ANS-DRL-012 - Well Integrity Manual

Uncontrolled when Printed
Well Integrity Manual
ANS-DRL-012
Issue Name: Mark Hobbs Name: Ken Lowe

Authority
Position: Production Manager CNS Position: Production Manager NNS
Signature: Signature:
Technical Name: Joe Narducci

Authority
Position: Drilling Manager
Signature:
Department: Drilling
Issue Number: Issue 1 First Issue Date: May 2015
Revision Date: August 2015 Next Review Date: August 2016
To access this document electronically please visit:
http://gbrbms.apachecorp.com/
Well Integrity Manual ANS-DRL-012
Contents
Revision History
Distribution List
Preface
List of Abbreviations
Section 1 Introduction
Section 2 Well Lifecycle
Section 3 Well Integrity Management System

Section 4 Well Integrity Monitoring, Testing
and Maintenance
Section 5 Subsea Well Integrity
Section 6 Corrosion, Scale, Wax and Corrosion Management
(Production Chemistry)
Section 7 Other Well Integrity Considerations
Section 8 Well Suspension, Temporary Abandonment
and Permanent Abandonment
August 2015 Issue 1 i/ii

Revision History
Amended By Date Issue No Description

Jim Horsburgh August 2015 Issue 1 First issue on BMS. This document
supersedes Apache Well Integrity Policy
and Procedure (FX-0344) and Heritage
EM DAPPs Well Integrity Assurance
Procedure (MM-M-G-00-MP-031/006).
August 2015 Issue 1 iii/iv

Distribution List
Holders of Controlled Hard Copy
Copy Copyholder Location
01 Data Control Centre (DCC) ODL, Aberdeen

02 BMS Library Apache, Caledonia House
03 Drilling Manager Apache, Caledonia House
04 Drilling Engineering Superintendent Apache, Caledonia House
05 Well Integrity Engineer Apache, Caledonia House
06 Well Intervention Superintendent Apache, Caledonia House

07 Completions and Subsea Superintendent Apache, Caledonia House
08 Drilling Technical Assistant Apache, Caledonia House
09 OIM Forties Alpha
10 OIM Forties Bravo
11 OIM Forties Charlie
12 OIM Forties Delta
13 OIM Forties Echo
14 OIM Beryl Alpha
15 OIM Beryl Bravo
Virtual Copyholders
Copy Copyholder
01 Document Technical Authority

02 Document Issue Authority
03 BMS Owner
04 Principal Production Engineer
05 Production Engineering Team Lead
06 Operations Support Superintendent
07 Operations Efficiency Manager
08 Information Services
09 Well Examiner, Chris Dykes International Ltd
10 NNS Production Manager
11 CNS Production Manager
August 2015 Issue 1 v/vi

Preface
Purpose
This manual has been designed in modular-format and each section may be amended
without significantly affecting the other sections. This Revision History should be updated
accordingly whenever any section is amended.
Review and Update

The content of this document will be reviewed for accuracy at 12-monthly intervals as decided
by the Technical Authority.
However, the document control system allows for continuous update of this document. As such,
any user may at any time identify an error or suggest an improvement using an Amendment
Proposal form, which is available electronically on the Apache North Sea BMS website,
or from the HSE Technical Assistant or Data Control Centre (DCC) Supervisor at ODL.
All holders of this document are registered so that they can be sent updates and be kept
informed of changes or reviews.
Responsibility of Copyholders
It is the responsibility of the registered copyholder of controlled hard copy versions to maintain
the accuracy of the document by ensuring that all updates are promptly incorporated and
acknowledged.
Furthermore, the registered copyholder of controlled hard copy versions must at all times
maintain custody of this document unless prior approval is given by the relevant Technical
Authority.
The roles and responsibilities of copyholders and ‘virtual’ copyholders are detailed in Section 1
of the Document Control Procedure (ANS-DCM-001).
August 2015 Issue 1 vii/viii

List of Abbreviations
ANSL Apache North Sea Ltd (Apache)

API American Petroleum Institute
ASV Annular Safety Valve
ASV Annulus Swab Valve (Subsea application)
BOP Blowout Preventer
BMS Business Management System
CNS Central North Sea
DCC Data Control Centre
DCR Design and Construction Regulations

DHSV Downhole Safety Valve
EM ExxonMobil
ESD Emergency Shutdown
ESDV Emergency Shutdown Valve
FALP Forties Artificial Lift Project
FASP Forties Alpha Satellite Platform
FWV Flow Wing Valve
HSE Health, Safety and Environmental
ICC Isolation Confirmation Certificate
ISSOW Integrated System of Work
KWV Kill Wing Valve
LMV Lower Master Valve
MAASP Maximum Allowable Annular Surface Pressure
MAOP Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure
MAWP Maximum Allowable Working Pressure
NNS Northern North Sea
NS North Sea
OIM Offshore Installation Manager
ORA Operational Risk Assessment
OSP Offshore Supervisor Production
August 2015 Issue 1 ix

ANS-DRL-012 Well Integrity Manual
List of Abbreviations (cont’d)
PBU Pressure Buildup

PFEER Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and Emergency Response
PWRI Produced Water Re-injection
RIDDOR The Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations
SCE Safety Critical Element
SIRP Safe Isolation and Re-Instatement of Plant
SSV Surface Safety Valve
TRDHSV Tubing Retrievable Downhole Safety Valve
TVM Tree Valve Maintenance
UMV Upper Master Valve
WCC Work Control Certificate
WRDHSV Wireline Retrievable Downhole Safety Valves
WSA Well Security Advisor
WSO Well Services Operator
x August 2015 Issue 1

Section 1
Introduction
Paragraph Page
1 Introduction 1-1
2 Purpose and Scope 1-1
3 Using this Document 1-1

4 Regulatory Requirements 1-2

4.1 Regulatory Enforcement 1-4
4.2 References to UK Legislation 1-5
4.3 Interfacing with the Regulatory Authorities (UK) 1-5
4.4 Apache Health, Safety and Environmental Group 1-6
5 Industry References 1-6
6 Notes on Terminology 1-7
Table
1.1 UK Well-related Legislation 1-2
1.2 UK Regulation References 1-5
1.3 Industry References 1-6
1.4 Asset-specific Terminology 1-7
Introduction
August 2015 Issue 1 1-i/ii
1 Introduction
As a prudent Operator and to ensure that its Licence to Operate (LTO) is not compromised,
Apache North Sea Ltd (Apache) must ensure that the requirements of any country-specific
regulations are met. Section 1 has been included to provide all personnel involved in well
operations with outline knowledge of the various regulations in force. It is not intended to be
a full training course but merely to provide an overview of well-related legislation and how
compliance should be met.
Note: Legislation is always subject to change, therefore, users of this section
are encouraged to consult the various websites and current revisions of the
reference documents quoted within this Section 1.
2 Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this document is to detail the management of well integrity for all of UK
Apache North Sea Ltd’s well-stock and in accordance with the applicable regulation which
requires a ‘lifecycle’ approach, is pertinent to the design, construction, operation
and maintenance of Apache wells in the United Kingdom.
This document is aimed primarily at field personnel involved in the ‘Operational Phase’ of
a well and focuses on the ‘what’ and ‘why’ in relation to well integrity. The ‘how
to’ work instruction documents reside at a lower level in the procedural hierarchy.
3 Using this Document

This manual has been laid out in modular format for ease of change based on the table
of contents provided. Any necessary forms and/or templates are provided in the section
relevant to the issue in question.
Although this manual focuses mainly on the operation and maintenance of wells, it should
be read in conjunction with other key Apache documents which deal with well integrity
requirements, including (albeit more focused on well construction and intervention
activities):
• Drilling and Well Operations Policy (ANS-DRL-002)
• Well Control Guidelines (ANS-DRL-003)
• Apache Well Lifecycle Process (intranet based)
• Risk Management – Drilling and Well Operations (ANS-DRL-013)
• Well Handover Procedure (ANS-SOP-059)
• SCE Performance Standards and Written Scheme of Verification (ANS-TI-036)
• Drilling and Well Operations Competency Management System (ANS-DRL-001)
Introduction
August 2015 Issue 1 1-1
The following documents are undergoing phase-out or revision within Apache but may
still be current at the time of issue of this manual:
• Heritage EM Drilling and Production Procedures Manual (DAPPs)
• Apache Well Integrity Policy and Procedures (FX-0344)
Manual users should, therefore, check to ensure that the documents outlined above are
still in use before referencing.
4 Regulatory Requirements
All UK safety legislation is underpinned by the Health and Safety at Work Act (HASAW)
and all industries in the UK have to comply with its requirements.
In respect of the oil and gas industry, specific legislation is derived from the Piper Alpha
Disaster of 1988 and the subsequent Cullen Enquiry which defined the requirement
for all installations operating on the United Kingdom Continental Shelf (UKCS) to produce
a safety case.
Dove-tailing with the contents of a safety case are several key regulations which must be
complied with and which put the onus on Operators to identify and to manage Major
Accident Hazards (MAHs). Such regulations, some of which are not directly related
to well integrity, are defined in Table 1.1 – how compliance is met is detailed
in individual installation safety cases.
Legislation Purpose How Apache Complies

Health and Safety Ensures the safety and Comprehensive Safety
at Work Act welfare of all workers Management Systems.
in the UK.
Safety Case Regulations Comply with UK Safety Installation-specific safety
(SCR) Case Regulations. cases are in place
for all Installations
Regulation 17/Schedule 6 Manage MAHs.
and wells and well
of SCR – Well Notifications
Advise the Regulator operations are described
Combined Operations of certain well activities. and detailed within such
(COMOPS) Safety Case documents.
Advise the Regulator of
combined (well) operations
between a fixed Installation
and a vessel.
Table 1.1 UK Well-related Legislation
Introduction
1-2 August 2015 Issue 1

Department of Energy and System for reporting System managed
Climate Change (DECC) and gaining consents by Drilling Technical
Consents System for certain well activities. Assistant(s).
(Permits and Consents) Consents are provided Managed by specialist
under the Petroleum Apache environmental
Operations Notice System personnel.
(PON).
PON System also applies
to the reporting of
chemicals – the PON 15
process. (Refer to section
on COSHH in this table.)
Design and Construction This is one of the main Apache Well Lifecycle
Regulations (DCR) regulations relating process (intranet based).

to wells.
Well Examination Scheme Well Examination Scheme
Defines the requirement manual (ANS–DRL-006).
to adopt a lifecycle
approach to all aspects
of well design, construction,
operation, maintenance and
subsequent abandonment.
Management and Defines the regulatory • Safety Cases.
Administration Regulations requirements for an
• Safety Management
(MAR) effective Safety
System
Management System.
Prevention of Fire and Safety Management
Explosion and Emergency System.
Response Regulations
(PFEER 1995)
Reporting of Injuries, To provide a system OIR9/B process and
Diseases and Dangerous for regulatory reporting. associated documentation.
Occurrences Regulations
Note: All RIDDOR Consult Apache Drilling
(RIDDOR)
Reports must HSE contact.
be channelled
via the nominated
HSE Contact.
Well Notifications Refer to Safety Case
regulations.
Table 1.1 UK Well-related Legislation (cont’d)
Introduction

Lifting Operations and Ensure that adequate
Lifting Equipment safety measures are in
Regulations (LOLER) place for the safe operation
of lifting equipment.
Provision and Use of Work Ensure that adequate
Equipment Regulations safety measures are in
(PUWER) place for the operation of
equipment.
Control of Substances Ensure that adequate Consult Apache HSE
Hazardous to Health safety measures are in Contact for COSHH
(COSHH) – Chemical place for the management training if necessary.
Usage Reporting and use of all chemicals in

the UK.
ATEX Guidelines European Union guidance Equipment Performance
on management and use Standards.
of equipment in potentially
explosive atmospheres.
Table 1.1 UK Well-related Legislation (cont’d)
4.1 Regulatory Enforcement

The UK oil and gas industry is subject to a Goal Setting Regime where performance
standards are set by the Operators themselves and not by the Regulator. However,
compliance with such standards is prescriptive and where necessary, regulatory
authorities in the UK have the necessary authority to:
• Carry out compliance assessments or audits of procedures or processes
• Issue an Improvement Notice – this is a notice ordering the company to improve
on compliance with the applicable performance standards, within a certain time period
• Issue a Prohibition Notice – this is a notice prohibiting further use of equipment
or process until the required performance standards have been met
Introduction
4.2 References to UK Legislation

The following legislative reference documents and websites are intended to provide
the reader with more detailed information than that supplied in this section.
Reference Name Comments

www.hse.gov.co.uk Fully-searchable UK Health and Safety
Executive website. Covers all industries in
the UK.
A guide to the well aspects of the Offshore Refer to www.hsebooks.co.uk
Installations and Wells (Design and
Construction, etc) Regulations 1996.
ISBN 978 0 7176 6296 8
A guide to the integrity, workplace Refer to www.hsebooks.co.uk

environment and miscellaneous aspects
of Offshore Installations and Wells
(Design and Construction, etc)
Regulations 1996.
ISBN 978 0 7176 1164 5
Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Refer to www.hsebooks.co.uk
Dangerous Occurrences (RIDDOR).
ISBN 978 0 7176 62906
Table 1.2 UK Regulation References
4.3 Interfacing with the Regulatory Authorities (UK)

In order to promote a disciplined and consistent approach to dealing with regulatory
authorities, only the applicable HSE Group contact should interface directly with contacts at
any regulatory authority. This requirement is particularly important in respect of the
following issues:
 The overall management of any regulatory authority findings or action items from
audits or assessments carried out by regulatory authorities
 Submission of reports under RIDDOR (OIR/9b process)
 Submission of any non-compliance reports and any follow-up actions
It is acceptable, however, for certain Apache personnel such as Drilling Superintendent,
Completions Superintendent and Well Services Superintendent to liaise with regulatory
authorities in respect of their day-to-day business, eg Well Notifications etc.
All formal correspondence must also be copied to the applicable HSE Group contact.
Introduction
4.4 Apache Health, Safety and Environmental Group

Certain individuals within the Health, Safety and Environmental (HSE) Group have
responsibilities in relation to regulatory compliance and must be consulted whenever
necessary.
The Apache HSE Group continually monitor for the issue of any new regulations and will
seek any necessary guidance from Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) in respect of any
actions arising from the introduction or revision of such regulations. The Drilling Group HSE
Engineer is available for advice if required.
Similarly, should personnel become aware of any pending changes to regulations they
are encouraged to discuss such changes with the applicable HSE Group contact.
5 Industry References
The following general industry references should be consulted wherever necessary.

API RP 90, Annular Casing Pressure
Management for Offshore Wells
API RP14B Design, Installation, Repair
and Operation of Subsurface Safety
Valve Systems
API 14A, Specification for Subsurface
Safety Valve Equipment
API 6A, Specification for Wellhead
and Xmas Tree Equipment
Oil and Gas UK – Well Abandonment
Guidelines
Oil and Gas UK Well Integrity Guidelines
ISO Technical Specification ISO/TS
16530-2 Well Integrity for the Operational
Phase
Table 1.3 Industry References
Introduction
6 Notes on Terminology
Following the transfer of ExxonMobil Assets to Apache, there has been a mismatch
of terminology which requires to be clarified in order to avoid subsequent incidents
due to confusion. Table 1.4 is intended to fulfil this purpose for the key items in question.
In time it is expected that such terminology will become fully harmonised.
Forties Terminology Beryl Equivalent Comments

UMV Upper Master HMV Hydraulic
Valve Master Valve
FWV Flow Wing Valve PWV Production Wing
Valve
NASA Non-active Side TKV Tubing Kill
Arm Valve
NASA Non-active Side KWV Kill Wing Valve
Arm
WSO Well Services WSA Well Security
Operator Advisor
TRSCSSV Tubing Retrievable DHSV Downhole
or SCSSV Surface Controlled Safety Valve
Sub-surface Safety
Valve
Table 1.4 Asset-specific Terminology
Introduction
August 2015 Issue 1 1-7/8
Section 2
Well Lifecycle
Paragraph Page
1 Introduction 2-1
2 Well Lifecycle Phases 2-1
3 Well Lifecycle Principles 2-1

4 Apache Well Lifecycle Process 2-2
5 Well Operating Envelopes 2-3

5.1 Process for WOE Compilation 2-3
5.2 Issue of WOEs – Post Well Construction Activities 2-5
5.3 WOE Changes 2-5
5.4 WOE Administration 2-5
6 Well Handover Process and Documentation 2-7

Table
2.1 Well Lifecycle Phases 2-1
Figure
2.1 Well Operating Compilation/Change Flowchart 2-4
2.2 Typical Well Operating Envelope 2-6
Well Lifecycle
1 Introduction
UK Legislation – specifically Design and Construction Regulations (DCRs) – requires a
‘Lifecycle Approach’ to the design, construction, operation, maintenance and
abandonment of any well. The UK Goal Setting Regime applies the principles of lifecycle
risk management to all aspects of offshore operation, covering installations, pipelines and
wells. The legislation that specifically applies to well management activities is the DCR,
with its main goal to provide a general framework for ensuring the safe condition of a well
at all stages of its life, including a Scheme of Examination by an independent and
competent person.
The prime purpose of Section 2, therefore, is to map out all activities for ensuring
compliance with legislative and Company standards and to provide an auditable process
to track such compliance.
2 Well Lifecycle Phases

The lifecycle phases of well can be summarised in simple terms Table 2.1:
Phases What does it cover? Comments

Design All activities necessary to design
a well.
Construction All activities to build a well –
eg drilling and completion.
Operation All activities to operate a well.
Maintenance All activities to maintain a well –
eg well intervention.
Abandonment All activities to suspend
operation and remove a well.
Table 2.1 Well Lifecycle Phases
3 Well Lifecycle Principles

In order to comply with the UK DCR, a number of aims for the lifecycle management
of a well must be met, as follows:
• Wells shall be designed, modified, commissioned, constructed, equipped, operated,
maintained, suspended and abandoned in such a way that there is no unplanned loss
of fluids and the risk to persons is As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP)
• A geological assessment must be performed before the design of a well
• Well design must account for safe suspension and abandonment
• Well materials must be fit for the intended purpose
Well Lifecycle
• The well Operator shall ensure that suitable well control and blowout protection
is available, before operations begin
• The well Operator must demonstrate that a well is properly designed and constructed
and adequately maintained
• The information which should be supplied to the Health and Safety Executive (or other
regulatory authorities) with regard to well operations and the frequency of reporting
• The requirement of all personnel involved to co-operate with the well Operator
• The requirements for personnel involved in well operations to be communicated,
trained and supervised
Key principles in respect of the well lifecycle approach are to provide:
• Consistent work practices and review processes for all well-related activities
• Adequate document control

• Clear communication cycle and direction to working procedures and manuals
• An induction process for all personnel involved in well activities
• Clear roles and responsibilities for well-related activities
• An auditable trail of well-related key activities through all phases of the well lifecycle
4 Apache Well Lifecycle Process

In practical terms, how Apache complies with the necessary requirements
is defined in the well lifecycle process that is set out in the following intranet site:
http://intranet.apachecorp.com/Regions/NorthSea/DWS/wlp/SitePages/Home.aspx
This site, which is continually updated, provides a roadmap for personnel involved
in well-related activities to carry out their day-to-day duties.
Although by no means an exclusive list, the site contains:
• Procedures
• Guidance notes
• Templates
• Tasks to be completed or requirements to be fulfilled
• Forms
• External website information
Well Lifecycle
5 Well Operating Envelopes

Well Operating Envelopes (WOEs) define the operating parameters for individual wells in
the operational phase, and Production Operations are accountable for operating the well
in accordance with the WOE.
WOEs are compiled and issued by the Drilling Group following well construction or
changes to well design, for example, on completion of well intervention operations.
Guidance for well design and subsequent WOE compilation is defined
in the Apache Drilling and Well Operations Policy (ANS-DRL-002) and other applicable
references.
A sample WOE is shown in Figure 2.2, although readers should be aware that the format
and content of WOEs can and do change, based on a myriad of factors such as well
design, type of service etc.
As a point of note, where a well has been subject to a change of use for any reason
or there is a significant change in operating conditions – eg a sharp increase in H2S
levels or a change in the injected fluids on a Produced Water Re-injection (PWRI) well
etc, then the Drilling Group must be consulted and the WOE reviewed and re-issued
wherever applicable.
WOEs should be reviewed regularly on a frequency determined by the Drilling Manager.
WOE templates are available from the Drilling Group Technical Assistant(s).
Note: As of the issue date of this manual, the generation of Well Operating Envelopes
for Forties Field Wells is currently in progress.
5.1 Process for WOE Compilation

The process for compilation/change of a WOE is defined in Figure 2.1. Personnel should
be aware that the technical documentation used to compile a WOE should be available
for audit purposes if required.
Well Lifecycle
Need for Change identified
Drilling/Completions/Well Operations
Engineer completes Technical Work.
Any additional Carry out formal

Risk identified Risk Assessment.
from Change?
Yes
No
Drilling Engineering Supt.

Reviews and accepts
Change.
Drilling Engineering Supt

approves Revised WOE
as Reviewer.
Drilling Manager Approves
Revised WOE.
Revised WOE sent to applicable OIM

for ‘Acceptance’.
OIM returns ‘Accepted’ WOE

to Drilling Group TA
Figure 2.1 Well Operating Compilation/Change Flowchart
Well Lifecycle
5.2 Issue of WOEs – Post Well Construction Activities

As discussed, WOEs are issued after well construction activities have been completed,
however it is often impractical to issue WOEs immediately prior to well startup. In such
instances the applicable Drilling/Completions Engineer must ensure that Production
Operations are provided with the necessary operating parameters to commence well
startup. The fully-approved WOE must subsequently be issued within a reasonable
timeframe along with applicable completion schematics and other important information.
On receipt of a WOE, Production Operations must ensure that the well is operated
within the parameters stated and all applicable alarm setpoints are set up to avoid
exceedances. Where such parameters cannot be met for any reason, then the Drilling
Group must be consulted for advice.
5.3 WOE Changes

WOEs can only be changed by the Drilling Group under the formal Management
of Change (MOC) process.
5.4 WOE Administration

WOEs are managed and administered by the Drilling Technical Assistant(s).
Well Lifecycle
Figure 2.2 Typical Well Operating Envelope
Well Lifecycle
6 Well Handover Process and Documentation

Handover of a well from one entity to another – eg Drilling or Well Services to Production
Operations and vice versa – means that the receiving party becomes the effective Owner
of that well during the applicable phase.
The use of an appropriate handover document when handing over a well to another
group is mandatory. Both parties must sign the handover documentation.
Key information required for well handover, depending on circumstances is a follows:
• Xmas tree/wellhead valve status (open or closed)
• Fluid in well – eg kill fluid/well fluids etc
• Changes to well following well intervention – eg deep-set plug installed
• Well barrier status when handover over
More detailed information on well handover is provided in the Well Handover Procedure
(ANS-SOP-059), located in the Apache Business Management System (BMS) or any
superseding procedure. Template well handover documentation is available on the
‘N’ drive or from the Drilling Technical Assistant(s).
6.1 Industry References

The following industry references provide more guidance on well handover.

UK Oil and Gas Well Integrity Guidelines
UK HSE Document – SPC/TECH/OSD/20
Version 2 Control of Wells during
Intervention Operations
Well Lifecycle
August 2015 Issue 1 2-7/8
Section 3
Well Integrity Management System
Chapter 1 Well Integrity Management System

Chapter 2 Well Integrity Training and Competence
Chapter 3 Evaluation of Well Integrity Failures/Issues
Chapter 4 Risk Assessment Process

Section 3 Chapter 1
Paragraph Page
1 Overview 3-1-1
2 Policy and General Expectations 3-1-1
3 Roles and Responsibilities 3-1-2

4 Training Requirements 3-1-4

4.1 Competency Requirements 3-1-4
5 SafeWells System 3-1-5
6 Well Integrity System Review, Reporting

and Issue Resolution 3-1-5
6.1 KPI Listings 3-1-6
6.2 Distribution of Well Integrity KPI Data 3-1-6
7 Risk Assessment and Management 3-1-7

7.1 Tools for Well Integrity Risk Assessment 3-1-7
8 Safety-critical Equipment 3-1-7
9 Well Reliability 3-1-8
10 Well Barrier Quantification 3-1-8
11 Well Examination Scheme Compliance 3-1-8
12 Management of Change 3-1-9
13 Industry References 3-1-9

August 2015 Issue 1 3-1-i
Section 3 Chapter 1
Well Integrity Management System (cont’d)
Table Page
3.1.1 Responsibilities for Well Integrity 3-1-2
3.1.2 Responsibility Coding 3-1-4
3.1.3 Basic Competence Matrix per Position 3-1-5
3.1.4 Industry References 3-1-9

3-1-ii August 2015 Issue 1
1 Overview
Section 3 focuses on how the system should be managed in respect of:
• Overall policies and philosophies
• Roles and responsibilities
• Guidance on the competencies and training of personnel involved with well integrity
• The SafeWells Well Integrity Management System
• Reporting requirements in respect of well integrity issues
• Well integrity KPIs
• Risk management
• Identification of safety-critical equipment
• Management of Change
• Legislative compliance – well examination
2 Policy and General Expectations

Policy in respect of well integrity is provided in Apache Drilling and Well Operations
Policy (ANS-DRL-002).
General expectations for well integrity can be defined as:
• All well integrity failures or anomalies are known and are recorded in the system
• The necessary maintenance activities are executed in a timely manner with any deviations
from the published requirements adequately managed
• Only competent personnel are involved in any decision making
• Risks resulting from well integrity issues are adequately managed to avoid any unplanned
release of hydrocarbons

August 2015 Issue 1 3-1-1
3 Roles and Responsibilities

High-level responsibilities for well integrity are shown in Table 3.1.1:
Well
Drilling
Drilling Well Drilling Intervention
Prod Manager Completions Platform
Role/Task OIM OSP Eng Integrity HSE Supt
Manager (Tech Supt Eng
Supt Eng Eng (Refer to
Authority)
Note 3)
Ownership and safety of I A R C C C C C C C

the well
Well Integrity Technical I C C A R C R C C C
Authority
Routine monitoring of I A R C C C C C C C
in-service wells as
defined within this Well
Integrity Manual
Execution of defined I A R C C C C C R C
integrity (Refer
(Refer to
testing and maintenance to
Note 1)
activities Note 1)
on in-service wells within
specified frequencies
Request for PPM I A R C C C C C C C
deferrals
Approval of PPM I C C A C C R C C C
deferrals
Conveyance of well I A R C C C C C R C
integrity information from
Installation
Table 3.1.1 Responsibilities for Well Integrity

3-1-2 August 2015 Issue 1
Well
Drilling
Drilling Well Drilling Intervention
Prod Manager Completions
Role/Task OIM OSP Eng Integrity HSE Supt Platform Eng
Manager (Tech Supt
Supt Eng Eng (Refer to
Authority)
Note 3)
Update and management I C C A C C R C C C

of well integrity records
based on information
supplied by Installation
Initial assessment of well I C C A R C R R R C
integrity risk levels
(Refer to Note 2)
Approval for continued A R C C C C C C C C
operation of higher risk
wells (refer to
Note 4)
All well design/technical I C C A R R R C C C
issues
Well integrity repairs I A C C C C C C R C
Issue of well operating I I I A C R C C C C
parameters
Notes: (1) Execution of Well Maintenance work (PPMs) is split by the type of work in question – ie Production Operations will execute work requiring
manipulation of ESD valves and any work requiring access to the process such as DHSV/ASV Testing etc, and Well Services will execute work
performed by specialist crews such as xmas tree greasing etc, on behalf of Production Operations.
(2) Refer to Chapter 3, Paragraph 1 for more details on Evaluation of Well Integrity Failures.
(3) For clarity, reference to Well Intervention Supt assumes that certain responsibilities can be delegated to the Well Services Team members by this
position.
(4) To ensure that the required controls and actions identified in the Drilling Team Change in Condition Assessment (CIC) are consistent with those
defined in any ORA, an assigned Well Intervention Engineer under delegated responsibility from the Drilling Manager will countersign the ORA, but
does not retain any direct responsibility for the authorised ORA.
Table 3.1.1 Responsibilities for Well Integrity (cont’d)

Code Category Description

R Responsible This person is responsible for performing the work.
Responsibilities in this category can be shared
or delegated.
A Accountable This person is accountable for, and is the authority
for ensuring that the activity is executed correctly
as defined in the approved Apache procedures
or other form of risk control. This accountability
cannot be delegated. A person can be accountable
and responsible for performing the work.
C Consult This person shall be consulted for input or support
of the activity concerned.
I Inform This person shall be informed once a decision

or action has been taken.
Table 3.1.2 Responsibility Coding
4 Training Requirements
This manual is not intended to be a training guide for well integrity but instead describes
some of the training necessary for personnel involved in well integrity activities. Obviously,
there are varying degrees of knowledge throughout the Company; for example a Drilling
Engineer may have much more knowledge of well design than a Production Operator
and conversely a Production Operator will have much more knowledge of operating a well
than a Drilling Engineer. Training and competence, therefore, has to be focused on the
position the training candidate is fulfilling.
Paragraph 1 provides an example of subjects to be covered as part of a well integrity
course.
4.1 Competency Requirements

In alignment with the discussion above on training, the competency matrix may
be significantly different between a Drilling Engineer and a Production Operator, hence
competency requirements must be tailored to the position. Individual Managers, Supervisors
and Superintendents should, therefore, define such requirements for their reports.

Well
Prod Well
Activity Services Comments
Operator Engineer
Supv
Monitor and report Skill Skill Knowledge
on well pressures
Operate xmas tree Skill Skill Knowledge
and wellhead calves
Operate and test Skill Skill Knowledge
DHSVs/ASVs
Well handover Skill Skill Knowledge
Well integrity maintenance Knowledge Skill Knowledge
and repairs
Well design Knowledge Knowledge Skill
Table 3.1.3 Basic Competence Matrix per Position
5 SafeWells System
As of May 2013, the Expro NS Ltd proprietary Well Integrity Management System –
SafeWells – is being introduced to Apache. This system is purpose-built to capture all
well integrity data across all Apache Assets. Personnel involved with well integrity issues
are to be trained in inputting data on their respective Installations.
Full population and use of the system will take some time to complete. The Well Integrity
Engineer should be consulted for details of the system and to arrange for the necessary
training where required.
6 Well Integrity System Review, Reporting

and Issue Resolution
This paragraph defines how the performance of the Well Integrity System should
be measured. Standard Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) are utilised to highlight issues
and concerns in respect of well integrity.
The purpose of KPIs is to measure the status and effectiveness of the system.
KPIs should be chosen to:
• Provide a baseline to measure progress
• Identify deviations from the plan
• Provide a basis for benchmarking
• Identify improvement opportunities

The process consists of:

• Establishing KPIs and targets to meet objectives
• Efficiently collecting data
• Adjusting equipment strategies as needed – eg changing maintenance frequencies
on long-term shut-in wells
• Calculating KPIs and comparing them to targets
KPIs should be used to identify actions to address well integrity issues and may change
over time as the process matures and problems are resolved.
6.1 KPI Listings

The Well Integrity Technical Authority in conjunction with Production Operations
Management, will define the necessary KPIs for the system for managing the overall well
risk. Such KPIs can include, but are not limited to:
• Percentage of wells with approved Operational Risk Assessments (ORAs) in place,
to continue operations
• Number of overdue integrity tests on safety-critical equipment covered by formal
deferral
• Number of overdue integrity tests on safety-critical equipment not covered by formal
deferral
• Percentage of failed integrity tests on safety-critical equipment
• Number of wells awaiting integrity work
• Number of maintenance deferrals on safety-critical equipment
• Number of incidents due to well integrity
• Number and percentage of green/yellow/orange/red SafeWells level of concern wells
In due course, it is expected that such KPIs will be generated and monitored from within
the SafeWells System – refer to Paragraph 5. The Well Integrity Engineer will collate and
issue all well integrity reports.
6.2 Distribution of Well Integrity KPI Data

It is important that well integrity KPI data is distributed to the correct people within
Apache. Such data is important for ensuring continued safe operations and for the
scheduling of any necessary repairs. The recommended distribution list for KPI data is
therefore:
• Operations Director
• Production Manager(s)
• Production Engineering Manager
• Drilling Manager
• Operations Support Superintendent

• Drilling Engineering Superintendent

• Completions Superintendent
• HSE Manager
• Safety Engineer (Drilling)
• Well Intervention Supt
• Well Operations Engineers
• Offshore Supervisor (Production)
• Platform Engineers
• Installation OIMs
7 Risk Assessment and Management

Assessment and management of the risk produced from well integrity failures is of major
importance. Key requirements for managing such risk are:
• The well integrity status for all wells is known
• All wells have published operating parameters
• All well integrity failures have been assessed for risk based on the standard Probability
x Consequence technique
• All higher risk well integrity failures are dealt-with expeditiously and Management are
made aware of such failures
• The cumulative risk effect of several well integrity issues in a single discrete area – eg
Forties eggbox or Beryl module, must be recognised and assessed
7.1 Tools for Well Integrity Risk Assessment

Tools for well integrity risk assessment have been compiled and details are provided
within this section.
8 Safety-critical Equipment
The definition of safety-critical equipment can be defined simply as ‘can cause
or contribute to a Major Accident Hazard (MAH)’. Further guidance on this subject can be
found in Paragraph 13 Industry References.
Safety-critical equipment can, for example, be a gas compressor, with a number
of Safety-critical Elements (SCEs) to be identified and satisfied – eg hydrocarbon
containment, overpressure protection etc.

Clearly, there is significant potential for MAH with certain incidents involving a well.
The majority of well equipment is, therefore, safety-critical and thus subject to the
generation of Performance Standards (PSs) and overall condition management via the
Well Integrity Management System. PSs for Wells are held within the Apache intranet
system; consult with the Well Integrity Engineer for more details.
9 Well Reliability
The system should be monitored for any developing trends in respect of equipment
reliability – for example, several consecutive failures of a particular type of DHSV.
The Well Integrity Engineer shall monitor the system for such trends and report any
issues identified to the Drilling Manager.
10 Well Barrier Quantification

Well barrier quantification shall form part of the well integrity management system
on a continuous basis. To clarify, continuous attention must be paid to ensuring
the necessary well barriers to atmosphere are available at all times as per the Drilling
and Well Operations Policy and that any deviations to this standard are addressed and
approved on a risk basis.
Refer to this section for more detail on this issue.
11 Well Examination Scheme Compliance

Using the main Apache procedures and processes – ie Apache Drilling and Well
Operations Policy (ANS-DRL-002), Apache Well Integrity Manual (ANS-DRL-012) and
the SafeWells System as references and as part of their duties the Well Examiner will
require to examine well integrity records and any repairs carried out. Such records can
include, although not an exhaustive listing:
• PPM records
• Pressure test charts
• Operational risk assessments
• Repair programmes
• Daily reports
• SafeWells records

12 Management of Change
Significant changes to the Well Integrity Management System should be subject
to the MOC requirements defined in the Apache Drilling and Well Operations Policy
(ANS-DRL-002).
The following industry references are relevant to this section.

Step Change in Safety – Assurance and Provides a good overview of SCEs and
Verification Practitioners Guide PSs.

ISO 16530: Well Integrity for the
Operational Phase (Current Rev)
Table 3.1.4 Industry References

August 2015 Issue 1 3-1-9/10
Section 3 Chapter 2
Well Integrity Training and Competence
Paragraph Page
1 Background 3-2-1
2 Training Guidelines 3-2-1
3 Well Integrity Fundamentals Training –

Recommended Course Content 3-2-2

August 2015 Issue 1 3-2-i/ii
1 Background
This document forms the basis for discussion and development of a competency system
covering well integrity. Key points to consider are:
• Require a listing of the main objectives for a well integrity course
• What should be covered in the well integrity training
• The need to include any exercises
• Timing and schedule
• Who to participate and mixture of skills in one group
• Handouts and/or documentation
• Computer based vs classroom-based – or other methods
• Training as a part of a competency management system
2 Training Guidelines
What to Cover in a Well Integrity Course and Timing of Training

The below recommended training is listed in a preferred sequence and with recommended
number of training days for each element. Note that this recommendation applies to all
personnel with assigned responsibilities for well maintenance, operations, servicing, design
and construction.
(1) Well integrity fundamentals – 1 to 2 days.
(2) Company specific training (test procedures, well design and internal requirements)
– 1 day.
Who Should Participate?

(1) Production operation personnel offshore (including OIM, production supervisors,
technicians and senior technicians).
(2) Production operation personnel onshore (including Ops Sup, production engineers,
production technologies, HSE personnel).
(3) Completion Engineers and Well Operations Engineers
It is recommended that management accountable for well integrity should have some form
of training also.
Type of Training – Classroom-based Versus Computer-based

Classroom training is preferred for Company-specific training. Both classroom-based
and computer-based training is good for training in regulatory requirements (eg UK DCR
etc) and well integrity fundamentals.
Particularly for the computer-based training method it is recommended that the training is
completed with a test and the training should include exercises, case solving and questions.

Additionally for classroom training it is recommended to include group work exercises.
Documentation and Handouts

It is recommended that the training participants get a copy of the latest regulatory
standards and Company-specific standards (procedures etc) and other internal documents,
preferably on a CD.
3 Well Integrity Fundamentals Training –

Recommended Course Content
(1) Roles and Responsibility for Well Integrity – who monitors/who does the report get
issued to/who fixes? Who manages the Well Integrity System?
(2) Basic Wellbore Physics – discuss formations/pressures/overbalance – underbalance/

temperature increases when wells flow etc. Animated diagrams should be available
to describe what is happening.
(3) Basic Well Construction with Emphasis on Barriers – describe minimum barrier
requirements. Provide a typical Well Schematic. Discuss tubing burst/collapse etc.
Discuss SCSSSVs/ASVs/xmas trees/tubing. Schematics, including Well Barrier
Schematics and cutaways should be provided.
(4) Basic Well Control Requirements – discuss and describe simple hydrostatics for
well control. Discuss and describe Well Emergency Shutdown functionality.
(5) Well Integrity Hazards – use case studies. For example, Alaska well/Snorre. Discuss
hydrates/sand/corrosion – erosion/well intervention ops etc. Well startup/shut down.
(a) Annulus monitoring and importance of reporting/trending.
(b) Discuss operating and design limits (pressure, temperature, flowrates etc)
Describe and provide typical annulus monitoring spreadsheet.
(c) Discuss annulus leak rate and other acceptance criteria. Discuss risk resulting
from annulus leaks.
(6) Annulus Bleed-down – discuss what should be reported and the reasons
for bleed-down during production. Discuss sources of Tubing to Annulus
Communications (TAC) – eg pipe/cement etc.
(7) Wellhead Maintenance Activities – discuss: importance of regular and adequate
well maintenance.
SCSSSV Testing – discuss: frequency/acceptance criteria/functionality/control line
integrity/repeat tests
Xmas Tree Valve Testing – discuss: functionality/acceptance criteria
Void Monitoring – discuss: implications for hydrocarbons in voids/repair methods,
monitoring equipment, accuracy and maintenance.
(8) Handover of Wells – need to ensure accurate and timely reporting. Discuss
information required and who gets it. Provide sample well handover documentation.

(9) Documentation – discuss need for keeping good well integrity records. Discuss and
describe need for Waiver System for operating wells outwith the standard. Provide
a sample.
(10) SafeWells Training – dependent on audience, discuss the main features of SafeWells.
Provide more detailed training for personnel entering data on a routine basis.

August 2015 Issue 1 3-2-3/4
Section 3 Chapter 3
Evaluation of Well Integrity Failures/Issues
Paragraph Page
1 Evaluation of Well Integrity Failures/Issues 3-3-1
2 Specific Responsibilities 3-3-2
3 Well Barrier Hierarchy 3-3-4

3.1 Assessment of Scenario-based Risk Scoring 3-3-5
4 Other Well Situations/Scenarios 3-3-14
5 General Considerations when Evaluating Well

Integrity Failures 3-3-17
5.1 Consequence Scoring and Guidance on Mitigation 3-3-18
6 Timescale for Well Integrity Repairs 3-3-20
Table
3.3.1 Specific Responsibilities for the Evaluation of
Well Integrity Issues 3-3-3
3.3.2 Well Barrier Hierarchy 3-3-4
3.3.3 Reference Tables Evaluation of Risk 3-3-5
3.3.4 Tubing-specific Scenarios (X = Failure) 3-3-7
3.3.5 Annulus-specific Scenarios (X=Failure) 3-3-7
3.3.6 Most Common Annulus-specific Scenarios specific to
Forties DGL Wells (X=Failure) 3-3-8
3.3.7 Spool (Horizontal) Xmas Tree-specific Scenarios (X=Failure) 3-3-9
3.3.8 Status Summary and Required Actions following Failures 3-3-10
3.3.9 General Scenarios/Conditions – Probability Score 3-3-13

Section 3 Chapter 3
(cont’d)
Table Page
3.3.10 Consequence Scoring Table 3-3-19
3.3.11 Consequence Mitigation Scoring Table 3-3-20
Figure
3.3.1 Evaluation of Well Integrity Failures – Basic Process

Flowchart 3-3-2
3.3.2 Example of Cumulative Risk 3-3-17

1 Evaluation of Well Integrity Failures/Issues

This following paragraphs deal with the management and resolution of well integrity
failures. The intent of this entire section is to:
(1) Define roles and responsibilities for dealing with well integrity issues.
(2) Discuss common failure modes and how they affect the overall integrity of a well.
(3) Define and describe a ‘rule-based’ process for wells which do not meet the minimum
standard for continued safe operation.
(4) Discuss and describe the SafeWells System and how information is inputted.
(5) Define and describe the interface between the Technical Authority (Wells Team) and
the Operating Group (Production Operations).
(6) Define and describe the assessment of risk process for evaluating well integrity
failures.
Readers should be aware that well integrity must be monitored for policy compliance
on a continuous basis. Where compliance cannot be met then the applicable and appropriate
measures to assess the risk of continued operation of a well must be applied. The simple
model depicted below defines the basic process to be applied for all Apache well integrity
issues and more detail is provided within this section.

Figure 3.3.1 Evaluation of Well Integrity Failures – Basic Process Flowchart
2 Specific Responsibilities
It is Apache policy to assign the responsibilities as defined below, for all integrity critical
operations. This is a requirement that is in line with the appropriate safety case
submission and is also a requirement of the applicable Apache safety management
systems.
Table 3.3.1 provides the necessary guidance on ‘who does what’ in respect of well
integrity evaluations.

TA (Drilling Manager)
SafeWells Data Entry

Production Manager
Well Services Supv

Platform Engineer
Well Intervention
Well Operations
Well Integrity
Team Leader
Drilling HSE
(if onboard)
Discipline
Engineer
Engineer
Engineer
Task
ORA
Supt
OSP
OIM
Task
No
001 Safety of Installation or Site I A R C C C C C C C C

002 Conveyance of Well Integrity Information from I A R C C C C C R R R
Installation
003 Collation of Well Integrity Information from I C C A R C R C C C C
Installation
004 Completion of the Change in Condition I C C A R R R C C C C
Assessment Screening Form
005 Formal Risk Assessment (RA) of Well Integrity I C C A R R R C C C C
Issues
006 Compilation and Issue of RA Report I C C A R R R C C C C I
to ORA Team Leader
007 Progression to Approval I C C C C C C C C C C A
and Issue of ORA
008 Execution of the ORA Action Plan I A C C C C C C R R C I
Table 3.3.1 Specific Responsibilities for the Evaluation of Well Integrity Issues

3 Well Barrier Hierarchy

In assessing the risk of well integrity failures, it is important to understand the various
barrier elements and their place in the critical hierarchy. Table 3.3.2 provides a simple
guide.
Device Criticality
Function Comments
(Element) Level
TUBING BARRIERS
DHSV Provides Emergency Shutdown High DHSV set between 500

(ESD) well shut-off downhole in the and 1000ft.
event of a major catastrophe to the
Installation.
Xmas Tree Provides Emergency Shutdown High

Master Valve (ESD) well shut-off in the event
(HMV/UMV) of a major release at surface.
Production Provides Emergency Shutdown High

Wing Valve (ESD) well shut-off in the event of
(PWV/FWV) a major release at surface and also
isolates a well from the process
system.
Lower Provides redundancy in the event Medium Requires manual

Master Valve of Surface ESD Valve failure. intervention to close in an
emergency hence ESD
functionality limited.
Tubing Kill Provides access for well kill and Low Normally-closed Manual
Valve/NASA venting to process etc. Valve.
Swab Valve Provides access for well intervention Low Normally-closed Manual
work. Valve.
ANNULUS BARRIERS
Hydraulically Provides Emergency Shutdown High
-Actuated (ESD) well shut-off in the event of
Annulus a major release at surface and also
Valves isolates a well from the gas lift/
process system.
Annular Provides annulus inventory High ASV set between 500 and
Safety protection in the event of surface 1000ft.
Valves release of gas-lift gas. Also provides
(all types) a well barrier in the event of Tubing
to Annulus Communication.
Table 3.3.2 Well Barrier Hierarchy

Device Criticality
Function Comments
(Element) Level
ANNULUS BARRIERS
Manual Provide access to the annulus for Low Normally-Closed Valves

Annulus venting or top-up.
Valves
Casing Provides isolation between High to Can introduce

Hanger Xmas Tree Bore and atmosphere. Low hydrocarbons into areas
Seals Also provides isolation between Criticality of a well where there is no
annuli. available shut-off to flow.
Criticality level will vary
accordingly dependent
on the overall well

integrity status.
Table 3.3.2 Well Barrier Hierarchy (cont’d)
3.1 Assessment of Scenario-based Risk Scoring

Following on from the Well Barrier Hierarchy above, a series of tables and general
guidance has been provided to assist personnel in evaluating risk for well integrity issues.
Where the action required is deemed mandatory (‘rule-based’), the actions are
highlighted in the table and cannot be modified without specific-approval from the
Technical Authority. All of the defined actions and requirements must be factored into
Chapter 3 of this section, which describes the evaluation of well integrity issues.
The structure of this section is as per table below.
Table No/Title Purpose Comments

Table 3.3.4 – Provides a matrix of the various The matrices provide
Tubing-specific combination of tubing-side well an unmitigated ‘probability’
Scenarios integrity failures possible and score that an Incident
a probability (of an event) score. or event will occur due
to the integrity failures.
Table 3.3.5 – Similar for the annulus-side. Similar for the annulus-side.
Annulus-specific
Scenarios
Table 3.3.6 – Provides a matrix of the most
Annulus Scenarios common annulus-side failure
Specific to Forties scenarios for Forties DGL Wells
DGL Wells annulus-side and a probability
(of an event) score.
Table 3.3.3 Reference Tables Evaluation of Risk

Table No/Title Purpose Comments

Table 3.3.7 – Provides a matrix of the most
Scenarios specific to common failure scenarios for
Spool (Horizontal) wells with a Spool (Horizontal)
Xmas Trees Xmas Tree installed.
Table 3.3.8 – Building on the above tables,
Status Summary and provides a short summary
Required Actions to of the well integrity status
following Failures and the actions to be taken.
Table 3.3.9 – Provides a ‘catch-all’ table Score is prior to mitigation.
General Scenarios of well integrity conditions
and Conditions and their mandatory probability
score.
Paragraph 4 – Discusses those general well
Other Well integrity conditions, scenarios
Situations/ and factors which cannot
Scenarios be easily accommodated into
a fixed methodology of
evaluation or assessment.
Paragraph 5 – Discusses those factors which
General although not directly associated
Considerations with a well, can contribute to the
risk if not adequately managed.
Paragraph 5 – Provides general guidance
Guidance on on applying a consequence
Consequence score to well integrity issues.
Scoring
Paragraph 5 – Table 3.3.11 – defines
Consequence consequence scores
for different well types.
Table 3.3.12 – discusses and
provides general guidance on
how mitigation can be applied
and scored.
Paragraph 6 – Provides guidance on the Recommended timescale
Timescale for Well timescales for repairing well for repairs to be completed
Integrity Repairs integrity failures. should be included in any
risk assessment.
Table 3.3.3 Reference Tables Evaluation of Risk (cont’d)

Unmitigated
UMV Wing Required and Mandatory
LMV SWAB DHSV
(HMV) (PWV) Actions Probability
Score
X X X Refer to Note 1 6
X X X Refer to Note 2 6
X X Refer to Note 3 5
X Refer to Note 4 3
X Refer to Note 4 2
X Refer to Note 4 2
X Refer to Note 6 1
X Refer to Note 6 1
Table 3.3.4 Tubing-specific Scenarios (X = Failure)
Surface Unmitigated and

ASV/
TAC Casing Required Actions Mandatory
G-DHSV
Valve Probability Score
X Refer to Note 10 3
X Refer to Note 9 3
X Refer to Note 11 1
Table 3.3.5 Annulus-specific Scenarios (X=Failure)

TAC TAC
Unmitigated
(Hole) in (Hole) in Lower to
Surface and
Gas Lift Gas Lift Upper Required
G-DHSV Casing Mandatory
Tubing Tubing Annulus Actions
Valve Probability
above below Comms
Score
G-DHSV G-DHSV
X X X X Refer to 6
Note 15
X X X Refer to 6
Note 12
X X Refer to 6
Note 15
X X Refer to 4
Note 12
X X Refer to 3
Note 13
X Refer to 2
Note 14
X Refer to 2
Note 16
X Refer to 2
Note 13
Table 3.3.6 Most Common Annulus-specific Scenarios specific to Forties

DGL Wells (X=Failure)

Upper
Lower TH to TH to Unmitigated
Tubing Tubing
Tubing NASA/ Xmas Xmas and
Hanger Wing Bonnet Required
DHSV Hanger Manual Tree Tree Mandatory
(TH) Valve Seals Actions
Plug Master Upper Lower Probability
Plug (any)
Leak* Seals Seals Score
Leak
X X X X Note 17. 6
X X X Note 18. 6
X X Note 19 6
X X X Note 20 6
X X Note 21 6
X X Note 18 6
X X X Note 18 6
X X X Note 20 6
X X Note 20 6
X X Note 23 6
X X Note 23 6
X Note 22 6
X X Note 25 6
X Note 23 5
X Note 24 5
X Note 26 3
X Note 26 3
X Note 27 3
Table 3.3.7 Spool (Horizontal) Xmas Tree-specific Scenarios (X=Failure)
Note: Some spool xmas trees have a swab valve installed on the top flange rather than
a second tubing hanger plug within the tubing hanger bore. For evaluation
purposes, this design should be treated as per the second tubing hanger plug
scenario.

Note Well Integrity Status/Condition Mandatory Actions

Note 1 Well ESD functionality has been Shut-in well. Provide well kill
seriously compromised with no inline programme for immediate execution
xmas tree valve redundancy. if deemed necessary. Commence
planning to execute repairs to restore
ESD functionality immediately.
Note 2 Single inline ESD available. Shut-in well. Risk assess for continued
No downhole protection operation. Execute repairs ASAP.
as DHSV failed but no redundancy
via LMV available.
Note 3 Single ESD available (DHSV). Shut-in well. Risk assess for continued
xmas tree redundancy via operation. Execute repairs ASAP.
manually-operated LMV.
Note 4 Single xmas tree ESD failure. Two Continue to operate well. Schedule
other ESDs available – well not out repairs at earliest opportunity.
of barrier compliance.
For DHSV failures, risk assess
For DHSV failures, downhole on a case-by-case ‘consequence’ basis
protection has been lost. and continue to operate well under ORA
unless risk value ‘RED’.
Note 5 Single ESD failure. Xmas tree Continue to operate well. Schedule
redundancy reduced via manually- repairs at earliest opportunity.
operated LMV.
Note 6 Reduced redundancy in manually- Continue to operate well. Schedule
operated xmas tree valves. repairs at earliest opportunity. Be
cognisant of reduced isolation for well
intervention rig-up.
Note 7 Single surface ESD situation (casing Shut-in well. Risk assess for continued
valve). operation. Execute repairs to remedy
TAC ASAP.
Note 8 Single well barrier situation (tubing Shut-in well. Commence planning
integrity). No ESD functionality should to execute repairs to restore ESD
TAC develop. functionality immediately.
Note 9 Single ESD situation (ASV). Shut-in well. Risk assess for continued
operation. Execute repairs ASAP.
If no TAC, two well barriers exist.
Note 10 TAC failure only, which can be Continue to operate well. Schedule
contained with existing two well repairs at earliest opportunity.
barriers (ASV and surface casing
valve).
Table 3.3.8 Status Summary and Required Actions following Failures


Note 11 Single ESD situation (casing valve). Continue to operate well. Monitor well
If no TAC two well barriers exist. for further deterioration. Schedule
repairs at earliest opportunity.
Note 12 Annulus manual valve and associated Shut-in well. Risk assess if planning
instrumentation to continue production. Consider
DGL Wells
is greatest risk as mitigation, removal of pipework after
only up to
annulus blowdown and replace with
Note16
double block and bleed arrangement.
Note 13 ESD functionality impaired but no Risk assess. Continue to operate well.
communication from lower annulus. Schedule repairs to restore ESD
Gas-side xmas tree Valves provide functionality at earliest opportunity.
surface protection.
Note: Some DGL wells may have an
injection valve installed. Risk
assessment should factor-in
this scenario.
Note 14 Single surface valve situation (casing Shut-in well. Risk assess for continued
valve). operation. Execute repairs to remedy
TAC ASAP or provide other mitigation.
Note 15 Well annulus protection has been Shut-in well. Risk assess. Schedule
compromised. repairs to restore integrity ASAP.
Note 16 Manual valve functionality impaired Risk assess. Continue to operate well.
but no communication from lower Schedule repairs to restore valve
annulus. functionality at earliest opportunity
Note 17 No means of flow shut-off in the event Shut-in well wherever practical.
Spool XTs of a leak at top flange and no safe Ascertain significance of leak via tubing
only means of well intervention unless hanger plugs. Consider best practical
henceforth adequate isolations can be achieved. repair to gain adequate barrier(s). Well
must not be put online until approved
ORA in place,
Note 18 DHSV is only practical ESD barrier Shut-in well. Assess overall well
(single barrier situation). Potential for condition. Execute repairs to restore
loss of containment. well integrity compliance at earliest
opportunity. Well must not be put back
on line unless approved ORA in place.
Note 19 DHSV is only practical ESD barrier Shut-in well. Assess overall well
(single barrier situation). condition. Execute repairs to restore
well integrity compliance at earliest
opportunity. Well must not be put back
Table 3.3.8 Status Summary and Required Actions following Failures (cont’d)


Note 20 No ESD functionality to shut off flow. Shut-in well. Assess overall well
Manual master valve is only available condition. Execute repairs to restore
shut-off device. High reliance on well integrity compliance at earliest
tubing hanger plug(s). opportunity. Well must not be put back
Note 21 This scenario can allow wellbore fluids Risk assess overall well integrity. If TAC
to enter the annulus via the lower TH apparent consider implications for
seals and with the DHSV failed, ESD annulus pressure on ESP wells.
functionality is impaired.
Note 22 As with Note 21, this situation can/will Risk assess overall well integrity. If TAC
result in Tubing to Annulus apparent consider implications for
Communication (TAC) due to leakage annulus pressure on ESP wells.

from the production bore through the Execute repairs to restore well integrity
lower tubing hanger Seals and into compliance at earliest opportunity. Issue
the annulus. ORA for continued operation.
Note 23 Single ESD barrier situation from Risk assess overall well integrity. Repair
wellbore. Manual master available. at earliest opportunity. Issue ORA for
continued operation.
Note 24 Single ESD barrier (wing valve) and Risk assess overall well integrity. Repair
high reliance on lower tubing hanger at earliest opportunity. Issue ORA for
plug. continued operation.
Note 25 Single ESD barrier situation from Risk assess overall well integrity.
wellbore. Hydrocarbons will be
Ascertain significance of leak via tubing
present at top flange. DHSV provides
hanger plugs. Consider best practical
ESD protection but breaking
repair to gain adequate barrier(s). Well
containment for well intervention
must not be put online until approved
will be problematic.
ORA in place,
Note 26 Single tubing hanger plug and DHSV Risk assess overall well integrity.
ESD functionality provide adequate Monitor more closely for further integrity
isolation. failures which may result in single
barrier situation. Repair at earliest
opportunity.
Note 27 Increased exposure at tubing bonnet. Risk assess overall well integrity.
Leaking tubing hanger upper seals will Monitor tubing hanger seals on a
introduce hydrocarbons to underside regular basis to ensure barrier
of bonnet. compliance is met. Repair at earliest
opportunity. Issue ORA for continued
operation.
Table 3.3.8 Status Summary and Required Actions following Failures (cont’d)

3.1.1 Risk Assessment of Subsea Wells

Due to the multitude of subsea xmas trees and wellhead configurations within Apache,
it is not practical to cater for every situation and scenario, however the general scenarios
outlined in the surface tree and spool tree tables above can be applied to most subsea
well integrity issues.
Key requirement as always is to ensure compliance with the Apache Drilling and Well
Operations Policy in respect of well barriers and to assess the risk where such policy
cannot be complied with in any way.
Unmitigated and
Well Condition Comments Mandatory
Probability Score
Any single barrier Overall risk value will be driven 6
to atmosphere situation by the ‘consequence’ score –
where no practical ie composition of wellbore fluids

mitigation can be applied. and severity of leak.
Any leak of wellbore fluids Overall risk value will be driven 6
to atmosphere. by the consequence score –
ie composition of wellbore fluids
and severity of leak and the
remaining barriers available.
Repairs must be executed
at the earliest opportunity.
Note: Probability score cannot
be changed as a leak has
actually occurred.
Any situation where the Assess on a case by case basis. 6
barrier within a barrier
requirement has been
breached or otherwise
compromised – eg casing
to casing communication.
Table 3.3.9 General Scenarios/Conditions – Probability Score

4 Other Well Situations/Scenarios

The following scenarios (by no means an exhaustive list) have not been factored into the
matrices and must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis:
• Combination of well integrity failures – for example, secondary (B) annulus
communication in combination with other well integrity issues such TAC or casing seal
failure etc. This is a situation where a barrier within a barrier protection has been
compromised
• Similarly, tertiary (C) annulus issues in combination with other well integrity issues can
in some instances, constitute a serious risk of loss of containment as the outer
boundary of the well has been compromised
• Wells with upper and lower primary annuli – such wells have varying degrees
of risk, dependent on several factors – eg packer integrity, G-DHSV integrity, top-up
capability etc. Risk assessments on such wells, should therefore address all aspects
of the wells integrity
• Lower annulus integrity issues (Forties field dual gas-lift wells)
In normal operation, wells with a dual-packer design and with no well integrity issues
would normally operate with the upper annulus filled with inhibited fluid. The lower
annulus would operate with high pressure gas-lift gas present during production.
No pressure change in the upper annulus should occur when the well is on production,
other than that from thermal effects when the well is brought online. Pressure monitoring
should, therefore, identify any leakage from the lower to the upper annulus.
Historically, some Deep Gas Lift (DGL) Wells in the Forties Field have gas-lift tubing
and/or shallow packer failures which have resulted in the upper annulus being filled with
gas-lift gas from the lower annulus at ca 80 to 110barg. Three failure modes have been
identified, namely:
(1) Leaking dual packer.
(2) Hole in the 2 3/8in gas lift tubing string.
(3) Complete failure of the dual packer.
Following assessment, those wells with known gas-lift tubing and/dual packer failures
have had instrument pipework removed from the surface annulus valve and replaced with
a double block and bleed arrangement to reduce the most credible leak paths which can
cause a large volume gas release from the gas-filled upper annulus. It also reduces the
escalation potential from adjacent wells with similar annulus integrity issues by removing the
instrument pipework at risk from a jet flame, should a release occur within the same
eggbox.
When upper to lower annulus failures occur on Forties Field DGL wells, the well
should be shut-in pending formal risk assessment to determine the way-forward
and an Operational Risk Assessment (ORA) issued to continue operation of the well.
In assessing such risks, the Wells Team Safety Engineer and the Drilling Engineering
Supt must always be involved in risk assessments involving DGL lower annulus failures
to ensure the risk remains within the tolerable area and to advise of any necessary
material change to the applicable safety case.

Annular Safety Valves (Beryl Field)

When assessing the risk generated from ASV failure in the Beryl Field it should
be recognised that due regard has been made within the accepted Beryl Safety Cases
(Beryl Alpha and Beryl Bravo) for the inherent risk posed by the significant volume of gas
lift gas present in the primary annulus during normal operations – this has been assessed
as a tolerable risk. When an ASV is found to be impaired (found as failed) or degraded
(not fully functional), an assessment of the volume and pressure of gas present in the
annulus must be made.
Should TAC occur in conjunction with an ASV failure, then the consequences of a release
may change and must be fully assessed on a case-by-case basis. To summarise, the key
requirement is therefore to maintain the mandatory two barriers from the reservoir in the
event of an ASV failure, which in this scenario would be: 1) no TAC; and 2) fully-functioning
and tested surface casing valve.
Spool (Horizontal) Xmas Trees

There are two types of spool xmas trees in Apache. Both of which are of similar basic
design in respect of failure modes and scenarios. The main difference between spool and
conventional xmas tree/wellhead designs is that there are no inline valves on the spool
tree. The main ESD valve – the wing valve is installed outboard of the wellhead and flow
from the wellbore is directed through the tubing hanger from the wellbore. Two tubing
hanger plugs in the vertical (inline) bore provide the necessary sealing from the wellbore.
It should be noted that some spool xmas trees may have a swab valve installed instead
of a second tubing hanger plug. For evaluation purposes, the swab valve design should
be treated the same as the second tubing hanger plug design.
As with conventional xmas trees and wellheads, key requirement is to ensure that the
two barrier performance standard is met. When risk-assessing well integrity failures on
such xmas trees, readers should be aware of the various failure modes and routes for
wellbore fluid release as there are more combinations of failure scenarios with this design
than the conventional xmas tree design (refer to Table 3.3.7). Reference to the applicable
design drawings when assessing such failures is therefore strongly recommended.
Table 3.3.7 and certain sections of Table 3.3.8 wherever applicable identify several
failure scenarios and is intended to provide readers with some guidance about where the
main risk areas are, but is by no means an exhaustive listing of the multitude of possible
combinations.
In general, the annulus scenarios for spool xmas tree wells is similar to conventional
xmas tree wells and therefore such scenarios have not been included.
• Wells with insufficient pressure to verify barriers – such wells by their very nature,
constitute much lower risk due to the consequences of a loss of containment.
However, best efforts must be made to at least ensure the functionality of any barrier
devices and monitor for any changes in the wells performance
• Any loss of control line integrity – in such instances, the functionality of a DHSV
and/or ASV can be seriously compromised. Such issues can allow hydrocarbons to be
at surface under a reduced barrier situation

• Wellhead (casing/tubing hanger etc) seals:

(1) In certain circumstances, a single barrier leakpath to atmosphere can occur due
to hydrocarbon leakage past wellhead seals. Dependent on the location of such
leakage and the particular wellhead design, a ring gasket can be the only barrier
to atmosphere, with no available secondary barrier (valve) to shut-off flow. The
risk with such wells should not, therefore, be underestimated when carrying out
a risk assessment and repairs should take place as soon as practical.
(2) Where applied pressure casing hanger void or seal tests have failed or where it
is impractical to pressure test due to the presence of sealant, some judgement
should be applied before declaring a ‘Fail’. If no gas is present within the void,
the barrier should be declared ‘Degraded’ or ‘Low Concern’ if justified, from an
overall risk standpoint. If gas is present then a ‘Fail’ should be declared.
• Residual hydrocarbons above an ESD device – eg above DHSVs and ASVs, both
of which have allowable leak rates. Over a period of time, the pressure above
the valve can build up to full well tubing head pressure and thus constitute a hazard.
Due to the substantial volumes of hydrocarbons involved, such a hazard should not
be ignored when evaluating risk
• Subsea wells – while it can be argued that any loss of containment from a subsea
well presents very little risk to personnel, the repercussions from a serious pollution
incident should not be underestimated. In addition, risk to personnel will arise when
a vessel is above a subsea well to carry out any well intervention work. In summary,
while risk values can be reduced for subsea well integrity issues while such wells
are in production, a repeat risk assessment must be carried out when preparing
for any kind of well intervention activity
• Cumulative risk – this is risk introduced by a combination of well integrity issues
within close proximity to each other – eg same eggbox or module. While it is not
practical to quantify the cumulative risk of the varying well integrity problems on an
Installation, due regard must be made for such risk when risk assessing well integrity
issues on an individual well. The wellhead maps (refer to example below) generated
for individual Installations provide Apache Management with a risk overview for each
Installation
Where concerns are raised as to a build-up of cumulative risk, then the Well Integrity
Engineer in the first instance should consult with the Technical Authority for further
guidance on reducing such risk.

Example of Cumulative Risk

Figure 3.3.2 Example of Cumulative Risk
5 General Considerations when Evaluating Well

Integrity Failures
The following are general discussion points to assist in evaluating well integrity issues:
• Safety-critical element (component) history/reliability – when evaluating well integrity
failures in particularly valves and other shut-off devices, a key factor
is whether the device will close on demand when functioned. This may be a key
control or mitigation identified at risk assessment and which may help to lower
the overall risk value. Subsequently, equipment reliability and past history whether
confirmed by historical data or by anecdotal evidence, should be used to ascertain
the probability of Failure to Close (FTC) on demand
• Well kill/plug – the need for a well kill and/or plug programme to be immediately
available, should be discussed and considered in all risk assessments where deemed
necessary, particularly for wells operating on single barrier under ORA
• External factors – for example, SIMOPS work adjacent to wells with significant integrity
issues may introduce additional risk unless managed effectively. Risk assessments for
individual wells should therefore identify SIMOPS with particular hazards which may
impact on the well in question. Other external factors which can impact on well
integrity are for example and by no means an exhaustive list:
− Kill system availability
− Availability of fire and gas detection/protection systems
− Fire pump availability
− Dropped object potential (refer to notes below)
− Adjacent scaffolding work

• Dropped objects – historically, when evaluating well integrity risks the most common
risk to uncontrolled release has been a dropped object impacting on the xmas tree
or wellhead valves and the associated instrumentation. Risk assessments must
therefore discuss this factor and provide the necessary mitigation and controls
• Human factors – when considering mitigation and controls for well integrity failures and
issues, a key component of risk assessment is to ensure that human factors
are discussed and addressed, particularly with issues where human intervention
is required to initiate a well shutdown in an emergency. In practical terms,
the assessment team should consider key area such as:
− Is access available to close a valve in an emergency situation? Particular attention
should be paid to ensuring that personnel are not put at risk by entering an area
where an uncontrolled release has occurred, to close a valve
− Is the equipment used to effect an emergency shutdown fully functional?
− Do the personnel tasked with effecting the emergency shutdown, know of their
responsibilities? Particular attention should be paid to ensuring that shift and tour
handovers highlight the well integrity issue in question
− Do personnel issuing Permits to Work (PTW) understand the implications of issuing
a PTW adjacent to a well with integrity problems?
5.1 Consequence Scoring and Guidance on Mitigation

The following tables provide the requirements for consequence scoring based on well type.
5.1.1 Consequence Scoring

Table 3.1.10 provides an unmitigated consequence score which must be applied
at initial assessment and is based on the type of well. For example, the consequences
of a release or leak from a producer well are far greater than a release from
a sub-hydrostatic water injection well.

Unmitigated and
Mandatory
Well Types Comments
Consequence
Score
Hydrocarbon Producer 6 No distinction made between
Wells gas-lifted, sub-hydrostatic, subsea
or ESP wells at this stage.
Cuttings Re-Injection 3 Consequence raised due to:
Wells (CRI) and
• Potential for abrasive material
Produced Water
in CRI wells
Re-injection (PWRI)
Wells • Potential for low levels of
entrained hydrocarbons in PWRI
wells
Water Injection Wells 3
(above hydrostatic)
Water Injection/PWRI 2 Pressure risk only during injection.
Wells (sub-hydrostatic)
Table 3.3.10 Consequence Scoring Table
Note: For the avoidance of doubt, the term ‘Unmitigated’ means that no controls,
precautions or special conditions have been applied to the issue in question.
5.1.2 Guidance on Mitigation Scoring

Depending on the well integrity failure or combination of failures, a variety of mitigations
and/or controls can be put in place to reduce the overall risk. This risk reduction can
be brought about by either a) reducing the probability of an incident and/or b) reducing
the consequences of an incident. For wells, it is more common for the probability
to be reduced rather than the consequences.
For hydrocarbon wells, some consequence mitigation can provided by the well
characteristics as defined in Table 3.1.11, however caution must be exercised in this respect
as any loss of containment on a well will result in a release of pressurised hydrocarbons at
the initial event, sufficient to constitute an MAH.

Example – Application
Well Types of Mitigation to Comments
Consequence Score
Gas-lifted producers 5 Removal of gas lift will cause
well to die over time. However,
the presence of gas in the annulus
still constitutes a substantial
hazard unless vented or otherwise
dissipated.
ESP wells 4 Pump shutdown will cause
the well to die.
Free-flowing 6
producers
No change in
consequence apparent.
Subsea wells 4 Consequence (and probability)
score will rise when vessel above
a well and must be re-assessed
for such activities.
Note: In all cases, the Technical Authority (Drilling Manager) must agree with
any published consequence score following mitigation.
Table 3.3.11 Consequence Mitigation Scoring Table
6 Timescale for Well Integrity Repairs

The urgency of any valve repair is dependent on the type of service that the xmas tree
is subjected to (producer/water injector etc), which valve(s) are affected and the extent
and nature of the leak (valves may be leaking but are able to hold pressure from
the direction of flow). For this reason, timescales for repair (or otherwise secure a well)
must be determined at the risk assessment stage.
It should be recognised that risk values may increase the longer the failed or degraded
barrier remains un-repaired.
For live hydrocarbon wells, the actuated xmas tree valves (ESD valves) should
be repaired at the earliest practical opportunity. This also applies to the lower master
valve as it provides a contingency to allow the well to be shut in, should both the actuated
valves fail.
As many water injection wells can be deemed not to flow hydrocarbons to surface
as they retain zero pressure (or go onto suction) such valve failures may be treated with
less urgency.

In all cases, a well should be monitored for any further failures which take the well out
of barrier compliance.
Repairs are not practical on ASVs unless of the DHSV (retrievable) type.
The general two barrier requirements should be applied to failures on subsea wells,
however due to the location of such wells, providing a repair timescale is impractical and
therefore subsea well failures must be addressed on case by case basis.
As discussed elsewhere, timescales for repair of integrity failures on non-hydrocarbon
wells (water injection wells/disposal wells etc) may be relaxed due to the lower risk
potential. However, it should be recognised that high injection rates and pressures over
a long period may accelerate erosion/corrosion issues. Such wells should be addressed
on a case by case basis.

August 2015 Issue 1 3-3-21/22
Section 3 Chapter 4
Risk Assessment Process
Paragraph Page
1 Review and Initial Assessment 3-4-1

1.1 Stage 1 – Well Barrier Quantification and Assessment 3-4-1
1.2 Stage 2 – Risk Assessment Process for Wells outwith
‘Green’ Level of Concern 3-4-3
1.3 Stage 3 – Publication of Results 3-4-8
1.4 Stage 4 – Production of Operational Risk Assessment 3-4-9

1.5 Risk Assessment Process Flowchart 3-4-11
Table
3.4.1 SafeWells Colour-coding Definitions 3-4-1
Figure
3.4.1 SafeWells Well Barrier Status Diagram 3-4-2
3.4.2 SafeWells Worked Example – First Pass (Initial) Assessment 3-4-2
3.4.3 Colour-coding Categories 3-4-3
3.4.4 Change in Condition Screening Assessment Form 3-4-5
3.4.5 Accompanying Risk Assessment Scoresheet 3-4-6
3.4.6 Wells Risk Assessment Summary Form 3-4-7
3.4.7 Risk Approval Matrix 3-4-8
3.4.8 Final Overall Risk Applied 3-4-9
3.4.9 Risk Assessment Process Flowchart 3-4-11

1 Review and Initial Assessment

1.1 Stage 1 – Well Barrier Quantification and Assessment
Following maintenance and integrity testing activities on a well, the available well barriers
following such work should be quantified. Key requirement and Apache policy, is to
maintain two barriers to atmosphere from the tubing and the annulus – the Performance
Standard risk assessments must therefore assess the entire well integrity status not just
the apparent failure(s).
Where it is apparent that this requirement has not been met or where there is doubt
as to the requirement, then the Well Integrity Engineer must be consulted for advice.
The simple Well Integrity Assessment Model embedded in SafeWells should be utilised by
data entry personnel, to quickly ascertain current barrier status. There are various
templates available for this purpose, based on actual well configurations. Consult with
the Well Integrity Engineer for guidance where necessary. The SafeWells data entry input
is based on the criteria outlined in Table 3.4.1:
In SafeWells, this colour signifies that the well ‘requires review’.

Undegraded barrier: <80psi/15mins leak rate between gates, ‘out
of well’ or pack-off/void test.
Degraded barrier: >80psi < 250psi leak rate between gates, ‘out of well’
or pack-off/void test deemed as a ‘Fail’ within SafeWells.
Assess on a case-by-case basis to evaluate level of concern.
Failed barrier: >250psi/15mins leak rate between gates, ‘out of well’
or pack-off/void test and/or ESD fails to close on demand within PS
time.
Untested barrier: deemed as a ‘Fail’ within SafeWells.
Assess on a case-by-case basis to evaluate level of concern.
Signifies a leak path to atmosphere.
Notes: (1) No credit can be taken for an ‘untested barrier’ and SafeWells will
recognise this fact and categorise as a ‘Fail’.
(2) Similarly, ‘degraded’ barriers will also be categorised as a ‘Fail’.
Table 3.4.1 SafeWells Colour-coding Definitions

Guidelines for use:

• Authorised users enter well integrity test data into SafeWells onsite
• When well integrity data is entered into SafeWells, each component in the well
assessment model will turn either green or red depending on test results as depicted
in the simple schematic below
• When a ‘Fail’ is noted, the well ‘level of concern’ colour will be turned to purple
signifying the well ‘requires review’
Figure 3.4.1 SafeWells Well Barrier Status Diagram
• Analyse whether the minimum two well barrier standard is still present on the tubing and
the annulus. This evaluation can be completed by authorised users in the first instance
but all such evaluations must be checked and agreed (‘accepted’) by the Well Integrity
Engineer within the SafeWells system
• Where it can be proven supported by the appropriate justification, that the required
two barrier standard has been met, no further assessment of risk is necessary
and the SafeWells Level of Concern – the Overall Well Risk, updated accordingly.
The Overall Well Level of Concern will now be changed to Normal Operation. Continue
to monitor well integrity. Refer to worked example below:
Overall Well
‘Level of Concern’
Individual Well
Barrier (SCE) Status
Figure 3.4.2 SafeWells Worked Example – First Pass (Initial) Assessment

• Where the minimum barrier standard is not present or where there are concerns
over a well integrity situation and the Level of Concern is not green, then proceed
to an assessment of risk based on the guidance and criteria defined within Stage 2
onwards
Notes: (1) It should be noted that the First Pass assessment defines the ‘as-found’
integrity status of the individual well barrier elements (SCE) or barriers
only, and does not at this stage, provide the overall risk from continued
operation of the well.
(2) The Well Integrity Engineer may choose to vary the ‘Level of Concern’
up or down following further assessment of the issue in question. For audit
purposes, all such changes must be logged and dated within the SafeWells
system and be accepted/approved at the appropriate level.
1.2 Stage 2 – Risk Assessment Process for Wells outwith

‘Green’ Level of Concern
The following process should be followed when/where a change in condition has been
identified which may have an impact on the integrity of the Installation. For wells this
would be in the situation where the published PSs or Well Design Criteria cannot be met
– for example, where a critical ESD valve has failed integrity tests or where the
mandatory two barrier criteria has been compromised etc. In such situations an initial
assessment must be performed using the Change in Condition Screening Assessment
Form.
To provide for increased granularity in assessing well integrity concerns or risks, the matrix
for such exercises is based on a 6 x 6 model. The assessed colour-coding derived from
the assessment of risk should then be inputted to the applicable well within the SafeWells
system to define the Level of Concern and assign the applicable colour-coding. Refer to
Figure 3.4.3.
Figure 3.4.3 Colour-coding Categories
Guidance is also provided within this Section 3 in respect of a) Probability (likelihood)

of an event and b) Consequences of an event – ie what is going to happen if an event
occurs? Refer to tables in Chapter 1.

The Change in Condition Screening Assessment Form should be used to effectively

identify what barriers are in place to prevent an MAH occurrence and specify what
realistic mitigation barriers can be provided, together with a score on the 6 x 6 matrix.
On completion of the Change in Condition Screening Assessment Form, a Wells Risk
Assessment Summary Form should be completed to fully define and summarise
the failure(s), hazards, mitigations and subsequent risk scoring.
The Apache Operational Risk Assessment (ORA) process, which is Company-wide
and described in more detail in other references, provides for an informed judgement
on the risks imposed by the failure(s) or condition identified and identifies the necessary
mitigations or controls to manage such risk. Following completion of the Change
in Condition Screening Assessment Form and the subsequent risk assessment exercise
documented in the Wells Risk Assessment Summary Form, where it is intended that
a well be kept in production then an ORA (or Waiver/Dispensation) must be completed
and issued by the Installation OIM.
Completion of the ORA must be based on the information supplied by the Well Integrity
Engineer or Technical Authority for Wells. It should be noted that the ORA process is part
of the electronic Permit to Work System (ISSOW) and utilises a 5 x 5 risk matrix and
as such, this matrix should be used to allocate overall risk for allowing continued
production or operation of a well with integrity issues.

Installation :
Failure Identified: SCE/Well No :
1 What is the impaired or degraded equipment/system used for?
2 Under what circumstances is the impaired or degraded equipment/system required to function?
3 Cumulative Risk - Are there any other SCE’s interdependent with this SCE or SIMOPS activities involved?
(Consider – deferred maintenance on other SCE’, existing ORA‘s, SIMOPS activities event and Current ORA appendix 3, 4 & 5 as
appropriate
4 Specify what MAH are involved: Blowout; Explosion; Fire; Toxic Gases; Release Well Bore Fluids;
Dropped Object uncontrolled Release of Stored Energy ?
5 What can we do to reduce the potential for these circumstances to occur?
6 What measures can we put in place to replace the functionality lost due to impaired or degraded
equipment/system?
7 How effective are these measures likely to be under the circumstances in which they are most needed?
8 Does the proposed change involve changes to the original design impaired or degraded
equipment/system, if so what are they?
9 Does the proposed change involve changes to the original procedures/method if so what are they?
10 Does the proposed change involve changes to the original design equipment, operating procedures and,
personnel are deemed competent to put changes in place?
11 Actions to be Taken / Agreed to mitigate shortcoming relating to equipment, procedures or people?
Equipment:
Procedure:
Training:
12 Under what circumstances could the specified MAH occur associated with the proposed change?
13 Together, are all of these measures sufficient to manage risk effectively, and for how long?
14 Review the proposed changes collectively above and ensure actions taken and agreed relating to
equipment/ procedure/method statement to be used are risk assessed to ALARP to proceed if NOT,
STOP.
Note: Attach Supplementary Documentation/Information where necessary.
Figure 3.4.4 Change in Condition Screening Assessment Form

Loss Prevention Control Barriers
1 2 3 4 5 6
6 6 12 18 24 30 36
Mitigation
5 5 10 15 20 25 30
4 4 8 12 16 20 24
3 3 6 9 12 15 18
2 2 4 6 8 10 12
1 1 2 3 4 5 6
1-6 No Performance Standard breach – two (2) un-degraded well barriers to atmosphere confirmed.
NORMAL Some minor failures identified but of low concern. Where significant operational mitigations and
OPERATION controls are required, then the issue of an ORA should be considered.
8-16 Performance Standard not fully met due to degradation of available well barriers but acceptable
DEGRADED mitigations and controls available. Operation can continue subject to application of identified
CONDITION mitigations and controls and issue of approved ORA where deemed necessary. Continue to monitor
integrity status.
18-25 Performance Standard not met. Continued operation may be acceptable with remaining or
IMPAIRED substitute temporary barriers and / or other mitigations and controls. More detailed Safety Study
CONDITION required to justify continued operation. ORA to be raised and approved at appropriate level of
management.
30-36 Performance Standard not met and no mitigations or controls identified at Initial Assessment. Wells
HIGH in this category must be shut-in on available barriers and Emergency Contingency Action initiated
POTENTIAL wherever necessary, to avoid compromising Installation integrity. Operation of the well must not be
resumed until the necessary repairs have been carried out or the well otherwise made safe and
Management Approval obtained.
Risk Score WITHOUT Controls / Mitigation identified
Risk Score WITH Controls / Mitigation identified
Team Members / Reviewers

Name Position
Approvers
Name: Name: Date of proposed

Position: Position: Change:
Date : Date: Time:
Figure 3.4.5 Accompanying Risk Assessment Scoresheet

Figure 3.4.6 Wells Risk Assessment Summary Form

1.3 Stage 3 – Publication of Results

Final Level of Concern scoring.
Final scoring is based on the standard Probability x Consequence equation. Two scores
should be evaluated:
(1) Score based on no mitigations or controls applied.
(2) Score based on the mitigation/controls identified and put in place.
In some instances, little or no mitigations or controls can be applied therefore the risk score
will not change.
The 6 x 6 risk matrix provided in the Change in Condition Screening Assessment Form
should be utilised to ascertain the risk value.
The risk approval matrix provided is then used to ascertain the level of approval required to
accept the risk. In all cases, the mitigated risk score should be applied not the unmitigated.
Such approvals will be managed via SafeWells based on this matrix.
Mitigated Risk Score Reviewer(s) Approver(s)

1 to 6 Well Integrity Engineer Well Integrity Engineer
8 to 16 Well Integrity Engineer Drill Eng Supt
Well Intervention Engineer Drilling Manager
Well Intervention Supt
18 to 24 Well Integrity Engineer Drilling Manager
Drilling Eng Supt
25 to 36 Well Integrity Engineer Drilling Manager
Drilling HSE Engineer
Drilling Eng Supt
Figure 3.4.7 Risk Approval Matrix
Input to SafeWells
Once the assessment of risk has been completed and the final scoring (or level
of concern) has been ascertained, the applicable overall colour coding for the well based
on the table below should be applied in SafeWells and the system-generated Reports
sent to the appropriate positions as defined in the matrix above. Refer to worked example
in Figure 3.4.8.

Overall Well Risk
Figure 3.4.8 Final Overall Risk Applied

Out-of-hours Arrangements
Outwith office hours only, it may be necessary to carry out a risk assessment without the
full complement of reviewers and approvers being available. In such instances, the risk
assessment may be executed onsite – subject to the following provisos:
• The rule-based process as defined within this section must be complied with in full
to ensure an informed decision is arrived at
• Wherever possible, the onboard Well Services Supervisor must be included in the risk
assessment. Where the Well Services Supervisor is not onboard, then the Duty
Onshore Well Intervention Engineer must be consulted and agree with the risk
assessment outcome
• All documentation from the risk assessment must be emailed to the defined reviewers
and approvers
• The defined reviewers and approvers must review and agree with the risk assessment
outcome at the earliest opportunity
The applicable Installation OIM has responsibility for ensuring the above requirements
are complied with.
1.4 Stage 4 – Production of Operational Risk Assessment

On conclusion of the assessment to define the level of concern, the final results should
be communicated to the nominated Production of Operational Risk Assessment (ORA)
Team Leader for inclusion into the ORA, which must be produced for continued operation
of a well or to order a well to be secured immediately. The recommended timescale for
repairs should be included with the subject results.

Recommended requirements for the generation of ORAs are:

• There must be a clear definition of what system(s) or equipment the ORA process
applies to (including all SCEs), and what degree of shortcoming/degradation
or impairment has triggered the assessment
• There should be clarity as to how the shortcomings/degradation or impairment of SCEs
are identified and notified
• The compilation, review and approval of an ORA must be commensurate with
the potential consequences and subsequent risk involved, and the appropriate level
of management must approve any ORA with a defined risk higher than Normal
Operation or the Green category
• Control measures should be in place to ensure that any associated remedial actions
are tracked, monitored and reviewed/closed out. This may include some priority
allocation of risk/impact categorisation to assist in effective management
• There should be an assessment of individual ORAs and how they may impact
on each other to affect the hazard management process and the overall risk level
for the Installation in question. There should also be consideration and/or evaluation
of other issues that will affect risk – for example, safety critical maintenance backlog,
operational restrictions, weather conditions etc
Documentation Retention Requirements

It is important to document the integrity status and risk profile of all wells and to retain
all relevant documentation for audit purposes. The process and receptacle for this
requirement is embedded within the SafeWells System, which may be interrogated
by authorised parties. The referenced documents should be retained for the life
of the well.
In respect of dealing with well integrity issues requiring risk assessment, the following
documents should be generated and kept on file – preferably within the SafeWells
System:
• Initial well integrity assessment model form
• PPM deferral forms
• Change in condition assessment form
• Wells risk assessment summary form with scores
• Operational risk assessments unique number should be filed within SafeWells (filed as
part of ISSOW)

1.5 Risk Assessment Process Flowchart
Carry out assessment of well integrity using

st
Well Integrity Assessment Model (1 Pass)
Yes
Required two (2) well
barriers still present Continue to monitor
and ESD capability well integrity status.
uncompromised?
No
Complete Change in
Condition Screening
Assessment Form
Complete Risk
Assessment and apply
Risk Score. Update
'Safewells’.
No
Management
Shut-in Well. agreement to
continue
production?
Yes
Compile, Approve and Issue

Operational Risk Assessment
(ORA). Update ‘Safewells’.
Execute necessary repairs within

recommended timeframe. Update
‘Safewells’.
Figure 3.4.9 Risk Assessment Process Flowchart

August 2015 Issue 1 3-4-11/12
Section 4
Well Integrity Monitoring, Testing
and Maintenance
Paragraph Page
1 Introduction 4-1
2 Well Safety Critical Equipment Maintenance and

Integrity Testing 4-1
2.1 Pressure Integrity of Safety-critical Equipment 4-2

2.2 Functionality of Safety-critical Equipment 4-2
3 Maintenance Strategies 4-2
4 Monitoring, Testing and Maintenance Frequencies 4-2
5 Well Maintenance Deferral/Exceptions Process 4-4

5.1 Notes on Completion of PPM Deferral Requests 4-5
5.2 Responsibilities 4-7
5.3 Applicable Documentation 4-8
6 Allowable Leak Rates for Well Safety-critical

Equipment 4-10
6.1 Definitions of Pass/Degraded/Fail 4-10
6.2 Allowable Leak Rates Table – Inflow Testing Only 4-10
6.3 Allowable Leak Rates Table – Pressure Testing Only 4-11
6.4 Tubing to Primary Annulus Communication Criteria 4-12
7 Well Barrier Quantification 4-14

7.1 Repair Actions 4-15
7.2 Repair Timescale Policy 4-15
Well Integrity Monitoring, Testing and Maintenance

August 2015 Issue 1 4-i
Section 4
and Maintenance (cont’d)
Paragraph Page
8 Xmas Tree and Wellhead Valve Integrity Testing 4-15

8.1 Platform Xmas Tree and Wellhead Valve Closure
Times 4-17
9 Downhole Safety Valve/Annulus Safety Valve

9.1 DHSV Testing and Changeout Policy 4-23
9.2 Wireline Retrievable Downhole Safety Valves in Gas
Injection Strings/Water Injector Wells 4-24
9.3 WRDHSVs Pulled During a Well Service Operation 4-25
9.4 Acceptance Criteria for Leak Rates Across DHSVs 4-25
9.5 Acceptance Criteria for Leak Rates Across Storm
Chokes 4-25
9.6 Failure Diagnostics 4-25
9.7 Annular Safety Valves 4-27
9.8 ASV Testing and Changeout (where applicable) Policy 4-27
9.9 Failure Diagnostics 4-28
10 Casing and Tubing (Annulus) Monitoring and

10.1 Annulus Pressure Monitoring Policy 4-30
10.2 Annulus Pressure Monitoring Equipment 4-31
10.3 Casing Fluid Management 4-33
10.4 Annulus Venting and Top-up Requirements 4-33
10.5 Maximum Allowable Annulus Surface Pressure
Operating Limits 4-37
10.6 Wells Operating with Zero Annulus Pressures 4-38

4-ii August 2015 Issue 1
Section 4
Paragraph Page
10.7 Alarm Setpoints 4-38

10.8 TAC Exceeding Acceptance Criteria 4-38
10.9 Criteria for Continued Operation with Casing to Casing
Communication 4-39
10.10 Annulus Pressure Diagnostics 4-39
11 Casing Hanger Seal and Wellhead Void Integrity 4-43

11.1 Maintenance Intervals 4-43
11.2 Integrity Testing Work Instruction 4-43
11.3 Criteria for Continued Operation with failed
Casing/Tubing Hanger Seals and Void Pressure Tests 4-43
12 Quality Assurance and Quality Control 4-44
13 Management of Change 4-44

August 2015 Issue 1 4-iii
Section 4
Table Page
4.1 Examples of Safety-critical Equipment and their Function 4-2
4.2 Well Maintenance Frequencies 4-3
4.3 PPM Deferral Tolerance Chart 4-5
4.4 Responsibilities for PPM Deferrals 4-7
4.5 Inflow Testing – Allowable Leak Rates 4-11

4.6 Pressure Testing Methodology 4-11
4.7 Pressure Testing – Allowable Leak Rates 4-12
4.8 Typical Integrity Testing Sequence 4-16
4.9 Forties Field DHSV Allowable Leak Rates 4-25
4.10 Forties Annulus Gauges – Example 4-32
4.11 Beryl Annulus Gauges – Example 4-32
4.12 Forties Single-string Wells – Annulus Pressure
Test Requirements 4-36
4.13 Forties DGL Wells – Annulus Pressure Test Requirements 4-36

4-iv August 2015 Issue 1
Section 4
Figure
4.1 Example Well PPM Deferral Request 4-9
4.2 Typical Xmas Tree and Wellhead Valve Failures 4-18
4.3 Continued Operation with Inline Xmas Tree Valve Failures 4-19
4.4 Continued Operation with Outboard Xmas Tree Valve Failures 4-20
4.5 Continued Operation with Spool Xmas Trees
Integrity Failures 4-21
4.6 Continued Operation with Annulus Valve Failures 4-22
4.7 Continued Operation with Failed DHSV 4-26
4.8 Typical ASV Test Graph 4-28
4.9 Continued Operation with ASV Failure 4-29
4.10 Typical Forties DGL Well Schematic 4-35
4.11 Recommended Alarm Setpoint Guidance 4-38
4.12 Well Integrity Leak Path Diagram 4-40
4.13 Continued Operation with TAC 4-41
4.14 Continued Operation with Casing to Casing Communication 4-42
Appendix 4A Recommended Maintenance Strategies

August 2015 Issue 1 4-v/vi
1 Introduction
This section deals with well integrity monitoring, testing and maintenance requirements
during the operational phase of a well. Work instruction – ie how to do guidance is provided
in other procedures or work instructions.
Where proformas for recording well integrity information are referenced, then such
documents are available from the Well Integrity Engineer, or directly from the SafeWells
System.
Maintenance on xmas trees and wellheads is normally carried out by specialist crews
under Apache supervision. Execution of the necessary integrity testing where venting
to process takes place – eg DHSV/ASV/xmas tree/wellhead valve inflow testing
etc, should be carried out by Production Operations personnel.
When failures have been identified it is important to:
• Identify the problem area by analysing what has happened by gathering as much
information on the failure as possible
• Ascertain if the required two barriers to atmosphere are in still in place
• Ascertain if the minimum one Surface ESD and one Downhole ESD (DHSV)
are still available
• Ascertain if replacement barriers can be activated or if further mitigation can
be applied
Throughout this section, therefore, readers are provided with a range of tools to analyse
problem areas in the field and to have the necessary information to hand when
discussing with the Well Integrity Engineer in the first instance. In all cases, the Well
Integrity Engineer should be notified/consulted on any well integrity failures identified.
Accountability for compliance with this section rests with the Installation OIM as Well
Owner during the operational phase.
2 Well Safety Critical Equipment Maintenance

and Integrity Testing
From the legislation, Safety-critical Equipment (SCE) is that equipment which can cause
or contribute to a Major Accident Hazard (MAH). In simple terms if such equipment did not
perform as desired then there is potential for a hazardous event to occur. Subsequently,
such equipment must meet the Performance Standard (PS) established for the service in
which it is employed.
The majority of equipment in a well is either pressure-containing – it contains the pressure
within it; or it is pressure-controlling – it shuts off flow/pressure when functioned. Such
equipment can also satisfy both requirements. Although not an exhaustive list, examples
of SCE and their function are provided in the Table 4.1.

Pressure- Pressure-
Equipment Comments
Containing Controlling
Tubing/Casing X
Xmas Tree Valves X X
DHSV/ASV X X
Production Packer X
Table 4.1 Examples of Safety-critical Equipment and their Function
2.1 Pressure Integrity of Safety-critical Equipment

The pressure-containing and the pressure-controlling functionality of all SCE in a well must
be verified to ensure that it continues to meet its PS, hence the need to pressure test such
equipment.
2.2 Functionality of Safety-critical Equipment

As part of well maintenance routines it is necessary to function test valves and other
devices to ensure correct functionality. Where the published PS is not fully met but only
partially met, then the device must be categorised as degraded. Examples would be an
ESD valve closure time slightly in excess of the published PS or a leak rate slightly over
the acceptance criteria on a low risk well.
For clarity, any ESD Failing to Close (FTC) (completely) on demand, or outwith
the minimum leak rate acceptance criteria must be deemed a ‘Fail’.
3 Maintenance Strategies
The table in Appendix 4A discusses and defines the Maintenance Strategies for various
types of well – eg Water Injection, Long-term Shut-in (LTSI) etc. The purpose of the table is
to ensure that effort is not wasted on carrying out maintenance on wells which
do not require it – eg LTSI wells do not require xmas tree valves to be greased
on the same frequency as an active well. Over-greasing will only result in grease being
pumped into the well causing future problems for well intervention.
4 Monitoring, Testing and Maintenance Frequencies

The following frequencies are for all Apache wells in the Forties and Beryl Fields and
should be consulted in conjunction with the maintenance strategies described in Table 4.1
above. Such frequencies and the actual work to be carried out may be changed under the
deferral process defined in Paragraph 5. Guidance for Subsea Wells is provided
in Section 5, Table 5.6.

Activity Annually 6 monthly 3 monthly Weekly Comments

Annulus Top-up and Test (Forties) X X Currently not routine for Beryl Wells –
by Exception only.
DGL Wells
under ORA TVM Technician must be briefed on
that can be hazard present on DGL wells with
topped-up pressurised Upper Annulus.
Tubing Annulus Communication (TAC) X Not a routine requirement for Forties Wells.
Checks (Beryl)
DHSV/G-DHSV and ASV Integrity Checks X
Xmas Tree and Wellhead Valve X
Maintenance
Xmas Tree and Wellhead Valve X X
Maintenance and Integrity Checks
Beryl Forties
Gauge/Instrumentation Surveys X X X X Notes:
(Production Ops Task)
Refer to Note • Surveys should also be completed after
any Well PPM or maintenance has
been carried out
• PPMs requirements issued from SAP.
Instruments Group is Technical
Authority
Table 4.2 Well Maintenance Frequencies

5 Well Maintenance Deferral/Exceptions Process

For various reasons, it is sometimes necessary to defer maintenance on safety-critical
equipment. In compiling this section the general principles outlined in the Apache
Maintenance and Inspection Deferral Procedure (ANS-MTC-004) have been applied
wherever feasible.
Key requirements when considering a deferral is to ensure that:
(1) Any potential deferral is assessed for risk. Any potential deferrals within
the green or yellow risk area may be approved by the Well Integrity Engineer,
Well Services Advisor or Well Services Supt, while any potential deferrals outwith
the green or yellow areas must follow the risk management process defined
in Section 3 of this manual.
(2) The well integrity status is known and acceptable for the deferral period.
(3) All deferrals are documented and are tracked through to closeout.
In addition, during PPM work, there will be instances where certain maintenance routines
are impractical to carry out due to various reasons and exceptions to the standard PPM
work instruction is necessary. Typical and practical examples would be:
• Situations where wellhead bleeder plugs are seized or otherwise inoperable. Such
a failure may result in a well having to be killed and plugged to effect a repair resulting
in a low risk benefit/high cost scenario
• Re-occurring non-critical failures, where repair is impractical or where the cost would
outweigh the risk benefits gained – for example, failure of a 13 3/8in wellhead void
pressure test. As the 13 3/8in casing/void does not normally provide hydrocarbon
containment, such a failure may constitute a low risk if there are no other issues which
compromise the overall integrity of the well – for example, 13 3/8in x 9 5/8in casing
communication etc
The majority of problem areas are of low risk to wellbore integrity and provided there
is ongoing surveillance to ensure compliance with the required two barrier policy (as with
all wells) and there are no other critical well integrity issues to consider, the repair of such
problems can be deferred for a period of time dependent on the risk.
For this type of deviation or exception, the PPM work instruction should be modified
to suit, under the deferral process as defined within this section.
Mandatory Requirements
• Maintenance on production wells already operating with significant well integrity failures
should not be deferred unless absolutely necessary, as any further deterioration
in the equipment may go unidentified for the period of deferral. In such situations,
it may be more prudent to issue an ORA to maintain maximum focus on this type
of well. The Drilling Manager as Technical Authority has the final decision on whether
an ORA is required

• The tolerance or Grace Period for the execution of well-related PPMs is based
on the guidance provided in the Apache Maintenance and Inspection Deferral
Procedure (ANS-MTC-004). As well-related PPMs are deemed safety-critical
(10% tolerance) and are generally based on a 6-monthly and 12-monthly frequency,
the tolerance for such work is therefore 18 days and 36 days from the scheduled
start date respectively. If work cannot be completed within this tolerance date,
then a PPM Deferral Request must be raised and approved. Table 4.3 provides
a graphical representation
Tolerance (Grace Period)

Maintenance Activity Type from Scheduled PPM Comments
Start Date
Safety-critical Maintenance 10% of frequency Majority of well-related
PPM work falls within
this category.
Production-critical 12% of frequency
Maintenance
General Maintenance 15% of frequency
Table 4.3 PPM Deferral Tolerance Chart
• Deferral periods must be identified on the Deferral Form and must be based on risk
assessment. For long-term low-risk deferrals or exceptions – for example, where
a full PPM cannot be executed for various reasons – a review of well status must
be made at each scheduled PPM or at 6-monthly intervals whichever is comes sooner
As risk is proportionate to the exposure time, a further risk assessment must
be carried out if the deferral is renewed for any reason. A second deferral must be
approved by the Technical Authority (Drilling Manager).
• PPM Deferral documentation should be held within the SafeWells System
5.1 Notes on Completion of PPM Deferral Requests

The following guidance notes should be complied with wherever practical and should
be read in conjunction with all other sections of this procedure.
Whenever the requirement for a PPM Deferral Request is identified, the Wells Team will
provide the necessary technical input to the Installation OIM. In doing so, the Offshore
Supervisor Production (OSP), Platform Engineer or Onshore Well Intervention Engineer
will complete the necessary PPM Deferral Request after discussion and/or consultation
with the OIM and Offshore Well Services Supervisor where necessary.
The PPM Deferral Request should clearly define the following key areas:
• The nature of the deferral or exception required
• The background/rationale to the required exception. Such an exercise must include
a discussion on the current well status in respect of overall integrity and containment –
ie any other issues which may result in a well integrity problem

• A statement on whether and how, compliance with the two barrier policy is achieved
and maintained. The past history of the well in respect of integrity failures should
be included in this statement
• Whether the request constitutes a repeat deferral
• Any ongoing mitigation or surveillance required. As discussed previously, for some
issues, it may be more prudent to issue an Operational Risk Assessment (ORA) also,
to ensure the necessary level of surveillance and mitigation is applied. The Wells
Team will provide guidance in this respect wherever applicable
• PPM Deferral Request validity period. This period should be based on the level
of risk and whether it will be feasible or practical to repair the problem. For example
some problems may only be repaired when a well is being worked-over and thus
may be required to be kept open
• What actions are required to close out the PPM Deferral Request
A hazard evaluation should then be carried out by the Wells Team to ascertain
and formalise the level of exposure. The PPM Deferral Request together with the applicable
hazard evaluation documentation should be reviewed internally within the Wells Team
and then sent to the OIM for review prior to final approval. The OIM must be satisfied that all
documentation is in order and that the well is safe to operate.
Once the OIM has agreed with all aspects of the PPM Deferral Request then they should
approve as per the Table 4.4.

5.2 Responsibilities
Responsibilities for compilation and issue of PPM Deferral Requests are as defined in the matrix below.
Onshore
Well Well
Task Offshore Platform Well Drilling
Task OIM OSP Integrity Services
No WSS Engineer Intervention Manager
Engineer Supt
Engineer
001 Overall Safety of the Well A R C C C C C C
002 Well Status Reporting to A R R C C C C I
Wells Team
003 Compilation of PPM Deferral A R C R R C I I
Request
004 Technical Review and C C R R R R* R A
Acceptance of PPM Deferral
Request
005 Approval for Issue A/R C C C C I C C
* R = Well Integrity Engineer has responsibility for ensuring that any PPM Deferral Requests outwith the green or yellow risk status
are risk-assessed and approved as per Section 3, Chapter 4 Risk Assessment Procedures.
Table 4.4 Responsibilities for PPM Deferrals

5.3 Applicable Documentation

• ISSOW Permit to Work System
• Well handover documents
• Risk assessment documentation
• PPM Deferral Request
• Operational Risk Assessment (ORA)

Figure 4.1 Example Well PPM Deferral Request

6 Allowable Leak Rates for Well Safety-critical

Equipment
It is not practical to define that all well safety-critical equipment be leaktight in the
operational phase. Subsequently, it is generally accepted throughout the industry that
allowable leak rates based on industry standards (API etc) and good oilfield practice
are acceptable.
6.1 Definitions of Pass/Degraded/Fail

For risk assessment purposes, Apache has categorised the results of well SCE integrity
testing into three categories as defined below. This allows for a risk score based
on the standard Probability x Consequence formula to be applied to the particular problem.
Categories are as follows:
Pass – this means that the device in question has a) met the required leak rate
Performance Standard (PS); and b) is fully functional.
Degraded – this means that the device is impaired in some respect and the PS is not fully
met. This could either be the leak rate is higher than the pass criteria but lower than
the fail criteria, and/or the functionality is impaired in some respect – eg valve closure
time outwith the PS but within acceptable limits as determined by risk assessment.
A probability of failure score will be applied to those devices or safety-critical
component(s) categorised as degraded (refer to Section 3, Chapter 3 Evaluation of Well
Integrity Failures/Issues for more details).
Fail – this means that the device does not meet the required PS and serves no purpose
as a well barrier or isolation. This would include devices which fail to function on demand.
6.2 Allowable Leak Rates Table – Inflow Testing Only

Allowable leak rates for safety-critical well equipment when inflow-testing are defined in
Table 4.5 and apply to the operational phase only, where the well is in service. The leak
rates quoted are not suitable for well barrier purposes where containment is to be broken.
test period is 15 minutes.

SCE Component Pass Degraded Fail Comments

Hydraulically <80psi >80psi > 250psi
actuated xmas tree
<250psi
and wellhead
valves (ESD
function)
Manually-operated <80psi >80psi > 250psi
xmas tree and
<250psi
wellhead valves
DHSVs <900scf/hour *Reduced >900scf/hour Reduced
functionality functionality
Fail to close
includes:
on demand
• Tubing/casing
comms with
control line
• Unable to
maintain C/L
pressure
ASVs <1907scf/hr Ditto above.
Tubing to Annulus API 14H Std • Refer to
Communication Paragraph 6.4
Volumetric
(TAC)
calculation
Casing to casing API 14H Std • Refer to
communication Section 10
Volumetric
calculation
Table 4.5 Inflow Testing – Allowable Leak Rates
6.3 Allowable Leak Rates Table – Pressure Testing Only

The following procedure should be used for testing between valve gates and any pressure
testing using applied pressure.
Step Action
1 Apply required pressure.
2 Allow 5-minute stabilisation period prior to commencing pressure test,
ensuring that pressure does not drop below 95% of required test pressure
before monitoring begins.
3 Monitor pressure for minimum 15 minutes.
Table 4.6 Pressure Testing Methodology

Pressure testing acceptance criteria for applied pressure:
Test Criteria
Pressure test Due to the higher test pressures (ca 4000psi)
involved than that for inflow testing, the allowable
leak rate is a maximum 5% drop from the applied
pressure (stabilised) over a period of 15 minutes.
Table 4.7 Pressure Testing – Allowable Leak Rates
6.4 Tubing to Primary Annulus Communication Criteria
6.4.1 Acceptable Communication Rates

(Platform and Subsea Wells)
Acceptable communication rates between tubing and primary annulus are based on API
RP 14B, which defines allowable leakage across a downhole safety valve, and is widely
regarded as an industry standard.
For gas leak paths the acceptable communication is defined as 900scf/hr and for liquid
systems it is defined as 6.3gal/hr.
Communication checks should be conducted as described in platform-specific procedures,
which provide the necessary work instruction for such work.
6.4.2 Calculation of Leakage Rate for Gas Lifted Wells

It is assumed that the pressure buildup rate will be controlled by the compressibility
of gas in the annulus. To calculate the leakage rate it is necessary to:
• Estimate gas volume in the primary annulus
• Calculate the allowable pressure buildup rate
Knowledge of the operation of the gas lift system will be needed to determine the fluid level
in the annulus. Generally the fluid level will be at the depth of that gas lift valve, through
which the well is being lifted. Any recent topping up, which may have put the fluid level
between the mandrels, should also be taken into account.
If there is any uncertainty as to the depth of the fluid level, assume it to be at the orifice
valve. This will result in a conservative allowable buildup rate.
To Calculate the Allowable Pressure Buildup Rate:

From API RP 14B (Appendix G):
Q.T .t
(P 2 / z 2 − P1/ z1) =
35.37 V

Where: Q = acceptable leak rate scf/hr = 900scf/hr

P = pressure (psi) (subscript 2:- final 1:- initial)
Z = gas deviation factor (subscript 2:- final 1:- initial)
V = gas volume in the annulus above fluid level (scf)
T = average temperature in gas volume (R)
t = build up time (hours)
To simplify the calculation, worst case values for z = 0.85 may be assumed.
The allowable change in pressure during the test (dPa) (psi) is then:
0.85 Q.T .t 21.63 T .t
dPa = =
35.37 V V
6.4.3 Calculation of Leak Rate for Natural Producers with Installed

Gas Lift Valves
It is assumed that the buildup rate will be controlled by the compressibility of the gas
in the annulus. The same method as described in Paragraph 6.4.2 above should be
applied, however, estimation of the gas volume may be more difficult.
If the annulus has never been topped up it should be assumed that there is gas down
to the operating valve at the time of the initial kick off. If the annulus has been topped up,
the fluid level will depend upon the current Bottom Hole Pressure (BHP).
6.4.4 Calculation of Leak Rate for Natural Producers without Gas

Lift and Gas Injectors and Water Injectors
These wells do not contain any gas lift valves, which means the fluid level in the annulus
is unable to fall. It is, therefore, assumed that the annulus is full of completion fluid
and that this completion fluid is water.
A pressure test should be used to check for tubing to annulus communication in these
wells. This results in fewer uncertainties regarding the fluid level and the type of fluid
controlling the rate of pressure change. It is also a quicker test. The pressure fall-off rate,
during a pressure test, will be controlled by the fluid compressibility.
Fluid compressibility (c) is defined as:
dv
c=
Vdp

Where: V = original volume (Annular Volume)

Dp = pressure change (psi)
Dv = volume change (galls)
For the normal range of test fluids and well conditions c = 3 x 10-6psi-1. API RP 14B
recommends an acceptable fluid leak of 6.3gal/hr.
The allowable change in pressure (dP) (psi) which this leakage per hour equates
to can therefore be calculated as:
6 .3
dPa =
42 x 3 x 10 −6
50 000
dPa =
V
or for pressure measured over time t (hrs):
50 000 t
dPa =
V
6.4.5 Secondary and Tertiary Casings Allowable Leak Rates

(Platform Wells)
Allowable leak rates for secondary and tertiary annuli are based on API RP 14B as per
the criteria for the primary annulus.
7 Well Barrier Quantification

Following maintenance and integrity testing activities on a well, the available well barriers
following such work should be quantified to check compliance with policy.
Where it is apparent that this requirement has not been met or where there is doubt
as to the requirement, then the Well Integrity Engineer must be consulted for advice.
In the next four paragraphs relating to Safety Critical Equipment Integrity Testing,
a paragraph entitled Failure Diagnostics has been included to define the actions
to be taken in the event of any failure.

The flowcharts in Paragraph 8 are intended to provide field personnel with the necessary
guidance to provide an initial assessment of the failure and for onshore personnel
to analyse whether the well can be kept online, or secured due to safety concerns.
It is recognised that the flowcharts do not address every combination of failure mode
and in such instances, field personnel should liaise with the Well Integrity Engineer or
Onshore Well Services Team.
7.1 Repair Actions

Following monitoring and maintenance activities on a well, any failure identified must
be communicated to the Well Integrity Engineer. The Well Integrity Engineer in conjunction
with the Well Services Superintendent will schedule the required repairs and will supply the
necessary personnel and equipment to execute such repairs.
Any repair work requiring the breaking of containment on a well requires a Work
Programme issued by the Wells Team together with a competent person to supervise the
repair operation. Refer to Section 3 of this manual in respect of roles and responsibilities.
Any deviation from this standard must be approved by the Drilling Manager.
7.2 Repair Timescale Policy

Consult Section 3 – Risk Management.
8 Xmas Tree and Wellhead Valve Integrity Testing

Xmas tree maintenance consists of:
(1) Greasing of valves.
(2) Functioning of valves.
(3) Integrity testing of valves.
(4) Visual inspection.
Proformas are available for the different xmas tree and wellhead configurations across
the Forties and Beryl Fields.
To ensure xmas tree and wellhead valve integrity, pressure testing should be performed
at least every 12 months. Testing should follow the guiding principles below, however,
detailed procedures are provided in the applicable work instruction.
There are two methods of pressure testing xmas tree valves and the appropriate method
should be chosen onsite, namely:
(1) Leak-off (or inflow testing) using well fluids from the direction of flow.
(2) Hydraulic testing with applied pressure, either between valve gates or across a closed
valve. Note that this method can only be employed for double-gate valves and not for
single-slab type valves.

Note: It is recognised that inflow-testing of production wing valves may prove

problematic due to difficulties in obtaining isolations from the process plant
to allow monitoring of a pressure increase in the flowline. In such instances
and where practical, applied pressure between the xmas tree valve gates should
be employed to confirm integrity.
In general, integrity tests using well pressure should be applied sequentially as shown in
the Table 4.8, however the sequence may be varied as required dependent on the
particular xmas tree configuration and process layout. Key requirement is to ensure the
work is executed as efficiently as possible to reduce well downtime.
Sequence Equipment
1 DHSV (if being tested)
2 Lower master valve
3 Hydraulic master valve/upper master valve

4 Production wing valve/flow wing valve
5 Tubing kill valve/Non-active Side Arm (NASA)
6 Swab valve
7 Wellhead valves and seals
Table 4.8 Typical Integrity Testing Sequence
Where new or replacement xmas tree or wellhead valves or other components have
been installed or where pressure containment has been breached pressure testing
should be performed to the 1.1 Maximum Expected Wellhead Pressure (MEWP)
as defined in the Apache Drilling and Well Operations Policy (ANS-DRL-002).
In the event of a failure, gate valves should have grease or sealant re-injected into
the relevant ports as applicable, be cycled a number of times and then re-tested. If a valve
produces similar leakage rates for three successive tests it should be rescheduled
for inspection or overhaul. The direction of leakage should be determined.
Regular testing provides integrity assurance for normal platform operations (in-service
wells) only. Where well intervention is to be conducted, more stringent leak testing
criteria should be applied to ensure isolation from the well bore prior to breaking
containment.
Failure Diagnostics
The following flowcharts provide operating personnel with the required steps to take
following identification of a xmas tree valve failure issue or anomaly. Where such
an issue has been identified, the Well Integrity Engineer must be informed/consulted
for further advice.

8.1 Platform Xmas Tree and Wellhead Valve Closure Times

There are no industry-wide standards for xmas tree ESD valve closure times, however
a closure time of 45 seconds is the adopted PS for Beryl wells and 60 seconds for the
lower-risk Forties wells.
Valve closure times must be measured during all major platform xmas tree and wellhead
PPMs. Where a valve fails to close within the PS without pressure in the xmas tree
or valve (as with most PPMs), then pressure should be applied to the xmas tree or valve
and the closure time measured again, before a failure is declared. Consideration should
also be given to cycling the offending valve several times to clear any binding in the valve
due to lack of use or having just been serviced.
Note: When checking closure times and to simulate actual working conditions, xmas
tree valves must be functioned closed from the platform ESD system not from
a portable pump (unless pump being used as part of a troubleshooting exercise).
Where the defined standard closure times cannot be met, the actual best closure time
achieved must be reported to the Well Integrity Engineer for the necessary risk assessment
to be completed.

Figure 4.2 Typical Xmas Tree and Wellhead Valve Failures

Figure 4.3 Continued Operation with Inline Xmas Tree Valve Failures

Figure 4.4 Continued Operation with Outboard Xmas Tree Valve Failures

Figure 4.5 Continued Operation with Spool Xmas Trees Integrity Failures

Figure 4.6 Continued Operation with Annulus Valve Failures

9 Downhole Safety Valve/Annulus Safety Valve

Integrity Testing
The following paragraphs define the integrity testing requirements for Downhole Safety
Valves (DHSVs) and Annulus Safety Valve (ASVs) and applies across all Apache Assets.
9.1 DHSV Testing and Changeout Policy

All downhole valves must be confirmed to be in an operable condition by a regular testing
programme. Wireline retrievable valves need only be replaced if they do not meet the test
requirements as recommended in API 14 H.
DHSVs on operational wells will be tested at the intervals determined as being
appropriate for the conditions on any particular platform. This will normally be on a 6-month
frequency.
DHSVs on dead and shut-in wells are normally tested every 12 months.
Note: The well is closed in at surface, allowing it to build up to full tubing head pressure
before the DHSV is closed. After closing the valve, the tubing above the DHSV
is then bled off at a controlled rate to the lowest practical value and the resultant
pressure buildup in the tubing is monitored.
Integrity testing of the DHSV consists of three main requirements and all three
requirements should be met to warrant a pass:
(1) Correct functioning of the DHSV – the DHSV closes upon release of control line
pressure. The DHSV remains open when control line pressure is applied.
(2) Inflow testing of the valve itself – will provide tubing protection, within an allowable
leak rate, when closed.
(3) Inflow test of the DHSV control line – there is no communication with either the tubing
or annulus pressures and the correct operating pressure can be maintained.
• As the majority of wells are gas lifted, it should always be possible to charge a well
with sufficient pressure to enable a differential to be applied, to allow a meaningful test
to take place
• Slam shut tests are not recommended
• DHSV testing should be carried out immediately prior to xmas tree maintenance
and well intervention operations. This removes the requirement to test the DHSV
on a separate occasion maximising well uptime. It is also preparation for some of the
valve maintenance

• Many water injection, ESP and PWRI wells go on to vacuum when closed-in due
to low reservoir pressure. Subsequently, in such wells where there is no pressure
to check the integrity of the valve (ie water injectors and dead wells) the regular testing
programme should still take place to confirm that control line pressure can
be maintained and that the well has no capability of maintaining hydrocarbon flow
to surface. Functionality of the DHSV can and should be checked for correct operation
by connecting a low-volume pump to the control line and observing: a) the pressure
response of the DSHV opening; and/or b) the volume of fluid returns from the control
line when the DHSV is closed
• The integrity testing of DHSVs in water injection wells is carried out, wherever possible,
by measuring the leak rate directly (ie measured volume of water). This is only applicable
if the well can sustain a significant supercharging effect for the duration of the test
Proformas for DHSV integrity testing are available within the SafeWells System
Tubing Retrievable Valves

If a Tubing Retrievable Downhole Safety Valve (TRDHSV) fails an integrity test after
three successive tests, it should be locked open and a suitable insert valve WRDHSV
installed. Consult the Well Integrity Engineer for advice in such a situation.
Control Line Failures

In addition to the integrity test on the valve body, it is also necessary to carry out pressure
and backflow tests on the control line. These tests are conducted to provide additional
information.
The pressure test only becomes crucial if the valve fails to hold any pressure and
a constant flow of control line fluid into the well prevents the DHSV from opening
or remaining open.
CAUTION: CONTROL LINE BACKFLOW CAN ALLOW HYDROCARBONS TO FLOW
BACK TO THE CONTROL UNIT AND ESCAPE TO ATMOSPHERE
AND/OR CAUSE THE HYDRAULIC FLUID TANK TO OVERFLOW
IN THE EVENT OF A PLATFORM SHUTDOWN.
TO MITIGATE THIS OCCURRENCE, WHEN A CONTROL LINE IS FOUND
TO BE LIABLE TO BACK FLOW, AN OPERATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT
MUST BE ISSUED WHICH REQUIRES THE CONTROL LINE TO BE
ISOLATED BY CLOSING THE NEEDLE VALVE CLOSEST TO THE XMAS
TREE WHEN A SHUTDOWN OCCURS.
9.2 Wireline Retrievable Downhole Safety Valves in Gas

Injection Strings/Water Injector Wells
A WRDHSV in a gas injection string, or a water injection well may be replaced with
an appropriately sized injection valve for the flow conditions. The injection valve should
be integrity tested as detailed in the DHSV tests, unless otherwise instructed.
Injection valves are not recommended to be run in hydrocarbon producing wells.

9.3 WRDHSVs Pulled During a Well Service Operation

If a WRDHSV is pulled during a well service operation, eg to gain access below
the valve, is in good condition and there is adequate time before any changeout is due,
then consideration should be given to re-running the WRDHSV. The decision to re-run
the WRDHSV rests with the Well Service Supervisor.
Valves that have seen service of 1 year or less can generally be considered for re-use
based on condition when pulled.
9.4 Acceptance Criteria for Leak Rates Across DHSVs

The acceptance criteria are based on the leakage rates allowable under API RP 14B.
For production wells it is based on the gas leakage rate, since the gas/oil interface
can drop below the DHSV when the well is shut in
Based on the equations specified in Appendix G of API RP 14B, it shows the pressure
build-up/leak rates, which are allowable above a closed DHSV during a 15 minute test.
Table 4.9 is only applicable to Forties Wells. For Beryl Wells, a formula spreadsheet is
available to check allowable leak rates on a case by case basis based on individual well
volumetric calculations. Refer to references in Paragraphs 6.2 and 6.4 for further details.
If necessary, consult the Well Integrity Engineer for advice on this issue.
Max Allowable Pressure Buildup/

Completion Tubing Type
Leak Rate/15 mins
7in Water Injector (Refer to 400cc/min
Paragraph 9.1)
5 1/2 Gas Lift String 46psi
2 3/8 Gas Injection String 277psi
4 1/2 Producer 70psi
Table 4.9 Forties Field DHSV Allowable Leak Rates
9.5 Acceptance Criteria for Leak Rates Across Storm Chokes

Where there have been problems with maintaining control line pressure on a DHSV,
a storm choke can be used to provide downhole protection. Such devices are set up
on an individual well basis and unless run on a ‘new’ well require a risk assessment prior
to use. Allowable leak rates and operating procedures must therefore be published for
such devices as part of the risk assessment process.
9.6 Failure Diagnostics

following identification of an annulus issue or anomaly. Where such an issue has been
identified, the Well Integrity Engineer must be informed/consulted for further advice.

Figure 4.7 Continued Operation with Failed DHSV

9.7 Annular Safety Valves

ASV integrity testing is very similar to that required for DHSVs. As discussed elsewhere,
there are two types of ASVs in use within Apache, namely:
• Standard downhole safety valve in annulus string
For this type of valve, integrity testing and allowable leak rate should be as specified
for DHSVs in Paragraph 9.4.
• Concentric annular safety valve
Maintenance/integrity testing consists of three requirements:
(1) Correct functioning of the ASV – the ASV closes upon release of control line
pressure. The ASV remains open when control line pressure is applied.
(2) Inflow testing of the valve itself – will provide annulus protection, within an allowable
leak rate, when closed.

(3) Inflow test of the ASV control line – there is no communication with either the tubing
or annulus pressures and the correct operating pressure can be maintained.
Proformas for ASV testing are available within the SafeWells System.
9.8 ASV Testing and Changeout (where applicable) Policy

All ASVs must be confirmed to be in an operable condition by a regular testing
programme. Wireline retrievable valves need only be replaced if they do not meet the test
requirements as recommended in API 14 H.
ASVs on operational wells will be tested at the intervals determined as being appropriate
for the conditions on any particular platform. This will normally be on a 6-month frequency.
As with DHSVs, whenever possible ASVs should be tested immediately prior to xmas
tree maintenance and testing and prior to well intervention work, to avoid additional
well closures.
Testing may not always be possible on the exact date and a deferral should be issued
as required following guidance in this section.
Allowable leak rate for concentric ASVs as installed in the Beryl Field is 0.015kgs/second
or equivalent to 1907scf/hour. This figure is based on a Heritage EM Study Beryl Field ASV
Assessment carried out by RiskX Ltd (Ref No RiskX/12-08-02/01) of November 2002.
As with DHSVs, a formula spreadsheet is available to convert this volumetric number
to a pressure increase. It should be noted that the acceptable pressure increase will vary
according to the depth of the ASV together with the annulus volume to surface, therefore it
is not practical to provide an arbitrary figure as a standard.
Note: Historically, and on subsequent investigation, there have been several instances
of ASV inflow tests being failed un-necessarily. It is important to understand
the physics of the gas in the annulus when conducting such tests.

When the ASV is closed and the gas above the ASV vented, the gas will cool rapidly
until venting stops and the surface casing valve is closed again. Once venting stops
and the valve is closed, the gas left above the ASV will heat up causing an increase
in pressure to occur. This effect can often be misconstrued as a failed test. It is important,
therefore, to ensure that sufficient time is provided for thermal stabilisation to take place,
before commencing the inflow test. The rate of change in pressures should, therefore,
be logged throughout the test to identify the when the stabilisation period has ended and
the test can be commenced. It should be noted that experience has shown that such
tests can sometimes take up to 5 or 6 hours to complete.
The chart below illustrates an example of this effect. Where there is doubt as to the validity
of an ASV inflow test, the Well Integrity Engineer should be called for advice.
Figure 4.8 Typical ASV Test Graph
9.9 Failure Diagnostics

following identification of an annular safety valve issue or anomaly. Where such
for further advice.

Figure 4.9 Continued Operation with ASV Failure

10 Casing and Tubing (Annulus) Monitoring and

Integrity Testing
Key requirements in respect of annulus monitoring and testing are defined below and
further detail on compliance is embedded within these paragraphs. Currently, across
Apache Assets real-time monitoring of annulus pressures via transducers is in place with
the data being fed into the proprietary Avoce or PI systems.
10.1 Annulus Pressure Monitoring Policy

• Annuli should normally be operated to comply with the policy of having two barriers
available between the surface and any contained hydrocarbons. (This includes the
requirement for annular protection by the inclusion of a packer or annular safety valve
on a platform well only)
• To maintain well integrity, the annulus pressures have to be closely monitored

to determine if a leak has occurred. Any change of annulus pressure (increase
or decrease) during operation of a well can point to a well integrity issue and should be
reported to the Well Integrity Engineer. Regular monitoring of annulus pressures
provides early indication of threats to the well operating envelope
• Each platform should have a system of regular monitoring and recording of annulus
pressures and fluids and reporting any hydrocarbons or excursions beyond the set
points
• Immediate action must be taken for any annulus found to contain hydrocarbons,
not associated with normal operating conditions
• All annuli pressures must be maintained within the specified set limits
• All annuli (including dead and shut-in wells) must be monitored to ensure that
hydrocarbons and/or excess pressures are identified
The following data should be recorded on a daily basis:
− Wellhead pressure (flowing or closed in)
− Gas injection pressure (where applicable)
− All annulus pressures
• Regular checks should be carried out to determine the nature of the fluid in any annuli
that contains pressure. It is recommended that this is carried out at minimum intervals
of two weeks
• All information must be recorded in a data recording system to verify that integrity
standards are being maintained and to provide data to evaluate trends, if required
• A potential well integrity problem must be reported as soon as possible to the Well
Integrity Engineer and OIM

• If hydrocarbons are identified, a decision on the requirement for remedial action will
be made on the change in risk associated with the presence of those hydrocarbons,
depending on the zone, inventory and the rate of influx. The initial requirement will
be to identify the rate of influx. This will be carried out by bleeding the annulus to zero
or as close to zero as practical and carrying out a PBU over 1 hour
10.2 Annulus Pressure Monitoring Equipment

A planned preventative maintenance programme must be in place for all annulus
pressure monitoring equipment – eg gauges, transducers, valves and pipework etc. Such
programmes would normally be executed by the Instruments Group with technical input
on requirements from the Wells Team.
Key requirements for annulus (and tubing) pressure monitoring equipment include:
(1) All equipment should be suitable for intended use.
(2) Test pressure-measuring devices shall be accurate to at least +/- 2% of full-scale

range (ref API6A: Specification for Wellhead and Christmas Tree Equipment).
If pressure gauges are used in lieu of pressure transducers, they shall be selected
such that the test pressure is indicated within 20 and 80% of the full-scale value.
(3) Gauges must have an anti-blowout device fitted, to avoid a hydrocarbon release
if damaged
(4) It is recommended that gauges are calibrated every 6 months, alternatively where
calibration equipment is not available onsite then a gauge replacement campaign
should be completed at the same interval. All gauges should carry a sticker
indicating when last calibrated or installed. Gauges should also be replaced on a
condition-basis where necessary.
(5) Where no pressure is present on an annulus gauge, particular care should be taken
to ensure that: a) any applicable needle valve is open; and/or b) instrumentation
pipework is not blocked. Instrument PMs should, therefore, include a requirement
to ensure that instrument lines are not blocked or damaged in any way and
that instrumentation needle valves are normally open or closed as applicable
to day-to-day monitoring of pressures.
(6) All needle valves should be of the several turns to close variety. Quarter-turn valves
should not be utilised for well monitoring purposes, due to the risk of inadvertent
operation and subsequent hydrocarbon release. There should be fully-operational
handles on all valves.
(7) Documented wellhead gauge surveys should be carried out at monthly intervals
by the applicable Production Operator. Any problems – eg broken glass, damaged
case or if the pointer has dropped off, should be highlighted and repairs instigated
immediately. Wellhead gauge surveys must also be carried out by Well Services
personnel on handover of a well following every well intervention. A proforma
for this requirement is available from the Well Integrity Engineer or the SafeWells
System.

‘C’
Criteria ‘A’ ‘B’
(if enclosed)
Annulus operating pressure (bar) Set limit 35 Set limit 25 Set limit 10
Top-up test (bar) 35 25 10
Potential increased pressure 155bar max 35 25
in the event of annulus
(gas lifted
communication
case)
Resultant operating ranges 35 to 155 25 to 35 10 to 25
to compare with API 6A gauge
range criteria
Best fit gauge range 0 to 200 0 to 60 0 to 25
Table 4.10 Forties Annulus Gauges – Example
Criteria ‘A’ ‘B’ ‘C’

Top-up test (bar) N/A N/A N/A
Annulus operating limits Wide 800psi, some 100 to 800psi
(from well operating envelope distribution 1000psi
documents) from 800psi to
4000psi
Comments Gas lift wells Alarm setpoint No gauges
operate ‘A’ at always lower fitted
2500psi max than above (Beryl Bravo)
Best fit gauge range 0 to 5000psi 0 to 1000psi
Table 4.11 Beryl Annulus Gauges – Example
Exception is Beryl Alpha Well A83 ‘A’ annulus – retain 10k gauge on A annulus only.
A83 has 10K Cameron tree installed.
Notes: (1) For Forties DGL wells with pressurised upper annulus, the best-fit range
should be selected on the basis of the maximum possible annulus
pressure with a similar requirement for ESP wells.
(2) DHSV supply pressure gauges should accommodate system test
pressures against the API criteria.
(3) Tubing head/xmas tree mounted bore pressure gauges: Range should not
be less than the pressure rating of the xmas tree.

10.3 Casing Fluid Management

The following paragraphs define an important aspect of well integrity by ensuring that
the integrity of all pressure-containing annuli is managed and maintained.
There are two key factors in casing fluid management, namely:
(1) Maximum calculated annulus pressures must not be exceeded to avoid casing
burst or collapse.
(2) The fact that an annulus has no pressure present does not necessarily mean
that integrity can be guaranteed, subsequently where practical, keeping casings
topped-up with fluid allows for:
• Early indication of casing and formation integrity
• In some instances, the presence of kill fluid in the annulus
On non-gas-lifted wells, each annulus should be topped-up to surface with Filtered

Inhibited Seawater (FISW) unless there is a valid reason not to as explained henceforth.
Historically, Forties wells have regular top-ups while Beryl wells have not been topped
up, mainly due to concerns over barite slump imposing excessive collapse forces
on the casing during annulus pressure testing. Subsequently, the Well Integrity Engineer
should be consulted prior to topping-up any Beryl Well annulus unless such work has
been sanctioned by a specific work instruction to that effect.
10.4 Annulus Venting and Top-up Requirements

The following requirements should be complied-with unless countermanded by a formal
work instruction or operational risk assessment.
Maximum Allowable Casing Pressures

Annuli venting must take place whenever casing pressures approach the maximum
allowable pressures as defined by the individual Well Operating Envelope (WOE)
or other published operating parameters. The WOE must always be consulted prior
to performing the work specified in this paragraph. The annulus in question does not
have
to be bled to zero and indeed a small pressure (ca100psi) maintained on an annulus
provides early indication of any anomalies.
Note: The primary annulus on ESP wells should not be pressure tested unless
specifically requested by onshore support due to the risk of explosive
decompression in the ESP power cable while bleeding down. Such wells
however, should still be topped up on the same frequency as other Forties wells.
Some annuli are in direct communication with water zones allowing an influx of fluid and
pressure. Once this condition has been established and recorded, an operational
instruction may be issued to allow the annulus to operate at a higher than normal
pressure to minimise the requirement for bleed downs.
Excursions from the WOE or operating parameters are only permitted following
appropriate risk assessment and change controls.

Sequence of Venting
The following should be observed to minimise the risk of collapse of the internal casings:
• The tertiary (‘C’) annulus should be at zero pressure before venting the secondary
annulus
• The secondary (‘B’) annulus should be at zero pressure before venting the primary
annulus
CAUTION: IN WELLS WITH INJECTION VALVES, PARTICULAR CARE SHOULD
BE TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT THE PRIMARY ANNULUS AND
THE TUBING ARE VENTED DOWN SIMULTANEOUSLY TO MINIMISE
THE RISK OF TUBING COLLAPSE. IF NECESSARY, CONSULT
THE WELL INTEGRITY ENGINEER FOR ADVICE ON THIS ISSUE.
Note: Due to welI design, it is not possible to monitor and bleed down the tertiary and
secondary annuli on subsea wells during the operational phase.
Venting Methods – Primary Annulus

Where there is a risk of hydrocarbons being present, safe venting of the primary
annulus (9 5/8in casing or 7in casing) should take place via the kill or vent system
to the production train or safe drain system whichever is deemed most suitable.
Subsea wells are normally bled down through the annulus wing valve and crossover
valve on the xmas tree, although, in some cases, this may be achieved through
the gas lift line.
Annulus Top-up (Primary Annulus)

Production wells without gas lift valves, and gas/water injectors without Tubing to Annulus
Communication (TAC) should be topped up when required. Top-up fluid will typically
be filtered inhibited seawater, delivered via the cement unit or other suitable pump, in order
to control pressure within operational limits and accurately measure the volume pumped.
Annuli (except Forties DGL wells) should be topped up and pressure-tested on an annual
basis unless otherwise advised. The Well Integrity Engineer should be consulted for advice
regarding any aspect of topping up.
Forties Dual Gas Lift Wells

Certain Forties wells have dual completions with gas lift mandrels. Such wells operate
with an upper annulus full of kill fluid and the lower primary annulus contains gas-lift gas
at pressure. For well integrity purposes it is important to ensure that the upper annulus is
kept topped-up and inflow-tested, to provide early indication of any communication
between the two annuli.
Where the dual packer is found to be leaking or where there is communication between
the upper and lower annulus for any other reason, then a risk assessment must
be carried out and an operational risk assessment approved and issued to continue
operation of the well as appropriate.

Figure 4.10 Typical Forties DGL Well Schematic
Forties Dual Gas Lift (DGL) wells should be topped up and tested on a quarterly basis
unless otherwise advised.
Forties Wells – Venting and Top-up (Secondary and Tertiary Annuli)

Platform secondary and tertiary annuli should be vented to a safe location. Secondary
and tertiary annuli should be topped up with filtered inhibited seawater after venting
operations have been completed.
Forties Wells – Pressure Testing of Annuli

The periodic pressure testing of annuli provides confidence that the annulus continues
to be pressure-containing and there is no leakage either to another annulus or to the
formation via the casing shoe. The figures quoted may be varied dependent on individual
well conditions. Such changes must be addressed under formal Management of Change
(MOC) procedures.

For Forties single-string wells ONLY, the following test pressures apply:
Annulus Maximum Test Pressure Comments

Primary (A) 35bar
Secondary (B) 25bar
Tertiary (C) 10bar
Table 4.12 Forties Single-string Wells – Annulus Pressure Test Requirements
For Forties Dual Gas Lift (DGL) wells ONLY, the following test pressures apply:
Annulus Maximum Test Pressure Comments

Primary (A) Top up and inflow test In instances where upper annulus
upper annulus ONLY to lower annulus communication has

unless specifically advised been identified, a test programme
otherwise by Wells Team. with required test pressures will be
supplied by the Wells Team.
Report any gas or inflow
into upper annulus.
Secondary (B) 25bar
Tertiary (C) 10bar
Table 4.13 Forties DGL Wells – Annulus Pressure Test Requirements
Note: The primary annulus on ESP wells should not be pressure tested unless
specifically requested by onshore support due to the risk of explosive
decompression in the ESP power cable. Such wells however, should still be
topped up on the same frequency as other Forties wells.
Failures and Anomalies

In the event of any primary annulus pressure equalising with the current tubing head
pressure in less than 24 hours, action should be taken, including venting if required,
to determine if TAC exists.
If the vented fluid consists of hydrocarbons, then the annuli should be vented to zero and
topped up with inhibited seawater, as appropriate. Field personnel should be aware that
continual venting may exacerbate the leak rate and in situations where it is necessary
to vent an annulus on a continuous basis, then the Well Integrity Engineer must be called
for advice immediately.
If pressure communication between the tubing and primary annulus is greater than
the limits determined from the calculations shown in Paragraph 6.4, further well integrity
checks must be carried out to ensure the well can still be secured and the leak path should
be determined. The failure must be reported to the Well Integrity Engineer for evaluation.
Note: For clarification, the term ‘secured’ refers to two barriers to atmosphere being
in place.

Vented Fluids – Analysis Requirements

During all annulus venting operations and where practical and safe, the fluid being
vented must be identified and recorded in the SafeWells System. Where feasible
a sample should be collected for analysis. The fluid should be centrifuged to determine
the proportions of oil, water and sediment and an API test performed on the oil. If the oil
is suspected of being diesel or base oil from drilling mud, then the mud laboratory should
be consulted to confirm whether this is the case.
Where water is being vented off, then analysis should determine whether formation
or injection water. This is particularly relevant to any failure investigation as it narrows
down the source of the water.
If necessary a sample of the fluid should be sent onshore for further analysis and the
Well Integrity Engineer informed.
Venting and Top-up – Reporting Requirements

The following data must be reported in the applicable annulus top-up report
(refer to proformas in SafeWells) after venting and top-up operations:
• Type of fluid vented, such as oil, gas or water etc
• Start and finish pressures and times
• Approximation of volume vented
• Volume of fluid used for top-up
The Well Integrity Engineer must be copied on all annulus top-up Reports and any
venting records.
10.5 Maximum Allowable Annulus Surface Pressure

Operating Limits
Maximum Allowable Annulus Surface Pressures (MAASP) are calculated for all wells.
Such pressures must not be exceeded under any circumstances to avoid either
equipment damage or formation breakdown.
Wells should not be operated close to the MAASP without an assessment being carried
out by the Drilling and Completions Group and the necessary MOC documentation
supplied. Well Operating Envelopes must therefore define maximum allowable operating
pressures for all annuli. Historically, in the Beryl Field maximum allowable operating
pressures have been very conservative with the intent that early warning of any
developing problem is flagged to the Wells Team.

10.6 Wells Operating with Zero Annulus Pressures

As discussed elsewhere, in itself a well operating with zero pressure in an annulus does
not instantly mean that a significant failure has occurred. However, it is important to ensure
that annulus will hold a column of fluid and contain pressure if required to do so.
• Subsequently, any well exhibiting zero pressure across all three annuli for any length
of time should be identified as requiring further investigation. In the first instance,
checks should be made on the monitoring instrumentation to ensure gauges are
functional and small-bore pipework is not blocked
• An example of further investigation would be to apply a nominal pressure to the ‘B’
annulus and check the response in the ‘A’ and ‘C’ annuli or top up with fluid and
pressure test
10.7 Alarm Setpoints

Alarm setpoints should be set up to alarm within a range of operating pressures

to include any minimum operating pressure as advised by the Drilling and Completions
Group within Well Operating Envelopes and other communications. Figure 4.11
illustrates the recommended arrangement.
Figure 4.11 Recommended Alarm Setpoint Guidance
10.8 TAC Exceeding Acceptance Criteria

In the event of communication between the tubing and primary annulus exceeding
the acceptable rates an investigation should be instigated and the leak path determined.
Leak paths are categorised as follows:
• Gas lift valves
• Wellhead pack-offs

• Tubing and casing kill valves

• Production packer
• Tubing seal assemblies
• Tubing leaking above DHSV
• Tubing leaking below the DHSV including DHPTG and chemical injection valve
As soon as the leak path has been determined, the ASV (where fitted) and DHSV should
be integrity-tested and details forwarded to the Well Integrity Engineer.
When the leak path has been determined, an initial assessment of the risk imposed
should be made. Where operationally feasible, a remedial plan to repair or isolate
the leak should be put in place and executed as soon as operationally possible. Where
repairs are not practical or where risk assessment does not warrant immediate repair –
ie barrier philosophy not compromised, the resultant operational risk assessment should
reflect the well status and justification for inaction.
10.9 Criteria for Continued Operation with Casing to Casing

Communication
In simple terms, the key issue for casing to casing communication is to understand
the fact that a barrier within a barrier has been compromised and that the potential
for communication with the atmosphere becomes higher. For example, any communication
from the primary (A) annulus into the secondary (B) annulus, particularly on a gas-lifted
well or a production well with tubing to annulus communication can result in the maximum
pressure ratings of the 13 3/8in casing and casing shoe being approached and the
presence of a large volume of gas in the secondary annulus.
Leak paths include:
• Wellhead seals
• Leaking connections
• Holed casing due to erosion/corrosion
For the reasons above, such wells should be shut-in, vented to as low a pressure
as is practical to minimise any gas inventory and an investigation carried out as to the
source of the communication. Any decision to continue operation of a well, particularly
a gas-lifted production well must be made on a ‘risk basis’ and with management
approval via an Operational Risk Assessment (ORA).
10.10 Annulus Pressure Diagnostics

The following flowcharts and diagrams provide operating personnel with the required
steps to take following identification of an annulus issue or anomaly. Where such
for further advice.

Figure 4.12 Well Integrity Leak Path Diagram

Figure 4.13 Continued Operation with TAC

Figure 4.14 Continued Operation with Casing to Casing Communication

11 Casing Hanger Seal and Wellhead Void Integrity

Casing seal hangers provide the necessary surface isolation between the different
casings on a well. These casing hangers (to include tubing hangers) therefore constitute
a series of barriers to uncontrolled flow from the wellbore and thus require monitoring
as to their integrity on a regular basis. The following guidance is based on Heritage EM
Beryl Alpha and Bravo Platforms 9 5/8in and 13 3/8in Wellhead Void Hazid – Frontier
Eng Ltd Ref No FES-S-R-1346-01 of July 2002.
Integrity testing on casing hanger seals and voids should be performed in accordance
with the applicable Well Maintenance Procedures, supplemented by the detailed
procedures described in the applicable Apache-approved manufacturers' maintenance
manuals. However, particularly on old wells, the action of pressure testing for integrity
to full working pressure can in fact accelerate failure of such seals. For this reason,
therefore, it may be prudent to limit pressure testing to the maximum THP of the well plus
500psi or indeed check for the presence of hydrocarbons only.

The failure of a void or casing seal hanger pressure test does not necessarily indicate full
communication with the wellbore. For example, on tubing hanger void tests pressure may
be dissipating through the lower seals into the next casing hanger seal area but there
may be no communication with wellbore hydrocarbons.
Specific-well PPM test reports should identify where a reduced integrity-checking regime
has been executed or recommended.
11.1 Maintenance Intervals

Maintenance intervals are in accordance with the requirements defined in Table 4.2.
However, where there is a known history of pressure test failure or other issues which
may impact on this requirement, this interval may be extended provided a PPM deferral
request (deferral) has been issued. Alternatively, specific PPM routines can be varied to
suit individual wells.
11.2 Integrity Testing Work Instruction

Detailed work instructions for the integrity testing of casing hanger seals and voids are
provided in the applicable Well Maintenance Procedures or manufacturers’ maintenance
manuals.
11.3 Criteria for Continued Operation with failed Casing/Tubing

Hanger Seals and Void Pressure Tests
In situations where a casing hanger seal has failed, then an evaluation of the failure
should be carried out. Ordinarily such failures do not constitute a major integrity hazard
unless there are other failures of the well containment envelope which introduce
hydrocarbons into the void or an adjacent annulus.

Key issues which must be considered are:

• Presence of hydrocarbons in any void including gas lift gas, with the inability
to bleed-off or stabilise such ingress
• Full communication with other annuli through a failed casing hanger seal (refer to
Paragraph 10.9 on Casing to Casing Communication)
• Any other relevant failures which may impact on continued safe operation for example
where TAC is present
• Compliance with the general two barrier principles
• Enhanced monitoring of the well for any ingress of hydrocarbons into voids
• The need for repairs to be carried out as soon as operationally practical. Note that
there are several sealant repair options available for repair of failed casing/tubing
seals. The Well Integrity Engineer will provide guidance on this issue where required
As with other types of integrity failure, the decision to continue operation of a well with
a failed casing seal hanger or void pressure test and/or the presence of hydrocarbons in
void must be made on a risk basis.
12 Quality Assurance and Quality Control

Part of the Well Integrity Engineer’s duties is to quality-check all data being supplied and
entered into the Well Integrity System. Where inadequate information has been supplied,
the Well Integrity Engineer will request the data to be corrected and re-submitted.
The Well Integrity Engineer will also provide guidance on all aspects of well integrity
when requested.
13 Management of Change
The Management of Change (MOC) process defined in the Apache Drilling and Well
Operations Policy (ANS-DRL-002) should be applied where change is necessary.
The following industry references can be consulted for further advice and information:

ISO 16530: Well Integrity for the

Appendix 4A
Recommended Maintenance Strategies

August 2015 Issue 1 App 4A-i/ii
Discussion on Maintenance
Well Type Discussion on Integrity Aspects Recommendations
Strategies
Active Oil and Gas Constitute the largest risk to Require optimum integrity on such wells. Continue with existing PPM scope and
Producers/Injectors personnel in the event of Maintenance to be kept within defined frequencies.
uncontrolled release. frequency.
Long-term Shut-in Oil Consequences of an uncontrolled Xmas trees on this type of well do not Omit greasing from PPM schedule.
and Gas Producers release no different than active oil require regular greasing as functioning
Continue with standard integrity testing
(open to reservoir) and gas producers. of valves is not frequent enough
regime. Consider plug/kill if no long-term
to deplete the grease reservoirs
use for well and thus eliminate need for
within the valve(s).
full PPM.
Long-term Shut-in Oil Such wells present low Ensure that PWV has sufficient integrity Grease and integrity test TKV and PWV
and Gas Producers/ risk/consequence of uncontrolled to isolate ingress of hydrocarbons into only if ingress from process apparent.
WI/PWRI wells release. However, such wells may xmas tree. If well status such that xmas
(NOT open to become charged up from process tree can be removed with barriers in
reservoir – plant if TKV or PWV integrity poor. place, then no requirement to retain
ie plugged/killed) full integrity on xmas tree (other than
TKV/PWV as noted).
Subsea Oil and Gas Consequences of an uncontrolled Newer style xmas trees – ie Skene/ Consider deferment for extending PPM
Producers/Injectors release more of an environmental Nevis/Buckland/Bacchus – do not frequency on a case-by-case basis.
issue than a risk to personnel. require regular greasing. Thus majority Base decision on failure history and
ESDVs provide the major of PPM scope can be completed from risk. Consider future well intervention
protection to platform personnel. Platform. requirements also.
However, be aware of minimum
For older subsea wells – eg SPS/plain
integrity requirements for any
Jane xmas trees – greasing is required.
future well interventions.

August 2015 Issue 1 App 4A-1
Discussion on Maintenance
Well Type Discussion on Integrity Aspects Recommendations
Strategies
Water Injection Wells In an uncontrolled release, water Adequate integrity required on xmas tree Consider deferment for extending PPM
(above hydrostatic) would be the released fluid and wellhead valves due to pressure frequency on a case-by-case basis. Base
therefore explosion risk is zero. hazard. Consider also erosion/corrosion decision on failure history and evidence
However, pressure presents issues. of corrosion/erosion.
a hazard to personnel.
Produced Water Such wells are generally PPM scope and frequency can be Consider deferment for extending PPM
Re-injection (PWRI) sub-hydrostatic, however relaxed, provided no history of major frequency on a case-by-case basis.
Wells hydrocarbons up to ca 600ppm integrity failures apparent. Consider also Base decision on failure history and
may be entrained in produced erosion/corrosion issues. evidence of corrosion/erosion. If flowline
water, although not deemed to to hydrocarbon process still attached,
be a major hazard. ensure TKV/PWV integrity adequate.
Water Injection Wells Consequence of an uncontrolled PPM scope and frequency can be Consider deferment for extending PPM
(sub-hydrostatic) release once injection pressure relaxed, provided no history of major frequency on a case-by-case basis. Base
removed is minimal. integrity failures apparent. Consider also decision on failure history and evidence of
erosion/corrosion issues. corrosion/erosion.

App 4A-2 August 2015 Issue 1
Section 5
Subsea Well Integrity
Paragraph Page
1 Introduction 5-1
2 Scope 5-1
3 References (all Current Revs) 5-1

3.1 Subsea-specific Definitions 5-2
4 Subsea Well Integrity – Roles and Responsibilities 5-3

4.1 Operation and Maintenance of Subsea Wells 5-3
4.2 Subsea Well Intervention Operations 5-7
4.3 Subsea Intervention 5-9
4.4 Subsea Well Suspension or Abandonment 5-11
5 Equipment/Well Design 5-11

5.1 General Well Design 5-11
5.2 Subsea Well Control Systems 5-16
5.3 Operation of Valves and Other Functions 5-19
6 Operation and Surveillance 5-20

6.1 Annulus Monitoring Requirements/General Notes 5-21
7 Subsea Infrastructure Issues/Anomalies 5-23
8 Subsea Well Maintenance Activities 5-25
9 Well Barriers/Isolations 5-30
10 Notes Specific to Well Intervention on Subsea Wells 5-31
11 Other Subsea Well Integrity Considerations 5-34

11.1 Well Suspension and Abandonment 5-34

August 2015 Issue 1 5-i
Section 5
Subsea Well Integrity (cont’d)
Paragraph Page
12 Emergency Response – Subsea Wells 5-36
Table
5.1 Roles and Responsibilities Matrix 5-4

5.2 Responsibility Codes 5-7
5.3 Well Entry Definitions 5-8
5.4 Subsea Work Ownership – Guidance Table 5-8
5.5 Subsea Intervention Work Definition 5-10
5.6 Recommended Subsea Well Maintenance Frequencies 5-27
5.7 Subsea Well Integrity Industry References 5-36
Figure
5.1 Typical Vertical Dual-bore Tree 5-12
5.2 Typical Valve Configuration for a Vertical Dual-bore Xmas
Tree 5-13
5.3 Typical Horizontal or Spool Tree 5-14
5.4 Typical Valve Configuration for a Horizontal or Spool Tree 5-15
5.5 Bacchus Xmas Tree 5-15
5.6 Sequence Hydraulic Control 5-16
5.7 Direct Hydraulic Control 5-18
5.8 Electro–hydraulic Control 5-18
5.9 Typical Control Room Screen 5-19
5.10 Beryl Area Subsea Facilities 5-24
5.11 Bacchus Field Subsea Facilities 5-25
5.12 Horizontal (Spool) Xmas Tree Valve Schematic 5-29
5.13 Information Flow Requirements 5-34

5-ii August 2015 Issue 1
Section 5
Subsea Well Integrity (cont’d)
Appendix 5A Subsea Well PPM Proforma Templae – Vertical

Dual Bore XT
Appendix 5B Subsea Well PPM Proforma Template – Horizontal
XT (S66 Example)
Appendix 5C Subsea Xmas Tree Valve Status Tool Example
(Template available from Well Integrity Engineer)
Appendix 5D Example Subsea Equipment ER Reference Chart

August 2015 Issue 1 5-iii/iv
1 Introduction
The execution of subsea Planned Maintenance (PM) obviously requires a well
to be shut-in to carry-out the required work. Significant volume losses can, therefore, occur
either from in-efficiencies either prior to, or during the work in question. This procedure
is intended to convey those best practices applicable to minimising well downtime
and subsequently, production losses.
It should be noted that the best practices noted in this procedure are intended
to supplement those already defined in other sections of this manual.
2 Scope
This procedure covers the execution of all subsea PM work within Apache. The scope
does not extend to the execution of wellwork on subsea wells but does discuss the integrity
aspects of aspects of planning for subsea well interventions together with providing
definitions on what it constitutes.
3 References (all Current Revs)

• As defined in other sections of this manual
• Apache Drilling and Well Operations Policy (ANS-DRL-002)
• Well services operational guidelines
• UK regulation
• Installation-specific production operations operating and training manuals
As per Abbreviations within this manual plus

AAV Annulus Access Valve
ADV Annulus Drilling Valve
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable
AMMV Annulus Manual Master Valve
AMV Annulus Master Valve
ASV Annulus Swab Valve
AWV Annulus Wing Valve
BOP Blow-Out Preventer
CIV Chemical Injection Valve
DHSV Downhole Safety Valve
DP Dynamic Position
DVB Dual Valve Block
ESD Emergency Shut-Down
EDF Emergency Disconnect Frame

GLCV Gas Lift Choke Valve

GLIV Gas Lift Injection Valve
GLV Gas Lift Valve
GV Gate Valve
HCU Hydraulic Control Unit
ID Internal Diameter
ITCCP ITC Crown Plug
LWIV Light Well Intervention Vessel
MODU Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit
PCV Production Choke Valve
PHMV Production Hydraulic Master Valve
PIV Production Isolation Valve
PMMV Production Manual Master Valve

PSV Production Swab Valve
PWV Production Wing Valve
QMU Quick Makeup
ROV Remotely Operated Vehicle
SIL Subsea Intervention Lubricator
TDU Tool Deployment Unit
THCP Tubing Hanger Crown Plug
TRT Tree Running Tool
UEDF Umbilical Emergency Disconnect Frame
WSTC Weight Set Tree Cap
XOV Cross Over Valve
3.1 Subsea-specific Definitions

The following definitions are subsea-specific and are additional to those outlined
in the preliminary pages of this document.
(1) The definition of ‘operating or host platform’ is the platform normally controlling
the subsea well. ‘wellwork installation’ is defined as the installation where the work
is taking place.
(2) The operating platform and the wellwork installation OIMs will retain accountability
for safety at their respective facilities.

4 Subsea Well Integrity – Roles and Responsibilities

While it is not is not intended to address specific well intervention work within the scope
of this section, it is important to define the ownership of subsea well integrity activities when
executing such work. The group executing the work in question may not necessarily be the
group having oversight of the equipment or activity. For example, the Subsea Projects and
Operations Group may have oversight on, for example, pressure transducers, but the Wells
Team may have responsibility for actually removing, repairing or re-installing such items of
equipment where well containment is to be breached.
In general terms and for clarity, the outer boundaries of a subsea well can be regarded
as the reservoir to the outer flanges on the xmas tree where a specification change from
the API Standard to another standard – eg AISI/ASME for flowline/gas lift lines etc,
is apparent. Instrument or chemical injection pipework may not be included but valving
directly on the xmas tree or flowbase is.
The definitions below are intended to identify and clarify roles and responsibilities
for such situations.
4.1 Operation and Maintenance of Subsea Wells

Accountability for the operation and maintenance of subsea wells during the Operational
Phase (In-service), as with platform wells, rests with the Operating Platform OIM.
The Platform OIM should ensure that the applicable operating and maintenance
and reporting requirements set out in this section are complied with.
Where technical support is required, the appropriate Functional Group (Drilling and/or
Subsea Projects and Operations Group) should be consulted as required.
The roles and responsibility matrix below provides more definition on roles and
responsibilities for the Operational Phase.

Roles and Responsibilities

The following matrix defines who does what in respect of subsea well maintenance.
Well Integrity Engineer

Production Manager
Engineer (Onshore)
Platform Engineer
Completions and
Well Intervention
Subsea Projects/
Ops Engineering
Drilling Manager
Superintendent
Superintendent
Maintenance
(if Offshore)
Subsea
WSS
OSP
OIM
No Task
001 Safety of Installation C A R C C C C C C C C

002 Issue of Subsea Well Status Report I A R C I C I I R R I
003 Technical content of PPMs I C C C A R R R C C I
in respect of Well Integrity
(Refer to Notes 1 and 2)
004 Scheduling of Well Integrity Testing C A R I C C I C C C C
(Refer to Note 1)
005 Execution of Well Integrity Testing C A R C I C C C C C I
006 Reporting within PPM System I A R R I C I I I I I
(SafeWells)
007 Issue of TAC and DHSV Leak-off Test I A R C I C C C I I I
Reports
Table 5.1 Roles and Responsibilities Matrix

5-4 August 2015 Issue1

Production Manager
Engineer (Onshore)
Platform Engineer
Completions and
Well Intervention
Subsea Projects/
Ops Engineering
Drilling Manager
Superintendent
Superintendent
Maintenance
(if Offshore)
Subsea
WSS
OSP
OIM
No Task
008 Reporting of Well Integrity Test Failures I A R R C C C C I C I

(Refer to Note 4)
009 Wellbore Integrity Technical Advice I C C R A R R R I C I
(Refer to Notes 3 and 4)
010 Subsea Equip Technical Advice I C I C C C C C A/R C I
(non-wells)
Refer to
Note 3
011 Planning and mob of Dive Support C A I I I C C I A/R C C
Vessel and all Dive Work
Refer to
Note 3
012 Planning and mob of Light Well C C C C A C C R R C I
Intervention Vessel and all Dive Work
Refer to
Note 3
Table 5.1 Roles and Responsibilities Matrix (cont’d)


Production Manager
Engineer (Onshore)
Platform Engineer
Completions and
Well Intervention
Subsea Projects/
Ops Engineering
Drilling Manager
Superintendent
Superintendent
Maintenance
(if Offshore)
Subsea
WSS
OSP
OIM
No Task
013 Implementation of any required risk A R C C C C C C C C I

reduction measures and/or the
acceptance of reduced integrity on
any well.
Notes: (1) The Drilling Manager as Technical Authority has ownership of the Technical Standards in respect of all subsea wells from the
sandface to the outer flanges on the xmas tree – ie at the PWV/TKV/gas lift valve(s) outer flanges wherever there is the spec-break,
from API to AISI for example.
(2) The Completions and Subsea Supt should approve all subsea well PPM proformas.
(3) The Subsea Projects and Operations Group roles and responsibilities are in respect of vessel and dive-related operations on subsea
wells only. Subsea Projects and Operations Group would not be involved in routine maintenance which is wholly platform-based
eg DHSV testing/TAC checks etc.
(4) The Offshore Supervisor Production (OSP) has responsibility for ensuring that the WSS is made aware of, and is consulted on any
identified problem or failures with subsea wells. The Offshore WSS has responsibility for the formal reporting of failures once they have
been confirmed. Note that the WSS may not always be onboard the Installation. If the WSS is not onboard, then the Well Integrity
Engineer onshore should be consulted for technical advice on how to proceed.
Table 5.1 Roles and Responsibilities Matrix (cont’d)

5-6 August 2015 Issue1
Code Category Description

R Responsible This person is responsible for performing the work.
Responsibilities in this category can be shared or delegated.
A Accountable This person is accountable for, and is the authority for
ensuring that the activity is executed correctly as defined
in the approved Apache procedures or other form of risk
control. This accountability cannot be delegated. A person
can be accountable and responsible for performing the work.
C Consult This person shall be consulted for input or support
of the activity concerned.
I Inform This person shall be informed once a decision or action
has been taken.
Table 5.2 Responsibility Codes
4.2 Subsea Well Intervention Operations

When a subsea well has been handed over for work to be carried out, the following
sections define more fully how well integrity issues are managed outwith the Operational
Phase:
• Any activities whereby the pressure containment of a well is or may be breached can
be considered subsea well intervention (or well entry). There are, however, some
situations where direct exposure to the wellbore does not occur and the work can
be safely performed under standard process isolation procedures and practices under
a subsea intervention programme
• The following tables are intended to provide guidance as to what activities
can constitute such a breach of containment
• Where work is deemed to be subsea well intervention only, the Wells Team
can initiate and execute such activities. Any work programme will be reviewed and
approved in accordance with Wells Team policies, processes and procedures
• The Subsea Projects and Operations Group will review and concur with the subject
work programme where necessary, unless the work is being performed entirely under
the remit of Drilling as a standalone operation with no other group interfaces
• In all cases the work described in Table 5.3 is classified as well entry and comes
under the Wells Team’s remit

Details of Work Comments

Any work requiring the removal This work should always be performed
or venting of the tree cap. under a well programme issued by the
Wells Team.
On horizontal or spool trees, any work As above.
requiring removal or venting of the internal
tree cap and/or crown plug.
Table 5.3 Well Entry Definitions
The following activities may be considered to be well entry dependent on the particular
equipment design and configuration. In all cases, discussion and agreement on a case-by-
case basis must take place between the Drilling and the Subsea Projects and Operations
Groups, to determine:
• Whether a well (well entry) programme is required
• Whether the work can be performed under a subsea intervention work programme
with the review and concurrence of the Wells Team (refer to Paragraph 4.3)
Key issue for all parties is to ensure that any exposure to the wellbore when performing
the work is safely managed and controlled utilising the most applicable and competent
personnel, thus minimising the hazard of uncontrolled flow from a well and/or pressure
hazards for divers.
Table 5.4 describes the activities that are considered subsea interventions or well
entry where ownership can lie either with the Wells Team or the Subsea Projects and
Operations Group, depending on the implications for maintaining well integrity.

Removal and installation of pressure Consider potential for exposure to
transducers where there is a potential wellbore on a case-by-case basis.
for communication with the wellbore.
Issue well intervention programme where
deemed necessary by the Wells Team.
Removal or installation of chokes where As above.
there is a potential for communication
with the wellbore.
Removal or installation of control pod As above. For clarification, any work on
containing CI or DHSV functions and any a chemical injection line or DHSV control
work on DHSV or CI control lines. line can lead to communication with the
wellbore.
Table 5.4 Subsea Work Ownership – Guidance Table


Any valve repairs that involve the removal As above.
of an actuator, actuator stem, bonnet, or
Note: By design, some maintenance
check valve or that require a valve to be
and repair operations can be
overridden.
performed on this type of
equipment without exposure to the
wellbore. In all cases, where
planning to perform this work under
a subsea intervention programme,
the Wells Team should check and
concur with this approach.
Table 5.4 Subsea Work Ownership – Guidance Table (cont’d)

The following well entry operations require the swab valve to be operated and/or additional
pressure barriers to be installed and therefore the Wells Team shall be the responsible
function in all cases:
• Installation or deployment of equipment capable of operating xmas tree swab valves,
such as the subsea wireline lubricator system
• Work performed on a well using a subsea wireline lubricator from a DSV or workover
riser from MODUs
• Subsea well suspension or abandonment where the reservoir has not been fully isolated
as per company or country-specific regulatory requirements, and thus constitutes
a potential hazard
4.3 Subsea Intervention

Any subsea activities not involving well intervention or well entry work but where there
is potential for the release of well pressure to create a safety risk to divers should
be considered subsea intervention.
The Subsea Projects and Operations Group shall retain overall responsibility for the offshore
operation and will issue the work programme, however this programme must be reviewed
and concurred by the Wells Team. This is to ensure that adequate and proven well barriers
and/or isolations are in place where necessary, before proceeding to breach any
pressure-containing/retaining components on or attached to a subsea well.
Onsite personnel must also be aware that any changes that occur during a subsea
intervention may necessitate the subsequent issue of a subsea well intervention
programme to address the change in situation. For example, where it is necessary
to put the necessary well barriers in place after being unable to stem a leak from a xmas
tree check valve following greasing operations.
The requirement for well intervention supervision should be discussed on a case-by-case
basis between the Subsea Superintendent, Subsea Projects and Operations Group
Manager, Drilling Manager and the applicable OIM.

It is recommended that a Well Intervention Supervisor or Engineer is onboard to provide

guidance in respect of well barriers and such like for this type of work.
Details of Subsea Intervention Work

Pipeline and chemical injection line work involving connection or disconnection from
trees or guidebases.
Work performed on valves that are outboard of the xmas tree production wing valve
and annulus wing valve, and outboard of the first valve on the platform topsides.
This includes any non-visual work performed on the following:
• Flowline valves
• Subsea chokes
• Manifold valves
• Tree valves
• Emergency shutdown valves
Any work on the platform control unit that controls the operation of the subsea tree
and other items of downhole equipment, involving the disconnection or reconnection
of control umbilicals.
Subsea tree valve greasing.
Any work performed on subsea structures such as visual inspection, opening doors
for planned intervention or releasing sliding legs.
Any operations that are performed on subsea umbilicals including connection and
disconnection between the tree and outboard of the first valve on the platform topsides.
This includes any subsea tree control piping and cabling.
Any pipeline work, which can be defined as all operations between the tree flowline
connectors and the subsea risers at the operating platform, including:
• Any non-visual work performed at the tree/guidebase to flowline interface, such
as the connection or disconnection of the flowline
• Any non-visual work performed on the chemical injection lines such as connection
or disconnection
Any operations performed on submerged control units controlling the functionality

of a subsea xmas tree, guidebase or associated downhole equipment, including:
• Any non-visual work performed on Subsea Distribution Units (SDUs)
• Removal or installation of non-chemical injection or DHSV control pods or modules
Any diving work in the categories above when a part of well construction, well
intervention and abandonment work or activities.
Table 5.5 Subsea Intervention Work Definition

4.4 Subsea Well Suspension or Abandonment

The definitions as provided in the preliminary pages of this document also apply for all
subsea well abandonment or suspension work.
All well abandonment/suspensions from a MODU will be under the management
and control of a Wells Team programme.
For well abandonment/suspensions from a DSV or LWIV, due consideration must be given
to evaluating whether the operation in question constitutes a subsea well intervention/well
entry. Such evaluation must be based on the level of exposure to a live wellbore and
the risk of an uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons. For example, perforating and cutting
of a wellhead in a well which has previously been plugged/abandoned or isolated
in accordance with company or country-specific regulatory guidelines, may not constitute
a well intervention/well entry and it is acceptable to perform the work under a subsea
intervention programme.
The Wells Team and the Subsea Projects and Operations Group must therefore discuss
and agree on what type of work programme is required to execute the planned work.
5 Equipment/Well Design
5.1 General Well Design
There are significant differences between surface (platform) and subsea wells – mainly in
respect of wellhead/casing and tree design. Detailed descriptions of such differences are
not within the scope of this section.
Xmas Trees
There are several designs of subsea trees in use with Apache and personnel involved with
subsea wells must study their particular xmas trees and configurations before carrying out
any planned maintenance.
Vertical Dual-bore Xmas Trees

Vertical trees have dual-bores leading to the production tubing and to the annulus –
the conduit to the annulus generally being a short section of pipe connected
to the tubing hanger. All valves on vertical trees are inline and the tree cap is generally
pressure-retaining. For annulus bleed-downs the annulus is connected to the tubing
via a Crossover Valve (XOV).

A typical vertical dual-bore xmas tree is shown in Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1 Typical Vertical Dual-bore Tree
Typical Valve Configurations

Below is a typical valve configuration for a vertical dual-bore tree. Note the location
of the various pressure transducers. As discussed elsewhere in this section, the successful
execution of planned maintenance on subsea wells is heavily dependent on the functionality
and exact location of these transducers in relation to the individual tree valves. Where
any transducers are found to be non-functional then the planned maintenance work
instruction must be modified to accommodate pressure monitoring from the remaining
functional transducers.

Figure 5.2 Typical Valve Configuration for a Vertical Dual-bore Xmas Tree
Horizontal/Spool Trees
Horizontal or spool trees (terminology dependent on manufacturer) differ from vertical
trees in that they have no inline valves on the tree – all tubing and annulus valves being
outboard of the vertical bores to the production tubing and the annulus. An internal tree
cap and crown plug are installed in the tree bore to provide the necessary barriers
to the atmosphere when the non-pressure retaining debris cap is installed.
Horizontal trees are designed to allow drill pipe access through the tree via drilling BOPs
and riser installed on top of the xmas tree. The wellbore can be entered once
the internal tree cap and crown plug have been pulled through the BOPs.

Figure 5.3 Typical Horizontal or Spool Tree

A typical valve configuration for a horizontal or spool tree is provided below.

Figure 5.4 Typical Valve Configuration for a Horizontal or Spool Tree
Figure 5.5 Bacchus Xmas Tree

5.2 Subsea Well Control Systems
Introduction
There are several different designs of control system for subsea wells. Each system has
advantages and disadvantages and there may be a mixture of different control system
types in one field.
A basic knowledge of how each system works is necessary for readers to understand the
implications of control system operability on well integrity. For more detailed information,
readers are directed to the Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) within the Company.
Sequence Control
This method of control operates on the basis of the tree/wellhead valves functioning
by increasing and decreasing the hydraulic control pressure to sequence the valves open
and closed. This system is generally a retro-fit utilised on older wells where
the original system has developed reliability issues – such as, electro-hydraulic systems
where the electrical function has been lost, etc.
Figure 5.6 Sequence Hydraulic Control
The following are the advantages and disadvantages of a sequence hydraulic control
system:
Advantages
• Increase in range of operability over direct control (typically 5 to 8km, 3 to 5 miles)
• No influence on umbilical size given increase in control functions (manifold at the far end)
• Usually open loop hydraulics (appropriate for expeditious hydraulic shutdown)

Disadvantages
• Increased complexity
• Hydraulic sequence control pod complexity
• Hydraulic fluid management
• Unable to pressure test function individually
• No process information of remote facility
When carrying out integrity tests with wells on such a system, it may not be possible
to integrity test individual valves on the tree/wellhead and it may only be practical
to ascertain that the valves in question are functioning and that there is no flow into
the flowline via the Production Wing Valve (PWV). This is termed a gross flow test. Where
such situations occur, it is prudent to carry out a risk screening exercise to ensure:
• That there is adequate protection for the host platform – such as flow from the reservoir,
can be contained within the well
• The risk to personnel in executing well intervention work can be minimised
Gross flow tests should be recorded in SafeWells as an adhoc test.
When planning well interventions on wells with sequence control, due regard must
be made for the fact that individual valves have not been fully tested as well barriers
and that further testing may be required once the workover control system from
the intervention vessel or MODU, has been hooked up and is functional. For information,
installation of the workover control system will bypass the sequence control and restore
operation of individual valves.
Contingencies must, therefore, be built into the applicable well intervention programme
with the assumption that individual valves may not integrity-test as desired. This will
avoid un-necessary downtime having to deal with detailed wellwork programme changes.
Direct Hydraulic Control

By its title, this system involves direct control via umbilical to the tree and wellhead
valves. This system is more likely to be found on older subsea wells by design where the
well is a short distance from the host platform, or where there have been problems with
an electro-hydraulic system. As intimated in the disadvantages below, valve closure
times may be greatly increased when utilising this system and due allowance must be
made for this fact when establishing acceptable closure times.
Advantages
• Simple to implement
• Robust in operation
• Good for control close to the pump – eg 500 to 750m
• Pressure testing of individual functions
• Usually closed loop hydraulics unless configured for local vent

Disadvantages
• Slow for operation at a distance
• Increase in umbilical size – ie a core for each function
• Limited in range of operation
• No process information of facility
Figure 5.7 Direct Hydraulic Control
Electro-hydraulic Control
This is the most common form of subsea well control system and involves a combination of
electrical and hydraulics to function the various tree and wellhead valves. The Subsea
Electrical Module (SEM) fitted close to the tree or manifold provides the necessary signals
to operate the hydraulics supplied by the host platform via an umbilical, to individual valves.
Figure 5.8 Electro–hydraulic Control

Advantages
• Increase in range of operability over sequence control (typically 10 to 100km)
• No influence on umbilical size given increase in control functions (manifold
at the far end)
• Can be either open or closed loop hydraulics (as appropriate for required performance
criteria)
• Process information retrieved from remote location
• Operation and control of complimentary equipment (pig detectors etc)
Disadvantages
• Electro hydraulic control pod complexity
• Power and signal distribution management

• Software control and management
5.3 Operation of Valves and Other Functions
Introduction
The schematic below illustrates a typical control room mimic-screen with a subsea tree
and its associated valving, pressure transducers and others.
Figure 5.9 Typical Control Room Screen

Valve Closure Times

Due to the complexity of design with subsea well control systems valve closure times can
be much longer than that for surface tree valves. Taking into account the design
parameters described above and based on field experience, tree valve closure times can
vary between 30 seconds and 3 minutes or even longer. Unlike surface trees, a repair or
modification to decrease closure times would not be practical on a cost-benefit basis.
In practical terms therefore, a Performance Standard (PS) for valve closure time which
is both achievable and repeatable, should be published.
In recording tree valves closure times the only guaranteed method of checking closure
time is to witness closure of a valve at the tree, utilising an ROV-conveyed camera
or by diver observing the valve functioning. Obviously, a substantial cost can be incurred
for an ROV or diver to witness valve closure times and thus it is recommended that this
work is planned alongside other higher value subsea work on an opportunistic basis
rather than a defined frequency.
In practice, however, experienced personnel are usually able to observe valve closure
when executing PMs by careful observation of pressure fluctuations within the tree
together with visual indication – usually a coloured LED, in the host platform control
room. control room indications alone should not be viewed as guaranteeing that
a valve has functioned closed.
Downhole Safety Control System Issues

Tubing or annulus to control line communication can result in contamination of the entire
subsea control system to the DHSV and personnel monitoring subsea wells should be
conscious of this issue when leak-off testing DHSVs. Any such communication should
therefore be reported to the Well Integrity Engineer for further investigation
6 Operation and Surveillance

The operating and surveillance requirements for subsea wells are essentially no different
than platform or surface wells. However, there are certain issues and anomalies with
subsea wells which should be recognised and accounted for. Such issues are defined
in the following paragraphs.
The following best practices have been derived from actual operating experience
and past history.

6.1 Annulus Monitoring Requirements/General Notes

Due to well design, it is only possible to monitor the primary (‘A’) annulus on subsea
wells. Annulus monitoring is normally via a pressure transducer on the annulus side
of the xmas tree. However, where the pressure transducer is faulty, the hydraulic master
valve can be closed and the Crossover Valve (XOV) opened, with the production wing
valve closed and the pressure recorded from the pressure transducer normally recording
tubing pressure.
Annulus monitoring normally takes place on a continuous basis but if such an arrangement
is not available then 12-hourly readings should be taken and recorded. Any anomalies
should be reported.
Annulus Venting
Venting of an annulus would normally be executed by closing the production master
valve and opening the Crossover Valve (XOV) to the tree and then subsequently
venting to the flowline via the open production wing valve. Care must be taken to ensure
that the annulus pressure is always higher than the tubing pressure before opening
the XOV, to avoid influx from the tubing to the annulus and alarm setpoints should be set
accordingly. Care should also be taken to avoid venting under high differential pressure,
in order to avoid hydrate formation.
Ambient Seabed Pressures/Flowline Volumes

It should be noted that when bleeding down a flowline to inflow-test a tree/wellhead valve
that the pressure at the subsea tree can never be bled to zero due to the hydrostatic head
of fluid from the flowline to the host platform.
For example a water depth/height of platform depth of 400ft with 8.3ppg of seawater in the
flowline will exert a hydrostatic head of (8.3 x 0.052) psi/ft x 400 = 173psi.
Similarly, due to the large flowline volume which may be present it may not be practical
to vent the flowline to ambient pressure as this exercise may take some considerable
time. For this reason, flowlines should be vented to a nominal pressure, determined
by the particular process train pressure together with past experience and judgement –
for example; reduced by ca 250psi, prior to executing a valve integrity test campaign.
Co-incidental with the large flowline volumes discussed above, readers should be aware
of the shortfalls of inflow-testing valves into a flowline and monitoring pressure increases
at the host platform. Even significant leak rates across a valve may not be detected
as a pressure increase, due to the large volume being monitored.

Hydrate Risk
In the North Sea, due to the cooling effect of the sea, some subsea wells may be at a high
risk of forming hydrates, particularly around the xmas tree and the gas lift lines
in a gas-lifted well.
Note also the potential for hydrate formation when venting an annulus at high differential
pressures and velocities particularly at startup.
Well startup and shut-in procedures should, therefore, address the potential for hydrates
and provide steps to avoid hydrates forming.
These facts should be recognised when operating subsea wells or planning maintenance
activities and the necessary hydrate prevention precautions should be followed.
Potential Trapped Annulus Issues

Personnel involved with the integrity of subsea wells should be aware of the potential
for trapped annulus issues. An annulus is trapped when cement or settled mud solids
extend above the previous casing shoe. Due to subsea well design where only the primary
annulus can be vented any trapped fluids can cause a buildup in annulus pressure
as a well heat up. This creates the potential for burst or collapsed casing or which may also
impact on the integrity of the production tubing resulting in uncontrolled flow of reservoir
fluid with obvious Health Safety and Environment (HSE) and cost implications. Typical
mitigations can include:
• Leave cement below previous casing shoe – challenging in deviated wells or reservoirs
near shoe
• Leave compressible fluid in trapped annulus
• Burst disk or foam wrap
• Vacuum insulated tubing
• Ensuring that the annulus pressure is always higher than the tubing pressure when
opening the XOV to vent down an annulus
• A Heritage EM Survey on wells with potential for trapped annulus is available from
the Wells Team ‘N’ drive or contact the Well Integrity Engineer for such information
Annulus Service Lines

On older horizontal (spool) trees an annulus service line is often used to vent
an annulus rather than the XOV. This practice should be avoided if at all possible
as there is potential for such lines to be plugged by debris and for hydrates to form.

7 Subsea Infrastructure Issues/Anomalies

As depicted by the schematic below, the infrastructure of a subsea field can be extremely
complex. Such complexity introduces anomalies not seen during integrity testing
of platform (surface) wells. Typical issues which can complicate integrity testing, although
by no means an exhaustive listing, include the following:
Shared Flowlines: leakage from one well to another can occur and will complicate
the accuracy of any inflow testing on an individual well – an example is where leakage from
a shared flowline where one well is shut-in for integrity testing and one is left flowing.
Should the Production Wing Valve (PWV) from the shut-in well leak from the downstream
(flowline) side then any integrity test on the tree valves will be affected by such a leak.
Leaking Flowbase or Manifold Valves: similar scenarios to shared flowlines.
The presence of ringmain gas lift lines will also present problems in evaluating
integrity-test results.
Control System Issues: as discussed in Paragraph 5.2, functionality of the applicable

control system can present problems in being able to integrity-test individual tree or
wellhead valves.
Failed Pressure Transducers: pressure transducers are the main instruments by which the
integrity status of individual tree and wellhead valves can be ascertained. Their proximity
within the subsea well system together with their functionality provide Operations personnel
with the necessary information to evaluate the integrity status of a well.
Should such pressure transducers be non-functional, then an alternative method
of establishing the integrity of individual valves should be sought. This would involve
re-configuration of individual valve positions in an effort to utilise an alternative pressure
transducer for pressure monitoring.
For reference, consult the example valve configuration and the example planned
maintenance proformas in the Appendices.
Based on the issues discussed above, PM proformas or work instruction must
be well-specific and based on the actual status of the well at the time of PM
execution. Where necessary they should be modified onsite to suit the as-found status.

Figure 5.10 Beryl Area Subsea Facilities
Figure 5.11 Bacchus Field Subsea Facilities
8 Subsea Well Maintenance Activities

The following are notes specific to executing planned maintenance routines and are
intended to take the reader from the initial work planning stages through to execution
of the actual work.
Co-ordination of Activities
If a dive support vessel is required for performing maintenance on subsea wells, adequate
time must be set aside for procurement of such a vessel. It is recommended that planning
for such work should commence around 26 weeks before planned execution.
All groups involved with subsea work (Instruments/Production Ops/Subsea Projects
etc) should review, those PM routines which require a well to be shut in to execute,
and ensure that wherever practical such routines are completed at the same time,
thus avoiding multiple well shut-ins.

Job Planning
When preparing for planned maintenance on a subsea well, adequate control room
personnel must be available to support the work.
Planned Preventative Maintenance (PPM or PM) routines should be tailored to suit
the service and criticality of each well, to avoid excessive downtime in executing
maintenance work. Therefore on a periodic basis, the status of each well (long-term
shut-in/suspended/change of use etc) versus the maintenance work being carried out
should be reviewed.
Liaison with Project Group(s)

Where a dive support vessel is necessary for carrying out visual work, the subsea projects
and operations group should be involved in planning of the work. Remotely Operated
Vehicle (ROV) inspections of subsea wells and infrastructure should be planned in
co-ordination with the Subsea Projects and Operations Group.

As with all high-cost subsea intervention work, the opportunity to execute work
of a lower-priority nature should be planned in to avoid duplicate campaigns and well
shut-ins.
Any documentation (reports/videos of leaks etc) relevant to well integrity should
be supplied to the applicable Well Intervention Engineer and Well Integrity Engineer
for evaluation, and kept on record.
Platform Liaison and Support

The execution of planned maintenance on subsea wells can be labour-intensive and
as such adequate control room/Production Operations support should be made available.
Where DSV work is involved the provision of a Well Intervention Supervisor or Engineer
to assist with any technical issues arising during such work, should be considered.
Work Instruction for Well Integrity-related Planned Maintenance (PM)

The work instruction for well integrity-related planned maintenance has been generated
by Wells Team personnel as Technical Authority for this type of work and is conveyed
via PM proformas. Each Apache Subsea Well has its own PM proforma based on the
latest available integrity status (refer to example in Appendices).
Detailed Roles and Responsibilities

The detailed Roles and Responsibilities Matrix (refer to Table 5.1) defines who does
what.
In addition, there should be a clear de-lineation of responsibilities between the groups
involved in any subsea well planned maintenance work. The issue of a suitable interface
document defining the work and associated responsibilities is strongly recommended for
any work where a vessel is involved.

Integrity Testing Requirements – Best Practices

Considerable downtime can be incurred due to the inability to rig-up on a well due to failed
or non-functioning xmas tree valves. The following best practices should be applied prior to
any work taking place;
Frequency of Integrity Testing for Subsea Wells: Table 5.7 describes the required frequency
of integrity testing for subsea wells. The majority of work can be executed from the host
platform, however any visual inspection or valve greasing work will require the use of a
vessel of some description.
The frequencies quoted may be varied provided the appropriate MOC/risk screening
exercise has been completed.
Equipment/Tests Description Frequency

Tubing to Annulus Testing of communication between 12 months
Communication tubing to annulus (or annulus to annulus

Testing where monitoring is possible).
DHSV Integrity Inflow testing of Downhole Safety Valves 12 months
Testing (DHSV)
Subsea Tree Valves Inflow testing of tree and wellhead 12 months
(Integrity Testing) valves.
Subsea Tree Valves PPM consisting of *valve greasing and Recommended
visual inspection including valve closure 24 months
times. (refer to
paragraphs
*Only if valve requires greasing
below)
periodically as the majority of valves
within Apache subsea assets are sealed.
Table 5.6 Recommended Subsea Well Maintenance Frequencies
While the maintenance frequency for subsea wells is defined as 24 months (+ 1 month
before being backlogged), it is recognised that it is not cost-effective to mobilise a Dive
Support Vessel (DSV) specifically for carrying out valve greasing and visual inspection
on individual subsea wells. Therefore this work would normally be carried out when
a DSV is mobilised for other more critical subsea work. Best efforts should, therefore,
be made to plan subsea well maintenance into routine or unplanned DSV schedules
wherever practical. Where the defined frequency of maintenance cannot be complied
with due to the reasons defined above, then the applicable management of change
documentation and risk screening should be completed.
In all cases, and in alignment with regulatory expectations, the period between visual
inspections should not exceed 5 years.

Inactive or Long-term Shut-in Wells

On long-term shut-in or inactive wells, where tree valves are not being cycled on
a regular basis or where the well has been secured – eg deep-set plug/kill fluid etc,
it may not be necessary to maintain the frequencies defined in the Table 5.6. A deferral
form may therefore be issued to accommodate a reduced or deferred PPM frequency.
Note that unless plugged or killed to the formation, long-term shut-in or inactive wells
should be viewed as potentially live wells.
Servicing Requirements
Servicing requirements will vary depending on the make and type of valve or component
in operation. General servicing requirements at work instruction level is provided in
manufacturers' service manuals or rig books.
Acceptable Leak Rates for Subsea Wells

Good engineering judgement based on practical experience taking into account the issues
described throughout this section has been applied in setting the preferred acceptable leak
rate of 200psi over 15 minutes for all tree and wellhead valves.
In situations where the API 14 criteria has to be applied, and due to the various
configurations of subsea xmas trees and associated equipment resulting in a wide range of
downstream test volumes, it is necessary to quote values on an individual well basis.
Note that certain well-specific PPM work instructions may indeed quote such volumes
and acceptable leak rates based on such data. As defined elsewhere therefore,
the requirements of the well-specific PPM or Well Operating Envelope (WOE) will over-ride
the preferred standard of 200psi.
When applying the API 14 B standard and as with platform wells, the acceptance criteria
is based directly on the formula presented in API recommended practice, and as presented
in this section.
General Notes on Integrity Testing

The following are general notes on issues which can occur during planned maintenance
work on subsea wells:
• Tubing to annulus communication testing: due to well design, it is only possible
to monitor and integrity test the primary or ‘A’ annulus on subsea wells
• In cases where tubing to annulus communication has been identified during integrity
testing, care should be taken to ensure that the crossover valve is not leaking into
the annulus causing erroneous results. Similarly the same issue can arise by the closed
annulus master valve leaking into the annulus via the gas lift system. Such conditions
should be eliminated by further investigation using a combination of valve manipulation
and pressure transducer monitoring
• Downhole safety valve testing: the majority of subsea wells have self-equalising
downhole safety valves and such valves can be re-opened by simply applying control
line pressure and monitoring the slow increase in tubing head pressure as the valve
opens

• However, to avoid any damage to non-equalising valves, individual well records should
always be consulted to check whether the valve is self-equalising or non-equalising,
prior to carrying out any integrity testing. On wells with non-equalising valves, the tubing
will have to be re-pressured to well tubing head pressure prior to attempting to re-open
the valve after integrity-testing
Tree/Wellhead Valves Testing

Typical issues for xmas tree valve testing can be:
• As discussed elsewhere, leakage from other valves on the xmas tree/wellhead
creating confusion as to the validity of the test. In such instances, advice should
be sought from the Well Integrity or Well Intervention Engineer in the first instance
• Valve float can occur on gate valves whereby the floating gates do not contact their
respective seats and seal-off but merely float. This phenomenon can sometimes
be cured by venting–off the pressure above very quickly

• On horizontal or spool trees with gas lift, difficulties have been experienced
with Annulus Drilling Valves (ADVs) or Annulus Access Valves (AAVs) depending
on the equipment manufacturer, failing to be leaktight. This situation will allow
an unrecognised single barrier (to gas lift) situation to occur which may present a risk
when well intervention work is being executed (refer to Figure 5.12)
Figure 5.12 Horizontal (Spool) Xmas Tree Valve Schematic

9 Well Barriers/Isolations
Well Barriers/Isolations
The barrier requirements for subsea wells are essentially no different from that for platform
or surface wells and the general two barrier requirement still applies, as defined
in other references such as the Apache Drilling and Well Operations Policy
(ANS-DRL-002).
Well Integrity Failures

Integrity failures on subsea wells by their design create a lower risk to personnel than
surface wells on manned installations. The addition of Emergency Shutdown Valves
(ESDVs) to a host platform also contributes considerably to a lessening of risk.
Subsequently, the risk from subsea wells while in service is predominantly environmental –
pollution incident – and financial – cost to repair or deal with. However, the costs to the
Company both in terms of reputation and financial outlay must not be underestimated and
as a prudent Operator, best efforts should be directed at ensuring no well integrity incidents
occur during the life of a subsea well.
While in-service wells present little risk to personnel, the execution of well intervention
operations of any description on a subsea well, increase that risk substantially as soon
as a vessel arrives over that well. The removal of tree caps and subsequent heavy
lift operations can introduce high consequence events should there be, for example
a dropped object incident.
Closure of Well Integrity Failures

As with all well integrity failures a record of work carried out must be kept and any failure
tracked through to repair and closure of the issue.
Risk Management and Available Tools

As discussed elsewhere, subsea wells constitute a much lower risk to personnel than
surface wells. Tools for risk management of subsea well integrity issues are described in
Section 3 of this manual. A key point of note is that any risk screening or risk assessment
for subsea well integrity issues must be based on two basic scenarios:
(1) In-service wells – while the well is in the operational phase.
(2) Well intervention – what is the risk to personnel when re-entering the well
for intervention work.
Other Considerations
The following general notes in relation to subsea wells are intended to supplement
the aforementioned notes.

Repairs on Subsea Tree/Wellhead Valves

It is generally not practical to carry out intrusive repairs (breaching xmas tree containment)
on xmas tree or wellhead valves on subsea trees due to the space-constricted working
areas involved and the practicalities of deploying ROV-operated tooling or divers to carry
out such work.
Where repairs to outboard components (valving/pipework etc) on trees or wellheads
are being considered, a full risk assessment must be carried out to identify and mitigate
any hazards apparent – particularly where divers are being deployed to execute the work.
10 Notes Specific to Well Intervention on Subsea Wells

Well intervention on subsea wells constitutes a high-cost area for the Company.
Any downtime incurred on such wells can result in substantial costs, both in terms
of volume losses and in vessel or MODU day-rates.
As subsea wellwork is executed by the Wells Team the following best practices apply to
both. However, Production Operations have responsibility for ensuring compliance when
requested.
It is strongly recommended that all relevant valves are functioned and integrity tested
prior to any vessel or MODU being mobilised. This work must be completed well
in advance of vessel/MODU mobilisation to ensure any failures identified can be dealt
with by the Engineer(s) compiling the applicable well programme. This will help avoid
any high-cost vessel/MODU downtime while attempting to obtain the necessary well
barriers or isolations for installing well intervention or well control equipment.
Particular attention must therefore be paid to the following:
Target well barriers – ie the well to be worked on, has adequate barriers for the
installation of well intervention or well control equipment. Such barriers should address
both the tubing and annulus well integrity requirements.
On manifold-type or flowbase systems, valves or systems with any communication
to the target well must be integrity-tested to ensure no ingress of hydrocarbons
can jeopardise the timely installation of intervention or well control equipment on the well.
While any vessel is onsite over a subsea well for well intervention, consideration must
be given to the proximity of other subsea wells in the field with a view to carrying
out any tree and wellhead maintenance or other inspection/maintenance tasks on the
well or associated structures – even where the maintenance tasks are not scheduled
for execution. Use of the well intervention vessel or MODU for such tasks concurrently
with well intervention work, can realise substantial cost-savings over a standalone
mobilisation.
Therefore on fields where template structures exist or where the wells are in close
proximity to each other, an evaluation of the location of all surrounding or adjacent
wells – specifically the distance between the target well and adjacent wells, should
be compiled and cross-checked against the operating range of any ROVs or divers.

Any integrity testing completed as part of a wellwork programme should be logged

and credited as ‘routine wellhead maintenance work completed’, within the SafeWells
System. This will avoid additional well shut-in time at the scheduled maintenance date.
Isolation of Wells/Process Plant for Intervention Access

As discussed previously, due to the complexity of subsea wells and their surrounding
infrastructure, there is considerable scope for error in isolating other wells or flow
sources, from the well to be worked on and care must be taken to avoid a hydrocarbon
release incident caused by failure to isolate all flow sources.
Key areas to be addressed are therefore:
Adjacent Wells
In situations where adjacent wells are at risk from, for example dropped objects, due
to ongoing well intervention work, then the integrity status of such wells MUST be
previously known or otherwise ascertained. Therefore a full campaign of integrity checks
should be executed PRIOR (at least 1 month before) to the arrival of the vessel to avoid
lost time addressing such issues. Any deficiencies noted during such checks – eg failed
tree valves etc, MUST be accounted for when planning the work in question and the
necessary risk assessments completed, or alternative well barriers/isolation requirements
noted and addressed.
A documented record of adjacent well integrity results MUST be provided in the
applicable project interface document.
Gas Lift System Isolations

The presence of high-pressure gas lift gas particularly in a ringmain design across an
entire subsea field can present major hydrocarbon release hazards when conducting well
intervention operations – particularly where gas lift lines are exposed to potential dropped
objects. The complexity of such a system allows potential for incident and care must be
taken to ensure that all risks have been identified and dealt with.
When planning well interventions on subsea wells, therefore, a documented record
of applicable gas lift line valve test results MUST be provided in the applicable project
interface document.
Emergency Shutdown Valves (ESDVs)

Where fitted, ESDVs are intended to isolate the host platform from a subsea well in an
emergency. In planning a subsea well intervention campaign, therefore, the integrity
records of all ESDVs which are relevant to the campaign should be reviewed and an
assessment made of their current suitability in the event of an emergency requiring their
closure. Where deemed necessary, ESDVs must be re-tested to ensure functionality and
sealing integrity.
A documented record of ESDV test results MUST be provided in the applicable project
interface document.

Documentation for Subsea Well Planned Maintenance
Overview
Appendices 1 and 2 provide examples of work instruction (proforma) which can be tailored
to suit individual subsea wells. This proforma must be based on tree and wellhead
design/type and must reflect actual well status at the time of work execution.
In addition to the proforma described above, various tools are available to assist
in generation of these proformas with respect to valve configuration and pressure
transducer configuration etc (refer to Appendix 5C – Subsea Xmas Tree Valve Status
Tool Example).
The proformas must be completed during execution of the planned maintenance with
all relevant data being accurately logged. Should the proforma in question prove
to be unsuitable during execution of the PM – for example, a pressure transducer proves
to be faulty or unreliable, then the proforma must be revised onsite to accommodate

the change in process. In all cases, best efforts should be directed at achieving the full
range of integrity tests as defined. Should the full range of integrity tests not be achievable
then the proforma must indicate what test(s) have not been executed.
Individual PPM proformas for every Apache Subsea Well are available from the Well
Integrity Engineer.
Documentation Retention Requirements

It is imperative that maintenance and pressure test documentation is retained
and made readily available for scrutiny. This will avoid repeating work already done
and thus avoid production losses.
General Note on Well Integrity Record Keeping

It is essential to track and document all well integrity issues on an ongoing basis to avoid
downtime and subsequent volume losses in the event of well intervention being required
on a well.
Applicable personnel should, therefore, ensure that records on well integrity issues
are being kept and are regularly updated.
It is important that the groups involved in work on subsea wells, share relevant
information between the groups. It is recommended, therefore, that all relevant parties
involved in subsea operations, have regular documented meetings to discuss upcoming
work and issues.
Figure 5.13 provides a graphical example of how information should be shared.

Figure 5.13 Information Flow Requirements
11 Other Subsea Well Integrity Considerations

11.1 Well Suspension and Abandonment
The following is an overview of how suspended/abandoned subsea wells should
be treated in respect of well integrity (refer to Section 8 of this manual).
References
(1) Apache Drilling and Well Operations Policy (ANS-DRL-002).
(2) Oil and Gas UK – Guidelines for the Suspension and Abandonment of Wells.
Definition of Suspension and Abandonment

General definitions for well suspension and well abandonment can be summarised as :
Permanent Abandonment
The actions taken to ensure the permanent isolation from surface and from lower
pressured zones, of exposed permeable zones, fluids and pressures in any well that will
not be re-entered.

Suspension
Also referred to as temporary abandonment. Actions taken prior to leaving a well to ensure
adequate isolation of permeable zones, fluids and pressures in any well that will be
re-entered or abandoned at a later date. It should be noted that regulatory authorities may
impose a time limit on how long a subsea well can be suspended for,
and personnel should be aware of any such requirements.
Inspections
Based on regulatory expectations, all suspended subsea wells should be inspected
on a regular basis – normally 4 years – with a maximum of 5 years between inspections
to allow for the necessary vessel planning work to take place on a cost-effective basis.
In addition, and as with active subsea wells, such inspections should be scheduled
whenever any adjacent work is taking place in the same area, irrespective of when the last
inspection has been carried out.
Wells confirmed to be fully abandoned with no anomalies, do not need to be surveyed as

part of the regular program unless required by regulatory authorities.
Any change in status as viewed by the ROV must be reported to platform management
and Wells Technical Authority, who in consultation with the Well Integrity Engineer,
should decide a course of action for the well.
Well Integrity Support Documentation Requirements

While not an exhaustive listing, the following documentation should be considered
a minimum requirement:
• A full listing of all suspended wells should be available together with current well
integrity status and details of any inspections carried out. In addition, future plans
for such wells should be documented in some form
• A full listing of all abandoned wells should be available together with as-left wellbore
schematics and details of any inspections carried out
• Shipping/navigation charts defining the exact position of all suspended/abandoned
subsea wells should be available
• Condition of suspended/abandoned wells – do we have complete and up-to-date
reports on the condition of such wells? For example, no significant corrosion/no fishing
nets or other debris is obstructing the well/no significant leaks to sea are apparent etc

12 Emergency Response – Subsea Wells

It is necessary to be in a position to deal quickly and effectively with any well control
events while subsea wells are in service – ie not in well construction or intervention
mode, which would be addressed under a well intervention or drilling programme.
In general, major subsea well control events would be turned-over to a MODU, but
relatively minor events could be dealt with using a Light Well Intervention Vessel (LWIV).
Regardless of the nature of the event, personnel should be able to quickly determine
the scope of supply of equipment and personnel necessary and available to deal with
well control events. The compilation and use of quick-reference charts defining
equipment requirements for various vessels – eg MODU or LWIV – is therefore
recommended and should be stored in the Drilling Group ‘N’ drive. An example is
provided in Appendix 5D. Such information should be included in any applicable
Combined Operations (COMOPS) document and Emergency Response manual.
The following industry references are relevant to this section.

Step Change in Safety – Assurance Provides an overview of Safety-critical
and Verification Practitioners Guide Elements and Performance Standards.
ISO 16530; Well Integrity for the
API Spec 17D – Design and Operation
of Subsea Production Systems-Subsea
Wellhead and Tree Equipment
Table 5.7 Subsea Well Integrity Industry References

Appendix 5A
Subsea Well PPM Proforma Template –
Vertical Dual Bore XT
Subsea Well PPM Proforma Template – Vertical Dual Bore XT











Appendix 5B
Subsea Well PPM Proforma Template –
Horizontal XT (S66 Example)
Subsea Well PPM Proforma Template – Horizontal XT (S66 Example)

August 2015 Issue 1 App 5B-i/ii

August 2015 Issue 1 App 5B-1

App 5B-2 August 2015 Issue 1











August 2015 Issue 1 App 5B-13/14
Appendix 5C
Subsea Xmas Tree Valve Status Tool Example
(Template available from Well
Integrity Engineer)
Subsea Xmas Tree Valve Status Tool Example (Template

August 2015 Issue 1 available from Well Integrity Engineer) App 5C-i/ii
Subsea Xmas Tree Valve Status Tool Example (Template

August 2015 Issue 1 available from Well Integrity Engineer) App 5C-1/2
Appendix 5D
Example Subsea Equipment ER
Reference Chart
Example Subsea Equipment ER Reference Chart

August 2015 Issue 1 App 5D-i/ii
Example Subsea Equipment ER Reference Chart

August 2015 Issue 1 App 5D-1/2
Section 6
Corrosion, Scale, Wax and Corrosion
Management (Production Chemistry)
Chapter 1 Erosion/Corrosion
Chapter 2 Production Chemistry
Corrosion, Scale, Wax and Corrosion

August 2015 Issue 1 Management (Production Chemistry) 6-i/ii
Section 6 Chapter 1
Erosion/Corrosion
Paragraph Page
1 Introduction 6-1-1
2 Corrosion Mechanisms and Theory 6-1-2
3 Corrosion Types Applicable to Well Integrity 6-1-4

3.1 General Corrosion 6-1-4

3.2 Localised Corrosion 6-1-4
3.3 Major Corrosive Species and Associated
Corrosion Mechanisms 6-1-4
3.4 Other Corrosion Mechanisms 6-1-6
4 Detection of Erosion/Corrosion 6-1-9
5 Materials Selection 6-1-9
6 Elastomers 6-1-9
6.1 Definition of Elastomers 6-1-9
6.2 Elastomers used in the Oil Industry 6-1-9
6.3 Major Seal Failure Modes 6-1-11
6.4 Seal Selection Process 6-1-11
Figure
6.1.1 The Electrical Circuit 6-1-3
Erosion/Corrosion
1 Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of erosion, corrosion and flow assurance considerations
which can impact on well integrity throughout the lifecycle of the well and outlines how
knowledge of the material properties and chemical processes which can occur in a well
can help ensure well integrity. This is not only important during the operational phase
of a well: loss of integrity, degraded material properties and loss of flow assurance
can also significantly impact on the ability to undertake intervention work, suspend and
abandon the well and prevent loss of containment to the environment, post-abandonment.
The first step towards delivery of well integrity is through material selection to ensure that
all the components in a well will retain physical integrity throughout the planned life of the
well. Material selection choices will be based on knowledge of:
• Operating conditions
• Chemical resistance to the production fluids (oil, gas, water)

• Chemical resistance to production chemicals used in the well
• Compatibility with other materials used in the well
Suitable choices will ensure that physical condition of the well components do not degrade
beyond a point where the material properties are compromised and can no longer provide
a physical barrier and/or withstand the mechanicals loads developed to provide containment
of production and injection fluids.
During the design phase, expectations of project life and economic considerations will
frequently determine the required level of material durability required for the anticipated
service the well will see. It is also not uncommon that well stock remains in service long
beyond the initial design life and therefore appreciation of the material properties
is important in anticipating the potential loss of integrity in the future under the prevailing
conditions. Actual operating conditions may turn out to be somewhat different from initial
expectations and this is particularly true for green field developments.
Review of the material performance at actual operating conditions and identification of any
change to the expected material performance should therefore be undertaken once
production data is available. Design of future wells and material selection, particularly
in brownfield developments should reflect the actual operating conditions and anticipated
changes particularly when secondary and tertiary recovery mechanisms are involved.
Chemical processes in the well can also result in the deposition of hydrocarbon
products, corrosion products and mineral scales which in addition to possibly reducing
production can also impact on well integrity. Mineral scales and corrosion products
can act to protect against corrosion through providing a protective layer (eg the passive
layer of corrosion resistant alloys is a corrosion product) or exacerbate corrosion rates
due to the area effect.
Erosion/Corrosion
Restricted access to all or parts of the well due to chemical deposits can limit downhole
inspection and monitoring, prevent well intervention to remediate integrity problems
or temporarily suspend the well and can result in more technically challenging and
ultimately more costly well abandonment. Chemical treatments pumped downhole for
well stimulation, dissolving chemical deposits or remediating well souring can, due
to their chemical nature, present an aggressive corrosion threat to the completion.
Process chemical treatments may also impact well integrity if, for example, lapses
in oxygen scavenger dosing of injection water results in excursions of oxygen to the point
where use of plain carbon steel tubulars in injection wells will not be not cost effective
due to premature loss of integrity. Similarly, poor microbiological control of injection
water can result in reservoir souring and eventual production well integrity issues due
to H2S corrosion. It is key, therefore, that production chemistry management and well
integrity management strategies are aligned.
The following sections give a high-level overview of basic corrosion physics and production
chemistry issues and products which need to be appreciated in order to deliver well
integrity through design (material selection) and mitigation by control of operating
parameters, production chemistry management and well intervention throughout the life
of the well. Readers should, therefore, be alert to the presence of corrosion/erosion
causation factors and their effect on well integrity.
2 Corrosion Mechanisms and Theory

Corrosion is probably the major factor influencing the selection of materials for completion
metallurgy, hence an understanding of the principles involved and the key corrosion
mechanisms is an important prerequisite in the materials selection process.
Corrosion is an electrochemical process that requires an anode, a cathode and a conductive
media or electrolyte, so that an electrical current flows during corrosion. For an electrical
current to flow, there must be a driving force, ie a voltage source and a complete electrical
circuit.
The voltage source is the metal itself. All metals contain stored energy, eg as a result
of refining and mechanical working. This means that metal will adopt an electrical
potential when it is put into an aqueous solution, known as the equilibrium potential.
Erosion/Corrosion
Figure 6.1.1 The Electrical Circuit
The electrical circuit consists of three parts. These are shown diagrammatically
in Figure 6.1.1 and consist of:
(1) The Anode
Is the portion of the metal surface that is dissolving or corroding. For iron this
can be represented by the chemical reaction:
Fe ⇒Fe2+ + 2 electrons
(2) The Cathode
Is the portion of the metal surface at which the electrons formed by the anodic
reaction are consumed. There are many cathodic reactions that can occur depending
on the composition of the solution.
For an acid the cathodic reaction would typically be:
2H+ + 2 electrons ⇒ H2 ↑(gas)
(3) The Electrolyte
Is the electrically conductive solution such as an aqueous salt solution, in contact
with the metal surface through which the electrical current (or electrons), necessary
to support the corrosion process, flows.
In the case where there is no externally applied electrical current, the anodic
and cathodic reactions are balanced, ie there will be no ‘total’ current flow measured.
The reasons why some areas of the metal surface act as anodes whereas others
act as cathodes, are complex. A major factor is inhomogeneity in the metal surface
and/or electrolyte. In general corrosion, the anodes and cathodes will be randomly
distributed over the surface and will move during the corrosion process. In localised
corrosion, eg pitting, the anodes will be restricted to certain, small areas.
Erosion/Corrosion
3 Corrosion Types Applicable to Well Integrity

The more likely corrosion types to be found in downhole completions can be classified
as follows:
3.1 General Corrosion

This can account for the greatest total metal loss, but can normally be predicted
and monitored. It results in a fairly uniform loss of material across the surface
of a component, leading to a loss in load carrying capacity, eg resulting from pressure,
tension, collapse.
3.2 Localised Corrosion

This results in uneven wastage of the component eg pitting corrosion. Pitting corrosion
is a particularly damaging form of corrosion in which components can fail by perforation

with only a small percentage weight loss. This can make pitting difficult to detect and can
lead to unexpected failures. In addition, pits will act as stress concentrators, reducing
the load carrying capacity of the component. Alternatively, localised corrosion may occur
at particular locations, eg crevices, mixed metal sites (galvanic attack), areas of high
turbulence (erosion-corrosion).
3.3 Major Corrosive Species and Associated Corrosion

Mechanisms
3.3.1 Carbon Dioxide

Carbon dioxide is commonly found associated with well fluids. Carbon dioxide (CO2)
dissolved in water forms a weak acid, known as carbonic acid, which can accelerate
corrosion. This is often termed sweet corrosion and is of particular importance for carbon
and low alloy steels. Corrosion can result in the development of a semi-protective iron
carbonate film across which corrosion can still occur, but at a significantly reduced rate.
Iron carbonate films are formed principally at higher temperatures (typically above 60°C).
This film may be damaged locally (eg as a result of flow or mechanical damage) resulting
in a particular form of localised pitting corrosion, known as mesa attack.
The rate of CO2 corrosion will be dependent on a number of factors, including CO2 partial
pressure, pH, temperature, flow velocity, and the presence and nature of other chemical
species (eg oxygen, chlorides, H2S).
Erosion/Corrosion
3.3.2 Hydrogen Sulphide

There are a number of possible sources of hydrogen sulphide in downhole fluids. These
include:
• Associated with the well fluids
• As a result of bacterial activity
In this case Sulphate-reducing Bacteria (SRB) can reduce sulphates in the fluids
to hydrogen sulphide.
• Breakdown products of chemical species in the fluids
One such source could be bisulphites added to remove oxygen from injection water.
Hydrogen sulphide dissolved in water can react with a steel surface, producing an iron
sulphide scale. This scale can be very protective. However, deep pits can result in regions
where the iron sulphide scale is damaged or is not present. In practice, this type of H2S
corrosion has practical significance when H2S partial pressure is </= 0.3kPA per 0.05psi
and <pH <5.5.
Of greater importance, at the relatively low H2S levels often found in downhole fluids,
is the mechanism known as Sulphide Stress Cracking (SSC). In general, all
environments containing water and H2S are covered by the term sour. However, by
convention, in the field of corrosion in the oil and gas industry only environments where
SSC can occur, as defined in NACE Standard MR-0175 (metals for SSC and stress
corrosion cracking resistance in sour oilfield environments), are designated as being sour.
SSC occurs as a result of the entry of atomic hydrogen into the metal.
Aqueous corrosion will produce atomic hydrogen, which would normally tend to recombine
via the reaction:
2H+ 2 electrons ⇒ H + H ⇒H2 ↑ (gas)
These hydrogen gas molecules are too large to enter the metal and are thus not harmful
to it. However, hydrogen sulphide is thought to discourage the recombination of hydrogen
atoms to form H2 gas and hence encourages the entry of atomic hydrogen into the metal.
Once in the metal the atomic hydrogen will diffuse to trap sites, where it will lead to a local
increase in the stress and/or a reduction in the strength of the metal lattice. For a material
under load, there is evidence to suggest that the atomic hydrogen will concentrate near
stress concentrators and may give rise to crack initiation at such points, hence leading
to a brittle like fracture. This type of cracking can occur quite rapidly. Thus, even
if materials are only to be exposed to sour conditions for short periods of time, they must
be resistant to SSC.
3.3.3 Oxygen
The presence of dissolved oxygen can have a marked influence on the corrosion of oil field
goods. High corrosion rates can result even at relatively low concentrations of dissolved
oxygen (much less than 1ppm). Acceptable levels can go from 20ppb to 10ppb in ageing
assets. In this process iron is converted by a corrosion reaction to oxides and/or
hydroxides. The cathodic reaction in this case is:
O2 + 2H2O + 4 electrons ⇒ 4OH-
Erosion/Corrosion
The corrosion rate in oxygenated near-neutral solutions is often controlled by the rate
at which oxygen can diffuse to the cathodic areas on the metal surface to support
the corrosion reaction. As such, the corrosion rate will be increased by flow, etc. Oxygen
corrosion is not normally a problem with produced fluids, as they contain no dissolved
oxygen. However, it can be a significant issue in water-based drilling muds, completion
brines, etc. In such cases it may be necessary to control the dissolved oxygen content,
eg using oxygen scavengers. Another area where oxygen corrosion can be a significant
issue is in injection water systems, in which case care must be taken to reduce
the oxygen to acceptable levels – eg using gas stripping or vacuum degassing.
3.3.4 Halide Ions

Halide ions, eg chloride and bromide ions, are present in many of the fluids likely
to be encountered downhole, ie formation waters, injection waters, completion brines,
workover fluids, etc.
Halide ions can cause localised corrosion damage to materials used for downhole
equipment in the form of corrosion pitting and/or crevice corrosion. In addition, they
can increase the corrosion damage resulting from the effect of other corrodents.
Halide ions can also give rise SCC of susceptible materials, principally austenitic stainless
steels. This type of cracking will normally only occur at elevated temperatures, typically
above 50°C (120°F) for austenitic stainless steels, and under the action of tensile stresses.
This can also include residual stresses from mechanical working.
SCC can be defined as crack initiation and growth in an alloy caused by the conjoint
action of corrosion and tensile stress. This cracking can occur at stresses well below
the yield strength. The mechanism by which this occurs is not fully understood, but
it requires the presence of certain specific alloy/environment combinations, eg austenitic
stainless steel in chloride containing solutions. The result of SCC is that normally ductile
materials can suffer from catastrophic, apparently brittle, failures.
3.4 Other Corrosion Mechanisms

This section describes other corrosion mechanisms which affect completion materials.
3.4.1 Galvanic Corrosion

Galvanic corrosion results when two different metals are electrically coupled to create
a corrosive environment. An electrochemical cell is set up between the two metals
in which one of the metals will act as an anode (ie it will corrode at an enhanced rate)
and the other will act as a cathode (ie there will be a certain degree of protection).
The susceptibility of a material couple towards galvanic corrosion of the anodic metal
(ie the metal with the lower equilibrium potential) is influenced by a number of factors,
such as the conductivity of the corrosive medium, the relative surface area of the two
metal components and the difference in the equilibrium potentials of the two metals in the
corrosive environment.
Erosion/Corrosion
3.4.2 Chloride Pitting Corrosion and Chloride Stress Corrosion

Cracking
Internal Chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking (CSCC) can occur in austenitic stainless
steels exposed to an aqueous chloride-containing environment in the presence of applied
or residual stress.
The actual susceptibility of austenitic and duplex stainless steels to chloride stress corrosion
cracking varies considerably. The susceptibility is generally dependent on the material grade,
strength, residual stress, exposure temperature, chloride content/concentration effects,
component geometry and the presence of oxygen.
The Series 300 Austenitic Stainless Steels are typically considered susceptible to chloride
SSC at temperatures >60°C. Note that internal chloride SSC can occur in stainless steels
in the absence of oxygen at temperatures above 120°C. This is due to local conditions
causing evaporation and deposition and the concentration of chlorides. In the case
of oxygen ingress into the system, cracking may occur at lower temperatures.
Chloride stress corrosion cracking manifests itself as branched long cracking (usually
transgranular) which when initiated will propagate and can result in rapid failure.
3.4.3 Crevice Corrosion

Crevice corrosion is the localised damage that can occur in a narrow gap (or crevice)
between two adjacent components. In the presence of water, localised (anodic) conditions
within the crevice, which differ strongly from the larger (cathodic) area exposed to the bulk
environment. These conditions are most common where there is differential aeration,
a difference in the oxygen content of the bulk liquid from that present in the crevice,
the oxygen supply is limited locally in a crevice location and the passive film is lost. In the
low oxygen conditions within the crevice the passive film cannot re-form fast enough
to maintain passivity.
Crevice corrosion occurs more readily than pitting corrosion, typically at temperatures
10 to 20°C lower than pitting initiation.
Examples of internal crevice locations include:
Susceptible locations in oxygenated seawater systems are typically seawater return lines
which can operate at temperatures higher than the seawater inlet/header and areas local
to coolers (outlet side) where the temperature can in some cases become be higher than
original design due to a change in process conditions.
3.4.4 Erosion-Corrosion
Erosion can be defined in a variety of ways, but is essentially the wastage of materials
due to the mechanical removal of the material surfaces by flowing environments. Such
wastage is most extreme when solids (such as sand) are present in the environment.
Corrosion-erosion can occur in environments that have the potential to be both erosive
and corrosive. The erosion and the corrosion can either be independent, in which case
the total wastage is the sum of the wastage produced by each mechanism in isolation,
or synergistic, in which case the total wastage is greater than the sum of the independent
processes of erosion and corrosion.
Erosion/Corrosion
As a result of tests on carbon steel in the presence of carbon dioxide, the Erosion/Corrosion
Research Centre, University of Tulsa have identified three regimes in corrosion/erosion
wastage:
Scaling Regime
In this regime the semi-protective corrosion product layer is retained on the metal surface,
affording some protection. This is the normal situation for solids free conditions, or more
benign corrosion-erosion conditions.
General Wastage Regime

In this regime any scales/surface films are removed from the metal surface by solids
erosion and/or do not have the time to form. Hence metal wastage as a result of both
erosion and corrosion can go on unabated. This is the normal situation for very aggressive
corrosion or erosion conditions.
Pitting Regime
In this regime the solid particles prevent scales/surface films forming at impingement
points on the metal surface, whilst scale/surface films form on the rest of the surface.
This leads to localised corrosion (pitting) damage. Corrosion in the bare impingement
areas can be significantly more aggressive in terms of metal penetration rate than for
general wastage. Some scales/surface films can act as cathodic areas, significantly
accelerating the corrosion rate in the relatively small anodic bare impingement
areas. This occurs at conditions intermediate between scaling or general wastage.
Corrosion (pitting) rates up to twice that anticipated for un-filmed conditions have been
observed. Pitting is more damaging than general corrosion, as it can result in penetration
in much shorter times and is more difficult to detect. This is an aspect that should
be borne in mind when selecting materials for downhole service, particularly corrosion-
resistant alloys.
Crevice corrosion is the localised damage that can result at a narrow gap or crevice
between two adjacent components. The local environment produced within a crevice
can be quite different to the bulk fluid environment, leading to corrosion damage
that could not be predicted from the general fluid composition. The crevice may
be between two similar materials, two different materials (in which galvanic corrosion
may also play a role), or even between a metal and a non-metal (eg elastomers).
An important factor in determining whether crevice corrosion will occur is the size of the
gap. Crevice corrosion is often exacerbated at higher temperatures. Corrosion-erosion
is sometimes confused with flow-enhanced corrosion, where the flow regime leads
to enhanced mass transport of corrosion products and reactants. Corrosion-erosion in the
absence of solids is taken to refer to enhanced wastage due to the physical rupture of the
protective, corrosion-product layer by energetic fluid flow regimes and the consequential
corrosion. The mechanical removal of inhibitor might also be defined as a form
of corrosion-erosion.
Erosion/Corrosion
4 Detection of Erosion/Corrosion
As is so often the case, erosion/corrosion is detected when a failure occurs – eg sudden
tubing to annulus communication or structural failure etc. The importance of regular
and accurate monitoring and reporting of key erosion/corrosion causal factors as described
in this section, should not be underestimated.
Well Operating Envelopes (WOE) set out the operating limits for a well and as such,
include the limits for erosion/corrosion causation factors such as H2S/CO2 etc. Where such
causal factors are known to exist, there are various tools (callipers) on the market which
can gauge the extent of any erosion/corrosion.
5 Materials Selection
As can be deduced from the aforementioned discussion, material selection is an important

aspect of completion design. If the wrong material is selected then premature failure
can result with considerable cost implications in both replacing the completion and lost
production. There are a number of manuals and references available that provide guidance
on selecting the optimum material for the intended duty.
6 Elastomers
6.1 Definition of Elastomers
The terms elastomer and rubber refer to polymeric materials which possess the ability
to recover from applied stress over a significant deformation range. A wide range
of elastomer material types or classes is available to cope with particular service
requirements. These classes are normally referred to by the name of the polymer which
is used, ie nitrile, Viton, Aflas, etc.
Within these classes it is possible to compound specific grades to yield individual
performance characteristics, each grade being manufactured from a mixture of ingredients
that comprises the base rubber, reinforcement (eg carbon black), curing agents, and other
additives (eg lubricants, anti-oxidants etc).
A large number of possible ingredients are available for compounding and this leads
to an infinite number of potential compounds. The art of the rubber supplier is to optimise
the properties of the compound to suit the particular performance requirements.
6.2 Elastomers Used in the Oil Industry

Of the many elastomer materials available, only a few find widespread use in oilfield
sealing applications. Brief summaries of each of these is given in the following
paragraphs. More detailed descriptions are available on elastomer manufacturers’
website.
Erosion/Corrosion
6.2.1 Nitrile Rubber

Nitrile Rubbers (NBRs) are the most widely used elastomer in the oilfield, due to them
having an excellent combination of chemical and mechanical properties, combined with
straightforward manufacturing. As a result, they are relatively inexpensive, and widely
available. The so-called acrylonitrile content of a nitrile base polymer affects many
of its performance characteristics.
The normal long-term service temperature range is -20 to 120°C (-5 to 250°F).
The main limitations for the use of nitrile materials are contact with H2S, highly aromatic
hydrocarbon fluids, bromide brines and strong acids.
6.2.2 Hydrogenated Nitrile Rubber

Hydrogenated Nitrile Rubbers (HNBRs) have better heat ageing characteristics than
NBRs, but have similar chemical resistance. Normal long term service temperature range
is -20 to 150°C (-5 to 300°F).
6.2.3 Viton Type Fluoroelastomers

Fluoroelastomers (FKM) are often known by the DuPont tradename, Viton, although
other similar polymers, especially fluorel, are also widely used. These materials are noted
for their high temperature capabilities and general chemical resistance. It is important
to understand that there are a number of chemically different types of Viton available,
increasing fluorine content being accompanied by increasing chemical resistance
but poorer elastomeric properties.
Normal long term service temperature range is generally -10 to 200°C (15 to 390°F) but
is very grade-dependent.
The FKM fluoroelastomers generally all have excellent chemical resistance. Their main
limitation is in respect of poor resistance to organic amine corrosion inhibitors at elevated
temperature.
6.2.4 Aflas-type Fluoroelastomers

Aflas-type Fluoroelastomers (FEPM) materials have the advantage of good resistance
to most amine based corrosion inhibitors.
Normal long-term service temperature range is 30 to 220°C (+90 to 430°F), so these
materials have very poor ambient sealing capabilities. Backup devices should always
be used, as these elastomers tend to have poor extrusion resistance.
6.2.5 Perfluoroelastomers
Perfluoroelastomers (FFKM), (Kalrez from DuPont and Chemraz from Greene Tweed),
have exceptionally good chemical resistance and are chemically unaffected by most
oilfield environments.
Mechanical properties are not particular good, however, and anti-extrusion backup devices
should always be used.
Erosion/Corrosion
Many FFKMs also show poor low temperature sealing properties and some have
limitations with amine corrosion inhibitors. Specific grade selection must take this into
account as required. Normal long-term service temperature range is 0 to 230°C
(30 to 445°F).
In addition, several plastic materials are often used as anti-extrusion backup rings,
eg PTFE, PEEK and Ryton. These are not normally subject to chemical attack in oilfield
service. These materials are not elastomeric and cannot be used as primary seals unless
they are spring or pressure energised, ie PTFE or PEEK O-rings will not seal.
6.3 Major Seal Failure Modes

There are three major failure modes for downhole rubber seals, these are:
• Extrusion
• Rapid gas decompression

• Chemical degradation
There are, of course, many other potential failure modes for rubber seals, and further
information is contained in other references.
6.3.1 Extrusion
Under certain combinations of temperature, pressure and seal housing dimensions,
an elastomer seal can be extruded into the gap it is meant to seal. This can cause
mechanical damage often referred to as peeling or nibbling. The simplest corrective action
for this is the use of plastic or metal anti-extrusion devices in seal design, eg PTFE or
PEEK backup rings.
6.3.2 Rapid Gas Decompression

This is a major failure mode in dry high pressure gas processing applications where
rubber seals can blister due to depressurisation of entrained gas. The effects downhole
are normally limited to safety valves and other shallow set equipment, which may see full
depressurisation. Many safety valve designs are now non-elastomer sealed as a result
for this application.
6.3.3 Chemical Degradation

Chemical reaction in a rubber seal, as a result of the chemical environment in which
it is operating, can cause either softening or hardening of the rubber.
6.4 Seal Selection Process

In general, seals can be selected by using the following four step process.
Erosion/Corrosion
6.4.1 Elastomer Seal Selection Summary

Complete steps 1 to 4 inclusive.
Step 1: Define the service conditions.
Step 2: The application defines seal geometry.
Step 3: The temperature, chemistry and time defines elastomer polymer type.
Step 4: The pressure defines material hardness.
The selection process is designed to take account of the major causes of elastomer seal
failure – chemical degradation in Step 3, and extrusion and explosive decompression
in Step 4.
In using this approach, the compromise between mechanical properties and chemical
resistance should always be considered. Nitrile materials and their derivatives have much
better mechanical properties than the fluoroelastomers, and so improvement of chemical

resistance is inevitably made at the expense of mechanical properties.
This selection process effectively represents a summary of a variety of data derived
from many different sources. Throughout the industry, many methods are used to qualify
seals as fit-for-purpose. It should be emphasised that it is unwise to rely solely on any one
single method. The tests should rather be regarded as a suite of complementary
techniques which when taken together can give data with which the best selection can be
made. More detailed information can be found in other references.
Erosion/Corrosion
Section 6 Chapter 2
Production Chemistry
Paragraph Page
1 Summary 6-2-1
2 Introduction 6-2-1
3 Mineral Scale 6-2-2

3.1 Description of Scale 6-2-2

3.2 Problems Caused by Scale 6-2-3
3.3 Water Injection Wells 6-2-3
3.4 Scale Prediction 6-2-4
3.5 Laboratory Evaluation of Scale Inhibitors 6-2-5
3.6 Application of Scale Inhibitors 6-2-5
3.7 Scale Dissolvers 6-2-6
4 Wax 6-2-7
4.1 Description of Wax 6-2-7
4.2 Impact of Wax on Flow Characteristics of Crude Oil 6-2-8
4.3 Testing Philosophy 6-2-8
4.4 Crude Oil Pretreatments 6-2-9
5 Asphaltenes 6-2-9
5.1 Description of Asphaltenes 6-2-9
5.2 Asphaltene Precipitation 6-2-11
5.3 Determining the Risk of Asphaltene Deposition 6-2-11
5.4 Operational Variables Effecting Asphaltene Deposition 6-2-12
Section 6 Chapter 2
Production Chemistry (cont’d)
Paragraph Page
6 Hydrates 6-2-12
6.1 Description of Gas Hydrates 6-2-12
6.2 Gas Hydrates Problems 6-2-13
6.3 Prevention Methods/Options 6-2-13
6.4 Hydrate Predictions and Modelling 6-2-14
7 Emulsions 6-2-15
8 Sulphate Reducing Bacteria 6-2-16

8.1 Wettability and Relative Permeability Changes 6-2-17
8.2 Completion Fluid Chemistry 6-2-17
9 Industry References 6-2-18
Table
6.2.1 Industry References 6-2-18
Figure
6.2.1 Examples of Scale Deposits 6-2-2
6.2.2 Variability of Crude Oil Pumpability Data 6-2-8
6.2.3 Hypothetical Structures for Asphaltenes Derived from
Oils Produced in Different Parts of the World 6-2-10
6.2.4 Gas Hydrate Snow 6-2-13
6.2.5 Hydrate Formation Curves 6-2-14
1 Summary
This section describes the behaviour of production, injection or treatment fluids through
the lifecycle of a production or injection well. It explains the various production problems
which arise from interaction of production or injection fluids from scale, wax, asphaltene,
hydrates, hydrogen sulphide, water wetting and emulsions. A description of each individual
problem is detailed and the chemistry which causes them along with predictive measures
and possible solutions.
2 Introduction
Downhole production chemistry concerns the behaviour of produced, injected or treatment
fluids through the lifecycle of the production or injection well. Understanding the interaction
of fluids with the reservoir matrix as well as changes in fluids behaviour during the
production or injection process is essential to avoid production losses and maintain flow
assurance.
Although the completion engineer might not be expected to be an expert in production
chemistry, it is important to understand the basic principles of fluids behaviour and the
potential consequences of interactions and changes including:
• Formation damage due to fluids/rock interactions causing wettability changes, and fines
migration
• Mixing of incompatible fluids causing scale and emulsions
• Precipitation of solids due to changes in pressure and temperature
• Corrosivity and erosional corrosion caused by fluids acidity or high rates
In general, prevention or avoidance of production chemistry related problems
is the preferred strategy. Remedial treatments can be expensive and can lead to further
problems. Increasing use of subsea facilities with reduced access increases the cost
of remedial work.
However, there are certain instances where a remedial strategy might prove more cost
effective such as the use of scale dissolvers to manage a low calcium carbonate scaling
risk in a platform well.
In conjunction with other discipline specialists it is the completions engineer’s role to:
• Assess potential risks from available data including fluids analysis
• Generate additional data further analysis and modelling
• Assess impact of risks on production and lifecycle costs
• Determine optimum strategies/solutions to obviate or minimise impact
• Document experience and share lessons learned
To minimise the size of this document and to ensure ongoing access to regularly updated
and expanding data sources, the format provides merely an introduction and overview
of each production chemistry topic. For more detailed information, readers are directed to
the applicable contacts within Apache.
3 Mineral Scale
3.1 Description Of Scale
Figure 6.2.1 Examples of Scale Deposits
Oilfield scale is generally thought of as the carbonates or sulphates of the alkaline earth
metals calcium, strontium and barium. However, complex salts of iron such as the sulphides,
hydrous oxides and carbonates may also form solid deposits that give similar problems.
As production moves into hotter and higher pressure environments, even common salt
(halite) can deposit, often in tonne quantities.
The deposition of mineral scales is dependent on a number of variables including:
(1) Degree of supersaturation (ie, concentration above the solubility limit) of scaling ions
in the water.
(2) Absolute temperature and the rate of temperature change.
(3) Degree of agitation during formation of scale crystals.
(4) Size and number of seed crystals.
(5) Presence of impurities.
(6) Change in pH of solution.
(7) Changes in pressure.
(8) Relative volumes of incompatible waters.
Common oilfield scales form in one of two ways. First, a change in conditions such
as temperature or pressure can promote carbonate scale to precipitate from a formation
water. Secondly, two incompatible waters mixing (eg a formation water with seawater)
can promote sulphate scale.
Iron scales (sulphides when production is sour, hydrous oxides when production is sweet)
often reflect corrosion in the system, with iron originating from the pipework or vessels
in the system itself. However, some formation brines naturally contain significant levels
of dissolved iron in the reduced ferrous state, which can lead to problems under some
circumstances.
3.2 Problems Caused by Scale

Scale does not restrict itself to any particular location in the oilfield. However, some areas
are more difficult and costly to treat than others. Problems include restrictions in pipeline
diameter, solids stabilisation of emulsions, under deposit corrosion, etc. Specific issues
arising at each location are discussed below.
3.2.1 Drilling and Completing Wells

Scale can cause problems if the drilling mud and/or completion brine is intrinsically
incompatible with the formation water. For example, allowing a seawater based mud
to contact a formation water rich in barium and strontium ions would be undesirable,
as would allowing a high-calcium brine to encounter a formation water rich in bicarbonate.
Note: Many oil-based muds also contain significant quantities of water and are not immune
from causing scale problems.
Drilling the first well in a new prospect can be particularly hazardous. There is no way
of knowing accurately the chemistry of the formation water that will be encountered
and often a more dense mud than is actually required will be used to reduce the chance
of kickbacks. There is, thus, an increased risk of invasion and formation damage due
to scale subsequently resulting in very high skin factors. In the extreme, productive zones
could be entirely blocked off. Obtaining representative water samples as soon as possible
are important to assess the consequences of drilling mud filtrate invasion in future wells.
3.3 Water Injection Wells

Problems may arise at the commissioning stage of new injectors if the injection water
is intrinsically incompatible with the formation water. For example, seawater injection into
an aquifer rich in strontium or barium ions could cause problems. This is often only
a temporary effect until the injection water has flushed away the formation brine from
around the near-wellbore region. Initially, protection against scale may be desirable,
for instance by deploying a scale inhibitor for the first few days. Such damage may
be ignored if fracturing past the damaged zones is practical.
3.3.1 Reservoir Damage

This is an aspect of scale precipitation which is only now being seriously addressed
by reservoir engineers. Scale formation in the near wellbore region of a producer could
have a beneficial effect if it is restricted to the water producing zones, thereby reducing
water cuts. However, scale blocks in the oil producing zones could kill a well. A better
understanding of the reservoir/fluid interactions such as ion exchange and mineral
dissolution/precipitation, and the movement and mixing of waters within the reservoir
are needed before any predictions are possible.
The effect on oil production from scale precipitation in the bulk reservoir will be small.
However, the consequences of scaling in the near-wellbore region could be significant.
3.3.2 Water Production

As soon as a production well begins to cut water, a risk of carbonate scale formation
occurs. The severity of the problem obviously depends on the water chemistry but
is aggravated by high drawdowns when large pressure drops increase the risk
of carbonate scale in the formation, across perforations or at chokes.
When injection water breakthrough occurs in production wells additional (and potentially
much more serious) scale problems may arise. Any mixing of incompatible brines can
cause severe scaling wherever it occurs (whether in the production wells or in the reservoir).
Experience suggests that problems are first observed in the production tubing rather than
in the near well region. Timely remedial treatments to reduce downhole scale formation
can then also protect the near formation.
3.3.3 Production Operations

Once water is first produced, process equipment such as heat exchangers, valves,
pumps, filters and all associated pipework are at risk. Solubility limits of mineral salts
may be exceeded by changing the temperature and pressure, or by mixing incompatible
waters. The latter possibility may arise from a process operation (sand-washing,
desalting, etc) or because waters from different wells are mixed in the production system.
This last point is particularly important even if a well which has suffered sea water
breakthrough does not suffer damage, the water which that well produces is unlikely to be
compatible with pure formation water and mixing such waters in the production system is
sooner, or later, bound to cause problems.
3.4 Scale Prediction

Scale formation from oilfield brines takes place in a multi-component, multiphase
environment. To predict the formation of scale in systems of this kind requires
a sophisticated computer model together with accurate kinetic and thermodynamic data.
The technical target for such a predictive model is to assess:
• How much scale will form as a result of a given operation
• Where it will form
• How damaging it will be
Satisfying the last criterion is rather difficult. Factors such as fluid dynamics (which
influence the transport of ions to and from a surface) and crystal size and shape
(which influence transport in porous media) are undoubtedly important. Frequently, detailed
information is unknown and accurate prediction is therefore often a compromise.
In addition to solid and aqueous phases, gases are also included in ion pair models.
Currently, all models are thermodynamic in nature and are unable to accurately represent
kinetics of the scale precipitation process. For information on these models contact the
applicable Apache Scale Management Contact.
3.5 Laboratory Evaluation of Scale Inhibitors

There are many techniques used to study scale deposition and inhibition but few
testing standards have been laid down within the oil industry. Test methodologies
and interpretation of results can vary widely from company to company. However, there
are some common tests which are similar in approach, if not in detail, to evaluate scale
inhibitor performance in the laboratory prior to deployment in the field.
3.6 Application of Scale Inhibitors

Scale inhibitors should be used wherever a risk of scale damage is predicted (or known
to exist from past experience). For example, inhibitors are often incorporated into drilling
muds, completion brines, and process water used for sandwashing or desalting. Scale
inhibitors have been used in injection water that is incompatible with the formation brine
present in the zones into which the water is being injected. Continuous injection of scale
inhibitors into production systems is commonly practised, and batch squeezes of production
wells is now a routine operation.
A good scale inhibitor must be:
• Efficient – ie it must be able to inhibit the scale in question, irrespective of the
mechanisms operating
• Stable – it must be sufficiently stable under the conditions imposed
• Compatible – it must not interfere with the action of other oilfield chemicals, nor
be affected itself by them. Compatibility in this sense is understood to include direct
chemical interaction and mechanistic antipathy
• Cost effective
In order to optimise the field performance, a chemical must be deployed correctly.
For example, injection of a scale inhibitor into a production header is wasted if it does
not contact incompatible waters before they mix in the production system. In some cases
it may be necessary to install continuous injection facilities downhole to ensure proper
deployment of scale inhibitor.
After a well suffers seawater breakthrough, scale formation could occur in the near
wellbore region, across perforations or in the tubing. While downhole injection
of an inhibitor may protect the tubing, squeeze treatments may be needed to ensure
protection of perforations and near-wellbore. In this technique production is stopped
and a concentrated solution of scale inhibitor is pumped into the well and out into
the formation. After a shut-in period of usually 6 to 24 hours, production is resumed,
and the scale inhibitor leaches back into produced fluids, giving protection against scale
formation until the scale inhibitor is exhausted, when the well is re-squeezed.
Note: Scale squeezes introduce cold fluid into a well which can cause enough
movement in the well tubulars to unseat a retrievable packer. Therefore, when
planning a scale squeeze, programme originators should be cognisant of this
effect and design the work accordingly. In some cases it has been necessary
to heat up the fluids being used for a scale squeeze, before pumping into a well.
Following a squeeze, the concentration of scale inhibitor in produced fluids falls

off exponentially. Successful treatments have as long a half-life as possible. There
are many factors controlling the rate of inhibitor returns and effectiveness of squeeze
treatments such as:
• Adsorption/desorption behaviour of scale inhibitor on reservoir rocks and minerals.
Work from Heriot-Watt University suggests a very steep rise in the adsorption
isotherm* at low inhibitor concentrations is a prerequisite for good squeeze lives.
*Definition of adsorption isotherm: a curve obtained by plotting at constant
temperature the quantity of adsorbate against the concentration of the substance in
the original gas or solution.
• Precipitation of scale inhibitor in the reservoir. A precipitation/resolution mechanism
can increase the squeeze lifetime over adsorption/desorption treatments. However,
the precipitation process must be carefully controlled in order to avoid blocking pore
throats and suffering irreversible loss of chemical

• Entrapment of scale inhibitors in the formation for other reasons, such as changes
in relative permeabilities of fluid as a result of actually applying the treatment
• Modification of inhibitor properties by the porous media
Experience within the industry is increasing, and as new chemicals are developed,
an improvement in squeeze treatments can be expected.
In more recent years focus has been on developing alternative delivery systems for scale
squeezing:
• Oil soluble inhibitors are frequently used for pre-emptive squeezing to address the risk
of scaling during initial water breakthrough or to treat water sensitive reservoirs
• Microparticle dispersions of ‘solid’ scale inhibitor
• Emulsified scale inhibitor
• Encapsulated scale inhibitor where beads of inhibitor are placed in the well sump
• Scale inhibitor encapsulated into gravel packs although these provide a once only
treatment
3.7 Scale Dissolvers

The dissolution of scale in a liquid is the reverse of the crystallisation process by which
the scale deposit was laid down. Carbonate scales are most readily dissolved with
mineral acids, although in order to avoid corrosion and other forms of damage organic
acids such as acetic acid are often preferred.
CaCO3 + 2HCl --- >CaCl2 + CO2 + H2O
The sulphates (especially barium sulphate) are particularly hard to remove once formed.
They are largely insoluble in acid and require chelants and/or mechanical removal (such
as high pressure water jetting).
Chelation or sequestration is the formation of soluble metal ion complexes in the presence
of substances which would normally give a precipitate. The process of chelation
is illustrated below:
Consider a system in which barium sulphate scale is present. In water/brine the solubility
of barium sulphate is in the range 5 to 50mg/l. There are, therefore, some barium ions
in solution:
BaSO4 --- > Ba2+ + SO42-
Ba2+ +L--->BaL
L = chelating agent
Calcium carbonate scale can be dissolved by hydrochloric acid treatments, however
the dissolving of barium sulphate scale remains a challenge to the industry although
some good results have been obtained with treatments using temperature and chemical
agitation.
4 Wax
Although wax rarely impacts Apache wells due to the higher temperatures, it is important
to understand the mechanisms of wax formation and deposition, the prediction of waxing
tendency and preventative and remedial options in order to contribute to the development
of a wax management strategy should it be required.
The presence of wax in a well can limit well intervention work and can affect the
functionality of key safety-critical devices – eg DHSV and xmas tree valves etc.
4.1 Description of Wax

Waxes are a natural constituent of crude oils and condensates consisting of mainly heavier
(>C17) paraffinic hydrocarbons. These may be straight or branched chain or cyclic,
and they affect production in two ways.
First, they can have an adverse effect on the viscosity of the oil. This has important
implication to pipelines, either in-field or export. They can impart non-Newtonian behaviour,
ie that the viscosity of the oil depends upon the shear rates applied to it, in addition
to the temperature. A good common example of this is household non-drip paint. Here,
under low shear the paint does not flow (ie non-drip), but at high shear when applied
by paintbrush, the paint flows naturally to cover the surface. Such behaviour in production
operations normally manifests itself during shutdowns or under turn-down operations.
Following a shut-in, when flow restarts, the initial shear rates may be very low. At low shear
rates the apparent viscosity may be high, in some cases so high that the available pressure
from the pumps is insufficient to start flow. This is particularly a problem in subsea lines
where the shut-in fluid temperature is low, compounding the high viscosity.
4.2 Impact of Wax on Flow Characteristics of Crude Oil

Most crudes are relatively fluid and easy to pump. However, this may not be the case for
waxy or heavy crude oils. Typical ranges in the characteristics of crudes affecting
pumpability are shown in Figure 6.2.2. Fluids eventually reach the ambient conditions
surrounding wells or pipelines. Waxy crudes can show significant variations in flow
behaviour at a given ambient temperature depending upon the conditions suffered
in reaching the ambient temperature. For instance, dynamic viscosity curves
are appropriate for normal flowing conditions, when a fluid cools under flowing conditions,
but do not describe the flow behaviour following a shut-in when fluids have cooled statically.
During a prolonged shut-in, waxy fluids may form a gel if they fall below their pour point.
This gel has mechanical strength and there must be available pressures from the wells
or pumps to overcome that strength and restart flow. It should be noted that fluids can
be and frequently are transported below their pour point when they have been cooled under
flowing conditions. These effects become further complicated by the presence of gas.
In a single phase system, the presence of gas can be beneficial by reducing the viscosity,
the pour points and the gel strength. In a two phase system, the oil properties have a lesser
impact on pipeline pressure drops than the effect of flow regime.
Therefore, it is important to understand not only the characteristics of the oil, but also
the operating conditions of flow, temperature and pressure, and whether gas is present
(ie two-phase (gas/liquid) flow).
Figure 6.2.2 Variability of Crude Oil Pumpability Data
4.3 Testing Philosophy

There are a number of tests available to measure the wax content of a crude oil. Since
it is not possible to define wax without reference to the conditions by which wax
is separated, the wax content is an empirical value. For instance, wax material that
is precipitated at 0°C is likely to have a different composition than any material separating
at 20°C. Some Operators define the wax content of a crude as the weight of material
precipitated when a solution of asphalt free crude is dissolved in dichloromethane
and cooled to -32°C.
The wax appearance temperature is that below which wax crystals form. In practice
this means the temperature above which either a sample of crude or a wall in which
it is in contact must be maintained in order to avoid wax deposition.
4.4 Crude Oil Pretreatments

The rheological (flow) properties of a crude oil depend to a large extent on the nature
of the wax it contains. The nature of the wax, in turn, depends upon the temperature
changes and the shear stresses that the sample suffered during the time that wax
was precipitating from the crude. It is vital to ensure that the temperature and shear
histories of a sample are well known before any measurements are made. Some
Operators uses four standard pre-treatments which cover a full range of the likely
rheological behaviour that a sample could exhibit from highly viscous to minimum
viscosity states. By measuring fluid properties (pour point, yield stress and dynamic
viscosities) after samples have been subjected to these pretreatments, likely field
behaviour during normal conditions and those following shutdowns, etc, can be identified.
5 Asphaltenes
5.1 Description of Asphaltenes

The term asphaltenes describes a group of compounds naturally present in crude
oils whose chemical structures are complex and difficult to analyse. They are not fully
understood and several theories exist to describe their chemistry and behaviour.
Generally, they form part of the high molecular weight fraction of a crude oil that, along
with maltenes constitute asphalt. The asphaltene fraction of a crude oil is usually defined
as the heavy polar aromatic fraction that is soluble in hot aromatic solvents such as
toluene, but insoluble in normal alkanes such as n-heptane.
Pressure changes are the main initiating factor in asphaltene precipitation and for cases
showing a problem, it is likely to be most acute in the vicinity of the bubble point.
There is a close relation between asphaltenes and the higher molecular weight resins
and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons that exist in crudes. During geological timescales,
heavy polycyclic aromatics oxidise to form neutral resins. Resins are described as the
material that is soluble in the n-alkanes that precipitate asphaltenes, but are absorbed
by surface-active materials such as Fuller's earth. Asphaltenes probably arise from
further oxidation of resins. They contain a broad distribution of polarities and molecular
weights and the material precipitated will vary with the solvent used. Therefore
asphaltenes are classified according to the precipitant and no single molecular structure
is appropriate. For instance, the standard IP test for the asphaltene content of a crude
oil determines the n-heptane insolubles. Lower molecular weight solvents such
as propane will precipitate larger amounts of material since the precipitate also contains
some resin material. The resultant molecular weight of the precipitated material therefore
can vary enormously from thousands to millions, depending upon the solvent. Analysis
of n-pentane precipitated asphaltenes might typically show 80 to 85% by weight carbon
of which 50 to 60% is aromatic, 7 to 10% hydrogen, and up to 10% sulphur, 3% nitrogen
and 5% oxygen, plus traces of heavy metals such as vanadium and nickel. The nature
of precipitated asphaltenes also varies between different crudes. Figure 6.2.3 is an
attempt at illustrating a typical asphaltine structure.
As with wax and scale issues, the presence of asphaltenes can limit well intervention
work and can affect the functionality of key safety-critical devices – eg DHSV and xmas
tree valves etc. The removal of asphaltenes from a well by mechanical means is very
difficult although some success has been achieved by chemical treatments with
for example – xylene. It should be noted however that such chemicals have health
and environmental concerns when used offshore.
Figure 6.2.3 Hypothetical Structures for Asphaltenes Derived from Oils Produced
in Different Parts of the World
In crude oils, the asphaltenes are not normally present in true solution. They have a very
strong tendency to associate with themselves and resins and form aggregates.
One theory suggests that asphaltenes are present in a micellar state in which there
is a central core consisting of very high molecular weight asphaltenes with many
condensed aromatic rings. This is surrounded by a region of sheets of lower molecular
weight asphaltenes and resins strongly bound by electrostatic forces. As the distance
from the central core increases, the number of condensed aromatic rings falls and there
is a gradual transition to less polarity and less aromaticity. The result is an onion-like
structure with layers of resins surrounding further layers of resin-like asphaltenes surrounding
a central asphaltene core.
Others suggest that asphaltenes do not exist as cumbersome aggregates, but as single
asphaltene molecules stabilised in solution by resins through hydrogen bonding.
5.2 Asphaltene Precipitation

Asphaltenes are only a problem when they are precipitated. Asphaltene deposits have
been observed in production tubing, restricting flow and causing production declines.
Tubing deposits can cause severe problems for wireline operations. They have also been
seen in production equipment, such as separators, where asphaltenes have collected
after having been precipitated further upstream. Asphaltene deposition in the reservoir
has been reported causing permeability reductions or changes to wettability, resulting
in lower recoveries. Downhole safety valve problems have been attributed to asphaltenes
in the Beryl Field. To identify whether asphaltene precipitation is likely and where it may
occur, the precipitation process itself must be understood.
The physical state of the asphaltene molecules or micelles in crude oil is determined
by the stabilising nature of the resins. In the stable well-dispersed state, the asphaltenes
are referred to as being peptized by resins and maltenes. Any operations that causes
the stabilising layers to be removed can result in the unpeptized asphaltene molecules
or micelle flocculating and forming a deposit. The stabilising effect of resins can
be illustrated by the nature of the asphaltene precipitate formed when n-alkanes are added
to a crude oil. Lighter alkanes can only remove some of the lighter outer resins which more
closely resemble alkanes in structure. Longer alkane chain lengths are able to remove
more of the peptizing resins, resulting in a precipitate with a lower molecular weight. Higher
alkanes produce a precipitate containing a lower percentage of resins and consequently
less precipitate.
The nature of the crude oil itself also has an effect. An aromatic oil will be a good solvent
for the peptised asphaltenes while a paraffinic crude will be a poor solvent. The risk
of asphaltene deposition is, therefore, a result of not only the amount of asphaltene and
resin material in the oil, the but also of the solvency power of the oil for its asphaltenes.
Crudes that are aromatic in nature and have a high resin content will be less liable
to asphaltene deposition.
Asphaltene deposits can appear hard and coal-like, or more sticky and tar-like. The nature
of the deposits is determined by the crude oil and the conditions under which precipitation
occurred. For instance, if all stabilising resins are stripped away and asphaltenes
precipitate, they will be composed of the high molecular weight, highly condensed core
species. These pack closely together leading to a very hard deposit. If asphaltenes
are precipitated by lighter n-alkanes, fewer of the peptising resins may be removed.
The resultant deposit may be a very viscous sticky fluid that can contain entrained oil.
5.3 Determining the Risk Of Asphaltene Deposition

In order to establish the risk of asphaltene precipitation during oilfield operations, the crude
oil must be characterised for its asphaltene content and its solvency for its asphaltenes,
and then the effect of the external conditions determined. Typical assays include
asphaltene and resin contents and their respective molecular weights.
The solvency of a crude for its asphaltenes can be determined via either a flow through
cell apparatus or using a laboratory titration technique. The main stages of assessing
the risk of asphaltene deposition in a well are:
• Sampling
• Determination of asphaltene and resin content
• Determination of the molecular weight of the asphaltene and resins
• Determination of flocculation onset
• Modelling
5.4 Operational Variables Effecting Asphaltene Deposition

Once on production there are several variables which can impact the onset of asphaltene
deposition in a well, including temperature, pressure, gas lift, acid stimulations, miscible
gas injection, electric fields and commingling different crudes. The mechanism and impact
of these are not within the scope of this section.
6 Hydrates
6.1 Description of Gas Hydrates
Hydrocarbon gas and liquid water can combine to form crystalline solids which resemble
wet snow or ice under conditions of high pressure and low temperature. Joule Thomson
cooling effects due to pressure drops are a key cause of hydrate formation in wells
and process systems particularly during shut-down or startup operations. These solids
are called gas hydrates or more correctly Natural Gas Hydrates (NGH). The crystal
structure is composed of cages of hydrogen bonded water molecules which surround
guest hydrocarbon gas molecules such as methane, ethane and propane.
Gas hydrates are unusual in that they behave as solutions of gases in crystalline solids
rather than as chemical compounds. No strong chemical bonds are formed between
the hydrocarbon and the water molecules. The ratio water molecules to gas molecules
can lie within the range 5.7 to 19. For methane hydrate (5.7 ratio), 15 wt% of the hydrate
is methane gas. NGH exists in two crystal structures type I (small cavity) and type II (large
cavity). The two structures are composed of different ratios of 12, 14 and 16-faced water
cages.
It should be noted that it is not necessary for a free gas phase to be present as long
as the hydrate formers are present in the system.
Figure 6.2.4 shows hydrate snow being removed from a condensate flowline. (Photograph
courtesy of Deepstar.)
Figure 6.2.4 Gas Hydrate Snow
6.2 Gas Hydrates Problems

Gas hydrate formation has been a major concern in oil and gas production systems ever
since Hammerschmidt identified pipeline hydrates in the 1930s. Hydrates can form
blockages in oil and gas pipelines and production facilities. Preventing gas hydrates
forming in pipelines and facilities costs the oil and gas industry millions of dollars
each year.
For well intervention work, the presence of hydrates can create both operational and safety
risks due to the potential for stuck tools to be ejected when attempting to retrieve.
6.3 Prevention Methods/Options

The present technical solutions available to prevent hydrate formation include lowering
the system pressure, methanol or mono-ethylene glycol solvents as thermodynamic
inhibitors, tri-ethylene glycol contactors to dehydrate gas, and pipeline insulation/heating
to keep the system warm and, hence outside the hydrate forming region. In recent years
new low dose hydrate inhibitors have been receiving considerable industry attention.
Replacement of the traditional thermodynamic inhibitors, methanol and glycol, is highly
desirable from both commercial and health and safety considerations. The operating
costs for these solvent-based inhibitor treatments are expensive, and the offshore
facilities for these treatments can be complex and logistically intensive. From a safety
perspective, it is becoming increasingly unacceptable to store large inventories of solvent
on offshore platforms. Some Operators have been working for several years to develop
a robust and cost effective low dose inhibitor technology which can be commercially
deployed in its oil and gas production operations.
6.4 Hydrate Predictions and Modelling

To determine the conditions of temperature and pressure under which hydrates can form
from a hydrocarbon stream with water, the best approach is to conduct careful
experimental measurements on the appropriate fluid mixture. In practice, however, this
is not always convenient and methods for predicting hydrate behaviour using thermodynamic
models are particularly valuable.
A model used by some Operators to carry out hydrate predictions is the Multiflash
software (Infochem Computer Services Ltd). Applications include subsea flowlines,
multiphase export lines, gas processing facilities, and drilling muds. Fluids treated have
spanned dry gases, through condensates, to heavy oils.
The information required for a model prediction is a compositional model for the
hydrocarbon stream together with details of water cut (only if very small) and salinity.
Hydrate suppression using methanol or glycol can also be treated, allowing estimates
to be made of dosing rates required to achieve specified operating conditions.

An important aspect of the modelling studies is the comparison of results with
experimental data that have been obtained for fluids with similar compositions. This has
provided a useful means of quality assuring the predictions, and to this end, a database
of such experimental data has been assembled.
It should be noted that the predictions of all models of this kind are of hydrate
dissociation, which represents a worst-case situation. The results are normally presented
in terms of a hydrate curve, such as that shown in Figure 6.2.5 below. Conditions of
temperature and pressure to the right and below the curve correspond to regions where
hydrates cannot form. To the left and above the curve are conditions where hydrates can
form, and are increasingly likely to do so within a given time period, at points further away
from the curve.
Figure 6.2.5 Hydrate Formation Curves
6.4.1 Low Dose Hydrate Inhibitors

Low Dose Hydrate Inhibitors (LDHIs) can be classified into two categories:
anti-agglomerates and Kinetic Inhibitors (KIs):
6.4.2 Anti-agglomerates
Anti-agglomerates (AAs) also known variously as hydrate dispersants, hydrate slurry
additives and Hydrate Growth Inhibitor (HGI). AAs work by suspending hydrate crystals
in the oil or condensate phase, thus dispersing hydrates and preventing agglomerations
into solid plugs. Some AAs, such as Baker Petrolite’s RE-4136, are surfactants which
attach to hydrate particles and disperse them as they form. Other AAs, such as IFP’s
Emulfip, are emulsifiers. Emulsifying AAs function by forming a tight water-in-oil emulsion
which limits hydrate crystal size by separating the water and ultimately the hydrates into
small droplets.
AA inhibitors will be operationally more complex due to having to deal with transport
of a slurry. There will also be issues about decomposing the hydrate slurry at the
receiving facility and achieving good water/oil separation. The current AA products (Shell
chemistries) are based on quaternary ammonium chemistry and have some toxicity issues.
6.4.3 Kinetic Inhibitors

Kinetic Inhibitors (KIs) disrupt hydrate nucleation and/or microscopic hydrate crystal
growth. This interference retards hydrate growth kinetics and consequently the hydrate
induction time. The goal is to prevent significant hydrate growth beyond the residence time
of the produced fluids. The induction time is the time between entering into hydrate-forming
conditions and the onset of hydrate formation. LDHIs are still a new technology in
offshore oil and gas production. In certain situations, applications of KI and AA technology
can be significantly lower cost than traditional control methods such as methanol or glycol
treatments. This is because LDHI dosage levels can be 50 to 100 times lower than the
dosage levels of thermodynamic inhibitors. These low KI and AA dosage levels translate
into lower pumping, storage and transportation Capex and Opex costs. LDHIs can also
provide an alternative technical solution, eg in situations where sufficient volumes
of methanol cannot be injected due to umbilical or injection limitations (Troika – GoM).
LHDIs can also offer desirable improvements in offshore HSE, for example by removing,
or greatly reducing, the inventory of flammable methanol/glycol solvents.
7 Emulsions
Emulsions can reduce production due to their high viscosities and may cause formation
damage both in production and injection wells. An emulsion is a stable dispersion
of two immiscible liquids (eg oil/water), in which one phase (dispersed phase) exists
as fine droplets suspended in the other phase (continuous phase). The water in-oil emulsion
is more common and problematic than the oil-in-water emulsions.
Emulsions are formed by mixing/agitation (ie by turbulence in the formation, at restrictions

or in pumps). They are stabilised by surfactants (particularly cationic surfactants),
asphaltenes or finely divided solids (eg wax and clays). Emulsions are characterised
by droplet size distribution and stability. Smaller droplets give tighter or more stable
emulsions. This is usually determined as water break-out versus time or measured
by voltage resistance across an immersed electrode.
Emulsions can be broken by demulsifiers (eg anionic surfactants), by dissolving the finely
divided solids and by heat
Water-in-oil emulsions can hold up to 70% water and have viscosities that are orders
of magnitude greater than the oil viscosity. This creates severe production problems,
such as poor inflow, high pressure drops, slow rod fall and overloaded ESP motors.
Continuous downhole emulsion formation can sometimes be prevented by better
completion practices (ie more perforations), but usually requires continuous chemical
injection below the tubing shoe or pump intake to break or invert the emulsion.
Injecting brines or acid into a formation with highly surface-active crudes (asphaltic
or paraffinic) can produce severe emulsion blockage which is very difficult to treat.
Including the proper combination of anionic or nonionic surfactants in treating fluids
and using a spearhead of a suitable aromatic solvent can prevent such problems.
The compatibility studies, specified in API RP 42, should be conducted on all completion
stimulation and injection fluids to evaluate the emulsion risks.
8 Sulphate Reducing Bacteria

Sulphate Reducing Bacteria (SRB) are micro-organisms found in surface water that
convert sulphates to H2S. They can create serious problems in any anaerobic (oxygen
free) conditions, such as those downhole, and particularly with seawater injection. SRB
can sour reservoirs, cause severe corrosion and plug injection wells. Souring sweet
reservoirs may require replacement of tubulars and surface equipment not meeting
NACE MR01-75 specifications for sour service where catastrophic failure as a result
of sulphide stress cracking can occur. SRBs are also cathode depolarizers (by accepting
hydrogen ion) and, therefore increase corrosion rates. They also produce slimes and
ferrous sulphides (a black solid) which may plug injector wells.
Microscopic counts or cultural techniques are the most reliable methods for determining
bacterial activity. API RP 38 provides methods for determining bacteria counts and
evaluating biocides.
Bacterial control is achieved by regular biocide treatment of injection waters and specific
treatment of drilling and workover fluids.
In the field, SRB activity is normally identified by the thick black sludge returned on wireline
tools during well intervention work. Such sludge when dry has the appearance of soot from
a chimney.
8.1 Wettability and Relative Permeability Changes

Changing the reservoir wettability from mainly water-wet to oil-wet can significantly reduce
oil production rates and waterflood sweep efficiency, particularly for low permeability
formations. Naturally water-wet rock (sandstone, carbonates, clays) can become oil-wet
by adsorption of surfactants or precipitation of organic scales. Cationic surfactants
(corrosion inhibitors) may cause sandstones to become oil-wet, and anionic surfactants
(scale inhibitors) may alter the wettability of carbonate reservoirs.
Injecting oil into a gas zone reduces the relative permeability to gas (decreases gas
saturation) and, thus, should be avoided. Similarly, increasing the water saturation in a tight
rock can reduce oil relative permeability and cause a water block. Hence, liquid emulsions
and foams are often used to fracture tight reservoirs, instead of water-based fluids.
Solvents can be used to restore wettability, and mutual solvents are used in acids
to minimise relative permeability damage in tight rocks.
8.2 Completion Fluid Chemistry

The major cause of downhole chemical problems is the injection of completion fluids that
are incompatible with the reservoir or formation fluids. Scale precipitation due to seawater
injection, wettability alteration due to cationic surfactants, clay damage due to salinity
changes, or emulsion formation are just a few examples. Acids require special
considerations since the large fluctuations in pH can dissolve or precipitate many
components, such as iron compounds or asphaltenes. Completion fluids must also be
compatible with the wellbore components to prevent corrosion of the metals or deterioration
of the seals.
Simple compatibility tests are adequate to identify many of these problems. Mixing
completion fluids with reservoir fluids in a standard high-pressure mud cell at reservoir
temperatures is an established technique.

Oil and Gas UK – Well Integrity
Guidelines (Current Rev)
ISO 16530 Well Integrity for the
American Petroleum Institute (API)
NACE MR01-75 Specifications for
Sour Service
Recommended Practice (RP) 38,
Determining Bacteria Counts and

Evaluating Biocides
Recommended Practice (RP) 42,
Fluid Compatibility Study (Emulsions)
Table 6.2.1 Industry References
Section 7
Other Well Integrity Considerations
Paragraph Page
1 Introduction 7-1
2 Well Startup/Shutdown 7-1
3 Wellhead Growth/Lateral Movement 7-1

4 Compaction and Subsidence 7-3
5 Sand Management 7-3
6 Monitoring of Conductors 7-4
Table
Figure
7.1 Simple Line Diagram on Measuring Wellhead Movement 7-3

1 Introduction
The following are issues which personnel operating wells should be aware of.
2 Well Startup/Shutdown
It is important to ensure that well startup and shutdown is managed efficiently and
effectively, to avoid either damage to the well components or to the reservoir itself.
Key risk areas are:
• The formation of hydrates due to large pressure drops when opening up a well
• A rapid increase in well temperature causing a pressure increase in the annulus
(or annuli)
• Damage to Electrical Submersible Pumps (ESPs) if the correct startup procedure

is not followed
• Excessive initial flowrate resulting in shock loading to the well and process plant
or erosion of chokes and other flow control equipment
• Damage to water injection wells due to excessive injection rates and rapid well startup
causing shock loadings to the well
• The introduction of large volumes of sand from unconsolidated formations due
to excessive well drawdown
• Damage to gas lift valves due to excessive flow rate – particularly when unloading
a well
3 Wellhead Growth/Lateral Movement

It is important to continually monitor for any sudden or unexpected changes in wellhead
growth or later movement and the Well Integrity Engineer should be consulted in all such
instances for further advice.
The thermal expansion caused by natural production causes wellhead growth and change
in axial load. The wellhead growth is also a function of the un-cemented length of casing
string.
Example: in one high rate high temperature gas field, the wellheads and trees moved
up 6 to 18 inches (152 to 457mm) when the wells were first put on production. This growth
is attributed to the thermal expansion after significant casing and tubing temperature
differences between the time they were first set and the time the wells were put
on production.
When a well has been shut-in for a long time before starting production, the wellhead
growth on producing from the well should be closely monitored. Give special attention
to the high pressure and/or high temperature wells.

Lateral movement of wells should also be monitored and any excessive movement
investigated – particularly where chocks have been installed to steady conductor
movement as on Beryl Bravo, where several instances of conductor movement have
been identified in recent years. The loss of any conductor chocks should, therefore,
be reported to the Well Integrity Engineer for further investigation.
Subsea wellhead growth is the term used for axial movement of the wellhead relative
to its wellhead initial position at the mudline. Wellhead growth is caused by the forces
exerted on the growth wellhead by:
• Thermal expansion of tubulars tied back to the wellhead
• Increasing pressure within the annuli between the tubulars
Changes in temperature from initial installed conditions can cause thermal stresses in the
casing. The casing is constrained axially at the top of the cement and at the wellhead.
The temperature increase from production elongates the casing and attempts to make
the high pressure wellhead move axially upward relative to the low pressure wellhead.
If the high pressure wellhead is locked to the low pressure wellhead, this axial constraint
causes a compressive force to be generated within the casing.
Increased well temperatures also cause the expansion of fluids in the annuli between
tubulars, which results in a pressure increase. The pressure increase acts on the underside
of the casing hangers, as well as on the tubulars. The effect of the compressive stresses
in individual tubulars and pressures in the annuli exert an upward force on the wellhead.
If the production casing (attached to the high pressure wellhead housing) is not cemented
all the way to the mudline, then the high pressure wellhead can move relative to the low
pressure housing (if not latched together), rising above its initial position at the mudline.
The axial forces that act on the locking mechanism between the low pressure and high
pressure wellhead housings should be considered when choosing the rating of the locking
mechanism.
The key inputs used to predict wellhead growth are the cement tops for the casing
(defines strain in each casing string), applied tension, and the well temperature when
producing (defines the temperature change from the initial conditions that cause thermal
stresses and annulus fluid expansion). If wellhead growth occurs, it affects the flowline
and other subsea equipment on the sea floor but not attached to the well.

Figure 7.1 Simple Line Diagram on Measuring Wellhead Movement
4 Compaction and Subsidence

In some mature fields – eg certain installations in the Norwegian Sector – depletion
of the reservoir pressure over several years of production can result in compaction
of the reservoir rock or subsidence of the formation. This phenomenon can also activate
faults within the rock and can ultimately impose significant loads on casing strings
and in the worst case undermine the security of the platform.
Historically, this issue has not been apparent in either the Forties or Beryl Fields despite
the many years of operational life for both fields. However, personnel should always
be alert to any signs of compaction or subsidence on their particular platform.
As with wellhead growth observing for movement of the xmas tree/conductor against
a fixed point on the platform (refer to Figure 7.1).
The Well Integrity Engineer should be informed of any wellhead movement outwith the
limits of normal operation.
5 Sand Management
The presence of sand in a well can result in erosion of equipment and the failure
of pressure-controlling equipment (xmas tree valves/DHSVs etc) to close on demand.

6 Monitoring of Conductors
While having no pressure-containment purpose, conductors contribute significantly to the
structural integrity of a well and as such should be monitored for any deterioration in
condition. Subsequently, Apache Projects Group have a surveillance programme in place
to monitor conductor condition.
The following industry references should be consulted for further information.


ISO 16530 Well Integrity for the

Section 8
Well Suspension, Temporary Abandonment
and Permanent Abandonment
Paragraph Page
1 Introduction 8-1
2 Definitions 8-1
2.1 Well Suspension 8-1

2.2 Temporary Abandonment 8-1
2.3 Plug and Abandon (Permanent Abandonment) 8-1
3 Preparing to Suspend, Temporarily Abandon

or Plug and Abandon a Well 8-2
3.1 Preparing for Suspension/TA/P&A Activities 8-2
3.2 Recommended Actions 8-2
4 Required Maintenance/Surveillance for Suspended

or TA wells 8-3
4.1 Apache Requirements 8-3
5 Record Keeping 8-4

5.1 Suspended Subsea Well Categorisation 8-4
5.2 Suspension/TA/P&A Schematics 8-5
6 Well Examination 8-5
Table
8.1 Suspended Subsea Well Categorisation 8-4
Appendix 8A Sample Suspension Schematic

August 2015 Issue 1 and Permanent Abandonment 8-i/ii
1 Introduction
Quoting the requirements under the UK Design and Construction Regulations (DCR):
‘Operators are to ensure that a well is designed, modified, constructed, equipped,
operated, suspended and abandoned that:
(1) So far is as reasonably practicable there shall be no unplanned escape of fluid
the well.
In addition, Operators are required to ensure that a well is so designed and constructed
that, so far as is reasonably practicable:
(1) It can be a suspended or abandoned in a safe manner.
(2) After its suspension or abandonment, there can be no unplanned escape from
it or from the reservoir to which it led.’
It is not intended to define any specific Apache technical requirements within this section
as the quoted Oil and Gas UK – Guidelines for the Suspension and Abandonment
of Wells (‘the Guidelines’), together with other Apache policies and procedures
as referenced within this manual, provide all the guidance necessary. However, key points
of note in respect of non-technical issues – eg record keeping/reporting/well categorisation
etc, are provided within this section to ensure that all necessary legislative requirements
are met in full.
2 Definitions
Definitions are provided by the Guidelines as follows in italics.
2.1 Well Suspension

‘Action taken prior to leaving the well to ensure adequate isolation of permeable zones,
fluids and pressures in any well that will be re-entered or abandoned at a later date.’
2.2 Temporary Abandonment

Same as Suspension.
2.3 Plug and Abandon (Permanent Abandonment)

‘The action taken to ensure the permanent isolation from surface and from lower pressured
zones, of exposed permeable zones, fluids and pressures in a well that will not
be re-entered.’

August 2015 Issue 1 and Permanent Abandonment 8-1
3 Preparing to Suspend, Temporarily Abandon

or Plug and Abandon a Well
The decision to suspend, Temporarily Abandon (TA) or Plug and Abandon (P&A) a well is
generally made as a multidiscipline group decision based on several factors, including:
• Long-term shut-in well – poor production and economic value
• Integrity issues
• Sidetrack candidate
• Change of use
3.1 Preparing for Suspension/TA/P&A Activities

It is important to recognise and outline key risk areas in respect of well integrity up until
the point where full abandonment is completed and a well poses no further integrity risk.
Key Risk Areas

• Lengthy periods of suspension can cause deterioration in tubulars particularly in wells
with corrosive fluids present and/or where the well has been suspended due to holed
casing/tubing etc. P&A costs and mechanical risk will rise substantially in such instances
• Un-noticed increases in pressure can result in well integrity risks, particularly where
a monitoring routine is not in place or not being applied
• The presence of scale in a well will, in the majority of cases, drive how the well
is suspended and ultimately abandoned
• Subsea wells, particularly those of an older design, commonly have control system
and pressure monitoring problems (refer to Section 5 Subsea Well Integrity) and
present particular challenges for executing Suspension/P&A work
3.2 Recommended Actions

• Check for the presence of scale by carrying out pre-work drifts
• Carry out calliper runs where deemed necessary
• Ensure that any fluids pumped into a well during suspension activities are treated,
to avoid corrosion or precipitation of solids
• Check monitoring equipment is installed and operating, and the appropriate
surveillance regime has been set up immediately following Suspension/TA work
Additionally, for subsea wells:
• A full ROV inspection of the well and immediate surrounding area should be carried
out prior to planning any work to ensure no debris or leaks are apparent

8-2 and Permanent Abandonment August 2015 Issue 1
• The operating status of the Subsea Control System must be known. During ROV
inspection, valves should be functioned and tested wherever practical to do so
• The operating status of any pressure transducers must be known. In some cases
the majority of transducers may be non-operational
Work programmes will have to take these issues into account (refer to Section 5 Subsea
Well Integrity).
4 Required Maintenance/Surveillance for Suspended

or TA wells
Unless suspended or TA wells have been fully abandoned (P&A) they should be treated
as live wells. Thus, the two barrier policy must be applied at all times unless an adequate
and approved assessment of risk has been carried out.
4.1 Apache Requirements

Monitoring and surveillance on suspended or TA wells should be maintained on a regular
basis – frequency of monitoring to be determined by the Wells Team on a risk-based
approach.
• The presence of two barriers from atmosphere should be confirmed periodically
• Well and annulus pressures should be checked and any anomalies investigated
• On subsea wells, an ROV inspection routine should be set up for all wells which
are not fully abandoned. Such inspections should witness valve functions wherever
practical and also check for leaks from the well and surrounding infrastructure
Note: Subsea well inspections are normally planned, managed and executed by the
Subsea Projects and Operations Group not the Wells Team. It is, therefore,
important to ensure that well inspection records resulting from such work are
communicated to the Wells Team, who have responsibility for reporting to DECC
on well inspections.

5 Record Keeping
The legislation requires that records of all wells are kept for a minimum of 6 months after
full abandonment. In practice, all well records are archived offsite.
5.1 Suspended Subsea Well Categorisation

The following are suspended subsea well categorisations quoted directly from the UK
Industry-standard – Guidelines for the Suspension and Abandonment of Wells (Current
Rev). Readers must ensure that the current revision of this document is referred to when
planning any work activities.
Category Definition
1 The well has been sufficiently suspended that final abandonment only
requires removal of the wellhead.

2.1 The well has one annulus un-cemented.
Placement of an additional permanent barrier is required to complete
the abandonment of the well. This may be done by placing a barrier into
the annulus or placing a separate barrier.
This type of well may be abandoned with a drilling rig or light well
intervention vessel.
2.2 The well has two annuli un-cemented.
Placement of an additional permanent barrier is required to complete
the abandonment of the well. This may be done by placing a barrier into
the annulus or placing a separate barrier.
This type of well may be abandoned with a drilling rig or light well
intervention vessel.
3 The suspended condition of the well is not suitable for full abandonment
without significant intervention.
Typically, with current technology, the abandonment programme will
require a drilling rig to safely effect the operation.
4 Wells are placed in this category for several reasons:
The downhole status is not known, therefore cannot be categorised.
The well is in a condition where it is not possible to safely abandon
with current technology.
Table 8.1 Suspended Subsea Well Categorisation
The categories may be prefaced with ML or SS indicating either a Mud-line (ML)

suspension system or Subsea (SS) wellhead on the well.

5.2 Suspension/TA/P&A Schematics

All subsea suspended/TA/P&A wells should have a well status schematic on record.
Such schematics should include the following details as a minimum:
• DECC well number
• Pore pressure/drilling fluid data
• LOT/FIT data
• Cement data
• Location co-ordinates
• Lithography data
• Any integrity issues apparent
• Fluids present in well – including all annuli

• Suspension/abandonment category and status
• Well inspection details
A sample of a well status schematic is provided in Appendix 8A. Consult the Well
Integrity Engineer for the necessary templates.
6 Well Examination
The legislation (DCR Reg 18) requires that all suspended and temporarily-abandoned
wells are subject to well examination on a regular basis until permanently-abandoned
(P&A).
Apache requires that such wells are examined on a regular basis as with other wells.
The schematics described in Paragraph 5.2 should be utilised for well examination
purposes. Records of well examination activities must be kept on file.

The following industry references should be consulted when planning and executing well
suspension and abandonment activities.

Oil and Gas UK – Guidelines for the This is the UK industry-standard guidance
Suspension and Abandonment of Wells for suspension and abandonment.
(Current Rev)
ISO 16530; Well Integrity for the
Oil and Gas UK – Guideline on Well Provides guidance on the generation

Abandonment Cost Estimation of costings for well abandonment
activities.

Appendix 8A
Sample Suspension Schematic


August 2015 Issue 1 App 8A-1/2

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Well Integrity Manual

Issue Name: Mark Hobbs Name: Ken Lowe

Technical Name: Joe Narducci

Issue Number: Issue 1 First Issue Date: May 2015

Revision Date: August 2015 Next Review Date: August 2016

To access this document electronically please visit:

Section 3 Well Integrity Management System

August 2015 Issue 1 i/ii

Amended By Date Issue No Description

August 2015 Issue 1 iii/iv

Holders of Controlled Hard Copy

Copy Copyholder Location

01 Data Control Centre (DCC) ODL, Aberdeen

06 Well Intervention Superintendent Apache, Caledonia House

01 Document Technical Authority

August 2015 Issue 1 v/vi

Review and Update

August 2015 Issue 1 vii/viii

ANSL Apache North Sea Ltd (Apache)

DCR Design and Construction Regulations

August 2015 Issue 1 ix

List of Abbreviations (cont’d)

PBU Pressure Buildup

x August 2015 Issue 1

2 Purpose and Scope 1-1

3 Using this Document 1-1

4 Regulatory Requirements 1-2

5 Industry References 1-6

6 Notes on Terminology 1-7

2 Purpose and Scope

3 Using this Document

Legislation Purpose How Apache Complies

Table 1.1 UK Well-related Legislation

Legislation Purpose How Apache Complies

Regulations (DCR) regulations relating process (intranet based).

Table 1.1 UK Well-related Legislation (cont’d)

Legislation Purpose How Apache Complies

Usage Reporting and use of all chemicals in

Table 1.1 UK Well-related Legislation (cont’d)

4.1 Regulatory Enforcement

4.2 References to UK Legislation

Reference Name Comments

A guide to the integrity, workplace Refer to www.hsebooks.co.uk

Table 1.2 UK Regulation References

4.3 Interfacing with the Regulatory Authorities (UK)

4.4 Apache Health, Safety and Environmental Group

The following general industry references should be consulted wherever necessary.

Reference Name Comments

Table 1.3 Industry References

Forties Terminology Beryl Equivalent Comments

Table 1.4 Asset-specific Terminology

2 Well Lifecycle Phases 2-1

3 Well Lifecycle Principles 2-1

4 Apache Well Lifecycle Process 2-2

5 Well Operating Envelopes 2-3

6 Well Handover Process and Documentation 2-7

2 Well Lifecycle Phases

Phases What does it cover? Comments

Table 2.1 Well Lifecycle Phases

3 Well Lifecycle Principles

• Adequate document control

4 Apache Well Lifecycle Process

5 Well Operating Envelopes