Department of the Classics, Harvard University

Boethius as a Transmitter of Greek Logic to the Latin West: The Categories

Author(s): Monika Asztalos
Source: Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, Vol. 95 (1993), pp. 367-407
Published by: Department of the Classics, Harvard University
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/311393
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 BOETHIUSAS A TRANSMITTEROF
GREEKLOGICTO THE LATIN WEST:
THE CATEGORIES

MONIKA
ASZTALOS

studentsof literatureAniciusManliusSeverinusBoethius(ca.
TO482-ca. 526) is above all the author of Philosophiae consolatio.
Historians of mathematics and musicologists are familiar with his
treatises on the quadrivialsciences. Historiansof ideas study his philo-
sophical and theological works mainly for their impact on medieval
thinkers. But not many scholars study Boethius' commentaries on
Greek philosophical treatises for their own sake or investigate his pro-
lix expositions of the third-centuryNeoplatonist Porphyry'sIsagoge or
introductionto Aristotle's Categories, of the Categories itself, and of
Aristotle's De interpretatione. Classicists are often repelled by
Boethius' inelegant Latin, awkwardlyinfluencedby the Greek, and his-
torians of philosophy complain about his lack of originality. While
acknowledging the essential fairness of these two judgments, my pur-
pose in this paper is to bring out what these commentaries, and espe-
cially the ones on the Isagoge and the Categories,1 reveal about
Boethius' working methods in his earliest works on Greek logic. I
intend to deal less with the end productthan with the road to it, and to
point to the stages of development and improvementexhibited within
these early works.

1This
paperis a byproductof my presentwork on a critical edition of Boethius' Com-
mentary on Aristotle's Categories. Its contents were first presented in a session on
Boethius and the Greeks duringthe annualmeeting of the AmericanPhilological Associ-
ation, Chicago, December 1991. The paperhas benefited from the careful reading of the
other participantsof that session: John Dillon, John Magee, and Steven Strange, as well
as from Jan Oberg, John Murdoch,and Gisela Striker. I also wish to thank FrankBern-
stein for generoushelp with its technical production.
368 MonikaAsztalos

Boethius devoted his first effort in Greek philosophy to Porphyry's

Isagoge, and later, in the year of his consulate (510), when he was in
all likelihood in his late twenties, he spent all his spare time comment-
ing for the first time on a work by Aristotle, the Categories. Ever since
Samuel Brandtattempteda chronology of Boethius' works on the basis
of their internal references, it has been commonly held that when
Boethius began commenting on the Categories, he had already written
both his expositions of Porphyry'sIsagoge (hereafterIsag. I and Isag.
2), the first one a dialogue in two books based on Marius Victorinus'
apparentlyincomplete Latin version, the second a five book commen-
tary on his own, complete translation.2This is certainly not the place
for a full discussion of the chronology of Boethius' works, but for the
argumentsof this paper it is necessary to establish the order between
Isag. 2 and the commentaryonthe Categories (CC).
Brandt's assumptionthat Isag. 2 was written before CC rests on a
single passage in the former work, where Boethius explains Porphyry's
demonstrationof how a comparison of the five predicables (genus,
species, proprium,differentia, and accident) with each other gives ten
differentcombinations.3At the end of his lengthy exposition in Isag. 2
2 S. Brandt, "Entstehungszeitund zeitliche
Folge der Werke von Boethius," Philo-
logus 62 (1903), 141-154 and 234-275. See also pp. XXVI-XXIX of the Prolegomena
to Anicii Manlii SeveriniBoethii In Isagogen Porphyriicommenta,rec. S. Brandt,Corpus
ScriptorumEcclesiasticorumLatinorum48, Wien/Leipzig, 1906. In his "Stylistic Tests
and the Chronology of the Works of Boethius," Harvard Studies in Classical Philology
18 (1907), 123-156, A. P. McKinley's conclusions concerningthe chronology of Isag. 1,
Isag. 2, and the commentaryon the Categories (hereafterCC) are the same as Brandt's.
McKinley studied the frequency of certain particles in these commentariesas well as in
Boethius' translationsof the Isagoge and Categories, assuming that Boethius' language
was influencedby his translationsof Porphyryand Aristotle. Now, some of McKinley's
data corroborateBrandt's chronology whereas others support the one I will suggest
below. Furthermore,McKinley's tests were made before the appearanceof L. Minio-
Paluello's critical editions of Boethius' translationsin the Aristoteles Latinus and would
thereforehave to be remade. I also believe that a necessary preliminarystage in examin-
ing whether Boethius' translatingactivities influenced his choice of particles is to com-
pare his Latin commentarieswith the extant Greek sources. Since there is no adequate
source apparatusin any of the editions of Boethius' commentaries,this would mean a
great deal of work. Concerningthe question whether Boethius wrote Isag. 2 before or
after CC, L. M. De Rijk follows Brandt'sview on pp. 125-127 of "On the chronology of
Boethius' works on logic," Vivarium2 (1964), 1-49 and 125-162, on exactly the same
grounds as the ones on which Brandt based his conclusions and without corroborating
them further.
3 Porphyrii Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium,ed. A. Busse, Com-
mentaria in Aristotelem Graeca (=CAG) IV:1, Berlin, 1887, pp. 17,14-18,9. Boethius'
 Boethiusas a Transmitter
of GreekLogic 369

Boethius presents a rule (not given by Porphyry)by which one can cal-
culate the number of different combinations of any given number of
things. The rule (subtract1 from the numberof things combined, mul-
tiply the rest with the original number,and divide the productby 2) is
also given by Ammonius, teacher of philosophy in fifth-centuryAlex-
andria,and it is thereforelikely that Boethius found the rule in a Greek
comment on the Isagoge.4 By way of example, Boethius furtheradds
that if you have four things, subtractone, multiply the remainingthree
by four, and divide the product by two, you get six combinations;he
concludes: atque hanc quidem regulam simpliciterac sine demonstra-
tione nunc dedisse sufficiat, in Praedicamentorum uero expositione
ratio quoque cur ita sit explicabitur. This has been taken by Brandtas
a reference to CC and, consequently, as evidence for CC's posteriority
to Isag. 2. Brandtdrew attentionto the fact that it is toward the end of
CC that each of the four types of opposition are compared with each
other.5 From this he was forced to conclude that at the time when
Boethius wrote Isag. 2 he had alreadyconceived his entire commentary
on the Categories in detail.
I propose instead that Boethius had written his entire commentary
on the Categories before beginning his second commentary on the
Isagoge. The reference to Praedicamentorumexpositione is, in my
opinion, not a reference to CC. First, Boethius' demonstrationin CC of
how one gets six differentcombinationsout of the four types of opposi-
tion occupies a few paragraphs- a brisk treatmentin comparisonwith
the several pages long exposition in Isag. 2. If one accepts Brandt's
chronology, one would surely expect a reference in the brief comment
in CC to the much fuller treatmentin Isag. 2 instead of the other way
around. Secondly, and more importantly,what Boethius says in the
passage from Isag. 2 quoted above is that he has judged it sufficient at
this point to present the combinationrule without proving it but that he

comment:ed. Brandt(see above, note 2), pp. 319,15-325,7.

4 Ammonius In Porphyrii Isagogen sive V voces, ed. A. Busse, CAG IV:3, Berlin,
1891, pp. 115,20-116,11 and 122,22-123,6. In his Prolegomena to the edition of
Boethius' commentarieson the Isagoge (see note 2 above), p. XXVI, Brandtsuggests that
the similarities between Boethius' and Ammonius' commentarieson Porphyry's treatise
can be accountedfor by assuming either that Boethius had access to Ammonius' work or
that they both depend on the same source. The latter assumption seems to me the more
likely one. However, the question of dependencyis hardto determine,since Ammonius'
work is the only extant Greekcommentaryon the Isagoge from late antiquity.
5 Patrologia Latina (= PL) 64, 272C-273A.
370 MonikaAsztalos

will demonstrateit in a commentaryon the Categories. But the pas-

sage in CC that Brandtassumed Boethius to be alluding to, althoughit
does contain a considerationof these six different combinations, does
not even mention the general rule for getting them. The work I take
Boethius to be referringto is thereforenot CC but the second commen-
tary on the Categories that we know he was planning to compose (see
below, p. 378) but which (if it was ever written)is now lost.
When dealing with the chronology of Boethius' philosophical
works, which in many cases are hardly more than translationsfrom
Greek sources, one has to consider the possibility that even references
to other works or to other places within the same work may be
translatedfrom Greek (several instances of this will be given below on
pp. 376 and 378). Therefore it is relevant in this case to point out that
in discussing the combination rule in his commentaryon the Isagoge
Ammonius has no reference to a commentary on the Categories.
Furthermore,he does not mention the fact that four things give six
combinations. This example may have been chosen by Boethius
because he knew that the rule could be demonstratedlater on in a
second commentaryon the Categories in connection with the discus-
sion of the four types of opposition that he had become familiar with
while working on CC. Whether or not Boethius became acquainted
with the rule by studying Greek comments on the Isagoge already
while composing Isag. 1, he had no use for it in that work, since Vic-
torinus' translationas quoted by Boethius does not include the passage
in which Porphyrymentions the differentcombinationsthat result from
a comparisonof the five predicables with each other. If Boethius met
the rule in a Greek commentaryon the Categories while composing CC
(this part of Porphyry'sextant commentary,the so-called Kata peusin,
is lost, but Simplicius, Ammonius' pupil and a contemporary of
Boethius, gives the rule in his commentary on the Categories6), he
must have decided not to use it in that work.
For the purpose, then, of establishing the chronology between CC
and Isag. 2, the reference in Isag. 2 is of little value. Were there indu-
bitably clear internal references in Boethius' earlier works, one could
establish the probable sequence of the latter in terms of these refer-
ences, but as it is, in this case the only reliable method to employ in
6 Simplicii in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium,ed. C. Kalbfleisch, CAG VIII,
Berlin, 1907, pp. 397,31-398,22.
 Boethiusas a Transmitter
of GreekLogic 371

dealing with the chronology is to study the doctrinaland terminological

development within Boethius' works. As I will show in this paper,it is
not only a safe method, but a fruitful one, and one that allows us to
draw new conclusions as to Boethius' own methods of approaching
Greek materialand presentingit in Latin.
For the time being, I will abstain from giving furthersupport (such
will emerge on pp. 373 (with note 12) and 375 (with notes 20 and 25)
below) in favor of the chronology I have proposedhere and simply take
it for granted that Boethius began commenting on Aristotle's
Categories immediately after having completed his commentary on
Marius Victorinus' translation of Porphyry's Isagoge, and, conse-
quently, at a time when Isag. 2 was still in the offing.
How did Boethius go about his new project of commenting for the
first time on a book by Aristotle, using as a basis, also for the first time,
a translationof his own?

I. The Translationsof the Categories Ascribed to

Boethius and their Transmission

Let me begin by summarizing some conclusions arrived at by

Lorenzo Minio-Paluello in his introductionto the critical edition of the
Latin translationsof Aristotle's Categories7: Boethius' translationof
the Categories occurs, Minio-Paluellomaintains,both in an incomplete
form (representing ca. two thirds of the Greek) as lemmata in CC,
which he calls b, and in a complete form, transmittedwithout the com-
mentary (a). There is also a composite text (c) consisting partly of a,
partly of an otherwise unknown, anonymous translation (x). Minio-
Paluello has concluded on stylistic grounds that x cannot be attributed
to Marius Victorinus. His cautiously forwardedhypothesis is that since
x is a cruder translationthan the one that can be attributedwith cer-
tainty to Boethius, and since no other person is known from before the
ninth century (the date of the earliest extant manuscript of c)
knowledgeable enough in Greek and Latin to have been able to pro-
duce a translationsuch as x, it probably represents an early effort by
Boethius.
Minio-Paluello assumes that whoever put together c had a defective
7AristotelesLatinus(=AL) 1:1-5. Categoriaevel Praedicamenta,
ed. L. Minio-
Paluello, Bruges/Paris,1961, esp. pp. XII-XXII.
372 Monika Asztalos

copy of x and suppliedwhat was lacking in it from a. But this does not
seem to fit with another observation of his, namely that the person
behind c mistakenly inserted into his text a word from Boethius' com-
mentary,a word that follows immediatelyupon a lemma.8It seems to
me more likely that the redactorof c did not combine x with a but with
b. He probablyhad copies of x and of Boethius' commentary,realized
that the translationexhibited in the CC, albeit incomplete,was superior
to x and improvedthe latterwith the help of the lemmata. This is sup-
ported by the fact that the parts of c that are also extant as lemmata
in CC often share textual errors with b against a but never with a
againstb.
Since Minio-Paluello,who is also the editor of the Greek text of the
Categories in the OCT,9 was able to observe that a and x do not
correspondto one and the same Greek version of the text, he assumed
that Boethius (identifiedas the translatorof x) may actually have com-
posed his second translation(a) "from scratch,"using another Greek
copy of the Categories than when he producedx.

A. Boethius' Translationa Not WrittenBefore CC

I would like to argue that Boethius translatedAristotle's Categories

while providing it, at the same time, with a commentary. Thus, the
Greek commentarieson the Categories that he made extensive use of
in his own expository work aided him not only in writing CC but also
in interpretingAristotle's text. I will exemplify my claim with an
account of how Boethius modified his interpretationof Aristotle's doc-
trine on homonymous and synonymous things. Aristotle presents the
doctrine in the opening paragraphsof the Categories (la 1-12), in
Boethius' translation(given also in c, the composite text):

Aequivoca dicunturquorumnomen solum commune est, secun-

dum nomen vero substantiaeratio diversa, ut animal homo et quod
pingitur. Horum enim solum nomen commune est, secundum
nomen vero substantiaeratio diversa;si enim quis assignet quid est
utrique eorum quo sint animalia, propriam assignabit utriusque
rationem. Univoca vero dicunturquorumet nomen commune est
8 The word ordine, PL 64, 269B. Minio-Paluello,p. XVI.
9 Aristotelis Categoriae et Liber de interpretatione,rec. L. Minio-Paluello, Oxford,
1949.
 Boethiusas a Transmitter
of GreekLogic 373

et secundumnomen eadem substantiaeratio, ut animal homo atque

bos. Communi enim nomine utrique animalia nuncupantur,et est
ratio substantiaeeadem; si quis enim assignet utriusquerationem,
quid utriquesit quo sint animalia,eandem assignabitrationem.

On the other hand, Boethius had quoted the incipit of Aristotle's

Categories already in Isag. I in the following way: Aequiuoca sunt
quorumnomen solum communeest, secundumnomen uero substantiae
ratio alia.10 According to Minio-Paluello," Boethius is using almost
the same words here as in his translationof the Categories. The only
divergence that Minio-Paluello draws attention to is that Isag. I has
alia where the Categories translation (both in the form of a and b)
reads diversa. This is indeed a minor variant. But what is more
significantis thatIsag. 1 rendersAristotle's with sunt, whereas
a and b have the correct dicuntur. One might •TyE•at
object that maybe in
Isag. 1 Boethius was not quoting the Latin definition of homonymous
things exactly, just giving the general idea of it. But when Boethius
a
quotes passage from the in
Categories Isag. 2, a work that, as I have
argued above, was written after CC, he follows his own translation
(both in the form of a and b) to the letter.12 the
Furthermore, following
comment in the CC (paralleled in Simplicius' commentary13)on the
appropriatenessof the word dicuntur shows that it is unlikely that
Boethius would have expressed the definition as loosely as he did in
Isag. I if he had been familiar with the Greek comments on the begin-
ning of the Categories: Res per se ipsae aequiuocae non sunt, nisi uno
nomine praedicentur. Quare, quoniam, ut aequiuocae sint, ex com-
muni uocabulo trahunt,recte ait 'Aequiuocadicuntur'. Non enim sunt
aequiuoca sed dicuntur. Thus, it was most likely the acquaintancewith
a Greek comment that made Boethius aware of the fact that Aristotle
had a purpose in writing instead of zortv(or rather,made him
yerTattascribed this
aware of the fact that the Greeks purpose to Aristotle).
10 Ed.
Brandt,p. 17,21-23.
11AL 1:1-5, p. X, note 2.
12Ed. Brandt, p. 152,8-10. Boethius
quotes Aristotle's Cat. 1 b 16-17. One might
argue that a reads secundumspeciem whereas the quote in Isag. 2 has secundumspecies,
but several manuscriptsof Boethius' CC exhibit the latter reading in the lemma. The
nasal stroke for m is easily confused in manuscriptswith s following a final vowel.
13PL 64, 164B. I quote from my own forthcomingcritical edition. Simplicius: CAG
VIII, p. 25,5-9.
374 MonikaAsztalos

Furthermore,he had neither produceda nor familiarized himself with

the Greek comments on the Categories when he composed Isag. 1.
This is not shocking news. But the following three examples demon-
strate that he had not even written a before he startedto work on the
CC, and what may indeed seem surprising,that he had not yet done so
when he wrote the introductionto the CC (i.e., before he came to the
firstlemma).
In Isag. I and in the introductionof CC Boethius gives an account
of homonymity and synonymity that is different from that given by
Aristotle in the beginning of the Categories. Boethius' account has no
counterpartin any extant Greek commentary. I believe that for some
reason Boethius met a theory of homonymous and synonymous things
while working on Isag. I and that it was not until he got beyond the
introductionof the CC and met the theory spelled out in the Greek
comments on the beginning of the Categories that he became familiar
with Aristotle's view.
Whereas Aristotle asserts that, for example, man and ox (i.e., two
species) are synonymous things because they have a common name
(animal) and the same definition in accordance with that name,
Boethius holds the view in Isag. I that man and animal (i.e., a species
and its genus) are synonymousthings since they are both called animal
and can be given the definition of animal.14And whereas Aristotle
exemplifies homonymous things, i.e., things that have only a name in
common but different definitions, with a living man and a picture that
are both called Qiov, Boethius exemplifies with a marble statue
representinga man and a living man that can both be called man.15
Boethius sticks to his interpretationslater on in Isag. 1, but there he
uses a statue of Venus and the goddess herself as examples of things
homonymous.16Moreover,in the introductorypartof his CC, before he
comes to Aristotle's text itself, Boethius repeats his previous examples
of synonymous things17(man and animal, although in one manuscript
the scribe has tried to improve Boethius' accountby substitutingasinus
for animal), but in the case of homonymousthings he now gives both
his own and Aristotle's view, saying that a living man and a painting
representinga man can both be called either animal or man. Having
14Ed. Brandt,pp. 17,24-18,12.
15 Ed. Brandt,p. 18,12-19.
16Ed. Brandt, 32,12-33,20.
pp.
17PL 64, 163D-164A.
 Boethiusas a Transmitter
of GreekLogic 375

proceeded in his commentaryto Aristotle's definition of homonymous

things, i.e., having producedthe first lemma of the Categories, he gives
only the Aristotelian example of a painting of a man and of a living
man that are both called animal.18 When he comes to Aristotle's
definition of synonymous things, he presents a theory that has no coun-
terpartamong the extant Greek comments and the purpose of which
seems to have been to integratehis own previous view with the Aristo-
telian one that he could not avoid facing at this point. He claims (and
this is one of the rare occasions on which he puts forth an original idea
in the CC) that either genera are synonymous with species, as animal
with man (Boethius' own view) or species are synonymous with
species of the same genus, as man, horse, and ox (Aristotle's view).19
But apparentlyBoethius grew weary of producinghis old examples, for
in Isag. 2 he gives nothing but Aristotle's doctrine.20
My second example showing that Boethius had not produced a
before startingto write CC relates to the beginning of chapter4 of the
Categories (1 b 25-27), where Aristotle provides for the first time a list
of the ten categories. Boethius' translationof Kic•ofat from this point
on21is situs. But he had given a list of the categories twice before, first
in the beginning of Isag. 1, and secondly in his comment on Cat. 1 a
20-b 6.22Both times he translatedKE'oOat with iacere. In the case of
Isag. 1, Boethius may have picked up the list of the categories from a
Greek source, since such a list is given in the prooemium of
Ammonius' commentary on the Isagoge23; the list in the CC (in the
comment on Cat. 1 a 20-b 6) is taken from Porphyry'scomment on the
same lemma.24(The switch in terminology from iacere to situs at 1 b
25-27 in CC fits with the hypothesis that CC is written before Isag. 2,
since in the latter work Boethius consistently translatescKE_'Ot with
situs.25)Thus, it seems that Boethius had not producedthe translationa
before starting to comment on the Categories, or he would not have
18PL 64, 165A. (This is of course a necessary minor adaptationto the Latin language,
since in Greek a paintingof anything,not necessarily a man, can be called Foiov).
19PL 64, 167B-C.
20Cf. Isag. 2, ed. Brandt,pp. 222,23-223,19. This fits with
my hypothesis thatIsag. 2
was writtenafterCC.
21PL 64, 220C and in the lemma 11 b 10.
22Isag. 1, ed. Brandt,p. 14,15; CC, PL 64, 169C-D.
23CAG IV:3,
pp. 19,13-20,14.
24CAG IV:1, 71,19-26.
p.
25Ed. Brandt,pp. 143, 23; 222, 13; 317, 12.
376 MonikaAsztalos

used the term iacere in the beginningof the CC.26

As for my third and last example: in the introductorypart of CC,
before he comes to Aristotle's text, Boethius follows Porphyryin quot-
ing Cat. 2 a 4-5. He translatesPorphyry'squote from Aristotle thus:
Singulumautem eorum, quae dicta sunt, ipsumquidemsecundumse in
nulla affirmationedicitur. Horum autem ad se inuicem complexione
affirmatiofit.27 But furtheron in CC, when he comes to 2 a 4-5, he
gives the following translation in the lemma: Singula igitur eorum,
quae dicta sunt, ipsa quidem secundumse in nulla affirmationedicun-
tur. Horum autem ad se inuicem complexione affirmatiofit.28 The
latter is also the wording in the comment following upon the lemma29
and in a. Consequently, a was not composed before Boethius
embarked on the commentary on the Categories, or the quote in the
introductorypartof CC would have read: Singula ... ipsa ... dicuntur.

B. Conclusions

In sum, Boethius may have come quite unpreparedto his first text
by Aristotle, unprepared,that is, in the sense of not startingto comment
on the Categories armed with a good translationbeforehand or with
more than a superficial knowledge of the text. As a matter of fact,
whenever Boethius refers to a passage in Aristotle's Categories beyond
the lemma or chapterhe is actually working on, a correspondingrefer-
ence can be found in both Porphyry'sand Simplicius' commentaries.30
26 It is tempting to sidetrackfor a moment into
speculatingon why Boethius changed
his terminology at 1 b 25-27. One reason might be that in translatingAristotle's exam-
ples of IKeo0at, namely a&va'etat and K~60ireat(in Boethius' translationiacere and
sedere), he found that situs would be a more suitable term than iacere for KEteo0at,the
genus of iacere and sedere. If this is the reason, one may wonder whetherthe translation
x should be ascribedto Boethius, since he would have become awareof Aristotle's exam-
ples and consequentlyof the unsuitabilityof the term iacere alreadywhile producingthat
translation. But I have decided to suspend for the time being any judgment on the
authenticityof x.
27PL 64, 162B; CAGIV:1, pp. 56,36-57,2.
28PL 64, 180B.
29PL 64, 180D.
30PL 64, 184B ( = comment on 2 a 11-19): Partes autem substantiae incompositaeet
simplices sunt species et materia, ex quibus ipsa substantiaconficitur,quas post per tran-
situm nominatdicens substantiaepartes et ipsas esse substantias. The referenceis to 3 a
29-32. Porphyry has a similar reference, CAG IV:1, p. 88,21-22, as does Simplicius,
CAG VIII, p. 78, 31-32. PL 64, 196C (=comment on 3 b 24-32): Manifestumest, ut
 Boethiusas a Transmitter
of GreekLogic 377

What is quite evident is that Boethius modified his conception of his

work as he went along. This is apparentin Isag. I where he sets out to
write a dialogue with some literary ambitions but, as Samuel Brandt
has pointed out, gradually abandonsthe dialogue form in book II and
drops it altogethertoward the end of the book only to have it reappear,
perfunctorily,in the last lines.31
It is easy to form the impression that Boethius plunged into his first
work on Greek philosophy-Isag. 1-equally "unprepared"as in the
case of the Categories. Boethius is there using Victorinus' translation
but often checks it against a Greek copy of Porphyry's text, and it is
with what seems to be an increasing irritationthat he makes note of
shortcomingsin his Roman predecessor's version.32It seems to me that
if Boethius had compared Victorinus' Latin translationwith the Greek
before starting to write Isag. 1, he would have decided to produce a
translationof his own. Isag. I appearsto be his one and only experi-
ment in basing a commentaryon someone else's translation.
Therefore, one may assume that Boethius startedout with the inten-
tion of using already existing translations of Greek philosophical
works- whenever such translations were available- and providing
them with explanations taken from Greek commentaries, but that he
discovered after his firsteffort that he ought to provide new translations
of the rest of the texts, since at least the one he had used by Victorinus
turnedout to be quite inadequate.

ipse est posterius monstraturus,haec non esse quantitatessed ad aliquid: magnumenim

ad paruum dicitur. Sed cum ad ea loca uenerimus,propositi ordinem loci diligentius
exsequemur. The referenceis to 5 b 11 ff. Porphyryhas it on p. 97, 3-5, Simplicius on
p. 106, 13-14. PL 64, 228C (= comment on 7 b 15): Ergo simul ea sunt quae se inuicem
uel interimuntuel inferunt,et de his quidemipse posterius tractat. The referenceis to the
Postpraedicamenta. Porphyriushas a similar reference on p. 118, 20 f; Simplicius on
p. 190,2.
31Brandt'sedition (see note 2 above), p. IX.
32Even if Boethius notices discrepanciesbetween Victorinus and Porphyryalready in
the beginning of his dialogue (ed. Brandt,pp. 33,1; 34,12; 35,5 ff; 36,23), it is not until
later that he actually accuses Victorinusof being in error(64,8), obscure (94,11), or of not
having understoodPorphyryproperly(95,14-15).
378 MonikaAsztalos

II. The Double Commentaries

A. Boethius Had No IntentionBefore CC to

Write Twofold Commentaries

Producing a translationof his own for a commentary was not the

only innovationin Boethius' methods at this stage. As I shall show, it
was in all likelihood while composing the CC that he conceived the
idea of providing, whenever necessary, two commentarieson a given
Greek work.
To be sure, since Boethius provided Porphyry's Isagoge with two
commentaries,one might argue that he formed his plan already while
writing Isag. 1, that is to say, before he began composing CC, but in
Brandt's opinion (with which I agree) there is nothing in Isag. 1 that
indicates beyond a shadow of a doubt that Boethius wrote this short
dialogue with the intention of returningto the subject later on. In the
introduction33to his edition of Boethius' commentarieson the Isagoge
Brandt retractshis earlier opinion34that the following passage in the
beginning of Isag. 1 indicates that at that early stage Boethius had
already conceived the idea of writing a second commentary on the
same work: quam quidem artem (i.e. rationalem) quidampartem phi-
losophiae, quidam non partem, sed ferramentum et quodammodo
supellectilem iudicarunt. Qua autem id utrique inpulsi ratione credi-
derint, alio erit in opere commemorandum.35In fact, Brandt notes,
Boethius does treatthe question at length in Isag. 2.36But, still accord-
ing to Brandt,a reference in Ammonius' commentaryon the Isagoge37
similar to the one in Boethius' Isag. I indicates that Boethius merely
translatedhis reference from a Greek source and, consequently, at a
time when he had probablyno idea in which context he would returnto
the subject. As it turned out, it was to be in Isag. 2. Brandt also
adduces38the following passage at the end of Isag. I as an indication
that Boethius, when he finished this commentaryon Porphyry'swork,

33P. XII f.
34"Entstehungszeit..." (see above, note 2), pp. 150 f.
35Ed. Brandt,p. 10,2-5.
36Ed. Brandt,pp. 140,12-143,7.
37CAG IV:3, p. 23,24. As Brandtindicated,Ammonius returnsto the question in his
commentaryon the AnalyticaPriora, ed. Wallies, CAGIV:4, pp. 8,15-11,21.
38In the Prolegomenato his edition, p. XIII.
 Boethiusas a Transmitter
of GreekLogic 379

considered the case closed: Sed iam tibi, mi Fabi, omnia quaecumque
ad Introductionem Porphyrii pertinent, plenius uberiusque tractata
sunt.39

B. Announcementin CC of a FutureDiscussion of Three Questions

and Its Relevance to the Intentto Write Double Commentaries

What about the commentary on the Categories? Let me begin by

quoting a passage from it that refers to a forthcoming treatmentand
where no correspondingreference can be found in any extant Greek
commentary:

Haec quidem est temporiintroductioniset simplicis expositionis

apta sententia,quam nos Porphyriumnunc sequentes, quod uideba-
tur expeditior esse planiorque, digessimus. Est uero in mente de
tribus olim quaestionibus disputare,quarum una est quid Praedi-
camentorumuelit intentio. Ibique, numeratis diuersorumsenten-
tiis, docebimus, cui nostrumquoque accedat arbitrium;quod nemo
huic inpresentiarumsententiaepugnaremiretur,cum uideat quanto
illa sit altior, cuius non nimium ingredientiummentes capaces esse
potuissent, ad quos mediocriter imbuendos ista conscripsimus.
Afficiendi ergo et quodammododisponendi mediocri expositione
sunt in ipsis quasi disciplinae huius foribus, quos iam ad hanc
scientiam paramusadmittere. Hanc igitur causam mutataesenten-
tiae utriusque operis lector agnoscat, quod illic ad scientiam
Pythagoricamperfectamque doctrinam, hic ad simplices introdu-
cendorummotus expositionis sit accommodatasententia.40

1. Question One: the Scope

The scope of the Categories, the intentio in Boethius' Latin, was a

subject of great controversy among all ancient commentators. It was
considered variously as words that signify, as things signified by words,
as concepts, or as a combination of all of the above: words signifying
things by means of concepts. Simplicius is the one who reportsthe dis-
39Ed. Brandt,p. 131,20-22.
40 Cf. PL 64, 160A-B. My edition here is based on a collation of all extant
manuscripts.
380 MonikaAsztalos

cussion and the different views in greatest detail.41 The view that
Boethius decides to follow in the CC is that the Categories is about
words of first imposition42signifying the ten genera of things, not qua
words but insofar as they signify.43This, Boethius says in the passage
quoted above, is the view of Porphyry44that he will follow in CC not
because it representshis own view but because it is easy to understand
for the beginnersfor whom he is writing. But in a future work, he con-
tinues, he will give his own view which is a deeper one.
In his second commentaryon Aristotle's De interpretatione(De int.
2), Boethius describes the scope of the Categories as words signifying
things insofar as they signify things by means of concepts.45Further-
more, he indicates that this is how the scope of the Categories was
described"in a commentaryon it (i.e., on the Categories)": in eius (sc.
libri) commentario. The question is what commentary Boethius is
referring to. Not CC, because there the scope of the Categories was
described without any mention of concepts. One cannot exclude the
possibility thatthe definitionof the scope of the Categories given in De
int. 2 as well as the reference there to a commentaryon the Categories
were taken from a Greek commentary on the De interpretatione(as
was seen above, Boethius had no qualms about translatingreferences
that he found in Greek commentariesand using them in his own). If
Boethius had come across the definition of the scope involving con-
cepts in a Greek commentary on the Categories, he had obviously
decided not to use it in his own CC. But there remains the possibility
that he is referring in De int. 2 to an explanation of the scope of the
Categories given in a (now lost) work of his own. If the latter is true,
this indicates that Boethius actually did write a second commentaryon
the Categories. Furthermore,it confirms that the view of the scope he
41CAG VIII, pp. 9,5-13,21. Cf. Ph. Hoffmann, "Cat6gories et langage selon
Simplicius--la question du 'skopos' du trait6 Aristotdliciendes 'Categories,"' Simpli-
cius. Sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie, ed. I. Hadot, Berlin/New York, 1987, pp. 61-90.
42 According to Porphyry, Kata peusin, CAG IV:1, pp. 57,20-58,5, words of first

imposition are names given to things, whereas words of second imposition are names
such as noun, verb, etc., given to other names.
43PL 64, 159A-161A. See also below, pp. 15-16.
44See CAGIV:1, pp. 57,16-59,33.
45Anicii Manlii SeveriniBoetii Commentariiin librumAristotelis HIEPIEPMHNEIA1,
rec. C. Meiser, Leipzig, I, 1877, II, 1880. Volume I contains De int. 1, vol. II De int. 2.
Boethius discusses the scope of the Categories in De int. 2, pp. 7,9-8,28. See especially
pp. 7,25-27 and 8,1-7.
 Boethiusas a Transmitter
of GreekLogic 381

gave there as his own is the one involving concepts. According to Sim-
plicius' commentary,this was the prevailing view among the commen-
tatorsand one held by, among others, Porphyry'sdisciple Iamblichus.46

2. The OtherTwo Questions:What Were They?

Which were the other two questions that Boethius intended to dis-
cuss in the future? The formula Est uero in mente de tribus olim
quaestionibusdisputare,quarumuna est, quid Praedicamentorumuelit
intentio is vague and intriguing enough to have aroused speculations
both among medieval scholiasts47and modem scholars. Among ques-
tions suggested by the latter are, for example, the authorshipof the
Categories and its title.48This is a naturalenough guess, since Boethius
ends his comment on the authenticityin the CC with the expression Sed
de his alias and introduces his explanation of the title with the words
Restat inscriptio, quae uariafuit (therebyshowing at least that this was
a debatedquestion if not thathe intendedto returnto it).49
In his account of the authenticityof the Categories, Boethius seems
to rely partly on the same informationas Simplicius,50namely that the
46 CAGVIII, pp. 11,30-13,21.
47 Six manuscriptsof the CC have a gloss either in the margin or insertedin different
places in the passage dealing with the scope, explaining that the three questions concern
the scope, utility, and orderof the Categories. The content of the gloss can be explained
by the fact that the utility of studying the Categories and the orderthat work occupies in
the philosophical curriculumare the topics treatedafter the scope in Boethius' introduc-
tory chapterof the CC. Five of these same manuscriptsalso have a gloss explaining that
the discussion will take place in alio commentarioquem composui de eisdem categoriis
ad doctiores. Both glosses have found their way into the printededitions of the CC.
48De Rijk suggests (see note 2 above), pp. 132-138, that the two additionalquestions
concernthe title and the utility of the work. He reaches this conclusion from interpreting
olim in the phraseEst uero in mente de tribus olim quaestionibusdisputareas a reference
not to the futurebut to the past and assumes that Boethius refers to "the threefamous old
questions"(p. 134). These, according to De Rijk, are the "well-knownPorphyriantrio"
intentio, inscriptio, and utilitas. Sten Ebbesen, however, suggests that the two questions
may concern the authorshipof the Categories and Aristotle's list of the categories. I
agree with his second alternativeand will give support for it below. See S. Ebbesen,
"Boethius as an Aristotelian Scholar"in: Aristoteles, Werk und Wirkung,Paul Moraux
gewidmet. Bd II. Ed. J. Wiesner, Berlin/New York, 1987, pp. 286-311. Ebbesen
discusses the futurequestionson p. 304.
49PL 64, 162A.
50CAGVIII, p. 18,7-21.
382 MonikaAsztalos

style of the work betrays its author, that without the Categories
Aristotle's philosophical production would be incomplete, and that
there is another book on the same subject that has been ascribed to
Aristotle. Neither Boethius nor Simplicius, however, reportsany con-
troversy on the authenticityof the work and there is nothing in their
respective accounts thatjustifies labelling them quaestiones. (Porphyry
does not treat this subject at all.) The "his" in Boethius' Sed de his
alias does not refer to the whole preceding passage on the authorship
but to a piece of informationgiven at its end (absent from Simplicius'
commentary)that some philosophers,among them lamblichus, doubted
that Aristotle was the inventor of the ten categories, since the
Pythagorean Archytas had already made the division before him.
Boethius reportsThemistiusas defending Aristotle's claim to original-
ity by explaining that this alleged fore-runnerof Aristotle was in reality
some peripatetic philosopher who wrote under the prestigious pseu-
donym of Archytas in order to secure the success of his book. By the
alias in the expression Sed de his alias Boethius may refer, not to a
forthcomingtreatmentin a second commentaryon the Categories, but
to one alreadygiven in his Arithmeticaon the origin of the division into
ten categories.51
As for the title of the work, Boethius goes through the different
names suggested and the groundson which they had been proposed in
a ratherthoroughaccount that has counterpartsin Porphyry52and Sim-
plicius.53Boethius makes it clear which views are to be repudiatedand
why. He does not indicate at all thathe will returnto the subject,and it
is difficultto see what he could have addedto the discussion if he had.
I find it hard to believe that the two additional questions that
Boethius shelved for a future discussion are those concerning the
authorshipand the title. To begin with, it seems more reasonable to
assume that the two questions should not be discussed in the CC at all
(notice how any discussion of the scope was postponed by Boethius)
but should be the object of considerable debate in the extant Greek
commentariesand furthermore,since it is not Boethius' habit to mys-
tify his readerson purpose, that he should identify the two questions in

51See Henry Chadwick,Boethius. The Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology, and

Philosophy. Oxford, 1981, pp. 77-78.
52CAGIV:2, pp. 56,14-57,15.
53CAGVIII, pp. 15,26-18,6.
 Boethiusas a Transmitter
of GreekLogic 383

his commentary by announcing unambiguously that he will discuss

them in a forthcomingwork.
There are indeed two such announcementsin the CC. In the first
instance, Boethius remarkson the fact that there are neither more nor
less than ten categories: Sunt uero quidam, qui contendunt recte
enumerationem non esse dispositam. Alii namque ut superuacua
quaedamdemunt,alii ut curto operi addunt,alii uero permutant. Quos
nimirumnon recte sentire alio nobis opere dicendum est.54 Porphyry
cites Athenodorus and Cornutus as critics of Aristotle's division.55
Simplicius has a very long discussion of the problem,56citing Her-
minus, Athenodorus,Lucius, Nicostratus, Xenocrates, and Andronicus
on the side of those who considered the highest genera to be less than
ten, and giving lamblichus' and Porphyry'sanswer to their objections.
(In this case, Porphyry'sdefense must have been given in the now lost
Pros Gedaleion, since it is absent from his Kata peusin.) Simplicius
then names the proponents of a greater number than ten, once again
Nicostratusand Lucius,57and gives the solution of the "moreillustrious
among the commentators,"58probably still Porphyry and lamblichus.
The only representativesof the opinion that the established account of
the categories ought to be reorganizedare, in Simplicius' account, the
Stoics. No particulardefender of Aristotle is mentioned in this case.
The latterpartof Simplicius' report,however, has a lamblicheantouch,
since it points out, among other things, that any criticism of the account
of the ten categories is not primarily directed against Aristotle but
against the Pythagoreansand Archytas who made the division before
Aristotle;and in the conclusion of his account of the debate Simplicius
points to the "divine lamblichus" as the one who demonstratedthe
sufficiency of the ten categories.
The second reference to a future treatmentof a question occurs at
the end of the chapteron the category of relation,as a comment on 8 b
21-24 which runs as follows in Boethius' translation:Fortasse autem
difficile sit de huiusmodi rebus confidenterdeclarare nisi saepius per-
tractata sint; dubitareautem de singulis non erit inutile. (The problem
54PL 64, 180C. Cf. note 48 above.
55CAGIV:2, p. 86,20-32.
56CAGVIII, pp. 62,17-68,31.
57Simplicius observes that some protagonistscriticized Aristotle's account from dif-
ferent standpoints(62,33-63,1); Nicostratusand Lucius were apparentlyamong them.
58 P. 66,13.
384 MonikaAsztalos

that Aristotle has been discussing is whethera substancecan be a rela-

tive.) Boethius comments on the passage: Quod scilicet numquam
diceret, nisi nos ad maiorem acuminis exercitationem considera-
tionemquerevocaret. Quod quoniameius est adhortatio,nos quoque in
aliis de his rebus dubitationes solutionesque ponere minime graua-
bimur.59ApparentlyBoethius is interpretingAristotle's conclusion to
the chapter on relation as an encouragementto return to the subject
again for a "greaterexercise of subtle speculation,"and even, perhaps,
as a justification for writing a second commentaryon the Categories.
The expression maiorem acuminis exercitationemconsiderationemque
is echoed in the beginning of De int. I where Boethius announces that
the second commentaryon the De interpretationewill explain what a
speculationof a deeper subtletydemands.6
There can be little doubt that the problems (dubitationes)and solu-
tions (solutiones) that Boethius saved for a future work are among
those included by Simplicius in his commentaryon 8 b 21-24 where
they are introducedthus: 'AXX&catp6o &v ent'1 otnbv ge.r&Icnvtin;
EwE
og •tepLivetv uatv r' ;in~txOeoaa; &dropia;(=Boethius' dubita-
tiones) i&'6VKai XS
T•zi
; Et; (= Boethius' solutiones)ac•'rCv ari•tovCda-
o0at.61 The philosophers cited in the discussions that follow are
Boethus, Ariston, Andronicus,Achaicus, Syrianus,Alexander,and "the
divine Iamblichus."62

C. When the Decision Was Made to Write a

Second Commentaryon the Categories

Here the careful readerwill object: If Boethius, when he announced

in his treatmentof the scope in the very beginning of CC that he would
discuss two other questions in a forthcoming work, had in mind (as I
believe he did) discussions pertainingto mattersdealt with furtheron in
the Categories, how can I claim (as I have done) that Boethius started
commentingon this work with a superficialknowledge of it at most and
even less of the Greekcomments thereon?

59PL 64, 238D.

60De int. 1, ed. Meiser, p. 32,2-3: quod vero altius acumen considerationis exposcit,
secundae series editionis expediet.
61CAG VIII, p. 201,17-18.
62Pp. 201,18-205,35.
 Boethiusas a Transmitter
of GreekLogic 385

My answer is that I believe that Boethius added the passage in

which the reference to a forthcoming treatment of the scope of the
Categories occurs, in the margin of his own copy of CC (beside the
introductorypartdealing with the scope of the work) after having com-
pleted the commentary(or at least after having completed the partcon-
taining the comments on chapter 7 on relatives). Furthermore,I
believe that the unknown person who produced the archetype (now
lost) of the CC inserted Boethius' marginal annotation in the wrong
place. I will demonstratethis by printingbelow the whole passage in
the CC where the scope of the Categories is treated. The part of the
text that I consider to be Boethius' marginaladdition is printedin ital-
ics and has been kept in the place it occupies in all manuscripts.

Quareprius breuiterhuius operis aperiundauideturintentio, quae

est huiusmodi. Rebus praeiacentibuset in propria principaliter
naturaeconstitutionemanentibushumanumsolum genus exstitit,
quod rebus posset nomina imponere. Vnde factum est, ut singil-
5 latim omnia persecutus hominis animus singulis uocabula rebus
aptaret. Et hoc quidem uerbi gratia corpus hominem uocauit,
illud uero lapidem, aliud lignum, aliud uero colorem; et rursus,
quicumque ex se alium genuisset, patris uocabulo nuncupauit;
mensuram quoque magnitudinis proprii forma nominis ter-
10 minauit, ut diceret bipedale esse aut tripedale;et in aliis eodem
modo. Omnibus ergo nominibus ordinatis, ad ipsorum rursus
uocabulorum proprietates figurasque reuersus est et huiusmodi
uocabuli formam, quae inflecti casibus possit, nomen uocauit,
quae uero temporibus distribui, uerbum. Prima igitur illa fuit
15 nominum positio, per quam uel intellectui subiectas res uel sen-
sibus designarent; secunda consideratio, qua singulas nominum
proprietates figurasque perspicerent, ita ut primum nomen sit
ipsum rei uocabulum, ut, uerbi gratia, cum quaelibet res homo
dicitur; quod autem ipsum uocabulum, id est 'homo', nomen
20 uocatur, non ad significationem nominis ipsius refertur sed ad
figuram,idcirco quod potest casibus inflecti. Ergo prima positio
nominis secundum significationem uocabuli facta est, secunda
uero secundum figuram. Et est prima positio, ut nomina rebus
imponerentur, secunda uero, ut aliis nominibus ipsa nomina
25 designarentur. Nam cum 'homo' uocabulum sit subiectae sub-
stantiae,id, quod dicitur 'homo', nomen est nominis, id est ipsius
386 MonikaAsztalos

nominis appellatio est. Dicimus enim: "Quale uocabulum est

'homo'?", et proprierespondetur:"Nomen". In hoc igitur opere
haec intentio est: de primis rerum nominibus et de uocibus res
30 significantibus disputare, non in eo, quod secundum aliquam
proprietatemfiguramqueformantur,sed in eo, quod significantes
sunt. Namque cum de substantiauel facere uel pati dicitur, non
ita tractatur,quasi unum eorum casibus inflecti possit, aliud uero
temporibus permutari, sed quasi aut hominem aut equum aut
35 indiuiduum aliquod aut speciem genusue significet. Est igitur
huius operis intentio de uocibus res significantibusin eo, quod
significantessunt, pertractare.
Haec quidem est tempori introductionis et simplicis exposi-
tionis apta sententia,quam nos Porphyriumnunc sequentes, quod
40 uidebatur expeditior esse planiorque, digessimus. Est uero in
mente de tribus olim quaestionibus disputare, quarum una est,
quid Praedicamentorumuelit intentio. Ibique, numeratis diuer-
sorum sententiis, docebimus, cui nostrum quoque accedat arbi-
trium; quod nemo inpresentiarum sententiae repugnare
huic,
45 miretur, cum uideat, quanto illa sit altior, cuius non nimium
ingredientium mentes capaces esse potuissent, ad quos
mediocriter imbuendos ista conscripsimus. Afficiendi ergo et
quodammododisponendimediocri expositione sunt in ipsis quasi
disciplinae huius foribus, quos iam ad hanc scientiam paramus
50 admittere. Hanc igitur causam mutatae sententiae utriusque
operis lector agnoscat, quod illic ad scientiam Pythagoricam
perfectamque doctrinam, hic ad simplices introducendorum
motus expositionis sit accommodatasententia. Sed nunc ad pro-
positum reuertamur, sitque in praesenti Praedicamentorum
55 intentio, quae est superius comprehensa,id est de primis uocibus
prima rerumgenera significantibusin eo, quod significantessunt,
disputare.
Et quoniam res infinitae sunt, infinitas quoque uoces, quae
significent, esse necesse est. Sed infinitorum nulla cognitio
60 est. Infinitanamque animo comprehendinequeunt. Quod autem
ratione mentis circumdarinon potest, nullius scientiae fine con-
cluditur. Quare infinitorum scientia nulla est. Sed hic Aristo-
teles non de infinitis rerum significationibus tractat sed decem
praedicamentaconstituens, ad quae ipsa infinita multitudosigni-
 Boethiusas a Transmitter
of GreekLogic 387

65 ficantiumuocum referridebeat, terminauit. Vt, uerbi gratia, cum

dico homo, lignum, lapis, equus, animal, plumbum, stagnum,
argentum,aurum, haec et alia huiusmodi, quae nimirum infinita
sunt, omnia ad unum substantiae uocabulum reducuntur;haec
namque, et si qua sunt alia, quae certe sunt infinita uocabula,
70 unum substantiae nomen includit. Rursus, cum dico bipedale,
tripedale, sex, quattuor, decem, linea, superficies, soliditas
et quaecumquealia ex eodem genere infinita sunt, uno quantitatis
nomine continentur,ut haec omnia, quae sub quantitateponuntur.
Rursus,cum dico album uel scientia uel bonum uel malum et alia
75 huiusmodi, quamquamin hoc quoque genere infinita sunt, unum
tamen nomen concludens omnia qualitatis occurrit; et de aliis
quoque similiter. Rerum ergo diuersarum indeterminatam
infinitamquemultitudinemdecem praedicamentorumpaucissima
numerositateconclusit, ut quae infinita sub scientiam cadere non
80 poterant, decem propriis generibus definita, scientia et com-
prehensione claudantur. Ergo decem praedicamenta,quae dici-
mus, infinitarum in uocibus significationum genera sunt. Sed
quoniam omnis uocum significatio de rebus est, uocum signi-
ficantium, in eo, quod significantes sunt, genera rerum genera
85 necessario significabunt. Vt igitur concludenda sit intentio,
dicendum est in hoc libro de primis uocibus prima rerumgenera
significantibus in eo, quod significantes sunt, dispositum esse
tractatum.63

The most obvious indication that the italicized passage is dislocated

occurs in its last sentence where Boethius summarizesthe scope given
"above"(superius) as "to discuss the primarywords (i.e., words of first
imposition) that signify the primary genera of things, insofar as they
signify." But that is not how the scope was defined "above", where it
was given thus: "to discuss the primarynames given to things, that is to
say, the words signifying things, not insofar as they are formed accord-
ing to some property and figure but insofar as they signify" (lines
29-32); and, a little further:"Thus, the scope of this work is to treat
words signifying things, insofar as they signify" (35-37). These two
definitions say nothing about the genera of things mentioned in the ital-
icized passage. But if the latter passage is moved to where I believe
63 PL 64, 159A-161A.
My edition is based on a collation of all manuscripts.
388 MonikaAsztalos

that Boethius had intended it to be inserted, namely after line 88, the
definitionof the scope in Boethius' additionwill be identical to the one
given in lines 87-88 which is obviously the one that Boethius refers to
as given "above". The definitiongiven in lines 87-88 is also closer to
Porphyry'sthatBoethius declares in his additionthathe has explained.
By moving the italicized passage thus, Boethius' account of the
scope gains a great deal in clarity of presentation. In lines 1-37 he
explains that the categories are words of first imposition, that is to say,
words signifying things, not words signifying other words (such as
noun and verb). In lines 58-88 he argues that the numberof words sig-
nifying things is as infinite as are the things themselves, and since an
infinite number of things cannot be the object of knowledge, the
categories are not the infinite multitude of words but the ten highest
genera of words signifying the ten highest genera of things. Boethius
would have been unpedagogicalhad he insertedthe definition (in lines
55-57 in the italicized passage) before lines 58-88, that is to say,
before he had explained why the categories signify not just things but
genera of things. Maybe the fact that the passages before and after the
addition end in a fairly similar way with definitions of the scope has
somethingto do with the fact that the additiongot insertedin the wrong
place. Furthermore,given the contentof the addition,it is clearly at the
end of the accountof the scope thatone expects to find it.
Thus, I believe that Boethius conceived the idea of postponing the
treatmentof certain Greek material to a second commentarywhile in
the course of composing the CC, maybe at the point when he ran into
Greek discussions concerning the correct number of the Categories
(see above, p. 383). Having completed CC (or most of it), he inserted
in its beginning an announcement of his intention to return to the
Categories once more in orderto discuss certainquestionsmore fully.

D. Division into Two Commentaries

According to Level of Depth

First of all, Boethius picked up the notion of preparinghis readers

(cf. the afficiendi ergo et quodammododisponendi in the addition on
the scope of the Categories, p. 386 above) during his encounter with
Aristotle's 8tO0'CEotgat 6 a 32 in the Categories. Boethius translatesthe
 Boethiusas a Transmitter
of GreekLogic 389

term with two Latin words, affectio and dispositio,64and comments on

6 a 32: Dispositio autem uel affectio est ad aliquam rem accommoda-
tio et applicatio, ut si quis grammaticamlegens, qui nondumperdidicit,
habet ad eam aliquam dispositionem,id est ea affectus est et habet ali-
quid accommodatumet quasi propinquum.65Thus, as Boethius under-
stood it, the process of learning requiresstudentsto approacha subject
twice, first by acquiringa superficialknowledge of a textbook, then by
considering the deeper aspects of its contents. Accordingly, the pur-
pose of CC was to provide readers with superficial knowledge. The
deeper aspects were reserved for a second, more advanced commen-
tary.
Secondly, the following passages from the CC may throw some light
on how the Greek comments on the Categories led Boethius to believe
that this treatise was intended to prepare students for more advanced
philosophical works. The first passage is a comment on Aristotle's
remarkin 10 a 25-26 that there might appearsome other mode of qual-
ity (than the four he has just treated),but that those just mentioned are
the ones most spoken of. Boethius explains: Non sunt tamenputandae
solum esse qualitates quas supra posuit. Ipse enim testatur esse
quoque alias qualitates, quas modo omnes enumerareneglexit; sed cur
neglexerit, multae sunt causae. Prima, quod elementi uicem hic obtinet
liber nec perfectam scientiam tradit sed tantummodoaditus atque pons
quidam in altiora philosophiae introitumpandit. Quocirca, si hoc ita
est, tantum dicere oportuit, quantum ingredientibus satis esset, ne
eorum animos nondumad sicentiamfirmos multiplicidoctrinae subtili-
tate confunderet. Quae uero hic desunt, in libris qui MEt&Tx cpuotcuc
inscribuntur apposuit. Perfectis namque opus illud, non ingredien-
tibus,praeparatur.66Here Boethius ascribes to Aristotle the conception
of the Categories as an elementary introduction to the "perfect
knowledge" (perfectam scientiam) and higher philosophy (altiora phi-
losphiae) of the Metaphysicswhich was intendedfor the "perfect,"not
for beginners. In this, he is following Porphyry,67as is Simplicius.68
Moreover, in a comment on 11 b 1-16, which is almost directly

64In CC, PL 64, 241B, Boethius comments on this terminology:Dispositionem uero

indiscrete idem quod affectionemuoco.
65PL 64, 216B-C.
66PL 64, 252B-C.
67 CAG IV:2, p. 134,25-29.
68CAG VIII, p. 264,1-4.
390 MonikaAsztalos

translatedfrom Porphyry,69Boethius explains that Aristotle has treated

the categories of facere and pati plene ... perfecteque in other works
such as De generatione et corruptione,those of ubi and quando in the
Physics, and all categories in a deeper and more subtle way (altius sub-
tiliusque) in his Metaphysics.70What Boethius does not translatebut
had in all likelihood read in the Kata peusin is Porphyry'sexplanation
that there are doctrines about the last six categories (facere, pati, ubi,
quando, habitus, situs), that are not included in the Categories, but that
enough has been said about these categories in that work considering
thatit was writtenfor beginners.71
Lastly, in the beginning of his comment on motion, Boethius
informs his readers that Aristotle took the division of motion into
species furtherin his Physics than in the present work. The reason for
this is, in Boethius' opinion: Igitur, quoniam hic liber ad introduc-
tionem quodam modo factus est, noluit nimis diuisionis attenuare
rationem, ne ingredientiumanimos subtiliori diuisione confunderet.72
Porphyry's extant commentary on the Categories ends before this
point, but Simplicius has a similarremark.73
Thus, if we consider the last mentioned three passages from the CC,
we may infer that Boethius, upon bringinghis commentaryto a conclu-
sion, was left with an impression- gained from the Greek comments
more than from Aristotle himself- that the Categories had been writ-
ten as an introduction to the more "perfect" philosophical works,
notably the works on natural philosophy and metaphysics, and that,
consequently, many of the things treatedin the Categories received a
fuller investigation in those more advanced treatises. It seems to me
that one cannot exclude the possibility that Boethius came to realize,
during his penetrationof the Greek comments on the Categories, that
since there was a certain amountof overlappingbetween the doctrines
of this work and those, for example, of the Metaphysics, it would be
well to prepare his readers for the metaphysical aspects of the
categories, but that from a pedagogical standpointit would be advise-

69CAG IV:2, p. 141,11-17.

70PL 64, 261D-262A.
71 Porphyry's comments on 11 b 1-16 are present in Simplicius' commentary,CAG
VIII, p. 295,4-16.
72PL 64, 289C.
73CAG VIII, p. 427,19-28.
 Boethiusas a Transmitter
of GreekLogic 391

able to save the questions with metaphysicalimplications for a second,

more advancedcommentaryon the Categories.
I will now illustratehow I believe that Boethius conceived and car-
ried out this division into two series of commentaries on the logical
works: one that was to deal exclusively with the "word-and-
proposition-aspects"of the Aristotelian texts and another that was to
take into account the metaphysicalimplicationsof these logical items.
The first time that Boethius made a reference in CC to a forthcoming
treatmentwas while discussing the number of the categories (since I
consider the reference to a forthcomingdiscussion of the scope to have
been added afterwardsin the present CC). Now, in the Greek com-
mentaries there is a topic of metaphysical importance in connection
with this discussion that Boethius avoids bringing up. The topic is the
view presentedby Aristotle in Metaphysics 998 b 22 that being is not a
genus common to the categories. This doctrine is broughtinto the dis-
cussion of the number of categories by Simplicius in his commentary
on the Categories.74But Boethius avoids every mention in the CC of
the doctrine that being is not a genus common to the categories and,
consequently, that it is not synonymously but homonymously predi-
cated of the ten categories. This in and of itself is ratherremarkable,
since he had explained it already in Isag. 1 75 in a comment on
Porphyry's remark76to the effect that if someone were to call all
categories beings ('vza), he would speak homonymously, since being
is not their genus, whereas if being were a genus common to all
categories, it would be said of them synonymously. In Isag. 2 Boethius
naturallycomes back to the theory77and explains at greaterlength why
being cannot be a genus common to all categories.78His silence on the
matter in CC is significant, since there he usually recycles topics
treated in Isag. I that are relevant to the Categories. Likewise, in his
elementary commentaryon the De interpretatione(De int. 1) he avoids
any reference to the way in which being can be said of the categories,
but in De int. 2, in a comment on 16 b 23, he does refer to the view that
being is said homonymouslyof the categories.79Thus, in the introduc-
74CAG VIII, pp. 61,19-62,17.
75Ed. Brandt,pp. 74,13-75,6.
76 CAG IV, p. 6,8-10.
77Ed. Brandt,p. 144,1-6.
78 Ed. Brandt,pp. 220,11-225,9.
79De int. 2, ed. Meiser, pp. 3-7.
392 MonikaAsztalos

tory CC and De int. 1 Boethius avoids bringingup how ens, the subject
matter of the Metaphysics, can be predicated of the categories,
although we know that he was aware of the problem, since he had
treatedit alreadyin Isag. 1, a work writtenbefore CC andDe int. 1.
Let us go back to Boethius' reference in CC to a forthcomingtreat-
ment of threequestions (see p. 379 above). There, he says, he will con-
sider the different views on the scope and make known which of them
he himself holds. He asks his readersnot to be surprisedthat his own
stand is different from the view he presents here (in the CC); they will
realize how much deeper the former is and thus that it is too difficult
for the beginners for whom he has written the present commentary.
Now, he says, he has followed the solution proposed by Porphyry
because it seemed easier, less complicated, and therefore suitable for
an introductoryand simple kind of exposition.
Thus, it is clear that Boethius was moved by pedagogical considera-
tions: at an introductorystage an easy explanationis to be preferredto
one that is philosophicallybetter, but more complicated. A parallel to
Boethius' choice in this case can be found in a passage of De int. 1:
"There are several explanations of this sentence by Alexander, Por-
phyry, Aspasius, and Herminus. We shall indicateelsewhere what Por-
phyry, the best of these commentators,said. But since Alexander's
explanationseems simpler, we have given it now for the sake of brev-
ity."80 In the corresponding part of De int. 2 Boethius relates
Porphyry'sexposition at length; in addition, he presents and criticizes
Herminus' view and gives a brief r6sum6 of Alexander's explanation.
The latter, he claims, is simpler but it should not be set aside even if
Porphyry'sview is truer.81
It is noteworthy that in both cases in which Boethius chooses to
present a simple view in an introductorywork and reserve a more pro-
found or complex one for advanced readers, the simple view is not
inconsistentwith the "truer"one. It is a simplified,less complete view,
to be sure, but perfectly compatiblewith the "deeper"one. Boethius is

80De int. 1, ed. Meiser, p. 132,3-8: huius sententiaemultiplexexpositio ab Alexandro

et Porphyrio,Aspasio quoqueet Herminoproditur. in quibus quid excellentissimusexpo-
sitorumPorphyriusdixerit, alias dicemus. quoniamvero simplicior explanatioAlexandri
esse videtur,eam nunc pro brevitatesubiecimus. The word alias refers to De int. 2, ed.
Meiser, pp. 274-294.
81 For his summariesand criticisms of Alexander,Herminus,and Aspasius, Boethius
may of course have relied on Porphyry's(now lost) comments on the De interpretatione.
 Boethiusas a Transmitter
of GreekLogic 393

therefore not double-tonguedbut gives his readers as much wisdom as

he judges them able to digest at a certain stage in their education.
Lastly, a few words should be said about the level of difficulty of
Boethius' two commentaries on the Isagoge. S. Brandt observed that
the doctrines of Isag. 2 hardly represent a more difficult level than
those in Isag. 1.82 Does this fact gainsay the observation made above
relative to the pedagogical concerns behind Boethius' twofold com-
mentaries? Not at all. For, as was mentioned above, Boethius had not
written Isag. I with any intention to return to the subject in a more
advanced commentary. When he did returnto Porphyry's Isagoge, it
was not only with the purpose of providing a deeper, more complex,
and philosophically truerexposition of Porphyry'sfive predicables,but
also of providing a complete Latin version of the text, translatingit
word for word (uerbumuerbo expressumcomparatumque)and with no
concern for literaryqualities, only for the truth.83Since he had written
Isag. I at such an early stage in his career, he took the opportunityin
Isag. 2 to revise his comments and add a substantialamount of doc-
trines that he became familiar with while appropriatingGreek com-
ments for his own work on the Categories.

E. Two Editions

At this point, a rathercurious remarkin Isag. 2 deserves mention; it

follows a quick review of some doctrines previously explained in the
CC: Sed si cui haec pressiora quam expositionis moduspostulat uide-
buntur, eum hoc scire conuenit nos, ut in prima editione dictum est,
hanc expositionemnostro reseruasse iudicio, ut ad intelligentiamsim-
plicem huius libri editio prima sufficiat, ad interiorem uero specula-
tionem confirmatispaene iam scientia nec in singulis uocabulis rerum
haerentibus haec posterior collocatur.84Brandt has pointed out85that
there is no such remarkin the dialogue on the Isagoge, and he suggests
that either Boethius' memory failed him or he wanted to give the
impression by this passage in Isag. 2 that he had formed the plan of
writing a second commentaryalready while composing Isag. 1.
82Prolegomena(see note 2), XXI.
p.
83Isag. 2, ed. Brandt, 135,1-13.
p.
84Isag. 2, ed. Brandt, 154,2-8.
p.
85 In the prolegomenato his edition, p. XIII.
394 MonikaAsztalos

It is not at all unlikely that Boethius firstpublisheda series of works

on logic comprising, at least, Isag. 1, CC, and De int. 1, and, at a later
time, a second edition with commentarieson the Isagoge, Categories,
and De interpretatione(provided, of course, that he ever did write a
second commentaryon the Categories). If this is the case, Boethius
may refer in the passage quoted above to what he had said in any of the
commentariesincluded in his first edition, not necessarily in the Isag.
1; nostro ... reseruasse iudicio may then be compared to Boethius'
statementin the CC that he will give his own view (on the scope of the
Categories) in a forthcomingwork: Ibique ... docebimus, cui nostrum
quoque accedat arbitrium. The passage in Isag. 2 may also refer to the
following announcementin the beginning of the De int. 1: Quocirca
nos libri huius enodationem duplici commentatione supplevimus et
quantum simplices quidem intellectus sententiarum oratio brevis
obscuraque complectitur, tantum hac huius operis tractatione diges-
simus: quod vero altius acumen considerationis exposcit, secundae
series editionis expediet.86That Boethius used the word editio for a
series of differentworks also seems evident from the following passage
in the De syllogismo hypothetico: ... in his voluminibus, quae in
secundae editionis expositione IEpi 'EpgirvE`(x;inscripsimus.87

III. The Greek Sources

I have already spoken extensively about Boethius' sources. Now,

however, I should like to treat the question of, not so much what they
were, but in what form they became known to him.

A. Porphyryand Post-lamblicheanComments

Most of CC has its origin in Porphyry'sKatapeusin (hereafterK.p.),

and, conversely, most of K.p. has been used in CC. In his 1923 article
"Bobce et Porphyre,"J. Bidez reachedthe conclusion that the K.p. was
86Ed. Meiser, pp. 31,6-32,33. If Boethius had these passages in the CC and De int.
1
in mind, the words huius libri in the quote from Isag. 2 must be takenwith intelligentiam
simplicem, not with editio prima. L. M. De Rijk suggested that the passage in Isag. 2
might be a referenceto the one quoted from De int. 1, but decided, on second thought, to
consider it instead a gloss addedby an early editor of Boethius' work. See De Rijk (note
2), pp. 129-132.
87PL 64, 841C.
 Boethiusas a Transmitter
of GreekLogic 395

the unique source, or almost unique source, of CC. Bidez pointed out
that Boethius did not give a literal translationof the K.p. but abandoned
the dialogue form, inserted lemmata from the Categories, changed the
content occasionally to suit the Latin language and Roman culture, and
paraphrased,amplified, summarized,or simplified his source as he saw
fit.88
Since Bidez' article, scholars have become aware of the fact that by
no means all of the Greek material in CC can be traced back to K.p.,
but that some of it has correspondences in, for example, Simplicius'
commentary. By his own admission Simplicius adheredto lamblichus
more closely and attentively than to other commentatorswhose works
were available to him and often even copied lamblichus' comments
verbatim.89According to Simplicius, in many cases "the divine lam-
blichus" followed Porphyry'sPros Gedaleion closely in his own com-
mentary, even with respect to the actual wording, while determining
and distinguishingsome things more carefully than his predecessor.90
At the present stage of my work on a critical edition of CC, my
hypothesis is that in this commentary,which was intendedto be a sim-
ple, elementary exposition of the Categories, Boethius relied for the
most part on the introductoryK.p., but that he also consulted at least
one other Greek commentarywrittenby someone who, like Simplicius,
followed lamblichus closely. For his second commentary on the
Categories, if it was ever written, Boethius probably relied more on
this follower of lamblichus.
First of all, the way in which Simplicius characterizes Porphyry's
two commentaries comes very close to Boethius' description of his
own CC and his future work on the Categories. Simplicius places K.p.
among the commentarieswrittenwith the purposeof uncoveringbriefly
"&RomaiayEnrtv) only the notions put forward by Aristotle
(ouvt6w;og
himself.91This can be compared with Boethius' promise in the begin-
ning of his CC to avoid deeper questions and to begin by uncovering
briefly (breuiteraperiunda) the scope of the Categories.92On the other
hand, Simplicius says that in Pros Gedaleion Porphyrygave a perfect
exegesis of the Categories and presented solutions to all objections
88 Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire, 2, pp. 189-201.
89CAG VIII, 3,2-4.
p.
90CAG VIII, 2,5-15.
p.
91 CAG VIII, 1,10-13.
p.
92PL 64, 159A.
396 MonikaAsztalos

raised by his predecessors.93This reminds us of Boethius' promise that

his forthcomingtreatmentof the Categories will be adaptedto perfec-
tam doctrinam; there he will give an account of the different views
held by others as well as of his own. Boethius probably found these
formats (brevity vs. full discussions) suitable for his own two editions;
there is no evidence that he had any first-handknowledge of Pros
Gedaleion (see below).
As for my claim that Boethius for his CC occasionally used at least
one commentarythat follows lamblichus: John Dillon has pointed out
that lamblichus was not an immaturedisciple of Porphyryand that in
the majority of the cases in which Porphyry is mentioned in
lamblichus' commentary on the Timaios, it is in a critical fashion.94
Given this, one might venture the hypothesis that lamblichus in his
commentary on the Categories, while as a rule following Porphyry's
Pros Gedaleion very closely and often verbatim,mentioned his prede-
cessor by name mostly when disagreeingwith him.
Whenever Boethius in his CC explicitly ascribes a certain philo-
sophical view to Porphyry,he alludes to or presents a competing opin-
ion withoutmentioningby name the holder of the latter. From Simpli-
cius' commentary we can gather that the competing view is that of,
among others, lamblichus. I will discuss here the passages of the CC in
question.
We have already seen how Boethius declares that he gives
Porphyry'sview of the scope of the Categories not because he adheres
to it himself but because it is simple and thus suitable for his introduc-
tory kind of commentary. We have also inferredthat his own view in
this matteris thatproposedby, for example, lamblichus.
Secondly, in a comment on 8 a 6-12, where Aristotle arguesthat the
perceptible is prior to perception, Boethius quotes a passage from the
Pros Gedaleion95where Porphyryclaims in opposition to Aristotle that
all relatives are simultaneousin nature,even perceptionand knowledge
on the one hand and the perceptible and the knowable on the other.96

93CAGVIII, p. 2,5-8.
94J. Dillon, "Iamblichuson Chalcis (c. 240-325 A.D.)," Aufstieg und Niedergang der
romischenWelt. Teil 2. Prinzipat. Bd. 36:2, Berlin/New York, pp. 862-909 (p. 868).
95That this is the source can be inferredfrom the fact that the quote does not translate
any passage in the K.p.; its contents, however, correspond to K.p., CAG IV:2,
p. 120,27-35. Cf. S. Ebbesen (note 48 above), p. 303.
96PL 64, 233B-D.
 Boethius as a Transmitterof GreekLogic 397

Since we know from Simplicius97that lamblichus did not agree with

Porphyry on this point but with Aristotle, one may assume that
Boethius, who also sides with Aristotle, quotes Porphyry's Pros
Gedaleion via lamblichus (or via some post-lamblichean commenta-
tor).
Thirdly, Boethius gives Porphyry's reasons98for considering the
Postpraedicamenta (the last part of the Categories judged spurious by,
e.g., Andronicus of Rhodes) a well-founded addition. He then gives
another defense of the Postpraedicamenta99;again, we know from
Simplicius that this second argumentwas proposed by lamblichus who
considered Porphyry'sreasons to contain only partof the truth.
On two occasions, Boethius mentions lamblichus by name and in
both cases he is critical of him. The first time'" the criticism had been
delivered by Themistius. The second time101Boethius introduces two
solutions proposed by lamblichus to an objection raised by some
against Aristotle's assertion (6 b 28) that all relatives are spoken of in
relation to correlativesthat reciprocate(Ackrill's translation). The first
solution, Boethius says, is worthless, the second, however, very strong.
A similardiscussion, all proponentsunnamed,is given by Simplicius102
who presents an evaluation of the proposed solutions that comes close
to the one in CC.
It is thus likely that Boethius used- apart from the K.p.- a com-
mentaryon the Categories writtenby someone who (like Simplicius) as
a rule followed lamblichus and mentioned him mostly when disagree-
ing, just as one may assume that lamblichus mentioned Porphyry
mostly when criticizing him. If so, Boethius inheritedthe references to
views in the Pros Gedaleion not from lamblichus but from the latter's
follower (and occasional critic). On the other hand, and especially
given the closeness in content between Boethius' CC and Simplicius'
commentary,it is not at all unlikely that Boethius would have found in
his post-lamblichean source, and heeded, a piece of advice similar to
the one given in the introductionto Simplicius' commentary, to wit,

97CAG VIII, pp. 379,22-380,2.

98PL 64, 263B-C.
99PL 64, 263D (Docent autem hoc, inquit, etiam ipse ordo congruus ... )-264B. It is
not clear who is the subjectof inquit.
100PL 64, 162A.
101PL 64, 224C-225B.
102CAG VIII, pp. 181,19-182,21.
398 MonikaAsztalos

never to neglect the works by Porphyryand lamblichusthemselves.103

B. Shiel's Thesis

It is with respect to everythingthat I have arguedso far in this paper

that I would like to consider in some detail the thesis concerning the
nature of Boethius' Greek sources that was proposed in an article by
James Shiel published in 1958, reprintedwith a postscriptin 1984, and
revised in 1990. Since the last, revised version must be considered the
latest view of the author, I will deal with the argumentsas presented
there.104
Shiel's thesis concerning the CC can be summarized as follows:
Boethius had a Greek copy of the Categories that contained marginal
explanations, some quite substantial. Most of these were taken from
the K.p., but only sporadically verbatim;the rest were additions from
later sources, including lamblichus. They all seem to derive from the
school of Proclus.
I will begin by expressing some general doubtsconcerningthe thesis
that Boethius' source was a Greek copy of the Categories provided
with marginal scholia. In CC Aristotle's text is usually introducedby
means of phrases like Ait enim, Atque hoc est quod ait, Nunc exposi-
tionis cursumad sequentia conuertamus. It seems to me, primafacie,
that Shiel's thesis would gain credibility if Boethius regularly intro-
duced his comments,instead of the lemmata,by means of phrases like
the ones mentioned above. I do not consider the few instances where
Boethius introducesby such phrases a named commentator'sview as
an argumentagainst me: in those cases,105Boethius is adducing views
not from the K.p. but from a post-lamblicheansource.
Here is a list of the argumentsthat Shiel gives in his revised article
in support of his thesis relative to the CC. All of them are used to

103CAG VIII,
p. 3,13-15.
104J. Shiel, "Boethius' commentarieson Aristotle,"in: Mediaeval and Renaissance Stu-
dies 4 (1958), pp. 217-244; Boethius. Ed. by M. Fuhrmannand J. Gruber. Darmstadt,
1984, pp. 155-183; Aristotle transformed,the ancient commentatorsand their influence.
Ed. by R. Sorabji. London, 1990, pp. 349-372. The most detailed and convincing criti-
cism of Shiel's thesis has been delivered by S. Ebbesen in the article cited in note 48.
Ebbesen discusses Shiel's thesis on pp. 289-291.
105PL 64, 224C-225B, 233B, and 263B-C.
 Boethius as a Transmitterof GreekLogic 399

confirm the view that Boethius was not following "an exact or com-
plete or first-handcopy of the Kata peusin."

(1) Boethius omits many of Porphyry's explanations, even some

useful ones. Had these been in his Greek source he would surely
have included some of them.
(2) Boethius' topics are not always in the same order as
Porphyry's,or even as Aristotle's.
(3) Many of Boethius' explanations are simpler than Porphyry's;
some of them add hardlyanythingto Aristotle's own words.
(4) Even where dependence on Porphyry is apparent,the verbal
similarities are seldom exact. The disparity of word usage rules
out any idea of direct translationof Porphyry.
(5) Many passages or phrases in the CC have no parallels in Por-
phyry but in other Greek commentators. Even when there is no
extant Greek parallel,the phrasingis such that one senses the pres-
ence of a Greek source.

First, I would like to make two general remarksconcerning Shiel's

argumentation (i.e., not his thesis): (a) Its purpose seems twofold,
although this is not explicitly stated; namely, on one hand, to refute
Bidez' suggestion that Boethius' commentarywas taken "almost com-
pletely form the Kata peusin," and, on the other hand, to prove that
Boethius' source was a Greek text of the Categories provided with
marginal annotations. For example, point (5) above provides in my
opinion more of a refutationof Bidez than supportof the scholia-thesis.
(b) Shiel's tacit assumptionis that whatever source Boethius used, not
only did he translateall that was in it, but he translatedit as faithfully
as Aristotle's text. This second point needs to be elaboratedfurther.
Of course, if Shiel did not hold that Boethius translatedwhateverhe
found in his Greek source, he could not very well argue from Boethius'
omission of explanations in the K.p. to his not possessing a complete
copy of that commentary and, accordingly, that Boethius only had a
copy of the Categories with scholia from the K.p.
In the case of Boethius' two commentaries on the De int. Shiel
asserts that "the two editions between them give us all the Greek
material,"the simplerpoints in the firstedition and in the second what-
ever Boethius omitted to translatein the first. Shiel furtherholds: "If
Boethius in the editio secunda omits to translate any point he tells us
400 MonikaAsztalos

so." He substantiatesthe latterclaim with a quote from De int. 2 where

Boethius declares that he will omit a point that Porphyry took from
Stoic logic, since it is unfamiliarto Latinears, and thereforehis readers
would not even be able to recognize what the problemwas all about.16
But I am not sure that one can infer from this one instance that
Boethius always tells us if he omits something in his Greek source.
The point he is making here is not merely, or even primarily,that he is
omitting somethingbut that he is not going to botherhis readerswith a
presumablyincomprehensiblepoint from Stoic logic.
The problem, it seems to me, is that in the case of the Categories,
we have only one commentaryby Boethius and that, consequently, we
are not in a position to judge whether the doctrinesin the K.p. omitted
in the CC would have appeared in the second commentary that
Boethius had it in mind to write (and maybe even did write), whereas
in the case of the De int. the two extant commentariesby Boethius
enable us to see exactly what he did treat, but, since in this case his
Greek sources are lost, we still cannot judge the extent to which he
reproducedthe Greek comments availableto him.
I will now turn to Shiel's tacit or implicit assumptionthat Boethius
translatedthe Greek comments as faithfully as he translatedAristotle's
text itself. It seems to me quite clear that Boethius had differentlevels
of ambition when he translatedthe "text" and when he translatedthe
Greek comments. Two examples will be given to show this. When
giving 6dyoq,language, as an example of a discrete quantity,that is to
say, a quantitythat consists of partsthatdo not form a continuum,Aris-
totle specifies: &axbyv tbv Erix(pOvfvj;q X6yov ytyv6voEvov
0•yw
(Categories 4 b 34-35). The phrase seems to have been thrown in as
an afterthoughtin order to make it clear that it is the spoken language
that Aristotle has in mind. But in CC Boethius explains that Aristotle
added the phrase dico vero illam quae fit cum voce orationem in order
to prevent any ambiguity that might arise from the fact that in Greek
X6yoqcan refer both to spoken language and to thought. In spite of the
fact, Boethius explains, that there is no risk of ambiguity in the Latin
language which has two words, ratio and oratio, where Greek has only
one, he has translated Aristotle's addition, "so that the translation
would not be accused of lying in any respect." He concludes:"In order
that nothing should be lacking, I have translatedeven what was not
106De int. 2, ed. Meiser, 201,2-6.
p.
 Boethiusas a Transmitter
of GreekLogic 401

very fitting in Latin."107There is a kind of reverse parallel to this in

the De int. 1,108 where Boethius has inserted the word ratio, absent
from Aristotle's text, in his translation. He explains this addition by
claiming that Aristotle intendedthe word to be suppliedfrom the
but there X6,yo;
referred to what is named oratio in
preceding passage;
whereas here the X6,yo;
that is to be understood refers to what
Latin, •6yo;
the Romans call ratio. Thus the need for inserting ratio. Boethius
ends: de qua re illis nunc satisfacimus, si qui Graecae orationis periti
nos forte culpabunt, cur quod illic non fuit, nostrae translationi
adiecerimus. I have not come across any correspondingapology for
deviating (or not deviating) from the text of a Greek comment. Thus, it
seems from both examples above that Boethius expected those of his
readers who were familiar with Greek to compare his translationof
Aristotle with the original and frown upon mistranslations,whereas he
felt that he had a freer hand with respect to the Greek comments. For
example, I do not interpretBoethius' omission of Porphyry'sexplana-
tion of the word Kwzrlyopi'ct109 in the way Shiel does; namely, as an
omission of a useful comment, which omission is an indication of
Boethius having had an incomplete copy of the K.p. I ratherbelieve
that since the word praedicamentumlacks the court-roomassociation
of the Greek word, Boethius did not consider the explanationuseful in
a Latin commentary,and since it was not partof Aristotle's text he felt
free to omit it.
I should now like to comment in some detail on the five points I
noted in Shiel's argument(above, p. 399).
(1) This is an argumentex silentio. I will comment on Shiel's exam-
ples one by one: (a) I have already shown that Porphyry'sexplanation
of the meaning of the word Kxrlqyopia'would not be suitable for a
Latin audience. (b) The omission of Porphyry'sreference to the views
of Athenodorus,Cornutus,Herminus,and Boethus on the scope of the
Categories11ois to be expected, since Boethius declares that he will
enumerate the different views in a forthcoming work. (c) In omitting

107PL 64, A-B: "...

Quare, ne quid mendaxtranslatio culparetur,idcirco hoc quoque
addidi: Dico uero illam quaefit cum uoce orationem ... Quocirca, ne quid deesset, etiam
hoc quod ad Latinamorationemminusesset conueniens transtuli."
108Ed.
Meiser, pp. 72,23-73,13.
109CAG IV:2,
pp. 56,3-57,14.
110CAG IV:2, p. 59,3-33.
402 MonikaAsztalos

Porphyry's explanation of the word X6yo; in Categories 1 a 2,111

Boethius is in good company, since Simplicius omits it as well.
Boethius, again like Simplicius,112includes insteada comment (lacking
in the K.p.) on the fact that X6yo; ti0; ob(ci; covers both definitions
and descriptions.113 (d) It is true that Boethius omits Porphyry'scom-
ment114on Aristotle's "chiasmic arrangement"of universal substance,
particularaccident, universalaccident, particularsubstancein 1 a 20-1
b 9 - so, incidentally,does Simplicius- but this time Boethius shares
a compartmentwith Ammonius who not only omits Porphyry's com-
ment but, like Boethius,115describes insteadthe chiastic arrangementin
a diagram.116(e) Boethius shares the omission of Porphyry's ouvo-
va(o;117 and Ka•r•&KaOtv6rlt18 with Ammonius. (f) The comment in
K.p. 82, 23-28, omitted by Boethius, is not very useful in a commen-
tary that is avowedly simple exposition of the text of the Categories,
a
since it does not give an explanationof Aristotle's text (this Boethius
has already done, with the help of Porphyry), but adds an instantia
against defining differentiaas somethingthat predicatesa species to be
quale: does the differentia,the objection goes, "winged" demonstrate
that each of the animals swan, raven, and eagle are qualities, not sub-
stances? Boethius normally excludes such instantiae from his com-
mentary. In this case he is accompaniedeven by Simplicius who usu-
ally does include such objections. (g) The comment in K.p. 98,34-99,3
has been left out by Boethius for good reasons: it deals with matters
that belong ratherto physics than to logic (the ever-moving heavens
cannot cease to move; movement is contraryto rest; therefore not all
substances are susceptible to contraries). (h) Boethius omits
Porphyry'sargument119 for an utterancebeing a discrete quantity(the
long syllable is to the shortas 2 to 1; 2 and I are numbers;numbersare
discrete quantities; ergo, etc.). Well, but so does Simplicius. (i)
Boethius omits a question raised in K.p. 132,4-11. So he does, but this
S"' CAG IV:2, p. 64,30.
112 CAG
VIII, p. 29,16-24.
113PL 64, 166A.
114 CAG IV:2, pp. 78,34-79,8.
115PL 64, 175C.
116Ammonius:In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarius, ed. A. Busse, CAG IV:4,
pp. 25,5-26,20.
117CAG IV:2, p. 81,7.
118 CAG IV:2, p. 81,16.
119CAG IV:2, p. 101,33-34.
 of GreekLogic
Boethiusas a Transmitter 403

is exactly at a point in his commentarywhere he declares that he ought

to limit the prolixity of the discussions and write his commentary so
that it is neither too brief (and therefore obscure) nor too lengthy
(which would bore the readers).120
(2) Shiel holds that Boethius' topics are not always in the same
order as Porphyry's,or even as Aristotle's. But one should realize that
Boethius' aim is to furnish an explanationof Aristotle's text; therefore,
he arrangeshis comments in an order that follows Aristotle and that
clarifies the meaning of the Categories as much as possible.
Porphyry's K.p., while being a commentaryon an introductorylevel,
reveals a philosophical ratherthan a pedagogical concern, even if the
latteris also present. I thereforethinkthatthe difference in orderof the
topics in the CC as comparedwith the K.p. is the result of a conscious
choice by Boethius based upon his purpose and personality as a com-
mentator,not a sign of his source having been not a continuous com-
mentary but a text with marginal scholia in disorder. As for Shiel's
claim that Boethius deviates from the order of things in Aristotle him-
self, I have found only one instance of this in the CC: 6 a 11-18 is
inserted between 5 b 11-14 and 5 b 14-6 a 11. But in this case
Boethius is very careful (as careful indeed as he is when he consciously
deviates from Aristotle's text) to announce that he has done so and
why.121
(3) Shiel argues that Boethius' explanations are simpler than
Porphyry's. This is, again, an argumentex silentio. Besides, most of
the explanations that are nothing but a rephrasingof Aristotle occur
toward the end of the commentary after Boethius' declaration that,
from this point on, he will have to keep his comments down to a
minimum. Shiel quotes part of this passage as a parallel with lam-
blichus who "similarlycurtails the prolixity of Porphyry'scomments."
I assume that what Shiel has in mind here is Simplicius' statementin
the very beginning of his commentary122that lamblichus determined
and distinguishedcertain things in Porphyryby means of abbreviating
the objections. But Simplicius is describing lamblichus' habit in gen-
eral of excluding problemstreatedby Porphyry. There is nothing in the
Greek commentariesthat implies that Boethius at this point is translat-
ing a Greek comment in declaring that he will keep his commentary
120PL 64, 250C.
121 PL
64, 213A.
122CAG VIII, 2,11-13.
p.
404 MonikaAsztalos

within reasonablelimits. Therefore, I cannot agree with Shiel's infer-

ence concerningthe meagernessof externalmaterialin the latterpartof
the CC: "in these sections the Greek which Boethius followed cannot
have been very voluminous or profound."
(4) I have already commented on Shiel's claim that the disparityof
word usage rules out any idea of direct translationfrom Porphyryby
pointing out that I cannot see any evidence in the CC that Boethius
intended to furnish as exact a translationof the Greek comments as of
Aristotle himself. What is worth considering- and certainly not only
in a discussion of Shiel's thesis- are those fairly numerous cases in
which Boethius' terminologydiffers from that of Porphyrywhile coin-
ciding with that of another Greek commentator. One example will
suffice: Shiel observes, and rightly so, that Boethius could never have
translatedaxiGEtgl23as diversitates.124 But what is significant in this
case is, I believe, not primarilythat Boethius is not translating(or even
rendering the notion of) aXaGEt;here but that he is translating8ta-
(popda;,the word that Ammonius uses in the correspondingplace in his
commentaryon the Categories125 and a word that Boethius regularly
translatesas diversitates. This, in turn,hardlyproves that Boethius got
the comment from the margin of a Greek copy of Aristotle's Organon
but that somehow or other Boethius' interpretationof Porphyry is
influenced by later commentatorswhose views are also reflected in
Ammonius' work.126
(5) As was pointed out above, Shiel's statementreveals something
about Boethius' Greek sources, whether extant or not, but nothing of
their formats. A question that I would, for my own part, find more
fruitful to investigate than the format of Boethius' source is whether
there is any way of determining(and this may be as difficult or impos-
sible to prove as Shiel's thesis) whether (a) Boethius had access to
Porphyry's K.p. and at least one post-lamblichean commentary, in
which case the verbal discrepanciesfrom Porphyrycan be explainedas
a result of Boethius' eclecticism and we must imagine him inserting
into a Porphyrian comment whatever he found suitable in a later
source; or (b) he used one or several later Greek commentariesthat
123CAG IV:2, 60,22.
p.
124PL 64, 212B.
125CAG IV:4, 15,22.
p.
126Shiel's claim, p. 355, thatall parallel
passages in Ammoniusturnup in Simplicius as
well, is not true.
 Boethius as a Transmitterof GreekLogic 405

incorporatednot only the Pros Gedaleion via lamblichus but also the
K.p. in a slightly adulteratedform. From my present stand-point, I
believe (a) to be more likely.
Since this paper focuses on Boethius' CC, I have deliberately
refrainedfrom answering Shiel's argumentsfor the scholia-thesis taken
from Boethius' other commentaries. I hope to have shown that all the
phenomena that Shiel has collected can (and some of them should) be
explained in ways other than as indicationsof Boethius' dependenceon
scholia. I believe, although this is not the place to discuss it, that the
same can be said in the case of Boethius' othercommentaries.
(As a matter of fact, since Ammonius' and Simplicius' commen-
taries exhibit all five points discussed above, one might with equal right
claim that their authors had access to Porphyry's (and others') com-
ments only in the form of marginal scholia. In order to avoid any
misunderstanding,I want to make clear that I do not wish to make such
a claim.)

GraduallyBoethius has been disrobed and divested of many titles to

fame in the history of philosophy. It all began with Bidez, a great
admirer of Porphyry, who judged Boethius severely: Boethius took
almost everythingin the CC from Porphyry,and Porphyrygained noth-
ing in the process. Shiel showed that Porphyrywas by no means the
only Greek commentatorwho had left his imprint in the CC, but this
did not help much, since he also claimed that Boethius had not read a
complete Greek commentary, not even the short K.p. Finally, the
interpretationsof two passages in De int. 2 given by Shiel and
Chadwick respectively, led John Dillon to conclude that Boethius tried
to cover up his lack of familiarity with the primary sources.127This
127 J.
Dillon, review of H. Chadwick's Boethius (see above, note 51) in The Classical
Review, N.S. 33 (1983), pp. 117-118. The following passage was interpretedby Shiel in
a way that led Dillon to believe that Boethius only pretendedto have read the Greek phi-
losophers whose views Porphyryrefersto: cuius expositionem(sc. libri De int.) nos scili-
cet quam maxime a Porphyrio quamquametiam a ceteris transferentesLatina oratione
digessimus (De int. 2, ed. Meiser, p. 7,5-9). Shiel takes the ceteris to be "obviously
Alexander,Aspasius, Herminusand the Stoics" (p. 358). But nothing in the quote reveals
that Boethius had pre-Porphyrianphilosophers in mind. He may as well be referringto
commentatorslaterthanPorphyry. Thathe is dependenton such is apparentfrom the fact
that he mentions Syrianus several times. Besides, Boethius merely says that he will
translate from other writers as well as from Porphyry; it would have been entirely
406 MonikaAsztalos

made Boethius not only unoriginal and ill-read, but on top of it

dishonest.
I am not trying to do the impossible, namely, presentBoethius as an

anachronisticfor him (or for somebody like Simplicius for that matter)to say that when-
ever he translates from pre-Porphyrianwriters, he quotes them via Porphyry. In the
beginning of the sixth and last book of the De int. 2 Boethius draws a sigh of relief,
announcingthat this book will put an end to his long commentarywhich has cost him a
considerableamountof laborand time, since he has collected the views of very many (sc.
philosophers) and spent almost two years continually sweating over his commentary:
Sextus hic liber longae commentationiterminumponit, quae quodammagno labore con-
stiterit ac temporis mora. nam et plurimorumsunt in unum coacervatae sententiae et
duorumferme annorumspatium continuo commentandisudore consumpsimus(De int. 2,
ed. Meiser, p. 421,2-6). Shiel interpretsthe end of this pasage in the following way and
quotes it in supportof his thesis: "Forthereare scholia of numerouspoints heaped up all
together and so I have spent almost two years in a constant sweat of writing comments"
(p. 361). Shiel takes sententia to mean scholion, marginalcomment,and refersto Isidore
of Seville's Etymologies, I, XXI, De notis sententiarum. But Isidore is discussing signs
referringto single words, sentences, or verses. Contraryto Shiel's belief, Boethius does
not use the word sententia in the sense of scholion but in the usual classical senses of
"sentence","meaning"(of discourse) and "judgement","view" (of speakersor writers).
Cf., e.g., the beginning of the CC: Ibique, numeratisdiuersorumsententiis, docebimus
cui nostrum quoque accedat arbitrium ... Hanc igitur causam mutatae sententiae-it
makes more sense to change one's view than to change a scholion. The plurimorumsen-
tentiae, the views of very many, is paralleledby the numeratisdiuersorumsententiis in
the beginning of the CC and can hardly mean "scholia of numerouspoints." Boethius'
second statement(that he has spent almost two years commenting on the De interpreta-
tione) should not be connected with the first one by means of an explanatory"and so".
The two statements illustrate that his work has cost him much labor (since he has col-
lected so many views) and time (since it took him almost two years). Shiel interpretssunt
... coaceruatae as "were heaped together",i.e., in the margins of a Greek codex, but I
agree with Chadwick(p. 129) who takes this to refer to what has been done by Boethius
in his commentary. The labor is the collecting of views done by Boethius. For the meta-
phorical sense in which coacervo (lit. "to heap together")is used here, cf., for example,
Cicero, De partitione oratoria, 11,40, where it is used with argumenta. Chadwickinter-
prets nam et plurimorumsunt in unum coacervatae sententiae thus: "because he has
compressed into a single book the contents of very many books" (p. 129). Due to this
interpretationJohn Dillon thought that Boethius was passing himself off as more well-
read than he actuallywas. But the "verymany books"are not therein the Latin. It is evi-
dent, at least to me, thatplurimorumrefersto the very many philosophers(as indeed there
were) who had pronouncedtheir views on the De interpretatione. Thus, Boethius is not
boasting about the labor and time spent collecting views from a large numberof books.
Indeed, the idea that Boethius claims to have indulged in a vast amount of readingand
that he triedto cover up the embarrassingfact that he is not relying on primarysources is
a myth the origin of which can be tracedto misinterpretationsof these two passages in the
De int.2 .
 Boethiusas a Transmitter
of GreekLogic 407

with Aristotle's Categories and De interpretatione. And I am not in a

position to judge whetheror not Boethius displays real originalityin his
later, more matureworks. But I think that it would be unfair to expect
novel interpretationsin commentarieslike the Isag. 1 and CC, which, if
my assumptions in the first sections of this paper are correct, are not
only the earliest of Boethius' works on Greek philosophy but also the
context in which he first encountered Aristotle. He seems to have
come quite unprepared to both the Isagoge and the Categories,
unarmedwith propertranslationsand unfamiliarwith the work he was
commenting on. Boethius is indeed an epitome of the expression
docendo discimus.

UNIVERSITY OF STOCKHOLM