Collective resistance to collective

collaboration: a leader’s introspection

Atri Sengupta and Bhaurao Sonawane

Introduction Atri Sengupta is based at

the Department of OB and
It was a sunny day on August 13, 2012. Mr. Surya Kant Mishra, the chief executive officer HR, Indian Institute of
and managing director (CEO and MD) of Utkal Alumina International Limited (UAIL)[1], was Management Sambalpur,
about to deliver his retirement speech. While quickly going through the points he had jotted Sambalpur, India.
down on a piece of paper, he became very emotional and was lost in deep thoughts. He Bhaurao Sonawane is
was wondering introspectively, “how effective were my actions as a leader of the company? based at the Department of
How much could I have engaged the stakeholders in all the company’s concerns?” PGPWE, Indian Institute of
Management Raipur,
Raipur, India.
Background
The reference point for the story was UAIL, an ambitious Greenfield alumina refinery, co-
generation power plant and bauxite mine, which had been struggling to be commissioned
since 1992-1993. It was a joint initiative of three conglomerates as follows: INDAL, Tata
Industries Limited (TIL) and Norsk Hydro Aluminum (NHA) of Norway intended to set up a
100 per cent export-oriented 1 million tons per annum (MTPA) alumina refinery. Afterward,
the capacity of the alumina refinery was planned to be 1.5 MTPA, expandable to 3 MTPA,
while bauxite mining was planned to be 4.5 MTPA, expandable to 8.5 MTPA. The capacity
of the co-generation power plant was to be 3
30 megawatts (MW).
The state government initiated a land acquisition process for the plant in 1993. Around 3,000
acres of land were acquired from 24 villages in the Kashipur block of Odisha[2], mostly
dominated by its tribal inhabitants (indigenous peoples). Kashipur block in Rayagara district
was characterized by its low socioeconomic status, in which the per capita income for each
family was far below the poverty line. Malnutrition, death from perennial diseases, a low literacy
rate and poor educational and medical facilities were predominant in the area (please refer to
Exhibit 1 for the socioeconomic statuses of the villages affected by the project and Exhibit 2 for
photography of the area). Majority of the population earned their livelihood mainly from crop
production with little support from the State Administration. Sometimes, farmers received
seeds free of cost, but irrigation, guidance on the cultivation of new and improved varieties of
seeds and other forms of support were not available. A few families, who didn’t have their own
land, were depended on non-agricultural activities, e.g. poultry, fisheries, as marginal workers,
etc.
Despite the poor socioeconomic and health statuses of the region, land acquisition for the Disclaimer. This case is written
solely for educational purposes
project was highly criticized and resisted by the indigenous peoples, alongside anti- and is not intended to represent
industrialization groups and several other social agencies. These groups believed that successful or unsuccessful
managerial decision-making.
industrialization in the area would affect the lives of indigenous peoples adversely and they The authors may have
disguised names; financial and
were demanding the return of the land to those residents. This led to a massive delay in the other recognisable information
project’s initiation of more than two decades as indigenous peoples were not ready to release to protect confidentiality.

DOI 10.1108/EEMCS-09-2019-0229 VOL. 10 NO. 1 2020, pp. 1-32, © Emerald Publishing Limited, ISSN 2045-0621 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j PAGE 1
 their land. Collective resistance led to an unforeseen incident of police firing on protestors in
2000. It caused the death of three tribal villagers that created a huge panic, which led to the
halting of activities related to the project for almost year years. TIL and NHA, two of the initial
partners, withdrew themselves from the project after that and sold their stakes to Alcan and
Indal. Indal was acquired in 2000 by Hindalco, a $15bn flagship metal company of the Aditya
Birla Group (ABG) in 2000. Finally, UAIL became a wholly owned subsidiary of Hindalco in
2007 after ALCAN sold their stake. Considering the stiff resistance from the indigenous
peoples to the placement of the refinery at Kucheipadar in Kashipur block, Hindalco proposed
a new site for the project in 2004. The site was located on barren, unforested land close to the
earlier site (about 21 km away from the bauxite mines), named Doraguda. A fresh project plan
was initiated then. However, the issues for indigenous peoples remained unresolved. Above
all, the conflicting interests of other stakeholders made it more challenging to deal with.
Massive delays disrupted all sorts of project planning leading to dissatisfaction and a loss of
faith amongst shareholders, management, contractors and vendors, employees and the
government. It was uncertain whether Hindalco should go ahead with the project. What type of
leaders would make due justice with the situation?

Mishra’s introspection
I can remember those days during early 2008 when I first met Kumar Mangalam Birla, the
chairman of ABG. He wanted me to lead UAIL through its crisis situation. Birla was intensely
passionate about the project. I was a little hesitant initially. However, Birla’s confidence
about the business viability and his “last man standing” attitude inspired me to take up the
challenge. His encouraging vision for the project thrilled me. The strategic importance of
UAIL to Hindalco was significant as this refinery (UAIL) was supposed to be the major
feeder for another two of Hindalco’s greenfield smelters. However, the turmoil faced by
UAIL derailed this plan. I knew that adequate availability of high-quality bauxite, the raw
material, in the area would augment the success of the project. The high-quality bauxite
could produce low-cost, high-quality products for the worldwide market leading to a
competitive advantage for Hindalco globally. I had belief in myself and my persuasive
power to manage the adverse situation responsibly. Therefore, I accepted the offer of the
CEO and MD positions on the condition of having complete autonomy in decision-making
processes. Kumar assured me that the management would provide all possible support.
I joined UAIL in December 2008. I had two major challenges to focus on:

1. Determining my immediate and far future courses of actions fitting with the core values
and ethical culture of Hindalco.

2. Engaging all concerned stakeholders with the growth trajectory of the project (please
refer to Exhibit 3 for the vision, mission and core values of HINDALCO).
I started investigating the project immediately after joining; I collected information, at first,
from internal documents, media and government reports, top management and employees.
I found that the root causes of the crisis were multifaceted but mostly people-related. The
external environment of the organization contributed to the crisis significantly leading to an
internal disaster.
I decided to open direct dialogues with all the concerned stakeholders and to begin just
with the villagers at first. Being a native of Odisha and having prior experience of leading a
large-scale manufacturing organization in the same region, I was in an advantageous
position to understand the local tribal villagers and their culture. They tended to be simple in
their nature and ways and were violent only if provoked. I had a strong empathy for their
plight: they were often victims of the region’s poor socioeconomic status, which resulted in
illiteracy, malnutrition and many cases of premature death. I wanted to get a sense of their
concerns and identify the potential amicable solutions. I was aware that nongovernmental

PAGE 2 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j VOL. 10 NO. 1 2020

organizations (NGOs), which were active in the area, created a lot of obstacles in the minds
of those poor people against the project because of their vested interests. After the
incident, which caused the deaths of three tribal villagers in 2000, there was absolutely no
communication with these people neither from the government and local administration nor
from my predecessors. NGOs, who were their only supporters, could earn their blind faith
very easily. Confined within their territory, lack of education and exposure to the outside
world made them not only unaware of but also reluctant to discover about developments
happened around the world. Above all, the absence of communication and lack of concern
for them from the company’s end led to complete mistrust in the minds of these indigenous
peoples about the project and its owners. My biggest challenge was not only to gain back
the trust of these peoples but also of all the concerned stakeholders. Where should I begin?
First, I decided to move my office and residence to the plant site. Before then, our employees
had been operating from the Rayagada district headquarters, 70 km away from the project site.
Employees were used to visiting the site on three days of the week. Intense rain (rainfall was
high because of the tropical climate) and collective resistance often stopped them visiting the
site more regularly. Initially, they were not ready to stay at the campus. I told the management
that I needed those employees in my team who were ready to shift to do so and the rest could
be transferred to Hindalco’s corporate office. I wanted to send a message to each of our
stakeholders that we, at UAIL, meant to do business responsibly. Hence, in spite of the
sparseness of the facilities, I shifted to the campus along with my wife as I was committed to my
work. I knew it would be difficult for my family to stay at the campus without amenities, as
compared to our accustomed lifestyle but we decided to shift and that became instrumental not
only for employee motivation but also sent a message of our seriousness to all the concerned
stakeholders, especially the villagers. I believed that as a leader I should set an example first
and that would inspire others to follow me. It happened in the same way. Immediately after
moving to the site, other employees not only shifted their offices but also got involved in building
their own office infrastructure there. When their shifting was completed, I addressed them and
explained my vision for the company. I said to them that moving to the site was essential for
team morale; everyone working together to build the plant meant a lot then. We were 85 people
who struggled with basic amenities there, but we proudly stood together and arranged
everything on our own. This enhanced employee morale and built a culture of cooperation and
collaboration. Then, I empowered them to manage the office’s internal issues and, following the
initial three months, I completely devoted the staff to the external issues.
After finding out that I was moving to the campus, the local administration asked us to take
police protection considering the history of hostility there. However, I politely refused police
protection, as we wanted to be a part of the local community and work to involve its
members wholeheartedly in our growth trajectory. My wife started visiting the local
vegetable market and temple, meeting with women villagers. I also accompanied her
sometimes to the temple and on shopping trips, to begin with. Instead of calling villagers to
my office, I started visiting all 24 villages affected by the project, one by one, along with my
corporate social responsibility (CSR) team. Sometimes, we even walked in the paddy fields,
full of water and mud, to get a feel for the tough lives of the tribal villagers and to talk to them
amidst their reality.
We listened to all their grievances. In a meeting, they were asking worriedly, “if you take our
land, how will we earn our future livelihood? What will happen to our children and family? So
far, we live so miserably and nobody bother about that. Now you need our land and you are
here to talk to us. You are going to make us more miser.” They submitted a charter of 20
demands. I could clearly sense their mistrust and hatred towards us. I decided to show
them our intention first. Hence I told to them, “let us first focus on five most crucial issues
along with timelines of three months”. When people from NGOs started asking about the
future of the tribal villagers, I gave them the references of other organizations located in
Rayagada and their consequent developments in the region. I arranged visits by a villagers’

VOL. 10 NO. 1 2020 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j PAGE 3

 team to a few of those organizations and to meet their respective local communities to
witness the developments. In the meantime, we started working on five selected issues and
ensured that we addressed those well ahead of the proposed timeline of three months.
These developments gave people a signal that management was concerned about them; at
least we were listening now to these poor and simple villagers.
Despite a warning from the local administration, we visited the community where three
villagers had died due to police firing to control unrest in 2000. They came to know about our
initiatives with other villages. We received a warm welcome from the villagers. In the meeting,
where 160 villagers were present, one NGO employee agitated, showing the widows of
those three deceased men and asked, “what was their fault and what would be their future”.
I said, “returning their husbands’ lives were not in our hands but ensuring a good future for
them”. They said, “we want at the rate of US$63.27 per month for each of these families”. I
told them, “why US$63.27? We will give them US$105.45 along with the free education of
their children up to 12th standard”. They became completely speechless. These
concessions resulted in a complete change in their mindsets. They opened themselves up to
us like family members do with each other. We gave our commitments to fulfill their relatively
small demands; in fact, we planned to do more than they demanded.
I felt annoyed when I saw that these people were flying black flags on January 26 (Republic
Day in India) and August 15 (India’s Independence Day) as symbols of protest. I
demanded that in return for our commitments, they would celebrate those auspicious days
with Indian tricolors and they did so. This received huge media coverage and attention from
all the stakeholders. All of them started taking an interest in our journey. The media, which
had been covering the story one-sidedly until then, began focusing on other perspectives
too. I always believed that “actions speak louder than words.” As a result, the government
and the local administration began to cooperate with us fully. Management and other
stakeholders also regained their confidence in the project. We earned their trust. However,
we still needed to go some miles further.
A fresh demand came from a few landowners affected by the UAIL project, who sold their
lands in 1996-1997 at an average rate of $676.06 per acre as determined by the
government, and records of rights obtained in the name of the Odisha Industrial
Infrastructure Development Corporation/UAIL. They demanded higher compensation to
handover their lands to UAIL. A team of landowners, a few local political leaders and NGO
people met me and said, “we want the landowners to be compensated equivalent to a
newly purchased land by ABG in nearby locations for a different project at the rate of US
$7728.84 per acre in 2006”. The price of land in 1992-1993 and 2006-2007 was certainly not
same. A negotiation took place under the supervision of the government as the land
acquisition was its responsibility, and it was decided to give the landowners compensation
at the rate of $4,416.48 per acre. Although we empathized with them and were ready to pay
at the rate of $7,728.84 per acre, the government did not agree to avoid the similar kinds
of agitation in other parts of Odisha. The government was right in the sense that the land
prices offered in 1997 and 2008 could not be the same.
I was in favor of stopping the mediators (the middlemen) – the local leaders and the NGO
people – from representing villagers (a few of them were landowners). I had a direct
dialogue with those landowners. I told them, “we are ready to pay rest $3,312.36 per acre
as an ex gratia payment, but after three years, on the condition that you won’t create any
further disturbance and cooperate with us in finishing the project”. I knew that these
additional payments would give us a burden of around $7.73m, which was quite a
manageable amount for a project of $1,656.18m (please refer to Exhibit 4 for the project’s
cost details). Our management also supported me. This proactive movement of ours made
them grateful toward us and those mediators evaporated from the system. Initially, they
were hesitant to trust us but our actions in the recent past were instrumental in regaining

PAGE 4 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j VOL. 10 NO. 1 2020

their trust. Peace was restored! Hindalco’s core values of integrity, commitment, passion,
seamlessness and speed were major guidelines for all my strategies.
My next move was to participate in all the tribal ceremonies and celebrate them wholeheartedly.
My employees and our family members were also involved in this. We celebrated our own
ceremonies with tribal villagers. We were enjoying living as a part of a big family.
In the meantime, I had to focus on another major issue related to vendors and contractors.
We roped in big contractors. However, massive delays in the project, raw material pilferage
from the site, the shortage of labor because of collective resistance, hiring extra high-priced
skilled laborers from outside, illegitimate demands of money from local leaders and
villagers, etc., which emerged without prior anticipation, escalated the construction cost. It
was difficult for the contractors to manage construction expenses within the agreed-upon
contract amounts and they were demanding price hikes. I knew that construction
bottlenecks would delay the project further. I convinced the management to settle on a
revised rate based on the argument that with the revised rate, our project cost would still be
far below the international project rates and that could give us extra competitive mileage in
the global market. The UAIL project was built for catering to both domestic and global
demands. Therefore, this decision would be cost-effective for us. I had also borne in mind
that without settling, it could be difficult for us to get any decent contractor.
I was completely aware that project cost was increasing but I was focusing on the long-term
gain for the UAIL. We spent a lot of money building roads, bridges, schools, health camps
and contributed too many other CSR activities for the betterment of the community.
Our next focus was on the employability of these indigenous peoples. We set up an industrial
training institute (ITI)[3] to skill them for different kinds of employment. We were also
brainstorming about the possibilities of including those skilled laborers in the UAIL project,
either on direct or indirect payroll. We were actually focusing on employment creation both
outside and inside the factory. We announced that we would train young people in the
community who had passed the 10-th standard certificate in ITI and then absorbed them into
our payroll. We received around 80 candidates for training in both the first and second years.
However, there were hardly 40 candidates in the third year. We had to bring people in from
outside. As it was an automated plant, we were in need of a smaller number of technical
people and ITI-trained people were appointed for this purpose in the junior cadre. However,
greater numbers of community members were expecting jobs at UAIL. Therefore, we
identified the nontechnical areas where the great number of generally skilled people could be
accommodated. We hired members from all the families evicted from their lands.
We identified that the drop in the number of candidates was due to the lack of basic levels
of education in the region. We opened up an Odia-medium school for that purpose (Odia is
the native language of the state of Odisha). Although NGOs praised us for our all initiatives,
they objected that we were not giving poor tribal children an opportunity to learn in English-
medium schools where our employees’ children studied. They pointed out that because of
this, discrimination between their children and our children would remain forever. Hearing
this, I instantly decided to open up an English-medium school in the locality. Aditya Birla
Public School (ABPS)[4]. an English-medium 12-th standard national level school, opened
in July 2011. Highly educated teachers were hired from outside. Immediately, we received
around 250 enrolments (from both tribal children and our children) in ABPS. I believed that it
was a highly effective suggestion made by the NGOs. Unlike at other ABG plants, ABPS
was set up during such an early stage of the UAIL project and that delivered extraordinary
results (please refer to Exhibit 5 for the CSR activities of UAIL and Exhibit 6 for the costs of
CSR activities).
Despite our early initiatives that resulted in a good level of social inclusion, there were fears
aroused amongst my employees and contractors because of some illegitimate acts
perpetrated by a few villagers. For example, illegitimate demands for donations from

VOL. 10 NO. 1 2020 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j PAGE 5

 employees; threats to give contractual jobs, such as construction material supply (but
overpriced), to local leaders frightened both employees and contractors. Failure to fulfill
their demands often led to agitation in front of the factory gates. One day, around 20
agitated people, who were actually provoked by some local leaders from a nearby village,
stopped me. I got out of my car. During our arguments, one person knocked me to the
ground with an iron rod. My security guards fired in the air to protect me. The mob
disappeared immediately. However, the news spread in the factory, and thereafter, to the
local administration quickly. A police force was sent by the local administration and I was
sent to be hospitalized in Vizag[5] because that had the nearest hospital to the UAIL
location. Fortunately, my injury was not so severe, and I asked to be treated there and then.
I knew that if I had left the area, I would not be able to control my people, who were furious
with the demonstrators. After getting over my initial shock, I saw what had happened as a
new challenge. I requested that the police should not arrest those mob members who had
attacked me but only to announce that these people would be arrested and put behind bars
for a long time. We did not lodge any formal complaint against the mob activists. On the
other hand, I urged my people not to stop work and they listened to me respectfully. My
objective at that time was just to avoid any face-to-face meetings between my people and
the mob. The situation could worsen in that case. After the announcement by the police,
family members of the mob members came to me tearfully requesting my forgiveness. I
asked them to agree in writing that they would never indulge in any illegitimate activities in
the locality and that they would earn their livelihoods in employment opportunities created
by us, for living a respectful life. They agreed and the police left the site. Thereafter, we
never looked back and the project developed as planned. The success of our initiatives was
reflected on several fronts, for example, preventing the loss of working days (Exhibit 7).
I always believed that positivity resides behind any negativity. Therefore, I always identified
the positive side of the adverse situations and used them to the project’s advantage. I
received huge appreciation from my management, as well as all the stakeholders
concerned. Could I engage all the stakeholders in the growth trajectory of UAIL, though?
Keywords:
I know I had to neglect a few small projects, which were in need of close monitoring. During
Leadership,
Stakeholder engagement, my 3.5-year journey at UAIL as CEO and MD, I ensured a partial stakeholder inclusion. How
Stakeholder management, should my successor strategize to achieve complete stakeholder inclusion or collective
Strategy collaboration? What advice should I give him as a newly appointed advisor to UAIL?

Notes
1. A Greenfield project of Hindalco Industries, ABG – an Indian conglomerate.
2. A state of India.
3. Please refer to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industrial_training_institute-for-details-of-ITI (accessed
19 February 2019).
4. Available at: www.adityabirlaschools.com/location.html (accessed 20 February 2019).
5. A city in Andhra pradesh, another state of India.
6. An Indian conglomerate.

Reference
Mangaraj, B.K., Aparajita, U., Dash, P.K., Dixit, B. and Gantayat, P. (2009), “Socio-economic and
baseline survey of the adjacent villages of Utkal alumina plants site in the Kashipur block of Rayagada
district”, A study report of Utkal University, Bhubaneswar, Odisha submitted to Utkal Alumina
International Limited.

PAGE 6 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j VOL. 10 NO. 1 2020

 Exhibit 1

Table EI Socioeconomic status of the region and villages affected by the project
Population (in %)
Household opting Students
No. of Household having Household having migration for Students appeared passed at
Sl. no Villages households Male Female no land (in %) no electricity (in %) livelihood (in %) at 10-th exam 10-th exam

1 Ambiligadtunda 55 120 100 73 98 73 0 0

2 Andirakanch 200 450 520 30 75 85 2 0
3 Bagrijhola 148 518 614 0 74 47 4 20
4 Bhitaramuchukuni 80 100 70 13 100 50 1 0
5 Bilamal 183 446 290 22 71 44 5 0
6 Dwimundi 130 295 345 46 93 46 3 50
7 Gaimundatunda 60 96 69 33 100 83 0 0
8 Gokulmunda 70 76 74 43 43 57 3 100
9 Hatikhaman 25 57 78 0 100 80 5 100
10 Jogiparitunda 165 470 490 18 89 61 3 0
11 Kanchagumma 70 266 310 14 100 86 0 0
12 Kodipari 155 960 725 26 90 39 6 20
13 Koral 300 490 630 60 53 53 1 25
14 Lachhugude 155 440 560 39 90 97 2 100
15 Lundrukona 50 85 125 0 100 60 0 0
16 Makapadar 45 105 95 22 87 67 10 0
17 Narigijodi 55 101 72 18 82 18 13 100
18 Osapada 50 100 95 60 100 40 4 100

VOL. 10 NO. 1 2020

19 Paikakupakhal 302 630 870 5 53 93 1 5
20 Perinigini 55 77 68 36 96 91 1 0
21 Ramibeda 30 96 88 100 67 67 10 0
22 Ratachuan 35 140 105 0 100 29 5 25
23 Tikarapada 200 900 850 55 100 100 0 0
24 Tikiri 525 918 998 50 27 48 5 48
Source: Study report of Utkal University, Bhubaneswar, Odisha, 2009. Mangaraj et al. (2009)
(continued)

j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j PAGE 7

 PAGE 8
Table EI
School (primary, high, etc.) Annual income (US$) Annual expenditure (US$) Expenditure spent (in %)
Cultural
Sl. no Villages No. available Operational Per household Per capita income Per household Per capita expenditure Food Education Health activities

1 Ambiligadtunda 0 0 47.3 11.83 46.96 11.74 59 2 11 29

2 Andirakanch 1 1 60.01 12.37 55.14 11.37 60 3 6 31
3 Bagrijhola 1 1 65.4 8.55 64.53 8.44 64 4 10 22
4 Bhitaramuchukuni 0 0 52.14 24.53 36.87 17.35 59 4 5 32
5 Bilamal 1 1 81.34 20.23 43.94 10.93 58 8 13 21
6 Dwimundi 1 1 112.83 22.92 108.65 22.07 53 2 15 30
7 Gaimundatunda 1 1 42.93 15.61 48.08 17.48 60 5 5 31
8 Gokulmunda 1 1 33.17 15.49 20.46 9.54 72 1 10 16

j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j VOL. 10 NO. 1 2020

9 Hatikhaman 0 0 46.63 8.63 48.57 8.99 68 9 11 12
10 Jogiparitunda 1 1 40.21 6.91 44.05 7.57 70 3 7 20
11 Kanchagumma 1 1 48.21 5.87 63.08 7.68 52 5 16 27
12 Kodipari 1 1 49.5 4.55 45.32 4.17 62 11 8 19
13 Koral 1 1 72.92 19.53 48.93 13.1 57 9 15 19
14 Lachhugude 1 1 61.58 9.54 53.19 8.25 63 2 9 26
15 Lundrukona 0 0 47.55 11.32 39.15 9.32 66 0 5 29
16 Makapadar 0 0 55.83 12.56 60.58 13.63 51 2 5 42
17 Narigijodi 0 0 32.06 10.19 56.68 18.02 62 1 8 29
18 Osapada 1 1 46.03 11.8 9.8 2.51 68 6 9 17
19 Paikakupakhal 1 1 18.92 3.81 20.97 4.22 57 7 16 21
20 Perinigini 1 1 72.22 27.39 71.56 27.15 59 8 9 24
21 Ramibeda 0 0 78.28 12.76 77.43 12.62 63 1 7 29
22 Ratachuan 1 0 34.27 4.9 37.1 5.3 67 6 11 1
23 Tikarapada 1 1 37.84 4.32 44.24 5.06 61 3 11 26
24 Tikiri 1 1 41.28 11.31 34.4 9.42 65 3 11 21
Exhibit 2. A village in Kashipur block during 2007-2008

Plate E1

Exhibit 3. Vision, mission and values of Hindalco

Our vision
To be a premium metals major, global in size and reach, excelling in everything we do
and creating value for its stakeholders.
Our mission

To pursue the creation of superior shareholder value relentlessly, by exceeding

customer expectations profitably, unleashing employee potential, while being a
responsible corporate citizen, adhering to our values.

Our values
Integrity: honesty in every action.

Commitment: on the foundation of integrity, doing what it takes to deliver, as promised.

Passion: missionary zeal arising out of an emotional engagement with work.

Seamlessness: thinking and working together across functional silos, hierarchy levels,
businesses and geographies.

Speed: responding to stakeholders with a sense of urgency.

Source: The company, available at: www.hindalco.com/about-us/vision-and-values (accessed

20 February 2019).

VOL. 10 NO. 1 2020 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j PAGE 9

 Exhibit 4. Project cost details of UAIL

Table EII
In US$ Mn
Point of
Total project Tangible Intangible Capital work purchase
Financial year expenditure asset asset in progress (POP) Profit/loss

1992-1993 –
1993-1994 –
1994-1995 –
1995-1996 5.47 0.01 0 0.82 4.64 0
1996-1997 2.67 0.02 0 1.46 1.19 0
1997-1998 1.56 1.51 0 1.01 1.06 0
1998-1999 3.94 0.64 0 0.76 2.54 0
1999-2000 2.88 0.24 0 0.06 2.70 0
2000-2001 3.61 1.67 0 1.55 3.49 0
2001-2002 1.45 0.03 0 0.03 1.51 0
2002-2003 0.47 0.06 0 0.00 0.53 0
2003-2004 0.54 0.02 0 0.00 0.56 0
2004-2005 3.21 1.70 0 0.30 1.21 0
2005-2006 11.40 1.70 0 4.51 5.19 0
2006-2007 25.25 1.76 0 15.23 8.27 0
2007-2008 75.48 5.68 0 34.07 35.72 0
2008-2009 110.66 1.55 0 129.72 20.61 0
2009-2010 171.18 6.72 0 177.03 12.57 3.25
2010-2011 244.44 0.24 0 208.31 35.90 0.52
2011-2012 278.59 1.97 5.22 332.58 61.18 2.87
2012-2013 385.72 25.92 0 359.80 0.00 18.12
Total 1,328.51 51.22 5.22 1,261.94 10.12 24.75
Project cost Loss
Source: The company (used https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_rupee_exchange_rate_history for
the conversion rate from INR to USD average of the year)

Exhibit 5. Corporate social responsibility activities of UAIL

1. Education:
䊏 ABPS from LKG to Std. VI with more than 150 students, out of which more than 80
per cent belong to underprivileged classes of society;
䊏 32 teachers supplemented at 15 peripheral schools to promote quality education;
䊏 Financial assistance to more than 100 students from land-losing families for higher
education;
䊏 Construction and renovation of 5 school buildings; and
䊏 Provided land for construction of high school building at Hadiguda.
2. Healthcare:
䊏 Full-fledged medical center for outpatients catering to more than 225 patients per
day;
䊏 In total, 1 mobile health unit catering to 44 villages in the Kashipur and T. Rampur
blocks covering on an average 31 patients;
䊏 Homeopathy services through a homeopathy dispensary set up at Nuapada;
䊏 General health screening and treatment camps;
䊏 Blood donation camps every six months;

PAGE 10 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j VOL. 10 NO. 1 2020

 䊏 Comprehensive eye care service including cataract surgery for 63 patients;
䊏 Anemia detection, treatment and awareness camps held regularly;
䊏 Round-the-clock services by 2 ambulances and donation of an ambulance to the
community health center, Kashipur;
䊏 In total, 40 hand pump bore wells and 3 spring-based water supply systems;
䊏 Disinfection of drains and waterlogging areas to guard against the spread of
disease;
䊏 Facilitating immunization through the pulse polio program;
䊏 Supply of assets to PHC (new) at Tikiri and Kucheipadar; and
䊏 Awareness of health care through rallies, competitions and street plays.
3. Sustainable livelihood:
䊏 Technical training of 50 persons in various trades through company sponsorship
industrial training centers at Kashipur/Rayagada;
䊏 Promotion of improved vegetable cultivation and capacity building of farmers
through various training, exposure visits, etc.;
䊏 Irrigation facilities through the construction of check dams, irrigation channels,
bore wells, ring wells, ponds and diversion-based irrigation structures;
䊏 Promotion of commercial broiler poultry farming with 7 farmers; and
䊏 Organizing regular livestock vaccination camps in 15 peripheral villages against
foot and mouth disease, hemorrhagic septicemia, black quarter, peste des petits
ruminants and enterotoxaemia and treatment camps.
4. Village infrastructure development:
䊏 Village electrification in all project-affected villages;
䊏 Community center construction/renovation (7 villages);
䊏 Market yard (2 villages);
䊏 Cement concrete road and drain construction/repair (more than 100 portions);
䊏 Road repair (more than 20 portions);
䊏 Water-bound macadam roads (more than 15 portions);
䊏 Bridges, culverts and causeways (more than 40);
䊏 Steps (staircases) to rivers (more than 20);
䊏 Bus shelters/rest sheds (5 villages);
䊏 Sitting altars (10);
䊏 Temples, puja mandaps, boundary walls and protection walls (more than 100);
䊏 Small water tanks/vats (15);
䊏 Streetlights (150); and
䊏 Hand pump platforms (21).
5. Social interventions:
䊏 Cultural festivals;
䊏 Organizing sports events (volleyball);
䊏 Supply of sports materials and supporting sports and cultural activities;
䊏 Support to Chaiti and Ghumura (district-level sociocultural programs) at Rayagada
and Bhawanipatna, respectively; and
䊏 Relief support to disaster-affected peoples.
Source: The company.

VOL. 10 NO. 1 2020 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j PAGE 11

 Exhibit 6. Investment of UAIL in CSR activities

Table EIII
Yearly CSR expenditure from FY 2010-2011 to FY 2016-2017
(in US$ Mn)
Sector 2010-2011 2011-2012 2012-2013

Education 0.15 0.24 0.21

Health care 0.02 0.10 0.11
Sustainable livelihoods 0.26 0.35 0.08
Infrastructure development 0.85 0.65 1.16
Social interventions 0.44 0.04 0.09
Total 1.71 1.38 1.66
Source: The company (used https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_rupee_exchange_rate_history for
the conversion rate from INR to USD average of the year); FY: financial year

Exhibit 7

Figure E1 Reducing trend in loss of workdays

Loss of Work -days

142
150 127

100 82

50 32
8 0 0 0
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Source: The Company

Corresponding author
Atri Sengupta can be contacted at: atrisengupta@iimsambalpur.ac.in

PAGE 12 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j VOL. 10 NO. 1 2020