Strengths of emotivism
The importance of the scientific approach to language
is accepted; words have particular meanings and they
must be empirically verified. Emotivism rejects,
therefore, the abstract use of words in previous
philosophical discussion.
A complex, sophisticated discussion of moral language
develops from emotivism. This is demonstrated by the
analysis of the statement “murder is wrong”. It
prevents ethicists regarding moral statements as self-
evidently true.
A distinction is made between ethical statements and
empirically verifiable facts — there is a “fact-value gap” terms are based in and related to facts of human life,
which is necessary for distinguishing between what we and that we have a factual and rational register for the
experience and what we hold as ethical positions.
The importance of each individual’s moral feelings is
stressed. The subjective nature of emotivism ensures
that all opinions are equally valid — it is egalitarian.
Stevenson’s views allow emotivism to move beyond a
“mere shouting match of emotions”, by stating that
people can differ in the way they respond, even though resolved, and thus it is deeply impractical. Also, Brandt
they have the same end in mind. He also asserts that
ethical statements contain elements of persuasion;
they present a moral claim.
Moral opinions are often based on gaining others’
approval or avoiding their disapproval; for instance,
Freudian theories of psychology argue that morality is
formed in childhood from authority figures
discouraging certain actions.
History reveals many examples of emotivist methods
of expressing moral views; for instance, Hitler’s
condemnation of the Jews and the modern extremist
position of the Westboro Baptist Church may not be
verifiable, but they are certainly emotivist.
Weaknesses of emotivism
Ayer’s logical positivism is by its own standards
meaningless.
Language may not be about verifiability; sentences
should not be seen as the linguistic equivalent of
arithmetical sums, because language is richer and more
opaque than science or maths.
Vardy says that the principal difficulty with emotivism
is that if we accept it as offering a good analysis of
moral language, all debate becomes “so much hot air”
and nothing else; talking about moral issues might help
release our feelings or persuade others into our points
of view, but we would be saying things which had no
significant meaning. Vardy says that this is “just plainly
improbable”, because “all morality cannot be reduced
simply to how we feel about something”.
Foot criticises this — she says that moral ideas and
goods that benefit and the wrongs that harm individual
and social life, and that moral terms express factually
elemental positions.
Just because you have an emotional feeling that
something is wrong does not logically mean that other
people should agree. According to Schlick, there is a
disconnection between, for example, the statement
“murder is wrong” and the implicit conclusion that
other people should not do it.
There are still no criteria in emotivism for judging
between two people’s moral opinions. Nothing can be
says that Stevenson assumes a “magnetic influence”
when this is not the case.
Ethical statements are not judged on the basis of the
emotional response of the hearer; they are judged on
the claims they make. As Warnock points out, to claim
“murder is wrong” is not simply about convincing the
hearer and making them approve; it is to make a
factual statement which can be discussed and debated.
If this were not the case, morality would change along
with emotions, causing extreme relativism and
subjectivism.
The fact that moral statements often carry a
tremendous weight of public and private emotions
does not mean that they are moral; it is possible for
one to feel right about something and yet be
considered very wrong.
Emotivism allows people to be used as a means to an
end, according to Macintyre.