheme logic (i.e. inputs/outputs/LEDs/pushbutton, Inter-trips, inter
locks etc.)
(23) Motor start report



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Research Report/Publication No.

Central Board of Irrigation and Power

Designed and Published by: Shri V.K. Kanjlia, Secretary

Shri Sanjay Patki

Shri Deepak Kumar Saxena Shri P.P. Wahi

Protection and Automation systems play an important role in meeting the

CHAPTER 2 : FUNDAMENTALS AND LOCATION OF CTS AND VTS IN SUB-STATIONS 4

CHAPTER 4 : PROTECTION PERFORMANCE MONITORING 26

CHAPTER 5 : GENERATOR AND GENERATOR TRANSFORMER PROTECTION 32

CHAPTER 6 : POWER TRANSFORMERS, AUTO-TRANSFORMERS AND SHUNT REACTORS 51

CHAPTER 7 : PROTECTION OF TRANSMISSION CIRCUIT-LINES & CABLES AND AUTO RECLOSING 90

CHAPTER 8 : HVDC PROTECTION SYSTEM 133

CHAPTER 10 : SPECIAL PROTECTION SCHEMES 187

CHAPTER 11 : PROTECTION OF ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS WITH RENEWABLE ENERGY RESOURCES 192

CHAPTER 12 : DISTURBANCE RECORDERS, ALARMS AND EVENT LOGGING 213

CHAPTER 13 : DC AUXILIARY SUPPLY SYSTEMS 231

CHAPTER 14 : SWITCHING DEVICES 236

CHAPTER 15 : PROTECTION SCHEMES USING TELECOMMUNICATION 238

• Costs associated with the voltage disturbances

The manual is structured as under :

• Chapter 13 deals with modern fault disturbance recording devices.

• Chapter 16 deals with the performance of switching devices.

• Chapter 19 deals with Testing of protection schemes at factory and at sites.

FUNDAMENTALS AND LOCATION OF CTS AND VTS IN

Section 2 (A) : FUNDAMENTALS

Requirements for the protection relays

• remote setting and monitoring through communications,

• user configurability of tripping schemes and other control logic.

• Multiple setting groups for easy adaptability to network changes

• the systems have an ability for continuous self-checking.

There are three kinds of arrangement of CTs.

Fault clearance scheme and Special Protection scheme :

Protection schemes are classified into two categories:

Main I and main II protection is therefore provided using:

• The plant specifications

• The requirements of reliability of protection equipment

2.1 FAULT CLEARANCE SYSTEMS

Fig. 2.1 : The fault clearance system

2.2 BACK-UP PROTECTION

The back up protections can be classified as under.

Circuit local back-up protection

2.3 REMOTE BACK-UP PROTECTION

2.4 CIRCUIT LOCAL BACK UP PROTECTION

2.5 SUBSTATION LOCAL BACK UP PROTECTION

2.6 DUPLICATED MAIN PROTECTIONS

• Block-1 in Figure presents the first main protection, Main-1

Fig. 2.2 : Duplicated main protections

2.7 BREAKER FAILURE PROTECTION

Fig. 2.3 : Flow diagram for breaker failure protection

2.8 RECOMMENDATION FOR APPLICATION OF SINGLE FAILURE CRITERION

A failure to operate of a protection relay,

A failure of remote end communication (especially line differential protection)

A fault in power transformer

GUIDELINES FOR PROTECTION SYSTEM ENGINEERING

2.1 GR. A AND GR. B PROTECTION

2.2 TRIP UNIT

2.2.1 1 ph & 3 ph trip (Protections which start auto recloser)

– Main I Line Protection

2.2.2 3 ph trip (Protections which block auto reclosure)

– Direct trip receive

These units shall be hand reset type

2.2.3 Direct Trip of Remote End Breaker

(i) When LBB relay operates