2019 Amc MMC Program

2019 AMC & MMC Program
Avionics Maintenance Conference

&
Mechanical Maintenance
Conference
April 29-May 2
Prague, Czech Republic
An ARINC Document
Prepared by AMC
Published by SAE ITC
16701 Melford Blvd., Suite 120
Bowie, Maryland, 20715 USA
AMC Reference 19-013/MSG-353

March 12, 2019
The AMC is an aviation industry activity organized by ARINC
Industry Activities to assist aviation interests in cooperating to
develop shared technical solutions and to establish technical
standards.
AMC seeks to reduce life-cycle costs for airborne electronics by
promoting reliability and improving maintenance and support
techniques through the exchange of engineering, maintenance, and
associated technical information and the development of voluntary
maintenance-related technical standards.
A primary means of exchanging avionics maintenance information is
the annual Avionics Maintenance Conference conducted under the
auspices of the AMC.
The AMC consists of representatives from the technical leadership of
the air transport avionics maintenance community. The voting
membership of AMC consists of those organization representatives of
commercial air transport operators that agree to pay an annual fee
appropriate to their size and category. These organizations are known
as AMC Member Organizations (AMO). Each organization will have
one vote.
AMC accomplishes its objectives through a number of activities
including the annual AMC conference, AMC Steering Committee
meetings, a quarterly newsletter PLANE TALK®, task group
activities, and liaison with the AEEC and with other aviation or
electronic industry activities.
2019 AMC & MMC Program
Welcome to the 2019 AMC & MMC in Prague, Czech Republic! We are certain that your
attendance at the AMC & MMC will prove enlightening and beneficial to your organization.
The AMC & MMC Program is organized into two major sections. The General Information
section contains the information that you will need to get the most benefit from this unique
aviation meeting. It includes the schedule of events and abstracts of the technical
symposiums that are planned. The AMC & MMC Questions by Topic – the most important
part of the program – presents the 276 questions submitted by airlines and suppliers that
will be discussed at the AMC & MMC.
AMC & MMC Reminders

The 2019 AMC & MMC officially begins with the Opening Session at 8:30am on Monday,
April 29, 2019. This will be a joint opening with the AEEC General Session.
Bring an up-to-date business card when you register. Your information will be used in the
attendance list in the AMC & MMC Report.
The AMC Steering Committee has decided that business casual is the appropriate dress
for all AMC & MMC events.
All participants are urged to attend the entire program. Every effort will be made to keep the
discussion on schedule. However, it is not always possible to accurately predict the amount
of time the various subjects will generate.
Joint Opening at the 2017 AMC | AEEC in Milwaukee, Wisconsin
P-1
AEEC | AMC
Phoenix, Arizona
May 11-14, 2020
P-2
2019 Conference Registration
Attendance Fees
An AEEC | AMC & MMC Badge is required for all activities related to the AEEC | AMC & MMC to
include the technical meeting, exhibit areas, hospitality suites, etc.
Conference Attendance Fees (cut-off date April 14, 2019)

• Non-Member/Non-Sponsor: $1000.00
• ARINC IA Corporate Sponsors: Complimentary
• AEEC, AMC, and FSEMC Members: Complimentary
On-Site Registration
If you miss the April 14, 2019, deadline for registration, we will be happy to assist you on site.
On-site registration will be located on the lower level outside of Congress Hall 1-3.
Hours of on-site operation:

• Sunday, April 28, 2019, from 2:00pm - 7:00pm
• Monday through Wednesday, April 29-May 1, 2019, from 7:00am - 3:30pm
• Thursday, May 2, 2019, from 7:00am - 11:00am
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Transportation Fact Sheet
The Airport
Vaclav Havel Airport Prague is the busiest airport in the eastern EU States, handling over 12 million
passengers annually. Interesting note: The Prague airport was used in the James Bond film, Casino
Royale, in the climactic Miami scene.
The airport has two main terminals, T1 and T2. Both have ground transportation areas just outside
of the arrivals and baggage claims.
First things first:
• You are going to the Hilton Prague Hotel

o Pobrazni 1, 186 00 Praha 8, Czech Republic
• Check in time is 1500.
• The hotel is near old town Prague with Metro, rail, and bus stops nearby. The nearest metro
station is Florenc, 3 minutes away.
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AMC & MMC GENERAL INFORMATION
WELCOME TO THE 2019 AMC & MMC P-7
AEEC | AMC & MMC KEYNOTE SPEAKER P-9
AMC & MMC SCHEDULE OF EVENTS P-10
AMC & MMC OPENING SESSION P-11
AMC INDUSTRY SESSION P-11
AMC & MMC SYMPOSIUMS P-12
AMC ELECTIONS P-14
AMC STEERING GROUP P-15
AMC & MMC GUIDELINES P-16
AMC & MMC SOCIAL EVENTS P-19
AMC FOLLOW-UP ITEMS P-22
MMC FOLLOW-UP ITEMS P-25
AMC & MMC QUESTIONS BY TOPIC See Next Page
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2019 AMC & MMC Questions by Topic
MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY 1
TEST SYSTEMS 23
AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS 29
FLIGHT CONTROLS 38
ELECTRICAL POWER 54
HYDRAULIC POWER 63
PNEUMATIC 64
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS 74
SOFTWARE 92
AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS 96
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEMS 101
FUEL SYSTEMS 107
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS 113
LANDING GEAR 149
ENGINE SYSTEMS 162
INDICATING SYSTEMS 168
LIGHTING 181
NACELLES & THRUST REVERSERS 185
DOORS 194
WINGS 195
EQUIPMENT/FURNISHING 196
OXYGEN 214
WATER & WASTE 217
IFE SYSTEMS 221
OTHERS 223
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Welcome to Prague!
Marijan Jozic
AMC Chairman
We were in Prague with AMC | AEEC in 2015. It

was great event. Our purpose was, as always, to
improve maintenance and lower costs. For 70
years, we have been organizing conferences and
maintaining our purpose, our WHY. All this time,
we have been asking ourselves if there was
another way to do the maintenance or repair
more efficiently and cost effectively. That is why
we have been seeking solutions for 70 years.
And we are successful! We help save millions of
dollars for our airline members. We set standards
not only for our members, but for the whole world. Finally, we educate. We are very
successful in organizing high-quality seminars and attracting excellent speakers, the best
in the industry.
Prague 2019 will be special. Although we have practiced our purpose for 70 years, this
time, we have a few new and exciting changes. Let me tell you about them.
Prague 2019 will be bigger than ever. We will have one more event called the Mechanical
Maintenance Conference (MMC). As you are aware, the first MMC was in Cleveland,
Ohio. The AMC Steering Committee organized it for our fellow mechanical engineers.
The first inaugural conference was a success. This year, we decided to hold it together
with AMC and AEEC. Therefore, the full name is AEEC | AMC & MMC conference. We
extended the ATA range and open forum for all aviation questions with exception of power
plant and primary structure. We expect great cooperation and fantastic open forum
discussions. Wait and see!
There is also an organizational change. Airline Avionics Institute (AAI), who was our
partner for 50 years, will hand over duties to ARINC IA. This means ARINC IA staff will
have additional responsibilities, like organizing coffee brakes, lunches, etc. Besides that,
everything regarding Volare awards was also handed over to ARINC IA. To guarantee
that Volare award recipients will be selected honestly and unbiasedly, the award selection
will be handled by a separate committee totally independent of the organization. Wait and
see!
In Prague, we will do an experiment with attendees. It will be something interactive and

very special. To keep it a surprise, I will not tell you much about it. Wait and see!
Last time, our attendees announced that the AMC conference in Prague 2015 had the
best food ever experienced at a conference. We hope that this time we can prove that it
can be even better. Wait and see!
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This is the seventh time that I am writing the Welcome in the AMC & MMC Program. I
have attended 20 AMC conferences, a few AEEC conferences, the inaugural MMC
conference, and many working groups. It was not always easy. The last seven years as
a chairman was a wonderful time and I enjoyed every little bit of it. But it is time to hand
over the torch to a new chairman, who will be elected after the conference. Somebody
told me that the best time to stop is when it hurts a bit. Well, it looks like I have chosen
the right time. I am happy that I can hand over the torch to a new chairman. At the same
time, it hurts a bit because I will miss my leading role. The following words are the best
description of my feelings:
We'll meet again

Don’t know where
Don’t know when
But I know we'll meet again some sunny day!
But first and foremost, let’s celebrate in Prague the 70th AMC conference (together with
MMC and AEEC) and make the best of it, as we always do.
The Chairman
P-8
2019 AMC | AEEC Keynote Speaker
Vincent Metz
Head of Strategy, Marketing & Communication
AFI KLM E&M
Vincent Metz is an experienced business

leader in aviation and travel industry with
over 20 years’ experience. Vincent Metz’s
his current position is Head of Strategy,
Marketing & Communication for AFI KLM
E&M business and he is part of the E&M
Executive committee.
Vincent joined KLM E&M in 1997 and early

in his career he became Line Maintenance
Area Manager Asia Pacific and Americas,
being one of the drivers behind the rapid
growth of the KLM Line Maintenance
network. In 2005, directly after the merger between AFR and KLM, he moved to
France and in the role of Product Sales Director for Components, became
responsible for the commercialization of the AFR component product. After
returning to KLM, he took charge of the lean implementation in the KLM
Component Repairs shop as Director Component Repair. Then Vincent switched
to the heart of the airline business, where in the Revenue Management
department of AFKL he was Pricing Director responsible for AFKL Long Haul
network, followed by a position as VP Commercial Asia Pacific AFKL. After that,
he switched back to the E&M business to move via business development to his
current role.
Vincent has a BSc in Aeronautical engineering and MSc in Industrial Engineering

& Management Science.
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2019 AMC & MMC Schedule of Events
Sunday – April 28
1400 Early Registration
1700 Welcome Reception
1900 Registration Closes
Monday – April 29
0700 Registration Opens
0830 Opening Session
1010 Coffee Break
1030 Symposium – Big Data – Continuation
1200 Lunch
1330 AMC & MMC Discussion
1500 Coffee Break
1630 Recess
1700 Visit Suites
Tuesday – April 30
0800 Industry Session
1010 Coffee Break
1200 Lunch
1600 Recess
1800 Exhibit/Reception
2000 Visit Manufacturer Suites
Wednesday – May 1
1010 Coffee Break
1200 Lunch
1520 Symposium – Cybersecurity
1630 Recess
1700 Visit Manufacturer Suites
Thursday – May 2
1200 Lunch – on your own
1500 Adjourn
Event Locations
Sunday Welcome Reception Congress Hall Foyer
Sunday – Thursday Registration Congress Hall Foyer
Monday – Thursday AMC & MMC Congress Hall
Tuesday Exhibit/Reception Congress Hall
Coffee Breaks Coffee breaks will be provided daily at 1010 and 1500
P-10
2019 AMC & MMC Opening Session
Monday, April 29 – 8:30am
Welcome and Introductions
AMC Chairman Marijan Jozic KLM Royal Dutch Airlines

AEEC Chairman José Almeida TAP Portugal
Keynote Speakers
Vincent Metz Head of Strategy, Marketing &

Communication,
AFI KLM E&M
Awards
Volare Awards Marijan Jozic KLM Royal Dutch Airlines

AMC Chairman
AMC Awards Anand Moorthy American Airlines

AMC Vice Chairman
AEEC Awards Robert Swanson FedEx

AEEC Chairperson-Elect
2019 AMC Industry Session

Tuesday, April 30 – 8:30am
Session Overview
AMC Chairman Marijan Jozic, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines
Future Concepts for Maintenance Subcommittee
OMG Obsolescence Management Guidance

Marijan Jozic, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines
TPS Test Program Set
Ted Patmore, Delta Air Lines
AT-ASB Air Transport-Avionics Service Bulletin
Ozgur Arayici, Turkish Airlines Technic
AMC Steering Committee Election Overview
AMC Exec. Secretary Sam Buckwalter
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2019 AMC & MMC Symposiums
Monday, April 29, 2019 – 10:30am
Big Data – Continuation
Speakers: James Jackson Delta Air Lines

Jason Onorati United Airlines
Andreas Ritter Lufthansa
Moderator: José Almeida TAP Portugal
Wednesday, May 1, 2019 – 3:20pm
Security
Speakers: Michael Vanguardia The Boeing Company

Peter Lemme Consultant
Moderator: Ted McFann FedEx
Cyber Security – The Defenders Discuss Protection of the Aircraft and Aircraft Data: This
symposium will explore what the experts, air framers, and airlines are doing to protect the
aircraft, aircraft data, and company intranet from the threats posed by hackers to our industry.
2019 AMC Symposium Speakers: Security
Michael Vanguardia
Associate Technical Fellow
The Boeing Company
Michael Vanguardia is an Associate Technical Fellow and

Cybersecurity Engineer for Boeing Commercial Airplane’s Product
Cybersecurity organization located in Seattle, Washington. In this role,
he supports security throughout the entire airplane development life
cycle: from security architecture definition and design though software
development and verification. This includes execution of security
penetration testing against embedded avionic systems across
Boeing’s fleet of commercial aircraft.
P-12
Peter Lemme
Totaport
Satcom Guru
Peter Lemme has been leading the integration of multiple suppliers,

service providers and regulators for over 38 years. Achievements
include notable first type-certification of automatic flight controls,
satellite communications, operational data communications, air
traffic control communications, and passenger entertainment
communications.
He is an active participant in ARINC IA AEEC subcommittees,

including ten years as chairman of the Ku/Ka-band Satcom
Subcommittee. Peter publishes posts regarding avionics and aviation on his blog,
www.satcom.guru.
Ted McFann
Manager – Avionics Data Management
FedEx
Ted McFann has been in the aviation industry for over 27 years. He
worked for the Naval Air Warfare Center in Patuxent River, Maryland
developing software for the AYK-14 Mission Computer, doing
research and development, test, and evaluation of advanced mission
computer solutions and the use of COTS for military applications. He
has worked for Delta and FedEx Express as a shop support engineer
and as a system engineer for a wide variety of avionics systems
including weather radar, TAWS, HUD, and EFVS. In 2013, Ted
became the manager of the FedEx Avionics Data Management Group
responsible for aircraft connectivity, managing aircraft data on and off the aircraft, aircraft health
monitoring, and managing EFB solutions.
Ted received his Bachelor of Science in Computer Engineering from Clemson University in
1990, and a Master’s in Engineering Management and Industrial Engineering in 2009 from the
University of Tennessee. He is also a certified Six-Sigma Black Belt, a Lean Green Belt, and a
Quality Driven Management expert.
The AMC & MMC Symposiums are intended to be interactive. Following the
conclusion of the presentations, questions and discussions are strongly encouraged,
as time permits.
P-13
2019 AMC Elections
AMC Steering Committee elections will be held for the following positions whose terms
end in 2019:
Member at large Air France KLM

Turkish Airlines
Delta Air Lines
If you are an AMC Member Organization (AMO) and you are interested in standing for election
to the AMC Steering Committee, please contact Sam Buckwalter, AMC Executive Secretary:
sam.buckwalter@sae-itc.org.
The AMC Steering Committee plans, organizes, and directs AMC activities
including the annual AMC conference, publication of PLANE TALK®,
establishing and monitoring standard setting activities, and acting on behalf of
AMC in matters related to AMC activities or to industry interests in avionics
maintenance. The AMC Steering Committee will authorize the AMC technical
work program and rule on the adoption of proposed ARINC Standards and
supplements to existing ARINC Standards.
The AMC Steering Committee shall be comprised of 11 voting representatives

of the AMOs elected to the AMC Steering Committee and a non-voting
secretariat provided by ARINC IA. AMOs represented on the AMC Steering
Committee shall be elected by the AMOs.
To ensure global representation, the AMOs elected to the AMC Steering

Committee should include at least one AMO from each of the following regions:
North America; Caribbean, Central, and South America; Europe; Africa and
Middle East; and Asia Pacific. AMOs will be attached to a specific geographical
region according to the ICAO definitions.
For more information, contact Sam Buckwalter, AMC Executive Secretary.
P-14
2019 AMC Steering Committee
AMC STEERING COMMITTEE ROSTER

Marijan Jozic
KLM/Air France
AMC Chairman
Anand Moorthy
American Airlines
AMC Vice Chairman
Ricardo de Azevedo e Souza Azul Linhas Aereas
Joe Falkenbach Delta Air Lines
Dan Ganor El Al Israel Airlines
Ted McFann FedEx
Kazuyoshi Kanno Japan Airlines
Karsten Montebaur Lufthansa Technik
Sheila LIddle Southwest Airlines
Ozgur Arayici Turkish Airlines
Dean Conner United Airlines
Sam Buckwalter
Executive Secretary SAE ITC, ARINC Industry Activities
& Program Director
P-15
2019 AMC & MMC Guidelines
Agenda – This program is the main document for the AMC & MMC. It is provided on the AMC
& MMC websites several weeks in advance of the meeting. Please bring a copy with you to the
meeting.
Seating – Airlines and other avionics users are seated in the center section of the meeting
room. Manufacturers, suppliers, and others who are involved in responding to discussion items
are seated in the wings of the meeting room.
The 2017 AMC, was held in

Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The
68th annual meeting was
attended by 32 airlines, four
airframe manufacturers, and
159 avionics suppliers.
The total registered

attendance was 681
attendees from 23 countries.
Delegates seated at the 2017 AMC in Milwaukee, Wisconsin
AMC Conference Room Layout
P-16
Promptness and Courtesy
• Please be prompt for the start of each session. Pay careful attention to the
start times published in the AMC & MMC Schedule of Events.
• Persons arriving late for the AMC & MMC Opening Session are asked to refrain from
entering the ballroom during keynote remarks.
• Persons with cellular phones are requested to turn off the ringers for these
devices during the meeting sessions. Use of these devices is not permitted in
the meeting rooms.
Meeting Conduct – Anyone wishing to comment on a discussion item or raise

a question during the discussion, please observe the following procedure:
1. Hold up the place marker to obtain the

microphone. Wait to be recognized by the 120o
moderator.
2. When recognized by the moderator, state

your name and organization.
3. Speak clearly and distinctly into the

microphone.
The Conference Microphone System is activated by pressing the button on the base of the
microphone unit. The microphone will illuminate a red ring on the “stalk” when activated. The
person speaking should be 8 to 20 inches away from the microphone stalk and within the shaded
area in the diagram. When finished speaking, pressing the button on the base will deactivate the
microphone, and the red ring light will extinguish. The microphones on the floor stands are similar,
except the button is on the actual microphone.
If a microphone is left open (red light illuminated) without a person speaking into it, please press
the button to turn off the microphone unit. This will prevent unwanted sounds in the audio system
and allow other speakers to be heard clearly.
Manufacturers are requested to follow the agenda when a discussion item they are planning to
answer is being introduced and to move to a microphone so
as to be ready to respond. This will significantly help to keep
the meeting flowing smoothly.
Language and Terminology – The AMC & MMC is

conducted in the English language. Since English is not the
native language for many AMC & MMC participants, please
keep the use of slang, vernacular, or colloquial expressions
to a minimum and speak slowly. If something is said that you
do not understand, please wave your hand and the
moderator will ask the speaker to repeat the comment.
P-17
AMC & MMC discussions typically generate a large amount of technical jargon and acronyms.
Please keep the use of acronyms to a minimum. Use only widely accepted acronyms. For
example, "INS" is generally well known as the acronym for the Inertial Navigation System;
however, "GBL" probably is not used to denote "Gyro Bearing Lubricant" in many organizations.
Since the AMC & MMC is all about communication and is an international meeting, the AMC
Steering Group encourages all attendees to participate. The person sitting next to you at the AMC
& MMC may have that one bit of magic information that will solve your problem or offer a new
perspective. Take time to meet that person, listen to what they have to say, and thank them for
participating.
The moderators take additional care to ensure the use of these guidelines. Participants are
encouraged to inform the moderator if you do not understand the discussion due to a language
barrier.
For cases where the moderator feels that the question or response is not clear, the moderator will
ask the respondent to repeat the response more slowly. In addition, manufacturers should be
willing to restate a question to ensure a clear understanding for everyone.
Discussion Item Procedure
• The moderator will direct your attention to each new item number. If the question is
complex, a brief summary may be made.
• When it appears that a group of operators have similar problems, the moderator
may ask for a show of hands to avoid redundant comments and to expedite
discussion.
• Airlines and suppliers are encouraged to provide concise verbal responses,
preferably not to exceed one minute.
• A copy of written responses should be given to the AMC Executive Secretary.
• All written responses must be read by the submitter to be included in the report.
• If solutions must be worked out after the conference, please send a copy of the
appropriate documentation to the AMC Secretary at ARINC Industry Activities. This
information will be published in PLANE TALK®.
NOTE: For delegates that are not native English speakers, it is

imperative that discussions on the conference floor be spoken
clearly, without colloquialisms, and loudly for all to hear.
Information for Manufacturers – New information related to improvements to existing

equipment or new designs may be of interest to users. Manufacturers who wish to include such
information in AMC & MMC discussions are asked to make prior arrangements with the chairman.
Manufacturers are asked to concentrate on technical aspects of the information and refrain from
giving a "sales pitch" during AMC & MMC presentations or discussion items. Sales related
comments are appropriate during breaks, at the Exhibit/Reception, or in hospitality suites.
AMC & MMC Report – The AMC & MMC Report will be prepared following the meeting and
will be available at:
https://www.aviation-ia.com/product-categories/amc-meeting-reports-and-presentations
P-18
2019 AMC & MMC Social Events
AEEC | AMC & MMC Welcome Reception
What a great way to start your evening – even better – what a great way to begin a week’s event.
Meet up with old friends, make new friends, and enjoy the food and entertainment.
The AEEC | AMC & MMC Reception is planned for 5:00pm until 7:00pm Sunday evening, leaving
you plenty of time to enjoy the nightlife of the city. The reception will be held in the Congress Hall
Lobby.
This wonderful social event is sponsored by many companies. You are encouraged to join as a
Reception Sponsor. In recognition of the reception sponsors, each company brand will be
promoted on our website, at the reception, and special thanks given during the conference.
If you would like further information on joining the sponsors of the Welcome Reception, please
contact Vanessa Mastros at vanessa.mastros@sae-itc.org.
ARINC Industry Activities and AAI

Beginning in Prague 2019, ARINC Industry Activities will be organizing and managing all of the
AEEC General Session and AMC & MMC Conference activities (e.g., technical programs,
welcome receptions, breakfasts, coffee breaks, lunches, hospitality suites, award programs, and
more).
Coffee Breaks
Refreshments during the morning and afternoon breaks are
provided by break sponsoring organizations. Morning and afternoon
refreshments include regular coffee, decaffeinated coffee, tea,
water, and a small snack.
Break sponsors receive recognition in our Mobile App and on our

web site. Additionally, break sponsors may give a short presentation
or provide a video just before the break release.
Coffee breaks will be provided at 10:10am and 3:00pm.
Lunch
As a convenience to the attendees and to avoid any unnecessary
delays in returning to the conference, a buffet style lunch is possible through lunch sponsoring
organizations.
Lunch sponsors receive recognition on our web site, during the event itself, and during the
conference. Lunch sponsors may also provide a video to be played during the lunch break.
Lunch will be provided at 12:00pm Monday through Wednesday.
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Showcase (Formerly AAI Reception)
The Tuesday Evening Showcase will be held on Tuesday, April 30, 2019, at 6:00pm.
AMC & MMC Hospitality Suites

All attendees are invited to visit the Hospitality Suites!
The AMC Steering Group encourages all airline participants to use Monday, Tuesday, and
Wednesday evenings as an opportunity to visit with the industry suppliers that are supporting
the AMC & MMC. We ask airline attendees to refrain from accepting invitations for dinners,
tours, or other activities that will take them outside the hotel where the supplier hospitality suites
are located.
A list of hospitality suites is available on the AEEC, AMC, and MMC event webpages
(https://www.aviation-ia.com/content/hospitality-suites).
AMC & MMC blocks several suites at the hotel. Persons desiring a suite should contact:
Vanessa Mastros
Business Manager
Tel +1 240-334-2575
vanessa.mastros@sae-itc.org
AMC & MMC Spouse and Guest Programs

Spouse/Guest tours are available on a first come, first serve basis. Information regarding the
tours are located on the following webpage:
https://www.aviation-ia.com/form/2019-aeec-amc-mmc-guest-program-registration
P-20
AMC & MMC Shipping

AMC & MMC has selected Agility Fairs and Events Logistics as the official freight carrier for the
handling of ground and air shipments, as well as storage, delivery, pickup, and reshipment of
materials.
For further information, please contact:
Paula Collaco
905-612-7158
pcollaco@agility.com
P-21
AMC Review
AMC Follow-Up Items
The responses to most AMC discussion items result in a solution being accepted and the discussion item
being closed. The following list identifies those discussion items still unresolved at the time of publication
of this AMC Report. Airlines and suppliers are requested to contact the AMC Executive Secretary if an
open item has been satisfactorily closed.
ITEM SECTION SUBMITTER SUPPLIER ACTION

Avionics
18-009 DAL Honeywell/OTTO Honeywell to support Otto.
Philosophy
Avionics Honeywell to improve their process for
17-011 ETD Honeywell
Philosophy Technical Publication access.
Avionics Boeing to develop an extraction that
17-016 ETD Boeing
Philosophy prints in pdf.
17-017 Avionics Airlines would like the cost of the VSB to
ETD All
18-015 Philosophy be included in the SB.
18-024 Avionics Honeywell to provide a method to
DAL Honeywell
17-178 Philosophy expedite labels for approved facility
18-029 Test Systems AFR/KLM Teledyne Teledyne to provide TS and TSDP.
18-035 Electrical Power ANA UTAS Resolve VSCF nuisance faults.

Electrical Power UTAS to provideV2.5 VFSG that replace
18-036 SR Technics UTAS
the journal bearing.
18-037 Electrical Power VIR UTAS Waiting for VFSG HO4 SB.
Electrical Power Resolve the burnt circuit board on
18-040 ETD UTAS
GAPCU.
18-049 Electrical Power AFR/KLM Pratt & Whitney P&W to provide CMMs.
18-056 Autoflight System ETD Thales Reduce the NFF rate on the ELAC.
Moog to resolve EMCU high power
18-060 Autoflight System JAL Moog/Boeing failure. Boeing to support fleet
replacement.
17-079 Navigation DAL UTAS/All Provide HMS for Pitot Tubes.
Boeing to complete model evaluation on
18-075 Navigation KAL Boeing
Quick Disconnects for all Aircraft
Boeing to provide a method to reduce
18-079 Navigation UAL Honeywell/Boeing moisture damage to the ADIRU due to
ineffective moisture shrouds.18
Left Open to review supplier progress on
18-084 Navigation ETD All
meeting ADS-B requirements.
Improve reliability of the EGPWC, by
17-096 Navigation SWA Honeywell
updating software.
Rockwell Collins to resolve the nuisance
18-088 Navigation ANA Rockwell Collins messages on Weather Radar to reduce
NFF.
Honeywell to release an update to
18-091 Navigation ANA Honeywell
CMM.
17-099 Resolve problems with FMC CDU
Navigation EXS GE Aviation
18-094 blanking in flight.
Boeing to certify the -005 Honeywell
18-097 Navigation ETD Boeing
TCAS computer on B777.
Rockwell Collins to complete root cause
18-108 Navigation ANA Rockwell Collins
analysis.
P-22
AMC Review
GE to resolve issue with defective
18-114 Navigation THY GE Aviation
capacitor.
Honeywell to provide root and solution
17-115 Communication ANA Honeywell
to RFM failure and then associated SB.
Rockwell to provide root cause and
18-125 Communication ANA Rockwell Collins
corrective action.
Airlines to check HFS-900D for darken
coils and report finding to Boeing and
17-116 Communication ANA Rockwell Collins Rockwell Collins. Rockwell Collins to
provide resolution to coil overheat
issues.
17-117 Boeing to speed up SB to install drip
Communication KLM/AFR Boeing
18-128 shield.
AstroNova to improve reliability of the
16-138 Communication DAL AstroNova
ACARS Printer.
Honeywell to resolve the VDR No
18-132 Communication DAL Honeywell/Boeing
Comm on the B717 platform.
Avionica to resolve avRDC Firmware
18-147 Communication UAL Avionica
Load.
Honeywell to reduce the lead time for
14-168 Software ETD Honeywell
software.
Supplier to provide a mean of electronic
18-150 Software NAX All distribution of software…no more
floppies.
BAE to visit KLM to resolve problem with
17-126 Environmental KLM/AFR BAE Systems
conformal coating.
UTAS to develop more efficient testing
18-160 Environmental LHT UTAS
of the galley heat exchanger module.
Request that the 90 day ULB
requirement be satisfied by stocking the
Indicating recorder part number separate from the
17-ULB All Airlines Boeing
Systems ULB and the recorder interchangeability
be based on the Form, Fit and Function
of the recorder.
Thales to provide process to replace
18-169 Indicating System AFR/KLM Thales
photocells.
Honeywell to improve the reliability of
18-183 Lighting AZU Honeywell
the Navigation light on the E-Jet.
Parker to provide missing data to create
18-191 Fuel Systems LHT Parker
a TS.
Sanfran to provide root cause analysis
18-194 Landing Gear SR Techics Safran
for the BTMU.
Airbus to publish SB on reducing LGCIU
18-197 Landing Gear AFR/KLM Airbus
dual faults.
UTAS to work with LHT to resolve
18-206 Engine Systems LHT UTAS
EEC150 -40 programming problems.
Adams Adams Right to provide solenoid rebuild
14-264 Other DAL
Right/Boeing and/or replacement.
Adam Right and Airbus to improve
18-212 Other ETF Adam Right/Airbus cockpit door locking systems
components.
To improve the reliability of the 267XP
18-220 Other DAL Rockwell Collins
chillers.
P-23
AMC Review
Airbus to work with Adams Right to
18-227 Other DAL Adams Right provide technical manual for the CDLS
system.
P-24
MMC Review
MMC Follow-Up Items
The responses to most MMC discussion items result in a solution being accepted and the discussion item
being closed. The following list identifies those discussion items still unresolved at the time of publication
of this MMC Report. Airlines and suppliers are requested to contact the AMC Executive Secretary if an
open item has been satisfactorily closed.

One way forward SB creates
17-003 Philosophy AFR/KLM UTAS
unnecessary spares burden.
Airbus to restore detail procedures in
17-012 Philosophy UAL Airbus
AMM.
UTAS to provide CMM maintenance
17-024 Flight Controls LHT UTAS
instructions.
UTAS to provide CMM maintenance
17-025 Flight Controls LHT UTAS
instructions.
Parker to provide minimum limit on
17-026 Flight Controls LHT Parker
Elevator PCU.
Equipment/ Remove 9-year requirement and allow
17-035 DAL Adams Rite/Boeing
Furnishing overhaul.
Redesign of the switch for the
17-041 Pneumatic AAL Honeywell
Temperature control valve.
Honeywell redesign the axial
17-044 Pneumatic AAL Honeywell containment ring or return to the
previous part.
Provide product improvement to
17-045 Pneumatic AFR/KLM Liebherr/UTAS increase the reliability of both
components.
UTAS to provide disassembly
17-046 Pneumatic AFR/KLM UTAS
procedures for butterfly assemble.
Whippany to provide the ability to
17-047 Pneumatic AFR/KLM Whippany Actuation purchase parts needed to repair rotary
actuators according to CMM.
Air Conditioning Nord Micro to resolve micro switch
17-059 AAL Nord Micro/Airbus
System issue with forward Cargo trim air valve.
Nacelles & Thrust Airbus to update the AMM to add a
17-067 DLH UTAS/Airbus
Reversers note to include fire blanket.
UTAS to improve reliability of the
17-076 Engine Systems JAL UTAS
PRVC solenoid.
Eaton to improve fuel cap retaining
17-088 Fuel Systems DAL Eaton Aerospace
cable and lug on A320 Fam.
Liebherr to improve reliability of the
17-099 Landing Gear AAL Liebherr
Nose Wheel Control Module.
Boeing to assist in finding root cause of
17-111 Landing Gear DAL Boeing the 767 main landing gear leaking
shocks.
Zodiac to assist AAL to reduce MEL
17-114 Water and Waste AAL Zodiac
rate on water separator.
Parker to improve reliability of the fuel
17-129 Other DAL Parker/Airbus
inerting system.
Parker to provide information on life
17-130 Other AAL Parker
limit change.
17-133 Other KLM B/E Aerospace B/E Aerospace to provide tool drawing.
Zodiac to improve reliability of Fuel
17-142 Fuel Systems DAL/HAL Zodiac
Valve single motor actuator.
P-25
MMC Review
Meggitt and Airbus to identify why the
pylon detector fails more frequently
17-143 Other DAL/HAL Meggitt
than any other position and design a
more robust detector.
Rockwell Collins to improve the
17-147 Other DAL/HAL Rockwell Collins
reliability of the Coffee maker.
Tellair/Airbus to provide resolution to
17-150 Other DAL/HAL Tellair/Airbus
Door Sill Anti-Rollout latch.
P-26
REFERENCE 19-013/MSG-353 - Page 1
MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY

Item Orig. Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From
1 AMC IRU Repair Data Multi Honeywell – Coon Multi 34-26 DAL
Rapids
Delta has previously submitted to the AMC concerns with Honeywell’s use of OEM data outside of the CMM in their
Coon Rapids, Minnesota, USA facility when servicing IRU components. This drove Delta to author a complicated
array of internal approvals to bring this data into our CAMP. Delta would like to acknowledge and thank Honeywell
for getting this information properly added into their CMMs during 2018. This was a promise made by Honeywell
during the 2018 AMC in Dallas and they met that commitment. Delta would like to state its appreciation to
Honeywell’s Philip Davis and the entire organization for making that happen.
Delta would like to encourage the rest of Honeywell, and other vendors as well, to pay close attention to this
example and to follow it in the future. Common repair data needs to be in the CMM.
Delta would also like to ask the AMC session moderator to sound the gavel on this success story. May we have
many more this week.
2 AMC The NFF Dilemma on All All All All ETD

Predictive Maintenance
Predictive maintenance is becoming more and more popular and main airframers are offering their own tools: Airbus
offers “Skywise” and Boeing offers “AnalytX”. These tools will allow to predict the failure of aircraft components, so
operators can command its early removal before the defect incurs into an operational interruption.
Such practice would mean that the component is removed in a serviceable condition and will be sent to the vendor
or shop without any actual failure message. Hence, the operator will only be able to justify the component removal
based on its own interpretation of the information provided by the predictive maintenance platform.
Image 1: Predictive Maintenance NFF Cycle


The dilemma comes when the unit is tested by the shop and the test results are Not Fault Found (NFF). In such
case, the operator will be charged the standard NFF rate for component testing and certification, refer to Image 1.
Etihad would like to know the vendors’ position in such a situation:
1. Will the operator avoid the NFF rate if it can be proven that the unit was about to fail?
2. Which documents will the vendor request to the operator to justify the removal without an actual aircraft
failure message?
3. Will the operator need to request vendor pre-approval before proceeding to remove the unit in order to avoid
the NFF charges?
Other operators’ comments and experience, please.
3 AMC Repeat Failure All All UAL
We are experiencing poor performance with aircraft reporting systems listing component that are failing but when
received in the shop they are tested as No Fault Found. We have had several units that pass both at the
component shop and at the OEM support center and repeated complaints have not been resolved.
How can airlines, OEMs, and vendors work together better to help reduce the number of no fault found units on
the LRU test station when they have known faults on the aircraft?
OEMs/vendors/other operators please comment.
4 AMC Less and Less Competition and All All All All ETD
Choices for Operators
On the one side, over 2017 and 2018, we have seen amazing evolutions happening around major aviation and
avionics companies:
• Airbus takes over Bombardier, converting the C-Series program into A220 Family.
• Boeing takes over Embraer’s Regional Jet division.
• Rockwell Collins completes acquisition of B/E Aerospace.
• United Technologies Company (UTC) takes over Rockwell Collins, renaming it Collins Aerospace.
• Zodiac is absorbed by Safran group.
• and more…
On the other side, on newly designed aircraft like A350 and B787, the avionics are fully integrated and mostly
managed by a single OEM, making single source a new norm.
In summary, we are trending into a globalized market managed by a few large aviation and avionics companies,
which offers fewer and fewer choices to operators on newly manufactured aircraft.
All these actions have the following side effects in aviation:

1. OEMs are not forced to compete to each other to achieve a better product at a better price.
2. Operators have less margin to negotiate contracts and conditions, as there are fewer manufacturers and
fewer choices in the market.
3. Potential impact on aircraft safety, as less competition means fewer reasons for innovation or product
improvement.
Etihad would like to know what OEMs and Airframers have to say on the above-mentioned points.
We are all affected. Operators, please comment.

5 AMC Standard Parts Multiple Multiple Multiple DAL
Delta continues to have problems with component OEMs and items the OEMs believe to be Standard parts. These
OEMs are using their own internally developed definition of what constitutes a Standard part. Delta, along with all
other operators, must use the FAA/EASA definition for Standard parts. When parts fail to meet the FAA/EASA
definition, they CANNOT be considered Standard and therefore require an FAA 8130 tag or EASA Form 1 to be
compliantly received into an operator’s system. This is leading to long delays (some lasting several months) and in
some cases multiple rejections before we receive the proper documentation. In cases where the OEMs refuse to
issue the proper documentation, our only recourse is to involve the airframe OEM for enforcement of the regulations.
Would the airframers, namely Boeing and Airbus, be willing to identify a primary POC expert in their organization for
dealing with this issue so we can resolve them in a matter of days instead of months?
Airframer, supplier, and other operator comments please.
6 AMC SB Pricing All All All All AT-ASB WG
At AMC 2018, carryover item 17-017 again addressed issues with pricing in Vendor Service Bulletins (VSBs), a
seemingly never-ending issue. Several other items were also raised at the AMC concerning service bulletin
deficiencies and concerns, some of which were carried over, and others which were closed: 18-013, SB Chemicals,
18-014, SB Notifications, 18-015, Quotations for Mod Kits, and 18-016, Quantifying reliability improvements in SBs.
After considerable discussion, a recommendation was put forward and overwhelmingly approved by the airline
participants to establish a working group tasked with developing an ARINC Standard to address SB pricing and
other recurring SB issues. This new standard will provide industry guidance to supplement ATA standards,
addressing gaps and vague areas to move suppliers and airframers toward a common standard for format and
wording in SBs for Air Transport Avionics.
The APIM for the SB Working Group was approved by the AMC Steering Committee. The SB Harmonization
Working Group has since been formed and the group held their initial meeting in February 2019. Work has begun on
the new standard with a goal of completion by AMC 2020. The current members represent the airframers, suppliers,
airlines, and MROs in our industry, and we invite additional participation from airlines and suppliers to help us to
accomplish the most inclusive job possible in creating this new standard.
After discussing the issue of SB pricing, the working group’s consensus opinion is as follows. Considering the needs
of the airlines, we find that the needs vary, ranging from airlines and airline MROs who modify and repair their own
components to airlines and low-cost carriers who outsource this work.
Airlines and MROs who perform repairs prefer piece part pricing in the service bulletin as they have the resources
and experience to determine the total cost to install a SB if given piece part pricing. Conversely, airlines and low-cost
carriers who outsource prefer per-unit cost to install a SB in a unit to use for budgetary planning on how they will
update their fleets.
This drives the need for two different types of pricing to be included in a SB:
1. Pricing for all piece parts used in a service bulletin will be provided (this is a current requirement of the
airframers). This requirement for a SB is for an itemized part list with supplier part number (where
applicable) and true vendor part number for each part list item, and the list pricing for each part list item.
Piece parts in this context include hardware items, software, licensing, and Intellectual Property (IP)
valuation, and, if applicable, pricing for a kit of the parts required.

2. Supplier’s installed list price for the SB, i.e., if the airline sends a working unit needing no other repair and
having all prerequisites installed to the supplier, what is the list price for the supplier to install the SB in that
unit, perform RTS testing, and return it modified with the SB, tagged, and in serviceable condition?
Note: Labor hours to install the SB, which are used by airlines in conjunction with 1. above, are required elsewhere
in the ATA standard and airframer requirements, and therefore do not need to be duplicated in the pricing section.
The working group requests that airlines and suppliers consider these proposed requirements for SB pricing, as
stated above (both piece part pricing and cost to modify a unit), to be included in all Air Transport SBs. We request
that all participants (especially smaller airlines and suppliers) discuss them at AMC 2019 in response to this item.
This can include benefits and impacts of the proposed standards, and support or objections they might have. The
working group will consider all inputs provided and we thank you in advance for your participation.
Airline, supplier, and airframer comments, please.
******17-017******
AMC Price to be Included in Airbus Avionics All Fleets All ETD

VSBs
Honeywell
L3 Communications
Others
In several occasions, Etihad finds that the cost involved in the embodiment of a modification is not mentioned in the
Vendor Service Bulletin. Instead the vendors state in the Price section: “Upon Request,” “The operator-purchased
material list price is not applicable,” “For pricing and contact information, see below” or “Installation of this service
bulletin is subject to special pricing.”
Just to mention an example, on 4 May 2016, Etihad requested to L-3 Com (aviationsales@l-3com.com) quotation for
the 90-Day Beacon Conversion Kit PN 068E5542-00 required for the embodiment of VSBs 31-30-03-024 R03 and
23-70-04-022 R03. After several reminders without success, Etihad approached Airbus Customer Services Supplier
Support in order to obtain some feedback from L-3 Com; as a result, Etihad obtained the precious quotation on
31 May 2016. This whole situation would have been avoided if the vendor included in the first place an approximate
cost of the material required to embody the VSB.
1. Why vendors do not state an approximate price (including validity period) of the material required in the
VSB? Is it because vendors offer different price to different operators for the same modification?
2. Airbus and Boeing: Can you provide your position on this situation? Is this a legitimate practice?
Other operators’ comments and experience in case of being affected, please.
******18-015******
Item Orig. Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
AMC Quotations in the All All AFR/KLM AFR

VSB
Any Service Bulletin’s modification kit in the VSB must be quoted. AFR-KLM experiences many unmet demand
regarding quotations on kits with no technical justification whatsoever. For AFR-KLM (all airlines?), the goal of
performing Service Bulletins internally is to keep availability high.
Other operators, airframers, OEMs comment please.

7 AMC Reliability SBs All All All All TAP
For the Vendor SBs issued for reliability improvement, it would be interesting to get the information from the vendors
of the expected added‐value for the unit. On most of the VSBs, not even the price of the modification/parts/kit is
available on the document itself, which makes the process of technical evaluation very time consuming.
This subject has been discussed at previous conferences; nevertheless, we have not seen a change on the vendors’
side.
OEMs and Airbus comments would be appreciated.
8 MMC VSB ICA Concerns DAL
Delta Air Lines, Inc. (Delta) often finds that supplier's issue Vendor Service Bulletins (VSB) in advance of revising
the appropriate Component Maintenance Manual (CMM) to incorporate the content contained within the VSB.
While Delta recognizes the challenges associated with timely technical publication actions, it remains critical that
the CMM be updated to include the recently issued VSB, to provide the operator with sufficient Instructions for
Continued Airworthiness (ICA). This situation is best summarized by an example as follows:
1. Supplier issues a VSB to modify a component from a ‐1 configuration to a ‐2 configuration.
2. Supplier fails to update the appropriate CMM to reflect the new ‐2 configuration (CMM is only effective for
the ‐1).
3. Operator upgrades their component's from from ‐1 configuration to ‐2 configuration via the VSB.
4. Operator installs a ‐2 configuration unit on its aircraft (AIPC recognizes ‐2 configuration).
5. A ‐2 unit is removed from the aircraft for a fault and routed to the shop for repair per the CMM.
6. Shop cannot return the ‐2 unit to service, because there is no ICA. The CMM is only effective for the ‐1
configuration as it was never updated to incorporate the contents of the VSB.
Often changes introduced through a VSB require unique testing and/or assembly disassembly procedures, which
are not recognized in the appropriate CMM when a supplier fails to incorporate the VSB in a timely fashion.
Several suppliers have taken the position that upon the release of a VSB, the VSB becomes part of the published
ICA, along with the CMM for that component. Delta does not agree with this position. Delta does not believe that
stance is in alignment with FAA Order 8110.54A, Chapter 2, Paragraphs 4, and 8, along with Chapter 4,
Paragraph 9.
Based on the aforementioned example, is a supplier required to incorporate a VSB into the appropriate CMM in a
timely fashion to provide operator's with sufficient ICA? If not, is the industry's position that the VSB and CMM
provide sufficient ICA to return a unit to service?
Operator, supplier, and airframer comments, please.

9 AMC Difficulty in Tracking and All Thales All All ETD

Identifying Modifications
Over the past years, Etihad has seen an uncommon practice followed by Thales in order to identify units embodied
with certain VSBs. Serve as an example the embodiment of Thales SIL-1404 on the Radio Management Panel P/N
C12848xxxx or embodiment of VSB 35-0L5-24-018 in the Battery Charge Limiter P/N 35-0L5-1006-08, which are
identified by the addition of an Inspected/fitted label.
Each avionics component is equipped with an Amendment or Modification label. It would make the operator´s life
easier if the vendor followed a simple way of identifying the unit by Part Number, Serial Number, and Amendment
Letter instead of Part Number, Serial Number, Amendment Letter, and additional inspected/fitted labels.
This practice is prone to the following difficulties:
1. A maintenance software system (SAP, AMOS, TRAX…) can track the unit by P/N, S/N, and Amendment
Letter. But there is no possibility to track it by additional inspected/fitted labels.
2. If the VSB is embodied and the corresponding inspected/fitted label placed, but later this label is removed
by accident or mistake, how would the operator know the component status? On the other side, if the
Amendment Letter label is missing on a component, it is clear that this label should be replaced and
properly marked.
3. An EASA Form One states the Amendments embodied on a component under the Remarks section, but
this section does not state the status of the inspected/fitted labels.
Figure 1: Identification Label Introduced by Thales SIL-1404 on RMP PN C12848Ax0x

Figure 2: Identification Label Introduced by Thales VSB 35-0L5-24-018 on BCL PN 35-0L5-1006-08
To Etihad´s knowledge, this identification practice is not being followed by other vendors.
Can Thales explain the reasoning behind this practice and favorably avoid it in the future for the sake of clarity and
tracking purposes?
Operators feedback please.

Associate
Airline
10 AMC Single Event Multiple Boeing B787 Multiple KLM/AFR KLM

Effects (SEE)
Collins
Aerospace
GE Aviation
Description:
KLM would like Boeing as OAM together with GE and Collins (UTAS) as OEM’s to provide operators and
maintenance staff with a better understanding of what SEE including Single Event Upset (SEU) and Single Event
Latch up are and how they can affect the aircraft (EICAS, MM and status messages), also refer to Boeing Fleet
Team Exchange FTX; ISE-21-18-23727.
Questions:
1. KLM would like to request OAM and OEMs to please issue a Service letter or other document with
explanation about SEE phenomenon. How can this manifest itself on aircraft systems/LRUs, how can
operators and maintenance staff possibly recognize the symptoms and effectively troubleshoot them? This
would create more awareness and provide guidance on how to deal with the effects of SEE on various
systems and LRUs.
2. Do other operators also feel the need to better understand SEE in order to create awareness and provide
guidance to their maintenance organization to help maintenance staff effectively trouble shoot these issues
and prevent Unscheduled Ground Time (UGT) and excessive maintenance cost?
Other operators, suppliers, and airframers comment, please.
Associate
Airline
11 AMC Obsolescence All All All All AFR/KLM AFR

Management and
Communication
Obsolescence is a major concern in our industry and its consequences cannot be avoided. However, obsolescence
must be considered as an unavoidable burden and not as a business opportunity. Given this ascertainment:
1. Operators need to receive obsolescence information in order to analyze the consequences and prepare
solutions well in advance. The way of communicating this information is not standardized among the OEMs
who use:
a. Service Information Letter as soon as a future obsolescence status is known even if the solution is
not yet defined.
b. Vendor Service Bulletin when it is the only proposed solution to the obsolescence. In that case, the
operator often discovers the obsolescence from the VSB, which is very late and sometimes after
the obsolescence effectivity.
c. Service Information Letter when there is no replacement part or no VSB and purchasing a new LRU
is the only proposed solution.
d. Commercial information without any technical document for the announcement of a new LRU in
response to a part unavailability. In that case, the document is not received through the technical
channel and therefore often unknown by the engineer.
Air France/KLM would like to receive a notification through a Service Information Letter for any obsolescence as
soon as the obsolescence conditions are known without waiting for the obsolescence to be effective or for a solution
to be proposed by the OEM.
2. Air France/KLM would like to know how the aircraft manufacturers intend to monitor the costs of the
solutions proposed by the OEMs in case of obsolescence. These consequences can range from low to very
high cost according to the solutions:
a. Part from an OEM inventory made from a Last Time Buy
b. Interchangeable replacement part FFF (Form, Fit, and Function)
c. LRU or SRU Vendor Service Bulletin needed for a replacement part which is not FFF
d. New SRU when no SRU modification possible
e. New LRU
Air France would like to know how airframers controls and manages the cost impact for airlines. Any solution should
be offered to the operators at cost.
Boeing, Airbus, and other operator comments, please.
Associate
Airline
12 AMC Obsolescence Definition AFR/KLM AFR

Understanding
A general understanding of obsolescence is the discontinuation or the recent and sometimes sudden unavailability
of a part. In the aircraft world this could range from basic piece parts to very expensive LRUs.
Obsolescence statement conditions are sometime differently understood by an OEM and an operator. This may lead
to some financial issues due to the costs of obsolescence declaration consequences. As obsolescence is more
accurately defined in the Aircraft manufacturers Product Support Agreements, these documents could be taken as
references. However, they still leave room for interpretation.
Air France/KLM would like to hear from Airbus, Boeing, ATR, and Embraer if it is correct to declare that a part is not
obsolete when:
• The part is no longer manufactured but is still available and can be purchased on the market
• The part is no longer manufactured, it cannot be purchased on the market, but it can be purchased from the
OEM.
• The part is still manufactured for a limited period of time, all the parts are already sold in Last Time Buy
conditions and cannot be purchased on the market, but parts can be purchased from the OEM.
Example: Radio Management Panel (RMP P/N C12848XXXX) and Integrated Standby Instrument System (ISIS P/N
C16221XXXX) have obsolete parts which cannot be bought. When the part is sent to the Thales repair Station,
those parts are replaced on the LRUs. OEM made stock on the part and did not offer Last Time Buy conditions.
Airbus, Boeing, ATR, and Embraer comments, please.

Associate
Airline
13 AMC ICD BP Updates Multiple Boeing B787 Multiple KLM/AFR KLM
Description:
ICD block point software loads have an impact on several ATAs, systems, and software parts within those systems.
Information and impact on the various systems in regard to software parts for the ICD updates are often
communicated through in multiple ways: FTDs under different ATA nr’s, GBST Configuration Advisories, Resolution
Advisories, Change documents, and SL letters. This makes it quite hard to determine impact on various systems
and software parts: OPS, AMIs, UMS, etc.
Questions:
1. KLM would like to request for the future ICD Block point updates Boeing release one document (SL, FTD, or
other communication updated regularly) that provides all relevant information in one clear overview for
operators/Engineering, including the following:
a. From which Cust/Line nr ICD will be factory installed.
b. Which ATAs and software parts are be involved.
c. Which, UMS, AMIs, ASOs will be impacted.
d. What the software concurrent requirements or dependencies will be across different ATAs.
2. Other operators your experience and comments please?
Boeing and other operator comments, please.
Associate
Airline
14 AMC ECCN All All All All AFR/KLM AFR
ECCN code are requested by authorities for transportation between countries, especially for US. ECCN code written
on the first page of CMM is related to documentation itself and not to LRU or its parts.
Air France is facing some difficulties for obtaining this information from OEMs.
Air France is requesting OEMs to include in the IPL the ECCN code related to the LRU itself and its parts.
Other operators, airframers, comment please.

Associate
Airline
15 AMC Difficulties for Getting See Table Multiple B787 All AFR/KLM AFR
Parts for New Fleets
A350
AFR/KLM is facing difficulties for getting quotations and adequate lead time for pieces parts for toolings on new fleet
B787 or A350 components. Some OEMs do not have the Part Manufacturer Approval yet for providing piece parts or
SRU. The time for obtaining the quotation are sometime too long and the lead time too. The global waiting time for
the airline could be reach more than one year and much more. See some examples below:
Number
NHA Designation NHA PN NHA CMM Part PN/Description OEM fleet Comments of day
rejection from Zodiac &
Water Pump 77001-040 38-17-14 quotation for pieces parts Zodiac B787 Parker 375
Exciter ignition 7000273H04 /05 /06 49-41-12 quotation for pieces parts PWC B787 no quotation received yet 527
RCP 30288-0101 28-21-02 quotation for pieces parts Goodrich B787 no response received yet 316
ACTUATOR, quoted by aviall, not yet
RETRACT MLG 2-8295-8 32-32-10 quotation for pieces parts Triumph B787 ordered 380
Overvoltage quote received part ordered,
Protection Unit 1719454x 24-24-28 quotation for Cards A2 & A3 Hamilton A350 long lead time 180
APUC 7000003H0x 49-61-21 quotations for RLU CMM 49-06-07 PWC B787 no quotation received yet 1357
CMSC 7000045H02 24-15-60 7005242A, CMM 24-15-62 UTAS B787 received A2 boards 899
ODSC 474494 21-52-01 quotation for tool P/N T-474494 Triumph B787 received 688
ordered in DEC18, PSD maxi
BOOST PUMP 39-0001-1500 28-24-39 quotation for pieces parts Eaton B787 MAR20 439
Operator, OEM and airframer comments please.
16 AMC Lead Times All All Airbus All TAP
Since the past year, TAP has been experiencing aggressively augmented lead times for repair parts orders placed
to vendors. In several cases, estimated lead times are up to 180 days or more for non-obsolete parts. For instance,
this occurs even with typical consumable parts used for repairs of LRUs, such as P/Bs, cable assys, labels and even
materials for SB embodiment, leading to several and critical no stock situations and unsustainable repair shop
turnaround times.
TAP would like to know if vendors are trying to improve their commitment and if the other operators have also been
experiencing long lead times and how they are managing it.
Other supplier and operator comments, please.

17 AMC MISH vs. Design Deficiency Various Various Various Various LHT
Contend:
There is no general boundary between MISH/CID (Mishandling/Customer Induced Damage) and design deficiency
of wear parts of LRUs returned from service!
Examples:
• Broken Cargo PDU (Power Drive Units) at B747-8. Modification of OEM did not cure the root problem.
• Defective Cargo Joysticks at XXX. Early wear is always deemed as MISH within warranty period.
• Shafting on wear parts makes warranty deny at B777 Ram Air Actuator.
• Shaving marks on A330/A340 APU Generator (main- and end-frame) due to AD-Note-Modification.
Are other operators and MRO seeing similar problems? Please comment.
LHT proposes to setup a working group to define the technical difference between MISH/CID and design deficiency,
depending on the reappearing occurrence of the same failure condition.
18 AMC Drawing Access Various Boeing All Various UAL
In numerous instances, we have been unable to access Boeing drawings for equipment on our aircraft, most
recently P/N 286W0670-003. This requires us to query Boeing for information we require that is not included in the
IPC or other Boeing manuals. We believe we should have access to all drawings for equipment installed on our
aircraft.
Other airlines – please comment.
Boeing – please comment on current policy and plans, if any, to update this policy.
19 AMC CMM Table/Figure Illegibility Several Several Several All DAL
Delta Air Lines has experienced difficulties with the clarity of tables and figures (most notably schematics). This is
sometimes caused by the OEM encrypting/signing documents where our technical publications team has to perform
additional re-formatting (wherein detail is degraded) to allow the insertion of supplemental information. In other
cases, details in illustrations go missing through the OEM’s publication process, or details are muddled due to poorly
scanned documents.
• Are any other operators experiencing these issues?

• Are there any quality control measures where publications are checked for legibility, particularly that of
tables and figures?
Operators, suppliers, and airframers comment, please.

20 AMC CMM Repair Data Removed Several Several Several All DAL
Component OEMs appear to be removing (level-3) repair information from CMMs recently. Some examples include
CMMs for:
1. A320 FCDC (115370-0106, LITEF)
2. B737 Cabin Temperature Indicator (162BL902, ULTRA)
3. B777 Air Cycle Machine (810209-2, Collins)
• Are any other operators experiencing these issues?

• What about level-3 repair data makes it undesirable to maintain?
21 AMC Airbus Kit Issues: Incomplete, Airbus A32X All ETD

Delayed, or Incorrect Content
A330
A380
Over the past few years, Etihad has experienced cases in which Airbus has delivered incomplete or incorrect
content in the Airbus Kits or, in other cases, Etihad has suffered huge delays in the delivery of Airbus Kits. The
following serves as examples:
1. In November 2018, Etihad received revised Commercial Offers ref. UP-2017-ETD1989-CO2 for A32X and
UP-2017-ETD1984-CO2 for A330. These offers stated that the kits required for the installation and activation of the
mandatory ADS-B OUT DO-260B transponder would not be delivered until April 2020, while the UAE mandate
deadline is January 2020. This means that Airbus needs approximately 18 months to deliver the first batch of kits
required for a mandatory modification.
2. In December 2018, Etihad approved Commercial offer ref. UP-2016-ETD0126-CO4 for installation of Low
Frequency Underwater Locator Devices (ULDs) on its A32X fleet. Airbus’s commercial offer stated that the first
batch of kits would be delivered in May 2019. The local UAE authority (GCAA) is mandating the installation of the
Low Frequency ULD in March 2019 under Notice of Proposed Amendment 2018-05.
3. During the embodiment of FOMAX wiring provisions in September 2018, Airbus provided several kits. Among
them, kit PN 461134A17R00 was missing parts inside Bundle PN D9000095485695. Furthermore, we would
appreciate it if Airbus reflected the content breakdown of the “Bundle” in the SB, as it would make the operator’s life
easier.
4. For the embodiment of ADS-B OUT DO-260B wiring provision SBs A320-34-1629 and A330-34-3321, Etihad
suffered extensive delays in the reception of the kits during summer 2017. These delays caused Etihad to lose
valuable C-check opportunities to embody this high manpower-consuming modification. Refer to closed AMC item
18-083.
5. During the embodiment of SB A320-24-1136 R00 in August 2016, Etihad received Airbus kit PN 241136A01R00.
The kit was supposed to contain 3 wires of 3 meters in length each, but the received kit contained 5 wires of 50 cm
in length. The discrepancy was raised under TR 80192846 and revised kit PN 241136A01R01 released under SB
A320-24-1136 R02.
6. SB A320-27-1245 (Install provisions for ELSD) suffered revision 01 in order to update the content of Airbus kits
PN 271245A01R03, 271245D04R00, and 271245D08R00. Airbus recognized in TR 80516052 (September 2018)
that these kits were missing parts, or the size of certain parts was not correct.
Questions:
1. Why is Airbus having so many issues with their kits?
2. What is Airbus’s plan to improve the kit lead time and avoid further mistakes?
3. Is the company in charge of making Airbus kits owned by Airbus or a subcontracted entity?
We would like to know if other operators are suffering similar issues with Airbus-provided kits. Also refer to Airbus
FAIR 18.0250.
Airbus and other operator comments, please.
22 AMC Monitored Retrofits and Retrofit Airbus A32X ETD

Information Letter (RIL) Tool
A330
A340
A350
A380
During AMC 2017, Etihad submitted item 17-014 (Monitored Retrofits and Retrofit Information Letters tool), stating
that the Airbus tool available for RIL monitoring was not suitable and not being properly updated.
During AMC 2018, Airbus promised that an online tool would be developed and available by end 2018. Based on
this promise, Etihad put some faith in Airbus and decided to close item 17-014.
In December 2018, Etihad contacted Airbus through TR 80539057 and requested an update on the promised tool.
The answer was that the “Monitored Retrofit dashboard” would not be ready before Q2 2019.
Furthermore, on December 19, 2018, Etihad downloaded the RIL excel file from Airbusworld and the “Last update”
date stated on the document was August 14, 2018. See Image 1.
Image 1: Screenshot of Airbus Excel RIL Tool Updated in August 2018
This issue was raised to Airbus under TR 80553280 and a new RIL excel file was released and made available on
Airbusworld on January 8, 2019 (Image 2). This meant that for approximately five months, operators had access to
an out-of-date document applicable to A32X/330/340/350/380 fleets.
Image 2: Screenshot of Airbus Excel RIL Tool Updated in January 2019
Etihad would like to know why it is taking Airbus more than two years to develop a simple online tool that will allow
operators to consult the fleets’ RILs in real time.
Regardless of this year’s Airbus promises, Etihad will not close the item.
Other operator’s comments and experiences in case of being affected, please.

23 AMC Shelf Life Policy Several All All N/A THY
Vendor manuals such as CMMs, Instruction Manuals, Standard Practices Manuals, etc., recommend shelf life for
most of the avionic equipment. At THY, we are trying our best to follow all of those shelf live recommendations;
however, this causes some problems with spare management, especially for the equipment that we do not have
internal capability.
What is the most efficient Shelf Life Policy for the Avionic equipment?
Other operator, component OEM comments, please.
Associate
Airline
24 AMC Mix of Suppliers Hamilton/PWC B787 49 AFR/KLM AFR
Air France faces strong difficulties for obtaining some quotations and parts for some ATA 49 LRU on B787.
In several PWC CMMs, some parts are referenced as Hamilton parts. However, Hamilton answered for some parts
that quotation request or order should be done through Pratt & Whitney Canada, and Pratt & Whitney Canada
responded it should be done through Hamilton and so on…
Air France thanks Boeing for their support on this matter. Finally, after too much time and too many exchanges,
PWC has confirmed that the support should be done through them.
However, Air France has not received any quotes and parts from PWC yet, despite the first requests being made a
long time ago.
As examples:
• For CMM 49-41-12 Exciter Ignition P/N 7000273H04 /05 /06: Any answer for the requests which have been
placed more for more than 1 year and half (August 2017) for CMM 49-41-12 Exciter Ignition P/N
7000273H04/05/06
• For CMM 49-06-07 LRU of CMM 49-61-21 APUC P/N 7000003H0x: Some quotes and parts received from
Hamilton; however, all requests which have been placed to PWC for more than six months have not
received answer yet.
Air France requests better support from PWC and to update their CMM for facilitating which supplier should be
contacted for ordering each part.
Operator, OEM, and Boeing comments please.


Associate
Airline
25 AMC Difficulties Getting 1380203-2 Hamilton A380 21 AFR/KLM AFR

Part Quotation
1380206-2
AFR/KLM is facing difficulties getting quotations for piece parts.
The time to obtain quotations is sometimes too long, so the waiting time for the airline could be more than two years
or more.
Could OEMs explain this situation?
Operator, OEM, and Airbus comment please.
Associate
Airline
26 AMC Component Reliability All Boeing B777 All AFR/KLM AFR

Program Boeing
In the Boeing Component Reliability Program Matrix (Updated 2016), we have only around 1500 Part Numbers for
all fleets and only 415 Part Numbers for the B777.
In addition, it seems that all the CRP Guarantee value are very low and under a standard reliability.
For example, for an ADIRU Honeywell PN HG2060AD01, the CRP value is 5663H but we have a reliability at
10533H.
Could Boeing explain:
1. How this CRP is calculated?

2. Why do we only have 415 Part Numbers?
Boeing comments please.
******18-024******
AMC ID Labels Honeywell Boeing 20-00 DAL

Airbus
Follow up to item 2015-65.
In 2015, Delta and other operators expressed frustration for the long lead times to procure Honeywell ID labels for
modifications or SBs. Lead times can be 90 days or longer. We can sometimes get this time down to 30 days by
sending additional emails and reminders. Even then 30 days is a long time to have a unit sitting in a repair shop
when all it needs is an updated ID label.
In 2015, Honeywell committed to getting this time down to "less than 2 weeks". Delta would like to know the status of
this commitment and when the lead times will drop to 2 weeks or less.
Honeywell and other operator comments, please.

******17-178******
AMC Labels Honeywell All DAL
Going on the Honeywell site it is not uncommon to get a “Not available for Purchase” for labels. When we address
this with Honeywell, they respond with a question if we are qualified to do this work for upgrades and label
replacements. It takes 3-5 months sometimes to eventually obtain labels.
Attached is some correspondence with Honeywell on labels. They generally take lengthy times to respond and to
agree to price and provide labels. This problem has been a reoccurring issue for years.
Delta is an approved facility to repair and modify Honeywell units under parts 121 and 145. Is it impossible for
Honeywell to maintain a list of approved repair stations and making it available to their contractors to expedite this
process?
The following is an example of the type of response we get to label requests.

Then when we challenge this response, we get this response from Honeywell:
Honeywell:
As we worked internally for your request, the part is procurable and we are working internally to get the price and
lead time. Once we get the update, we will inform you.
Regards,
Ramzani Mubarak Begum H
Customer Support Representative
Then we wait 3-5 months for labels.
Other operator’s comments please.
******17-011******
AMC Honeywell Tech Pubs Not Available Honeywell All ETD

for Immediate Download
In several occasions, documents are not available for immediate download on the Honeywell Technical Publication
website. Instead, the operator has to fill in a form and justify the reason for downloading the document.
Several days after filling the form, the operator receives an Email confirming that the publication is available for
download. This is highly inconvenient, as the Publication is required at the exact time that the operator looks for it. It
is absolutely worthless to be granted access to download a Technical Publication several days later, when the issue
is already solved or the document is no longer required.
Figure 1: Example of Technical Document not available
Other major Avionics vendors have their publications available for download in real time and do not require to fill in
any forms.
1. Why is Honeywell the only vendor having this practice?

2. Has Honeywell any plans to stop this habit and provide easy and immediate access to its Technical
Publications?
Other operators’ comments and experiences in case of being affected, please.

27 AMC Preferred Maintenance Reports All All All All THY
Preferred Maintenance Records, documentation advised and keeping desired data.
Shop Reports, EASA Form One/FAA 8130-3, and other documents are those, in general, that are accepted as the
“OUTPUTs” of the maintenance carried in a shop for an LRU: during maintenance, which types of test data
results should be saved, which types of items should be recorded and kept in PC, etc., which format the BITE
should be saved and kept, etc. Such terms are not clearly stated in the CMMs or the SB/SILs. So, every Repair
Center has its own method to prepare Release to Service documents.
Therefore, would OEMs evaluate the case to provide either in CMM or though SIL/SLs desired BITE data to be
kept, desired print/save ATE or Manual Bench Results, desired (expected) Test Results, or desired DATABASE
format to fill? Even a sample of LRU repair and its related maintenance data kept per regulations should be given
as an example.
A common ARINC Standard for “Release to Service documentation and keeping desired data” may be initiated to
have common documentation.
OEM, airline, and MRO Center comments please!
******17-016******
AMC Extract SBs per Configuration Boeing Any ETD
When Boeing releases an SB, it contains several configurations to cover differences among all the MSNs covered
by such SB. In many cases, the number of different configurations is too high, making the document too dense and
difficult to evaluate for the affected airline and specific configuration.
To Etihad´s knowledge, Boeing has not yet developed any tool to extract a single pdf covering only a single
configuration per SB. On the contrary, the competitor Airbus makes available to operators a tool called SB+, which
allows to extract a pdf containing a single configuration out of a several configuration SB.
As example, mandatory Airbus SB A320-32-1346 is composed of 681 pages and 15 configurations. When
configuration 002 is extracted in a single pdf using the SB+ tool it results on a 118-page document, significantly
reducing the operator workload during SB evaluation.
Does Boeing have any plans to implement such SB configuration tool in the near future?
Other operators’ comments and experiences in case of being affected, please.

*****18-009*****
AMC Transferred to OTTO Several Honeywell All All DAL

OTTO
Boeing
Airbus
Honeywell moved responsibility to OTTO for repair and support for several components without ensuring OTTO was
ready and capable of supporting the components including the repair piece parts.
We would like Honeywell to fully support all of these components going forward until such time as OTTO has repair
piece parts available and can fully support component repair.
Other operator, Boeing, Airbus, Honeywell, OTTA comments please.
28 AMC Provide Level 3 Training Various Collins Aerospace B787 Various JAL
Others
The similar agenda has been submitted in recent AMCs. Recently, vendors do not provide CMM level 3
maintenance training. If the training course is set, the entry fee is expensive. In addition, the travel fee for instructor
is charged to operators because the training courses cannot be held in the United States due to restricted facility.
JAL believes that operator shop engineers are the most able persons to find the trouble of components initially and
to give idea of solutions considering flight and maintenance crews’ operations and actual usage and circumstance of
the components on the aircraft. The level 3 training giving to operators can contribute the improvement of
component quality and flight safety consequently.
Please consider of setting level 3 training with adequate costs.
Please comment on it from aircraft makers, vendors, especially Collins Aerospace.
Operators comments would be very appreciated.
29 MMC Airbus MSD General Airbus All All THY
Airbus Material Storage Data (MSD) Periodic Check control requires some actions to be done in shop
environment (like changing preserving liquid, replacing batteries, etc.) and some actions that can be done without
removal of the rotable unit from warehouse (like visual inspection, turning over – tires, actuators).
Does the unit (rotable) need to be recertified by Form 1/8130-3 after completion of periodic check control that can
be done inside the warehouse without sending to shop? How do the other operators, MROs handle this issue?
Other operator and Airbus comments please.


Item Orig. Summary LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the
Title Associate Airline
30 MMC 3D Printing Any All All All AFR/KLM AFR
We read that several OEM, airframers, and airlines have started to produce and fly 3D printed parts. These parts
are made of plastic or metal and use different processes.
AFR would like airframers or OEMs to provide a Standard Practice for 3D printing in order to facilitate
manufacturing and approval of parts.
Airframers, OEMs, and operators comment, please.
******17-003******
Associate Airline
MMC I/W Philosophy Several UTAS B787 21 AFR/KLM KLM
ATA 21 of the B787 knows many problems on several subjects. These are counterattacked by numerous
Component Service Bulletins, most of them still under warranty. However, the interchangeability of the new
component is almost always “ONE-way forward,” even when technically/operationally speaking, a TWO-way I/W is
very much possible with no problems. It seems that on the B787, there is a different “I/W philosophy” than on other
Boeing types.
For operators, this “One-way policy” creates a burden on spares investments and a huge pressure to implement the
SBs as soon as possible (not on attrition), which means another financial burden and workload.
• If technically/operationally possible, KLM suggests the Boeing SBs indicate a TWO-way I/W, and let the
operator decide for themselves if, how, and in what tempo they will perform the SB.
• Also, KLM would like to know from Boeing (and/or UTAS) the philosophy behind the ONE-way I/W policy. It
might have something to do with warranty.
• KLM would like to know how other operators are experiencing the above issue.
Operators, OEMs, and Boeing comments please.


******17-012******
MMC AMM AMM Airbus A319/A320 Any UAL
In various places in the Airbus Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM), the detailed instructions of the procedures
have been deleted. Instead, the AMM refers to service bulletins. For example, in AMM 27-44-51-220-004-A, Step
4 Procedure, the AMM states: “Do the detailed visual inspection, refer to the latest revision of ISB 27-1164”, and
there is no detail instruction of how to do the inspection given in the subject AMM.
There are three issues with this:

1. The maintenance department may not or does not have access to service bulletins.
2. The service bulletins are not appropriate documents for maintenance to follow to perform the specific job
as some service bulletins contain multiple maintenance tasks and provide more information than needed.
It will cause confusion to maintenance, create work stoppage and introduce error. Furthermore, in many
service bulletins, it requires reporting to Airbus (immediately) if defect is found. However, our airline
protocol is to have maintenance contact Engineering. After investigation and confirming the defect, UAL
Engineering will contact Airbus. By doing so, Engineering keeps track of issues and not to be blindsided.
Engineering is also to ensure the reporting is done correctly and corresponding corrective actions are
taken.
3. Another serious issue is that the AMM states “refer to the latest revision of ISB xx-xxxx.” Very often, there
are ADs lock us in to a certain revision of the service bulletins; or there are AMOCs allow the operators to
use the later revision of the service bulletin, but our Airlines is not necessarily going to adopt that AMOC,
which means for our AD compliance plan, a certain revision of the service bulletin needs to be used, and
not necessary the latest. To use the latest service bulletin may put the operators out of AD compliance.
The solution: United Airlines requests Airbus to restore the detailed procedures in AMM and stop referring to
service bulletins as the work instruction.

TEST SYSTEMS
31 AMC Test Setup Specification 2340356-1 Honeywell ATR 72 21 UNI

Unclear (Heat Exchanger)
For the Flow/pressure loss tests of the Heat Exchanger P/N 2340356-1, the test setup as shown in Figure 103 and
Figure 105, CMM 21-51-02 does not show the critical dimensions of D1, D2, D3, and D4 of the test ducts.
Consequently, we do not have enough data to build the test setup locally.
EVA requests Honeywell provide the dimensions of D1, D2, D3 and D4 as shown in the figures below.

TEST SYSTEMS
Associate
Airline
32 AMC Late Fuel Level Test Set Meggit B747-400SF 28 EVA EGAT
Response PN 89-244-3 of Fuel
Level Control Card
PN 85-118-8
The test set calibration is due. It was shipped to Meggitt and was received on September 2018.
We requested that Meggitt provide the quotation from October 4, 2018 until January 15, 2019. Meggitt was e-mailed
about 22 times and even called by telephone over 10 times. Meggitt’s response was the same: it is under evaluation
and/or the engineer is on vacation, or the evaluation would be complete at the end of January.
EVA AIR would like to know when Meggitt will provide the calibration quotation/lead time and when they will ship it
back.
Other operator comments, please.
33 AMC Angle of Attack Sensor 0861DR UTAS B737 34 KAL
UTAS added about 30 items of tools and equipment in B737 AOA Sensor’s CMM 34-12-34 Rev 9 (Jan 16/18)
compared to the previous revision.
The list of these tools and equipment includes critical special items such as 0861DR Test Fixture (P/N
0061R09075), CAB Calibration Console (P/N 0061R1438), Demodulator (P/N 0061R02057), etc.
KAL cannot understand why those many tools and equipment were added, because test procedures in Rev 8 were
good enough to detect the defect.
KAL has continuously requested UTAS to provide a quotation and purchase information to purchase and apply a
new revision to shop maintenance for KAL’s fleet since last July. But, UTAS has not provided that information to us
yet.
So, KAL kindly requests the following to UTAS:

1. UTAS should provide a quotation and purchase information for those items which KAL requested ASAP.
2. Or, UTAS should provide the spec-information such as drawings, dimensions, material of those tools and
equipment.
3. Or, UTAS should develop the alternative measures with the tools and equipment the customer could
procure and Manual Revision ASAP.
Collins Aerospace and other operator comments, please.

TEST SYSTEMS
Associate
Airline
34 AMC Missing TSDP 182594-001 GE B787 42-40-01 KLM/AFR KLM

Information Aviation
KLM received SSP37206-4 TSDP from GE.GE supplied ATP executable software SSP32479-6 (specified in the
TSDP) to run on the ATP test set. This executable software directly addresses all required computer peripherals on
PCI Bus 2. An obsolete, nowhere to be found, Amplicon VENTRIX 4002 P12.2 is specified in the TSDP for this
purpose.
Boeing - GE AVIATION SYSTEMS LTD. and GE AVIATION SYSTEMS LLC PSAA-SS&E-0216C-1 in clause 7.0
states: “Seller shall offer for sale or identify a source for all GSE recommended by Seller.” GE is unable to provide a
source of supply for or sell the Amplicon computer.
GE offered to enter another solution for the ATP test set in the CMM. 1P3434TE1, “B787 RDC Acceptance Test
Procedure (ATP)/Environmental Stress Screening (ESS) test set”. This entered the CMM in revision 13. GE offered
to supply a quote for 1P3434TE1.
In the present situation, GE is not willing to revise the TSDP to create a possibility for the customer to build
1P3434TE1, reasoning that they have already supplied a test solution in the current TSDP.
KLM is requesting GE to supply either of these options to KLM:

1. Offer for sale or identify a source for Amplicon VENTRIX 4002 P12.2 in the configuration that is specified in
the TSDP and CMM.
2. Revise the current TSDP and specify everything that is needed to build 1P3434TE1 and put it in operation.
Boeing please provide your point of view regarding the situation? Other operators comment please.
Also, GE please provide a constructive solution to solve this problem.
35 AMC TSDP 822-1293-033 Rockwell Collins B777 34-40-48 AAL

TCAS TTR-921 822-1293-332 B737
TTR-921 A319
A321
AAL employed a third-party Test Equipment Company to build test solution for AAL use; there is an established IP
protection contact in place between all three parties, AAL, Rockwell Collins, and the Test Equipment Company.
Rockwell has provided the TSDP, but the TSDP is incomplete. There is not enough technical data to perform the
test steps.
Example: Rockwell Collins provided communication specification for a test step, but there is not enough technical
data to perform the query to the LRU.
What is Rockwell Collins’ TSDP support policy?
Rockwell Collins, other operators, and OEMs, please comment.

TEST SYSTEMS
36 AMC Tooling 321000M02, 321000M03 Lord (Fly by A320 Fam 27-92-13 LHT
Side Stick Transducer Wire)
Units
A330
A340
Content:
• The OEM Lord deleted in the latest CMM revision 9 from 15 May 2017 the usage of alternate tools.
• LHT in the past has bought original tools and original software according prior CMM revision.
• The OEM ignored all tries from LHT to clarify tool tolerances, so that we can use our prior original tools
again.
• The OEM Lord constrains all MRO to buy new test tools “T11” and “T12”.
• The OEM Lord did not name the measurement value tolerances.
Question:
• -What is the reason to withdraw detailed test data and tool and limit specification (retreat access to Level 3
Documentation)?
LHT requests Lord to disclose that information in further CMM revisions!
Please any comments from other MROs.
37 AMC FCC/FAA Test IFR6000 and TR220 Aeroflex All 23-00 DAL
Requirements ATC/TCAS Test Set
TIC 34-00
Delta’s FCC licenses for Transponder test equipment (Frequency 1030.0 MHZ) use require direct coupling, and at
some airports, direct coupling as well as the tests need to be performed inside a hangar. As far as we know, there
are not any TCAS coupler venders for some aircraft with the number two ATC antenna built into the TCAS antenna.
Are the test equipment venders aware of this requirement? How are other airlines implementing the FCC/FAA
requirements?
License WRLT2000 for LGA reads: Frequency 1030.0 MHZ the unit must operate under a hood with a dummy load
or direct connected VIA cable to the aircraft receiver to reduce free space radiation.
Operator and supplier comments please.

TEST SYSTEMS
38 AMC Obsolete BM-5A Honeywell Multiple DAL
The Topcon BM-5A and BM-5AS are obsolete and cannot be repaired when they fail to calibrate. Honeywell has this
photometer listed in many CMMs, with no options for a replacement. Delta would like Honeywell to identify a
replacement as well as develop any new or modified interfaces in order to ensure the replacement will function
correctly and communicate with existing Honeywell developed tooling and test equipment. Initial conversations
indicate Honeywell may be willing to do this, but that Delta will have to pay for it.
We would like to hear from Boeing and Airbus if this is in line with their Product Support agreements.
We would also like to know what other operators may be doing to resolve this issue in their organizations.
Airframer, operator, and supplier comments, please.
39 AMC Test Solution Support IRIS 2000 ATE Cobham UAL

Aeroflex
Since change of ownership, Aeroflex could not be contacted. Please provide current support contact info for the IRIS
2000 ATE.
Supplier comments, please.
Title Associate
Airline
40 AMC No TSDP 003CM00-0x00 Ultra B787 CMM AFR/KLM AFR

and Tool Electronics 30-11-X0
Quote
Wing Ice
Protection
Control
Unit
(WIPCU)
Despite multiple requests, since October 2017, Air France has not received from Ultra-Electronics TSDP and/or
any quotation for tooling for those cited in CMM 30-11-30/40/50/60 for allowing to maintain WIPCU system P/N
003CM00-0100/-0200/-0300/-0400.
Air France requests Ultra Electronics provide Air France with TSDP and quotations of the tools cited in the CMM.
Ultra-Electronics, Boeing, and other operators please comment.

TEST SYSTEMS
41 AMC Test Equipment 30128-01, -02, -03 UTAS/Simmonds B737 28-41-73 AAL
Quote Fuel
Quantity
Processor Unit
Requested Test Equipment quote from UTAS at “GP UTAS Customer Response Center.” The request was
redirected to the UTAS location in charge of the component. The request was received/acknowledged by the UTAS
location, but there was no further response from the location. Several attempts were made to reach out UTAS with
no response.
What is the best method to get support on UTAS component and test equipment?
Are other operators seeing similar issues?
Item Orig. LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From
42 MMC FA5000 CVR RTS 5013-5000-30 L3 A220 23 DAL
Delta’s A220 aircraft have the L3 FA 5000 CVR installed and there is currently no test capability. L3 has included
the test procedure in CMM 23-70-30, but the ground support equipment/software specified does not exist. L3 has
offered to handle the RTS if returned to them.
By what document will L3 complete the RTS?
L3 and other operator comments, please.
Item Orig. LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From
43 MMC FA5002 FDR RTS 5013-3100-30 L3 A220 31 DAL
Delta’s A220 aircraft have the L3 FA 5003 FDR installed and there is currently no test capability. L3 has included
the test procedure in CMM 31-30-30, but the ground support equipment/software specified does not exist. L3 has
offered to handle the RTS if returned to them.
By what document will L3 complete the RTS?
L3 and other operator comments, please.

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS
******18-056******
AMC ELAC High No Fault 3945128215 Airbus A32X 27 ETD

Found (NFF) Rate
3945129100 Thales
Etihad’s A32X fleet has suffered a high No Fault Found (NFF) rate over the past years on a fleet of 37 aircrafts for
both Non-Downloadable ELAC PN 3945128215 (std L97+) and Downloadable ELAC PN 3945129100 (std L97+).
Below Table 1 shows that the Non Downloadable ELAC PN 3945128215 (std L97+) removed on Etihad fleet over
2017 suffered a 52% NFF rate.
2017 Removals Analysis Confirmed Fault Not Fault Found

ELAC Non-Downloadable 10 removals / 48% 11 removals / 52%
ELAC Downloadable 7 removals / 70% 3 removals / 30%
Table 1: Distribution of ELAC Confirmed and NFF Rates over 2017
In the majority of the cases, the ELAC or related Flight Control fault occurs during push back and causes a return
to stand with a consequent delay. In such situations, the lack of time and limited capability to perform
troubleshooting ends up in an ELAC replacement, but apparently the fault does not reproduce in shop during
ELAC testing.
During 2017, Etihad’s fleet has suffered a total of 13 hours and 12 minutes of delays due to ELAC faults that were
cleared after either ELAC replacement or by applying MEL. Refer to Table 2 for the detailed list of delays.
Table 2: List of Delays Suffered in Etihad A32X Fleet during 2017 due to ELAC Faults
In order to tackle such a high rate of NFF and delays, Etihad has actively embodied Thales VSBs 394512B-27-
021/2/7 on ELAC computers; nonetheless, these actions does not seem to have improved the unit’s reliability.
For additional information, refer to Airbusworld FAIR 16.0051 (ELAC reliability). Furthermore, up to Etihad´s
knowledge, two major A32X operators flying more than 100 aircraft have suffered a NFF rate higher than 50%
during 2017.
Thales:
• Provide details about the worldwide NFF rate of ELAC PN 394512821x and 3945129100 for 2017. If the
NFF is 50% or higher, is that an acceptable figure?
• Aside from the Thales VSBs 394512B-27-021/2/7, what can operators do to improve the ELAC reliability?
AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS
• If the root cause of this high NFF rate resides in the design of the ELAC computer, what are Thales’s
plans to improve the unit?
Airbus:
• Is Airbus aware of such a high NFF rate on the ELAC? If so, what are Airbus’s recommendations?
• What is Airbus doing to avoid such a high NFF rate on a component installed on their manufactured
aircraft?
Operator comments please.
44 AMC GSE (Software) for Thales ATR72-600 22 AZU

Troubleshooting
Seven years ago, we had an AOG on our first ATR72-600 due to a problem in the automatic flight system. The
airplane was already on the ground for about five days when we received help from an engineer from Thales who,
with the help of a laptop equipped with a software dedicated to troubleshooting and interfaced with the LAN of the
airplane (next left cockpit window), solved the AOG in a few hours of service.
We asked Thales to have access to this super useful tool and, until today, it denied us use.
Thales and ATR, please give us access to use this software. We wasted several days in AOG that could have
been solved in a few hours.
Other operators comments please.

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS
******18-060******
AMC EMCU CA72711-006 Moog B787 27 JAL
EMCU (Electric Motor Controller Unit) Gen 2+ still has the issue of “High Power Failure”. High-power failures can
result in internal damage to EMCU circuitry with the inability to repair the EMCU.
Since 2016, JAL has experienced 4 times of high power failure of EMCU Gen 2+. All of these EMCUs are
scrapped as Beyond Economical Repair and needed to purchase new EMCU for replacement spare.
JAL understands Boeing and Moog work hard for mitigating this issue, and current 787-FTD-27-13015 stated as
follows:
• Root cause and mitigating actions for high-power failures has not been determined.
• The Gen 3 EMCU will provide numerous improvements that should mitigate high-power faults,
• Including improving electrical stress margins, reducing high voltage stress, and improving power supply
stability.
The Fleet Team IdeaXchange Call held in January 2018 introduced this issue as by far the most common
occurrence for B787 fleets.
This issue may be solved by providing Gen3, but still exists on Gen 2+. JAL has concern about this because, at
least, the issue will be continued on all of Gen 2+ forever and will cost over several hundreds of thousand dollars
per year. This influence will be on the all B787 operators using Gen 2+. Furthermore, same problem will possibly
occur on Gen 3 without identifying root cause.
Therefore, JAL still expects Boeing and Moog to resume the root cause analysis and provide measures for Gen
2+ as well.
Comments from other operators, Boeing, Moog, and other airframers are highly appreciated.
45 AMC EMCU CA72711-006 MOOG B787 27 ANA
We often experience the failure of EMCU due to the issue “High Power Failure,” especially spoiler’s position.
The total number of the discrepancy was eight cases within a year due to this failure mode and 50% of these
eight cases led to flight delay/cancellation. As there are four positions regarding spoiler’s EMCU per an airplane
and we have around 65 airplanes, we are always facing the possibility of delay/cancellation due to this failure
mode for about 300 units. That is why this issue is the biggest concern in the B787 flight control system for us.
Although we understand that the plan of EMCU GEN 3 is suspended and the investigation has been progressing
between Boeing and MOOG, we cannot clearly identify how this thing has been going. As the issue is related with
Boeing SRP (Service Related Problem), we would like Boeing and MOOG to have more initiative for the
investigation to proceed.
Operators, please comment and share your experiences.
Boeing and MOOG, please provide us with the timeline when the investigation is completed. In addition, we would
like Boeing and MOOG to take this SRP issue into CRB (Component Review Board) or CRC (Component
Reliability Collaboration) to facilitate this issue to be resolved effectively by Supplier Management and Boeing and
Supplier Executive leadership. Please consider it. We would like to get Boeing/MOOG’s feedback.
Operators, Boeing, and MOOG comments please.

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS
46 AMC Primary Actuator Control 7028273-822 Honeywell E190 27 AZU

Electronics (P-ACE)
E195
Reason: FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH CAS message being triggered in the fleet due to P-ACE x FCM x CAN BUS
failures.
1 - Background
Azul currently operates around 180 units PN 7028273-822. The current MTBUR for the unit is 29.083 FH (WW
MTBUR 19063FH). In the last 12 months, 11 units have been removed due to CAN BUS issue. The investigation
is ongoing and currently Embraer/Honeywell confirm a high failure rate of P-ACE T1 transformers (affected
manufacture data codes 0750 +/- 25 weeks) and also cracks on solder joints of the CAN controller integrated
circuits.
2 - Operational impact
• 11 removals in the last six months
• Two delays and one cancellation in the last six months
3 - Actions at P-ACE shop visit

• Transformers A2 T1 and A3 T1 replacement (Manufacture date codes 0750 ± 25 weeks) upon shop
return (May 2017).
• P-ACE Shop Instructions have been revised to add the following information (May 2018):
- To emphasize that the Transformers have shown failures related to power supply and if they are
found cracked or with other damage, it shall be replaced.
- To inform that the CAN Controller ICs and Crystal Oscillators are showing failures related to cold
or weak soldering and that the soldering shall be reflowed to ensure a complete pad wetting.
4 - Next update expected February 2019

Honeywell is conducting an investigation to find the root cause for transformer the failures. Honeywell is also
investigating the CCA solder process robustness and continuous monitoring of the identified solutions
effectiveness.
Honeywell, your comments, please.

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS
47 AMC Mode Control Panel 4082260-939 Honeywell B737 22 KAL
Recently, KAL frequently experienced the failure of LCDs which were installed on the front panel of mode control
panel. Even if KAL replaced it with new LCD or Honeywell repaired the MCP, their reliability of LCD is lower than
expected.
Because the replaced LCD and/or repaired MCP is showing a defect of light leakage from LCD, with having low
accumulated operating hours.
In the past, LCD’s reliability was satisfactory but recently, LCD defect occurs with very high frequency.
KAL kindly requests Honeywell the following:

1. KAL kindly requests Honeywell verify the root cause of this issue and provide us any measure to reduce
LCD defect rate.
2. Honeywell should improve the LCD quality of the front panel.

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS
48 AMC RTLU NFFs RTLU DV8456701-5 Artus/Meggitt A320 Fam 27 TAP
Since the introduction of FAC standard 0624, we have been assisting to an increasing number of RTLU (P/N
DV8456701‐5) unjustified removals (during investigations performed by the OEM). In the past, this issue has
been linked to intermittent failures from the Electronic Boards installed on the unit’s Control Module
(SIL F1549‐27‐23‐05); however, even in units with new boards, the intermittent “Auto FLT RUD TRV LIM 1 (or 2)”
fault messages remain.
The modification on the FAC software has restricted the operation tolerances from the RTLU; nevertheless, this
had no effect on the unit’s specifications and test (which should have happened if the limits were somehow
adjusted).
Other operators, Artus/Meggitt, and Airbus comments would be appreciated.
Title Associate
Airline
49 AMC Tools Thales E13206XX-kit FM Thales A320 22 AFR/KLM AFR

FMGC
A330
It is not possible to get any answer from Thales when we send a request to get a quote for tools and software in
order to upgrade a repair capability, e.g., software #552570-02-01 (CMM 22-83-56) and D20221AA FM kit bench
test for FM kit E13206BA.
Air France wishes to obtain an answer to its requests.
Operator and Thales comments, please.
Associate
Airline
50 AMC Encoder Reliability 822-0044-001 Rockwell CRJ 22 LHT DLH

Issues at FCP-4402 Collins
LHT recognized a lot of short runners due to unreliable encoders installed on the FCP-4002. The OEM already
tried to improve the reliability with the implementation of SBC FCP-4002-22-7 and FCP-4002-22-8 but without
significant success. The chronic unit rate is currently by about 40%. Units with mentioned SBCs already installed
are as unreliable as without.
Rockwell-Collins: What are the further plans to improve the reliability of the mentioned encoders?
All: Comments please.

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS
Associate
Airline
51 AMC Encoder Reliability 822-1567-10x Rockwell B737 22 LHT DLH

Issues at MCP-730 Collins
LHT recognized that in approx. 40% of all removals of MCP-730 PN 822-1567-10x minimum one encoder (PN
830-8723-001) was faulty. This often leads into a low reliability as encoders fail from time to time. The only
recommendation of the OEM is to replace pro-actively all encoders acc. to SIL MCP-730-17-1. From LHT view it
would be more efficient when the encoder installed will be replaced by more reliable ones.
Rockwell-Collins: What are the further plans to improve the reliability of the mentioned encoders?
Associate
Airline
52 AMC Flight Control 398500-100x Parker Q400 27 LHT DLH

System Electronic Hannifin
Control Unit – Long
and Insufficient
Technical Support
406475-0x-0x BAE
Systems
The Q400 FCS/ECU is maintained and certified by BAE Systems, but Parker Hannifin is handling the repair
business. As the Quotes as well as the findings/actions are generally not very meaningful, we normally have
clarifications and technical requests to find the root cause for a failure to be able to find a way to working on an
improvement. But our questions will be insufficiently or only partially answered. It is not very rare that a
clarification takes several months. As a current example, there is still a pending clarification from a Quote out of
May 2018 which is not sufficiently answered. LHT escalated these issues several times without any noticeable
improvement.
Parker/BAE: How can the process for technical clarifications be improved to reduce the clarification time?
All: Do other airlines also see the long clarification times?

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS
Associate
Airline
53 AMC Burnt EMI Filter 766389x UTC CRJ 27-51 LHT DLH
Boards Aerospace
Slat/Flap
Electronic
Control Unit
1716470A (CRJ) ERJ
1700064F (ERJ)
LHT observes a frequent and extremely critical burning of the capacitors located on the SFECU EMI filter boards
A10/A11. In each year of 2017 and 2018, we had five units with such damage. The EMI filter board consists of
27ea capacitors and 3ea inductors. It provides filter function for the three-phase input power of the SFECU. There
are two filter boards installed per unit. Due to the extensive burnings, other SFECU subassemblies will often be
damaged seriously as well, e.g., motherboard A1 which is located very close the EMI filter board (see pictures
below). This leads to a total loss of the SFECU.
Unfortunately, LHT is not able to determine any correlation neither to a specific batch of unit serial numbers, batch
of capacitors nor any aging problems of the used capacitors.
AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS
An investigation has been addressed to UTC in October 2018 already. Two burnt units have been provided to
UTC for the investigation. Despite repeated requests, no results have been announced so far (Jan 2019). A
technical solution is urgently demanded.
Please any comments from other operators.
UTC, what is the status of your investigation? What will happen next?
54 AMC Elevator Tab CMM 183A8100-5/-6 Boeing B737 55-20 UAL

Resistance Check
Boeing drawing 183A8100 instructs an electrical conductivity test between the jumper terminal and the adjacent
lower composite panel on Elevator Tab part numbers 183A8100-5/-6 with a maximum resistance of 100 ohms.
However, B737 CMM 55-20-17, Section 701 – Assembly, Para. 2.C.(4).(b).3) instructs a resistance check
between the mast arm fairing located on the Elevator Tap upper surface and the jumper.
Could Boeing clarify if the CMM provides the correct instructions for the resistance check?
Boeing and other operator and supplier comments.

FLIGHT CONTROLS
Associate
Airline
55 MMC Control Lever (6GA) 215TS07Y00 Zodiac A320 32 THY TKT

Reliability ECE Fam
Turkish Airlines’ fleet has been experiencing serious issues related with the PN: 215TS07Y00 LG CONTROL
LEVER both on A320 FAM and A330 aircrafts. There were total of 32 PN 215TS07Y00 replacements made with
11 replacements were made only in last 12 months. Most of those units were found with faulty PN 367UN01
switch assy, which is almost expensive as the new whole unit. Therefore, almost all switch-related units are being
scrapped at the THY shop. A total of 45 PN 367UN01 replacements have been done in the last five years.
THY fleet has experienced eight different "CTL LEVER" status message occurrences rooted from 6GA issues
since 2014. Additionally, a total of 25 different L/G Ctrl Lever caused LGCIU status messages appeared since
2013.
The root cause for switch failure could not be clearly identified by any document or procedure. Contrary to TFU
32.31.00.029, THY shop procedures do not include any partial/stopped lever operation or inconsistent up and
down inputs, and we believe that related switches are needed to be investigated deeper.
THY would kindly asks other operators if they also experience such issues.
Associate
Airline
56 MMC ELAC Reliability 39451282XX Thales A320 27 THY TKT

Improvements Fam
38451291XX
THY’s fleet has been experiencing high removal rates of ELACs, especially PN 3945128215 Non-Data Loadable
components, where most units found NFF. In order to improve these figures, TKT is currently implementing the
following SBs as a package: SIL-1379 (ERACLE replacement), SIL 1293 (Improvement Package),
SB-394512B-27-022, and SB-394512B-27-027 (which cannot be done without implementation of
394512B-27-021). Also, in order to reduce NFF rates, SIL-1376 is being considered.
TKT would like to ask if other operators have benefited by these improvements in term of component faults and
removals.
Thales and other operator comments, please.

FLIGHT CONTROLS
Associate
Airline
57 MMC Flap Position 9028A0005-01 Liebherr A330 27-55 DAL HAL

Pickoff Unit
Moisture Ingress
Hawaiian Airlines replaced three position pickoff units in 2018 and another in January of this year in FIN positions
29CV and 30CV due to flaps locked ECAM warnings. Moisture has been noted inside of the removed units. The
three units removed in 2018 were original installs on lower time recent delivery aircraft, but the most recent failure
occurred on an aircraft that was delivered in 2010 and had accumulated over 38,000 hours.
The mitigation procedure of checking the position differences via the MCDU is covered by AMM
27-51-00-820-801 but allows for adjustment if found to be out of limits. Is Airbus suggesting that the APPU be
replaced if found out of AMM limits or is further visual inspection for water contamination required prior to
replacement?
We understand Airbus is investigating the root cause of failure but would like to know if Leibherr is also
performing an investigation? What are the expected completion dates of the investigations?
Airbus, Leibherr, and other operator comments, please.
Title Associate
Airline
58 MMC Pitch Damper D2731010000100 Ratier All 27 AFR/KLM AFR

Roll Damper Figeac Airbus
D2731010000200 Airbus
D2731010000300
AFR/KLM is facing difficulty testing and repairing this component according to CMM 27-92-42 and 27-92-43.
During the test (A. (2) according to CMM), a high friction is observed with every repaired actuators, so the test
fails.
The cylinders do not move to fully extended position without external help, unlike the CMM recommendation. It
seems that O-rings P/N ASNA2088-01 (item 01-080) are involved in the friction observed during the test, even
when different suppliers of O-ring and their dimensions are in compliance with the applicable standard.
Furthermore, we have already observed that the test failed, even on a new pitch damper.
Actuator tests also fail in Ratier Figeac Faculty, but the test pass correctly when the pitch damper is tested with its
NHA.
AFR/KLM requests a revision of the CMM 27-92-42 and 27-92-43 to widen the clearance of test A. (2) due to the
friction.
Airbus, Ratier-Figeac, other operators comments please.

FLIGHT CONTROLS
Associate
Airline
59 MMC Repair of Electro 51200-x Goodrich CRJ 27 LHT DLH

Hydraulic Servo Valve Aerospace
Canada Ltd.
Follow up to MMC 2017 item “Flight Controls item 24.”
Failure of the Electrohydraulic Servo Valve (EHSV) is still one of the main failure reasons for the CRJ Multi-
Function Spoiler Power Control Unit (MFS PCU). Manufacturer of the EHSV is Zodiac Aerospace (Safran). Zodiac
is also an EASA/FAA Repair Station (FR.145.290).
Until 2013, LHT sent all EHSVs directly to Zodiac and got the valves back in repaired condition with EASA Form 1
(Dual Release). Later repair orders were rejected and LHT was advised by Zodiac to send the valves directly to
Goodrich Aerospace (UTAS).
Following repair orders for the EHSV directly sent to Goodrich were rejected with the statement Goodrich has no
capability for the EHSV and LHT should send the CRJ Multi-Function Spoiler Power Control Unit (MFS PCU) for
repair.
LHT has capability for the MFS PCU and still needs a repair station or maintenance documentation for the EHSV.
(CMM 27-64-00 from Zodiac just includes testing; parts list, etc., is missing)
Multi-Function Spoiler Power Control Unit (MFS PCU)

Part number 51200-7,-9,-11,-13,-15
FLIGHT CONTROLS
Zodiac and Goodrich (UTAS) please comment.
Bombardier, please comment on the fact that no repair capability is offered for the EHSV, but only for the NHA
(MFS PCU).
Other operators, please share your experience with this issue.
Associate
Airline
60 MMC Technical DV8456701-5 Artus A320 27-23-51 LHT DLH

Solution for
Solder Issues on
Cards
Pacific
Scientific
Meggitt
Currently, there is no obvious safety information about the criticality of the TLU. There is only an Airbus TFU and
an OEM SIL F1459-27-23-05 (Service Information Letter). The strongest fact currently is the sentence within the
CMM, that for every unscheduled removal (meaning: in every case, as this is an on-condition unit), the boards
have to be exchanged, even when tested NFF.
The description of failure mode acc. to Airbus TFU 27.23.00.004 leads to the conclusion that it is not only a
reliability issue but has also an impact on the safety of the aircraft. The mandatory board exchange was a
sufficient temporary fix after the Air Asia accident, but there should be a more permanent solution, considering
that the A320 Fam will most probably stay in service for 25 years or more.
Meggitt: The passage about the board exchange is contained in the trouble shooting section of the CMM instead
of the general or repair section, which leads to different interpretation. In addition, the link in the CMM to a SIL,
which typically only contains information (commercial or new production standard), could lead to further
misinterpretation.
How can better documentation, either by means of an updated CMM (define clear conditions, when the boards
have to be replaced) or other approved data (for example, make the boards exchange mandatory via an
Airworthiness Directive), be provided?
Meggit: The current process increases the cost/FH and is not a permanent long-term solution. Please provide
information on the development of a permanent solution taking the following points into consideration:
a) Re-design of the boards, so that they do not have the issue of undetectable solder cracks (different solder
technique, analysis of the weak spots and improving those, etc.),
b) Make a repair of the old boards possible and economical feasible, and/or
c) Improve the test-parameters and conditions, so that solder cracks can be identified (cold soak test,
climate chamber, etc.) and repaired.
FLIGHT CONTROLS
Extract of CMM 27-23-51/Chapter Fault Isolation
Airframer, supplier, and operator comments, please.

FLIGHT CONTROLS
Associate
Airline
61 MMC ARINC 625 Compliant C99163 MOOG Inc. B787 27-21-02 LHT DLH
TSDP
C99160
C99162
C99257
Mid-2015, LHT started to check the documents (CMM and TSDP) of B787 Flight-Controls to build up test
capabilities. During the review, it quickly became apparent that the data contained in the documents was not
sufficient to test these components with third-party test systems. LHT then checked the documents for compliance
with the World Airline and Supplier Guide (WASAG), as well as the ARINC 625-1. Both documents are mentioned
in the PSAA between Boeing and MOOG. The ARINC 625-1 is not fulfilled. The Test Specification (TS), which is
part of the TSDP and the CMM, is not containing the necessary data to do a return to service test.
LHT requested missing data first time in December 2015 at MOOG to build-up test capability. This request was
denied in April 2016 with the comment that the requested data is intellectual property of Boeing. Subsequently,
LHT requested the data at Boeing and at first, this request was denied as well. Boeing then proposed a revision of
the TSDP (starting with P/N C99163, Rudder PCU) and asked LHT to support this process by pointing out the
missing information. From that point, LHT sent lists with questions and changed these questions to comments
upon request. This process, which LHT tried to force with emails, meetings and conference calls, produced a lot
of work load at LHT from 2016 until 2018, but a success is not visible yet.
In April 2018, Boeing requested an updated TSDP from MOOG, which should fulfill the ARINC 625-1. MOOG
delivered a new TSDP in September to Boeing, but it was rejected by Boeing because it was still insufficient. Next
deadline for an updated TSDP is End of February 2019. LHT tried to support this process several times and is
willing to continue supporting it, but its requests were rejected (e.g., Boeing asked LHT to review the rejected
TSDP from September, but this was denied by MOOG because this TSDP is not released) or there was often no
response from Boeing or MOOG. For LHT, it looks like the update process of TSDP and the integration of the
customer has to be improved. The process of TSDP generation and revising is not transparent to LHT, as well as
the schedule, when a change is requested due to missing data.
Inquiry:
• Delivery of an ARINC 625 conform documentation until mid of 2019 for the mentioned components.
• Provide a schedule for update process, if providing ARINC compliant documentation, until mid of 2019 is
not possible.
• Point out the problems/reasons for such a long update process.
• LHT is continuing willing to support the process of updating the TSDP, if possible and both parties involve
LHT into the process.
Boeing, MOOG, and other operator comments, please.

FLIGHT CONTROLS
Item Orig. Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO,
the
Associate
Airline
62 MMC Design 734-06485-x Boeing B747-8 27-51-22 LHT DLH

Responsibility
Boeing PN Shimadzu
S256U500-4100
Umbra
The ballscrew assembly is manufactured by Umbra Group, with the design responsibility by Shimadzu Corp.
Repair facility for these units is Umbra Group.
In the past, we had several units removed from DLH B747-8 and sent to Umbra for repair during the warranty
period. Umbra claims that the units had seen forces beyond the designed limit. No abnormalities during the flights
had been reported.
While Shimadzu acknowledges that there is a dispute between Boeing and Shimadzu, the issue has not been
resolved yet and the operator is left with the entire cost for the repair (ongoing since 04/2018). This has already
resulted in multiple AOG orders.
• Who is responsible for the design of the unit?

• How can we streamline the process of warranty case handling (and who covers the cost for the time
being) so that the repair process is not slowed down for everyone involved (Umbra cannot continue work
without the cost approval, operator does not give approval for units under warranty, etc.)?
Boeing, suppliers, and other operator comments, please.
63 MMC B737 Slat Wedge Replacement 114A5010 Boeing B737 57-00 UAL
114A5020
114A5030
114A5040
CMM 57-43-01, CMM 57-43-02, CMM 57-43-03, and CMM 57-43-04 do not provide necessary information
regarding the trailing edge wedge assembly replacement, distance between slat trailing edge to auxiliary arm
roller, and rigging tolerance.
Boeing stated that replacement of trailing edge wedge to drawing requirements is difficult to achieve without
tooling similar to assembly jigs. However, no Boeing tooling or process for B737NG slat wedge replacement has
been developed as of now.
Is this something Boeing is looking to develop and incorporate to the CMMs?

FLIGHT CONTROLS
64 MMC Replacement Part Lead Time 113A2100-x Boeing B737 57-00 UAL
113A3100-x
Multiple replacement parts for B737NG IB Main Flap and OB Main Flap are posted with extremely long lead time.
This includes but not limited to lower panel P/N 654A0004-1138 with EST 12/2/19, wedge assy P/N 113A3511-3
with EST 10/18 and pushed to 2/19, fitting P/N 113A3135U1 EST 9/19.
Can Boeing comment on this issue? Can this lead time be improved upon?
Associate
Airline
65 MMC Length Information SC5300 UTC Aerospace A330 27 LHT DLH

for Testing Series Systems
A340
LHT has trouble with the extended and retracted length of P/N SC5300-Series. In the testing section of the CMM
27-24-51, Rev. 7, no information about the two lengths or the two positions is given.
Therefore, the question is are these two positions not so critical that they have to be verified during the final
testing before release to service?
From LHT’s point of view, the two lengths have to be verified during the testing and therefore, LHT needs the two
length. Is UTAS able to provide this information together with the acceptable tolerances?
In a first reply UTC Aerospace Systems stated the following:

The extend and retract length, also called ‘’center to center ‘’ distance comes from design tolerance stacking,
it has not been deemed necessary that this parameter should be routinely checked during MRO ATP
That theorical center to center distance is practically adjusted on A/C by line mechanist during servocontrol
removal/installation AMM task
A check of the AMM showed that there is no adjustment procedure described during installation.
This issue was submitted to UTC (reference CAS-74562-T2M7N1) on Sep. 19, 2018, without further reply.
Airbus and UTAS, please comment.

FLIGHT CONTROLS
Item Orig. Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO,
the
Associate
Airline
66 MMC Usage of Sealing 31073 UTC Aerospace A320 27 LHT DLH

Compound PR1460Q Series Systems Fam
or S1125 Adhesive
In CMM 27-14-51 for P/N 31073-Series (Aileron Servo Control) wen found that on page 722 the note during
Installation of wiring instructs to fit all sleeves of the wiring with sealing compound PR1460Q or S1125.
LHT found that compound PR1460Q is a rather soft material whereas S1125 is adamant which makes it
impossible to remove it after it has cured in case you need to exchange the wiring.
The only solution is to cut the wires and install a new connector. Please find attached a picture of the removed
connector.
Is it correct that both sealing compounds can be used? Why are you allowing the usage of S1125?
The issue was submitted to UTAS (reference CAS-90215-G9X4S5).
UTAS please comment.

FLIGHT CONTROLS
Associate
Airline
67 MMC CMM 27-34-52 – Rev 31075 UTC Aerospace A320 37 LHT DLH
16, Corrections & Series Systems Fam
Clarifications
LHT found several errors in IPL of CMM 27-35-52 for P/N 31075-Series.
In figure 6 the effect code for item 270 (P/N 30973-222 and P/N 30973-262) is incomplete. The effect codes
“E”/“K”/“L” are missing.
In figure 5 the effect code for item 270 (P/N 30973-222 and P/N 30973-242) is incomplete. The effect codes
“C”/“D”/“E”/“H”/“Q”/“R”/“T”/“V”/“X” are missing.
In Figure 4, the effect code for item 4-330F (P/N 31075-150AAA) is missing.
UTAS was informed about the issues under reference CAS-91286-M5G2F9(T).
UTAS, please provide correction of CMM.
UTAS comments, please.
Associate
Airline
68 MMC Post-SBC SC4710 UTC Aerospace A330 27 LHT DLH

SC4710-27-02 P/N Series Systems
Missing in IPL
A340
LHT found that for IPL item 3-300A in CMM 27-26-52 for P/N SC4710-Series the post-SBC SC4710-27-02 P/N
816266 is missing.
Please see attached the applicable screenshot from CMM and also from the SBC page 4 showing pre- and post-
mod. P/N. Pre-mod. P/N 802581 which is listed in CMM as IPL item 3-300A, but post-mod. P/N 816266 which is
missing in CMM.
The issue was submitted to UTAS (reference CAS-86431-R0W3H5(T)).
UTAS please provide a temp. Revision of CMM 27-26-52 with correct IPL.
FLIGHT CONTROLS
FLIGHT CONTROLS
UTAS comments, please.

FLIGHT CONTROLS
Associate
Airline
69 MMC Assembly of Selector SC4710 UTC A330 27 LHT DLH

Valve does not Series Aerospace
Distinguish Between Systems
Pre- and Post-SBC
SC4710-27-02
A340
LHT found that in CMM 27-26-52 the “installation of the selector-valve” (page 703) does not distinguish between
pre- and post-SBC SC4710-27-02.
It states, “Put the slide-valve (2-280) in the liner (in any position)”. This is only correct for pre-SBC SC4710-27-02
units. For post-SBC SC4710-27-02 units, the slide valve must be installed in one specific direction (visible bored
side). This is described on page 708 of CMM 27-26-51 for P/N SC4700 correctly.
Furthermore, the drawing on page 706 of CMM 27-26-52 does not reflect post-SBC SC4710-27-02 configuration
as the bore in the left side of the slide valve is not shown. Please see page 706 of CMM 27-26-51 for correct
illustration of post-SBC configuration.
The applicable extracts from both CMMs have been provided to UTAS with detailed explanations. If necessary,
this can be added for reference.
We await correction of CMM 27-26-52 at the next opportunity.
The issue was submitted to UTAS (reference CAS-85657-Z9T1P2(T))
UTAS, please provide temp. Rev. of CMM 27-26-52.
UTAS comments please.
Associate
Airline
70 MMC Definition of SC5300 UTC Aerospace A330 27 LHT DLH

Specified Life Series Systems
A340
Page 112 and 117 of the CMM (see next page for CMM extract) refer to a percentage of the specified life of the
component. The CMM states that at 30 % of specified life a certain limit applies and at 100 % of specified life a
different limit applies.
What is the specified life? Please see attached the two applicable extracts from CMM.
The only information regarding a possible life for this component was found in older revisions of ALS Part 4 for
A330 and A340-300/-300. The current revision of the applicable A/C documentation states that the limits for this
P/N were deleted. (see Revision 4 of ALS Part 4 for A330 – Sub-Part 4-2 and Revision 3 of ALS Part 4 for A340-
22/-300 – Sub-Part 4-2)
The issue was submitted to UTAS (reference CAS-94411-D4S6P9(T)).

FLIGHT CONTROLS
UTAS please provide information what is meant with specified life and if this is related to the former limitations in
ALS Part 4.
UTAS and other operator comments, please.
71 MMC Epoxy Carbon Prepreg – Plain A320 Elevators Airbus All 51-30 UAL
Weave 193 gsm 120 ⁰C and More General
Interchangeability Applications
Airbus CML contains two (2) Appli Codes for Epoxy Carbon Prepreg - Plain Weave - 193 gsm - 120C cure as
follows:
• 13LDC1 - Plain Weave - 193 gsm – 120 oC
• 13LDC9 - Plain Weave - 193 gsm – 120 oC Legacy
A review of the CML Introduction indicates that the difference between the two (2) Appli Codes is the location
used on the aircraft as designated by the 1 and 9.
Could Airbus evaluate allowing materials listed under Appli Code 13LDC1 as allowable substitutes for materials
listed under Appli Code 13LDC9 on components such as A320 Elevators?

FLIGHT CONTROLS
******17-024******
MMC Multi-Function Spoiler 51200-11 UTAS CRJ700 27 LHT

PCU
(Goodrich CRJ900
Aerospace Canada)
CRJ1000
CMM 27-62-02 is missing maintenance instructions for the attached servo valve, PN 51215-3. However, UTAS
seems to have repair and adjustment capabilities. Please provide maintenance details, such as an individual
CMM including acceptance test procedure, spare parts list and maintenance, to allow maintenance on the servo
valve.
Other MROs and UTAS please comment.
******17-025*****
MMC Rudder PCU 390500-1009 Parker Hannifin Q400 27 LHT

390500-1011
CMM 27-21-04 is missing maintenance instructions for the attached servo valve, PN 74160-01 (390599-1003).
Please provide maintenance details, such as an individual CMM including acceptance test procedure, spare parts
list, and maintenance, to allow maintenance on the servo valve.
Other MROs and Parker Hannifin please comment.
******17-026******
MMC Elevator PCU 390600-1009 Parker DHC-8-402Q 27 LHT
LHT experienced several cases where the anti-rotation lugs of the tailstock show some wear marks. Total Time of
most of the Elevator PCUs was below 20,000 FH
FLIGHT CONTROLS
Since there is no specific inspection criteria in the CMM, LHT contacted Parker about the omissions.
Parker came up with following instructions:

1. Perform visual inspection of anti-rotation lugs for scuffing, damage and measure 0.542 +/- 0.005
2. Replace tail stock P/N 390643-101 if the above anti rotation lugs dimension is below 0.537 inches.
Following these instructions (basically, Parker provided manufacturing dimension), LHT stated that most of the
tailstocks were beyond these limits and had to be replaced. Actual wear exceeds the minimum limit of 0.537
inches by 0.01 inches Parker stated they consider evaluating the possibility of an in-service wear limit, but this will
be a “longer term project.”
Question to other MROs:

Have you experienced similar findings on the Elevator PCUs?
Question to the OEM (Parker):

When can we expect to have a final solution for this problem? Is there an interim approval to use a minimum limit
of 0.527 inches as an in-service wear limit?
Parker and other MRO comments, please.

ELECTRICAL POWER
******18-035******
AMC VSCF Converter 757183D/F UTAS B777 24 ANA

Nuisance Faults
ANA Comment for Follow-Up Item 14-057
ANA has experienced 8 unscheduled removals (including 1 GTB and 1 short time removal) due to ELEC B/U SYS
EICAS status message with Maintenance Message 24-45480/45490 and/or SRF 224/225 from Jan. 2016 to Dec.
2017.
At the 2017 AMC, UTAS said that Boeing and UTAS engineering would perform system-level testing in the Boeing
lab. We would like to know the result of lab testing and the root cause of this problem.
We would like to keep this item open until the root cause is revealed and corrective action is provided.
Boeing, UTAS, and other operator comments, please.
72 AMC VSCF Converter 757183D/F Collins Aerospace B777 24 ANA

Nuisance Faults (UTAS)
ANA has experienced eight unscheduled removals (including one GTB and one short time removal) due to ELEC
B/U SYS EICAS status message with Maintenance Message 24-45480/45490 and/or SRF 224/225 from January
2016 to December 2017. ANA did not experience this failure mode during 2018.
As a result of reviewing unscheduled removals of the VSCF Converter, we noticed that this failure mode is on a
decreasing trend. ANA would like to know the progress of system-level testing in the Boeing lab (Ref. 18-035).
Other operator, Collins Aerospace, and Boeing comments please.

ELECTRICAL POWER
******18-036******
Associate
Airline
AMC VFSG Disconnect 7001330H03 UTC B787 24 SR AMX

Issue Aerospace Technics
Systems
ETD
CHH
In approximately 2/3 of VFSG removals seen by SRT over the past 12 months, the cause of removal could not be
determined, the input carbon seal overheated/damaged, and in some cases, the rotor overheated. Low Oil Pressure
(LOP) is the removal reason for the majority of these cases.
This issue is highlighted in Boeing Fleet Team Digest 787-FTD-24-16005, which mentions that a new input carbon
seal is being developed by UTAS to address the LOP problem. If this improvement addresses the seal damage
problem too, it will help prevent unnecessary removals.
Please, can UTAS provide more information about the carbon seal, and confirm if the new design will address the
overheating issue when the VFSG has been disconnected as well?
UTAS, Boeing, and other operator comments, please.
******18-037******
AMC VFSG Disconnects due to 7001330/H01/H02/H03 UTAS B787 24 VIR

AOHE Cracking
VAA is suffering increasing numbers of VFSG removals due to disconnect in flight, typically “ELEC GEN DRIVE XX”
with MM 24-16224 (Variable Frequency Start Generator XX has an internal fault) and 24-17664 (Variable Frequency
Start Generator XX has low oil pressure).
In a high number of cases (8 in the last 12 months), the cause is found to be oil leaking from the AOHE but of
course, when the VFSG is disconnected in flight, it must be replaced. According to 787-FTD-24-14002, “Over time,
the VFSG oil system pressure instability/pulsations may lead to fatigue induced damage/oil leaks within the
equipment used in the VFSG's external oil cooling circuit, primarily the AOHE for Rolls Royce. The excessive oil
pressure pulsations would exceed the AOHE design capabilities and result in a cracking from high cycle fatigue.”
UTAS believes the cause of the oil pressure instability is the decision to remove the FOHE (Fuel Oil Heat
Exchanger) from the oil circuit, but Rolls Royce does not agree.
VAA’s experience is that UTAS is denying warranty on any VFSG removal that is caused by an AOHE oil leak. But
what is the cause of oil pressure instability that leads to the AOHE cracking and who is responsible for this?
VAA is aware the fix for this issue is the new SSD PRV in the H04 VFSG.
What is the Boeing position on this?
What is the Boeing/UTAS position on warranty, and how can this be resolved for the operators?
Other operators, Boeing, and UTAS comments please.

ELECTRICAL POWER
73 AMC VFSG 2.5 7001330H03/H04/H05 Collins Aerospace B787 24 VIR
VAA continues to have removals of the VFSG and is currently completing the H04 retrofit on the fleet. VAA is very
concerned that as more and more aircraft come out of warranty, the VFSG repair bills are not sustainable.
Why did UTAS not develop the VFSG to behave more like an IDG when it can operate for a limited time
disconnected without driving a large repair bill in the shop? The technology is not new. Several years since EIS,
Collins is still working on a mod to the input seal similar to that of an IDG. Operators continue to pick up the cost.
Additionally, VAA understood the longer the unit operated disconnected under MEL, the more damaged the VFSG
would be. But VAA has removed a unit disconnected in descent and operated disconnected for 40 mins, yet the
damage was similar to a VFSG that had remained on-wing for three days on MEL. VAA engaged with Collins to be
told that no analysis has been done to compare time on-wing disconnected versus level of damage/repair required.
VAA would like other operators to share their experiences and Boeing/Collins comments please.
Associate
Airline
74 AMC Variable Speed Constant 1701768 UTC B777 24 AFR/KLM AFR

Frequency Generator
This question is related to AMC 2018 item 48.
Despite the explanation provided last year by both UTC and GE, AFR is still facing a high rate of shaft shearing on
its B777-200ER fleet (not on B777-300ER fleet with the same VSCFG).
Following 777-FTD-80-16001, this issue was supposed to be solved with GE90 Service Bulletin 80-0046 R0 but it is
only a one-time inspection of the Starter Air Valve P/N 3290976-X and does not modify the SAV opening time.
AFR also follows the GE90-90 WSPG recommendation for SAV soft-time overhaul: 5,000 cycles.
What other actions are Boeing, GE, UTC, and/or Honeywell going to implement in order to solve this very old issue?
Boeing, GE, UTC, Honeywell, and operators comment please.

ELECTRICAL POWER
Associate
Airline
75 AMC VFG Arcing 1712967G Collins A350 24-22 LHT DLH

Aerospace
Airbus
Rolls Royce CHH
During winter season 2017/2018, arcing at the terminal block caused malfunction to some of the installed VFG
(Variable Frequency Generator) fitted to Lufthansa German Airlines (DLH) A350 fleet. The latest winter season
showed an increased number of VFG arcing events (12 airplanes operating with six identical events during last two
months).
The arcing occurs at the terminal block of VFG 1A between T1-T3 and the generator housing. Burned terminal
blocks causing VFG removals as well as burned feeder wires have also to be replaced. The power source is INOP
until spare VFG/feeder wires are available. This leads to reduced el. backup, increase of maintenance cost, and
operational delays, e.g., VFG malfunction shortly after aircraft deicing. After two winter seasons, a final solution is
highly appreciated.
According to the manufacturer’s analysis, the effect is caused by ingression (spray) of de-icing fluid. At the moment,
a cleaning process recommended by Airbus is planned as a temporary measure.
Other operator comments please. Are there any experiences from sealing or covering the exposed external power
contacts?
Airbus, please explain the technical solution to stop the moisture ingress.
Airbus, please provide timeframe for availability of aircraft SB and Mat Kits.
ELECTRICAL POWER
******18-040******
AMC Broken Promises on 1700667D Airbus A32X 24 ETD

GAPCU Final Fix
Release
UTAS A330
A340
This is a tribute on the broken promises on the following AMC items: 63-2014 (AFR/KLM), 60-2015 (AFR/KLM), 61-
2015 (USA), 53-2016 (AFR/KLM), and 54-2016 (DLH). Since 2014, the AMC has been demanding to UTAS a
solution on the worldwide problem suffered by GAPCU PN 1700667D, due to the burn of capacitors in the printed
circuit board.
In the particular case of Etihad, we suffered a Customer Induced Damage on GAPCU PN 1700667D SN 1411
removed from A330 MSN 0724 in 2016 for a total of, lets say big bucks, on which the capacitors in printed circuit
board A6 were found burnt (Figure 1). The shop report concluded that the cause of failure was outside the GAPCU,
in this case, the GPU likely provided out of specs power.
An additional case took place in July 2017 on A340 MSN 933 on GAPCU PN 1700667D SN AADU001957. In this
case, several diodes (D1, D2, D3, D6, D7, D8, and D9) were damaged on printed circuit board A5 and the origin of
the burnt was due to external power out of specifications (Figure 2). In this case VSB 90EGS31AP-24-14 was
embodied.
In AMC 2015 UTAS committed to release the Vendor Service Bulleting by end of 2015. Then in AMC 2016 UTAS
stated that the VSB 90EGS31/33AP-24-13 will be released in Q2 2016. According to our UTAS Field Representative
(Ron Pang): “VSB 90EGS31/33AP-24-13 was released in November 2016, but shortly after canceled as ineffective,
i.e., did not demonstrate the ability to consistently prevent external overvoltage damage”. Finally, this issue was
neither raised nor discussed in AMC 2017.
Questions:
1. What has UTAS to say to operators when it takes 2 to 3 years to develop a VSB that simply replaces the
capacitors for new ones that have a greater tolerance and the solution is unsuccessful?
2. How can UTAS ensure that VSB 90EGS31/33AP-24-13 or subsequent will be the final fix for the continuous
capacitor burn problem?
3. When will UTAS expects to release a final solution to this problem?
4. Does UTAS manufacture other GAPCU Part Numbers? If so, do they suffer this problem?
5. What can Airbus say to an OEM that has failed to deliver an on-time solution year after year?
Figure 1: On the left affected Capacitor as shown on VSB 90EGS31AP-24-13 / On the right GAPCU capacitors
burnt on SN 1411
ELECTRICAL POWER
Figure 2: Diodes burnt on GAPCU PN 1700667D SN AADU001957
******18-049******
Associate
Airline
AMC ESC 4505005 Pratt & Embraer 49 AFR/KLM AFR

Series Whitney
4508022 E-Jet
This question relates to AMC 2017 item 51.
Electronic Starter Controllers are covered by CMMs 49-40-02 and 49-44-02. Schematics, wiring diagrams, repair, or
IPL are described into each CMM of SRU, but these documentations are not available:
• 49-04-01 ESC Printed Wiring Assemblies (restricted access)
• 49-04-03 Controller PWA (restricted access)
• 49-10-31 Internal Harness Assembly
• 49-52-14 Axial Flow Fan Assembly
AFR-KLM requests that all technical documentations should be available. Embraer explained that two of these
CMMs are available online and two are submitted to intellectual property. Embraer stated they could provide an
overview of these documents, which AFR-KLM did not receive.
AFR-KLM does not understand the reason why intellectual property applies to SRU’s CMM. Besides, no CMM of the
four mentioned are available online.
Operators, Embraer and OEM comments please.

ELECTRICAL POWER
76 AMC Mandatory 7000045 Collins Aerospace B787 24 ANA

ESS PVT
7000045H0x/CMSC
7000051
7000051H0x/BPCU
7000053
7000053H0x/GCU
ANA is preparing to add CMSC, BPCU, and GCU to our in-house repair capability. Action Items (Temporary
Revisions) are released to include mandatory Environmental Stress Screening Performance Verification Test (ESS
PVT) to the CMMs 24-15-60, 24-22-40, 24-41-15.
Boeing FTD 787-FTD-24-18002 states that units returned from the fleet will receive enhanced screening to reduce
the number NFF returns including possible intermittent faults of Low Voltage Power Supply (LVPS). But no
information is released for the ESS PVT for the CMSC. The FTD also states that approximately 60 units in the fleet
had identified that potentially have failsafe events and mod-dot will be added when a screened LVPS is installed.
ANA thinks the ESS PVT should be one-time and only necessary for the 60 units.
ANA requests to clarify the reason why the ESS PVT is mandatory for all returned CMSC, BPCU, and GCU
regardless of the removal reason for every shop visit.
ANA requests Collins Aerospace to modify or improve CMSC, BPCU, and GCU not to require ESS PVT every shop
visit.
Boeing, Collins Aerospace, other operators, please comment.
77 AMC AC Power System Design Various Boeing B787 24 JAL
JAL encounters numerous troubles on various units concerning to high power AC input. Various vendors of the units
answer: “AC power design meets the Boeing requirement”. JAL requests Boeing to review the high-power AC
design regarding stress of variable voltage, spike noise, and some particularities of Boeing 787 giving common
impact to AC power module of each unit.
Currently JAL is having the following AC power issues:
Nomenclature Part Number Vendor Symptom

CMSC 7000045HXX Collins Aerospace Overstress and heat damage on A2 and A4 boards
EMCU CA72711-00X MOOG High Power Failure
SCUMC P/N 7011040H03 Collins Aerospace Heat damage on A5 board
PECS Pump 7110170HXX Collins Aerospace Burned power board
ICS Pump 7011038H0X Collins Aerospace Burned power board
CMSC: Common Motor Start Controller

EMCU: Electric Motor Controller Unit
SCUMC: Supplemental Cooling Unit Motor Controller
PECS: Power Electronic Cooling System
ICS: Integrated Cooling System
Boeing and other operator and supplier comments, please.

ELECTRICAL POWER
78 AMC Electronic Circuit Breaker Various A350 24-00 DAL

Lockout
A220
B787
With the new generations of aircraft, many circuit breakers are virtual instead of physical. Safety during maintenance
checks often require electrical busses to be de-energized and circuit breakers to be pulled.
How are airlines handling virtual circuit breaker lockouts during maintenance?
Airline comments please.
79 AMC LVPS Failure 7000053H0X / GCU Collins B787-8, -9, -10 24 JAL
Aerospace
7000051H0X / BPCU
GCU and BPCU have a failure mode of “Failsafe Cycling Event” as discussed in the 787-FTD-24-18002. According
to it, the root cause of “Failsafe Cycling Event” is intermittent failure of LVPS (Low Voltage Power Supply).
From 2018/4Q, Collins is performing enhanced screening test on GCU and BPCU to seek out possible intermittent
faults. JAL recognizes this test as an interim action against intermittent LVPS failure. Actually, this test is listed in
Collins AI (Action Item), but JAL has been informed that Collins will never incorporate the enhanced screening test
into the CMM and the AI will be cancelled.
JAL is expecting that Collins will establish fundamental improvement of LVPS as soon as possible because this test
is possible to cause another issue (e.g., heat stress to the solder joint).
JAL would like to know the plan about improvement of LVPS and target date of end of enhanced screening test.
Comments from other operators, Boeing, Collins and other airframers are highly appreciated.
Associate
Airline
80 AMC BCL Reliability 35-0L5-1006-08 Thales A320 AFR/KLM AFR
Referring to AMC 2018 item 42.
We thank Thales for bringing to our attention the list of recommended SBs to improve the BCL reliability:
SBs 35-0L5-24-014, 24-015, 24-017.
It appears that parts for SB 24-014 (Converter on Power Supply Board) are now obsolete and non-procurable.
We would like to continue performing this SB in a way to maintain the BCL reliability in conformity with Airbus’s
recommendation in 2018.
Could Thales provide replacement parts for the SB 24-014?
Other operator comments please.
Associate
ELECTRICAL POWER
Airline
81 AMC CMM Missing SP3062B / Meggitt A330 24 AFR/KLM AFR

TRU
TFE Electronics A340
Since the publication of VSB SP3062B-24-004 (issue date 2017, April 26), the CMM has not been released; the P/N:
SP3062B does not appear on it.
Air France wishes to know the date of publication for the new CMM.
Meggitt/TFE Electronics, Airbus comment please.
82 AMC Spare Parts No ELM2011-1, Tyco Electronics B777 24-07-04 LHT

Sidestable Corporation (a TE
Contactor Connectivity Ltd.
Company)
ELM2011-2
Content:
• The repair of SIDESTABLE CONTACTOR on level 3 per CMM 24-07-04 from Tyco Electronics is not
possible as no spare parts are provided from TE Connectivity Ltd. Therefore, the only way to repair those
components is to send them to the OEM Tyco Electronics.
• LHT’s request for spare parts is now (18 JAN 2019) 267 days open and LHT did not receive any offer for
spare parts.
• Also, TE Connectivity Ltd recommended to buy the spare parts at GE Aviation and Flame Enterprises Inc.,
but LHT did not receive any offer as well.
Question:
• Why is TE Connectivity Ltd/Tyco Electronics unable to offer the spare parts in an acceptable time?
• Where can LHT buy such spare parts in an acceptable time?
LHT requests TE Connectivity Ltd/Tyco Electronics to disclose where LHT can receive spare parts in order to repair
the units.
Please any comments from other airlines/MROs.
83 MMC IDG Governor Failure 761574B Collins B737NG/MAX 24-11-85 LHT
LHT frequently receives integrated drive generators with damages caused by stuck governor assemblies during
winter periods. This failure is well known and identified as a design deficiency of the governor assembly caused by
cold starting temperatures.
Collins (former Hamilton Sundstrand) was informed about this problem but has not provided corrective actions yet.
• Collins and Boeing, please comment if corrective actions will be provided.

• Other MROs and operators, please comment if you experienced similar cases.
Collins Aerospace, Boeing, and other operator and MRO comments, please.
HYDRAULIC POWER
84 MMC Type 5 Fluid Airbus 32 LHT
LHT Hydraulic Engineering has the impression that problems regarding leakage during repair and overhaul of units
have increased since the switch to Type 5 fluid.
What are experiences of other operators/MROs?
Airbus, other operator and MRO comments please.
85 MMC Accumulator 3059103-7/-10 MOOG B717-200 29 DAL
We have been experiencing Low Time Failures of the Bladder installed in the HYD. SYSTEM AND ELEVATOR
CONTROL ACCUMULATOR.
The 3059103-10 units are Post SB:3059103-29-02 which were installed the New Design Bladder with a greater heat
tolerance giving a supposed 200% improvement. Both Pre and Post SB units are failing at the same rate. There are
3 units per ship, L/R and Aft, the units Pre or Post SB are randomly failing 1 at a time, with an average time on-wing
of 7500 hrs.; they are designed to last over 20K hrs.
Is Boeing working with MOOG to design an improved Bladder to increase on-wing life expectancy?
Boeing, MOOG, and other operator comments, please.

PNEUMATIC
86 MMC ISLN BYPS CK VLV 732-11750-03 Shimadzu B767 36 ANA
ANA has 106 qty of the isolation bypass check valve.
The major removal reasons were visual check NG and functional check fail, and major failed parts were broken/wear
of spring, or wear/crack of flapper. Therefore, currently ANA has been replacing the valve at 5000 ± 2000 FH
interval, and maintaining in shop to check the wear of spring and flapper before causing the flight interruption.
At the maintenance, ANA has been replacing the flapper whenever ANA finds any wear since there is no wear
limitation of the face of flapper and body on CMM (2017: 13qty, 2016: 23 qty, 2015: 7qty, 2014: 21qty).
ANA would like to know if another operator has same problem on B767 isolation bypass check valve flapper.
Shimadzu, Boeing, and other operator comments, please.
Title Associate
Airline
87 MMC Bushing 3291677 Honeywell B777-300 80-11-81 AFR/KLM AFR

Series/SAV (with GE)
Topic: Replacement of Worn Bushing into the Housing Valve (see IPL figure)
Problem: Bushing is not procurable.
Result: Replacement of Housing Valve Assembly P/N 3184254-1.
Current Situation: After the technical acceptance by the HW engineering, the request was sent to the Honeywell
business department for the contractual repair cost. Now, despite several emails and meeting, AFR is still without
Honeywell’s contractual validation to begin this repair.
AFR requests a solution from the OEM.
OEM, airframer comments please.

PNEUMATIC
88 MMC Bleed Leak ATR72-600 36 AZU
AZUL is facing a problem with ATA 36 (bleed leak) in its ATR72-600 fleet.
In the last six months, we have had four cancellations and nine delays. The main root cause was the leading edge
duct seals (P/N ASNA2141-40-07) worn.
ATR was contacted, but we have not received any conclusive answers.
ATR comments, please.
Are other operators facing the same issue?
89 MMC Bleed Fail 1013952-1 UTAS E-Jet 36 AZU
AZUL is facing problems with ATA 36 (bleed fail) in its E-Jet fleet.
In the last six months we had three cancellations and nine delays. The main root cause was the NAPRSOV P/N
1013952-1 bad reliability.
Embraer was contacted and informed that they have a final solution, but the SB issue is being postponed.
When Embraer does intend to issue the SB?
Embraer comments, please.
Are other operators facing the same issue?

PNEUMATIC
90 MMC Overpressure 6740F010000/ Liebherr A319 36-11-12 LHT

Isolation Valve 6740G010000
Hi Pressure 6773E/6774 A320 36-11-
Regulating Valve Series 05/06/27/28/4
5/46/48/49/51
HP Bleed Valve 6713D/6714D A321
Series
6773B030000/ A330
6774B030000
The indication microswitch 16HM4 has an early failure, mainly abnormal level of electrical resistance. Liebherr
issued SIL LS6740-36-01 on Jan 2018 (only 6740F/G) for additional testing to detect the early failure of the
microswitch and introduce a switch with new manufacturing process (overpressure isolation valve SN 6740-15001 or
higher, microswitch date code SN 1744 or higher). This microswitch is also installed on many High Flow valves as
listed above with the same problem. The new microswitch also fails from stock or within a few hundred flight hours of
service.
Other operators, have you seen the same failure with the new switch?
OEM, why SIL does not address all LRUs above? Will OEM look at a re-design of this switch?
OEM and other operator comments please.
91 MMC Hi Pressure 6773E010000/ Liebherr A319 36-11-05/27/45/48 LHT

Regulating Valve 6773F010000
HP Bleed Valve 6713D080000 A320
6773B030000 A321
A330
Overpressure Valve 6763-02300 on LRUs above has a persistent problem “from stock”. It could fail test as a stand-
alone part (not assembled on LRU). Sometimes, even if it passed test, and after assembled on LRU, accomplishing
Hi Temp. testing, it may fail if re-tested.
When disassembled for troubleshooting, following findings may be observed:

1. Contamination not common, but it has been observed from time to time
2. More shims than it is supposed to have for proper functioning.
3. imperfect seating of clapper over threaded clapper, and misaligned movement in valve body, which causes
sticking and/or not functioning properly. It is evident by marks on one side of clapper outside surface when
moving in body.
4. Excessively tightened nut that affects valve functioning.
Other operators, have you seen the same failures/findings?
Will OEM look at reviewing the production quality process of this OPV?
Other operator and OEM comments please.

PNEUMATIC
92 MMC Bleed Air Isolation Valve Corrosion 2760000-101 Parker B737 36 EXS
Boeing
Jet2.com is suffering numerous failures of Parker Bleed Air Isolation Valve on our recently delivered aircraft. This is
not an issue we see on our established fleet, despite the valve being the same.
Parker has performed an investigation and cited nickel based contaminate as the root cause. They have also cited
that this contaminate does not come from their valve.
Jet2.com is seeking other operators’ experience with this valve, and for Boeing to assist in determining the source of
this contamination.
Other operators, Boeing, and Parker comments please.
93 MMC Fan Air Valve – Reliability 3291260-5 Honeywell B717 36-25 DAL
In the interest of improving reliability, Delta Air Lines is currently investigating the Fan Air Valve (FAV – P/N
3291260-5). During this investigation, it has been noted that the Torque Motor is a top driver with regards to the
reliability of this unit. When contacted, Honeywell expressed that issues related to the torque motor are likely tied to
the filter. Delta took this information from Honeywell and began pursuing various avenues to clean/replace/inspect
the filters; however, none were viable options due to financial implication associated with them. After exhausting all
possible avenues, Honeywell was once again contacted; however, they express very little interest in addressing the
issue.
It was also brought to light during this investigation that the bolt holes used to mount the FAV to the AC are
becoming worn/elongated due to vibration. When contacted, Honeywell stated that a visual inspection is performed,
and if necessary, a dimensional inspection (no inspection found in CMM). Additionally, they stated that only “one unit
out of one thousand” has been found with elongated mount holes. However, this directly contradicts Delta’s findings,
as multiple units have been found with elongated mount holes. Conversation with Honeywell is ongoing.
Questions:
• Are other operators experiencing a reliability issue with the Fan Air Valve (P/N 3291260-5)
o If yes, what actions were taken to correct?
• Are other operators experiencing the aforementioned damage to mounting bolt holes?

PNEUMATIC
94 MMC PRVC Diaphragm Ruptures 792755-15/-16 UTC Aerospace B747 36 LHT

Systems
B767
The Pressure Regulating Valve Controller (PRVC) PN 792755 has been a known driver of issues in ATA 36
(removals, delays, etc.) for many years. Several approaches were taken to improve the reliability of the unit and the
situation. The diaphragm inside the component and its surrounding parts was identified as a key factor for the
performance/failure reason. Several SBCs were developed to improve calibration stability of the PRVC and to
prevent a fail (break/rupture) of the diaphragm:
• 36-190 (B747) Jun 9/11 / 36-2181 (B767) – Diaphragm PN 792801-3, Spring Seat PN 818789-1, Code L19
• 36-191 (B747) Sep 20/12 / 36-2182 (B767) – Diaphragm PN 792801-5, Spring Seat PN 818789-2, Code
L20
• 36-194 (B747) Feb 28/17 / 36-2185 (B767) – Diaphragm PN 792801-5, Spring Seat PN 818789-3, Code
L21
The last modification code L21 introducing an improved Spring Seat was developed specially to prevent the failure
of a torn/broken diaphragm (as a part of Boeing ATA 36 Tiger Team activities). The analysis of the shop findings
during the last few years shows that torn/broken diaphragms are still a main failure mode with the L21 configuration
and improvement measures (e.g., enhanced more resistant diaphragm design) are still urgently needed. Please
refer to att. diagrams of reference operator.
Do other operators observe the same behavior?
What will be done to improve these LRUs?
Figure 1: Cases of Ripped Diaphragms per Modification Code and Year

PNEUMATIC
Figure 2: Cases of Ripped Diaphragms (All Modification Codes) per Year as Percentage of Event Total and in Sum
Figure 3: Example of Ripped Diaphragm Partially Disassembled
Figure 4 and 5: Intact and Ripped Diaphragm

PNEUMATIC
95 MMC Low-Time HPV 6713D080000 Liebherr A319 36 UAL

Microswitch Failures
6773E010000 Honeywell
Honeywell Microswitch P/N 16HM4 is installed on all part number standards of Liebherr High Pressure Valve
assembly in the A319/320 family ATA 36 system. According to the MIL specifications for this microswitch, it is good
until 260 °C. However, during operation, the temperature of the air from the high stage duct can be as hot as 550 °C.
United needs to know the status of alternative design(s) for this switch to ensure proper operation for the
temperature range and/or mitigating actions that can be applied at a shop-level to reduce the failures of these
switches due to over-temperature conditions.
Note that this has been a long-term issue with Liebherr and we would like to hear from Liebherr at the MMC.
Other operators: Comments?
Liebherr, Honeywell, and other operator comments, please.
******17-041******
MMC Temperature Control Valve 39808-2 Honeywell B737 21 AAL

398908-3
398908-4
398908-5
The B737 Temp Control Valve has for some time not performed satisfactorily for the needs of the aircraft. Honeywell
issued service bulletins to convert the -3 valve to the -4 valve, without success in increasing the reliability.
Subsequently, additional service bulletins were released to convert the -3 valve to the -5 valve, or the -4 valve to the
-5 valve.
A vital part in the upgrade of these valves is the (actuator) switch, part number 2047168-8. While it seems to operate
better than the old switch, part number 67620694-1, its performance is still lacking. The new switch exhibits signs of
blinking or flickering on the test panel and Honeywell has revised the CMM (21-51-94) to state that this is not a
confirmation of reason for removal or rejection.
AAL has experienced some switches that must be cycled several times before making contact. These are switches
that have not been in service for an extended time. Some failures have occurred within 500 hours. We would like to
see an improvement or a redesign to this switch.
Questions:
1. Boeing/other operators – Have you seen the above switch failures as well?
2. Will Honeywell look at a re-design of this switch?
Honeywell, Boeing, and other operator comments, please.

PNEUMATIC
******17-044******
MMC Air Turbine Engine Starter 3505448-5-1 Honeywell B767 80 AAL

9281M79P03
9281M79P01
3505448-3-1
The air turbine engine starter “rotating assembly incorporates an axial containment ring with twelve equally spaced
tungsten carbide cutter pins. Should the turbine wheel move axially, following a thrust bearing failure, the cutter pins
will cut the rim from the turbine wheel and the cut rim shall be contained with the area of the containment ring.” CMM
80-11-11, page 3.
AAL has experienced many starter failures where the cutter pins have failed to cut the rim from the turbine wheel. In
some instances, the heat has become so intense that the turbine wheel shaft has become distorted or even melted.
The axial containment ring that is currently available is part number 3500685-2. The cutter pins are installed from the
back (flat side) of the axial containment ring by the manufacturer. The problem that is occurring is that the cutter pins
are moving away from the turbine wheel, both by vibration or by impact. When the containment ring fails in its
purpose to slow/stop the turbine wheel or to cut the rim from the turbine wheel, the turbine wheel continues to spin at
a high rate, often causing a more catastrophic failure than necessary. The previous axial containment ring (part
number 3500685-1) cutter pins were installed from the side facing the turbine wheel, thus eliminating any possibility
of the cutter pins exiting the axial containment ring.
Questions:
1. Boeing/other operators – Have you seen the above failures as well?
2. Will Honeywell redesign the axial containment ring or return to the previous part (part number 3500685-1)?
Boeing, Honeywell, and other operator comments, please.
******17-045******
Title Associate
Airline
MMC HP 6763C080000 Liebherr A330 36 AFR/KLM AFR

Regulating
Valve
Anti-Ice FYLB-52145-1 UTAS 30-21-15
Pneumatic
Shutoff Valve
FYLB-52145-2
FYLB-52145-3
Problems of vibration on engine CF6-80E1, which causes heavy damages on HP REGULATING VALVE and ANTI
ICE PNEUMATIC SHUTOFF VALVE. The vibrations seem to continue despite the modification by addition of links
(VSB GE CF6-80E1 72-0472 and AIB A330-71-3029).
1. MTBUR of the HP regulating valve (20 000 for MAY 2016 and 6925 for MAY 2017) decreases since end of
2015 after realization of modification. The main removal reasons (not open/HPV fault/not closed) are due to
many important damages (actuator repair/heavy damage) declared per OEM, 12 heavy damages for 2015-
2016 for AF-KLM fleet.
2. Regarding FYLB-52145, the heavy vibration level of CF80 engine has a real impact on the reliability of the
valve. A VSB FYLB-52145-30-177 (upgrade from PN FYLB-52145-2 into -3) was implemented with no
positive results on the reliability (on A330 fleet). The same valve installed on A340 fleet has a MTBUR 3x
PNEUMATIC
higher than the one installed on A330 fleet.
Will AIB, GE or LBH, and UTAS provide a new solution to improve the reliability of both components?
Please airlines, comment.
Examples of damages due to the vibration of engine, caused by the wear of the link on HP regulating valve:
Piston
Actuator housing
Link damaged
PNEUMATIC
******17-046******
Associate
Airline
MMC Trim Air Valve 1380221-X UTAS A380 21 AFR/KLM AFR

1380224-X
Data is missing on CMM 21-63-19 Rev.13 concerning the tools to perform the disassembly procedure of the
Butterfly Assembly from Valve Housing. Currently, when we remove the rivets of butterfly by drilling process, we
damage this part and others.
AFR/KLM requests UTAS to design fixtures and process to perform the disassembly of the Butterfly Assembly.
UTAS and other operator and supplier comments, please.
******17-047******
Title Associate
Airline
MMC Rotary R4232M-2/R4232M6-2 Whippany A380 21 AFR/ AFR

Actuator Actuation KLM
Systems
1380162-7/-8 Hamilton
Sundstrand
No quotation and provisioning available from the Rotary Actuator spare parts (CMM 21-52-42 Rev.06 UTC
Aerospace Systems).
Currently, we do not have the possibility to repair this actuator alone. The current solution to repair the NHA (Trim Air
Valve PN 1380221-X/1380224-X) is only by a standard exchange of an actuator assy or sending the NHA to
Hamilton for repair.
Same case for the Rotary Actuator PN 1380155-5 (CMM 21-52-37 Rev.04 UTC Aerospace Systems) with NHA
Temperature Control Valve PN 1380214-X.
AFR/KLM requests to have the possibility to purchase the parts needed to repair the rotary actuators according to
the related CMM.
Whippany and other operator and supplier comments, please.

COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS
96 AMC SDU 7516118-27010 Honeywell B777 23 ANA
This is an additional input related with AMC item 17-115 (Follow-up item).
Honeywell released SB 7516118-23-0028 May 18, 2018, to introduce new DRFM (Digital Radio Frequency
Module), but this SB does not have effectivity of P/N 7516118-27010, which is installed in ANA B777 fleet.
ANA requested Honeywell to add effectivity of P/N 7516118-27010 to SB 7516118-23-0028, but Honeywell
response is as follows: “We do not have approval from Boeing to utilize the new DRFM for future repairs on the
7516118-27010 (SD-700 for non-Airbus applications). There will not be a Service Bulletin announcing any change
to the SD-700 for using the DRFM.”
Honeywell’s response disappointed ANA because ANA expected that introduction of DRFM would improve SDU
reliability.
Based on contents mentioned above, ANA would like to raise the following inquiries:
1. Please provide the root cause of ARFM failure which is introduced in SB 7516118-23-0021.
2. Please provide other Honeywell proposals to address ARFM failure.
******17-115******
AMC SDU 7516118-27010 Honeywell B777 23 ANA
ANA has still experienced many removals of SDU due to RFM failure, though incorporated SB 751618-23-0021 to
have better reliability. In the last two years, half of unscheduled removals were related with RFM failure. ANA
believes Honeywell should investigate the cause of RFM failure (post SB 751618-23-0021) and consider making
modification to improve reliability.
Other operators and Honeywell comment please.
97 AMC ORT File Corruption 822-2556-102 / Collins B777-300ER 23-15 UAL

and Loading SDU-2200 Aerospace
The SDU-2200 ORT files are corrupted when an SDU-2200 is replaced. These files are loaded to the SDU-2200
by the SDU Config Module (SCM). Corrupted ORT files result in system log status CC NOT READY and
inoperative Inmarsat SATCOM System.
Reload of the ORT files with the same part number to the SDU-2200 are unsuccessful. Alternate part number
ORT files must be loaded into the SDU before loading the approved part number ORT files.
B777-300ER airplanes with the SDU-2200 have had these problems since deliveries began in 2016 and have
been reported to Collins Aerospace and Boeing. No solutions have been available to UAL.
What work has Collins Aerospace and Boeing done so far to resolve these issues? What work is planned in the
future to resolve these issues?
Have other SDU-2200 SATCOM users experienced these problems?
Collins Aerospace, Boeing, and other operator comments, please.

*****18-125*****
AMC VHF Frequency Change 822-2211-101 Rockwell Collins B787 23 ANA

TCP-2100
ANA has been encountering VHF frequency change between “ACTIVE” and “STBY” without XFR switch push on
the TCP. Thirty-one (31) events have been reported for 3 years (Y2015 to Y2017). In most of the cases, flight
crew notes the frequency change when they are called on emergency frequency by ATC. This could be a safety
issue due to lost communication during a critical phase. However, no mitigation action has been given.
Boeing, suppliers, and other operators, please comment.
98 AMC VHF Frequency Change 822-2211-101 Collins Aerospace B787 23 ANA

TCP-2100
This item was discussed at last year’s AMC (Item 18-125).
ANA has experienced over 50 incidents of Uncommanded Frequency Change on the TCP and a few other
operators have had similar experiences. Details of the problem can be found in the referenced FTD.
The issue has been identified as a Safety Service Related Problem and Boeing/Collins Aerospace is developing a
new TCP software to rectify this problem.
Boeing and Collins Aerospace, please provide an update on the development of the software and schedule.
References:
FTD: FTD-23-18006
MOM: MOM-MOM-18-0504-01B
Boeing, Collins Aerospace, and other operator comments, please.

99 AMC VHF Transceiver 064-50000-2031 Honeywell B717 23 DAL

Mod
Delta has experienced VHF data transmission problem with the Honeywell VDR P/N 064-50000-2031 which is
installed on B717 fleet. The VDR times out when abnormal VDL M2 data burst happens. This causes loss of data
and unresponsive data transmission. Honeywell has issued Service Bulletin SB064-50000-0007 to upload a new
software that is supposed to fix the problem. However, this SB also updates VDR part number to 064-50000-
2032. B717 IPC does not include this new part as interchangeable to current part. Therefore, we are unable to
install this new part.
Questions:
Honeywell: Can Honeywell make the Mod a mod dot change instead of a part number change?
Boeing: Can Boeing update IPC to include new part number 064-50000-2032 as interchangeable to
064-50000-2031? After all, this is only a software change.
Honeywell, Boeing, and other operator comments, please.
100 AMC HFS-900D 822-0990-120 Collins Aerospace B787 23 ANA

Burnt/Overheated Coils
This item was discussed at last year’s AMC (Item 17-116).
From last year’s AMC, Boeing and Collins Aerospace shared the view that “"RPDU firmware H03 should prevent
the HF transceivers from being powered by less than the required three phases and this should reduce the
electrical stress on the radios and improve the system reliability."
B787 aircrafts delivered since June 2017 have a new firmware (H03) implemented in the RPDU and it is expected
to rectify the issue of burnt EMI Fillter Coils. Boeing has been monitoring the B787 fleet for burnt or overheated
coils and evaluating the effectiveness of the new firmware.
ANA confirms that B787s delivered since July 2017 have not experienced burnt or overheated coils.
Operators, please comment and share your experiences.
Boeing, please confirm if the new firmware is the resolution to this issue and provide updates on the monitoring
results.
Reference: 787-FTD-23-16002

******17-116******
AMC HFS-900D 822-0990-120 Rockwell Collins B787 23 ANA
ANA found out 24 coils overheat in the HF Transceiver with SB27 for a year. ANA is aware of the RPDU new
firmware to address nuisance SSPC failed open events. However, the new firmware does not resolve coils
overheat issue.
ANA sent the removed A4A3 cards to Rockwell Collins for further investigation in 2016.
According to 787-FTD-23-16002, root cause has been determined that is Rockwell Collin's SB27 introduces a
capacitor upgrade that resulted in an increase to the HF Transceiver's current harmonic susceptibility range.
ANA requests Rockwell Collins to provide a corrective action.
Are any operators seeing a similar issue?
Other operator and vendor comments, please.
101 AMC HFS-900D HF 822-0990-120 Collins Aerospace B787 23 ANA

Transceiver
Boeing
This issue is related to AMC item 17-117.
ANA has experienced that internal boards of some HFS-900Ds have corrosion and short circuit due to moisture
ingress from CMDU wire bundle.
ANA is applying sealant at AFT cargo door cheek dripshield in accordance with Boeing SB
B787-81205-SB250159-00 to avoid this moisture ingress issue, but ANA understands that application of sealant
is interim action and Boeing has plans concerning additional protection of moisture ingress into left HFS-900D by
introducing a new drip shield between the CMDU and the HFS-900D.
This information is provided by FTD 787-FTD-23-18005.
Based on contents mentioned above, ANA would like to raise the following inquiries.
Boeing, please provide milestones of SB release concerning introduction of a new drip shield.

******17-117******
Title Associate
Airline
AMC HFS-900D 822-0990-120 Rockwell B787 23 KLM/AFR KLM

Collins
Boeing
Reference is made to Question 136 from the 2016 AMC and to Boeing’s 787-FTD-38-13006:
KLM still sees many units (HFS-900D) delivered to the shop with moisture damage. Boeing announced during last
year’s AMC: “The issue is now being reviewed by Boeing Equipment Installation Engineering to assess how
effective the drip shield over the electronics rack is in protecting the HF Transceiver from moisture intrusion. At
this time, Boeing is actively discussing the development of an improved protection or modifying the drip shield.”
Changes (i.e., production incorporation) for drip shield/water line shroud installation in Forward EE Bay is
scheduled for Feb 2017. Why does this take such a long time (compared to the Aft EE bay solutions)?
*****18-128*****
AMC HF Transceiver 822-0990-120 HFS-900D Rockwell B787 23 VIR

Moisture Ingress Collins
Reference is made to Q136 from 2016 AMC and Q117 from 2017 AMC.
VAA has suffered many removals of HF Transceivers from the B787 fleet due to moisture ingress issues (25
removals in total, 21 confirmed due to moisture damage). VAA is embodying SB 787-24-0159 but strongly
believes this is not a final fix for this issue.
The application of tape above the CMDU panel partially addresses one leakage path only. VAA has seen the
same failure mode after the SB has been embodied, albeit the removal rate has slowed.
VAA has discussed this at length with Boeing, but is frustrated with the lack of progress to properly address the
problem. Boeing has suggested that operators should look at engineering their own solution, which is not
acceptable. Warranty is being denied on the removed units, so it is costing a lot of money.
VAA would like to encourage other operators who see this issue, to report to Boeing via a Service Request.
Other operator and Boeing comments, please.

102 AMC HF Transceiver Boeing B787 23 VIR

Moisture Ingress
VAA refers to Items 127 and 128 from last year. According to 787-FTD-23-18005, the latest information from
Boeing is:
“Change Committed: November 2018 (target)
Production Incorporation: TBD
Service Bulletin Available: TBD”
Can Boeing please provide an update on when the SB is expected to be released and will kits be available for
Operators to at least target the problem aircraft straight away? Will the SB be FOC?
Is Boeing willing to accept warranty claims for the repairs to the HF transceivers due to moisture ingress to date
since the SB release admits the problem with the original installation design?
Boeing and other operator comments please.
103 AMC HFS-900D HF 822-0990-120 Collins Aerospace B787 23 ANA

Transceiver
ANA still experiences transmitter failure due to failure of A1U50 and A2CR27 after performing SIL 12-1 and
SB CPL-920D-23-8.
Subject of SIL 12-1 is “Repair of A1 cards with suspect U50 IC” and ANA already checked whether all ANA
HFS-900D units have the date code 0945 of A1U50. It means that ANA removed the date code 0945 of A1U50 at
all ANA HFS-900D units.
Subject of SB CPL-920D-23-8 is “CPL-920D coupler reset mitigation during self test” and ANA understood that
this SB has relationship with failure of A1U50 and A2CR27 by Collins Aerospace response.
Collins Aerospace informed ANA that the coupler reset causes damage to A1U50 and A2CR27. In addition, ANA
understood that Collins Aerospace experienced A1U50 failure, which has date codes of 0943, 0944, 0945, and
0946 from Collins Aerospace information.
Based on contents mentioned above, ANA thinks that failure of A1U50 and A2CR27 have other failure trends.
Other operators, please comment if you have experienced the same issue concerning failure of A1U50 and
A2CR27 after performing SIL 12-1 and SB CPL-920D-23-8.
Currently, ANA is asking Collins Aerospace to resolve this issue and is waiting Collins Aerospace’s response.

******16-138******
AMC ACARS Printer 700750-1812 AstroNova B737-900 23-22 DAL

B737-800
B767-400
Delta is experiencing poor reliability for the AstroNova (Miltope) ACARS Printer, P/N 700750-1812. These are
installed as Supplier Furnished Equipment (SFE) on the B737-900’s currently being delivered. Delta had 65
removals from the B737-900 fleet alone in 2015 and this is our newest fleet. The Meantime Between Unit
Removal (MTBUR) is 2363 and a Meantime Between Failure (MTBF) of 3746 hours. The majority of the removals
from the aircraft are "Printer Inop," "Printer Fail Message," or "Printer Prints Continuously," yet, when these are
tested in the shop, we are unable to duplicate the problem seen on the aircraft.
Delta has several printers that are repetitive and will not stay on the aircraft. Delta has sent some of these back to
the OEM, AstroNova, and they too are having difficulty duplicating the failure.
Are other airlines experiencing poor reliability for this printer? If so, is the printer's reliability better on some fleets
than others?
Is Boeing or AstroNova doing anything to enhance the shop test to better replicate the aircraft configuration and
messaging that takes place on the aircraft, e.g., communication between other units?
Supplier and operator comments, please.

*****18-132*****
AMC ACARS 064-50000-2031 VHF Honeywell B717 23-22 DAL

Transceiver
064-50000-0303 VHF Rockwell Collins
Transceiver
Boeing
Ongoing issue of B717 (VDLM2) going no comm or sleep mode during flight. The equipment configuration is a
Rockwell Collins CMU 900 151 with a Honeywell VDR radio part number 064-50000-2031, -0303.The same
ACARS unit is installed on B737-700/-900 fleets, but the radio used is a Rockwell Collins VDR. We are not seeing
these problems on fleets equipped with the Rockwell Collins radio.
If relevant, this is the last comment from engineering, when Honeywell was engaged:
SB RTA-44D-23-30 is only effective for P/N 064-50000-2000 having serial number 7329 and below. This mod in
not effective for the -2031 units that we have. We asked Honeywell if there was another equivalent upgrade to
improve Mode 2 reliability for our units and they never replied.
(B717 Honeywell FMS/Boeing issue)
ACARS FMC COMM ISSUE: on an intermittent basis, B717 ships on a random basis will reject all FMC comm
uplinks. The problem usually persists until the ship is completely powered down.
Another way to put it: B717s are less than 10% of the fleet – but on any given day, 95% of the following type
rejects are from the B717 fleet. This is probably an FMS issue, and the fix will require a new FMS system, or FMS
redesign/recertification. This problem contributes to half of all the ACARS CMU removals on this fleet.
QU ATLYDDL
.DDLXCXA 021425
_REJ
FI DL721/AN N994AT
DT DDL MTYV 021425 S16A
- H1 MBB - #MDPER/PD946,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,114/SN432B6
*****18-147*****
AMC avRDC Firmware Load 804-1250-32 Avionica B777-200 23-16 UAL
When attempting to load firmware on some of our avRDC P/N 804-1250-32, the message “Error writing file. No
space left on device” was displayed by the configurator tool. We have had to replace the avRDC when this
message is displayed. Avionica stated that they are investigating how remaining capacity affects the MTDFS flash
memory block. If the MTDFS is full, firmware loads are stopped.
Can Avionica please provide an update on this problem?
Have any other operators experienced the inability to load firmware on the avRDC?
Other operators and Avionica comments please.
104 AMC Repair Discontinuity of Fixed: RESCU 406AP, Honeywell All 23 KAL
ELT 406AF, 406AFN
Portable: RESCU 406SE
Honeywell recently changed the repair policy with Battery replacement for Fixed and Portable ELT.
• Applicable model: all existing ELT models of Fixed RESCU 406AP, 406AF, 406AFN/Portable RESCU
406SE
• Honeywell will discontinue the battery replacement service no later than June 30, 2019.
• Moreover, Honeywell will also discontinue the repair of ELTs no later than the end of year 2021.
The ELT Battery is replaced as per their TRP cycle, so KAL should replace total 374 units (Fixed 160 and
Portable 214). This is so big burden for KAL, because it amounts to 2 million USDs.
We understand that new type ELT installation on the aircraft to be delivered in production line is reasonable.
However, we cannot understand why operators put up with the change of all existing ELT to 406AFN2 and
406SG, because this issue is a product design problem, and this is the one-way change of Honeywell repair
policy.
KAL strongly requests Honeywell to continue to maintain the battery replacement and repair of existing ELTs.
Vendor comments, please.

105 AMC ELTs Various Kannad A330 23 ARG

A340 25
For several years, the avionics shop of Aerolineas Argentinas has been recertifying/reprograming various makes
and models of ELTs from all its fleet.
In the last year, Kannad has denied us to do this in two phases:
First denying us the possibility of reprogramming the ELTs (despite having sold the elements required for that
task).
Later imposing abusive conditions (to our knowledge) to provide the technical documentation of these units.
Kannad and other operator comments, please.
106 AMC HPA-901A High Power 822-0953-001 Collins Aerospace B767 23 ANA
Amplifier
ANA has experienced that some HPA-901As are failed at test step 5.0 INPUT VSWR Test by using RFT-1000
test station.
ANA already informed Collins Aerospace of this issue and performed the following contents.
• TUA (Test Unit Adapter) calibration
• RF cable replacement
• Check of TUA, coax cable, connectors, and related test equipment
• Replacement of coax cables which has relationship with INPUT VSWR Test failure
But this issue was not solved.
Collins Aerospace reviewed the limitation of INPUT VSWR Test and Collins Aerospace recognized that test
limitation of INPUT VSWR Test is narrow.
Currently, Collins Aerospace is corresponding concerning revision of HPA-901A test software to address INPUT
VSWR Test failure issue.
Please provide timeline concerning revision of HPA-901A test software.

107 AMC Radio Tuning Panel 285W0114-X BAE Systems B777 23 ANA
ANA is often experiencing the frequency window's indication will be dark due to running out of lamp inside of light
block backlighting. ANA is replacing light block backlighting to address this issue, but the price of light block
backlighting is $563.00, and it is not cheap for ANA.
ANA considered that ANA could reduce maintenance cost if ANA replaced only the lamp with a new one by
disassembling the light block backlighting, but CMM 23-12-04 does not have procedure, tool, material, and parts.
ANA already requested BAE Systems to add procedure, tool, material, and parts to CMM 23-12-04 but BAE
Systems response was negative. In addition, BAE Systems did not inform ANA of a reason why light block
backlighting’s lamp replacement is not feasible. ANA still believes that light block backlighting’s lamp replacement
is technically feasible.
1. Please provide the reason why light block backlighting’s lamp replacement is not feasible.
2. If lamp replacement is technically feasible, please add procedure, tool, material, and parts to CMM
23-12-04.
BAE Systems and other operator comments, please.
Associate
Airline
108 AMC EFB Docking 822-2773-201 Rockwell A350 46 AFR/KLM AFR

Station Collins
AIRWORTHINESS OF THE DOCKING STATION DS-2200
This Docking Station (DS) is an equipment provided by Rockwell Collins under P/N Rockwell, but this OEM is
neither the manufacturer nor the repair station of the DS. The real manufacturer and repairer is RITEC and the
FAA form part 145 issued by RITEC informs that the DS is a PMA repaired according to CMM RITEC 100737A
(as per FAA form and certificate of conformance in annex); however, this CMM is not procurable and not
approved in the Airbus documentation, it is the CMM 462001 from Rockwell Collins which is approved in the
Airbus documentation.
Air France requests to Airbus and Rockwell Collins to solve this issue and make official the correct CMM
(reference and availability on Airbus World).
Airbus, Rockwell Collins, and FAA comment please.

Associate
Airline
109 AMC EFB Docking 822-2773-201 Rockwell A350 46 AFR/KLM AFR

Station Collins
RELIABILITY OF THE DOCKING STATION DS-2200
Reliability of docking station associated to a Thales Pad is far lower than DS associated with other Pads. DS +
Thales Pad MTBUR is 3,700 FH while GMTBUR is 60,000 FH. Failures are mainly due to both USB switch IC P/N
301033-0007 (U17) and USB hub IC P/N 301088-0070 (U46 and U47).
Airbus and the involved parties have been performing analysis since June 2018. AFR is still waiting for the result
of this analysis and is expecting an action plan to improve the reliability of the DS + Thales Pad.
Airbus, Rockwell, Thales, and other airlines comment please.
Title Associate
Airline
110 AMC VHF-2100 822-1287-1xx Rockwell Airbus 23 AFR/KLM AFR

Collins
On VHF-2100 P/N 822-1287-1xx, two transistors (Q903 and Q906) are burning due to integrated circuit (A2U61)
BGA soldering technology showing poor resilience.
Rockwell Collins has added two resistors to deal with this issue, in the circuits of the transistors. This modification
is not traced in any document. Following AFR-KLM’s request, Rockwell Collins announced the release of a
Service Bulletin for A1Q903 and A1Q906 and ECD of SB was April 30, 2018. This SB has not been published and
Rockwell Collins states that the release is dependent on Airbus’s approval.
Rockwell Collins, Airbus, comment please.

111 AMC SDM-3 Test 285W0025-3 BAE Systems B777 23-31-06 LHT
Discrepancy Speaker
Drive Module
Assembly
The BAE Speaker Drive Module Assembly is an audio amplifier for the passenger address system that has a 2-
channel variant, 285W0025-2; and a 4-channel variant, 285W0025-3. The return to service test requires loading
Factory BITE Software (FBS) on the LRU during the workshop visit to communicate with the LRU processor for
access to memory, ports, peripherals, and other testing resources. Each Speaker Drive Module variant has its
own FBS part number: 2306-SHP-01N-12 for the 285W0025-2, and 230D-BPS-01N-13 for the 285W0025-3. On
the 285W0025-3, the circuitry and processing of two additional audio output channels must be tested compared to
the 285W0025-2. Some of the steps within the test procedure contain results tables to be evaluated for
285W0025-3 only. These are:
• 5.7.3.1 Speaker Monitor Test
• 5.7.3.2 Audio Mute Test
• 5.7.3.3 Standby Test
• 5.7.3.4 THD Test
• 5.7.3.5 Frequency Response Test
• 5.7.3.6 Speaker Fault Test
• 5.7.3.7 Speaker Fault BITE Compatibility
According to the manual, for the Speaker Monitor Test there is a set of 16 additional results for the 285W0025-3
beyond the 18 results for the 285W0025-2 that the unit should return in response to the FBS command
“SPKR_MON” to exercise the resources used in the two additional audio channels. In reality, the LRU returns the
same set of 18 results that are expected for 285W0025-2, in the same format as for the 285W0025-2 model and
then reports “done”. The additional 16 results are not presented.
Similarly, the Audio Mute Test is returning the 8 results for the 285W0025-2 but not the additional 24 results
required for the 285W0025-3. Likewise, the Standby Test is returning the 6 results for the 285W0025-2, but not
the additional 14 results for the 285W0025-3.
The remaining four “for 285W0025-3 only” tests, THD Test, Frequency Response Test, Speaker Fault Test, and
Speaker Fault BITE Compatibility, are behaving as expected. Therefore, some aspects of the Factory BITE
Software for the 285W0025-3 function in accordance with the manual, but the steps which are supposed to return
additional data tables, i.e., Speaker Monitor Test, Audio Mute Test and Standby Test, do not.
Aside from loading the correct Factory BITE Software part numbers that correspond to the 285W0025-2 and
285W0025-3, are there any setup configurations that differ between the two part numbers?
Can the OEM please provide any data that will enable the LRU to present the results tables required in the test
procedure for the tests described above for the 4-channel Speaker Drive Module, 285W0025-3?
OEM and operator comments, please.

Item Orig. Summary LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

Title
112 AMC CPDLC Communication Management Honeywell B787-9 23-00 VIR

Function BP5.0
Boeing
VAA is developing its procedures for CPDLC in European ATC environment in preparation for ATN mandate in
2020.
VAA has established whether heading West to the USA or East to China, etc., if you do not tick the FANS box
when entering London [EGTT] all subsequent handovers work fine with no pilot input. If you come from the East
starting at Sweden, for example, handover will work to each subsequent FIR until; you reach a FANS capable FIR
such as Maastricht or London when handover fails.
1. Are other operators having similar problems?

2. Boeing/Honeywell comment.
3. Does the LSAP [23 ATC DB] PN HNP54-AD23-5003 contain information on which ATC canters are ATN
compliant/compatible? If so, does it require updating as we approach European mandate?
Boeing, Honeywell and other operator comments, please.
113 AMC B787 Terminal Cellular System 2250100-01 Boeing B787 46 VIR
VAA refers to item 173 from last year. VAA understands that Boeing are working on developing a replacement for
the Terminal Cellular Unit, known as the WWU.
As 3G technology is retired around the world, will operators will be forced into upgrading to the WWU to take
advantage of 4G, but operators with TCS have already paid for a system which comes as an option on B787? As
VAA does not have TWLU, VAA is very concerned about future developments of the TCS system.
Other operator and Boeing comments please.
114 AMC Handset PTT Button 285W0024-xx BAE Systems Multi 23 UAL
The PTT button is being affixed to the keypad by a piece of adhesive tape, the button is prone to detach from the
keypad and gets wedged between the pad and the carrier, rendering the handset inoperative.
Other operators: Any other solutions implemented?
BAE: Please provide a more secure way of attaching the PTT button.
115 AMC B787 Core Network Boeing B787 46 VIR

Troubleshooting
Collins
VAA has a lot of problems troubleshooting core network defects on B787 aircraft. This is often because more than
one Maintenance Message is generated in AHM and the FIM points in different directions. Some Maintenance
Messages appear to be nuisance. VAA usually has to engage Boeing for help which can be a time-consuming
process if the defect is on MEL. Boeing often request log files to analyze, which takes time to get if the defect
means the aircraft is not connecting to the ground network.
VAA believes some Core Network training would be useful to increase knowledge and understanding to help
troubleshoot the system more effectively. VAA would like to know if other operators has similar issues with the
core network on B787 and would training be useful?
Is this something that Boeing/Collins would be prepared to commit?
Boeing and other operator comments please.

SOFTWARE
******14-168******
AMC Software Media Several Software PNs Honeywell A32X Any ETD
A330
A340
In several occasions Etihad has suffered the inconvenience of having to wait for software to be delivered in physical
media format from Honeywell. Serve as example the FMS Options Config file (OPC) PN PS4089060-901 or the
customized Airline Modifiable Information (AMI) PN PS62002797-901, PS62002798-901 and PS62002799-901.
If software is provided in an electronic platform no time is spent in transportation and is available to the customer in
real time. Moreover, nowadays, Honeywell allows the electronic distribution of software like the Navigation Database
and Terrain Database.
Etihad would like Honeywell to reconsider its current software distribution policy and allow the customer to decide
how to obtain the software, either in physical media or via a direct download.
Honeywell comments please.
Other operator comments are highly appreciated.
*****18-150*****
AMC EDS Many Many All NAX
Electronic Distribution of Software (EDS)
This item is for all suppliers of loadable software LRUs.
We are still receiving software on floppy disks from suppliers. For example, Rockwell Collins said at the AMC a few
years ago they would implement EDS in 2016, yet a few months back, we received ACARS software on a floppy
disk.
We have switched to Boeing EDS (BEDS) for B737NG and wonder when the various suppliers will follow suit.
Other supplier, airframer, and operator comments, please.

SOFTWARE
116 AMC Load TDB from 69000940-1xx Honeywell B737MAX 34 NAX

ONS (EGPWS)
In December 2017, NAX inquired Boeing about the possibility to load EGPWS Terrain Data Base (TDB) from ONS
using ARINC 615A.
Boeing replied (SR 3‐4076392697): "At this time the EGPWS Terrain Database cannot be loaded via ONS due to
compatibility issues between the ONS directory structure and the Honeywell TDB software file structure. If this
becomes possible at a future date, a loading procedure will be added to the AMM."
As of today, there is no procedure for this option in the AMM.
As NAX uses wireless staging of software to the MAX fleet, these updates would be greatly simplified with the
availability of this feature. NAX wants to know when Boeing expects this feature to become available.
Boeing, Honeywell, and other operator comments, please.
Associate
Airline
117 AMC ACMF AMI ACMF AMI Boeing B787 45 KLM/AFR KLM
Exceeds 45 DGA (Not Baseline)
OPS Limits
The introduction of ACMF OPS BPv8 software removed Data Gathering Application (DGA) dynamic parameter
allocation. This means that the DGA parameters allocation follows the rules of the Port Mapping Table (PMT) and
are assigned by the ACMF OPS upon start-up.
Each of the 13 DGAs have a signal limit 389 parameters that it can process. Total Active Signal limit: 5057 (13 x
389). Some signals can only be handled by one DGA, some signals can be handled by all DGAs. This allocation is
performed by the ACMF OPS (and is not to be influenced by the operator).
The Ground Based Software Tool (GBST) to build the ACMF AMI does not warn the ACMF AMI builder that a newly
built ACMF AMI may or may not exceed one or more DGA OPS limits upon loading the software on the airplane.
Boeing recommends that operators making significant changes to recorded signals to contact Boeing for assistance
in assessing whether the DGA limits will be an issue or Boeing suggests using a trial and error process after each
ACMF AMI built to determine whether or not the ACMF AMI exceeds one or more DGA OPS limits.
This will limit the operators’ flexibility whilst creating customized AMIs. The operator will never get the maximum
parameters out of the total maximum recording limit of 5057 unless you know exactly which parameters are
assigned to what DGA by the ACMF OPS.
1. Are other operators experiencing similar issues?
Although Boeing makes a friendly gesture to help operators to assess a Customized ACMF AMI for potential DGA
OPS limit issues, KLM believes potential DGA OPS limits should be prevented during the build of an ACMF AMI in
the GBST.
2. Is the OEM currently working on a solution to this issue?

SOFTWARE
Associate
Airline
118 AMC Software Parts Multiple Boeing B787 Multiple KLM/AFR KLM
(UMS, AMI)
Collins
Aerospace
GE
Aviation
Description:
KLM noticed Boeing service bulletins with accomplishment instructions to install software updates do not include
information in regard to impact on User Modifiable Software (UMS), Airline Modifiable Information (AMI), or
operational software parts that have to be re-loaded or updated. KLM has experienced problems several times when
accomplishing a Boeing SB that had an effect on software parts not mentioned in the SB.
Questions:
1. KLM would like to request Boeing to mention it in their Service bulletins when UMS, AMIs, or other
operational software are impacted and have to be re-loaded or updated or when they effect customized
software parts in any way.
2. Other operators your experience and comments please?
119 AMC Software Troubleshooting Boeing B787 24-00 UAL

and Software Releases
Best Practices
(1) United Airlines has suffered from a few delays and many unnecessary LRU components trying to track down
“ghost” maintenance messages. It was realized that an aircraft power cycle could have saved us a lot of false
diagnostics, so UAL is asking Boeing for a recommended aircraft power cycle interval.
(2) Next, how is software performance testing being improved at Boeing and its tier 1/2/3 suppliers to prevent
introducing so many new failure modes with new software releases? For example, after loading CMSC BP4
software, the L1_EMP, L2_EMP, and R1_EMP may not report ATA 24 maintenance messages when a CMSC fault
is present (787-FTD-24-18005). How is software reliability and testing being improved so there are not multiple
iterations? The constant revisions to the software make it very difficult for airline operators to maintain a consistent
baseline across the fleet, thus making it difficult for us to track operational software reliability.
(3) UAL would propose that Boeing vet all software releases with a test batch of operators prior to releasing it to the
field because the testing currently being executed is not robust enough to capture all the corner conditions in a test
or lab environment.
(4) Additionally, UAL would like Boeing to provide its airline operators some recommendations on COTS tools to
better diagnose software issues, i.e., CAN/ARINC bus loggers, so that more information can be shared with Boeing
on pertinent software issues so that Boeing or the appropriate vendor can reproduce the issue in a controlled
environment.
Boeing and other operators, please comment.

SOFTWARE
120 AMC Control of LSAPs Boeing B787 Multiple VIR

Relating to ADs
VAA notes that for an AD relating to software (e.g., FAA AD 2018-22-09 for B787 ADS-B OUT) that there are
statements such as “As of the effective date of this AD, no person may install ISS OPS part number
COL40-0010-0100 or COL46-0007-0100 on any airplane, except in accomplishment of the actions required by
paragraph (i) of this AD.”
VAA would like to know how operators comply with this requirement and do operators do anything extra when the
LSAPs are the subject of an AD? For example, permanently delete the pre-AD parts from the LSAPL or somehow
have them highlighted in their E&M system?
Also, does Boeing have any recommendations on how operators should deal with pre-AD software parts?
121 AMC A220 Wireless Dataload CSALP A220 46 DAL
The A220 currently utilizes a USB to load software onto the aircraft. This presents security concerns for Delta Air
Lines due to AC 119‐1. Delta would prefer to use the wireless data loading option or a secure portable data loader.
Delta Air Lines was told the software Build 8B would be available at the end of 2018.
1. How are other operators handling loading software on the A220?

2. When will the software Build 8B be available to activate AHMU Data Transfer capability?
Airframer and other operator comments, please.
122 AMC Teledyne PMAT Teledyne All 46 DAL
Delta Air Lines currently utilizes the PMAT‐2000 for data loading. The PMAT‐2000 can be unreliable and bulky for
mechanics. They do not always sync efficiently, and they are often out of date even though they were connected to
the network. Quite often mechanics have to go through multiple PMATs before they find one that works correctly
with the aircraft.
Can Teledyne provide a timeline for the rollout of the PMAT‐XS?
Teledyne and other operator comments, please.

AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS

123 MMC Ram Air Door 541674 Honeywell B737NG 21 ANA

Actuator Material Series
Change
ANA has experienced many unscheduled removals of B737 Ram Air Door Actuator (RADA) on B737-700/800
when compared with B737-500. RADA on B737-700/800 directly modulates inlet door. On the other hand, RADA
on B737-500 modulates inlet door through pulleys and cable. Therefore, RADA on B737-700/800 is affected by
larger vibration and load.
Larger vibration and load accelerate the wear between Jackscrew (IPL item no. 375) and Nut Assy (380).
Excessive wear causes RADA stall, then “PACK LT” is turned on. It is required to apply a layer of MIL-PRF-7808
oil on the Jackscrew by the CMM (21-20-36). But oil is easily exhausted under large vibration and load. It does
not keep lubricating Jackscrew and Nut Assy for a long time.
On the other hand, in the B767 RADA (2022432 series) CMM, MIL-PRF-23827 grease is specified for the
lubrication between Jackscrew and Nut Assy. Generally, grease is applied for longer-term lubrication than oil.
ANA would like Honeywell to replace lubricating material, MIL-PRF-7808 oil with MIL-PRF-23827 grease.
Honeywell, Boeing and other operator comments, please.
124 MMC B777 FCV 810204-4 Collins Aerospace B777 21 ANA
ANA experienced removal of 45 FCVs by FCV STATUS MSG in the last one year.
According to the data from Quick Access Recorder, it was found that the current exceeding FCV torque motor
operating current value is sometimes supplied from ASCPC to the torque motor. Collins Aerospace advised that
torque motor become inoperative intermittently by supplying a current greater than operating current to the torque
motor. We believe that this systematic inconsistency contributes to FCV STATUS MSG.
We hope that the root cause (FCV, ASCPC, SYSTEM DESIGN or other) is identified and the reliability of FCV is
improved.
We would like Boeing to coordinate with component OEM so that an appropriate solution is provided (FCV OEM:
Collins, ASCPC OEM: Honeywell).
Other operator, Boeing, Collins Aerospace, and Honeywell comments please.

125 MMC LCV B777 Short 810204 Hamilton/Collins B777 21-35 LHT
Runner
Major reason removals: “FCV not in commanded position,” “torque motor not in commanded position.”
Shop findings of low time performing units pointing to proximity switch and torque motor.
High rate of NFF units combined with low time performance, first observed in 2013. Units involved do have SNRs
beginning with 2013 or later.
The torque motors are being tested in accordance with the applicable CMM 30-00-01 (PNR 810351-X, 810615-X)
and result in functional performance failure. No repairs or calibration instructions are given.
LHT requests to have access to complete CMM to repair and re-calibrate these torque motors.
LHT requests Hamilton to provide root cause analysis on the low time performing issues, since LHT has provided
data and operators provided QAR data to investigate the confirmed issue on the FCV.
126 MMC Obsoleted CPOV ECU 2119164-2 Honeywell B777 21 JAL

(ECU Pre SB)
(ECU Post SB) 2119164-4
(CPOV Pre SB) 2119160-2
(CPOV Post SB) 2119160-4
The assembly of the CPOV (Cabin Pressure Outflow Valve) includes two ECU (Electronic Control Unit) as one of
the child components.
Since the ECU is categorized as a Line Replaceable Unit according to the Boeing Aircraft IPC, JAL basically
controls the ECU as a Line Replaceable Unit. This was reasonable to control because replacement of the CPOV
assembly needs significant workload (two men, around 10 hours), and almost all the reasons for removal are
caused by faulty ECU.
However, because of obsolescence of the motor board and sensor board which are installed on the ECU dash
number “-2”, SB2119164-21-4249 had been released to install newly redesigned cards. Applying this SB changes
ECU dash number from “-2” to “-4”. If the SB is incorporated to the ECU, re-configured 2119164”-4” is going to be
unable to install on the CPOV 2119160”-2”. Then the CPOV also must be incorporated SB 2119160-21-4246,
which changes CPOV dash number from “-2” to “-4”.
However, almost JAL fleets are still having CPOV “-2”. This situation forces the ECU to be unable to control
spares, and operators who are using "-2" to control CPOV as only an LRU despite the fact that the ECU has
tenfold removals of CPOV.
JAL thinks this is unreasonable since it forces significant workload for the replacement, and costs are extremely
high for CPOV repair and modification. Also retrofit of CPOV is not realistic.
Honeywell advised us about there is ECU “-3”, but this is only interchangeable with -4.

Questions:
1. Comments from the other operators who are using CPOV 2119160-2 would be appreciated.
2. Does Honeywell have some other reasonable solution to keep using ECU as spares? Also, the
explanation about the reason why they could not keep ECU interchangeability would be appreciated.
127 MMC APU Supply Various Honeywell B737 49 EXS

Chain Issues
Jet2.com is suffering numerous supply chain issues caused by Honeywell at a Honeywell endorsed and licensed
MRO.
Examples are below:
• GTCP131-9B
o T2 Disc Issues
• Chase Aerospace/ANZ (Jet2.com’s nominated Honeywell approved APU repair shop)
currently have three units with Honeywell for repair. The first was received at Honeywell
on December 3, 2018 and was initially allocated an SSD of January 9. This was then
pushed out to January 31, then February 9. Today, it is showing February 8. The second
was received at Honeywell January 16 and allocated an ESD January 29. This was then
pushed to February 12. Today, they have offered ANZ an exchange. ANZ has requested
but received no detail on exactly what the exchange is yet: this is TBD. The third T2 was
received at Honeywell January 16 and allocated an ESD January 29; this was then
pushed to February 12.
• ANZ has a new T2 on order. The order was placed on the January 16. No shipping detail
has been offered to date and as the part is on critical allocation, ANZ has not been
advised as to when it will ship.
o Main Harness Issues
• Received at Honeywell December 17 with a promised 20-Day turn time; it was then given
an SSD of March 1, 2019. ANZ had to fight to get this completed on time. The ship date
was pulled back to January 25.
o Starter Generator Harness Issues
• Received at Honeywell July 2, 2018, it is currently showing an SSD of February 23. ANZ
has demanded an explanation on how something with a 20 TAT can blow out to 200-plus
days, ANZ has suggested that they go to the market to buy the repair parts they require
as there are suppliers offering that part. ANZ has also offered to purchase and supply the
part to break the deadlock; to date, this has not been accepted.
o FCU Issues
• The FCU for P-5007 was received at Honeywell December 17 with a promised 28-Day
turn time. SSD was January 14, then was pushed out to February 18.
o Oil Cooler Issues
• The Oil Cooler for P-5007 was received by Honeywell December 14 and allocated an
SSD of January 11. It was then pushed out to February 15.
• (To support Jet2, ANZ will offer exchanges for these two items should they still be in
Honeywell’s ‘care’ when ANZ has the APU core built – but this should not be required).
• GTCP85-129
o Turbine shrouds
• Two APUs are on hold due to APU Shrouds. These have been out since July 2 and now
have a mid-February SSD. This apparently occurred because the American military
commandeered the entire production run, which is not a satisfactory reason as the OEM
should be planning production to cover demand including military demand.
• Overall effect of poor APU support:

o Everchanging SSDs do not provide ANZ with confidence of supply until they actually see an AWB
and are reluctant to provide Jet2 an APU completion date as they are not confident the parts will
be delivered on time to support their claims. Without meaningful SV completion dates, Jet2 as an
operator cannot proactively plan the remaining APU removals in their Maintenance plan.
o The knock-on effect for Jet2 is that their 2018/2019 Winter APU removal plan has been severely
impacted. The result is Jet2 is now forced to schedule APU removals in the middle of Summer
2019 during their busiest time of the year. A maintenance burden any airline can do well without
during the Summer flying program.
Other operators, Boeing, and Honeywell’s comments please.
128 MMC eFlow Aircraft Cabin 398908-5 (TCV) Honeywell B737-800 21-61 EXS
ROC Fluctuation
51090248-004 (PFTC) Boeing
Jet2.com is suffering with numerous Cabin ROC fluctuation events on our new delivery aircraft. In order to return
the aircraft to service, FIM 21-33 Task 802 is necessary following a fluctuation event. This FIM task checks for
Air-conditioning Pack leaks and if none are found, instructs the replacement of the Left or Right Temperature
Control Valve. As it is impossible to determine which TCV caused a fluctuation, this almost always requires the
replacement of both Left and Right Pack Temperature Control Valves, which is an unnecessary maintenance
burden and has resulted in some significant delays.
Jet2.com acknowledges that a software update for the PFTC is in progress; however, this is not scheduled until
May 2019. Please can TBC and Honeywell determine either a way to determine which TCV is at fault, to prevent
the necessity to replace both at once or a Flight Crew Procedure such as changing temperature selection to
preclude the e-FCV fluctuations, etc.
Honeywell, Boeing and other operator comments, please.
129 MMC Heat Exchanger Cracking 182820-3 Honeywell B737-800 21-61 EXS
Boeing
Jet2.com is suffering with numerous Cabin ROC fluctuation events on our new delivery aircraft. In order to return
the aircraft to service, FIM 21-33 Task 802 is necessary following a fluctuation event. This FIM task checks for
Air-conditioning Pack leaks where several of these cracks are being noted.
Jet2.com has raised this with Honeywell, who advised that “cracks should not be noticeable during inspections.”
Jet2.com is unsatisfied with this response, and still experiencing removals. Jet2.com has requested allowable
crack limits, so that these can be incorporated into our manuals, to preclude unnecessary removals; however,
Honeywell has not provided any information. Whilst these cracks appear to be in the mounting flange area,
Jet2.com believes these to be manufacturing deficiencies that need addressing.
Other operators, Boeing, and Honeywell comments please.

130 MMC TCV-5 Unreliability 398908-5 Honeywell B737-800 21-61 EXS
Jet2.com is seeing an unacceptable level of reliability with the -5 TCV. Numerous warranty returns are from our
factory new aircraft under warranty, where most are NFF; however, we often have a number of leaking capacitors
as an incidental finding. Other issues include position switch issues. Honeywell has implied that there will be
another part number roll. This TCV started life as a -2 and we are now at a -5. Will these part number rolls be the
final part number rolls that correct the issues with the TCV?
Does Honeywell have an update on when these reliability improvements will be available to the operators?
******17-059******
MMC Forward Cargo Trim Air 600700-00-500 Nord Micro A320F 21-43 AAL
Valve
600700-00-501
Of AAL’s 392 Airbus A320F aircraft:

• 49 aircraft have Forward Cargo Heat
• 180 aircraft have Aft Cargo Heat
• 163 aircraft do not have Cargo Heat
Current 12-month MTBUR for the Hot Air Trim Valve (P/N: 600700-00-501) on aircraft equipped with Forward
Cargo Heat is 3,708 FH. Current 12-month MTBUR for the same part number on aircraft equipped with Aft Cargo
Heat is 16,360 FH.
On the 49 aircraft (delivered between July 2013-May 2014) with FWD Cargo Heat, AAL has experienced 41 valve
removals and 20 Cargo Heat Controller (P/N: 600611-00-600/-601) in the 12 months ending in May 2017. Based
on our shop reports, the valves are experiencing over a 90% failure rate and the Controllers are closer to a 30%
failure rate. Due to the over 90% failure rate, AAL believes there is a design issue with the Hot Air Trim Valve.
AAL is working with both Nord Micro and Airbus on the reliability issues with the valve, but have yet to receive a
fix for our FWD Cargo Heat Faults.
Are other operators equipped with FWD Cargo Heat experiencing the same issues?
Can a fix and a timeline please be provided?
Nord Micro, Airbus, and other operator comments, please.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEMS

******17-126******
Title Associate
Airline
AMC Equipment 285U0035-211 BAE B747-400 21 KLM/AFR KLM

Cooling Card Systems
During the period November 2015 – October 2016, 8 Equipment Cooling Cards have been replaced from 3
freighter aircraft only and sent to BAE Systems. According our reliability system, the MTBUR of subject cards is
1,828 hrs and a NFF percentage of 100% was recorded. KLM is looking into this high replacement rate and NFF
problem. With Boeing SL 747-SL-31-100 in mind we believe it might be a moisture issue and therefore not
detectable during normal testing/repair.
Referenced SL states:
“Cards can also be sent back to the supplier for maintenance services and recoating. BAE Systems service
centers not only address the conformal coating deficiencies, but also remove and replace any components
showing signs of contamination.”
Due to the 100% NFF rate KLM concludes that the aforementioned action is not done by BAE Systems for the
cards sent to them. Thus, KLM believes that the standard testing and repair procedures are not capable of
detecting moist induced damage on subject cards.
BAE Systems: Please confirm and/ or elaborate on testing and repair procedures.
Other airlines: Please comment.
*****18-160*****
Associate
Airline
AMC Testing 7011006H03 – UTAS B787 21 LHT Several

Requires Full
Disassembly
Large Galley
Heat Exchanger
Module
Due to the design of PN 7011006H03, the whole unit has to be disassembled and all insulation covers have to be
removed and discarded for functional test. In total, the whole unit is more or less overhauled, even if only a test is
necessary. This procedure is followed because of several components inside that are not accessible without a
whole disassembly. This results in long lead times for testing as well as in high workload for the maintenance
personnel.
Operators, please share your experience with this component.
Airframer, OEM, what are your actions to enable a more efficient testing? What are your plans to achieve a higher
maintainability for this component?
ENVIROMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEMS
Title Associate
Airline
131 AMC Vibration Test Several UTAS B787 21 KLM/AFR KLM

Boeing
KLM/AFR requests to reopen AMC item 18-154.
Reference is made to KLM/AFR question 17-002 at the MMC Conference in Cleveland.
KLM asked UTAS and Boeing to relax the CMM test (CMM 21-54-12 and 21-55-01). KLM suggested
removing the vibration test from the CMM whenever the electronic board is replaced. After a long
discussion, UTAS agreed to accomplish the investigation and report results at AMC conference in April
2018.
The issue is very important for KLM and KLM strongly supports the change in the CMM. 2Q 2018 has
arrived here in Dallas and KLM would like to hear UTAS’s answer.
UTAS and Boeing comments, please.
Associate
Airline
132 AMC NGS Pack Air 7012013H04 UTAS B787 47 KLM/AFR KLM
Filter Replacement
Nitrogen Generating System – air filter/ozone converter.
Filter costs are high, and they are discarded every 6000 hrs. Considering the 6000-hour replacement interval, the
maintenance cost of this consumable is very high compared to other filters. On B777 or other fleets, there is a
cleaning task which brings the cost down to acceptable levels.
This item has been discussed with Boeing and Collins Aerospace; however, a suitable solution has not been
found so far.
KLM would like to see:

a) A CMM cleaning/regeneration method for the filter/Ozone converter.
b) The possibility to replace its filter element.
c) Another cost-effective solution

Associate
Airline
133 AMC Condenser UTAS A380 21 AFR/KLM AFR

SB1380270-21-06
On October 18, 2018, UTAS released the SB SB1380270-21-06 to exchange the installed condenser with a new
condenser.
The real reason described in the TFU 21.50.00.004 dated September 18 is due to the coating being insufficient in
production.
Solution: Analysis shows that coating is not sufficiently applied during production (too thin). The condenser
corrosion in turn is caused by inadequate surface protection, due to inadequate coverage by coating material.
A new coating application process has been developed. The number of coats to be applied to the cold side of
the condenser will be raised from two to seven.
The new condenser availability is expected by end of 2018.
New condenser will be introduced by 2 SB (one SB by AGU).
But in the UTAS SB, the root reason disappears, and the condenser exchange costs must be taken in charge by
the airlines.
We just had the same issue with the Dual Heat Exchanger (the weld crack by insufficient weld quality) with a very
high cost for the airlines.
Why does the root cause disappear in the UTAS SB and why do UTAS or Airbus not take in the charges of these
production issues?
AFR asks UTAS or Airbus that all the exchanges be FOC, even without unscheduled removals.
Operators, UTAS, and Boeing comment please.

Associate
Airline
134 AMC Condenser 4101944G Triumph Thermal A380 21 LHT DLH

Fan – Missing Systems (Maryland)
Information
About Repair
Details
UTC Aerospace
Systems (Goodrich
Corporation Monroe)
The A380 condenser fan PNR 4101944G is repaired by UTC Aerospace Systems but was designed/integrated by
Triumph Thermal Systems. This component is contracted for Lufthansa Technik and we are sending it to Triumph
Thermal Systems Maryland; the repair work and certificate will be done by UTC Aerospace Systems (Goodrich in
Monroe).
For most of the units, the motor drive needs to be changed/repaired due to an internal failure. UTC has set up an
exchange pool of motor drives, which means that the defective motor drive will be removed and a used repaired
one will be used for the repair of the condenser fan.
Lufthansa Technik has already requested to receive detailed findings of the changed core motor drives several
times for years but has never received them. This is needed to understand the failure modes of the condenser fan
and the motor drive and to be able to create more detailed reliability analysis.
Please provide findings overview of previous events and findings for motor drives for future events.
Triumph Thermal Systems (Maryland): Which failure modes appear on the motor drives? What are the measures
to improve reliability?
Triumph, UTAS, and other operator comments, please.


Associate
Airline
135 AMC Supplemental Cooling N052100001 Triumph A380 21 LHT DLH

System Controller – Thermal
Bad Reliability/Design Systems
Flaws (Maryland)
N052100002
The A380 SCSC is repaired by Triumph Thermal System in Maryland but needs to be sub-contracted to a vendor
in New England for welding of covers/connectors etc. as the inner parts of the housing are hermetically isolated.
1. LHT suffers high price repairs due to unreliable Boost Inductors which is the most common failure reason. In
avg., nearly 3 EA of the Boost Inductors need to be replaced due to “Overheat” (plus labor/Administration, Sub-
contracting and mandatory new material). Airbus has already dropped a “Request for Work” to improve the
reliability of the SCSC/Boost Inductors, but LHT didn’t receive the result of the investigation.
TTS-M: What are the next steps for increasing the reliability and decrease the removal rate of the Boost
Inductors.
Airbus: Would you be so kind to share the results of your “Request for Work”?
All: Do you have same experiences?
2. Sometimes during the De-Lidding-Process of both covers, the housing suffers cracks at the inside corners near
the welding. This leads into complete replacement of the housing which could not be a failure of an operator. The
replacement of the housing is highly expensive. In LHT’s view, these further damages are risk of the repair-facility
and the costs must also be borne by them.
3. The newest Quotes shows burnt contacts (deemed as Customer Induced Damage by TTS-M; for LHT it is
normal wear/tear) which leads either into replacement of the whole housing to meet the TAT or replacement of
the connector for a lower price but with an additional TAT of 8 weeks. An investigation on the connectors of the
affected aircraft were performed without any findings.
All: Does anyone have the same experience with these new findings?
TTS-M: What are the next steps for increasing the reliability and decrease the removal rate of the Boost
Inductors.
Airbus: Would you be so kind to share the results of your “Request for Work”?
136 AMC Avionics Fan with EVT3454HM01 / Safran A320 FAM 21 TAP
BBHM Avionics Fan Ventilation
Systems
SVS released in early 2018 the modification of Avionics Fan P/N EVT3454HC to P/N EVT3454HM01,
incorporating Ball Bearing Health Monitoring Function, which claims to prevent smoke smell events due to ball
bearing failure during operation. Despite the results of the ISE published by Airbus, we believe the duration of the
ISE was not enough to enable to make a proper analysis of the unit’s behavior in normal operation conditions. An
interval of 8000 FH to 12000 FH is recommended for overhaul of the avionics fan but ISE took only a few months,
with warning threshold being triggered with very low FHs since modification.
TAP would like to know the experience of other operators who have implemented this modification. Namely, how
it affects MTBUR values within your fleet, premature removals, and if any new failure mode has been identified.
Airbus and vendor comments are also welcomed.
Title Associate
Airline
137 AMC Forced 7011040H0x / Hamilton B787 21 AFR/KLM AFR

Modification SCUMC
Hamilton states that the A1 board P/N 7005053 of the SCUMC P/N 7011040H02 is now obsolete and a new A1
board P/N 7006687 must be ordered. However, the new A1 board can only be fitted on the SCUMC P/N
7011040H03, forcing operators to perform a costly service bulletin. Operators need an alternative for this
obsolescence.
Do other operators face similar issues, including on different LRUs?
Hamilton, Boeing, comment please.

FUEL SYSTEMS
*****18-191*****
Associate
Airline
AMC FCMC TPS 367-327-00x Parker A340 28-41 LHT DLH

Issues Fuel
Control
Management
Computer
(FCMC)
Over the last few years, we are constantly facing test problems with the ATEC Series 6 ATP for Parker’s Fuel
Control Management Computer (FCMC) P/N: 367-327-002/-003 and miss a Fault Data retrieval function. Also, the
TS (Test Specification) update for 367-327-003 is overdue. We are pushing Spherea to get these items solved.
Spherea informed LHT that they need Parkers’ assistance to get these problems fixed and that a cooperation
agreement exists between Parker and Spherea. Parker promised to support on all open items, but until today,
there is no further response from Parker.
LHT requests Parker to

• Provide missing fault data dump and decode information
• Provide up-to-date TS (Test Specification)
• Support Spherea with any data necessary to complete Test Program and support on all open items as
promised
How can Airbus further support our demand?
Airbus, Parker, Spherea, and other operator comments, please.
138 AMC Fuel Quantity Data Concentrator 367-334-002 Parker A380 28 KAL
Hannifin
KAL suffers the failure of LRU’s identification, showing PN, SN, and related software information during FQDC
auto testing.
Even though KAL purchased three types of board for FQDC repair, KAL is unable to use them for the LRU repair
due to this identification issue.
At final stage of the test program set operation, operator cannot identify the PN, SN and software’s information of
LRU of own TPS.
KAL believes a specific tool is required and loaded into the system to achieve successful identification. Despite
several requests, the vendor has not provided it yet.
KAL would like to request Airbus and Parker review this issue to provide the tool.
Airbus, Parker Hannifin, and other operator comments, please.

FUEL SYSTEMS
139 MMC 737 NGS Check 2040021-101 Parker B737NG 47 UAL

Valve
With the center fuel tank full, both the primary and secondary NEADS check valves sometimes fail, allowing fuel
to damage the ASM and other components. UAL requests Parker/Honeywell to provide root cause for failed
check valves and present a solution.
Parker, Honeywell, and other operator comments, please.
140 AMC IRP (Integrated Refueling Panel) 6026-01/-02/-03 Ontic B777 28 KAL
KAL has been experiencing numerous maintenance delays by IRP refueling valve control switch failure (S12 to
S14 on IRP).
It is an obvious fact that it is impossible to dispatch the aircraft with no fuel. To mitigate the operational disruption,
KAL is doing an IRP switch refreshment campaign, replacing refuel valve switches (S12 to S14) on the IRP and
applying a new potting method for the entire B777 fleet with OEM "Ontic", despite its being a costly solution.
Furthermore, the IRP that have incorporated SB 6026-28-714/-717 called new potting method also makes failure.
KAL has doubts about the effectiveness of SB 6026-28-714/-717.
KAL found out other operators also suffering from the same switch issue through Fleet Idea eXchange (on MBF)
that KAL has opened (ISE-28-18-22546). But there is no action and no official answer from Boeing and Ontic.
• Recent switch failure removals: 22 removals (Recent three years)
KAL would like to Boeing and Ontic to find the root cause and its solution for frequent switch failure.
Boeing, Ontic, and other operator comments, please.

FUEL SYSTEMS
141 AMC Decrease of MTBUR 30278-0102 Collins B787 28 JAL

Aerospace
FQDC 30278-0202
Recently, JAL has encountered many removals of FQDC (Fuel Quantity Data Concentrator) from Boeing 787.
Here is data of fiscal year versus MTBUR on JAL’s fleet:

FY2014 116,299 FH
FY2015 152,978 FH
FY2016 189,690 FH
FY2017 36,647 FH
FY2018 21,335 FH
MTBUR has significantly been decreasing since FY2017. JAL has reviewed flight cycle data of removed FQDC
and found increasing tendency of short-time removals – defined as removal below 100 flight cycle since install.
FY2017 Number of unscheduled removals: 14, Number of short time removals: 1

FY2018 Number of unscheduled removals: 16, Number of short time removals: 7
Thus, JAL assumes that the decrease of MTBUR is not only caused by deterioration of FQDC. CMM test
specification may be insufficient to seek out potential failure.
JAL would like Collins Aerospace to seek out further improvement of FQDC from both of design point of view and
test specification point of view.
Comments from other operators, Boeing, Collins Aerospace, and other airframers are highly appreciated.
FUEL SYSTEMS
Associate
Airline
142 AMC Refuel Control 30288-0101 UTC B787 28 LHT DLH

Panel – Corrosion Aerospace
on Front Panel
(Design Deficiency)
The Front Panel of the Refuel Control Panel suffers corrosion around the switches and mounting holes.
According to UTAS, “Mechanical damage to the Front Panel (e.g., nicks, chips) that cuts through the paint layer
and exposes the metal underneath starts the galvanic corrosion process where the copper plating and the
aluminum body meet. To prevent this, UTAS proposed to change the finish of the RCP Front Panel from copper
plating to anodize (except where copper plating is necessary for soldering).”
From LHT’s point of view, this cannot be basically operators guilt as the corrosion often starts next to the switches
installed originally by the OEM. Although the replacement of a corroded Front Panel is covered by the OEM-
warranty for the first 5 years, the corrosion had never led to a technical fault of the unit but needed a replacement
of the complete front panel plus additional costs for harness/switch when the corrosion passes attaching parts.
LHT expects a replacement of a corroded front panel FOC as this must be deemed as a Design Deficiency.
UTC Aerospace: LHT considers the front panel corrosion to be a design deficiency issue. Please provide
information regarding the design of the panel and the resulting corrosion issue.
All: Do you see the corrosion issue as well?

FUEL SYSTEMS
143 MMC Start Fuel Nozzle 4502052A Pratt & Whitney Q400 APU 49 LHT
Clogging Canada International,
Inc.
APS1000
Start fuel nozzles of Q400 APU (APS 1000) are removed by customers due to no APU start. Main finding is
clogged start fuel nozzle. According Pratt & Whitney Canada International Inc., the source of the start fuel nozzle
clogging is due to an inefficiency of the purge system. The purge system is not efficient enough to totally purge
the nozzles, causing coking over time of the residual fuel.
P&WC is evaluating a “soft time” for the fuel nozzles, to recommend a replacement interval to the customers.
Implementation of a “soft time” does not solve the problem of an inefficient purge system.
Q1: Implementation of a “soft time” does not solve problem of clogged fuel nozzles. Is there a modification of the
purge system under development? If not, why not?
Pratt & Whitney and other operator comments, please.
144 MMC OVH of Fuel Fuel Components, Woodward 73-XX-XX LHT

Components if Mainly FMUs and
Contamination at Inlet HMUs
Filter is Present
Several fuel control units such as HMUs and FMUs were sent to Woodward and contamination at inlet screen
was detected. Due to the present contamination, overhaul is the only possible work scope to be performed on
such units according to Woodward, regardless of flight hours of unit. General rule by Woodward: if the
contamination is deemed to be small enough or found to be inconsistent in size to suggest the possible presence
of contamination even smaller than what they have found in the inlet screen, the FMU is deemed to be
contaminated. This leads to increasing costs for the airlines that are difficult to explain on a technical basis.
Q1: What is the basis for the decision to have units overhauled which show contamination at inlet screen?
Q2: Was an analysis conducted on different units in order to determine amount of contamination inside of unit is
inlet screen was found contaminated? If yes, what was the outcome? If not, why not?
Woodward and other operator comments, please.
145 MMC V2500 Fuel Metering Unit 8061-6XX Woodward MD90 73 DAL
Various issues have caused International Aero Engines (IAE) to hard time the Fuel Metering Unit (FMU) for both
the V2500-A5 and V2500-D5 Fleets at a very low interval. The V2500-D5 (MD90) FMU is the same FMU utilized
on the V2500-A5 Fleet (Airbus).
Delta would like feedback on what is being done to improve and return the V2500 FMU to a reasonable life and
for industry support during the interim.
Woodward and other operator comments, please.

FUEL SYSTEMS
******17-088******
MMC Refuel/Defuel Coupling Cap 0727504 Eaton Aerospace A320FAM 28-25 DAL
Delta has experienced reports of missing Refuel/Defuel Coupling Cap (MPN 07275040) on the A320FAM. During
a 12-month period, we experienced 162 reports of “Missing Cap” on a total fleet of 136 aircraft. Details about the
background are available via Airbus TFU 28.25.41.001.
Delta reviewed the Refuel/Defuel Coupling Cap installation identified the following items:
• Cable assembly chain to be broken at the chain attachment lug.
• Cable assembly ring to be missing.
• Damage to the Refuel/Defuel Coupling Cap due to interference between the chain attachment lug and the
fuel cap handle.
Delta agrees that the current design/installation is subject to failure due to human factors. This creates a risk of
FOD originated by Refuel/Defuel Coupling Cap separating from the aircraft due to incorrect installation. However,
the design should be improved to adapt to the operational environment. Therefore, Delta is requesting the
following:
• Eaton/Airbus to evaluate the relocation of the chain attachment lug.
• Eaton to modify Fuel Cap to increase strength of the retaining cable assembly.
Eaton, Airbus, and other operator comments, please.
******17-142******
Associate
Airline
MMC Fuel Valve Single Motor D97C00-624 Zodiac A330 2821 DAL HAL
Actuator Reliability
D97C00-654
D97C00-682
HAL was experiencing poor reliability with Single Motor Actuator (SMA) MPN D97C00-624 and instituted a fleet
campaign to replace all SMAs on all aircraft with -654’s, which was completed in the first quarter of 2016. An
improvement was noted for a short period of time, but failures are once again on the rise with ATA 2821 at the top
of the reliability index. Current experienced MTBUR is 33,541, which is far below the GMTBUR of 70,000
currently listed on the Airbus heatmap.
With Airbus FAIR item 15.0082 open for so long and still no clear identification of root cause, will Zodiac be
providing operators replacements for early failure units?
Airbus, Zodiac, and other operator comments, please.

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
Title Associate
Airline
146 AMC Standby LK-35-X Tokyo Aircraft B737 34-13 AFR/KLM KLM
Altimeter Instrument Co.
Boeing
Our respectful supplier Tokyo Aircraft Instrument Co. inserted in the CMM the text: TKK limited the repair work to
only the repair shop which is TKK approved.
This is unusual text in the CMM. KLM’s shop is a FAA and EASA 145 repair station. We do not see the reason why
TKK is limiting us with repairs, especially because we did it in the past. In revision 8 and lower, there was no
restriction. We complained and with help from Boeing, they promised to remove the restriction in revision 10. They
did not. Also, in revision 11, there was no change. Therefore, we would like to ask Boeing and the OEM to cooperate
and take care of the repair returns in revision 12.
Ref:
34-13-02 Page 305 Revision 10 Dec 22/16
34-13-02 Page 707 Revision 10 Dec 22/16 C. Counter, altitude deleted
34-13-02 Page 308 Revision 8 Aug 25/98 H. Counter, altitude (IPL fig 3)
34-13-02 Page 708 Revision 8 Aug 25/98 B. Counter Altitude (IPL fig 3)
We would appreciate it if the OEM could put back the revision 8 in the latest revision of the CMM (in the new
Revision, which will be 12) and enable us to do the repair like we did before.
Tokyo Aircraft Instrument Co., Boeing, and other operator comments, please.
Title Associate
Airline
147 AMC Total Air 0102AW1AF-1 Rosemount E-Jet 34-18-76 LHT CLH
Temperature (+Product Aerospace
Sensor Family) (UTAS/UTC)
Corrosion
and Erosion
One of the top findings of the Total Air Temperature sensor is corrosion and erosion on the housing and inlet.
This finding is also found on units still under warranty and subsequently the warranty is denied due to field damages.
All: Do other airlines also see these findings early on their units?
Rosemount Aerospace: What is the root cause for corrosion and erosion appearing within the first years of service?
What will be done to improve this issue?
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
148 AMC Total Temp Sensor 102LJ2AG UTC B737 34-18-61 ARG
ARG has not get any answer from UTC for the referenced B737 units.
In order to locally process these sensors, our shop has developed an alternate procedure for ONE step in its testing
but when we ask UTC (directly or via its local representative – www.latconsultancy.com), we never get an answer.
In addition, we never get an answer regarding RFQ for test equipment required by the referenced CMM.
UTC and other operator comments, please.
149 AMC ADIRU Rack Removal on N/A Boeing B717 34 UAL

Boeing Aircraft
B737
B747
B757
B767
B777
Boeing published a multiple-fleet SIL (e.g., 737-SL-34-245 or 757-SL-34-183) addressing the subject,
“DISTURBANCE OF THE CRITICALLY ALIGNED INERTIAL REFERENCE UNIT/AIR DATA INERTIAL
REFERENCE UNIT MOUNTING HARDWARE” affecting all Boeing/Douglas airplanes with Inertial Reference Units
(IRUs), Air Data Inertial Reference Units (ADIRUs), and Fault Tolerant (FT) ADIRUs installed.
UAL is concerned with the following statement in the SIL: “If the ADIRU mounting hardware has been removed or
disturbed, then the operator must contract with Boeing to send an Aircraft on Ground (AOG) crew with special
alignment tooling to recalibrate the installation. Boeing has no operator procedure to accomplish the IRU or ADIRU
shelf alignment.” This this is very restrictive for the airlines.
UAL is requesting an alternative procedure which allows operators to remove the racks as long as it is verified that
the rack can be reinstalled to the original configuration. This includes verifying the same bolts are used and torqued
properly and the shims are undisturbed and undamaged. Boeing has already allowed for similar procedures on UAL
aircraft because the alignment tool was unavailable. There have been no in-service issues.
Boeing and other vendors please comment.

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
******18-079******
AMC ADIRU Moisture HG2050AC07 Honeywell B737 34-00 UAL

Ingression
United Airlines has experienced frequent moisture damage to ADIRUs due to ineffective moisture shrouds located
above the E5 rack. This has contributed to significant operational and financial impact. There are 2 moisture shrouds
located above the E5 rack for aircraft delivered prior to 2014. After that time, a single piece moisture shroud was
implemented. United has incorporated Boeing SB 737-25A1626 and 737-51-1017, but continues to have the
moisture ingression issue on aircraft with the 2-piece shrouds. Boeing currently does not have plans to provide an
SB to retrofit the single piece moisture shroud into the earlier aircraft.
Have other operators experienced the moisture ingression issue? If so, what actions have you taken to prevent the
damage from occurring?
Operators and Boeing comments please.
150 AMC ADIRU Health HG2050ACXX Honeywell B737NG 34 EXS

Monitoring
Honeywell have alluded to the on-wing Gyro Health monitoring via FDR/FDM which would allow a more target gyro
health check programme, Jet2.com would like an update on this and how it would work with the 737NG.
Other operators, Boeing and Honeywell’s comments please.

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
151 AMC A32X Pitot Probe Airbus A32X 34 ETD

Retrofit Policy
UTAS
In October 2018, Airbus released SB A320-34-1678 (Navigation – Sensors, Power Supply and Switching – Replace
UTAS Pitot Probe 0851HL by Pitot Probe 0851MC). The reason was that new icing requirements (CS25 Appendix P
and Appendix O) have been defined by EASA with an increased maximum ice crystal concentration and UTAS has
developed new Pitot Probes that comply with these requirements.
In parallel, Airbus also released in October 2018 SB A330-34-3367 (Navigation – Sensors Power Supply and
Switching – Install UTAS Pitot Probes PN 0851MC Compatible with new Icing regulation) and RIL LR34M18001408
R00 (Install UTAS Pitot Probes 0851MC compatible with new icing regulation). This RIL makes the provision of the
new UTAS Pitot Probes 0851MC FOC for A330 fleet until 31-OCT-2020, but no RIL was released for A32X.
These unequal conditions were discussed with Airbus under TechRequest 80553264, but the answer provided by
Airbus was unsatisfactory.
Questions:
1. UTAS pitot probes PN 0851HL are prone to blockage due to icing conditions regardless of the aircraft type
they are installed in. Nonetheless, Airbus makes the retrofit FOC for A330 and not for A32X, being indirectly
responsible of the unsafe operation of thousands of aircraft worldwide. Under which technical reasons has
Airbus taken this decision?
2. How many cases of unreliable airspeed has Airbus received from operators on A32X and A330 fleets due to
ice crystal blockage?
3. Aside from UTAS Pitot Probes, which other new icing requirement-compliant Pitot Probes are Airbus going
to certify on A32X and A330 fleets?

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
******18-075******
AMC Leak Test of Pitot Probe 0851HT-1 Pitot Probe UTAS B737 34 KAL
0856LU5, 6 Pitot Probe Boeing B777
0856RE5, 6 Pitot Static B744/748
Probe
KAL has suffered from many Delays and Flight Cancellations due to the failure of Pitot Probes.
Even though KAL is now doing High-Time replacement to reduce the delay, heavy delays of more than 1 hour is
unavoidable if the failure is detected after the push back. This is due to the leak test, which should be performed
after the replacement of Pitot Probe.
The following shows the delays of KAL due to the pitot probe replacement from 2011 on.
A/C Type Total Delays DLYs less than 1 HR DLYs above 1 HR DLYs above 3 HR and CNX
737 20 4 14 2
747 11 0 4 7
777 5 3 1 1
As KAL reviewed, there is a SB for B767 fleet to change the pitot probe and air hose from thread type to Quick
Disconnect (QD) type fitting and as a result, leak test is not required on those aircraft. This QD type is also used on
B787 and B777X fleets.
Unfortunately, B737MAX still has this thread-type fitting and this kind of delay will continue on this new B737MAX,
too.
KAL would like to request Boeing to change the design of fitting for Pitot Probe to QD type for the convenience of
operators. Additionally, KLM asks Boeing to provide a retrofit program for the existing fleets like B737, B777, B744,
B748, and so on.

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
152 AMC Aspirated TAT Probe 102LJ2AG Collins Aerospace B737NG 34 UAL
Fit on the B737NG
B737MAX
Boeing AMM 34-21-06 provides the following QUALIFIED I/W DATA: “FOR NON-ASPIRATED INSTALLATIONS
(BLEED AIR NOT SUPPLIED TO PROBE), 102LJ2AG WITH PNEUMATIC FITTING CAPPED CAN REPLACE
OR BE REPLACED BY 102AH2AG. USE CAP P/N BACC14AD04J. GASKET 66-13280-1 IS USED WITH
102AH2AG AND 66-13280-2 IS USED WITH 102LJ2AG.”
FTD 737NG-FTD-34-15005 and SIL 737-SL-34-239 describes the allowable interchangeability.
UAL has tried to install the aspirated probe (P/N 102LJ2AG) on two different aircraft and they had different issues.
The TAT probe on the first aircraft did not fit properly because the aspiration line interferes with the nearby wire
bundle. Note: On the second aircraft, the aspiration line was closer to the bundle than desired, but there was no
interference. Both aircraft had an issue with the aspirated TAT probe being more difficult to replace. Due to the
aspiration line interference, the connector had to be removed from inside the aircraft requiring the removal of a
pressure access panel. The aircraft had to be pressurized and checked for leaks afterward. This led to extended
down time on the line.
UAL submitted an SR looking for a solution. Boeing responded by stating the “Conditional Qualified I/W is correct
and valid.” They continued their response with “Boeing notes, we have received past reports of Wire Bundle
interference issues. However, analysis of the previously reported interference issues have been identified as
resulting from modifications made to the original aircraft delivery configuration.”
The current TAT probes (P/N 102AH2AG) do not have near the reliability the newer probes (P/N 102LJ2AG)
have.
UAL would like an option for a non-aspirated probe with improved reliability and the aspiration line removed.
Boeing and Collins Aerospace please comment.
******17-079******
AMC Heaters, Pitot, TAT Varies by Aircraft Boeing All 34-00 DAL
Airbus
Rosemount
Failure of pitot/static/TAT heaters usually results in flight cancellations, delays and air turnback/diversions due to
flight restrictions for weather. If there is a way to determine the health of pitot heaters by on wing monitoring
electrical current, voltage drop, resistance, etc., to the probe, operators may be able to avoid the Operational
Difficultly Index (ODI)s and move probe heaters from a hard time maintenance program to a managed on
condition program.
What is being developed or added to aircraft to be able to detect degradation of the various heaters prior to an
actual failure?
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
153 AMC Standby Attitude Indicator (SAI) 501-1657-02 L3 Aviation B737 34 KAL
At last year’s AMC (Item No 18-086), KAL issued a quality problem with the rotor housing assembly of L3’s SAI.
L3 did not take proper action regarding this issue and KAL has been suffering same difficulties, such as SAI’s
frequent premature removal due to rotor housing failure and frequent occurrence of SAI’s bench-stock-out situation,
which induced severe flight operation difficulties.
KAL would like to raise this issue and request L3 to take proper action again:
1. L3 should improve the overhaul quality of the rotor housing assembly.
2. L3 should revise the CMM to make in-house repair of rotor housing assembly possible ASAP.
154 AMC LRRA Antennas S67-2002-28 Sensor Systems B737NG 34 THY

Randome’s Separation
from the Baseplates
LRRA Antennas Radome’s Separation from the Baseplates
LRRA antenna radomes were separating from the baseplates as can be seen from the pictures. Boeing responded
that such antennas should be immediately replaced. However, the frequency of the removals was too high.
We would like to learn if other operators face such cases and Boeing’s solution.
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
OEMs, airlines, MRO centers, comment please!

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
155 AMC Antennas Several Airbus A320 34 AZU

Interchangeability
A330
Airbus issued in January 2018 the ISI (In-Service Information) 34.00.00100, where it informs that does not recognize
antennas of the ATA 34 (navigation and surveillance) that do not have the system’s manufacturer (Collins
Aerospace, Thales, or Honeywell) P/N label together in the antenna. This condition forces the operator to buy the
antenna only from the system’s manufacturer.
This complicates the operator’s material department. Airbus informs that having the additional label ensures product
quality.
What additional tests does the system’s manufacturer do that guarantees this intended quality?
We do not believe that a manufacturer like System Sensor, which is a world reference, will sell antennas that do not
meet design specifications.
Airbus, please give us your comments.
Are other operators facing the same problem?
Airbus, operator, and manufacturer comments, please.
156 AMC NVM Data Download 822-2120-102 Collins Aerospace B787-9 34-42 VIR
Currently the NVM data can only be downloaded in the workshop. To assist with investigation of in-service events,
VAA requests that Boeing and Collins Aerospace incorporate the NVM data download procedure in the B787 AMM
in the earliest possible revision.
157 AMC ADF Receiver (DFA- 066-50014-1101 Honeywell B787 34 ANA

75B)
ANA experienced delay due to system anomaly (No R ADF POINTER identification and No ID tone) on B787-9
airplane. ADF receiver was removed and sent to repair and found to have bad IC U8015 (Antenna Power Switch on
Receiver Module). Bad U8015 is known issue since 2015 AMC, and baking process change had been implemented
as corrective action in accordance with Honeywell letter; S/N cut-in DF75B-09231. However, the bad U8015 has
implemented new baking process change.
According to ANA’s experience, repair report from 2016 indicates five (5) U8015, which had been implemented
NEW baking process, failed again.
ANA would like to Honeywell to investigate the U8015 failures which have been implemented with the new baking
process.
Other operator and Honeywell comments, please.

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
158 AMC DM-441B Distance 066-1107-0021 Cobham DHC-8-400 24 ANA

Measuring System
ANA is considering changing the maintenance level of DM-441B from 1 to 2 at ANA shop. ANA checked the
required tool, material, equipment, and parts to establish the level 2 maintenance. In case of parts, CMM mentions
parts information per revision status individually and ANA was not able to confirm revision status at DM-441B
identification label.
Hence, ANA was not able to understand which part of IPC ANA should use.
ANA contacted to Cobham through Thales concerning how to understand revision status of DM-441B. From
Cobham’s response, ANA understood that Cobham is using the configuration index which is Cobham's internal
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
document to understand revision status of DM-441B and Cobham informed ANA that Cobham is not able to disclose
the configuration index to ANA.
ANA does not understand why Cobham is not able to disclose the configuration index to operators and ANA thinks
that Cobham should disclose the configuration index to operators by Cobham responsibility.
1. Please provide the configuration index for operators.
2. If 1’s response is negative, please provide the reason logically why Cobham is not able to disclose the
configuration index to operators.
Cobham and other operator comments, please.
159 AMC MagVar Table Update IRU: HG2100BC02 Boeing B787 34 ANA
AHRU: HG2111BC02
Boeing Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) revisions for Inertial Reference System (IRS) were implemented in June 2018.
It prohibits certain flight operations such as autopilot/flight director ILS approach and landing operations that use
magnetic north referenced courses or bearings in areas where MagVar table errors are greater than 3 degrees, and
all flight operations based on magnetic heading or magnetic track angle in areas where MagVar table errors are
greater than 5 degrees.
Due to this new AFM limitation, ANA’s B787 is affected by the 3-degree error limit at some airports, especially in
Alaska in 2019. We need to update our B787 MagVar table (2010 epoch) to the latest one as soon as possible to
maintain our flight operations; however, Boeing did not offer a new MagVar table for B787 at the time of the AFM
revision and announced to release a service bulletin for B787 MagVar table update in June 2019, which was very
late for us.
ANA requests Boeing release the service bulletin without delay.
Also, regarding the future MagVar table update for Boeing airplanes, we request Boeing release a service bulletin in
a timely manner so that operators can update the MagVar table before MagVar table errors exceed the limits. We
believe this is very important for operators.
Other operators and Boeing comments please.

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
160 AMC Intermittent GPS Signal Multiple MMR and N/A B757 34-58 FDX
Troubleshooting GPS WAAS Receivers
B767
B777
MD10
MD11
A300
A310
Deployment of Mode S Transponders compliant with RTCA DO-260B across FedEx’s fleet enabled Transponder
Fail annunciations in the cockpit that result when position information from an onboard GPS source is not available.
For the first time, brief intermittent GPS signal disruptions that may last less than a minute are now visible to the
flight crews.
Excluding occasional write ups for audio system noise and p-static, FDX Maintenance has not, in the past, had to
address too many instances where EMI/RFI emissions from an LRU cause failure annunciations in the cockpit.
Troubleshooting instances where intermittent LRU failures cause EMI/RFI emissions that cannot be duplicated on
the ground is costly, owing to extended repeat down times and the consumption of a lot of parts that may or may not
fix a problem. Fortunately, the occurrence of problems like that have been relatively rare in the past.
The rate at which we have seen GPS reception failures since our compliance with RTCA DO-260B has been very
large by comparison. We see numerous random one-off events that cannot be duplicated on the ground, are not
traceable to a failure, and that never repeat again.
We have found issues with beacon light systems on at least three fleets: some are chronic, some just the occasional
LRU failure. Our Maintenance department now knows to check the beacon when the GPS problem can be
duplicated on the ground. On at least one aircraft, we struggled trying to correlate ACARS and SATCOM message
irregularities in flight with inflight GPS failures with inconclusive results.
We are also aware of two cases where GPS signals in certain geographic regions are prone to interruptions, owing
to a political situation on the ground. There was a locally published NOTAM in one case.
Across the various aircraft model types operated in the FedEx fleet, identification of the source of the GPS signal
disruptions has been a challenge.
Questions:
1. What are other operator experiences with aircraft RFI/EMI and GNS receivers? What measures have they
taken and what resources have they found for systematic troubleshooting?
2. What are operator experiences regarding regional jamming of GNS signals? What measures have been
taken and what resources have they found?
Other operator and supplier comments, please.

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
161 AMC MMR Thales Airbus UAL
The ILS and the GPS SRUs for the MMR are not repairable on a consistent basis by the OEM and getting
replacement cards can take 180 to 240-day lead time. The lack of available SRU spare market appear to show that
the OEM did not account for SRU failure rate in the LRUs. This has driven an increased cost in attaining serviceable
SRUs and LRUs to sustain the current fleet.
Thales, please comment.
162 AMC Abnormal 822-2532-100 / 3G Collins Aerospace B777-300ER 34 EVA

Navigation
Systems
B777F
EVA has one B777 Freighter experiencing a repeat Fault “GPS L” and “GPS R” advisory messages during cruise
since airplane delivery from Boeing in December 2018. These messages are displayed between TPE to ANC or
ANC to TPE only. This airplane has installed new Rockwell Collins 3G MMR P/N 822-2532-100; the other three
B777 Freighters installed Rockwell Collins MMR P/N 822-1821-002. However, other EVA B777Fs on the same day
and route do not exhibit this same fault.
EVA performed the MMR and EGPWC tests and passed. EVA has swapped LH MMR to center MMR and followed
Boeing’s recommendation to inspect MMR connectors: all conditions checked off normal. According to EVA pilot
voyage report, during flight on NOPAC, the “GPS R” and “ADS-B OUT R” are displayed. The “GPS R” and “GPS L”
message disappeared after approximately 35 minutes. So far, EVA cannot fix this problem.
Operators, Boeing, and Collins Aerospace comments please.
163 AMC Confused Test Embraer E-Jet 195 34 AZU

E-Jet 190
During accomplishment of task E19X-34-52-720-801A, there appears two options of GSE (IFR601 and IFR6000)
and also two options of test (over the air and direct cable connection), but there is no separation of the instructions
for one specific GSE. In other words, there is no separation for instructions using each GSE.
Therefore, the technician must read all existent instructions and waste time that should be optimized.
Embraer was contacted and as they consider this subject an improvement and demand a considerable amount of
time. They have declined to correct the task and therefore, the operator will continue to waste time accomplishing it.
Embraer and other operators, comments, please.

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
Associate
Airline
164 AMC Electronic Clock 2620-02-1 Ontic B777 31 AFR/KLM AFR
Air France needs to apply the SB 2620-31-298 on Clock 2620-02-1. Air France has requested the part kit
PN: 2620-31-298 since April 2018 to ONTIC at new.po@ontic.com. As of today, we have no answers after few
reminders.
Air France requests the supplying of the part to apply the SB.
Ontic, other operator comments, please.
Associate
Airline
165 AMC Electronic Clock GMT4150-1 Cobham Embraer 31 AFR/KLM AFR
Three amendments are applicable on clock GMT4150-1: A, B, C. But these amendments are not specified in any
available document for the airline (as SB, SIL, CMM…).
Cobham said that amendments are archived in “FEE aircraft airframer’s”:

• GMT4150 amendment A  GMT4150-1 amendment A: FEE airframer 247F/DT/90: motor replaced.
• GMT4150-1 amendment A  GMT4150-1 amendment B: FEE airframer 279F/FA/95: EPROM changed
and modification of fixation pcb display.
• GMT4150-1 amendment B  GMT4150-1 amendment C: FEE airframer 363A/DT/00: add TAG «barcode».
Please, could Cobham clarify what “FEE” means?
Air France requests a SB to verify and apply the modification in relation to amendments A, B, and C.
Other operator and Cobham comments, please.

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
166 AMC Honeywell TCAS TPA-100B TCAS PN Honeywell A32X 34 ETD

Poor Reliability 940-0351-005
Airbus A330
In 2018, Etihad A32X and A330 fleets have experienced the removal of 21 units of Honeywell TCAS PN
940-0351-005, see Table 1.
Table 1: Etihad A32X and A330 TCAS Removals
On the one side, after shop report analysis, it was confirmed that approximately nine of the removed units resulted in
NFF (43%).
On the other side, there is only one TCAS computer installed on the aircraft and Etihad has suffered several cases
of Air Turn Back (ATB) due to TCAS faults experienced in flight, as ATC does not allow airlines to continue the flight
when crews report an inflight TCAS failure. For that reason, maintenance personnel are instructed to replace the
TCAS if the fault occurs during pushback in order to mitigate the risk of an ATB.
Etihad completed the upgrade of TCAS computer from PN 940-0351-001 to PN 940-0351-005 during 2017. Since
this upgrade was completed, Etihad’s fleet has experienced an increased number of messages “NO DATA FROM
TCAS” as stated both in Airbus FAIR 17.0209 and AMC Discussion Item 18-098. We have also experienced an
increase in TCAS PN 940-0351-005 removals in comparison to previous years when PN 940-0351-001 was in
operation.
Questions to Airbus and Honeywell:

1. Is there decreased reliability on TCAS PN 940-0351-005 in comparison to TCAS PN 940-0351-001?
2. If so, what are the results of ongoing investigations?
3. If so, why was this not found during the in-service trial installation or avoided before TCAS PN
940-0351-005 was released into operation?

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
******18-097******
AMC Certification of TCAS PN 940-0351-005 Boeing B777 34 ETD

940-0351-005 on Boeing Fleet
Fleet
Etihad A32X/330/340 and B777 fleets were equipped with Honeywell TCAS P/N 940-0351-001.
In May 2017, EASA released AD 2017-0091 due to false TCAS traffic alerts making mandatory the upgrade of
Honeywell TCAS from P/N 940-0351-001 to P/N 940-0351-005 only on Airbus fleets. Apparently, the problem
suffered by TCAS P/N 940-0351-001 was only affecting the Airbus fleet and not the Boeing fleet due to the different
way the GPS signal is feed into the TCAS on both platforms.
As Etihad operates both Airbus and Boeing fleets, it meant that Airbus fleet needed to be upgraded to P/N 940-
0351-005 while Boeing fleet remained at P/N 940-0351-001. From the logistics point of view this creates a costly
spare segregation (P/N 940-0351-005 for Airbus and P/N 940-0351-001 for Boeing) that was not there before the
mandate.
For this reason, Etihad contacted Boeing thru message ETI-ETI-17-0284-02B in order to hope for Boeing to certify
P/N 940-0351-005 on B777 fleet and again reach the lost commonality on the TCAS computer, but Boeing replied
that there is no intention to do so.
Why Boeing does not certify P/N 940-0351-005 on B777 fleet?
Other operator’s comments and experience in case of being affected, please.

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
******18-084******
AMC FAA ADS-B OUT DO-260B Honeywell iMMR Boeing All 34 ETD
Mandate, Exemption 12555 and Fleets
Compliance with 14 CFR91.227
Airbus PN 69002602-0101 Airbus
Boeing PN 69002600-0101 Honeywell
Rockwell Collins GLU-2100 Rockwell
Collins
Airbus PN 822-2532-300
Boeing PN 822-2532-100
The January 1, 2020 US/FAA mandate for ADS-B OUT (DO-260B) is more stringent than the EASA equivalent in
terms of expected position source availability through 14 CFR 91.227, which theoretically encompasses SBAS
capability on the MMR. Etihad, along with many other operators, have applied for Exemption No. 12555 in order to
obtain additional five-year period to comply with the accuracy requirements requested by the FAA.
By August 1, 2018, the operators that applied for the exemption are supposed to submit to the FAA a complete plan
specifying the affected aircrafts, MMR manufacturer, PN and Service Bulletin, along with the planned embodiment
dates (refer to Figure 1). According to the latest communications exchanged with the vendors these are their
expected products and certification dates for the FAA compliant MMR:
* Honeywell iMMR:
Airbus PN 69002602-0101: Expected certification September 2018/EIS Q2 2019.
Boeing PN 69002600-0101: B737MAX certified/Expected certification on remaining platforms on end 2017.
* Rockwell Collins GLU-2100:

Airbus PN 822-2532-300: Expected certification A32X mid 2019/A330 and 380 under discussion/A350 compliant.
Boeing PN 822-2532-100: Expected certification B737MAX Q1 2018/B777X in 2020 and after on B777.
Figure 1: Screenshot from the FAA exemption upgrade plan
The fact of operators being forced to submit a complete plan by August 2018 on an equipment that will only be
certified on a later date is extremely challenging as we have to blindly select an equipment without actual reliability
data or known issues in its operation.
Questions:
1. Can Airbus and Boeing provide a detailed list of the required upgrades to comply with the FAA mandate for
each of their fleets?
2. Can vendors (Honeywell, Rockwell Collins, etc.) provide their inputs in regards to their qualified equipment
(MMR) and updated certification dates on each aircraft platform?
Operators comments please.

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
167 AMC ADS-B Out Mod Kits N/A Airbus A320 34-52 THY
A330
THY and Airbus are working closely for the in-time embodiment of ADS-B Out DO-260B; however, we are struggling
to obtain the modification kits from Airbus. They are providing very long lead-times for the kits (more than one year)
and they cannot achieve the lead times that we agreed to before. Some of our kit deliveries are postponed around
one year from the date that provided in the commercial offer.
It is obvious that all airlines in the world are requesting kits, which may affect kit procurement adversely and this is
understandable; however, this is not a desirable modification. Delayed kit deliveries and longer lead times causes
airlines to miss their heavy checks, which will cause them to ground their aircraft before mandate deadline just for
this modification.
Airbus has informed us that kit procurement will be improved but we are not sure if this will help to catch the
mandate deadline.
What is Airbus’s plan to support airlines in order to catch ADS-B Out Mandate (especially the FAA mandate)?
Other operators, Airbus comments, please.
168 AMC ADM C1700DA01 / ADM Thales B737 31 KAL

WHCU 733888-1-1 / WHCU Zodiac B748 30
EGPWC 965-0976-003-230-230 Honeywell B777 34
EGPWC 965-0976-003-232-232 Honeywell B737 34
TCAS Computer 9003500-10905 ACSS & L3 Comm B777 34
TCAS Computer 940-0351-001 Honeywell B737 34
KAL has experienced many cases of NFF regarding above avionics computer components. KAL requested
Thales, Zodiac, Honeywell, and ACSS to find a solution against the NFF issue, respectively.
Whenever KAL returns the core unit to each of the above vendor shops, we request the detailed investigation for
isolation of NFF condition. Ultimately, as KAL line maintenance staff worked the troubleshooting in aircrafts, they
have done proper performance of corrective action for troubleshooting on-wing as per FIM or TSM. However,
those replaced core units have occurred frequent and high rates of NFF.
KAL has continued monitoring NFF components returned to vendor. But there is certain limitation about resolution
of NFF. KAL needs an ultimate solution for reducing high rate NFF of those components.
Supplier and operator comments, please.

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
169 AMC Loss of Mode S/Poor 822-2120-102 Collins B787-9 34-42 VIR
Performance Reported by ATC Aerospace
Boeing
VAA has received several reports by different ATC agencies of loss of mode S/poor Mode S performance on its
B789 fleet.
So far VAA has replaced six ISSPUs [All NFF] and one Bottom Mode S/TCAS antenna for this issue.
The ongoing investigation with Boeing/Collins Aerospace is taking considerable time and effort to support.
1. Have any other operators had similar events?

2. What findings/defects have other operators confirmed?
3. Please can Boeing/Collins Aerospace provide the latest update on their investigation and the next planned
steps?
Title Associate
Airline
170 AMC TTR-921 822-1293-332 Rockwell A320 Fam 34 AFR/KLM AFR

Collins
Air France currently operates 119 aircrafts equipped with unit P/N 822-1293-332. The GMTBUR for the unit is 7000
hours. In the last 12 months, 50 units have been removed. This unit has caused 10 delays on Airbus fleet.
The current A320 family MTBUR on our fleet is 6480 H.
Questions:
1. Are other operators seeing similar low MTBUR on TCAS TTR-921?
2. Is the OEM currently working on a solution to this issue?
Operator and Collins Aerospace comments, please.

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
171 AMC Degradation of 174101-02-01 GE Aviation B787-800 34 JAL

MCDU Keypad
174101-03-01
174101-02-02
174101-02-03
This item is the continuation from the last AMC 17-103 and 104.
For the wear resistance improvement of existing rubber type keypads, JAL has been exchanging to the hard type
keypads since last year, and the numbers have been reached to 12 of the units. The conditions of keypads are
going well as expected at this time.
However, still the hard type keypads have only been assigned for 174101-02-01.
JAL understands GE Aviation is in the process of expanding target units and will be released the SB for PN:
1741010-03-01, 174101-02-02 and 174101-02-03. JAL is awaiting the SB to be released and would like to hear
about its target date.
Comments from GE Aviation would be appreciated.
Title Associate
Airline
172 AMC ISSPU 822-2120-102 Collins B787 34-42 AFR/KLM KLM

Test Decal Aerospace
Collins Aerospace places a Test Date Marking Plate (Test Label) on ISS-2100 repaired units (ISSPU). Refer to
lower decal in picture attached. The maintenance regulations do not require to install the Test Label:
Component level maintenance:

• There is no Regulatory requirement to attach the Test Label to the unit (ref CMM); no shelf life (periodic
testing) required.
Aircraft level maintenance:

• The aircraft maintenance program is the leading document with respect to aircraft operations and
functional ISS system testing (24 CMON interval).
Conclusion: There are no requirements for Collins to install any Test Label on the ISSPU when serviced at the shop.
KLM E&M states that the Test Label confuses the aircraft ground engineer and Component Services employees.
Therefore, KLM has requested Collins to not install this Test Label after service. However, Collins continues to install
the Test Label for the following statements:
1. Collins Service Centers do not know the end user's Transponder Test requirements for aircraft certifications,
such as FAR 91.413, so they always attach the Test Date Label to all Transponders when they are
Serviced.
2. Customers are not required to meet any 24-month testing requirements can either ignore this label or
remove it.
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
KLM E&M can only create a process to ignore or remove the label when the statements are incorporated in the
CMM, and not based on suggestions or instructions per e-mail. Nevertheless, Collins is not willing to update the
CMM for this purpose.
Collins and other operator/MRO comments, please.
173 AMC B787 TAWS Update 822-2120-102 ISSPU Rockwell B787 34 UAL
Frequency Collins
Rockwell Collins has indicated that they will be updating the TAWS database for the B787 ISSPU at approximately
one-year intervals. The equivalent Honeywell Terrain Databases for the Honeywell EGPWS are currently being
issued on a 56-day cycle. Given the critical nature of the TAWS database on the B787 to provide crew alerts for
potential terrain, obstacle, and runway encounters, United is requesting that Rockwell-Collins issue updates to the
B787 TAWS database on a more frequent interval than annually, preferably at the same 56-day cycle as the
Honeywell databases. UAL would also like to know the views of other B787 operators on this issue.
Collins Aerospace, Boeing, and other operators please comment.

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
******17-096******
AMC Enhanced Prox 965-0976-003-232 Honeywell B737NG 34 SWA

Ground Computer
(EGPWC)
965-1690-055
SWA has seen a below average failure rate of the EGPWC over the last year and has been working with Honeywell
for a solution. Honeywell implemented Mod 1 which addressed some of the shutdown issues. They also
implemented an inspection for bad solder joints, especially on the A2 CCA.
Honeywell has been evaluating a new SB 965-0976/1690-34-0133 for CPU software modifications to help but has
yet to be released. It was scheduled for AUG 2016. Honeywell tells SWA maybe sometime in 2018. This is
unacceptable.
Are other operators experiencing below average failure, less than 25,000 flight hours on these part numbers?
What is Honeywell doing to get this software released?

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
174 AMC Cable Chafing and 7021450-801 / Honeywell E170 34 JAL

Metal Fatigue WU-880
E190
JAL has been experiencing numerous removals of Weather Radar Transceivers WU-880 which have been
damaged on the cable.
There are following problems during the scanning motion:

• Cable wear due to numerous touches of the cable with flat antenna or chassis. See Photo 1.
• Repetitive swing motion causes damage on the magnetron cable by the metal fatigue. See Photo 2, 3,
and 4.
Touched and Rubbed

Photo 1
Damage
Photo 2 Photo 3
Ground wire cut
Photo 4
At this time, JAL has experienced 13 ea. cases of damaged cable after the SB 7021450-34-19 Revision 3 (Dated 21
July 2017) was incorporated. Therefore, it is certain that the issues are not solved by this SB. Further improvement
is needed.
Honeywell, please review the situation of post-SB Revision 3. Comments about next actions would be appreciated.

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
175 AMC DAA-4A Drive Unit 2041444-04XX Honeywell A320 34 ANA

Woodward MPC B767
(WMPC)
B777
Honeywell’s response to this drive unit motor's repair and overhaul issue is as follows at AMC 2018 in Dallas:
“Honeywell plans to create drawing, as well as update the two CMMs 31-09-81 (3001-81) and 31-09-82 (3001-82)
by the end of Q3 2018.”
ANA communicated with Honeywell periodically to confirm progress of drive motor CMM revision and Honeywell
informed ANA that Honeywell is not able to revise these CMM for the following reason: “Woodward-MPC is not
willing to support other entities in the repair and overhaul of these units, consequently Honeywell will not be able to
update the CMM with orderable parts as ANA has requested.”
On the other hand, ANA communicated with Woodward MPC about this issue and Woodward MPC's response is as
follows: “Woodward does not have PMA, or any license, so we cannot sell parts. In addition, we are restricted from
selling parts directly to airlines.”
ANA thinks that there are different opinions between Honeywell and Woodward MPC and Honeywell should take the
lead to solve this issue.
ANA believes that operator is able to perform drive motor’s repair and overhaul in accordance with DAA-4A CMM
and drive motor CMM.
Honeywell, please take the lead in resolving this issue and provide a solution to ANA.
Other operators, please comment if you are performing drive motor repair and overhaul by yourselves.
Honeywell, Woodward MPC (WMPC), and other operator comments, please.

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
******18-091******
AMC DAA-4A Drive Unit 2041444-04XX Honeywell A320 34 ANA

Woodward MPC B767
(WMPC)
B777
This issue has relationship with the past AMC discussion item 13-158.
Motor bearing replacement is required in DAA-4A Drive Unit CMM 34-41-11 and CMM 34-41-11 calls the following
CMM to replace motor bearing.
• CMM 31-09-81 for Elevation Drive motors P/N 360-0101-001 or -002
• CMM 31-09-82 for Azimuth Drive motors P/N 360-0102-001, -002 or -003
• CMM 31-09-85 for Azimuth Drive motor P/N 360-0104-001
ANA shop technicians are replacing drive motors at this moment to perform “preventative maintenance schedule for
more than 6,000 and 12,000 flight hours” in accordance with check section of CMM 34-41-11. ANA considers that
motor bearing replacement is a lower cost than drive motor replacement and is economical for shop maintenance.
ANA tried to establish maintenance capability of drive motors at ANA shop maintenance sections in 2013, but ANA
abandoned this plan due to a non-procurable screw (No. 0-80) P/N 431-0497-024. Replacement of Screw (No. 0-80)
P/N 431-0497-024 is required in CMM 31-09-81 and CMM 31-09-82, one at a time.
Honeywell informed operators that the required parts for performing overhaul are procured from Honeywell Global
Material Services (GMS) in AMC 2013.
ANA cannot accept this non-procurable parts issue and ANA considers Honeywell should provide an environment
where operators can purchase the required parts from Honeywell by Honeywell’s responsibility.
ANA is re-considering maintenance capability establishment of drive motors at ANA’s shop maintenance section at
this moment.
ANA strongly requests Honeywell to provide corrective action of this non-procurable parts issue.
Honeywell, Woodward MPC (WMPC), and other operator comments please.

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
176 AMC Weather Radar 930-2000-001 Honeywell A32X 34 ETD

Repairs
Transmitter-
Receiver
A330
Etihad Airbus A32X and A330 fleets are equipped with the latest Honeywell Weather radar RDR-4000 system.
Over 2015, Etihad experienced several delays and faults on the fleet equipped with Honeywell Weather radar
RDR-4000. After communication with Airbus through TR 80029847, we got confirmation that the following VSBs
would solve the poor reliability issues suffered in the system:
• Embodiment of VSB 930-1005-34-2 (Software MOD 1) on Radar Processor PN 930-1005-001.

• Embodiment of VSB 930-2000-34-4 (Hardware MOD 30) on Transmitter Receiver PN 930-2000-001.
After campaigned embodiment of the above VSBs, the reliability of the Weather radar system improved and the
operational interruptions decreased during 2016 and 2017; the reliability of the Weather radar RDR-4000 decreased
again during 2018 and the operational interruptions and inoperative Wx radars increased (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Etihad A32X Wx Radar RP and TR Removals in 2018
Unfortunately, during embodiment of VSB 930-2000-34-4 (Hardware MOD 30) on Transmitter Receiver
PN 930-2000-001, Etihad suffered the following issues. VSB 930-2000-34-4 (Hardware MOD 30) installs a diode on
the Synthesizer CCA in order to avoid momentary power switching. If the Synthesizer CCA is found faulty during the
incoming ATP test, the diode cannot be installed and the whole Synthesizer CCA has to be replaced by a new one
through embodiment of VSB 930-2000-34-5 (MOD 29 (includes MOD 28 and MOD 30)).
Embodiment of VSB 930-2000-34-4 (Hardware MOD 30) costs “X” USD, while embodiment of VSB 930-2000-34-5
(MOD 29 (includes MOD 28 and MOD 30)) costs 22 times more than “X” USD.
The following list of Etihad Transmitter Receiver PN 930-2000-001 units were sent to Honeywell for VSB
930-2000-34-4 embodiment exclusively, but Honeywell decided to embody VSB 930-2000-34-5 by replacing the
whole Synthesizer CCA at a higher cost under the following shop report reasons:
• SN TR01838: Regarding fault log, replaced defective Synthesizer module.

• SN TR01373: Found 64MHz out of limits.
• SN TR01376: 64MHz out of limits after 30 min operation.
• SN TR01542: Many faults recorded and confirmed at test bench.
• SN TR01673: 64MHz below tolerance after 30 min operation.
• SN TR01775: Unit Failed during incoming ATP.
• SN TR01808: Regarding fault log, replaced also synthesizer module.
Questions to Honeywell:
1. Etihad A32X and A330 fleets completed the Honeywell Wx radar RDR-4000 retrofit in 2014. The system
was supposed to be the latest and most advanced Honeywell Wx radar system; nonetheless, this system
has been a source of problems, shown poor reliability, and has been hard to troubleshoot since retrofit.
What are Honeywell’s plans to improve the RDR-4000 overall reliability?
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
2. Etihad has demanded Honeywell provide the incoming ATP test results of the above units in order to see
the specific chapter in which the unit failed the incoming test. Honeywell has declined to provide these ATP
results. Why?
3. According to Honeywell: In some cases based on Fault memory fault logs, this even if unit wouldn’t fail the
ATP. We would rather make a pro-active repair than take the risk in case a return NFF to have an early
removal (that could have operational impact).
Etihad disagrees with this approach, as the removed Transmitter Receivers were removed serviceable and
sent to Honeywell’s shop exclusively for VSB 930-2000-34-4 (Hardware MOD 30) embodiment. The above
statement does not technically justify at all that the VSB (diode installation) could not be accomplished.
4. Honeywell’s shop report contains a “disposition” section that shall state the removed and installed
subassemblies’ PN and SN. In none of the abovementioned Honeywell shop reports are the removed and
installed Synthesizer CCA PN and SN stated, which shows a clear lack of quality standards in Honeywell’s
shop reports.
Operators’ feedback please.
177 AMC Weather Radar 2041444-04XX Honeywell B737 34 ARG

Antenna
A330
We are re-issuing the item 90 from the 2018 AMC since we never received a formal answer.
Here at Aerolineas Argentinas, we are having a problem with the referenced unit (weather radar antenna).
For at least three years, we have been waiting for Honeywell to inform us when they will have a training course
available for the maintenance of that unit.
This will allow ARG to put this LRU in REP condition instead of B/C in our capability list.
Other operator, Airbus, Boeing comments please.

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
178 AMC WXR Transceiver 822-1710-002 Collins Aerospace B777 34 ANA

(WRT-2100)
Boeing
Boeing proposed wiring change for B777 single installation of Collins Aerospace WXR concerning TERRAIN/WXR
relays at AMC 2018 in Dallas. ANA performed jumper wire implementation at TERRAIN/WXR relays and monitored
whether weather nuisance message will be reduced or not but it was unsuccessful. Jumper wire implementation at
TERRAIN/WXR relays could not reduce weather nuisance message.
On the other hand, ANA found that Boeing has created FTD 777-FTD-34-18005 concerning weather nuisance
message. FTD 777-FTD-34-18005 mentions the following contents: “Supplier Rockwell Collins has identified the root
cause and is performing regression testing on the proposed solution to address this nuisance fault.”
ANA asked Collins Aerospace whether this FTD is for the single weather installation or not and ANA understood that
this FTD is for the dual weather installation from Collins Aerospace’s response.
Currently Boeing, Collins Aerospace, and ANA are searching the next additional leads.
Boeing, is there the other possible cause of this weather nuisance message at aircraft side? Please provide the
corrective action for this issue.
Boeing, Collins Aerospace and other operator comments, please.

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
******18-088******
AMC WXR Transceiver 822-1710-002 Rockwell Collins B777 34 ANA

(WRT-2100)
Boeing
Rockwell Collins performed the single installation weather radar system design review at Rockwell Collins laboratory
by Boeing support but unfortunately, it was unsuccessful. Rockwell Collins suspects that the higher number of
nuisance fault message is related to the configuration of the single weather radar system and ANA agrees with
Rockwell Collins’ opinion because WRT-2100 single installation is showing many more nuisance messages than
WRT-2100 dual installation. ANA strongly thinks this is an airplane system design issue.
The current situation is that Boeing is requesting ANA to perform the flight crew survey to search for additional leads.
ANA already performed the flight crew survey in past and provided data of the flight crew survey result for Boeing
and Rockwell Collins.
ANA appreciates the support of Boeing and Rockwell Collins to identify a root cause of the higher number of
nuisance fault message but progress is not so good.
ANA strongly requests Boeing to conduct ANA and Rockwell Collins to next leads to identify a root cause and find a
solution.
For further action, ANA would like to raise the following inquiries:
1. What is possible root cause of higher number of nuisance fault message?
2. What kind of data do Boeing and Rockwell Collins need to identify root cause?
Boeing, Rockwell Collins and other operator comments please.
179 AMC False Predictive Winds 822-2259-002 Collins A220 34 DAL

Weather Radar Aerospace
Delta Air Lines is currently receiving multiple Predictive Windshear (PWS) Alerts for the A220. Delta's procedures
require a crew to immediately accomplish a go‐around maneuver if a windshear alert occurs during an approach.
These alerts are determined to be nuisance messages; however, Delta flight crew cannot evaluate possible false
PWS alerts and then determine if the approach can safely be continued. If the go‐around maneuver is consistently
applied as trained, these false PWS alerts will impact our operation in high traffic airports.
1. Are other operators experiencing a high rate of Predictive Windshear Alerts?

2. What is Collins Aerospace's timeline for a fix to the Weather Radar?
3. Will Delta have to send P/N 822‐2259‐002 out for upgrade? If so, what is the expected turn time?
4. When will the production cut‐in be for the upgraded unit?
Collins, airframer, and other operator comments, please.

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
Associate
Airline
180 AMC WRT-2100 822-1710-4XX Rockwell Various 34 AFR/KLM AFR

Collins
822-1710-3XX
A manual performance test procedure is described in CMM 34-40-58 “SUBTASK 34-40-58-700-007-A01 G. Final
Performance Test Procedure”. The UUT MPN 822-1710-4XX and -3XX does not react as described in the CMM due
to misunderstanding from our part or false information in the CMM.
Some corrections have been done but unfortunately, the procedure is still not applicable. For example, the tests “4.6
three-Wire Analog Altitude Tests” to test “4.38 Faults Removed” do not work properly.
Could Rockwell-Collins rewrite a correct manual performance test procedure?
Other operator and Rockwell Collins comments, please.
181 AMC WXR Radar Antenna 622-5137-601 Collins Aerospace B787-9 34-42 VIR
Flat Plat Corrosion
VAA has recently had to replace a Weather Radar Antenna flat plate due to excessive corrosion after three years’
service.
This is a high cost item.
1. Have any other operators had similar experiences?

2. Is there any corrosion protection process that Collins recommends?
3. Why does warranty not cover this?

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
182 AMC Radar Drive Assembly 822-2131-003 Collins B787 34 ANA

(DRV-2120) Aerospace
As result of discussion with Collins Aerospace concerning DRV-2120 failure after AMC 2018 in Dallas, ANA
understood that encoder disk failure has intensive tendency.
There are two issue of defacement and scratch concerning encoder disk failure.
Defacement: Scratch:
Collins Aerospace performed the best practice at all Collins Aerospace service center to avoid scratch of encoder
disk when assembly. Collins Aerospace completed implementation of the best practice at all Collins Aerospace
service center March 2018.
ANA feels that the number of cases of scratch of encoder disk is reduced, but ANA still has experienced defacement
of encoder disk after performing the best practice at all Collins Aerospace service centers.
ANA already informed Collins Aerospace of this issue that defacement of encoder disk still exists, and ANA thinks
defacement of encoder disk happens due to intense temperature change because the encoder disk repeatedly
suffers tough conditions.
Currently, Collins Aerospace is performing the failure trend analysis of encoder failure.
1. Please provide a timeline of encoder disk failure to have corrective action.
2. Did Collins Aerospace already complete the failure trend analysis of encoder failure?
3. What is root cause of encoder disk failure?

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
******18-108******
AMC Radar Drive Assembly 822-2131-002 Rockwell B787 34 ANA

(DRV-2120) Collins
822-2131-003
ANA is performing SB DRV-2120-34-502 actively to reduce flight delay, ATB (Air Turn Back) and RTO (Rejected
Take Off). But unfortunately, ANA has experienced unscheduled DRV-2120 P/N 822-2131-003 removal with short
time usage after modification as follows.
S/N TSO (Hr) TSN (Hr) Fault Code Defective Parts

4NVDV 1112.41 4204.39 5102 Encoder Flex Circuit Card A3
4FPTN 1928.1 18319.6 5102, 5106 Tilt encoder disk (Preventative maintenance)
47X3P 1075.25 14626.2 5102, 5106 Elevation cable assy
3WLNB 23.48 12690.2 5108 Encoder Flex Circuit Card A3
Also, ANA has experienced some unscheduled removals of DRV-2120 P/N 822-2131-003 which is installed in
delivered aircraft as follows:
S/N TSO (Hr) TSN (Hr) Fault Code Defective Parts

4RPGT 4266.05 4266.05 5101, 5108 Tilt encoder disk
4PPF9 4483.03 4483.03 5101, 5103 Driver interconnect circuit card A1
5104, 5106, Tilt encoder disk and Encoder Flex Circuit
4RPLX 5205.58 5205.58
5108 Card A3 (Preventative maintenance)
ANA feels that removal of DRV-2120 is increasing after performing SB DRV-2120-34-502. Therefore, ANA suspects
regarding whether reliability of DRV-2120 P/N 822-2131-003 is improved or not by performing SB
DRV-2120-34-502.
From contents mentioned above, ANA would like to raise the following inquiries.
1. Please provide reliability data of DRV-2120 P/N 822-2131-003.
2. Please provide Rockwell Collins’ opinion regarding whether reliability of DRV-2120 can be improved or not
by performing SB DRV-2120-34-502.
3. What is the root cause of the following parts failure?
a. Tilt encoder disk, Driver interconnect circuit card A1, and Encoder Flex Circuit Card A3
Rockwell Collins and other operator comments please.

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
183 AMC Receiver Transmitter 822-2127-002, -003 Collins B787 34 ANA

Module (RTM-2100) Aerospace
ANA has experienced that line mechanic and shop technicians are not able to install operational software to
RTM-2100. There are 158 cases of RTM-2100 removal and 20 cases are the issue that software cannot be
installed. Data period is from April 1,2016 through November 5,2018.
ANA understood that there are two defective points of the issue that software cannot be installed:
1. Digital Receiver (A3) assy defective
2. A3U13 dry-joint
Failure rate is approximately 12.7% and ANA thinks that it is a little high.
ANA already informed Collins Aerospace of this issue and Collins Aerospace is performing RTM-2100 A3
investigation.
ANA understood that A3 assy has the following issue from Collins Aerospace investigation report:
1. The majority of the confirmed failures were related to insufficient/cracked solder joint on the A3U13 PHY
leads.
2. The other sources of failure were A3U20 optical transceiver, A3 Fiber Optic Cable, A3 U11 RAM, and A3
Data Bus AC terminator thermal failure.
Currently, Collins Aerospace is performing further analysis of this issue and ANA is waiting Collins Aerospace’s
response to take corrective action of the issue that software cannot be installed.
Other operators, please comment if you have experienced the same issue as ANA.
Collins Aerospace, please provide detailed timeline of this failure to take corrective action.
******17-099******
AMC Flight Management 176200-01-01 GE Aviation B737-300 34-61 EXS

Computer Systems
B737NG
Both FMC CDU blank in flight resulting in a loss of map data and VTK flags appearing on PFDs. Autothrottle, LNAV,
and VNAV disengage with some reports of autopilot entering CWS PITCH & CWS ROLL modes, and then the
FMCs restore after circa 40 seconds with no loss of data. Issue appears to be more prevalent with FMC OPC
U10.8A; however, Jet2.com has seen issues on U12.
Jet2.com is aware other operators are experiencing this phenomenon and do not believe the root cause of this is
‘atmospheric radiation’ as previously cited.
GE Aviation and other operator comments, please.

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
******18-094******
AMC FMC CDU Blanking 176200-01-01 GE Aviation Systems B737-300 34-61 EXS
B737NG
Raised at 2017 AMC, Both FMC CDU blank in flight, resulting in a loss of map data and VTK flags appearing on
PFDs. Autothrottle, LNAV, and VNAV disengage with some reports of autopilot entering CWS PITCH & CWS ROLL
modes, and then the FMCs restore after circa 40 seconds with no loss of data. There is a significant increase in
crew workload and causes an array of problems for the Jet2.com operation.
Jet2.com, Boeing, and GE have been communication, and we were advised: “GE Aviation continues to perform
extended burn in testing of the SRAM device that is less susceptible to atmospheric radiation. This testing is planned
to be conducted over the next two months. To date, all testing conducted has been successful. At the end of the
testing, Boeing will advise accordingly. We anticipate the testing will be completed by the end of February next year
(2018).”
Jet2.com would like an update on the process and proposed fix for operators suffering the same in-service issues.
GE Aviation, Boeing, and other operator comments, please.
184 AMC ATLAS Documentation C16221K Thales B737NG 34 ARG

C16786E
We are re-issuing the item 102 from the 2018 AMC since we never received a formal answer.
Thales does not provide ATLAS documentation for the reference B737NG units.
Please see the answers given:
*** QUOTE ***

We are sorry to inform you that we will not create a subscription to this document as Aerolineas Argentinas does
not have repair capabilities for this equipment
&
We are unfortunately unable to meet your request for this subscription as the document requested contains
proprietary information only useful to repair centers.
*** END OF QUOTE ***
As per our understanding it is a recursive argument (the chicken or the egg dilemma) because if we do not get the
technical documentation, we cannot evaluate if we may be able to process those units.
Other operator, Boeing comments please?

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
******18-114******
AMC Defective Capacitors 174101-01-02 – LCD CDU GE Boeing 34 THY

Aviation
On subject unit, while cleaning the LRU, technician saw that LCD CDU BACKLIGHT ASSEMBLY (A2) PN:
174143−01−02 had defective capacitors. Please see the pictures below:
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
Although these capacitors were burned/damaged, the ATEC Series 6 test passed. We already forwarded this case
to GE Aviation during previous AMCs, but it was probably forgotten.
In order to get attention from the other MROs, we are asking this question.
GE Aviation and operator comments please!

LANDING GEAR
*****18-194*****
Associate
Airline
AMC BTMU Short Runners 4305740091 Safran A330 32-47 SR ETD

Technics
SWR
AEA
PAL
VOZ
FIN
LNI
SR Technics pool is experiencing high number of poor performers with P/N 4305740091.
In last 12 months, 6 out of 16 removals occurred after less than 100 FH or 50CY since last shop visit. SR
Technics’ pool units are maintained by Safran.
• S/N 4045 (TSN 27980 FH): Unit was previously removed and sleeves of P1 and P2 were found defective.
After 65 FH in operation, this S/N failed again. Shop confirmed that Sleeve of Screening was found
debonded.
After 100 FH in operation, unit failed. Shop confirmed that the temperatures simulated at 0 °C, 300 °C,
700 °C, 1000 °C of connector P2 were out of tolerance. Unit not repairable to be scrapped.
Unit was installed and removed again after 7 days installed. Shop confirmed NFF. Unit was installed
again on different a/c and failed after 106 FH and tested NFF.
• S/N 1091 (TSN unknown): Previously, unit had contacts replaced by (Air France shop). After 430 FH unit
had erratic output voltage on N1 channel at low temperature. Unit non-repairable.
• S/N 0707 (TSN 42915 FH): Unit had been previously tested NFF. After 211 FH, unit was removed again.
Unit again tested NFF.
Question 1: What is the worldwide experience with short runners?
Performance of P/N 4305740091 is high (MTBUR > 60,000 FH); however, it is observed that the performance of
old units after first shop visit drastically decreases. First removal usually occurs above 35,000 FH and after 1st
shop visit, units start causing short runner events.
Question 2.1: Having a look at S/N 4045, 0742, and 1091 performances, can last events be associated to poor
maintenance during previous shop visit?
Question 2.2: Having a look at S/N 0302 and 0707 performances and considering that both units have
accumulated more than 40,000 FH, how confident is Safran with the NFFs?
SR Technics Pool NFF is currently 31%.
Question 3.1: What is the worldwide NFF figure?
Question 3.2: What is the MTBF of units tested NFF?
Question 4: What does Safran propose to tackle aging effect and avoid short runners?
Question 5: What is the experience of other airlines and MROs?
Safran and other airframer, supplier, and operator comments, please.

LANDING GEAR
185 MMC A330 ESG 201490001 RMLG Airbus A330 32-10 DAL
20149002 LMLG Safran
Delta is seeking to extend the life of its A330 fleets beyond Design Service Goal (DSG) to Extended Service Goal
(ESG). The airframe life will be extended to 126K FH (A330-300) and 130K FH (A330-200). The life limits for
some parts of the Growth MLG (installed on Delta’s first 20 A330 AC) are less than the ESG of the airframe. In
order to reach ESG with the airframe, a significant amount of MLG parts need to be replaced at a high cost.
What are other operators of A330s with Growth MLG doing as the AC reach the DSG?
Who is choosing to extend to ESG?
If extending to ESG, are other operators buying new gear parts for the ones that are expiring prior to ESG?
What are Airbus and their supplier, Safran LS, doing to help operators reduce the cost of replacing these parts?
Airbus, Safran, and other operator comments, please.
186 MMC Piston Rod Anti 201590908 Safran A319 32 THY

Rotation Tab
A320
A321
After ten years of overhaul period of landing gear, MLG Retraction Actuator – Pistons PN: 201590908 are found
worn at the anti-rotation tab surface very often. Since there is no repair scheme on the CMM 32-31-86, Safran
Landing Systems suggest applying for a repair concession and then propose using approved repair scheme (65-
4517030-00), which requires tungsten carbide metal spray coating to the worn tabs. As the metal spray coating
thickness is limited, it is impossible to fully restore the tab dimension neither to the design dimension nor to the in-
service wear limit of the CMM.
In one of the repair concessions issued by the Safran (RC-GL-0090907), it is stated that “the resulting free play in
assembled condition is acceptable”.
If the final free play is acceptable for a dimension below in-service wear limit, Safran is requested to decrease the
CMM limit and add the repair scheme 65-4517030-00 to the CMM 32-31-86, as this is very frequent failure of the
piston.
Other operator and Safran comments please.

LANDING GEAR
187 MMC MLG Retraction 201590001 Safran A320 Fam 32 TAP

Actuator Piston Rod
Repair/Redesign
201590002 Cage: K0654
201590003
201590004
The PISTON ROD (P/N 114193601 or 201590908) is a life-limited part with the potential of 60,000 Flight Cycles.
The rod end of this part has four anti-roll pegs (identified as dimension “K” refer to CMM 32-31-86 Rev. 35, Fits
and Clearances – Figure 801) used as rotation limiter of the piston rod when installed.
TAP Portugal has experienced a considerable number of early scrapped piston rod subassy due to the wear of
the anti-roll pegs (maximum allowable clearance = 1mm), given that no repair is described in CMM.
Considering piston rod is a non-procurable part and the significant price of the subassy (unit price 2019 =
10,925,79 USD), TAP Portugal would like to know:
1. Are other operators experiencing similar issues?
2. Is the OEM currently working on any repair to this reported problem or, alternatively, a new design of the
piston rod with reinforced anti-roll pegs?
OEM and other operator comments, please.
Title Associate
Airline
188 MMC Lockstay 10-452701-000 Safran A320NEO 32 AFR/KLM AFR

Actuator
AFR/KLM observed some lack of information in A320NEO CMM component in the repair chapters. Several repair
procedures available in the CMMs of A320NEO are no longer available in the CMMs of A320NEO components.
For example:
A320NEO Cylinder in CMM 32-11-21 is repairable with refurbishing available for holes; oversize bushes are
allowed, and those repairs are no longer available in CMM 32-31-05 for A320NEO.
AFR/KLM requests a revision of A320NEO CMMs to introduce those repairs again, such as example above.
Airbus, other operator comments please.

LANDING GEAR
189 MMC LLP Documentation Safran Airbus 32 LHT
In the aftersales market, P/Ns listed in the ALS as a Life Limited Part (LLP) are not procurable. You can only buy
the Assy P/N.
Often, only the bare P/N (LLP P/N) and S/N are engraved on the part and the assy P/N and S/N is missing or is
written down on the part with an EDDING.
Non-engraved information is not Skydrol resistant and can be lost.
On the Form 1, only the Assy P/N is stated.
Therefore, a traceability of the LLP P/N is not given in this case because there is no link between LLP P/N and
Assy P/N. This information is missing on the Form One (see figure).
Do other operators or MROs have the same problems during the buildup of an MTS (Movement Traceability
Sheet)?
Can Safran write down the not-procurable bare P/N (LLP P/N) and S/N in field 12 of the From One of the NHA?
Alternatively, LHT would accept the engraving of both LLP P/N and assy P/N on the part.
bare P/N (LLP P/N)
assy P/N
Other operator, airframer, and Safran comments, please.

LANDING GEAR
*****18-197*****
Associate
Airline
AMC Landing Gear 210TS07Y01 Airbus Airbus 32 AFR/KLM AFR

Control Lever
Two landing incidents on AFR Airbus A320 and A330 landing gear in 2013 led AFR-KLM to question the design of
the Landing Gear Control Lever by Zodiac. This problem has been evoked during AMC sessions in 2014 **Item
250** but led to no action despite reliability working group that was to take place mid-2014.
Zodiac stated the incriminated switch (S1) is found with a tension drop out of the reference test values, but the
relation between those out-of-tolerance values and the removals has not been clearly established. Zodiac agrees
with a redesign of the switch but is waiting for airframer’s approval. An Alert Control Review ACR-F320-2016-003
has been opened by Air France.
Has Airbus made progress on this subject?
Other operators, Airbus, Zodiac, comment please.
Title Associate
Airline
190 AMC Electrical D23119000 Safran Landing A320 Fam 32 AFR/KLM AFR
Box System
In 2017, AFR fleet has experienced three late departures incriminating Landing Gear Electric Box, later confirmed
in shop. Like every year, AFR-KLM is observing peak in removals during rainy periods. Placed on the landing
gear, the electrical box is subject to many water splashes. Its design should take this parameter into account.
Water stays trapped into the box. As a result, 85% of the failures are due to oxidation. GMTBUR (7940 FH) is
hardly met during rainy periods (8000 FH).
In 2018, this item was submitted and closed with the promise of Safran to take actions in the year. As of today,
Safran has not made or shared progress on the water ingress.
This item was submitted in 2011 by TAP Portugal, mentioning that the SB 580-32-3159 does not correct the
defect.
Other operators, airframers, OEMs comment please.

LANDING GEAR
Associate
Airline
191 MMC Flow Gain Limits E21384000-x Safran A380 32 LHT DLH
within Acceptance Landing
Test Procedures Systems
CMM Figure 1002 shows the acceptance criteria for the flow gain of the A380 BLG Steering Actuator Servovalve
(red limits). Acc. to Safran Landings Systems, the limits cross the x axis at ±0.16 mA (CSC ref. 161667 and
184326).
LHT measured several serviceable servo valves, but never achieved that these limits are met.
It is also remarkable that the limit does not connect the max. values in a linear way but narrows towards the x-axis
and widens towards the max. limits. LHT believes that the true limit should connect the max. limits in a linear way
and by this cross the x-axis at ±0.7 mA instead of ±0.16 mA.
LHT also contacted MOOG Aircraft Group as they seem to be the true OEM of the servo valve. LHT believes this
because one overhauled unit from MOOG was among the tested units that failed the flow gain criteria at LHT.
However, MOOG denied any comment on the case due to IP regulations between them and Safran.
Safran and MOOG, please comment. Other MROs, please share your experience on the unit if available.
192 AMC Mishandling on BTMU 35-1H5-1002 Thales A320 32-47-18 DLH
Thales has started to consider more and more damages to the BTMU, for example, to the connectors, as
mishandling, independent of the installation time of the component.
Due to the exposed position in the landing gear, this component is very prone to physical damages and due to the
environmental influences, also very prone to corrosion. This leads to a difficult removal of this component from the
aircraft, during which parts of the connectors may be damaged without improper customer handling.
Do other airlines have similar experiences?

LANDING GEAR
193 AMC MRO Capability, 321200M02 Lord (Fly A320 Fam 27-92-14 LHT
Repair Capability by Wire)
Speed Brake 321200-1M00 A330
Control
Transducer Unit
A340
Content:
Repair is no longer possible according to CMM 27-92-14, Revision 6, 15 November 2014, because all relevant parts
of the units have been deleted in the IPL. On most workshop events, e.g., the lever (1-310) must be replaced,
because its painting is worn, but the lever is no longer repairable or be replaced. External MRO of this unit is not
possible. Current revision of CMM is revision 8, 30 May 2017.
Question: What is the reason to withdraw detailed IPL in the CMM (retreat access to Level 3 Documentation)?
LHT requests Lord to disclose that information in further CMM revisions.
194 MMC 737-800/-900 Carbon 2-1740-1 Goodrich B737-900 32-41 DAL

Brake Reliability
Delta has been working with Boeing and Goodrich to improve the longevity on wing of the B737-900 carbon
brakes. We have also seen a number of instances of small brake fires.
Are other carriers struggling to see expected longevity out of this product? Are any carriers taking extraordinary
measures to control the temperature of the brakes in the operation such as increased block time, use of fans at
the gate, or retrofitting the aircraft with brake fans?
Boeing, Goodrich, and other operator comments, please.
Title Associate
Airline
195 MMC Crack on Tie 3-1540 UTC B777-200 32 AFR/KLM AFR

Bolt Hole Aerospace
Main Wheel Systems
Assembly
Goodrich
Regularly we find departures of cracks during eddy current inspection of the tie bolt hole on the outer half wheel.
Do the other airlines have this issue?
Is there a way to prevent these cracks that start mostly with corrosion points?
Airlines comments please.

LANDING GEAR
Title Associate
Airline
196 MMC Heat Shield 2615101-3 Honeywell A380 32 AFR/KLM AFR

Main Wheel
We often find cracks on the flange extensions on the heat shields (P/N 2616956). Could we have information
about the origin?
Despite the modification/repair, there is no improvement. That pushes us to replace often the heat shield.
What corrective actions could limit these cracks? Could you redesign the equipment to avoid this kind of issue?
OEM, airline comments please.
Associate
Airline
197 MMC Cold Temperature 74149 Parker B777 32 LHT DLH

Test Added by Latest
CMM Revision
CMM Revision No. 8 dated November 30, 2018, added a cold temperature test for the B777 Autobrake Module.
This test requires separate test setup including a temperature chamber, capable to cool down the fluid, and the
test unit to -15 to -25 °F (-26 to -32 °C).
LHT would like to know why this test was added about twenty years after the initial release of CMM 32-42-01.
LHT believes that this test should only be an option for troubleshooting under certain circumstances or for units
with intermittent failures which cannot be detected with standard test procedures.
Parker (UTAS) and other MROs please comment

LANDING GEAR
198 MMC NLG Door Manifold Fuse 71461-2 Eaton Aerospace A330 32 LHT
Cage Code 99643 A340
LHT frequently receives nose gear door fuse manifold assemblies from service with cracked manifolds
(PN: 47596-6).
Eaton is aware of this issue and is currently working with Airbus on a solution.
• Other MROs, is this known to you?

• Eaton and Airbus, please comment if those damages are considered damages due to normal operation or
abnormal wear and tear.
• Eaton and Airbus, please comment on the status of the development of the solution and provide
timeframe.
The location of the cracks can be seen in the following figure:
Eaton, Airbus, and other operator and MRO comments, please.

LANDING GEAR
199 MMC A330 vs. A350 – Main Tire Multiple Airbus A330-200/300 32 DAL
[SIZE AND PLY/LOAD
RATING COMMONALITY]
A330-900NEO
A330-900NEO HW
A350-900
DAL currently operates A330-200/300 and A350 aircraft. We are currently challenged by the common size of
main tires (1400x530R23) with the variations being the load/ply rating. This presents us with human factors
related issues.
The A330-200/300 aircraft are equipped with 36 ply tires. We also understand a heavy A330-900NEO [251T]
could potentially be using a 40-ply tire coupled with a higher gross weight wheel/ brake. The A350 tires are at 42
ply. All three tires are the same size (1400x530 on a 23” rim). We understand there are challenges to overcome in
order to couple a 42-ply tire downwards, but we are also challenged with human factors issues.
As our exposure to the Airbus wide body fleet increases, DAL is interested in driving tire/wheel/ brake
commonality as much as possible and address human factors challenges for the long term. Would it be possible
to review this at Airbus in collaboration with the wheel/ brake/tire OEMs and DAL/other operators?
Airbus, OEMs, and operator comments, please.
200 MMC A350 – Main Tire V3245005800000 Airbus A350-900 32 DAL

[Premature Shoulder Wear]
DAL has been monitoring main tire removal trends since EIS. We continue to see removals for tire shoulder wear
earlier than the expected LPT for our fleet. We have shared our experience with Airbus [REF: Airbus FAIR ATA
32: 17.0098 and DAL REQ# 80552822]. We have noted the wear is typically on the INBD shoulder.
• Wheel OEM – UTAS
• Tire OEM – Bridgestone (Typical cycles on tires evaluated – 135 to 173)
We are aware the issue is not specific to a tire supplier. We are also aware that Airbus intends to modify the angle
of MLG side stays. What is the plan of action at Airbus to expedite this to all impacted aircraft and is there a
timeline for resolution?
Airbus and other supplier and operator comments, please.

LANDING GEAR
Associate
Airline
201 MMC Standard Several, e.g., MOOG A300-600 27 LHT DLH

Practice Manual P376A0002 Aircraft
Not Available Group
In CMM 27-60-76, we found the reference to the MOG Standard Practice Manual (SPM) 20-00-00. On page “Intro
1,” the CMM states “Reference Publications MOOG Aircraft Group standard Practices Manual, 20-00-00”.
Unfortunately, LHT does not have this MOOG SPM in its documentation system.
The first reply from MOOG was that “SPM 20-00-00 is a MOOG standard practice manual and will not be
distributed.”
The former OEM of this unit P/N P376A0002 was Smiths Industries.
How can MOOG refer to a SPM without distributing this document?
LHT does have access to several other SPMs from other OEMs and considers this documentation necessary for
maintenance in order to follow procedures given in those SPMs.
MOOG, please comment on this issue.
Do other MROs have access to this SPM?

LANDING GEAR
******17-099******
MMC Nose Wheel Steering 1855A0000-06 Liebherr E190 3251 AAL

Control Module
Since entry into service at American Airlines, the Nose Wheel Steering Control Module (NSWCM) and its
associated steer fail fault have been a reliability issue. Upgrades over the years have provided a reduction in
steer fail faults as well as provided the ability to reset off gate (resets help move the aircraft, but are not the real
fix). While these upgrades have had a positive impact in delays and cancellations, the rate is still an issue at AAL
and other operators.
The chart above from Embraer highlights the increase in EJETS worldwide since February 2013 and the increase
in February 2015. Despite the improvements in the NWSCM software, AA and other operators are still
experiencing reliability issues.
What are the next steps for Embraer and Liebherr?
Are complex towing situations (PHL and DCA) the reason for increase in steer fails?
Embraer, Liebherr, and other operator comments, please.

LANDING GEAR
******17-111******
MMC Landing Gear Shock 161T1100-() Boeing B767 3211 DAL

Leakage, Main
In 2013, the DAL B767 fleet suffered a very high volume of MLG seal events, with several low time occurrences
happening after overhaul, or a repack. The initial onset problem noted by Line Maintenance is typically a scraper
ring extruding on the forward side, and the subsequent leakage. A repack is typically required, as the use of
spares has not been found beneficial. No root cause was ever clearly found, and the issue disappeared.
In 2017, this issue returned. DAL has been contacted by other operators that are suffering in the same way, as
well as their MRO respective support facilities. We are attempting to determine if there is a process errantly
applied, or if other causes are contributing to this condition.
Recent removals have been found with a significant amount of brass in the fluid, and one example of a lower
bearing showed significant ID chatter. Access inhibits the ability to see the leak path, so it is not known if leakage
is occurring through the static or dynamic seals, but dynamic seals have been found with nibbled contact edges in
some cases. Samples have been retained for evaluation.
Rare occurrences of a backup ring being installed upside down have been found, but this is also not a consistent
finding.
One aircraft out of service for repeat dual strut leakage was found with an out of round condition on the pistons
with weight on wheels. One piston measured 0.006 and the other 0.009 out of round, measuring smaller in the
Fwd-Aft direction. This out of round condition disappeared when the aircraft was jacked. This amount of out of
round is sufficient to eliminate the clearance between the piston and lower bearing, creating a binding and friction
condition. Both parts had been overhauled within the previous 12 months. They were subsequently removed and
completely stripped to have any ladder cracks remapped for verification that the parts were within structural
limitations. Data was submitted for these two parts, and determined acceptable in accordance with Boeing
correspondence. These parts are on hold pending further discussion.
Actions taken to date:

• DAL has been attempting to determine contributing factors, and has developed a checklist to assist with
troubleshooting
• DAL Engineering has evaluated several internal overhaul processes to determine how to better produce
these parts.
• DAL Engineering and at least one Landing Gear Overhaul facility are planning a joint process review for
assembly of our next shipset of B767 gear to determine if there is an opportunity for sharing of best
practices. First opportunity will present itself at DAL, 31 August. Boeing is welcome to attend.
The gear and/or pistons in question have varied service life, and quantity of overhaul cycles.
Question:
Would Boeing consider initiating a WTT inclusive of MROs and airlines to determine best practices that can
resolve this issue? DAL has seen leakage on gear that assembled with both the old style and new style bearing,
and has reviewed the Service Bulletins and Service Letters that are applicable to this issue.
Question:
Would Boeing consider that the out of round condition found could cause sufficient interference and friction to
generate heat and degrade seals? Are the Ladder Cracks noted in Ref /C and /D/ sufficient to allow for this
amount of ovalization?
Question:
The Ref /A/ CMM requirements for refinish call for a generous chrome plate runout of 0.09/0.15 inch at the upper
LANDING GEAR
end of the working OD, without callout for a transition that would accommodate an interference free seal
installation. This can create an issue during assembly as significant loads are generated when assembling and
installing the lower bearing/seal retainer, inclusive of the scraper and seals. Is it more appropriate to have the
chrome plate runout at the upper end be restricted more tightly to the 1.47/1.57-inch transition radius, and/or
dressed to match that radius to ensure a smoother transition for these seal components?
Question:
Along with the industry recognized ladder cracking condition that this fleet suffers from, the bearing chatter and
piston out of round observations have brought into question how heat may be a factor in this problem. If there is
sufficient heat to cause ladder cracks, what temperatures must the strut reach for that to occur, and does that
exceed the design threshold for the seals? Is it realistic for this to occur early in the overhaul cycle, or within a
short interval from repack?
Question:
There was a requirement incorporated for chrome parts to have a primer wipe applied following finish grind. The
intent was to fill the minor surface cracks inherent in chrome plate in an attempt to inhibit the onset of corrosion at
the root of those voids. These minor cracks have also filled the role of holding fluid that allows for some lubrication
of the seals. If the primer, once cured, inhibits this lubricity, could this also contribute to nibbling on the dynamic
seal? With a robust primer wipe maintenance program DAL considers that elimination of this practice may
improve seal performance on this platform.

ENGINE SYSTEMS
*****18-206*****
Associate
Airline
AMC EEC150-40 OPS 824972-x-yyy UTAS A321 73-28-02 LHT DLH

Programming EEC150-40
Problem
From time to time, we suffer from EECs, which pass incoming test with no faults but after programming
operational software, these units fail the “Application Code Internal Fault” test.
Testing and programming is performed on ATEC Series 6 with TPS 6-V69C-02. It happens on different ATECs
with two different TUAs. If this happens, the fault words point to pressure sensor calibration data or interface
failure usually.
Sometimes we succeed to get this unit released with reprogramming sensor calibration data, but some units need
to be sent to OEM. UTAS in this case was able to release the units after testing NFF and reprogramming.
Does any other shop have experienced similar problems?
What will UTAS do to support this airline’s request?
202 AMC Oil Quantity Transmitter Repair 8TJ146AAW3 Ametek A330 79-31-12 TAP
TAP sent two units P/N: 8TJ146AAW3 twice to AMETEK AEROSPACE for repair. Both times the units were
considered NFF, even with the additional testing that was required. When the units were sent a second time, TAP
advised Ametek that for tracking proposes, the units were replaced between engines and the fault followed the
units. As Ametek advised that no more testing could be performed, the units where considered NFF and
serviceable. As this answer did not address the obvious fault of these units, TAP investigated and found that both
had extensive cracked solders in the Electronic Components Assy Card.
1. Ametek, any additional comments?
2. Have other operators also experienced this problem?
Ametek and other operator comments, please.

ENGINE SYSTEMS
ENGINE SYSTEMS
203 AMC Visual Indicator 125A3 Zodiac A320F 79-21-36 TAP

Aerospace
Units P/N: 125A3 Visual Indicator have a housing (P/N: 89409) with a small orifice on one corner to be used with
a locking wire. With usage, this small orifice gets ripped, making it impossible to lock the nut.
As no repair for this damage is provided, the housing needs to be replaced if such damage occurs, which is a
considerable value.
1. Have other operators also experienced this problem?
Operator and Zodiac Aerospace comments, please.
204 MMC Intake Bypass LA11A2104 ITT Aerospace DHC-8-400 71 ANA

Door Actuator
Poor Reliability
Due to the design of the actuator, the average flight time is remarkably short. The recent MTBUR is around 3000
hr.
The actuator is located at the outside of the airplane. However, it is not sealed and not protected from water
ingress. Main failure reason of the actuator is poor contact of the micro switch.
ANA has repeatedly requested Bombardier and ITT Aerospace to change the design to improve the seal
characteristics and the switch’s water-resistant characteristics over the years. At last, they mentioned that they
have a plan to release an improved actuator. But the detailed schedule has not been disclosed.
Bombardier and ITT Aerospace, please provide the target date of the new actuator release.
Associate
Airline
205 AMC ECU ECU FADEC1 Fadec Several 73-21 LHT DLH
FPA/Missing Intl.
Wire Size
Information
The current FADEC1 FPA (Front Panel Assy) CMMs do not include the front panel wire size information. Wire
size need to be determined from removed wire, which is difficult to do and a possible source of error. We
understand that updating all FPA CMMs is a timely matter might be a challenge. However, wire size information
must be available for production.
What can be done to provide this wire size information to authorized repair shops at short notice?
When will the FPA CMMs be revised in order to include wire size information?
Other operator and Fadec comments, please.

ENGINE SYSTEMS
Associate
Airline
206 AMC ECU Pressure Fadec Several 73-21 LHT DLH

Transducer Intl.
Availability
For several months, new pressure transducers for ECUs (FADEC, P/N 189D5266Pxx) are not available for
purchase. BEA (for FADEC Intl.) gave the information that in the beginning of 2019, transducers will be available,
but they are still unable to provide new spare transducers.
Fadec International (BEA/Safran), please provide a dependable delivery date in short notice!
Fadec and other operator comments, please.
Associate
Airline
207 AMC Chargeable SBs 2121M82Pxx General B787 73 DLH LHT

Introducing New Electric
Design Due to Company
Design Deficiency
LHT is experiencing EEC removals associated with the HP Compressor Discharge Pressure (PS3) signals
disagree faults. The fault mode occurs as a result of moisture accumulated in the PS3 line. Boeing and GE
investigated the issue and created CNRs (Customer Notification Report) to advise operators to remove the EEC if
the PS3 messages occured seven times within 14 days. In the associated FTD, Boeing confirmed that GE is
working on a redesign of the PSS heating capability in order to reduce the PS3 messages resulting from moisture
accumulation.
Why is the SB chargeable although it clearly corrects a design fault?
Questions to OEMs and aircraft manufacturers: When can a fault mode be considered as a “Design Fault”? There
is no clear definition for this term in all relevant product support agreements?
OEM, operator, and airframer comments, please.

ENGINE SYSTEMS
208 MMC Fuel Lacquering G4000VSVA01 Goodrich Control Engine 75-32-42 LHT
on Servovalve Systems (UTAS) V2500
Inlet Filter
VSV-Actuator G4000VSVA01 is removed for troubleshooting due to different FADEC removal reasons.
During shop visit, fuel lacquering on servovalve inlet filter is detected. No cleaning or repair procedure is given
within CMM and therefore costly replacement of servovalve is necessary. Youngest affected unit had TSN=6500
and due to lacquering defined as CID by UTAS, no new part warranty is granted. There were several discussions
on different Repair Orders (POs) without positive outcome for LHT. UTAS views this as external contamination
that is not covered under warranty. For response by IAE/PW CTS and pictures for reference, please see below.
SB G4000VSVA75-8479 is available for modification to PN G4000VSVA02, but it does not address lacquering
topic.
Q1: What is the current investigation status of IAE fuel task force regarding fuel deposits/lacquering?
Q2: Why does the servo valve has to be replaced by new replacement instead of cleaning/flushing?
Q3: Why is no replacement of inlet filter possible?
Q4: Why is only cleaning mentioned in SB V2500-ENG-75-0097? Removed units in the past have shown that
most of the time replacement of servovalve is necessary. This is not in line with SB which does not mention a
repair workscope.

ENGINE SYSTEMS
******17-076******
MMC Controller – Pressure 792755 Series UTAS B767 36 JAL

Regulating
JAL has experienced some Reject Take Off and Ground Turn Back due to EICAS message “X ENG PRV”
appearing when engine start was caused by in-operative PRVC (Controller - Pressure Regulating) Solenoid (P/N
808633-3) at high temperature. JAL is performing Heat Soak Test in accordance with the CMM; however, similar
problems happen. This is considered a random failure (no correlation of the time).
Comments from other operators who have experienced a similar failure of PRVC solenoid will be appreciated.
Comments from other operators, vendors, and airframers about countermeasures/special knowledge to isolate
the solenoid failure will be appreciated.
INDICATING SYSTEMS
****17-ULB****
Associate
Airline
AMC CVR 2100-1X2X-xx L3 Boeing 31300 DAL
DFDR 2100-4X4X-xx L3 Boeing
ICAO ANNEX 6 describes that non-deployable flight recorder containers shall have securely attached an
automatically activated underwater locating device operating at a frequency of 37.5 kHz. At the earliest
practicable date, but not later than 1 January 2018, this device shall operate for a minimum of 90 days.
This requirement is being satisfied by the airframe manufactures by certifying the SSFDR and the SSCVR with a
stand-alone part number for recorders with the 90-day ULB installed.
Delta considers the recorder and the ULB two separate LRUs and this should be configured at the Aircraft IPC
level.
Having the recorders identified based on the ULB installed causes a number of problems for the Airline including
the following:
• ULB is considered hazardous material when shipping and requires special handling of the recorder. This
could delay shipment of the recorder for special reads of the flight recorder data.
• Additional inventory of the recorder is required for a recorder with the same Form, Fit, and Function.
• If an SB is accomplished on the recorder to install a 90-day ULB, the Recorder cannot be installed on an
aircraft only requiring a 30-day ULB without undoing the SB.
• The ULB stays with the aircraft and is transferred to the new recorder being installed. The recorder and
the ULB are stocked separately and the ULB is only changed at battery expiration or failure.
Delta request that the 90-day ULB requirement be satisfied by stocking the recorder part number separate from
the ULB and the recorder interchangeability be based on the Form, Fit and Function of the recorder. The 30 day
and 90-day ULB configuration should be controlled at the aircraft tail number through the AIPC.
Questions:
1. Are other operators seeing similar issues?
2. Airframe manufacturer recommendation.
3. Vendor comment.
INDICATING SYSTEMS
*****18-169*****
Associate
Airline
AMC LCDU C19298AF05 Thales 31 AFR/KLM AFR

EDU C19755BA01
PDU68 C19596AC04
On these products, the LCD module assembly (LAM) contains photocells.
In case of photocell failure, the LAM is declared unrepairable (must be replaced by a new one.) even if the LCD
matrix is in good condition.
Do you have a solution to replace just the photocells or is there a marketing implementation strategy?
LCDU CMM 31-63-30 Figure 1 Item 95

EDU CMM 31-60-02 Figure 2 Item 250
PDU68 CMM 31-64-05 Figure 1 Item 110

INDICATING SYSTEMS
Associate
Airline
209 AMC TAT Sensor 102AH2AG UTAS B737 34-18 AFR/KLM KLM
Testing
Reference is made to CMM 34-18-52.
The TAT sensor is considered a non-repairable LRU. Also, it is known that the sensing element made of platina is
linear.
Therefore, if you test it on one temperature, it should cover the whole range. In the subject CMM, we noticed that
there are different tests prescribed/defined: Bench Check, Calibration Test, Probe calibration test (alternative
method), Heater Power Test, Hermetic Seal test, Insulation resistance test, and Heater Dielectric Withstanding
Voltage Test. There is a lot of equipment required and the duration of test for such a non-repairable probe is quite
long. Unfortunately, there is no explicit statement that only the first test Bench Check is sufficient for return to
service.
Can you confirm that only the Bench Check is required to declare the TAT sensor serviceable?
If there is more testing required, we would like to ask that you reconsider the situation and make it more user
friendly. For example, Heater Dielectric Withstanding Voltage Test is something that the OEM is supposed to do
after manufacturing of the sensor. Why should we do that particular test during every shop visit?

INDICATING SYSTEMS
210 AMC L3, Enough is Enough FA2100 L3 A32X 23 ETD

CVR & DFDR Model
Airbus A330 31
A380
Over 2017 and 2018, Etihad has been suffering the following issues related to the L3 CVR and DFDR model
FA2100:
1. Unacceptable lead time in L3 repairs:
Over 2018, L3 required the following lead times to repair Etihad units. In some cases, it took L3 up to six months
to repair a unit:
Figure 1: List of Lead Times of CVR and DFDR from L3 Repairs
2. Lead time in L3 spare parts:
In Q4 2018, Etihad’s avionics shop had four CVRs pending repair as they were awaiting parts from L3:
CVR PN 2100-1026-02 SN 730022: In shop from October 26, 2018 (on January 14, 2019, unit still in shop)
PWA Audio Compressor PN 205E3977-29
PWA Adv Acquisition processor PN 205E2502-24
CVR PN 2100-1026-02 SN 314345: In shop from Oct 16, 2018 until December 31, 2018: TAT 66 days
CVR PN 2100-1026-02 SN 1037581: In shop from November 5, 2018 until January 2, 2019: TAT 58 days
Capacitor PN 142E1619-03
CVR PN 2100-1025-02 SN 636988: In shop from September 16, 2018 (on January 14, 2019, unit still in shop)
Capacitor PN 142E1619-03
PWA PN 205E2503-01
3. Poor reliability of L3 CVR and DFDR:

INDICATING SYSTEMS
Just in 2018, Etihad has suffered an accumulative of around eight hours in delays due to L3 CVR and DFDR
failures during pushback. In most cases, the only solution was CVR or DFDR replacement:
Figure 2: List of Delays Caused by CVR and DFDR
In 2018, Etihad’s A32X fleet has experienced the following number of removals of L3 CVR and DFDR units,
proving to be completed below the Guaranteed MTBUR:
Figure 3: Etihad A32X Fleet CVR and DFDR Removals over 2018
4. Lack of customer support from L3:
In summer 2017, Etihad contacted L3 without getting much support. During summer 2018, L3 was contacted
again, this time involving Airbus’s supplier support department, with the goal to obtain from L3 a root cause
analysis on the suffered high number of removals and awaiting recommendations to restore good reliability on the
units.
After several conference calls and e-mails throughout 2018, Etihad obtained NIL feedback from L3. On November
29, 2018, Etihad received the long-awaited visit of Mike Philips (L3 customer support), but during his visit, none of
the previously-raised items were prepared or reviewed by L3.
After extensive communication with L3, they mentioned that one of the solutions was the embodiment of VSB 019
for CVR and 021 for DFDR. These VSBs incorporate a new NAND Crash Survivable Memory Units (CSMU) on
newly-manufactured units since September 30, 2013.
INDICATING SYSTEMS
Etihad requested if L3 knew the Serial Number from which this modification was embodied at the manufacture
line for each of the affected Part Numbers, but L3 was not able to provide such information.
In July 2018, Airbus updated TFU 31.33.00.032 (L-3Com DFDR and CVR latched faults) in order to communicate
operators about the release of L3 SIL FA2100FDR 001AB describing the issue suffered by these units.
Nonetheless, it took to Etihad several communications with L3 and Airbus (TR 80487153) to obtain the precious
SIL.
In the majority of Etihad delays, the DFDR or CVR got latched in fault mode before departure, inducing a delay
due to the time required to replace the unit. L3 SIL FA2100FDR 001AB recommends the embodiment of
additional VSBs 023 and 024 for CVR and VSB 025 and 026 for DFDR. These VSBs incorporate a new
functionality called Highly Accelerated Stress Screening (HASS), which is supposed to avoid certain faults to latch
the unit in fault mode.
For additional information, please refer to:

• Airbus FAIR 18.0246 (L3 DFDR/CVR faults, delays, removals and lack of support)
• Airbus FAIR 18.0214 (CVR cannot test during cockpit preparation)
• AMC item 20-2018 (Lack of Standards by L3)
Questions to L3:
1. Why is L3 is the only vendor duplicating or being forced to duplicate their documentation? One document
was released under L3 and another document was released under Airbus L3 SIL FA2100FDR 001AB.
2. Why L3 is not able to provide a clear Serial Number cut for the units embodied with VSB 019 (CVR) and
021 (DFDR) from the manufacture line?
3. Why L3 is not capable of providing a root cause analysis for the CVR and DFDR removals suffered by
Etihad after months asking for help and solutions, even involving Airbus’s supplier department?
Questions to Airbus:
1. Airbus announced that L3 will be the single-source supplier of new flight data recording technologies like
Combined Cockpit Voice and Data Recorder (CVDR) or Automatic Deployable Flight Recorder (ADFR).
How can Airbus select as single source a supplier that is unable to deliver on time sub-assembly spare
parts, takes months to repair units, lacks basic customer support standards, and gathers complaints from
all over the commercial aviation community?
2. In November 2018, Airbus communicated to Etihad that L3 will be part of the yearly Airbus supplier rating
survey. Why has taken Airbus so many years to include L3 in the Airbus supplier rating survey when it is
a supplier that is continuously on the spot in terms of poor customer support?
Other operators’ comments and experiences with L3 units, please.

INDICATING SYSTEMS
211 AMC To Inform the Operators APE5100-1 / Cobham A320 31 TAP

of the Clock Part Number Avionics – Air Fam
Change from PN Precision
APE5100-1 to APE5110
A330
The purpose of SB APE5110-31-01 is to correct of the software (through Micro Controller Board change) to avoid
the bug on CHR and Elapse time (incoherent display) occurring during the month of February for years 2016 to
2019, 2032 to 2035, and 2048 to 2055. This SB has various conditions in which its application is not FOC. As this
is a design problem, TAP thinks that it should be always FOC.
Cobham, Airbus, and other operator comments, please.

INDICATING SYSTEMS
Associate
Airline
212 AMC Late Response S9518106906200 / ATR ATR 31-53 UNI EGAT
Bundle
UNI Air has incurred delays and AOG cases three times due to the PITCH DISC WARRING MSG during pre-flight
check and taxi last year. The reason was that the wire bundle P/N S9518106906200 is broken and because the
Ground is removed, MFC does not receive the Ground and triggers the alert. UNI performed the one-time
inspection and found the wire was chafing in the conduit. UNI strongly considers the following reasons to cause
the issue:
1. Bundle routing is not enough to support the pitch uncoupling mechanism movement.
2. Interior wire length is too short; it will cause the wire to tighten when the pitch uncoupling mechanism
extends.
3. Wire chafing causes the wire to break. The material needs to improve.
UNI requested ATR to investigate the root cause on September 13, 2018. After several discussions, ATR
performed a prompt inspection on several aircraft and found similar incorrect routing installations, which seems
confirm the root cause of the broken cable issue. UNI awaits the correct installation drawing to re-install the wire
bundle. This issue was opened over five months ago.
Airframers: How long will it take to provide the correct installation drawing to solve this issue?
Other operators, OEMs, please comment.

INDICATING SYSTEMS
213 AMC Dataframe Issues 2234320-02-02 Airbus A320NEO 31 AZU

FDIMU
AZU has chosen the Teledyne FDIMU on DAR for its A320neo fleet. The main reason for choosing the DAR
instead of QAR was the capability to customize the acquisition dataframe.
For AZU’s surprise, the aircraft received from factory came with a 256 wps acquisition dataframe installed. This
fact was not clear on Airbus’s options catalogue. When trying to upgrade the dataframe from 256 to 1024 wps,
AZU realized that Airbus does not have such an option available. Airbus has only 1024 wps option for QAR
selection on A320neo. A 256 wps dataframe is not enough for AZU’s data monitoring needs.
After AZU contact, Teledyne has started a project to develop an acquisition frame and increasing the recording
speed to 1024 wps with no Airbus support. Teledyne delivered a customized FDIMU DMU software and AZU has
installed it on only one tail for validation and test purposes.
Since then, AZU is facing issues in order to decode the customized 1024 wps flight data.
AZU uses the SAFRAN avionics AGS decoding software, but in order to configure the AGS for proper flight data
recognition, some documentation was needed; however, Airbus has denied access to this documentation.
Teledyne and SAFRAN avionics are working together on the decoding frame development.
AZU has been working on this matter for two years so far.
Questions:
1. Why Airbus has not certified a 1024 wps acquisition frame on DAR selection? When will Airbus provide
such a solution?
2. The main differential of choosing the DAR selection is the capability to customize the acquisition
dataframe, so why has Airbus denied the documentation do to so?
3. AZU is aware about the FOMAX option but we also understand that this is an operator’s choice. What
solution can Airbus provide for those operators who will not select FOMAX but need a robust and
customizable solution for data acquisition, e.g., DAR 1024 wps or faster?
Airbus, Teledyne and Safran Avionics comments, please
Any other operators facing this issue?
214 AMC Piece Parts C19266DA01 Thales A320 22 UAL
We often have to replace a whole SRU instead of one or two small parts that have low serviceability life. This
causes the repair costs to be higher than necessary. UAL asks Thales to provide repair options that include
replacement of piece parts.
Thales, Airbus, and other operators comments please.

INDICATING SYSTEMS
215 AMC No S/W Loaded on C12349AD03 Thales B777 31 UAL

New Board-- High
Speed Cockpit Printer
UAL ordered a new Processing Board for LRU referenced above. When the board was received, it was found to
be inop in any unit it was installed in. After discussion with Thales, it was learned that the boards are not shipped
with the necessary software installed. Subsequently, the board was sent back to Thales to have the software
loaded for an additional repair cost.
UAL would like to know Thales’s policy regarding board software.
Item Orig. Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft AT From If MRO, the
A Associate
Airline
216 AMC Availability of 727-1601-01 Leonardo A330 31 AFR/KLM AFR

CMM Pressure
Indicator
Sirio Panel
Since August 31, 2017, for more than eighteen months, AFR/KLM has been trying to obtain the CMM for
PN 727-1601-01. We have received no answer from the OEM.
AFR/KLM would like to know the availability date of this CMM.
Operators, OEMs, and Airbus comment.
Associate
Airline
217 AMC Cathode Ray Tube 3906130302 Thales A320F 31-62 AFR/KLM AFR
(CRT) Production Avionics
Stoppage SAS
FCDU 3906130402
Following Thales’s CIL-90, which was introduced in December 2017, the production stoppage of CRT Displays
(= EIS 1), we would like to get more information on the topic.
• The availability of CRTs: is there a quite precise estimation (date) of a future shortage?
• Cost and operational impact are extremely high to perform the retrofit from EIS1 to EIS2 (LCD Displays).
Does Thales or Airbus plan to participate in reducing the retrofit cost for the airlines?
Operator, OEM, Airbus comment please.

INDICATING SYSTEMS
218 AMC Hazmat Shipping DK-120/90 Underwater Dukane A319 23 UAL

of ULBs, V/FDR Locator Beacon
A320
UAL ships Underwater Locator Beacons (ULB) as fully regulated dangerous goods. Recently, this policy surprised
a representative of the Cargo Shipper’s Association as he was not aware of any other airlines shipping these
devices as fully regulated dangerous goods.
Rationale: Once the ULBs had to broadcast 90 days vs. the original 30-day requirement, the batteries required
increased capacity. In the case of the ULB, the battery lithium content increased from 0.6 grams to 1.7 grams.
Once the single cell battery capacity exceeds 1.0 grams, the battery, ULB, and anything the ULB attaches are
single cell batteries and from our interpretation must be declared fully regulated dangerous goods before
shipping. The reference UN3091, Lithium metal batteries contained in equipment (Packing Instructions 970,
Section 1) can be found in the 60th Edition of the IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations, effective January 1, 2019,
and effective through December 31, 2019. Airbus Voice/Flight Data Recorders (V/FDRs) also fall into this
situation.
We would appreciate comments from other operators as to how they manage shipment of these devices.
Dukane, Airbus, and other operator comments, please.
219 AMC 4G Support 5316928-05 Pratt & Whitney A220 46 DAL

Health
Management
Unit
CSALP
The A220 is equipped with a HMU (Health Management Unit) P/N 5316928‐05 that supports 3G roaming data
transmission, but 3G service is sunsetting.
What is the timeline for upgrading the HMU P/N 5316928‐05 to 4G?
Pratt & Whitney and airframer comments, please.

INDICATING SYSTEMS
220 AMC MRO Capability, ED45A100 Safran Electronics A320 31-35-47 LHT
Repair Possibility & Defence Fam
ED45A300
Content:
OEM Safran published CMM 31-35-47, Revision 7, 10 July 2017, and reduced the detailed parts list and repair
procedures of the Data Management Unit (DMU). Due to this revision, the repair of printed circuit boards is no longer
possible.
Question:
What is the reason to withdraw detailed IPL and repair procedures in the CMM (retreating access to level 3
documentation)?
LHT requests Safran to disclose that information in further CMM revisions again.

INDICATING SYSTEMS
221 AMC High Rate of PCMCIA 2233000-816/916 Teledyne A318 31 DAL

Card Failures
2233000-976 Sagem A319
2234320-02-02 Honeywell A320
2234340-02-02 A330
ED45A300 B717
ED48A100/200 B737
967-0214-001 B757
967-0212-002 B767
B777
Video Link: https://drive.google.com/open?id=1BaLhTZ0Lr5icfn_F9pJttRRudMn9Jtny
The Delta fleet uses a variety of Teledyne, Sagem and Honeywell data management units equipped with PCMCIA
slots. These slots are utilized to record a copy of flight recorder data used by our Flight Safety Department as
FOQA data. Our procedures pull the memory cards from the data management units, download the memory
card’s contents, reformats the memory card for re-use and reinstalls the memory card in the data management’s
PCMCIA slot. Over the past 4 years Delta has distributed 6780 PCMCIA memory cards to be used in 432 aircraft.
The 6780 number is over 15 times the quantity needed to support the 432 aircraft.
Delta uses PCMCIA memory cards recommended by the manufacturer of the data management units.
Engineering has examples showing that extreme amounts of these PCMCIA memory cards are failing structurally
(welds at connector end breaking) in a manner that allows the memory card to be installed (upside down)
incorrectly, causing significant loss of data capture and high costs to replace failed memory cards.
Questions:
1. Are other operators seeing similar Issues?
2. Vendor comments? Have vendors looked at alternatives due to PCMCIA obsolescence?
3. Have vendors looked at using a PCMCIA adapter w/compact flash as an option?
4. Other options?
Operator and supplier comments, please.

LIGHTING
222 AMC Navigation Light Fail 31-8788-1 Honeywell E-Jet 24 AZU
The item below is being discussed for the third time. The text below shows what was discussed the first time in
2017:
AZUL is facing a problem with the bad reliability of the navigation light sub-assembly P/N 31-8788-1. We have
had to replace 442 units. The mean time that the unit remains in the wing is only 521 hours. Honeywell was
contacted and did not give us an answer as to how this component will be improved.
Since the last AMC in Dallas, we have not received any news from Honeywell.
Honeywell and other operator comments please.
*****18-183*****
AMC Navigation Light Bulb 31-8788-1 Honeywell E-Jet 33 AZU
This item was discussed last year as item 155. Until now, Honeywell has not given us a final solution for the
problem.
For this reason, we are resubmitting this question.
Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From
17-155 Navigation Light Bulb 31-8788-1 Honeywell E-Jet 33 AZU
AZUL is facing problem with the bad reliability of the navigation light sub-assembly P/N 31-8788-1. In the past
12 months, we replaced 442 units. The mean time that each unit remains in the wing is only 521 hours.
Honeywell was contacted and did not give us an answer how this component will be improved.
Honeywell and other operators, comment please.

LIGHTING
Associate
Airline
223 AMC Landing Lamps CMQ4559X CML B737NG 33-40 KLM/AFR KLM
Aviation
B744
B777
A330
Several occurrences took place concerning incandescent sealed beam Landing Lamps with part number
CMQ4559X. After removal from the aircraft, they broke spontaneously when Aircraft Maintenance Technicians
picked the lamp up from, or placed them on, a work stand. Lamps with ref. part number seem to fail fairly often in
this way. They have also been found cracked on several occasions while installed in the aircraft.
After the above-mentioned occurrences, KLM Engineering collected several used unserviceable CML Landing
Lamps with part number CMQ4559X. Further investigation revealed that the dome shaped reflectors from all
inspected lamps were cracked (with and without failed filaments). For this reason, these lamps have been
withdrawn from use to prevent injury to personnel or damage to equipment. The remainder of the shipment in
storage has been sent back to the supplier with a request to investigate the cause of these failures.
Question:
Do other MROs and operators have similar issues with this part number lamp?
224 AMC EPSU 3214-62 Diehl Aerospace GmbH A330 33 KAL

3214-62-10
3214-62-20
KAL has experienced several maintenance delays due to EPSU failure on A330 aircrafts. Currently, P/N 3214-62
and 3214-62-20 have been installed on A330 classic aircrafts and P/N 3214-62-10 has been installed on A330
enhanced aircrafts.
If an EPSU is failed in outside stations, a lot of passengers have to be removed as per MEL. If FPEEPMS is failed
due to EPSU, the aircraft cannot be dispatched unless the defective EPSU is replaced.
The main reason to lead this failure is EPSU battery. The best way to prevent this problem is the allocation of
EPSU Battery in all the station or loading as FAK. But since the battery is categorized as Dangerous Goods, it is
almost impossible to load on the aircraft. Also, since the shelf life time is too short, it is not efficient to allocate it.
KAL would like to get other airlines’ experience about EPSU failure and how to operate A330 aircrafts in case of
EPSU failure.
Diehl Aerospace and operator comments, please.

LIGHTING
225 AMC Reliability of Lavatory ECU AEPC000200A0003 Jamco B787 33 JAL
ECU – Elec Control Unit part number AEPC000200A0003 is a circuit card for the purpose to generate constant
current into the lavatory interior lighting.
Since 2016, JAL has been observing its increasing number of removals. In 2017, we experienced four times of
departure delay due to inoperative lighting at the departure preparation.
In response to the above situation, JAL has been talking to Jamco, and was advised the almost failure of the
ECUs were caused by blown temperature fuse located close to the FET. According to Jamco analysis, since the
thermos-tolerance is suspected not to be optimized, Jamco and Boeing have been taking their effort for
investigation and planning design change.
However, the progress of planning improvement has been taking long time. And it seems like the target date is
also not set yet.
Especially for the summer season, its failure rate tends to increase in association with outside temperature. JAL
hopes to accelerate the improvement activities in time for this summer.
Could Boeing or Jamco advise operators the target date of the improvement for the ECU?
Comments from other operators would be highly appreciated too.
Title Associate
Airline
226 AMC Reliability 040000-X Goodrich B777-300ER 33-40 AFR/KLM AFR

Issue Camera Main
Lights Landing
Gear Light
Assembly
For several years, we have noticed a problem on the ground maneuver Camera Lights, which give lighting to the
area around the Main Landing Gears (MLG).
These lights are used with the ground maneuver camera system when the light intensity in these areas is
insufficient.
The most common problem for an in-operable MLG Camera Light is the burned-out lamps (P/N HLX64621).
Several operators have reported the MLG Camera Light problems caused by damaged lamp socket
(P/N 040004-1) in the reflector assembly (P/N 040000-1) and (P/N 040000-2).
This situation is reported in the Boeing Ref. Case No. CAS-94176-M6X8M6.
Ref AIPC: 33-47-00-01

-LIGHT ASSY (P/N 040000-1)
-RETAINER ASSY – SOCKET (P/N 040004-1)
Can you share your recent experience, such as similar reports from other operators, trend in socket replacement,
and root cause of the socket damage (if known) and to provide recommendation, if any, to prevent this failure?
Can you please tell us if you have alternatives to solve this issue?
Operators, Goodrich, and Boeing comment please.

LIGHTING
227 AMC Use the Approved Lamp (Bulb) All 33-40 Airbus
on Halogen Technology Airbus
External Lighting Systems
It has been reported to Airbus that unapproved/uncertified lamps (bulbs) were installed on Halogen technology
external lighting systems on Airbus aircraft. These unapproved standards do not fit properly inside the light
housing assemblies or the light holders. As a consequence, these lamps can cause arcing and corrosion on the
contacts, and/or are prone to excessive vibration, causing them to break apart and fall off the aircraft.
Airbus would like to take the opportunity of this conference to emphasize on the fact that only lamps that are
approved by the light assembly manufacturer shall be installed, as indicated in the IPC and vendor CMM.
As an example, only the sealed beam lamp P/N Q4559X manufactured specifically by General Electric (GE) is
approved on the Landing Lights. The Halogen lamp P/N 8GH005597-12 manufactured specifically by Goodrich is
the only lamp approved on the halogen technology rear tailcone Navigation Light.
Finally, Airbus would like to remind the existence of the In-Service Information (ISI) article 33.40.00001 describing
this issue for GE standards, and the ISI 33.41.00015 for Goodrich standards (please also refer to the closed FAIR
item 16.0232).
Operators comment please.

NACELLES & THRUST REVERSERS
228 MMC Lock Brake Sticking 3283086-3 Honeywell B767 78 ANA
ANA has replaced 128 Lock Brakes between 2006 and 2018 as suspected cause of the damage of Short Flex
Shaft. Our line mechanics mostly suspect that the Lock Brake “sticking” causes the damage. However, only seven
of 128 Lock Brakes were confirmed to be the cause of the Short Flex Shaft damage at ANA's shop inspection.
ANA would like to know the mechanism of short flex shaft damage to reduce the removal of Lock Brake without
any fail.
We have the following questions and requests regarding this situation to Honeywell and Boeing:
1. We believe that the major cause of the short flex shaft damage such as shearing is sudden stuck of lock
brake. Honeywell and Boeing comments please.
2. Is there a possibility that the stuck Lock Brake return to normal condition suddenly for some reason?
3. If the sticking is enough to break the shaft, what kind of sticking marks appear? Which part of the Lock
Brake does the mark appear at?
4. What is the reason why Lock Brake suddenly sticks?
229 MMC C-Duct Actuator Locking 721Z3191-33 Goodrich B787GE 78 JAL

Function Failure
Japan Airlines has experienced eight (8) removals of C-Duct Actuator, P/N 721Z3191-33 since 2017 due to
unable to lock at C-Duct opening. All of shop inspection results for these actuators at Goodrich were No Fault
Found.
The C-Duct Actuator, P/N 721Z3191-33, was introduced by Goodrich Service Bulletin 787-G78-009 to improve
lock reliability. However, similar locking function failure experienced in P/N 721Z3191-29 (Pre-SB) is still seen.
Requests:
1. JAL would like to know if other operators have experience of locking function failure with C-Duct Actuator,
P/N 721Z3191-33.
2. JAL would like to request Goodrich to show the worldwide data of removal reason and inspection result
for C-Duct Actuator, P/N 721Z3191-33 returned to Goodrich for repair.
Goodrich and other operator comments, please.

Title Associate
Airline
230 MMC Fan Cowl 725Z3191-31 Goodrich B787 71 AFR/KLM AFR

Actuator Aerostructures
The hydraulic female “quick disconnect coupling” to connect actuator to the test bench is not referenced in
documentation such as CMM.
Goodrich has already informed AFR-KLM that Parker is the vendor of the item that connect Actuator on aircraft.
Parker has noted they are not the PMA holder and the part can only to be sold to Boeing.
AFR-KLM requests the correct reference of female coupling to be ordered. Who is the authorized vendor?
Boeing, Goodrich comments please.

231 MMC Fan Cowl 721Z2300-303NC Boeing B787-200 71-10 UAL

UTAS GENX-1B
UAL has experienced two damaged fan cowls which exceed the repair scope of SRM
B787-A-54-21-01-01B-664A-A. The SRM covers wet lay-up repairs which is applicable to only 25% of the fan
cowl surface (SRM example shown as Fig. 1). One fan cowl was covered by UTAS one off repair, and the other
was traded in for exchange after Boeing/UTAS could not provide one off repair.
UAL would like to request Boeing/UTAS to provide pre-preg repairs to expand the SRM to cover no size limit
permanent repair as with other Boeing SRMs (777 SRM 54-20-01 Repair 1 as an example shown as Fig. 2). It is
frustrating while all other Boeing fleets operated by UAL has SRMs that list no size limit 350 °F pre-preg repairs;
but for the 787, 75% of the fan cowl is in the un-reparable zone.
UAL is open to new repair materials such as M20 or other pre-pregs.

Boeing, please comment.

232 MMC B767 GE Inlet Cowl 224-2101-573 Collins B767 71-11-16 UAL
Component Overhaul Aerospace
Instructions
Goodrich
Aerostructures
UAL has been working on the subject Inlet Cowl and has noticed that the CMM does not contain sufficient data in
order to perform a complete overhaul of the Inlet cowl. For example, the check section contains information on
what TAI items to check on previous configurations of the nose cowl where a spray tube is used for the TAI,
where on the newest configuration a TAI spray tube does not exist and is a D-Duct style TAI system. Repairs for
the newest configurations are also not common and therefore the manual does not actually cover a full overhaul
and requires a newer revision.
Other operators: How are you performing repair/overhaul for the GE Inlet Cowl?
UAL requests a manual revision to include repair and overhaul instructions for the latest/newest configuration.
Can Collins Aerospace comment on this issue and provide a timeline for this manual revision to be released?
Collins Aerospace and other operator comments please.
233 MMC B767 CF6-80C2 D52B1000-XX Middle River B767 78-32 UAL
Translating Sleeve Aircraft Systems
Skin Repairs
General Electric
UAL has had to fix damage on the Thrust Reverser Translating Sleeve Outer Skin. When referring to 767-4 SRM
54-35-01, there is a note stating, “There are no repairs for these parts in the structural repair manual at this time.”
When referring to MRAS CMM 78-32-00 for engine CF6-80C2, permanent repair calls out for an external 17-7 PH
stainless steel doubler. Typical repair for all other fleets repair refers to a Pre-Preg repair in chapter 51 of the
SRM. UAL is looking to perform typical pre-preg Carbon Fabric Reinforced Plastic Bond repair for outer skin
repair as referenced in other fleets. If so, material identification and orientation will be needed.
Other operators please comment.
Can General Electric or Middle River Aircraft Systems rep. comment on this issue? Can a composite repair be
developed?
234 MMC B767 CF6-80C2 D52B1000-XX Middle B767 78-32 UAL

Translating Sleeve River
Actuator Clevis Wear Aircraft
Systems
D52B2519-11 (Clevis) General
Electric
D52B2520-11 (Clevis)
UAL has been replacing actuator clevis’ that have an average of about 5% material removal on support and
sometimes much less. When referring to 767-4 SRM 54-35-01, there is no information for translating sleeve. All
repair and part information is in MRAS CMM 78-32-32. When reading through inspection section of
CMM 78-32-32, no wear is allowed on actuator clevis. UAL does not find it feasible to have no allowable wear, as
a slight scratch will not affect the structural integrity of the component. A send up was sent to GE Aviation who
supports MRAS part and allowable damage was rejected without providing limits. UAL is looking for quantitative
information (Wear Limits) as to how much wear is allowed before scrapping the part. Wear in location shown in
figure attached (CMM 78-32-32, pg. 515, Figure 505) is a common issue.
Are other operators seeing this same wear? How are other operators handling the no wear limits?
Can General Electric or Middle River Aircraft Systems rep. comment on this issue? Please provide wear limits for
the actuator clevis that takes into account minor damage.
GE Aviation, Middle River, and other operator comments, please.

235 MMC B757 Thrust 93835-ASSY-4241068-1-F Rolls Royce B757 78-31-00 UAL
Reverser
Actuator Tube
During overhaul of the B757 Thrust Reverser it has been discovered that upon installation of the actuator tubes
the tube compression fittings leak. Tubes are received into the shop new from the vendor and will still leak upon
re-installation. UAL believes that an O-Ring be installed in order to ensure proper sealing of the actuator tube.
UAL must scrap tube that leak even when the tube is new from the OEM. This is not feasible as it causes
scrapping parts that may otherwise be used with a design modification using an O-ring.
Other operator comments?
UAL requests Rolls Royce provide a permanent fix for the leaking issue.
Rolls Royce and operator comments, please.

******17-067******
Title Associate
Airline
MMC Hydraulic TY1213- Goodrich A320 Fam 78-31-53 LHT DLH

Control Unit Series Actuation
Systems
TY2092- (UTAS)
Series
Primary Door TY2091- 78-31-56
Latch Series
In the above-mentioned CMMs, a fire blanket is shown in the CMM IPL as individual part with P/N CH2013A0009
or P/N CH2091A0004. Units received for maintenance are frequently delivered without this fire blanket from the
customer.
According to AMM, Subtask 78-31-19-020-050-B (PN: TY2091-Seris, the three thermal blankets (Items 30, 35,
and 40) must be removed from the blocker door latch. But it is not noted in the AMM, what to do with the
replaced thermal blankets.
Request: A note needs to be added into the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) that the thermal blankets are
part of the door latch.
Example:-- Note Put the thermal blankest in a suitable container and attach to the unservicable unit.
Questions:
Does the OEM consider the fire blanket part of the LRU? In consequence, does the OEM consider a missing fire
blanket mishandling?
Operator and supplier comments, please.

DOORS
236 MMC Evaluate the EMI Contribution in the Eldec All 52-70 Airbus
Spurious Triggering of Crane Airbus
CABIN/EMER/AVNCS DOOR ECAM Aerospace
Alerts
Airbus has been reported several occurrences of spurious ‘door open’ ECAM indications, affecting the Cabin,
Emergency, and Avionics doors. This issue is described in the TFU 52.71.00.015. Among other contributors,
Airbus has identified the Electro-Magnetic Interference (EMI) as a root cause for some occurrences: one operator
was able to correlate spurious “DOOR L AFT CABIN” ECAM alerts with the emission of HF data in flight.
Additional tests performed by Airbus have confirmed this correlation and the door proximity switch susceptibility
against EMI/induced currents.
Airbus would like to determine the importance of the EMI contribution fleetwide, in comparison to the other
identified root causes (vibration, humidity, etc.). Therefore, Airbus kindly requests operators’ feedback regarding
the following question: Are aircraft more affected by spurious CABIN, EMER and/or AVNCS doors alerts when
operated on routes requiring the use of HF rather than VHF?
Operators comment please.

WINGS
Associate
Airline
237 MMC Flap Track Fairing Various Airbus A330 57-56 DAL HAL
Covers
We are complying with the AMM 57-56-11-440-801-A installation procedure of cleaning and applying sealant to the
mating surfaces of the flap track fairing covers, but still experience loss of covers. In 2018, there were 25 covers
found missing that required CDL deferral.
Parts departing aircraft events have been the subject of increased scrutiny by regulatory agencies and require
tracking for reporting purposes.
Are other operators experiencing loss of flap track covers?
Has Airbus considered a redesign of the flap track fairing covers that included a more robust mechanical means of
attachment?

EQUIPMENT/FURNISHING
238 MMC Door Striker AR4726-5 Adams Rite B777 25 ANA

Boeing
In the item No. 35 of latest 2017 MMC, ANA had commented and requested to encourage improvement of the
striker assembly to avoid frequent replacement. We hear that Boeing and Adams Rite have made an effort to
incorporate modified switch into the striker assembly.
Could Boeing and Adams Rite introduce their modification plan and schedule in the MMC?
Boeing, Adams Rite, and other operator comments, please.
******17-035******
MMC Door Strike AR4704-2/-6 Adams Rite B747 25 DAL

AR4726-1/-5 B777
The Boeing widebody Door Strikes have a 9-year discard requirement, due to the CMRs. Delta has requested the
discard requirement be changed to an overhaul requirement.
Delta requests that Boeing and Adams Rite work together to certify that an overhauled unit passes the
requirements.
Additionally, the 9-year requirement does not take into account the actual usage of the components, which is what
would lead to the failure of the internal solenoid.
Boeing, Adams Rite, and other operator comments, please.
******14-264******
AMC Cockpit Door Strike Assembly AR4726-1/-5 Adams Rite B747 25-00 DAL
AR4704-2/-6 B767
B777
Adams Rite has provided Boeing with a requirement that the cockpit door strike assemblies must be discarded
within 9 years. This requirement is tied to the solenoid. Research has shown that the solenoid can be rebuilt,
removing the necessity of maintenance discarding the unit.
Other operator, vendor comments please.

*****18-212*****
AMC Cockpit Door Strike Failure AR4714-7 Airbus A32X Fleet 52 ETD
and Door Misalignment
AR4714-11 Adams Rite
On A32X the Cockpit Door Locking System (CDLS) is composed of several components (Controller, keypad,
Strike…) and they are all manufactured by Adams Rite.
Over the past years Etihad has suffered an extremely poor reliability of the Cockpit door strike PN AR4714-7 and
AR4714-11 (Figure 1). After several communications exchanged with both the door strike manufacturer (Adams
Rite) and Airbus, it seems that the real failure is more related to a Cockpit door misalignment issue than related to
the Cockpit Door Locking System components.
Figure 1: Adams Rite door strike P/N AR4714-x
Physical inspection of Cockpit door on Etihad A321 A6-AEH MSN 6760 (delivered Sept 2015) was performed in
July 2017 and showed signs of excessive wear of the door latch bolts, signs of door frame clash and missing
bumpers; refer to pictures 2 and 3.
Figure 2: Pictures showing abnormal latch bolt wear
Figure 3: Pictures showing clash with door frame and missing bumpers
All the information and pictures were shared with Airbus on Techrequest 80334085 and they confirmed that
despite the aircraft being delivered with the latest cockpit door modifications it was showing signs of door
misalignment.
Etihad would like to know from Airbus which is the latest feedback on the issue and what are Airbus plans to
improve the situation.
For additional information, refer to Airbus FAIR 09.0047. Other operators’ comments and experience in case of
being affected, please.

*****18-227*****
AMC Cockpit Door Lock AR4709-25-03 Adams Rite A320 25-20-26 DAL
Controller Tester Aerospace
A330
In order to troubleshoot intermittent errors, we need to troubleshoot the Cockpit Door Locking System (CDLS)
Control Unit Programmer P/N AR4737-1.
We need the schematics for the following parts included in the Adams Rite Aerospace (ARA) CDLS Control Unit
Programmer package:
*Bench Test Unit (BTU) ` 73155-1

*DCU Signal Cable 73146-1
*RS232 Computer Communications Cable 73147-1
There was no technical manual provided with this tester. We do not accept that technical information regarding
the testing of LRUs should be withheld from operators and MROs.
Other operator comments welcome.
239 MMC Flight Crew Seat 3A380-0007-01-X Ipeco B787 25 ANA

3A380-0008-01-X Boeing
ANA has often experienced that Flight Crew Seat on B787 was replaced because the seat did not move
electrically. After the seat removed from aircraft, the mechanic replaced the subject component such as ECU
(P/N:EC0602A00P71100A), Vertical actuator (P/N:2A380-0825), Horizontal actuator (P/N:2A380-0827) and sent
them to Ipeco for the repair. However, most of all shop finding reports showed no fault found functionally.
On the other hand, the installed seat on the aircraft is functioning properly after being replaced with new one. This
shows that the removed components or seat electrical system seem to have something wrong functionally.
In recent three years, 59 seats were replaced, 17 ECUs were replaced, 63 V-actuators were replaced, and 63
H-actuators were replaced.
Based on contents mentioned above, ANA would like to raise the following request: to maintain more reliability as
a seat electrical system, an investigation more detailed than existing one for finding the root cause is needed.
Ipeco, Boeing, and other operator comments, please.

Associate
Airline
240 MMC Trash Compactor 3210 Safran B777 25-30-17 AFR/KLM AFR
Motor Assembly Series Cabin
On trash compactor motor assembly, when mounting bracket, rivetless nutplate is damaged (item 80 Figure 11
IPL 25-20-17).
OEM proposes to replace the motor assembly. We propose to replace insert and screw.
Can the OEM propose insert and screw P/N and a repair process?
Operator and OEM comments, please.
Associate
Airline
241 MMC Trash Compactor T900 Safran A350 25-35-27 AFR/KLM AFR
Motor Assembly Series Cabin
AFR requested access to the gain software as described in the CMM:
As its answer to this request, the OEM proposed a test stand. We do not understand why the software listed in
the CMM cannot be supplied.
OEM comments please.

Title Associate
Airline
242 MMC Drawings Aircraft Safran A350XWB 25 AFR/KLM KLM

Evacuation Aerosystems
System
According to the “A350 XWB AIRCRAFT EVACUATION SYSTEM” CMM 25-61-58 page 1002: Drawings of
equipment/tools manufactured by Air Cruisers are available from Air Cruisers upon request.
The initial AFR request is dated on 26/09/2017, until this date AFR has no news from Zodiac either about the
drawings and the prices.
In this context, could the OEM provide the drawings and prices of these tools?

Associate
Airline
243 MMC Fire Extinguisher See Attached Kidde B777 26 AFR/KLM AFR
Container Data
AFR received several answers from the OEM about fire extinguisher overhaul. However, these answers were not
included in the CMM and AFR got authorities remarks. AFR requested several times for the change
implementation.
AFR requests OEM to modify the CMM in accordance with mail rather than Non-Technical Objection, which is not
considered approved documentation.
P/N CMM E-mail

473474 26-21-44 1. Torque Specifications
473854 26-21-53 Following E-Mail dated Dec 13/2011, Kidde Aerospace has No
473876 26-21-54 Technical Objection to increasing the torque to 135 – 140 in-lbs
473475 26-21-45 (15.25 – 15.82 Nm) should the valve leak.
Note: See in page 8003, Table 8001 “Torque Specifications” IPL
Figure and Item 1-80 or 1-80A Fitting, Fill and-Safety du
DTR.
2.. Following E-mail Dated October 4 2012 kidde Aerospace No
Technical Objection for use the part number MS21914-10W cap
Pressure Seal rep 26.
3. Fire extinguisher containers filling.
First of all, we don't have this issue on small extinguisher
containers to meet the Nitrogen pressure and weight given into
Table –Leading Particulars – of CMMs when we fill the containers
with the Nitrogen pressure given in Table 7003.
But for large Ti extinguisher containers, AFR can't meet the CMMs
requirements.
If we follow the indicated Nitrogen pressure given in Table 7003, we
can't achieve the required Nitrogen weight given in table 1 –
Leading Particulars. To reach the required weight, AFR has to fill
at the max Nitrogen Pressure noted in Table 1 ( see below table):
See the Email below for the answer .
472620 26-20-96 1- Following E-Mail dated Jun 05/2012 Kidde Aerospace has Not
473838 26-21-56 Technical
Objection to use of copper seat P/N A805505 during overhaul of
containers
472620-X to assist in preventing a leak from the fill plug area.
Note: Subtask 26.20.96.410.002.A01 Before (1) install the copper
seat P/N
A805505 in the weldment fill fitting.
CMM 26-21-45 26-21-54 26-21-54 26-21-54 26-21-44

P/N 473475-3 473876-3 473876-3 473876-3 473474-3
SN 1805G 0461BA 0956BA 2225BA 18899EL
EXTINGUISHING 72.00 to 72.25 80.00 to 80.25 80.00 to 80.25 80.00 to 80.25 52.50 to
AGENT WEIGHT lbs lbs lbs lbs 52.75 lbs
N NITROGEN 0.47 to 0.59 lbs 0.46 to 0.57 lbs 0.46 to 0.57 lbs 0.46 to 0.57 lbs 0.57 to
WEIGHT for 300 to 325 for 300 to 325 for 300 to 325 for 300 to 325 0.66 lbs
Psig at 70°F psig at 70°F Psig at 70° F Psig at 70° F for 360 to
385 Psig
at 70° F
AIRBONE MAX. 84.76 lbs 92.80 lbs 92.80 lbs 92.80 lbs 62.72 lbs
WEIGHT
Measured Empty 10.72 lbs 10.63 lbs 10.39 lbs 11.00 lbs 8.65 lbs
Weight Container
A
less discharge
head & cartridge
Extinguishing 72.10 lbs 80.18 lbs 80.23 lbs 80.12 lbs 52.68 lbs
H
Agent Filled weight
Room 70° F 70° F 70° F 70° F 70° F
Temperature
Stabilized 70°F 70° F 70° F 70° F 70° F
Container
Temperature
Nitrogen Pressure 300 Psig 300 Psig 300 Psig 300 Psig 360 Psig
per table 7003
Nitrogen achieved 300 Psig 300 Psig 300 Psig 300 PSIG 360 Psig
Pressure
G Final Bottle weight 83.10 lbs 91.08 lbs 90.98 lbs 91.48 lbs 61.82 lbs
Calculated 0.28 lbs 0.27 lbs 0.36 lbs 0.36 LBS 0.49 lbs
Nitrogen Weight for 0.47 lbs for 0.46 lbs for 0.46 lbs for 0.46 lbs for 0.57
N
(A+H)= L , (G-L)= minimum minimum minimum minimum lbs
N minimum
Needed Nitrogen 320 Psig 325 Psig 325 Psig 325 Psig 385 Psig
Pressure to meet
Nitrogen minimum
required weight
Final Container 83.34 lbs 91.30 lbs 91.12 lbs 91.62 lbs 61.93
J
Weight
Calculated 0.52 lbs 0.49 lbs 0.50 lbs 0.50 lbs 0.60 lbs
Nitrogen Weight
N
(A+H)= L (J-L)=
N
Operator, OEM, and airframer comments, please.

Associate
Airline
244 MMC Repairability of Wire 60592 Zodiac A320 25-65-17 LHT DLH
Control Assembly Aerospace Fam
P/N 65757-101
EWG
The Wire Control Assembly P/N 65757-101 is part of the inflation system for the A320 offwing escape slides. It is
the link between the emergency escape door of the aircraft and the reservoir/valve assembly, which is located in
the aircraft fuselage and is necessary to inflate the A320 offwing slide.
The part itself is a wire with a ball at one end and a terminal on the other and has two deflection pulleys (see
graphic). LHT receives a lot of NHA units P/N 60592-Series that have Wire Control Assemblies with a bend wire
or a bend terminal and since there is no repair procedure for this part, the whole assembly has to be replaced.
LHT therefore would like to see that the OEM includes a repair procedure for this part in the CMM.
Do other operators or MROs have similar experiences and thus requesting the reparability of the component/part?
Will the OEM provide a repair procedure for this part in the respective CMM?
Other operator and OEM comments, please.

Associate
Airline
245 AMC Reliability of A350 688-x B/E A350 25-36-49 LHT FIN
Galley Chiller Series Aerospace
The reliability of the A350 Air Chiller is very low (688-x series Air Chiller). B/E Aerospace has already released
several SBs for reliability improvement, but until now the reliability has not increased significantly.
Do other airlines also see a low reliability?
B/E Aerospace: What is the current status of the reliability improvement program?
B/E Aerospace and other operator comments, please.
*****18-220*****
AMC 267XP Chillers 267XP B/E Aerospace B767 25-33 DAL

(Rockwell Collins) A330
Reliability has been poor. B/E promised to make reliability improvements to be implemented by the end of 2017.
There have been no reliability improvements so far.
B/E, airframer, and other operator comments, please.

246 AMC Poor Reliability 4323100-01-6622 B/E Aerospace B777 25 EVA

Steam Oven
1. B/E Aerospace tried to improve the reliability of oven control module PN 4383100-02-6622 by software
update on the power board SB-OCM300-25-0026 but it did not help. Other operators, please share your
experiences.
2. EVA AIR has two oven control modules PN 4383100-02-6622. While aircraft was on cruise, there was a spark
and smoke emanated after the oven was on medium steam for three minutes. EVA believes the oven control
module connector and its mating connector in the oven assembly must be replaced with one that has bigger
contacts for higher-rated current and temperature, and better separation between the power contacts. B/E
Aerospace and other operators, please comment.
Oven Control Module Connector (Good Condition)
Oven Control Module Connector (Burnt Condition)
Case 1 (MAR/17/2018)
Case 2 (JAN/05/2019)
247 AMC Poor Reliability Espresso HFE2005-01 Iacobucci B777 25 EVA

Maker
EVA has experienced many removals of Espresso Maker PN: HFE2005-01 due to continuous leaking of water to
the drain tube. The problem, per Iacobucci, is due to failure of the manifold. They advised EVA to replace the
manifold every time failure is found.
The cost of replacing the manifolds (there are about seven manifolds or solenoids in each espresso maker) is
high. However, the main reason for failure of the manifolds was never corrected until now: the spring inside the
manifold tends to stick to the solenoid’s plunger in open position, which could be due to inadequate dimension
clearance.
In addition, maintenance found a compound inside the water supply system.
EVA requests Iacobucci investigate the reason why this compound was found inside the water supply system,
provide corrective action to the manifold with less cost to the operator, and clarify the main failure reason for the
manifold.
After disassembly, EVA found water inlet main fold contaminated, which caused the solenoid water leak.
Iacobucci, Boeing, and other operator comments, please.

******17-133******
Title Associate
Airline
MMC Espresso 4671-XXXX-XX B/E B787 25-33-44 AFR/ KLM

Beverage Aerospace KLM
Water
Heater
Steam 4660-XXXX-XX 25-35-11
Oven
4651-XXXX-XX 25-35-15
4323500-XX-6600 25-35-52
AFR/KLM has requested several times all the tool drawings to have new repair capability.
Our PSAA says: Boeing 787 SFE tooling…of which in accordance with PSAA D6-81852 Rev. C, their drawings
should be provided to the aircraft customer or customer designee.
Please note that the letters addressing KLM as customer designee were previously sent out to B/E Aerospace.
We understand that B/E Aerospace protects Intellectual Property Rights, but we are following the PSAA
procedure and we are authorized to get the data.
We need these drawings to perform maintenance and calibration on the Test equipment.
We see this happening with other OEMs, too.
Boeing and other operators, please comment. How can the airlines and designees get the drawings?
******17-147******
Associate
Airline
MMC Coffee Maker 4510-22UF00 BE A330 2536 DAL HAL

Reliability Aerospace
Airbus
Coffee makers have been #1 on the HAL component performance index for years. In the last 12 months, they
have had 109 confirmed failures with an experienced MTBUR 7517. Most of the failures are for the liquid level
sensors and/or ventilation valves.
What is being done to improve reliability of this highly used, but often deferred, necessary flight equipment?
BE Aerospace, Airbus, and other operator comments, please.

248 MMC B/E Aerospace Lavatory Module 1L300040 Collins B737 25 EXS
Aerospace
Boeing 38
Jet2.com is struggling with numerous built quality issues with the new B/E Aerospace Lavatory installed on our
new aircraft.
These issues include:
7 x Lavatory Door Frame Trim damaged or poor condition

5 x Lavatory Door Rub Strip End Caps missing
5 x Lavatory Seat Lids cracked
2 x Lavatory Shrouds cracked or poor condition
2 x Lavatory Bin Access Door Trim Panels damaged
2 x Lavatory Sink dented or Backsplash damaged
2 x Lavatory Vanity Door/Mirror Trim damaged
1 x Lavatory Call Assistance Trim cracked
1 x Lavatory Amenities Box delaminated
Please see images below:

These issues risk causing passenger injury, are visually displeasing to our high cabin standards, and add
significant maintenance burden due to frequent replacements. Poor design of certain aspects of the module are
deemed to be the root cause.
Other operators, Boeing, and Collins Aerospace comments please.

OXYGEN
249 MMC Crew O2 Masks MF20 Series Zodiac B737NG 35 AAL

and MAX
B777
A320F
A330
AA uses the Zodiac MF20 series masks cross fleet and between legacy AA and US Air fleets. In the past few years,
increasing reports of supply hose failure at the mask attachment have been reported. Zodiac has been informed of
the failures and our concerns but contends that the failures are caused by mishandling. We believe a stiffer molded
sleeve, or a deficient connection design, is a contributing factor. We are implementing a “Caution – Do Not Pull
Sleeve” to help but believe more will be needed.
Also, the inflatable harnesses are not lasting for the estimated five to six years before failure with required usage
cases.
Questions:
1. Boeing/Airbus/Other Operators – Have you seen the above supply hose failures as well for your MF20
series masks?
2. Will Zodiac look at a re-design of this connection?
3. Boeing/Airbus/Other Operators – For your masks, has harness life falling short of expectations with normal
usage?
Boeing, Airbus, Zodiac, and other operator comments, please.
Associate
Airline
250 MMC Face Shield Separation MF20-534 Zodiac A330 35-13 DAL HAL
In 2018, 55 flight crew oxygen masks were replaced with about half of them due to failure of the lower center shield
attachment pin. It appears that the pin is not strong enough to withstand normal operation. The HAL MTBUR for the
mask is 7,044.
Is there a service bulletin available or in work that provides for a stronger attachment pin at this location?
Have other operators been affected by this failure?

OXYGEN
Zodiac and other operator comments, please.

OXYGEN
251 MMC Air Supply Hose Failures MF20-534 Zodiac 35-13-60 LHT
Our usage on supply line hoses (PN DTS4058G) on these Full Face Quick Donning Mask Regulators has more
than doubled from 2017 (42/1035 = 4%) to 2018 (88/1023 = 8.6%). The common failure is shown below. We have
noticed that a majority of these failures are on newer masks (DOM of 2016 and later). We suspect the manufacturing
process might have changed.
Do other operators observe the same trend?
Is this topic known at the OEM and what will be done to correct this trend?
Title Associate
Airline
252 MMC Torquage 804044-15 / Safran B777 35 AFR/KLM AFR

of Valve Aerosystems
Cylinder
Why does the locknut between oxygen cylinder and valve torque indicated in the CMM (240 in.lbs) damage the
valve thread? As a consequence, the valve cannot be installed because the thread is damaged.
We thought the repaired valve was the problem, so we bought a new valve and tested the torque value indicated in
the CMM (240 in.lbs). We noticed the same results: the valve thread is damaged.
Could Zodiac give us a value to torque properly and update the CMM?
OEM comments please.

WATER & WASTE

Associate
Airline
253 MMC Toilet Installation TA9115-00 AOA A330 38-31 DAL HAL
Alignment
TA9125-00
Airbus A330 AMM 38-31-41-400-801-A specifies waste pipe axial and angular limitations during installation but
does not contain directions to correct out of tolerance conditions. The waste pipes of unserviceable units received
at the repair facility have measured as much as 0.25-inch vertical deviation from drawings. This misalignment is
causing a preload of the outlet elbow, part number 9110-000000-13, which could lead to cracking of the elbow
and leaks.
FAIR item 16.0036 has been open for almost three years with several operators confirming cracked outlet elbows
but the only remedy offered is to install correctly.
Would it be possible for Airbus to include instructions, such as shimming the mount base, in the AMM in order to
obtain the closest possible waste tube alignment?
WATER & WASTE
Associate
Airline
254 MMC Waste Separator G520DA72 AOA A330 38-36 DAL HAL
Failure
Hawaiian Airlines has experienced several failures of the waste separator assembly such as broken internal
components and cracked flanges. This has led to effluent overboard discharge and fuselage skin corrosion.
Repairing these conditions are a safety and health concern for maintenance personnel. The Airbus recommended
maintenance program for cleaning and replacement is being complied with, but failures continue to occur.
The design of the waste separator does not appear to be robust enough to perform as expected under normal
operating conditions. Has AOA investigated damaged separators or performed testing to identify root cause of
failures? When can we expect a modification that will improve performance and reliability?
Have other operators experienced similar waste separator failures?
AOA, Airbus, and other operator comments, please.

WATER & WASTE

Associate
Airline
255 MMC Repair Training Multi Safran B787 38 AFR/KLM AFR

Aerosystems
AFR has requested training on the following components:

• 77000-575 – GWIV
• 77000-600/77001-040 – Potable Water Pump
• 77000-695 – 2 port Motor Operated Drain Valve
• 7700-685 – 4 port Motor Operated Drain Valve
OEM does not have the ability to provide the trainings (repair is done by subcontractors, repair is done by other
business units, or Zodiac does not have PMA certificate to sub-assy and piece parts).
We request Zodiac (Safran Aerosystems) to propose a solution and provide training as contracted with airframer.
Airframer, Zodiac, and other operator comments please.
Associate
Airline
256 MMC Gray Water 77000-575 Safran B787 38 AFR/KLM AFR

Interface Valve Aerosystems
AFR requested to have access to SW77000-575 and TB77000-575 to repair its GWIV. No tool drawings or quote
were provided.
AFR requests to have access to tool drawings and data to build its special test equipment as OEM contracted
with airframer.

WATER & WASTE
Title Associate
Airline
257 MMC A320 14330-514-205 Safran A320 38-31 AFR/KLM AFR

Toilet Aerosystems Fam
Revolution
14330-514-206
14330-514-207
14330-514-208
References:
1. Zodiac VSB: 14330-004-38-003 and 14330-004-38-002 for “Toilet Assembly Replacement”
2. Zodiac CMM: 38-34-41 for “Revolution Vacuum Toilet”
Requests:
We know some operators have upgraded their A320 Airplanes by VSB listed “1”.
Among these concerned operators:

• Is there someone who may share with AFR their experience around reliability, efficiency, and
maintenance facility of these “Toilet revolution”?
Airlines comments please.
******17-114******
MMC Water Separator 14401-085 Zodiac A320F 38-30 AAL
AAL experiences consistently high MEL rates for the vacuum toilet system, with a MEL rate of .20 per 100
departures over the last 12 months. The top drivers of these MELs are waste tank quantity indication and vacuum
generator availability on the ground. Both of these failures are a direct result of water separator failure. Waste
water from the tank is being sucked into the vacuum generator and reducing its service life as well as
contaminating the LLT to the point it cannot transmit an accurate indication of waste level in the tank. AAL
currently replaces the water separator every 24 Months (730 Days) or 7,500 FH or 5,000 FC, whichever occurs
first. A reduction of replacement time to 750 FH to align with the A check is too aggressive and out of scope for
the work being done. AAL would like Airbus/Zodiac to investigate an improvement to the water separator MPN
14401-085 and similar such that the unit can last at minimum 7,500 FH without contaminating the liquid level
transmitter and vacuum generator.
AAL is aware of Airbus SIL 38-020.
Other operator, Zodiac, and Airbus comments please.

IFE SYSTEMS
258 AMC Thales i5000 QSEB 178861-101 / QSEB Thales A330 44 KAL
Power Board Fails
178861-102 / QSEB B777
Last March 2018, smoke and burning smells occurred under seat 57E (economy class) after take-off on the
KE647 (ICN-SIN) flight. The aircraft was HL7584 (A330-300) and equipped with Thales i5000 IFE system.
L19 thermal fuse inductors designed to protect the QSEB internally with overcurrent and overheating were the
main causes of smoke and burning odors. According to the Thales investigation report, as of November 2018,
there have been seven confirmed L19 thermal fuse failures related to the QSEB since Thales changed the QSEB
design to replace the L19 inductor with the new L19 thermal fuse inductor. Even if this was not the first time,
Thales has no solution to prevent the QSEB burn because the LRU design has met its safety requirements in
Thales’s perspective.
How can you say it is "safe" when smoke and burning smell occurs during flight?
There are 5,382 QSEBs in 48 aircrafts equipped with the Thales i5000 IFE system at Korean Air. If there were no
solutions to prevent the QSEB burn, it could recur and cause other flight diversions/delays/ATBs that were used
to determine a definitive adverse economic impact to the operators.
259 AMC Discontinuation of RD-FW7805-53 Panasonic B777 44 KAL

Minor Part for IFE
LRU
10.6” Smart Monitor A380
Last year, KAL received a notice about the discontinuation of minor part (R8U4FW7805W). Since KAL could not
repair the IFE monitor, we sent it abroad for repair. During the repair process, KAL operated aircraft with seat
blocked condition. Even though we repeatedly told Panasonic about our difficulties, the situation has not
improved.
Recently, the warranty (four years) for the monitor has been over. The last aircraft equipped with this monitor is
still less than five years. KAL has introduced equipment and authorization from Panasonic for the repair of
monitors but could not fix it because of minor part discontinuation.
This condition causes economic loss to KAL and the bigger problem is that seat blocks still occur. Due to monitor
repair abroad and discontinuation of the minor part, TAT has increased. KAL requested several alternatives
(purchase an additional monitor, reproduce minor part for repair, decrease TAT period, etc.) to prevent seat
blocks, but all were rejected from Panasonic. Because of these circumstances, we do not have any option to
solve this problem.
1. Panasonic informed KAL that discontinued minor parts will increase. Therefore, KAL strongly requests to
Panasonic take measures to prevent seat blocks.
Panasonic and other operator comments, please.

IFE SYSTEMS
260 AMC Gen 3 GCS RD-NB2504-01 BC03 Panasonic A319/A320 44-35 UAL
RD-NB2511-02 DPA02 B757
B767
B777
B787
United and Panasonic recently completed upgrading Panasonic eXConnect-equipped airplanes to the Gen 3
Panasonic GCS system, including BC-03, CWAP, and Gen 3 software/content. Gen 3 aircraft SLA performance
has improved since the 2018 AMC to 96.4% for non-outlier airplanes, and 52.9% for outlier airplanes.
Occurrences of dark flights has also improved. However, United continues to experience dual-panel antenna
MTBF/reliability issues, and the Gen 3 Network has been plagued with outage service impact from network
failures, network maintenance events, and network upgrades.
What is other operators’ experience with the Gen 3 hardware, software, and content?
What is other operators’ experience with the Gen 3 network?
Any information for further reliability improvement of GCS?
Other operator and Panasonic comments, please.

OTHERS
261 AMC ISPS Units 1191-46 Astronics A319 25 TAP

A320
A321
TAP currently has installed in the fleet a total of 1120 ISPS units (45 aircraft). Since this system was first installed
in the end of 2016 up until the end of 2018, there were 288 unscheduled removals, representing more than 25%
of the total units in service. In 2018 alone, TAP had a total of 190 unscheduled removals with confirmed failures.
The unscheduled removals were always due to the same failure that resulted in no power being supplied to the
electrical sockets.
In November 2017, Astronics released Mod C, which was intended to be a permanent solution for the faults that
were being experienced, but since then TAP had 14 units that failed again even after being already embodied
with Mod C by Astronics. As recommended in the service bulletin, TAP’s action plan has been to embody the Mod
C on attrition basis after unscheduled on‐wing removals.
TAP would like to know if other operators are experiencing a similar issue with this unit and the approach that is
being taken to solve it.
Is Astronics working in an improved solution to this problem?
Astronics and other operator comments, please.
Associate
Airline
262 AMC Finding System Parts Boeing B787 53 KLM/AFR KLM

in the B787 Fuselage
KLM recently completed the first three C-checks of KLM 787-9s. An issue that created multiple maintenance
disturbances was the lack of access to fasteners for replacement due to lightning strike damage.
Example 1: ref A shows a picture of a lightning strike on a fastener on PH-BHD (ZB236). After removal of the
interior lining from the forward cargo compartment, a duct was found to cover the fastener location, see ref B. This
duct is part of the ECS. There was no more time left in the C-check to remove, re-install and test this duct.
KLM engineering analyzed why the presence of this duct was missed during the work preparation phase. We
found that:
1. The fastener is common to a stringer that is NOT shown in the 787-9 SRM structure identification,
2. The duct/ECS system is not referenced or shown in the frame drawing.
OTHERS
Ref. A
Conclusion: the inability to see in Boeing SRM and fuselage frame drawing that the ECS system is located
directly behind the frame makes the engineer miss important access information.
Example 2: PH-BHD (ZB236) had a lightning strike at a fastener at STA569, between STR38L and 39L. During
access, KLM found that the fastener is behind the ref C Refrigeration Unit. This unit cannot be removed easily.
Since the C-check ground time was limited, the fastener could not be replaced. KLM also found that this fastener
is common to an intercostal that is not shown in the 787 SRM, nor in the frame drawings.
Conclusion: again, KLM engineering missed important access information here, resulting in a maintenance
disturbance and postponement of the task.
General:
To prevent future work stoppage and postponement of repairs, KLM engineering needs more insight into the
presence of system parts adjacent to 787 structure, as noted in the two examples above. The structure LWG
drawing typically does NOT show the surrounding system parts, NOR are they referenced. The system drawings
ARE generally accessible for KLM in the Bill of Materials Data Search, but you do need a system drawing number
to start.
Please note that it is often not practical to have a look inside a 787 during A-checks: KLM mechanics have a high
workload and have little time to assist engineering with removing and re-installing lining, parts, systems. The
cockpit is a busy area with mechanics doing checks, there not much space for system/cabinet removal. Also,
787s are not frequently hangered due to the high A-check interval.
This item was sent to Boeing as a SR. Until now, Boeing indicates that a composite drawing that combines the
structural, electrical, and systems installation for a specific section of the airplane does not exist and has not been
produced by Engineering. However, in each of the systems installation drawings, there will be a reference to a
structure, electrical harnesses, or system as a reference for orientation purposes.
In other words: you will have to review the separate system installation drawings, which remains a labor intense
way.
OTHERS
DESIRED ACTION:
KLM Engineering needs a B787 (LWG) drawing that shows all of the airplane systems that are located between
fuselage frames, or immediately behind fuselage frames. The drawing should show (1) if there is a system
present adjacent to the structure, and (2) show a reference drawing number of that particular system.
KLM needs such a drawing to engineer lightning strikes for the B787-9 and B787-10 fuselages. Separate
drawings for each B787 section will also do.
263 MMC Belly Panels 495Z2206-3 Boeing B787-800/900 53-60 UAL
B787-800/900 SRM CH53 does not have repairs for Section 44 through Section 46 belly panel/fairings. All other
Boeing fleet SRMs cover interim and permanent repairs. UAL requests Boeing to add such repairs to the
B787-800/900 SRM.
Boeing, please comment.
264 AMC Drawing Access Boeing All UAL
In numerous instances, we have been unable to access Boeing drawings for equipment on our aircraft (i.e.,
recently P/N 286W0670-003). This requires us to query Boeing for information we require that is not included in
the IPC or other Boeing manuals. We believe we should have access to all drawings for equipment that is on our
aircraft.
Boeing and other operators comment please.
265 AMC Flexi Prints 49-117-10 / SFCC BAE A319 27 UAL

A320
The LRU has flexi prints that have become brittle over the years and are easily damaged. UAL has a number of
units that require flexi print replacement that BAE has been unable to supply.
Does BAE have a recovery plan for these parts?
BAE and other operator comments, please.

OTHERS
266 AMC Long Turn Times Various BAE Various UAL
Units returned to BAE consistently exceed 30 day turn times and often 60+ days. Does BAE have a plan to
improve on their turn time?
BAE and other operator comments, please.
267 AMC Obsolescence Issues All Airbus UAL
OEM have either replaced or removed optional parts from the IPL and replaced them with OEM part numbers that
are not available. This places a burden on the operator in getting replacement parts when the OEM has issue in
identifying their own part numbers. We get a message like “Piece parts are unknown or not in our system.”
Airbus and other operators, please comment.
Associate
Airline
268 AMC Training Thales 39451282xx Thales A320 AFR/KLM AFR

3945129100
Since October 2017, we have asked Thales for training sessions on ELAC “B & B-DL” including Bite decoding.
Last reminder was done on February 2018.
Thales replied at the time that they had a resource problem and that they could not provide any date for the next
training session. We have heard no news since then (March 2018).
Could Thales provide a date for the next ELAC training? Similar request for the new FMGC POWER 8 training.
Other operator and Thales comments, please.

OTHERS
Associate
Airline
269 AMC Shelf Life All All Airbus All AFR/KLM AFR
Limitation
COMPONENTS SHELF LIFE LIMITATION:
AFR faced many issues on components for which a "Shelf Life" or a "Partial Check" are indicated on the
EASA/FAA form One, i.e., cap-coupling refuel P/N: 0727540 EASA form in annex (but many different P/N are
concerned by this same topic), although unfortunately not mentioned anywhere in official reference documents
(neither CMM nor SPM for the majority). Airbus has been contacted for more information.
Airbus answered and confirmed that conservation data are issued from the OEMs and conform to the
Manufacturer's Design Data (MDD) and also specified that Manufacturers (OEMs) have no obligation to make
them appear into their CMM or other technical documents.
Some CMM storage chapters provide this information.
Open Questions:
What solutions could OEMs implement (if not decided to insert into their referenced documents directly as Airbus
said) to clearly provide storage data (shelf life storage)?
Operators, OEMs, and Airbus comment please.

OTHERS
Associate
Airline
270 AMC No Test Capability 28969-x GKN B787 30-11-01 DLH ACA
on Heater Mats Aerospace
GKN still has not set-up full test capability on the B787 heater mats (PNR 28969-x). Although they can technically
test the units, they cannot issue any release to service certificates. This part is definitively too expensive to be
scraped and rebought in new condition.
When will the test capability including certification capability be set up?
GKN Aerospace and other operator comments, please.
271 AMC SRM Material Substitution Airbus A320 51-30 UAL

Factor
Airbus A320 SRM 51-70-12-001, Table 04 lists 1.37/1.42 substitution factors for 2024-T42 when replacing 2024-
T3 CLAD. A stiffness and strength comparison between 2024-T42 and 2024-T3 CLAD indicates this substitution
factor should be closer to 1. The high substitution factor raises possible concerns of a stiffness imbalance when
the substitution is made leading to a hardpoint.
Could Airbus discuss this substitution factor?
Airbus comments please.

OTHERS
Item Orig Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From
272 AMC 3D Technology Impact All All All All Safran

Engineering
Services
A lot of parts were built and installed on aircraft since 2015. In some cases, the aircraft manufacturer used
additive manufacturing to create parts that are even more resistant to wear and the passage of time.
What is the danger for the introduction of counterfeit part, and how can it be avoided in terms of security and
traceability?
273 AMC A220 Security Logs Many CSALP A220 46 DAL
Delta Air Lines is required to collect security logs for the A220 per AC 119‐1. Currently the system is designed
where Delta Air Lines must collect security logs from four different LRUs.
1. What is CSALPs plan to centralize the collection of the security logs?

2. Is there a vision for wireless security log downloading on all the LRUs?
Collins, airframer, and other operator comments, please.
274 AMC 737 ONS Boeing B737 46 DAL

Teledyne
Delta Air Lines currently utilizes a Maintenance Laptop for the Portable Maintenance Devices (PMD) to perform
routine and/or non‐routine maintenance on the 737 ONS (Onboard Network System).
When will Boeing certify the PMAT‐XS as an alternate to the Mtc Laptop for the B737 ONS?
Boeing, Teledyne, and other operator comments, please.

OTHERS
275 MMC Fire Extinguisher – 33600005-3 Meggitt A320 Fam 26 TAP

Press. Switch
34600028-1
The Halon 1301 fire extinguishers have installed a welded pressure switch. This pressure switch is designed to
permit the functional test with a hex-wrench, during aircraft maintenance or in the shop, during overhaul and
repair.
We noted that this hex adapter in the pressure switch is showing more frequently a strong corrosion.
Due to manufacturing material used, with the addition of a weak design, the hex wrench adapter fractures very
frequently. This component is not repairable, and the cost associated with the replacement makes the unit
normally beyond economical and technical repair.
The conclusion is that the design of the hex adapter and materials used in this fire extinguisher should be
reanalyzed by the manufacturer to avoid the scrap as a consequence of a test.
The newly manufactured fire extinguishers have also frequently shown corrosion on the container, not acceptable
per DOT regulations.
We would like to know the industry experience on this matter and the manufacturer feedback about this issue.
Considering this issue is a serious problem already reported to the manufacturer, we would like to know, in the
case of a worldwide reported issue, what has been done to improve the reported problem.
Meggitt and other operator comments please.
******17-143******
Associate
Airline
MMC Fire Detection Pylon Detector 7101-52 Meggitt A330 2611 DAL HAL
Due to ETOPS operating requirements, HAL has experienced several operational disruptions due to failed pylon
fire detectors. In the last 12 months, 6 pylon detectors have been replaced, but in the same time period, only 4
detectors have been replaced for all other positions.
Has Airbus or Meggitt identified why the pylon detector fails more frequently than any other position and designed
a more robust detector for that position?
Airbus, Meggitt, and other operator comments, please.

OTHERS
276 MMC Wiper Motor Convertor 2313M347-4 Rosemount B737 30 JAL

(Collins)
2313M348-4
JAL has experienced three schedule interruptions and removed the Wiper motor convertor (WMC) due to the
wiper inoperative in 2018.
Collins shop findings mentioned that three WMCs were found failure of module on power CCA (Part Number
02316-0191-0002). Collins Engineers advised us they are aware that the power module in the WMC is likely to fail
over time. It is one of the highest failure findings during repair.
Rosemount design engineering has proposed an update to this WMC Model 2313M-347-4/-348-4 that would
eliminate the power module such that it is replaced with discrete components.
JAL assumes that update is useful for us since we can replace power CCA without removing and reinstalling
wiper and WMC. The Wiper inoperative is serious problem for JAL because it is most likely to cause schedule
interruptions, so we strongly hope that Collins Engineers expedite an update to this WMC.
Comments from other operators, Collins, Boeing and other airframers are highly appreciated.
******17-129******
MMC Air Separation Module 2060017-101 Parker A320 FAM 47 DAL

(ASM)
2060017-102
2060017-103
Delta has seen 30 removals in the last 18 months, for Fuel Inerting system maintenance messages and other
faults. This is trending in a similar way to the B737NG Air Separation Module (ASM).
Unscheduled Removal (UR)

Stock Num:32-4710-9-0003,30Jun2017
30 23 25
25 17
20 13 14 14 14 15
15 11
UR
7 8
10 5
5
0
Jul-16
Sep-16
Feb-17
Apr-17
Jun-17
Aug-16
Oct-16
Jan-17
Mar-17
Nov-16
May-17
Dec-16
Month-Year
Other supplier and operator comments, please.

OTHERS
******17-130******
MMC Air Separation Module 2060017-102 Parker A319 47-10 AAL

2060017-103 A320
A321
ASM MPN 2060017-102 had an AD mandated life limit of 27,000 FH when the FTIS system was installed. In April
2017, this life limit was reduced from 27,000 FH to 17,000 FH with very little communication or discussion with the
operators. This change in life limit has resulted in early projection of spending on ASM replacements, tracking
changes, and coordination with the OEM.
Questions:
1. Why was the life limit reduced from 27,000 FH to 17,000 FH on P/N 2060017-102?
2. Why was the life limit on P/N 2060017-103 pro-rated if it is being transferred from a High Temp System to
Low temp system? It is very confusing from a configuration point of view for operators.
Parker and other operator comments, please.
******17-150******
Associate
Airline
MMC Door Sill Anti-Rollout 402100-1 Tellair A330 2551 DAL HAL
Latch Causing Door
Damage
For three years, HAL has been plagued with operational disruption due to cargo door damage caused by the door
sill anti-rollout latch failing to return to the up position. The root cause given by Tellair is wear of the cadmium
plating of pivoting components, allowing corrosion to form which leads to sticking and/or binding. The fix reported
by Tellair, which is still unavailable, will be improved plating. No mention of lubrication, servicing, or inspection
changes has been received.
What type of analysis and testing has been performed that makes Tellair feel that a plating change alone is the
final fix for this problem? When will these improved latches be available?
Tellair and other operator and supplier comments, please.

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2019 AMC & MMC Program

Avionics Maintenance Conference

AMC Reference 19-013/MSG-353

AMC & MMC Reminders

Joint Opening at the 2017 AMC | AEEC in Milwaukee, Wisconsin

Conference Attendance Fees (cut-off date April 14, 2019)

Hours of on-site operation:

First things first:

• You are going to the Hilton Prague Hotel

AEEC | AMC & MMC KEYNOTE SPEAKER P-9

AMC & MMC SCHEDULE OF EVENTS P-10

AMC & MMC OPENING SESSION P-11

AMC INDUSTRY SESSION P-11

AMC & MMC SYMPOSIUMS P-12

AMC ELECTIONS P-14

AMC STEERING GROUP P-15

AMC & MMC GUIDELINES P-16

AMC & MMC SOCIAL EVENTS P-19

AMC FOLLOW-UP ITEMS P-22

MMC FOLLOW-UP ITEMS P-25

AMC & MMC QUESTIONS BY TOPIC See Next Page

AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS 96

ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEMS 101

FUEL SYSTEMS 107

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS 113

LANDING GEAR 149

ENGINE SYSTEMS 162

INDICATING SYSTEMS 168

NACELLES & THRUST REVERSERS 185

WATER & WASTE 217

IFE SYSTEMS 221

We were in Prague with AMC | AEEC in 2015. It

In Prague, we will do an experiment with attendees. It will be something interactive and

We'll meet again

Vincent Metz is an experienced business

Vincent joined KLM E&M in 1997 and early

Vincent has a BSc in Aeronautical engineering and MSc in Industrial Engineering

AMC Chairman Marijan Jozic KLM Royal Dutch Airlines

Vincent Metz Head of Strategy, Marketing &

Volare Awards Marijan Jozic KLM Royal Dutch Airlines

AMC Awards Anand Moorthy American Airlines

AEEC Awards Robert Swanson FedEx

2019 AMC Industry Session

AMC Chairman Marijan Jozic, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines

Future Concepts for Maintenance Subcommittee

OMG Obsolescence Management Guidance

AMC Steering Committee Election Overview

AMC Exec. Secretary Sam Buckwalter

Big Data – Continuation

Speakers: James Jackson Delta Air Lines

Moderator: José Almeida TAP Portugal

Wednesday, May 1, 2019 – 3:20pm

Speakers: Michael Vanguardia The Boeing Company

Moderator: Ted McFann FedEx

2019 AMC Symposium Speakers: Security

Michael Vanguardia is an Associate Technical Fellow and

Peter Lemme has been leading the integration of multiple suppliers,

He is an active participant in ARINC IA AEEC subcommittees,

Member at large Air France KLM

The AMC Steering Committee shall be comprised of 11 voting representatives

To ensure global representation, the AMOs elected to the AMC Steering

For more information, contact Sam Buckwalter, AMC Executive Secretary.

AMC STEERING COMMITTEE ROSTER