‫ﻛﺎﻧﺖ‪ ،‬ﻭﻳﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﻳﻦ ﻣﺘﻘﺪﻡ ﻭ ﻧﻘﺪ ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﻲ‬

‫**‬
‫ﺳﺮﻭﺵ ﺩﺑﺎﻍ * ـ ﭘﺮﻫﺎﻡ ﻣﻬﺪﻳﺎﻥ‬

‫ﭼﻜﻴﺪﻩ‬

‫ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﻘﺎﻟﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺍﺑﺘﺪﺍ‪ ،‬ﻟﺐ ﺭﺃﻱ ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﻓﺎﻳﺪﻩﻣﺤﻮﺭ‪ ،‬ﺑـﻪ ﻋﻨـﻮﺍﻥ ﺷـﺎﺧﻪﺍﻱ ﻣﻬـﻢ ﺍﺯ ﻣﻜﺘـﺐ ﺍﺧـﻼﻕ ﺗﺠﺮﺑـﻲ ﻧﺘﻴﺠـﻪﮔـﺮﺍ‪،‬‬
‫ﺗﻮﺿﻴﺢ ﺩﺍﺩﻩ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﺩﺍﻣﻪ‪ ،‬ﺍﺯ ﺩﻭ ﻣﻨﻈﺮ ﺑﻪ ﻧﻘﺪ ﺁﻥ ﭘﺮﺩﺍﺧﺘﻪ ﺧﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﺷﺪ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﺑﺘﺪﺍ‪ ،‬ﻧﻘـﺪ ﻛﺎﻧـﺖ ﺑـﻪ ﺍﺧـﻼﻕ ﺗﺠﺮﺑـﻲ‪،‬‬
‫ﺑﺎ ﺗﻮﺟﻪ ﺑﻪ ﺁﻣﻮﺯﻩﻫﺎﻱ ﻣﺤﻮﺭﻱ ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﻛﺎﻧﺘﻲ‪ ،‬ﻣـﻮﺭﺩ ﺑﺮﺭﺳـﻲ ﻗـﺮﺍﺭ ﺧﻮﺍﻫـﺪ ﮔﺮﻓـﺖ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﺩﺍﻣـﻪ‪ ،‬ﺑـﺎ ﻣـﺪﻧﻈﺮ ﻗـﺮﺍﺭ ﺩﺍﺩﻥ‬
‫ﺗﺌﻮﺭﻱ ﻣﻌﻨﺎﺩﺍﺭﻱ ﺭﺳﺎﻟﻪ ﻣﻨﻄﻘﻲ ـ ﻓﻠﺴﻔﻲ‪ ،‬ﺭﺃﻱ ﻭﻳﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﻳﻦ ﺩﺭ ﻣﻮﺭﺩ ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﻣﻮﺭﺩ ﺑﺮﺭﺳﻲ ﻗﺮﺍﺭ ﮔﺮﻓﺘـﻪ‪ ،‬ﺭﺑـﻂ ﻭ ﻧـﺴﺒﺖ‬
‫ﺁﻥ ﺑﺎ ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﻛﺎﻧﺘﻲ ﻛﺎﻭﻳﺪﻩ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﻧﺘﻬﺎ‪ ،‬ﺑﻪ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﻬﻢ ﭘﺮﺩﺍﺧﺘـﻪ ﺧﻮﺍﻫـﺪ ﺷـﺪ ﻛـﻪ ﺁﻳـﺎ ﺑـﺮ ﻣﺒﻨـﺎﻱ ﻧﻈﺮﻳـﻪ ﻣﻌﻨـﺎﺩﺍﺭﻱ‬
‫ﻭﻳﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﻳﻦ‪ ،‬ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻣﻜﺎﻥ ﺗﺤﻘﻖ ﺩﺳﺘﮕﺎﻩ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﺳﺨﻦ ﮔﻔﺖ؟‬
‫ﻭﺍﮊﮔﺎﻥ ﻛﻠﻴﺪﻱ‪ :‬ﻧﻘﺪ ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﻲ‪ ،‬ﻓﺎﻳﺪﻩﮔﺮﺍﻳﻲ‪ ،‬ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ‪ ،‬ﻧﻈﺮﻳﻪ ﻣﻌﻨﺎﺩﺍﺭﻱ‪ ،‬ﻭﻳﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﻳﻦ ﻣﺘﻘﺪﻡ‪.‬‬

‫‪ .۱‬ﻣﻘﺪﻣﻪ‬
‫ﺑﺤﺚ ﻭ ﮔﻤﺎﻧﻪ ﺯﻧﻲ ﺑﺮ ﺳﺮ ﺑﻦﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﻭ ﻋﻘﺒﺔ ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺘﻲ ﺩﺍﻭﺭﻱﻫﺎﻱ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﺍﺯ ﻋﻤﺪﻩ ﺩﻏﺪﻏﻪﻫـﺎﻱ ﻓﻴﻠـﺴﻮﻓﺎﻥ ﺍﺧـﻼﻕ ﺍﺳـﺖ‪.‬‬
‫ﺑﺮﺧﻲ‪ ،‬ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺪ ﻧﺘﻴﺠﻪﮔﺮﺍﻫﺎ‪ ،‬ﺍﺣﺮﺍﺯ ﺧﻮﺑﻲ ﻭﺑﺪﻱﹺ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﻳﻚ ﻓﻌﻞ ﺭﺍ ﺩﺭ ﮔﺮﻭ ﺁﺛﺎﺭ ﻭ ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﻣﺘﺮﺗﺐ ﺑﺮ ﺁﻥ ﻣﻲﺩﺍﻧﻨـﺪ ﻭ ﺑـﺮ‬
‫ﺁﻧﻨﺪ ﻛﻪ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺭﺳﻴﺪﻥ ﺑﻪ ﺩﺍﻭﺭﻱ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﻣﻮﺟﻪ ﺑﺎﻳﺪ ﺑﻪ ﻋـﺎﻟﻢ ﺧـﺎﺭﺝ ﺭﺟـﻮﻉ ﻛﻨـﻴﻢ‪ .‬ﺍﻣـﺎ ﺑﺮﺧـﻲ ﺩﻳﮕـﺮ‪ ،‬ﻧﻈﻴـﺮ ﻛﺎﻧـﺖ ﻭ‬
‫ﻭﻳﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﻳﻦ ﻣﺘﻘﺪﻡ‪ ،‬ﻣﻌﺘﻘﺪﻧﺪ ﺗﺎ ﺁﻧﺠﺎ ﻛﻪ ﻣﺎ ﺑﺎ ﻭﻗﺎﻳﻊ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﭘﻴﺮﺍﻣﻮﻥ ﺳﺮ ﻭ ﻛﺎﺭ ﺩﺍﺭﻳـﻢ‪ ،‬ﺩﺍﻭﺭﻱ ﺍﺧﻼﻗـﻲ ﻧﻤـﻲﻛﻨـﻴﻢ؛ ﺯﻳـﺮﺍ‬
‫ﺍﻳﻦﻛﻪ ﭼﻪ ﺍﻣﺮﻱ ﺭﺥ ﺩﺍﺩﻩ ﺩﺭﺑﺎﺭﺓ ﺍﻳﻦﻛﻪ ﭼﻪ ﺍﻣﺮﻱ ﺑﺎﻳﺪ ﺍﻧﺠﺎﻡ ﺷﻮﺩ‪ ،‬ﭼﻴﺰﻱ ﺑﻪ ﻣﺎ ﻧﻤﻲﮔﻮﻳﺪ‪.‬‬

‫* ﺍﺳﺘﺎﺩﻳﺎﺭ ﻭ ﻋﻀﻮ ﻫﻴﺌﺖ ﻋﻠﻤﻲ ﻣﺆﺳﺴﻪ ﭘﮋﻭﻫﺸﻲ ﺣﻜﻤﺖ ﻭ ﻓﻠﺴﻔﻪ ﺍﻳﺮﺍﻥ‪.‬‬

‫* * ﺩﺍﻧﺸﺠﻮﻱ ﻛﺎﺭﺷﻨﺎﺳﻲ ﺍﺭﺷﺪ ﺩﺍﻧﺸﮕﺎﻩ ﺗﺮﺑﻴﺖ ﻣﺪﺭﺱ‪.‬‬
 ‫‪ .۲‬ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﻓﺎﻳﺪﻩﮔﺮﺍ‬
‫ﺍﺯ ﺟﻤﻠﻪ ﻣﻜﺎﺗﺐ ﻓﻠﺴﻔﻪ ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﻃﻮﻝ ﺗﺎﺭﻳﺦ ﻗﺎﺋﻠﻴﻦ ﻓﺮﺍﻭﺍﻧﻲ ﺩﺍﺷﺘﻪ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﻧﺘﻴﺠـﻪﮔـﺮﺍ ﺍﺳـﺖ‪ .‬ﺍﺯ ﻗـﺎﺋﻠﻴﻦ ﺑـﻪ‬
‫ﺍﻳﻦ ﻧﻈﺮﻳﻪ ﺩﺭ ﻳﻮﻧﺎﻥ ﺑﺎﺳﺘﺎﻥ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﺑﻪ ﺍﭘﻴﻜﻮﺭﻳﺎﻥ ﺍﺷﺎﺭﻩ ﻛـﺮﺩ‪ .‬ﺑﻌـﺪ ﺍﺯ ﺭﻧـﺴﺎﻧﺲ‪ ،‬ﺟﺮﻣـﻲ ﺑﻨﺘـﺎﻡ ﻭ ﺟـﺎﻥ ﺍﺳـﺘﻮﺍﺭﺕ ﻣﻴـﻞ‬
‫ﺳﻠﺴﻠﻪ ﺟﻨﺒﺎﻧﺎﻥ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻧﺤﻠﺔ ﻣﻬﻢ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﺑﻮﺩﻩﺍﻧﺪ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﻳﻚ ﺗﻘﺴﻴﻢﺑﻨـﺪﻱ ﻛﻠـﻲ‪ ،‬ﺍﺧـﻼﻕ ﻧﺘﻴﺠـﻪﮔـﺮﺍ ﻣـﺸﺘﻤﻞ ﺑـﺮ ﺳـﻪ ﺷـﺎﺧﻪ‬
‫ﺍﺳﺖ‪:‬‬
‫‪١‬‬
‫ﺍﻟﻒ( ﺧﻮﺩﻣﺤﻮﺭﻱ‬
‫‪٢‬‬
‫ﺏ( ﮔﺮﻭﻩﻣﺤﻮﺭﻱ‬
‫‪٣‬‬
‫ﺝ( ﻓﺎﻳﺪﻩ ﮔﺮﺍﻳﻲ‬
‫ﺧﻮﺩﻣﺤﻮﺭﻱ ﺭﻭﺍﻥﺷﻨﺎﺧﺘﻲ‪ ٤،‬ﺑﻪ ﻣﺜﺎﺑﺔ ﺁﻣﻮﺯﻩﺍﻱ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﻲ‪ ،‬ﻣﺘﻀﻤﻦ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﻌﻨﺎﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﺍﻧـﺴﺎﻥﻫـﺎ ﺑـﻪ ﺻـﺮﺍﻓﺖ ﻃﺒـﻊ ﺩﺭ ﭘـﻲ‬
‫ﻛﺴﺐ ﺳﻮﺩ ﻭ ﺩﻓﻊ ﺿﺮﺭ ﺧﻮﻳﺶ ﻫﺴﺘﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﺧﻮﺩﻣﺤﻮﺭﻱ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ‪ ٥،‬ﻛﻪ ﻳﻚ ﻧﻈﺮﻳـﻪ ﻫﻨﺠـﺎﺭﻱ ﻭ ﺍﺧﻼﻗـﻲ ﺍﺳـﺖ‪ ،‬ﺑـﺮ ﺍﻳـﻦ‬
‫ﻣﻄﻠﺐ ﺍﻧﮕﺸﺖ ﺗﺄﻛﻴﺪ ﻣﻲﻧﻬﺪ ﻛﻪ ﻛﺴﺐ ﻟﺬﺕ ﻭ ﺩﻓﻊ ﺍﻟﻢ ﺷﺨﺼﻲ ﺩﺭ ﺗﻜﻮﻥ ﺧﻮﺑﻲ ﻭ ﺑﺪﻱ ﻓﻌـﻞ ﻣـﺪﺧﻠﻴﺖ ﺗـﺎﻡ ﺩﺍﺭﻧـﺪ‪.‬‬
‫ﻓﺎﻋﻞ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺗﺸﺨﻴﺺ ﺧﻮﺑﻲ ﻭ ﺑﺪﻱ ﻓﻌﻠﻲ ﻣﻌﻴﻦ ﻛﺎﻓﻲ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﻟﺬﺕ ﻭ ﺍﻟﻢ ﺧﻮﻳﺶ ﺭﺍ ﺩﺭ ﻧﻈﺮ ﺑﮕﻴﺮﺩ ﻭﻻﻏﻴـﺮ‪ .‬ﺑـﻪ‬
‫ﻫﻤﻴﻦ ﺳﺒﺐ‪ ،‬ﭘﺎﺭﻩﺍﻱ ﺍﺯ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻴﻮﻥ ﺍﺳﺎﺳﺎﹰ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦﻛﻪ ﺧﻮﺩﻣﺤﻮﺭﻱ ﺭﺍ ﺑﺘﻮﺍﻥ ﺗﺌﻮﺭﻱﺍﻱ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﺑـﻪ ﺣـﺴﺎﺏ ﺁﻭﺭﺩ‪ ،‬ﺗﺮﺩﻳـﺪ‬
‫ﺩﺍﺭﻧﺪ‪ .‬ﻭﻓﻖ ﺭﺃﻱ ﺍﻳﺸﺎﻥ‪ ،‬ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﺍﺯ ﺗﻮﺟﻪ ﺑﻪ ﺩﻳﮕﺮﻱ ﻭ ﺑﺎ ﻗﻴﺪ ﻭ ﺑﻨﺪ ﻧﻬـﺎﺩﻥ ﺑـﺮ ﺗﻤـﺎﻳﻼﺕ ﻭ ﺧﻮﺍﺳـﺘﻪﻫـﺎﻱ ﺧـﻮﻳﺶ ﺁﻏـﺎﺯ‬
‫ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ ﻭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺩﻗﻴﻘﺎﹰ ﺍﻣﺮﻱ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﺧﻮﺩﻣﺤﻮﺭﻱ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﺁﻥ ﺭﺍ ﭘﺎﻙ ﺑﻪ ﻛﻨﺎﺭ ﻧﻬﺎﺩﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻞ‪ ،‬ﮔﺮﻭﻩﻣﺤـﻮﺭﻱ‪،‬‬
‫ﺍﺯ ﺍﺣﺮﺍﺯ ﻟﺬﺕ ﻭ ﺧﻮﺷﺒﺨﺘﻲ ﻭ ﺩﺭﺩ ﻭ ﺭﻧﺞ ﮔﺮﻭﻫﻲ ﺍﺯ ﻛﻨﺸﮕﺮﺍﻥ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ‪ ،‬ﻧﻈﻴﺮ ﻛﺎﺭﮔﺮﺍﻥ‪ ،‬ﻣﻌﻠﻤـﺎﻥ‪ ،‬ﺩﺍﻧـﺸﮕﺎﻫﻴﺎﻥ ﻭ‪،...‬‬
‫ﺑﻪ ﻣﺜﺎﺑﻪ ﻣﻼﻙ ﺗﺸﺨﻴﺺ ﺧﻮﺑﻲ ﻭ ﺑﺪﻱ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ‪ ،‬ﺳﺨﻦ ﻣﻲﮔﻮﻳﺪ‪.‬‬
‫ﻓﺎﻳﺪﻩﮔﺮﺍﻳﻲ‪ ،‬ﻣﺒﺘﻨﻲ ﺑﺮ ﺍﺻﻞ ﻓﺎﻳﺪﻩ‪ ٦‬ﺍﺳﺖ‪ :‬ﺑﻴـﺸﺘﺮﻳﻦ ﺧﻮﺷـﺒﺨﺘﻲ ﻭ ﻟـﺬﺕ ﺑـﺮﺍﻱ ﺑﻴـﺸﺘﺮﻳﻦ ﺍﻓـﺮﺍﺩ ﺟﺎﻣﻌـﻪ‪ .‬ﻣﻄـﺎﺑﻖ ﺑـﺎ ﺭﺃﻱ‬
‫ﻓﺎﻳﺪﻩﮔﺮﺍﻳﺎﻥ‪ ،‬ﻋﻤﻠﻲ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﻣﺘﻀﻤﻦ ﻛﺴﺐ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮﻳﻦ ﻟﺬﺕ ﻭ ﺧﻮﺷﺒﺨﺘﻲ ﻭ ﺩﻓـﻊ ﺑﻴـﺸﺘﺮﻳﻦ ﺩﺭﺩ ﻭ ﺭﻧـﺞ ﺑـﺮﺍﻱ‬
‫ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮﻳﻦ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺟﺎﻣﻌﻪ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ .‬ﺍﺯ ﺟﻤﻠﻪ ﺧﺼﻮﺻﻴﺎﺕ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻧﻈﺮﻳﻪ‪ ،‬ﺳﺎﺩﻩ ﻭ ﺩﺭ ﺩﺳﺘﺮﺱ ﺑﻮﺩﻥ ﻣـﻼﻙ ﺍﺭﺯﻳـﺎﺑﻲ ﺁﻥ ﺍﺳـﺖ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ‬

‫‪1. Egoism‬‬
‫‪2. Altruism‬‬
‫‪3. Utilitarianism‬‬
‫‪4. Psychological ٍEgoism‬‬
‫‪5. Ethical Egoism‬‬
‫‪6. Utility Principle‬‬

‫‪١‬‬
‫ﻭﺍﻗﻊ‪ ،‬ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﻫﻤﻪ ﻫﻨﺠﺎﺭﻫﺎ ﻭ ﻣﻼﺣﻈﺎﺕ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﺭﺍ ﺑﺮﺣﺴﺐ ﺍﺻﻞ ﻓﺎﻳﺪﻩ ﺻﻮﺭﺗﺒﻨﺪﻱ ﻛﺮﺩ‪ .‬ﺑـﺎ ﺑـﻪ ﻛـﺎﺭ ﺑـﺴﺘﻦ‬
‫ﺁﻣﻮﺯﻩﻫﺎﻱ ﻓﺎﻳﺪﻩﮔﺮﺍﻳﺎﻧﻪ‪ ،‬ﻛﻨﺸﮕﺮ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﺍﺯ ﻣﻮﺍﺟﻬﻪ ﺑﺎ ﺗﻌﺎﺭﺿﺎﺕ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﺭﻫﺎ ﻣﻲﮔﺮﺩﺩ‪ .‬ﭼـﺮﺍ ﻛـﻪ ﻣـﻲﺗـﻮﺍﻥ ﻣﻴـﺰﺍﻥ‬
‫ﻟﺬﺕ ﻭ ﺍﻟﻢ ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﺍﺯ ﻫﺮ ﻳﻚ ﺍﺯ ﺧﺼﻮﺻﻴﺎﺕ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﺩﺧﻴﻞ ﺩﺭ ﻳﻚ ﻣﻮﻗﻌﻴﺖ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﺭﺍ ﻣﺤﺎﺳﺒﻪ ﻧﻤﻮﺩ ﻭ ﺑـﺮ‬
‫ﻣﺒﻨﺎﻱ ﺁﻥ‪ ،‬ﺍﺯ ﺧﻮﺑﻲ ﻭ ﺑﺪﻱ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﻓﻌﻞ ﻣﻮﺭﺩ ﻧﻈﺮ ﺧﺒﺮ ﺩﺍﺩ‪ .‬ﺑﻪ ﺩﻳﮕﺮ ﺳﺨﻦ‪ ،‬ﺍﺯ ﺁﻧﺠﺎﻳﻲ ﻛﻪ ﺗﻨﻬﺎ ﺧﺼﻮﺻﻴﺎﺕ ﺍﺧﻼﻗـﻲ‪‬‬
‫ﻣﺮﺑﻮﻁ‪ ٧‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻧﺤﻠﻪ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﻋﺒﺎﺭﺗﻨـﺪ ﺍﺯ ﻟـﺬﺕ ﻭ ﺍﻟـﻢ ﻭ ﺩﺭ ﻋـﻴﻦ ﺣـﺎﻝ‪ ،‬ﺍﺧـﻼﻕ ﻧﻴـﺰ ﺻـﺒﻐﺔ ﻭﺣـﺪﺕﮔﺮﺍﻳﺎﻧـﻪ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ ﺗـﺎ‬
‫ﻛﺜﺮﺕﮔﺮﺍﻳﺎﻧﻪ‪ ،‬ﺍﺳﺎﺳﺎﹰ ﻗﺼﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﺭﺽ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﺳﺎﻟﺒﻪ ﺑﻪ ﺍﻧﺘﻔﺎﺀ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻉ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺗﻌﺎﺭﺽ ﻫﻨﮕﺎﻣﻲ ﭘﻴﺶ ﻣﻲﺁﻳﺪ ﻛﻪ ﭘﺎﻱ ﺑـﻴﺶ‬
‫ﺍﺯ ﻳﻚ ﻣﻘﻮﻟﻪ ﺩﺭ ﻣﻴﺎﻥ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻨﺠﺎ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺗﺸﺨﻴﺺ ﺧﻮﺑﻲ ﻭ ﺑﺪﻱ ﻭ ﺑﺎﻳﺴﺘﮕﻲ ﻭ ﻧﺒﺎﻳﺴﺘﮕﻲ ﻓﻌـﻞ‪ ،‬ﺗﻤـﺎﻡ ﺧـﺼﻮﺻﻴﺎﺕ‬
‫ﺩﺧﻴﻞ ﺩﺭ ﻳﻚ ﻣﻮﻗﻌﻴﺖ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﺻﺮﻓﺎﹰ ﺑﺮﺣﺴﺐ ﻟﺬﺕ ﻭ ﺍﻟﻤﻲ ﻛﻪ ﺑﻪ ﺑﺎﺭ ﻣﻲﺁﻭﺭﻧﺪ‪ ،‬ﺳﻨﺠﻴﺪﻩ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﻧﺪ ﻭ ﺑﺲ‪.‬‬
‫ﺑﻨﺎﺑﺮ ﺁﻧﭽﻪ ﺁﻣﺪ‪ ،‬ﻣﻼﻙ ﺍﺗﺨﺎﺫ ﺗﺼﻤﻴﻢ ﻣﻮﺟﻪ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﺩﺭ ﺗﻤﺎﻣﻲ ﺷﺎﺧﻪﻫﺎﻱ ﻣﻜﺘﺐ ﻧﺘﻴﺠﻪﮔﺮﺍﻳﻲ‪ ،‬ﻋﻄﻒ ﻧﻈـﺮ ﮐـﺮﺩﻥ ﺑـﻪ‬
‫ﻋﻮﺍﻗﺐ ﻭ ﺁﺛﺎﺭ ﺧﺎﺭﺟﻲ ﻣﺘﺮﺗﺐ ﺑﺮ ﻓﻌﻞ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﻫﻤﻴﻦ ﺍﻣﺮ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﭘﺎﻱ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﺧﺎﺭﺝ ﻭ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﻪ ﺭﺍ ﺑﻪ ﻣﻴﺎﻥ ﻣﻲﻛﺸﺪ‪.‬‬
‫ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﻣﺜﺎﻝ‪ ،‬ﻓﺮﺽ ﮐﻨﻴﺪ ﺷﺨﺺ ‪ a‬ﺑﻪ ﺷﻤﺎ ﭘﻨﺎﻩ ﺁﻭﺭﺩﻩ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ ﻭ ﺷﻤﺎ ﺍﻭ ﺭﺍ ﺩﺭ ﻣﺤﻠﻲ ﻣﺨﻔﻲ ﮐﺮﺩﻩ ﺑﺎﺷﻴﺪ‪.‬ﺩﺭ ﻫﻤـﺎﻥ ﺍﻭﺿـﺎﻉ‬
‫ﺷﺨﺺ ‪ ،b‬ﮐﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺟﺴﺘﺠﻮﻱ ﺷﺨﺺ ‪ a‬ﺍﺳﺖ ﺑﺎ ﺣﺎﻟﺘﻲ ﺧﺸﻤﮕﻴﻦ ﻭ ﺩﺭ ﺣﺎﻟﻲ ﮐﻪ ﻣﺴﻠﺢ ﺍﺳﺖ ﺑﺮ‪ ،‬ﺷـﻤﺎ ﻭﺍﺭﺩ ﻣـﻲﺷـﻮﺩ‬
‫ﻭ ﺳﺮﺍﻍ ﺷﺨﺺ ‪ a‬ﺭﺍ ﻣﻲﮔﻴﺮﺩ‪ .‬ﺣﺎﻝ ﭼﻪ ﺑﺎﻳﺪ ﻛﺮﺩ ﻭ ﺍﻧﺠﺎﻡ ﻭ ﻳﺎ ﺗﺮﻙ ﻛﺪﺍﻡ ﻓﻌﻞ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻴـﺴﺖ؟ ﺍﺯ ﻃﺮﻓـﻲ ﺟـﺎﻥ ﺷـﺨﺺ‬
‫‪ a‬ﺩﺭ ﺧﻄﺮ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻭ ﺑﻪ ﻣﺠﺮﺩ ﺍﻳﻨﻜﻪ ﺷـﺨﺺ ‪ b‬ﺑـﻪ ﺩﻻﻟـﺖ ﺷـﻤﺎ ﺷـﺨﺺ ‪ a‬ﺭﺍ ﺑﻴﺎﺑـﺪ‪ ،‬ﺍﻭ ﺭﺍ ﺍﺯ ﭘـﺎﻱ ﺩﺭ ﺧﻮﺍﻫـﺪ ﺁﻭﺭﺩ‪ .‬ﺍﺯ‬
‫ﺳﻮﻱ ﺩﻳﮕـﺮ‪ ،‬ﺑـﺮﺍﻱ ﺩﻓـﻊ ﺷـﺮ ﺍﻭﻝ‪ ،‬ﻣـﻲﺗـﻮﺍﻥ ﺩﺭﻭﻍ ﮔﻔـﺖ ﺑـﻪ ﻃـﻮﺭﻱ ﻛـﻪ ﺷـﺨﺺ ‪ b‬ﺷـﺨﺺ ‪ a‬ﺭﺍ ﻧﻴﺎﺑـﺪ‪ .‬ﻣﻄـﺎﺑﻖ ﺑـﺎ‬
‫ﺁﻣﻮﺯﻩﻫﺎﻱ ﻣﻜﺘﺐ ﻓﺎﻳﺪﻩﮔﺮﺍﻳﻲ‪ ،‬ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺗﺸﺨﻴﺺ ﺭﻭﺍﻳﻲ ﻳﺎ ﻧﺎﺭﻭﺍﻳﻲ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﺩﺭﻭﻍ ﮔﻔـﺘﻦ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳـﻦ ﺳـﻴﺎﻕ‪ ،‬ﺑﺎﻳـﺪ ﻣﺤﺎﺳـﺒﻪ‬
‫ﻧﻤﻮﺩ ﻛﻪ ﺁﻳﺎ ﺍﻧﺠﺎﻡ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻓﻌﻞ ﻣﺘﻀﻤﻦ ﻛﺴﺐ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮﻳﻦ ﻟﺬﺕ ﻭ ﻣﻨﻔﻌـﺖ ﻭ ﺩﻓـﻊ ﺑﻴـﺸﺘﺮﻳﻦ ﺿـﺮﺭ ﺧﻮﺍﻫـﺪ ﺑـﻮﺩ ﻳـﺎ ﻧـﻪ؟ ﺍﮔـﺮ‬
‫ﺩﺭﻭﻍ ﮔﻔﺘﻦ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺳﻴﺎﻕ ﻣﺘﻀﻤﻦ ﻛﺴﺐ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮﻳﻦ ﺳﻮﺩ ﻭ ﺩﻓﻊ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮﻳﻦ ﺍﻟﻢ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ ،‬ﺻﺪﻭﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻓﻌﻞ ﺍﺯ ﻛﻨﺸﮕﺮ ﺍﺧﻼﻗـﻲ‬
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‫ﺭﻭﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬‬

‫‪ .۳‬ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﻛﺎﻧﺘﻲ‪:‬‬

‫‪7. morally relevant features‬‬

‫‪ .۸‬ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺁﺷﻨﺎﻳﻲ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ ﺑﺎ ﻣﮑﺘﺐ ﻧﺘﻴﺠﻪ ﮔﺮﺍﻳﻲ ﻭ ﺍﻗﺴﺎﻡ ﺁﻥ‪ ،‬ﻧﮕﺎﻩ ﮐﻨﻴﺪ ﺑﻪ‪:‬‬
‫‪-Tannsjo, T. (2002) Understanding Ethics: An Introduction to Moral Theory (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University‬‬
‫‪Press), chapters 2-3.‬‬
‫‪-Odel, S.J. (2004) On Consequentialist Ethics (Canada: wadsworth).‬‬

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‫ﻓﻠﺴﻔﻪ ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﺷﺒﺎﻫﺖ ﻭ ﺗﻨﺎﻇﺮ ﺯﻳﺎﺩﻱ ﺑﺎ ﻓﻠﺴﻔﻪ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻲ ﺍﻭ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ‪ .‬ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﺩﺭ ﻓﻠﺴﻔﻪ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻲ ﺧﻮﺩ ﺑـﻪ ﺑﺮﺍﺑـﺮﻱ ﺗﻤـﺎﻣﻲ‬
‫ﺍﻧﺴﺎﻧﻬﺎ ﻭ ﻣﺨﺘﺎﺭ ﻭ ﺁﺯﺍﺩ ﺑﻮﺩﻥ ﺍﻳﺸﺎﻥ ﺑﺎﻭﺭ ﺩﺍﺷﺖ‪ .‬ﺍﻭ‪ ،‬ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺷﺮﺍﻳﻂ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻲ ﻧﺎﻣﻨﺎﺳﺒﻲ ﻣـﻲﺯﻳـﺴﺖ‪ ،‬ﺷـﺎﻫﺪ ﻗﺮﺑـﺎﻧﻲ ﺷـﺪﻥ‬
‫ﺁﺯﺍﺩﻱ ﻣﺮﺩﻡ ﻭ ﺳﺮﻧﻮﺷﺖ ﺁﻧﻬﺎ ﺩﺭ ﭘﺎﻱ ﺧﻮﺩﻛﺎﻣﮕﻲ ﻭ ﻣﻨﻔﻌـﺖ ﻃﻠﺒـﻲ ﺣﻜﻮﻣـﺖ ﭘـﺮﻭﺱ ﺑـﻮﺩ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﭼﻨـﻴﻦ ﻓـﻀﺎﻳﻲ ﻭ ﺑـﻪ‬
‫ﻭﺍﺳﻄﻪ ﺣﻀﻮﺭ ﻓﻜﺮﻱ ﻣﺎﻛﻴﺎﻭﻟﻲ ‪ ،‬ﻫﺪﻑ ﻫﺮ ﻭﺳﻴﻠﻪ ﺍﻱ ﺭﺍ ﺗﻮﺟﻴﻪ ﻣﻲ ﻛﺮﺩ ﻭ ﺩﻭﻟﺘﻤﺮﺩﺍﻥ ﺑﻪ ﻣﻨﻈـﻮﺭ ﺍﺳـﺘﺤﻜﺎﻡ ﭘﺎﻳـﻪ ﻫـﺎﻱ‬
‫ﺣﻜﻮﻣﺖ‪ ،‬ﺧﻮﻳﺶ ﺭﺍ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻗﺪﺍﻡ ﺑﻪ ﻫﺮﮔﻮﻧﻪ ﻓﺮﻳﺒﮑﺎﺭﻱ ﻭ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﺀ ﺳﺨﻨﺎﻥ ﺩﺭﻭﻍ ﻣﺠﺎﺯ ﻣﻲﺩﺍﻧﺴﺘﻨﺪ‪.‬‬
‫ﺑﻨﺎ ﺑﺮ ﻓﻠﺴﻔﻪ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻲ ﮐﺎﻧﺖ‪ ،‬ﻣﻨﺎﺳﺒﺎﺕ ﺍﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻭﺿﺎﻉ ﻃﺒﻴﻌﻲ ﻣﻤﻠﻮ ﺍﺯ ﮐﺸﻤﮑﺶ ﻭﺩﺭﮔﻴﺮﻱ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻭﺗﻨﻬﺎ ﺩﺭ ﺳـﺎﻳﻪ ﻳـﮏ‬
‫ﺣﮑﻮﻣﺖ ﺁﺯﺍﺩ ﻭ ﺩﻣﻮﮐﺮﺍﺗﻴﮏ ﺍﺳﺖ ﮐﻪ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻧﺰﺍﻉ ﻓﺮﻭﮐﺶ ﻣﻲﮐﻨﺪ؛ ﺣﮑـﻮﻣﺘﻲ ﮐـﻪ ﺑـﻪ ﺁﺯﺍﺩﻱ ﻭ ﺍﺭﺍﺩﻩ ﺷـﻬﺮﻭﻧﺪﺍﻥ ﺑﻬـﺎ‬
‫ﻣﻲﺩﻫﺪ‪.‬ﺍﺯ ﻣﻨﻈﺮ ﮐﺎﻧﺖ ﺑﺎﻳﺴﺘﮕﻲ ﺗﮑـﻮﻳﻦ ﻭ ﺗﺄﺳـﻴﺲ ﺟﺎﻣﻌـﻪ ﺍﻱ ﻣﺘـﺸﮑﻞ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻧـﺴﺎﻧﻬﺎﻱ ﺁﺯﺍﺩ ﻭ ﻣﺨﺘـﺎﺭ ﻣﺒﻨـﺎﻳﻲ ﺍﺧﻼﻗـﻲ‬
‫ﺩﺍﺭﺩ‪ .‬ﺍﻭ ﺑﺎ ﻋﻠﻢ ﺑﻪ ﺗﻨﻮﻉ ﻭ ﺗﻜﺜﺮ ﻓﺮﻭ ﻧﺎﻛﺎﺳﺘﻨﻲ ﺯﻣﻴﻨﻪﻫﺎﻱ ﻓﺮﻫﻨﮕﻲ ـ ﺍﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ ـ ﺍﻋﺘﻘﺎﺩﻱ ﺷﻬﺮﻭﻧﺪﺍﻥ ﻳﮏ ﺟﺎﻣﻌـﻪ‪ ،‬ﺑـﺮﺍﻱ‬
‫ﺭﻫﺎﻳﻲ ﺍﺯ ﺗﻌﺎﺭﺽ ﻭ ﻛﺸﻤﻜﺶ ﻭ ﻭﺿﻊ ﻗﻮﺍﻧﻴﻦ ﻓﺮﺍﮔﻴﺮ ﻭ ﻣﻮﺭﺩ ﭘﺬﻳﺮﺵ ﻫﻤﮕﺎﻥ‪ ،‬ﺑﻪ ﺍﺻـﻠﻲ ﻋﻘﻼﻧـﻲ‪ ،‬ﭘﻴـﺸﻴﻨﻲ ﻭ ﻣـﺎ ﻗﺒـﻞ‬
‫ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻲ ﺗﻤﺴﮏ ﻣﻲﺟﻮﻳﺪ‪» :‬ﺑﻪ ﮔﻮﻧﻪ ﺍﻱ ﺭﻓﺘﺎﺭ ﮐﻦ ﮐﻪ ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﺁﻥ ﺑﺎ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮﻳﻦ ﺁﺯﺍﺩﻱ ﺑﻴﺮﻭﻧﻲ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﻫﻤﻪ ﻣـﺮﺩﻡ‪ ،‬ﺳـﺎﺯﮔﺎﺭ‬
‫ﺑﺎﺷﺪ«؛‪ ٩‬ﺍﻭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﺻﻞ ﺭﺍ »ﺍﺻﻞ ﻋﺎﻡ ﻋﺪﺍﻟﺖ«‪ ١٠‬ﻣﻲﻧﺎﻣﺪ‪.‬‬
‫ﻣﺘﻨﺎﻇﺮ ﺑﺎ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻧﮕﺮﺵ ﺩﺭ ﻓﻠﺴﻔﻪ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻲ‪ ،‬ﮐﺎﻧﺖ ﺩﺭ ﻭﺍﺩﻱ ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﻧﻴﺰ ﺑﺮ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺑﺎﻭﺭ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﻣﻴﺎﻥ ﻋﻘﻞ ﻭ ﻧﻔـﺲ ﺗﻌﺎﺭﺿـﻲ‬
‫ﻫﻤﻴﺸﮕﻲ ﺑﺮﻗﺮﺍﺭ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﻭﻱ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺗﻔﻮﻕ ﻳـﺎﻓﺘﻦ ﻋﻘـﻞ ﺑـﺮ ﻧﻔـﺲ ﻭ ﺑـﻪﺩﺳـﺖ ﺩﺍﺩﻥ ﺗﻘﺮﻳـﺮﻱ ﻣﻮﺟـﻪ ﺍﺯ ﭼﮕـﻮﻧﮕﻲ ﺗﻨﻈـﻴﻢ‬
‫ﻣﻨﺎﺳﺒﺎﺕ ﻭ ﺭﻭﺍﺑﻂ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﻛﻨﺸﮕﺮﺍﻥ‪ ،‬ﺩﺳﺘﮕﺎﻩ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲﺍﻱ ﺭﺍ ﻣﺒﺘﻨﻲ ﺑﺮ ﺍﺭﺍﺩﻩ ﺁﺯﺍﺩ ﻭ ﺍﻭﺍﻣﺮ ﻣﻄﻠﻖ‪ ١١‬ﭘﻴﺸﻨﻬﺎﺩ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﺪ‪.‬‬
‫ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﺑﺎ ﺁﻣﻮﺯﻩ ﻫﺎﻱ ﮐﺎﻧﺖ‪ ،‬ﺍﻧﺴﺎﻥ ﻭﺍﺟﺪ ﻗﻮﻩ ﻋﺎﻗﻠﻪ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻭ ﻫﻤﻴﻦ ﺧﺼﻮﺻﻴﺖ ﺍﺳـﺖ ﻛـﻪ ﻓـﺮﻕ ﻓـﺎﺭﻕ ﻣﻴـﺎﻥ ﺍﻭ ﻭ ﺳـﺎﻳﺮ‬
‫ﻣﻮﺟﻮﺩﺍﺕ ﺭﺍ ﺗﺸﮑﻴﻞ ﻣﻲ ﺩﻫﺪ‪ .‬ﺍﻧﺴﺎﻧﻴﺖ ﺍﻧﺴﺎﻥ ﺑﺼﻮﺭﺕ ﺍﺭﺍﺩﺓ ﻣﺘﻌـﻴﻦ ﺷـﺪﻩﺍﻱ‪ ،‬ﻛـﻪ ﺩﺭ ﻗﺎﻟـﺐ ﺍﺣﻜـﺎﻡ‪ ١٢‬ﻭ ﮔـﺰﺍﺭﻩﻫـﺎﻱ‬
‫ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﺩﺭﻣﻲﺁﻳﺪ‪ ،‬ﻣﺘﺠﻠﻲ ﻣﻲ ﺷﻮﺩ‪ .‬ﭼﻨﻴﻦ ﺍﺭﺍﺩﻩ ﻣﺘﻌﻴﻦ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺍﻱ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻗﺘﻀﺎﺋﺎﺕ ﻫﻨﺠﺎﺭﻱ ﻗﻮﻩ ﻋﺎﻗﻠﻪ ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬‬
‫ﺑﺎ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺗﻮﺿﻴﺢ ﻛﻪ ﺣﻮﺍﺩﺛﻲ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﭘﺪﻳﺪﺍﺭﻱ ﺭﺥ ﻣﻲﺩﻫﻨﺪ ﻣﺤﻜﻮﻡ ﺑﻪ ﺗﺒﻌﻴﺖ ﺍﺯ ﻗﻮﺍﻧﻴﻦ ﻃﺒﻴﻌـﻲ‪ ،‬ﻭ ﺗﻐﻴﻴـﺮ ﻧﺎﭘﺬﻳﺮﻧـﺪ‪.‬‬
‫ﺑﻪﻋﻨﻮﺍﻥ ﻣﺜـﺎﻝ‪ ،‬ﻗـﻮﺍﻧﻴﻨﻲ‪ ،‬ﻧﻈﻴـﺮ ﻋﻠﻴـﺖ‪ ،‬ﺟﺎﺫﺑـﻪ‪ ،‬ﻓﻴﺰﻳـﻚ ﻧﻴـﻮﺗﻨﻲ ﻭ‪ ،...‬ﺩﺭﺟﻬـﺎﻥ ﺑﺮﻗﺮﺍﺭﻧـﺪ ﺑـﻪﻃﻮﺭﻳﻜـﻪ ﺗﺨﻄـﻲ ﺍﺯ ﺁﻧﻬـﺎ‬
‫ﺍﻣﻜﺎﻥﭘﺬﻳﺮ ﻧﻴﺴﺖ‪.‬‬
‫ﻣﺎﺩﺍﻣﻴﻜﻪ ﺩﺭﺑﺎﺭﺓ ﺟﻬﺎﻥ ﭘﺪﻳﺪﺍﺭﻱ ﺳﺨﻦ ﻣﻲﮔﻮﻳﻴﻢ‪ ،‬ﺍﻧﺴﺎﻥ ﻧﻴﺰ ﺩﺭ ﻋﺪﺍﺩ ﻳﻜﻲ ﺍﺯ ﻣﻮﺟﻮﺩﺍﺕ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺟﻬﺎﻥ‪ ،‬ﻣﺸﻤﻮﻝ ﻗـﻮﺍﻧﻴﻦ‬
‫ﺁﻥ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻭ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ‪ ،‬ﺗﻔﺎﻭﺗﻲ ﺑﺎ ﺳﺎﻳﺮﻣﻮﺟﻮﺩﺍﺕ ﻧﺪﺍﺭﺩ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻞ‪ ،‬ﺑﻪ ﻣﻴﺰﺍﻧـﻲ ﻛـﻪ ﺍﻧـﺴﺎﻥ ﺁﺯﺍﺩﻱ ﺧـﻮﻳﺶ ﺭﺍ ﻣﺤﻘـﻖ‬

‫‪ . .۹‬ﺍﻣﺎﻧﻮﺋﻞ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ‪ ،‬ﻧﻘﻞ ﺑﺎﺍﻧﺪﮐﻲ ﺩﺧﻞ ﻭ ﺗﺼﺮﻑ ﺍﺯ‪ :‬ﺭﺍﺟﺮ ﺳﺎﻟﻴﻮﺍﻥ‪ ،‬ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﺩﺭ ﻓﻠﺴﻔﻪ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ‪ ،‬ﺗﺮﺟﻤﺔ ﻋﺰﺕﺍﷲ ﻓﻮﻻﺩﻭﻧﺪ‪ ،‬ﻃﺮﺡ ﻧﻮ‪ ،‬ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ‪.۱۳۸۰ .‬‬
‫‪۱۰. Universal Principle of Justice‬‬
‫‪11. Categorical Imperatives‬‬
‫‪12. maxims‬‬

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‫ﺳﺎﺯﺩ‪ ،‬ﺍﻧﺴﺎﻥ ﺗﺮ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻣﻌﺘﻘﺪ ﺍﺳﺖ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﻪ ﻓﻘﻂ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻣﻮﺭ ﺍﻣﻜﺎﻧﻲ ﺑﺮﻣﻲﺩﺍﺭﺩ ﻭ ﻫﻴﭻ ﭼﻴﺰﻱ ﺩﺭﺑـﺎﺭﻩ ﺍﻣـﺮ ﻣﻄﻠـﻖ‪ .‬ﻛـﻪ‬
‫ﺍﺳﺎﺱ ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﺍﻭ ﺭﺍ ﺗﺸﻜﻴﻞ ﻣﻲﺩﻫﺪ‪ ،‬ﻧﻤﻲﮔﻮﻳﺪ‪ .‬ﺍﻣﺮ ﻣﻄﻠﻖ ﻣﻘﻮﻟﻪﺍﻱ ﺗﺮﻛﻴﺒﻲ‪ ،‬ﭘﻴﺸﻴﻨﻲ ﻭ ﺭﺍﻫﻨﻤﺎﻱ ﻋﻤﻞ ﺍﺳـﺖ ﻭ ﺑﺎﻳـﺪﻱ‬
‫ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺁﻥ ﻣﻨﺪﺭﺝ ﺍﺳﺖ ﺁﻥ ﺭﺍ ﺍﺯ ﺳﺎﺣﺖ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﻪ ﺑﻴﺮﻭﻥ ﻣﻲﺭﺍﻧﺪ‪ .‬ﻫﻴﭻ ﭼﻴﺰ ﺩﺭ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﺧﺎﺭﺝ ﻣﺒﺘﻨﻲ ﺑﺮ ﺍﻧﺘﺨـﺎﺏ ﺁﺯﺍﺩ‬
‫ﻭ ﻋﺎﻗﻼﻧﻪ ﺭﺥ ﻧﻤﻲﺩﻫﺪ‪ .‬ﻫﺮ ﺁﻧﭽﻪ ﺩﺭ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﻪ ﺭﺥ ﻣﻲﺩﻫﺪ‪ ،‬ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻝ ﻋﻠﺘﻲ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻭ ﺍﺧﺘﻴﺎﺭﻱ ﺩﺭ ﭘﺲ ﭘـﺸﺖ ﺁﻥ ﺩﻳـﺪﻩ‬
‫ﻧﻤﻲﺷﻮﺩ‪ .‬ﺍﺯ ﻫﻤﻴﻦﺭﻭ‪ ،‬ﻣﻔﻬﻮﻡ ﺁﺯﺍﺩﻱ ﻭ ﺑﻪ ﻣﻨﺼﻪ ﻇﻬﻮﺭ ﺭﺳﺎﻧﺪﻥ ﺁﻥ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ ﻣﻌﻨﺎﻱ ﻛﺎﻧﺘﻲ ﻛﻠﻤﻪ‪ ،‬ﻧﺴﺒﺘﻲ ﺑـﺎ ﺟﻬـﺎﻥ ﭘﻴﺮﺍﻣـﻮﻥ‬
‫ﻧﺪﺍﺷﺘﻪ‪ ،‬ﻣﻘﻮﻟﻪﺍﻱ ﺍﺳﺘﻌﻼﻳﻲ ﻭ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﻪ ﺣﻮﺯﺓ ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﺑﻴﺮﻭﻥ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺟﻬﺎﻥ ﭘﺪﻳﺪﺍﺭﻱ ﻭﺍﻗﻊ ﺷـﺪﻩ ﺍﺳـﺖ‪ .‬ﺁﺯﺍﺩﻱ‬
‫ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﻌﻨﺎ ﺑﺎ ﺍﺣﻜﺎﻡ ﻫﻨﺠﺎﺭﻱﺍﻱ ﻛﻪ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻗﺘﻀﺎﺋﺎﺕ ﻋﻘﻞ ﻋﻤﻠﻲ ﻫﺴﺘﻨﺪ‪ ،‬ﻫﻢ ﻋﻨﺎﻥ ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬‬
‫ﭘﺲ ﺑﻨﺎﺑﺮ ﺭﺃﻱ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ‪ ،‬ﺍﻣﺮ ﻣﻄﻠﻖ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﻛﻪ ﺳﻠﺴﻠﻪﺟﻨﺒﺎﻥ ﺍﺣﻜﺎﻡ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﺍﺯ ﺍﺭﺍﺩﺓ ﻣﺘﻌﻴﻦ ﺷﺪﻩ ﻧﺸﺄﺕ ﻣﻲﮔﻴـﺮﺩ‪.‬‬
‫ﺩﺭ ﻋﻴﻦ ﺣﺎﻝ‪،‬‬
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‫»ﭼﻨﻴﻦ ﻫﻨﺠﺎﺭﻱ ﻳﻜﺘﺎﺳﺖ ﻭ ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﺑﻴﺶ ﺍﺯ ﻳﻜﻲ ﺍﺯ ﺁﻥ ﻣﻤﻜﻦ ﻧﻴﺴﺖ«‪.‬‬
‫ﻭﻱ ﺳﻪ ﺻﻮﺭﺗﺒﻨﺪﻱ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻣﺮ ﻣﻄﻠﻖ ﺍﺭﺍﺋﻪ ﻣﻲﮐﻨﺪ ﻭ ﺗﺎﻛﻴﺪ ﻣﻲ ﻭﺭﺯﺩ ﻛﻪ ﻫﺮ ﺳﻪ ﻣﻌﻄـﻮﻑ ﺑـﻪ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺘـﻲ ﻭﺍﺣﺪﻧـﺪ ﻭ ﺍﺯ ﻳـﮏ‬
‫ﻣﻘﻮﻟﻪ ﭘﺮﺩﻩ ﺑﺮﻣﻲﺩﺍﺭﻧﺪ ﺳﻪ ﺗﻨﺴﻴﻖ ﺍﻭ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻗﺮﺍﺭﻧﺪ‪:‬‬
‫ﺻﻮﺭﺗﺒﻨﺪﻱ ﺍﻭﻝ‪ ،‬ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻥ ﻋﺎﻡ‪» :‬ﻣﻦ ﻫﻴﭽﮕﺎﻩ ﻧﺒﺎﻳﺪ ﺟﺰ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺭﻓﺘﺎﺭ ﮐﻨﻢ ﻛﻪ ﻫﻤﻮﺍﺭﻩ ﺑﺘﻮﺍﻧﻢ ﺍﺭﺍﺩﻩ ﮐﻨﻢ ﮐـﻪ ﺁﻳـﻴﻦ ﺭﻓﺘـﺎﺭﻡ ﺑـﻪ‬
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‫ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﻲ ﻋﺎﻡ ﻣﺒﺪﻝ ﺷﻮﺩ‪«.‬‬
‫ﺻﻮﺭﺗﺒﻨﺪﻱ ﺩﻭﻡ‪ ،‬ﺍﺣﺘﺮﺍﻡ ﺑﻪ ﻛﺮﺍﻣـﺖ ﺍﺷـﺨﺎﺹ‪ »:‬ﭼﻨـﺎﻥ ﺭﻓﺘـﺎﺭ ﻛـﻦ ﻛـﻪ ﺑـﺸﺮﻳﺖ ﺭﺍ‪ ،‬ﭼـﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺧـﻮﺩ ﻭ ﭼـﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺷـﺨﺺ‬
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‫ﺩﻳﮕﺮﻱ‪ ،‬ﻫﻤﻴﺸﻪ ﺑﻪ ﻋﻨﻮﺍﻥ ﻳﮏ ﻏﺎﻳﺖ ﺑﻪ ﺷﻤﺎﺭ ﺁﻭﺭﻱ‪،‬ﻭﻧﻪ ﻫﺮﮔﺰ ﺗﻨﻬﺎ ﻫﻤﭽﻮﻥ ﻭﺳﻴﻠﻪ ﺍﻱ‪«.‬‬
‫ﺻﻮﺭﺗﺒﻨﺪﻱ ﺳﻮﻡ‪ ،‬ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻥ ﮔﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺟﺎﻣﻌﻪ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ‪» :‬ﻫﻤﻪ ﺁﻳﻴﻨﻬﺎﻱ ﺭﻓﺘﺎﺭ ﺑﺎﻳﺪ‪ ،‬ﺑـﻪ ﻭﺍﺳـﻄﻪ ﻗـﻮﺍﻧﻴﻨﻲ ﮐـﻪ ﺧـﻮﺩ ﻭﺿـﻊ‬
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‫ﻣﻴﮑﻨﻨﺪ ﺑﺎ ﻗﻠﻤﺮﻭ ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﻏﺎﻳﺎﺕ ﻭ ﻗﻠﻤﺮﻭ ﻃﺒﻴﻌﺖ ﻫﻤﺎﻫﻨﮓ ﺷﻮﻧﺪ‪«.‬‬
‫ﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﺍﻭﻝ‪ ،‬ﭼﻨﺎﻧﻜﻪ ﻣﺸﺨﺺ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﻣﻼﻛﻲ ﻋﻴﻨﻲ ‪ ،‬ﻣﻄﻠﻖ ﻭ ﻋﻘﻼﻧﻲ ﺑﺪﺳﺖ ﻣﻲ ﺩﻫـﺪ ﺗـﺎ ﺑـﺎ ﺑـﻪﻛـﺎﺭ ﺑـﺴﺘﻦ ﺁﻥ ﺑﺘـﻮﺍﻥ‬
‫ﺭﻭﺍﻳﻲ ﻳﺎ ﻧﺎﺭﻭﺍﻳﻲ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﻳﻚ ﻓﻌﻞ ﻣﻌﻴﻦ ﺭﺍ ﺗﺸﺨﻴﺺ ﺩﺍﺩ‪.‬‬
‫ﮐﺎﻧﺖ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﺻﻞ ﺭﺍ ﺗﻘﺮﻳﺒﺎ ﺑﻪﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﺷﻬﻮﺩﻱ ﻣﻲﭘﺬﻳﺮﺩ‪» :‬ﻋﻘﻞ ﻣﺸﺘﺮﮎ ﺁﺩﻣﻴﺎﻥ ﺩﺭ ﺩﺍﻭﺭﻳﻬﺎﻱ ﻋﻤﻠﻲ ﺧﻮﺩ ﺑﺎ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻧﮑﺘﻪ‬
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‫ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻘﺖ ﮐﺎﻣﻞ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ ﻭ ﻫﻤﻴﺸﻪ ﺍﺻﻠﻲ ﺭﺍ ﮐﻪ ﺍﻳﻨﺠﺎ ﺑﻴﺎﻥ ﮐﺮﺩﻳﻢ ﺩﺭ ﻧﻈﺮ ﻣﻴﮕﻴﺮﺩ‪«.‬‬

‫‪ .۱۳‬ﺍﻣﺎﻧﻮﺋﻞ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ‪ ،‬ﺑﻪ ﻧﻘﻞ ﺍﺯ‪ :‬ﺭﺍﺟﺮ ﺳﺎﻟﻴﻮﺍﻥ‪ ،‬ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﺩﺭ ﻓﻠﺴﻔﻪ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ‪ ،‬ﺗﺮﺟﻤﺔ ﻋﺰﺕﺍﷲ ﻓﻮﻻﺩﻭﻧﺪ‪ ،‬ﻃﺮﺡ ﻧﻮ‪ ،‬ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ‪ ،۱۳۸۰ ،‬ﺹ‪.۷۷‬‬
‫‪.۱۴‬ﺍﻣﺎﻧﻮﺋﻞ ﮐﺎﻧﺖ‪،‬ﺑﻨﻴﺎﺩ ﻣﺎﺑﻌﺪﺍﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﻪ ﺍﺧﻼﻕ‪،‬ﺗﺮﺟﻤﻪ ﺣﻤﻴﺪ ﻋﻨﺎﻳﺖ ﻭ ﻋﻠﻲ ﻗﻴﺼﺮﻱ‪،‬ﺧﻮﺍﺭﺯﻣﻲ‪ ،‬ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ‪ ،‬ﺳﺎﻝ ؟؟؟ﺹ‪.۲۷‬‬
‫‪.۱۵‬ﻣﻨﺒﻊ ﭘﻴﺸﻴﻦ ﺹ‪.۷۴‬‬
‫‪ .۱۶‬ﻣﻨﺒﻊ ﭘﻴﺸﻴﻦ ﺹ‪.۸۷‬‬
‫‪ .۱۷‬ﻣﻨﺒﻊ ﭘﻴﺸﻴﻦ ﺹ‪.۲۷‬‬

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‫ﺑﺮ ﻣﺒﻨﺎﻱ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺗﻨﺴﻴﻖ‪ ،‬ﺍﻣﺮ ﻣﻄﻠﻖ ﻛﻨﺸﮕﺮﺍﻥ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﺭﺍ ﺍﺯ ﻋﻤﻞ ﻛﺮﺩﻥ ﺑﻪ ﺍﺣﻜﺎﻣﻲ ﻛﻪ ﺑﺪﻭﻥ ﺗﻨﺎﻗﺾ ﺩﺭﻭﻧﻲ ﻧﺘـﻮﺍﻥ ﺁﻧﻬـﺎ‬
‫ﺭﺍ ﺑﻪﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻥ ﻋﺎﻡ ﺩﺭ ﺁﻭﺭﺩ‪ ،‬ﻣﻨﻊ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﺪ‪.‬ﺍﻳﻦ ﺗﻨﺎﻗﺾ ﺩﺭﻭﻧﻲ ﻳﺎ ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﺍﺯ ﺗﺼﻮﺭ ﻫﻤﺰﻣﺎﻥ ﺧﻮﺩ ﻓﻌﻞ ﺑﺎ ﻗـﺎﻧﻮﻥ ﻋـﺎﻡ‬
‫ﺍﺳﺖ ﻭ ﻳﺎ ﻧﺎﺷﻲ ﺍﺯ ﺗﻨﺎﻗﺾ ﻣﻴﺎﻥ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺿﺎﺑﻄﻪ ﺑﺎ ﺩﻳﮕﺮ ﻗﻮﺍﻧﻴﻦ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲﺍﻱ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﮔﺬﺷﺘﻪ ﺑﺮ ﻣﺴﻨﺪ ﺗﺼﻮﻳﺐ ﻧﺸﺴﺘﻪﺍﻧﺪ‪.‬‬
‫ﺫﻛﺮ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻧﻜﺘﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻨﺠﺎ ﺿﺮﻭﺭﻱ ﻣﻲﻧﻤﺎﻳﺪ ﻛﻪ ﺗﻨﺎﻗﺾ ﻋﻨﻮﺍﻥ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺻـﻮﺭﺗﺒﻨﺪﻱ ﻟﺰﻭﻣـﺎ ﺑﺎﻳـﺪ ﺍﺯ ﺟـﻨﺲ ﺗﻨـﺎﻗﺾ‬
‫ﻣﻨﻄﻘﻲ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ ،‬ﻳﻌﻨﻲ ﺻﺮﻓﺎ ﺑﺎ ﻣﺪﺩ ﮔﺮﻓﺘﻦ ﺍﺯ ﺗﺤﻠﻴﻞ ﻋﻘﻼﻧﻲ ﻭ ﺑﻪﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﭘﻴﺸﻴﻨﻲ ﺑﻪﺩﺳﺖ ﺁﻳﺪ‪.‬ﻫﺮ ﭼﻨﺪ ﺑﻨﺎ ﺑﻪ ﻧﻈـﺮ ﻛﺎﻧـﺖ‪،‬‬
‫ﻫﻨﮕﺎﻣﻴﻜﻪ ﺑﺨﻮﺍﻫﻴﻢ ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻥ ﻋﺎﻡ ﺭﺍ ﺍﺯ ﺷﮑﻞ ﻛﻠﻲ ﻭ ﺻﻮﺭﻱ ﺁﻥ ﺑﻪﺷﻜﻞ ﻣﺤﺘـﻮﺍﻳﻲ ﺍﺳـﺘﺨﺮﺍﺝ ﻧﻤـﺎﻳﻴﻢ‪ ،‬ﺑـﻪ ﻧﺎﭼـﺎﺭ ﺁﻧـﺮﺍ ﺍﺯ‬
‫ﻣﺤﺘﻮﺍﻱ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﻪ ﭘﺮ ﻣﻲ ﻛﻨﻴﻢ‪ .‬ﻭﻟﻲ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺻﺮﻓﺎ ﻳﻚ ﻣﺮﺣﻠﻪ ﻣﻴﺎﻧﻲ ﻭ ﺍﺳـﺘﻌﻼﺟﻲ ﺍﺳـﺖ ﻭ ﻧﺘﻴﺠـﻪ ﮔﻴـﺮﻱ ﻣـﺎ ﺑﺎﻳـﺪ ﺻـﺮﻓﺎ ﺑـﺮ‬
‫ﻣﺒﻨﺎﻱ ﺑﺮﻭﺯ ﻳﺎ ﻋﺪﻡ ﺑﺮﻭﺯ ﺗﻨﺎﻗﻀﻲ ﻛﻪ ﻣﻨﺸﺄ ﻣﻨﻄﻘﻲ ـ ﻋﻘﻼﻧﻲ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ‪ ،‬ﺍﺳﺘﻮﺍﺭ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪.‬‬
‫ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺭﻭﺷﻨﺘﺮ ﺷﺪﻥ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﻬﻢ ﺧﻮﺏ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻣﺜﺎﻟﻲ ﺭﺍ ﻛﻪ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﺩﺭﺑﺎﺭﻩ ﻭﻋﺪﻩ ﺩﺭﻭﻍ ﻣﻲﺯﻧـﺪ‪ ،‬ﺭﺍ ﺩﺭ ﻧﻈـﺮ ﺑﮕﻴـﺮﻳﻢ‪ .‬ﻓـﺮﺽ‬
‫ﻛﻨﻴﺪ ﻣﻲ ﺧﻮﺍﻫﻴﻢ ﺑﺒﻴﻨﻴﻢ ﺁﻳﺎ ﻭﻋﺪﻩ ﺩﺭﻭﻍ ﺩﺍﺩﻥ ﻋﻤﻠﻲ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻳﺎ ﺧﻴﺮ؟ ﺧﻮﺏ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻣﺴﺌﻠﻪ ﺭﺍ ﺑﺮ ﻣﺒﻨﺎﻱ ﺍﺻـﻞ ﻋـﺎﻡ‬
‫ﻭ ﻫﻤﭽﻨﻴﻦ ﻣﻌﻴﺎﺭ ﺍﺭﺍﺋﻪ ﺷﺪﻩ ﺗﻮﺳﻂ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ‪ ،‬ﻣﺒﻨﻲ ﺑﺮ ﻟﺰﻭﻡ ﺑﺮﻭﺯ ﺗﻨﺎﻗﺾ ﺑـﺮﺍﻱ ﺿـﺪ ﺍﺧﻼﻗـﻲ ﺍﻧﮕﺎﺷـﺘﻪ ﺷـﺪﻥ ﻳـﻚ ﻓﻌـﻞ‪،‬‬
‫ﺍﻳﻨﮕﻮﻧﻪ ﺻﻮﺭ ﺗﺒﻨﺪﻱ ﻛﻨﻴﻢ‪:‬‬
‫ﭼﻨﺎﻧﭽﻪ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻓﻌﻞ ﺿﺪ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ ﺑﺎﻳﺪ‪ ،‬ﺗﺮﮐﻴﺐ ﻋﻄﻔﻲ ﺿﺎﺑﻄﻪ ﻓﺮﺩ ﻭ ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻥ ﻋﺎﻡ ﺗﻨﺎﻗﺾ ﺁﻣﻴﺰ ﺑﺎﺷـﺪ‪ .‬ﺑﮕﺬﺍﺭﻳـﺪ ﺿـﺎﺑﻄﻪ‬
‫ﻓﺮﺩ ﺭﺍ ﺍﻳﻨﮕﻮﻧﻪ ﺩﺭ ﻧﻈﺮ ﺑﮕﻴﺮﻳﻢ‪» :‬ﻣﻦ ﻫﺮ ﻫﻨﮕﺎﻡ ﻛﻪ ﺑﻪ ﻧﻔﻌﻢ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ ﻭﻋﺪﻩ ﺩﺭﻭﻍ ﻣﻲ ﺩﻫﻢ«‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ ﻫﻤﺎﻥ ﺣﺎﻝ ﻭ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺳـﺎﺧﺘﻦ‬
‫ﻳﻚ ﮔﺰﺍﺭﻩ ﻋﻄﻔﻲ‪ ،‬ﻣﻲ ﺑﺎﻳﺴﺖ ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻥ ﻋﺎﻡ ﺑﻪﺷﻜﻞ ﺯﻳﺮ ﻟﺤﺎﻅ ﺷﻮﺩ‪:‬‬
‫»ﻫﺮ ﻛﺴﻲ ﻫﺮ ﻫﻨﮕﺎﻡ ﻛﻪ ﺑﻪ ﻧﻔﻌﺶ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ ،‬ﻣﻲ ﺗﻮﺍﻧﺪ ﻭﻋﺪﻩ ﺩﺭﻭﻍ ﺑﺪﻫﺪ«‬
‫ﺑﻪ ﻧﻈﺮ ﻣﻲ ﺭﺳﺪ ﺗﺮﻛﻴﺐ ﻋﻄﻔﻲ ﻣﻴﺎﻥ ﺿﺎﺑﻄﻪ ﻓﺮﺩ ﻭ ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻥ ﻋﺎﻡ ﻋﻘﻼﹰ ﻭ ﻣﻨﻄﻘﺎﹰ ﻣﺤﻘﻖ ﻧﺎﺷﺪﻧﻲ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﺯﻳﺮﺍ ﺍﮔـﺮ ﻫـﺮ ﻛـﺲ‪،‬‬
‫ﺑﻪﺷﺮﻁ ﻣﻨﻔﻌﺖ ﺑﺮﺩﻥ‪ ،‬ﻭﻋﺪﻩ ﺩﺭﻭﻍ ﺑﺪﻫﺪ‪ ،‬ﺩﻳﮕﺮ ﺍﺳﺎﺳﺎﹰ ﻛﺎﺭﻱ ﺑﻪﻧﺎﻡ »ﻭﻋﺪﻩ ﺩﺍﺩﻥ« ﺑﺎﻗﻲ ﻧﻤﻲ ﻣﺎﻧﺪ‪ ،‬ﭼﺮﺍﮐـﻪ ﺷـﺮﻁ ﻭﻋـﺪﻩ‬
‫ﺩﺭﻭﻍ ﺩﺍﺩﻥ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﻃﺮﻑ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﻣﻦ ﻛﻪ ﻣﻲ ﺧﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﭼﻴﺰﻱ ﺩﺭ ﻋﻮﺽ ﻭﻋﺪﻩ ﻣﻦ ﺑﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺩﻫـﺪ ﺩﻳﮕـﺮ ﻭﻋـﺪﻩ ﺩﺭﻭﻍ‬
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‫ﻧﺪﻫﺪ ‪.‬‬

‫‪ .۱۸‬ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺗﻮﺿﻴﺢ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ ‪،‬ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﺑﺎ ﺁﻣﻮﺯﻩ ﻫﺎﻱ ﮐﺎﻧﺖ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﻣﺴﺎﻟﻪ ﺭﺍ ﺍﻳﻨﮕﻮﻧﻪ ﺻﻮﺭﺗﺒﻨﺪﻱ ﻣﻨﻄﻘﻲ ﻛﺮﺩ‪:‬‬
‫ﻓﺮﺽ ﮐﻨﺒﺪ ﮔﺰﺍﺭﻩ ‪ P‬ﺑﻴﺎﻧﮕﺮ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ ﮐﻪ‪":‬ﻣﻦ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﻢ‪ ،‬ﭘﺲ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﭘﺲ ﺩﺍﺩﻥ ﭼﻴﺰﻱ ﻛﻪ ﻗﺮﺽ ﮔﺮﻓﺘﻪﺍﻡ‪ ،‬ﻭﻋﺪﻩ ﺩﺭﻭﻍ ﺑﺪﻫﻢ‪".‬ﻭﮔﺰﺍﺭﻩ ‪ Q‬ﺑﻴﺎﻧﮕﺮ ﺁﻧﮑﻪ‪":‬ﻃﺮﻑ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻞ‬
‫ﻣﻦ ﻧﺒﺎﻳﺪ‪ ،‬ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﻗﺮﺽ ﺩﺍﺩﻥ ﺁﻥ ﭼﻴﺰ‪ ،‬ﺑﻪ ﻣﻦ ﻭﻋﺪﺓ ﺩﺭﻭﻍ ﺑﺪﻫﺪ‪ ".‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻨﺼﻮﺭﺕ ﮔﺰﺍﺭﻩ ﺷﺮﻃﻲ‪ P‬ﺁﻧﮕﺎﻩ ‪ Q‬ﻣﻨﻄﻘﺎ ﺻﺎﺩﻕ ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬ﺣﺎﻝ ﺍﮔﺮ ﻣﺎ ‪P‬ﺭﺍ ﺑﻪ ﻋﻨـﻮﺍﻥ ﺍﺻـﻠﻲ ﺍﺧﻼﻗـﻲ‬
‫ﺑﭙﺬﻳﺮﻳﻢ‪،‬ﻫﻢ ‪p‬ﺭﺍ ﺧﻮﺍﻫﻴﻢ ﺩﺍﺷﺖ ﻭﻫﻢ‪ ،‬ﺑﻨﺎ ﺑﺮ ﺍﺻﻞ ﻋﺎﻡ‪ ،‬ﺑﺎﻳﺪ ﺑﭙﺬﻳﺮﻳﻢ ﮐﻪ ﻫﻤﮕﺎﻥ ﺑﺘﻮﺍﻧﻨﺪ ﺍﻳﻨﮕﻮﻧﻪ ﺭﻓﺘﺎﺭ ﮐﻨﻨﺪ‪.‬ﭘﺲ ﺑﻨﺎﺑﺮ ﺍﻳﻦ ‪ ~Q‬ﺭﺍ ﻫﻢ ﺧﻮﺍﻫﻴﻢ ﺩﺍﺷﺖ‪.‬ﺣﺎﻝ ﺑﺎ ﺗﻮﺟﻪ ﺑﻪ ﮔﺰﺍﺭﻩ‬
‫ﺷﺮﻃﻲ ‪ ،P‬ﺁﻧﮕﺎﻩ ‪ Q‬ﻭ ‪ ~Q‬ﺧﻮﺍﻫﻴﻢ ﺩﺍﺷﺖ‪ ~P:‬ﻭ ﺍﺯ ﺁﻧﺠﺎ ‪ P^~P‬ﮐﻪ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺗﻨﺎﻗﺾ ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬ﻭﺍﺯ ﺁﻧﺠﺎ ﮐﻪ ﻧﺘﻴﺠﻪ ﻏﻠﻂ ﻧﺎﺷﻲ ﺍﺯ ﻓﺮﺽ ﻏﻠﻂ ﺍﺳﺖ‪،‬ﮔﺰﺍﺭﻩ ‪ P‬ﻧﻤﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﺪ ﺍﺻـﻠﯽ‬
‫ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪.‬‬

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‫ﺗﺎﻛﻴﺪ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﺩﺭ ﺻﻮﺭﺗﺒﻨﺪﻱ ﺩﻭﻡ ﺑﺮ ﺍﺭﺯﺵ ﺫﺍﺗﻲ ﻭ ﻳﻜـﺴﺎﻥ ﻫﻤـﻪ ﺍﻧـﺴﺎﻧﻬﺎﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺑﻨـﺎ ﺑـﺮ ﺭﺍﻱ ﮐﺎﻧـﺖ‪ ،‬ﺗﻨـﺴﻴﻖ ﺩﻭﻡ ﺗﻌﺒﻴـﺮ‬
‫ﺩﻳﮕﺮﻱ ﺍﺯ ﺗﻨﺴﻴﻖ ﺍﻭﻝ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﺯﻳﺮﺍ »ﻓﺮﻣﻮﻝ ﺍﻭﻝ ﺑﻪ ﻣﻨﺰﻟﻪ ﺍﺻﻞ ﺗﻌﺎﻣﻞ ﻳﺎ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠﻪ ﺑﻪ ﻣﺜﻞ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻭ ﺑﺮ ﻃﺒـﻖ ﺁﻥ‪ ،‬ﺿـﻮﺍﺑﻂ ﺑﺎﻳـﺪ‬
‫ﺑﺘﻮﺍﻧﻨﺪ ﺑﻪ ﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻥ ﻋﺎﻡ ﺩﺭ ﺁﻳﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﺑﻨﺎﺑﺮﺍﻳﻦ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ ﺁﻥ ﺗﻠﻮﻳﺤﺎﹰ ﺗﺼﺪﻳﻖ ﻣﻲ ﺷﻮﺩ ﻛـﻪ ﺟﻤﻴـﻊ ﻣﻮﺟـﻮﺩﺍﺕ ﻣﺘﻌﻘـﻞ ﺍﺭﺯﺵ‬
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‫ﺫﺍﺗﻲ ﺩﺍﺭﻧﺪ«‬
‫ﻫﻤﭽﻨﻴﻦ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ ﺻﻮﺭﺗﺒﻨﺪﻱ ﺩﻭﻡ ﻧﻴﺰ ﺗﺄﻛﻴﺪ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ ﻛﻪ ﺑﺎﻳﺪ ﺑﻪ ﻧﺤﻮﻱ ﺭﻓﺘـﺎﺭ ﻛﻨـﻴﻢ ﻛـﻪ ﺍﺣﺘـﺮﺍﻡ ﺧـﻮﺩ ﻭ ﺍﺷـﺨﺎﺹ ﻣﺘﻌﻘـﻞ‬
‫ﺩﻳﮕﺮ ﻣﺨﺪﻭﺵ ﻧﺸﻮﺩ ﻭ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﻨﻈﺮ‪ ،‬ﻫﻤﭽﻮﻥ ﺻﻮﺭﺗﺒﻨﺪﻱ ﺍﻭﻝ ﮐﻪ ﺟﻬﺎﻧﺸﻤﻮﻝ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻣﺘﻀﻤﻦ ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻥ ﻋﺎﻡ ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬‬
‫ﺑﻪﻋﻨﻮﺍﻥ ﻣﺜﺎﻟﻲ ﺩﻳﮕﺮ‪ ،‬ﻣﺒﺘﻨﻲ ﺑﺮ ﺗﻨﺴﻴﻖ ﺩﻭﻡ‪ ،‬ﺟﻬﺖ ﻟﺰﻭﻡ ﺑﺮﻭﺯ ﺗﻨﺎﻗﺾ ﺩﺭﻭﻧﻲ‪-‬ﻣﻨﻄﻘﻲ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺿﺪ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﺍﻧﮕﺎﺷﺘﻪ ﺷـﺪﻥ‬
‫ﻓﻌﻞ‪،‬ﻓﺮﺽ ﮐﻨﻴﺪ ﺷﺨﺺ ‪ a‬ﻣﻴﺨﻮﺍﻫﺪ ﺍﺯﺷﺨﺺ‪ b‬ﺑﻴﮕﺎﺭﻱ ﮐﺸﺪ ﻳﺎ ﺍﻭ ﺭﺍ ﻣﻮﺭﺩ ﺳﻮﺀ ﺍﺳﺘﻔﺎﺩﻩ ﻗﺮﺍﺭ ﺩﻫﺪ ﻭ ﺩﺭ ﺍﺯﺍﻱ ﺍﻧﺠـﺎﻡ‬
‫ﮐﺎﺭ‪ ،‬ﭘﻮﻟﻲ ﺑﻪ ﻭﻱ ﭘﺮﺩﺍﺧﺖ ﻧﮑﻨﺪ؛ ‪.‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﺷﺨﺺ ‪ a‬ﺍﺯﺷﺨﺺ ‪ ،b‬ﺻﺮﻓﺎ ﺑﻌﻨﻮﺍﻥ ﺍﺑﺰﺍﺭ ﻭ ﻭﺳﻴﻠﻪ‪ ،‬ﺑﻬﺮﻩ ﻣـﻲﺟﻮﻳـﺪ‬
‫ﻭﺍﻳﻦ ﺻﺮﺍﺣﺘﺎ ﺑﺎ ﺗﻨﺴﻴﻖ ﺩﻭﻡ ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻥ ﻋﺎﻡ ﮐﻪ ﺑﺮ ﻣﺒﻨﺎﻱ ﺁﻥ "ﻫﺮﮔﺰ ﻧﺒﺎﻳﺪ ﺑﻪ ﮔﻮﻧﻪ ﺍﻱ ﺭﻓﺘﺎﺭ ﮐﺮﺩ ﮐﻪ ﺍﺷـﺨﺎﺹ ﺻـﺮﻓﺎ ﻭﺳـﻴﻠﻪ‬
‫ﻗﻠﻤﺪﺍﺩﺷﻮﻧﺪ‪ "،‬ﺩﺭ ﺗﻨﺎﻗﺾ ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬ﺩﺭﻧﺘﻴﺠﻪ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻓﻌﻞ ﺿﺪﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﻗﻠﻤﺪﺍﺩ ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ‪.‬‬
‫ﺩﺭ ﺻﻮﺭﺗﺒﻨﺪﻱ ﺳﻮﻡ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺖ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ‪ ،‬ﻋﻼﻭﻩ ﺑﺮ ﺳﭙﺮﺩﻥ ﻧﻘﺶ ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﮕﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﻭ ﺍﺟﺮﺍﻱ ﻗﻮﺍﻧﻴﻦ ﺑـﻪ ﻳﻜﺎﻳـﻚ ﻣﻮﺟـﻮﺩﺍﺕ‬
‫ﻣﺘﻌﻘﻞ‪ ،‬ﻧﻘﺶ ﺍﺟﺘﻤﺎﻉ ﺭﺍ ﻧﻴﺰ ﭘﺮ ﺭﻧﮓ ﻣﻲ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ‪ .‬ﺍﻭ ﻭﻇﻴﻔﻪ ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﮕﺬﺍﺭﻱ ﺍﺟﺘﻤـﺎﻉ ﺭﺍ ﺑـﺮ ﻋﻬـﺪﻩ ﺍﻧـﺴﺎﻧﻬﺎﻱ ﺁﺯﺍﺩ ﻭ ﻣﺨﺘـﺎﺭﻱ‬
‫ﻣﻲ ﺳﭙﺎﺭﺩ ﻛﻪ ﺑﺮ ﻣﺒﻨﺎﻱ ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻥ ﺧﻮﺩ ﺁﻳﻴﻨﻲ ﻭ ﺍﺻﻞ ﻛﺮﺍﻣﺖ ﺍﻧﺴﺎﻧﻬﺎ ﻋﻤﻞ ﻛﺮﺩﻩ‪ ،‬ﻣﻨﺎﺳﺒﺎﺕ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﺭﺍ ﻭﻓﻖ ﺁﻥ ﺗﻨﻈـﻴﻢ ﻣـﻲ‬
‫ﮐﻨﻨﺪ‪.‬‬
‫ﺑﻨﺎ ﺑﺮ ﺁﻧﭽﻪ ﺁﻣﺪ‪،‬ﮐﺎﻧﺖ ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﻣﺒﺘﻨﻲ ﺑﺮ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﻪ ﺭﺍ ﻋﻘﻴﻢ ﺩﺍﻧـﺴﺘﻪ‪ ،‬ﺑﺮﺍﺳـﺎﺱ ﻣﻔﺮﻭﺿـﺎﺕ ﺧـﻮﻳﺶ ﺩﺳـﺘﮕﺎﻩ ﺍﺧﻼﻗـﻲ ﻋﻘـﻞ‬
‫‪٢٠‬‬
‫ﻣﺤﻮﺭﻱ ﺭﺍ ﭘﻲ ﺍﻓﮑﻨﻲ ﻣﻲ ﮐﻨﺪ ﮐﻪ ﭘﺎﺳﺨﮕﻮﻱ ﻧﻴﺎﺯﻫﺎﻱ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﺍﻧﺴﺎﻥ ﻣﺪﺭﻥ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪.‬‬

‫‪.۴‬ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﻭﻳﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﻳﻨﻲ‬

‫‪ .۱۹‬ﺭﺍﺟﺮ ﺳﺎﻟﻴﻮﺍﻥ‪ ،‬ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﺩﺭ ﻓﻠﺴﻔﻪ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ‪ ،‬ﺗﺮﺟﻤﺔ ﻋﺰﺕﺍﷲ ﻓﻮﻻﺩﻭﻧﺪ‪ ،‬ﻃﺮﺡ ﻧﻮ‪ ،‬ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ‪ ،۳۸۰ ،‬ﺹ‪.۱۰۶‬‬

‫‪ . ٢٠‬ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺁﺷﻨﺎﻳﻲ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ ﺑﺎ ﺍﻣﻬﺎﺕ ﺁﻣﻮﺯﻩﻫﺎﻱ ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﻛﺎﻧﺘﻲ‪ ،‬ﻧﮕﺎﻩ ﻛﻨﻴﺪ ﺑﻪ‪:‬‬
‫‪ -‬ﺍﺷﺘﻔﺎﻥ ﮐﻮﺭﻧﺮ‪ ,‬ﻓﻠﺴﻔﻪ ﮐﺎﻧﺖ‪ ,‬ﺗﺮﺟﻤﻪ ﻋﺰﺕ ﺍﷲ ﻓﻮﻻﺩﻭﻧﺪ‪ ,‬ﺧﻮﺍﺭﺯﻣﻲ ‪ ,‬ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ‪.۱۳۷۹ ,‬‬
‫‪ -‬ﺍﻣﺎﻧﻮﺋﻞ ﮐﺎﻧﺖ‪ ,‬ﻧﻘﺪ ﻋﻘﻞ ﻋﻤﻠﻲ‪ ,‬ﺗﺮﺟﻤﻪ ﺍﻧﺸﺎﺀ ﺍﷲ ﺭﺣﻤﺘﻲ‪,‬ﻧﻮﺭﺍﻟﺜﻘﻠﻴﻦ ‪ ,‬ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ‪.۱۳۸۵ ,‬‬
‫‪- Hill, T.E. (2000) ‘Kantianism’ in The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, Lafollete, H. (ed.),‬‬
‫‪(Oxford:Blackwell Publisher), pp. 227-246.‬‬
‫‪-O’Neill, O.(1997) ‘Kantian Ethics’ in A Companion to Ethics, Singer, P.(ed.), (Oxford:Blackwell Publisher),.‬‬
‫‪First Published 1991, pp.175-185.‬‬
‫‪-Nordenstam, T.(2001) ‘Kant and the Utilitarians’, Ethical Perspectives, 8(1), pp. 29-37.‬‬

‫‪٦‬‬
‫ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺩﺭﻙ ﺻﺤﻴﺤﻲ ﺍﺯ ﺭﺃﻱ ﻭﻳﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﻳﻦ ﺩﺭ ﺑﺎﺏ ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﻭ ﻣﻘﺎﻳﺴﻪ ﺁﻥ ﺑـﺎ ﺍﺧـﻼﻕ ﻛـﺎﻧﺘﻲ ﻛـﻪ ﭘﻴـﺸﺘﺮ ﺁﻣـﺪ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﺑﺘـﺪﺍ‬
‫ﺫﻛﺮ ﭼﻨﺪ ﻧﻜﺘﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺑﺎﺏ ﻧﻈﺮﻳﻪ ﺗﺼﻮﻳﺮﻱ ﻣﻌﻨﺎ‪ ،‬ﻛﻪ ﻣﻮﺿﻊ ﻣﺨﺘﺎﺭ ﻭﻳﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﻳﻦ ﺩﺭ ﺩﻭﺭﺍﻥ ﻧﺨﺴﺖ ﻓﻠﺴﻔﻲ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﺿـﺮﻭﺭﻱ‬
‫ﻣﻲﻧﻤﺎﻳﺪ‪.‬‬
‫ﺍﺯ ﻧﻈﺮ ﻭﻳﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﻳﻦ‪ ،‬ﺟﻬﺎﻥ ﻣﺘﺸﻜﻞ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻣﻮﺭ ﻭﺍﻗﻊ‪ ٢١‬ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﺁﻧﻬﺎ ﻧﻴﺰ ﺧـﻮﺩ ﺷـﺎﻣﻞ ﭼﻴﺰﻫـﺎ‪٢٢‬ﻫـﺴﺘﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﻭﺍﺣـﺪ ﻣﻌﻨـﺎﺩﺍﺭﻱ‬
‫ﮔﺰﺍﺭﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﮔﺰﺍﺭﻩﺍﻱ ﻛﻪ ﻧﺎﻇﺮ ﺑﻪ ﺍﻣﺮ ﻭﺍﻗﻊ ﻭ ﻣﺸﺘﻤﻞ ﺑﺮ ﺭﻭﺍﺑﻂ ﻣﻴﺎﻥ ﺍﺷﻴﺎﺀ ﺑﺎ ﻳﮑﺪﻳﮕﺮ ﺩﺭ ﺟﻬـﺎﻥ ﺧـﺎﺭﺝ ﺍﺳـﺖ‪ .‬ﺍﻭ ﺑـﻪ‬
‫ﺍﻗﺘﻔﺎﻱ ﻓﺮﮔﻪ‪ ،‬ﮐﻪ ﺍﺯ ﺗﻮﺍﺑﻊ ﮔﺰﺍﺭﻩ ﺍﻱ‪ ٢٣‬ﺳﺨﻦ ﻣﻴﮕﻔﺖ‪،‬ﺍﺯ ﺭﻭﺍﺑﻂ ﮔﺰﺍﺭﻩ ﺍﻱ‪ ٢٤‬ﺳﺨﻦ ﺑﻪ ﻣﻴـﺎﻥ ﻣـﻲ ﺁﻭﺭﺩ‪ .‬ﮔـﺰﺍﺭﻩ ﺑﻴـﺎﻧﮕﺮ‬
‫ﺭﻭﺍﺑﻂ ﺑﻴﻦ ﺍﺟﺰﺍﻱ ﮔﺰﺍﺭﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻭ ﻟﺰﻭﻣﻲ ﻧﺪﺍﺭﺩ ﮐﻪ ﺗﮏ ﺗﮏ ﻋﻨﺎﺻﺮ ﮔﺰﺍﺭﻩ ﻣﺎ ﺑﺎﺯﺍﻱ ﺧﺎﺭﺟﻲ ﺩﺍﺷﺘﻪ ﺑﺎﺷـﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﻭﻓـﻖ ﺭﺃﻱ‬
‫ﺍﻭ‪ ،‬ﮔﺰﺍﺭﻩﺍﻱ ﻋﻠﻲﺍﻻﺻﻮﻝ ﻣﻌﻨﺎﺩﺍﺭ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﺗﺼﻮﻳﺮ ﺩﺍﺷﺘﻪ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ .‬ﺻﺪﻕ ﻭ ﮐﺬﺏ ﻓﺮﻉ ﺑﺮﻣﻌﻨﻲ ﺍﺳـﺖ‪.‬ﺍﮔـﺮ ﮔـﺰﺍﺭﻩ ﺍﻱ ﺭﺍ‬
‫ﺗﻨﻬﺎ ﺑﺘﻮﺍﻥ ﺗﺼﻮﻳﺮ ﻛﺮﺩ )ﻳﻌﻨﻲ ﺍﻣﻜﺎﻥ ﻣـﺼﻮﺭ ﻛـﺮﺩﻥ ﺁﻥ ﻭﺟـﻮﺩ ﺩﺍﺷـﺘﻪ ﺑﺎﺷـﺪ(‪ ،‬ﺁﻥ ﮔـﺰﺍﺭﻩ ﻣﻌﻨـﻲ ﺩﺍﺭ ﺍﺳـﺖ ﻭ ﺩﺭ ﻏﻴـﺮ‬
‫ﺍﻳﻨﺼﻮﺭﺕ ﻓﺎﻗﺪ ﻣﻌﻨﻲ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺣﺎﻝ ﺍﮔﺮ ﺗﺼﻮﻳﺮ ﺍﺭﺍﺋﻪ ﺷﺪﻩ ﻣﻨﻄﺒﻖ ﺑﺎ ﻭﺍﻗﻌﻴﺖ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﺧـﺎﺭﺝ ﺑﺎﺷـﺪ‪ ،‬ﺁﻥ ﮔـﺰﺍﺭﻩ ﺻـﺎﺩﻕ ﻭ ﺩﺭ‬
‫ﻏﻴﺮ ﺍﻳﻨﺼﻮﺭﺕ‪ ،‬ﻛﺎﺫﺏ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺑﻪﻋﻨﻮﺍﻥ ﻣﺜـﺎﻝ ﮔـﺰﺍﺭﻩ » ﺍﻣـﺮﻭﺯ ﻫـﻮﺍ ﺑـﺎﺭﺍﻧﻲ ﺍﺳـﺖ« )ﺩﺭ ﺻـﻮﺭﺗﻴﮑﻪ ﺍﻣـﺮﻭﺯ ﻫـﻮﺍ ﺻـﺎﻑ‬
‫ﻭﺁﻓﺘﺎﺑﻲ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ( ﺍﺯ ﻭﺿﻊ ﻣﻤﮑﻨﻲ‪ ٢٥‬ﺳﺨﻦ ﻣﻲﮔﻮﻳﺪ‪ ،‬ﻳﻌﻨﻲ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﺁﻥ ﺭﺍ ﺑﺮ ﻣﺒﻨﺎﻱ ﻣﺆﻟﻔﻪﻫـﺎ ﻭ ﺍﺟـﺰﺍﺀ ﺟﻬـﺎﻥ ﺧـﺎﺭﺝ ﺑـﺎ‬
‫ﻳﻜﺪﻳﮕﺮ‪ ،‬ﺑﻪ ﺗﺼﻮﻳﺮ ﺩﺭﺁﻭﺭﺩ‪ .‬ﻭﻟﻲ ﭼﻮﻥ ﻧﺎﻇﺮ ﺑﻪ ﺍﻣﺮ ﻭﺍﻗﻌﻲ ﺩﺭ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﺧﺎﺭﺝ ﻧﻴﺴﺖ‪ ،‬ﻛﺎﺫﺏ ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬‬
‫ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﺑﺎ ﺁﻣﻮﺯﻩﻫﺎﻱ ﺩﻻﻟﺖﺷﻨﺎﺳﺎﻧﻪ ﻭﻳﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﻳﻦ‪ ،‬ﺯﺑﺎﻥ ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺖ ﮔﺰﺍﺭﻩﺍﻱ ﻭ ﮔـﺰﺍﺭﻩ ﻣﺎﻫﻴـﺖ ﺗـﺼﻮﻳﺮﻱ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ‪ .‬ﺍﮔـﺮ ﭼﻨـﻴﻦ‬
‫ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ ،‬ﺻﺮﻓﺎ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﻧﺎﻇﺮ ﺑﻪ ﭘﺪﻳﺪﻩ ﻫﺎﻱ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﺧﺎﺭﺝ ﻭ ﺗﻮﺳﻌﺎﹰ ﻫﺮ ﺁﻧﭽﻪ ﺩﺭ ﻋﻠﻮﻡ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﻲ ﻣـﻮﺭﺩ ﺑﺤـﺚ ﻗـﺮﺍﺭ ﻣـﻲﮔﻴـﺮﺩ‪،‬‬
‫ﺳﺨﻦ ﻣﻌﻨﺎﺩﺍﺭ ﮔﻔﺖ ﻭ ﺑﻴﺮﻭﻥ ﺍﺯ ﺣﻮﺯﻩ ﻋﻠﻮﻡ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﻲ‪ ،‬ﻧﻤﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﺳﺨﻨﺎﻥ ﻣﺤﺼﻞ ﻣﻌﻨﺎﺩﺍﺭﻱ ﺑـﺮ ﺯﺑـﺎﻥ ﺟـﺎﺭﻱ ﺳـﺎﺧﺖ‪ .‬ﺍﺯ‬
‫ﺍﻳﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ﺗﻔﺎﻭﺕ ﻣﻌﺘﻨﺎﺑﻬﻲ ﻣﻴﺎﻥ ﺭﻳﺎﺿﻴﺎﺕ‪ ،‬ﻣﻨﻄﻖ‪ ،‬ﺩﻳﻦ ﻭ‪ ...‬ﺩﻳﺪﻩ ﻧﻤﻲﺷﻮﺩ‪.‬‬
‫ﺍﮐﻨﻮﻥ ﺑﺒﻴﻨﻴﻢ ﺩﺭ ﻓﻀﺎﻱ ﺭﺳﺎﻟﻪ ﻣﻨﻄﻘﻲ ـ ﻓﻠﺴﻔﻲ )ﺍﺯ ﺍﻳﻦ ﭘﺲ ﺁﻧﺮﺍ ﺑﻪ ﺍﺧﺘﺼﺎﺭ ﺭﺳﺎﻟﻪ ﺧﻮﺍﻫﻴﻢ ﺧﻮﺍﻧﺪ(‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ ﺑﺎﺏ ﺍﺧـﻼﻕ ﻭ‬
‫‪٢٦‬‬
‫ﮔﺰﺍﺭﻩﻫﺎﻱ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ‪ ،‬ﭼﻪ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﮔﻔﺖ ؟‬

‫‪٢١. facts‬‬
‫‪٢٢. things‬‬
‫‪٢٣. functional proposition‬‬
‫‪٢٤. relational proposition‬‬
‫‪٢٥. possible states of affairs‬‬

‫‪ .۲۶‬ﻛﻠﻴﻪ ﺍﺭﺟﺎﻋﺎﺕ ﺑﻪ ﺭﺳﺎﻟﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﻘﺎﻟﻪ ﺑﺮﮔﺮﻓﺘﻪ ﺍﺯﻣﻨﺒﻊ ﺯﻳﺮ ﺍﺳﺖ‪:‬‬

‫‪- Wittgenstein, L. (1961) Tractatus Logico – Philosophicus, translated by Pears, D. and Mc Guinns, B.‬‬
‫‪(Routleage and Kegan Paul: London and New York), Revised Edition 1974.‬‬
‫‪2٧. transcendental‬‬
‫‪.٢٨‬ﻧﮕﺎﻩ ﻛﻨﻴﺪ ﺑﻪ ﻓﻘﺮات ‪ ٦,٤١‬ﻭ ‪.٦,٤٢١‬‬

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‫ﻭﻳﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﻳﻦ ﺑﻪﺻﺮﺍﺣﺖ ﻭﺟﻮﺩ ﺍﺭﺯﺷﻬﺎﻱ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﺩﺭ ﺟﻬﺎﻥ ﭘﻴﺮﺍﻣﻮﻥ ﺭﺍ ﺍﻧﻜﺎﺭ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﻣـﺪﻟﻮﻝ ﻛـﻼﻡ ﻓـﻮﻕ ﺍﻳـﻦ ﺍﺳـﺖ‬
‫ﻛﻪ ﮔﺰﺍﺭﻩﻫﺎﻱ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﺑﺎﻳﺪ ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺪ ﮔﺰﺍﺭﻩ ﻫﺎﻱ ﻣﻨﻄﻘﻲ ﻭ ﺭﻳﺎﺿـﻲ‪ ،‬ﺿـﺮﻭﺭﻱ ﺑﺎﺷـﻨﺪ؛ ﭼﺮﺍﻛـﻪ ﻣﺘـﻀﻤﻦ ﺍ‪ِ‬ﺧﺒـﺎﺭ ﺍﺯ ﺟﻬـﺎﻥ‬
‫ﭘﻴﺮﺍﻣﻮﻥ ﻭ ﻧﺎﻇﺮ ﺑﻪ ﺍﻭﺿﺎﻉ ﻣﻤﻜﻦ ﻧﻴﺴﺘﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﻋﻴﻦ ﺣﺎﻝ‪ ،‬ﻧﻈﻴﺮ ﮔﺰﺍﺭﻩﻫﺎﻱ ﻣﻨﻄﻘـﻲ ﻭ ﺭﻳﺎﺿـﻲ‪ ،‬ﺍﺳـﺘﻌﻼﻳﻲ‪ ٢٧‬ﻫـﺴﺘﻨﺪ‪ ٢٨.‬ﺑـﻪ‬
‫ﺗﻌﺒﻴﺮ ﺩﻳﮕﺮ‪ ،‬ﻫﺮﭼﻨﺪ ﻣﻔﺎﻫﻴﻢ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﻧﻤﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﻨﺪ ﺩﺭ ﻗﺎﻟﺐ ﮔﺰﺍﺭﻩ ﺭﻳﺨﺘﻪ ﺷﻮﻧﺪ ﻭ ﮔﺰﺍﺭﺓ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﻣﻌﻨﺎﺩﺍﺭ ﺑـﺴﺎﺯﻧﺪ‪ ،‬ﺍﻣـﺎ ﺩﺭ‬
‫ﻋﻴﻦ ﺣﺎﻝ ﺣﺎﻛﻲ ﺍﺯ ﻧﮕﺮﺵ ﻓﺮﺩ ﺑﻪ ﻋﺎﻟﻤﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﻗﺮﺍﺭ ﻧﻴﺴﺖ ﮔـﺰﺍﺭﻩﻫـﺎﻱ ﺍﺧﻼﻗـﻲ ﺩﺭ ﺑـﺎﺏ ﺟﻬـﺎﻥ ﭘﻴﺮﺍﻣـﻮﻥ ﻭ ﺣـﻮﺍﺩﺙ ﺁﻥ‬
‫ﺍﺗﺨﺎﺫ ﻣﻮﺿﻊ ﻣﺤﺘﻮﺍﻳﻲ ﻛﻨﻨﺪ؛ ﺑﻠﻜﻪ ﺑﺎﻳﺪ ﺻﺮﻓﺎﹰ ﺍﺯ ﭼﮕﻮﻧﮕﻲ ﻧﮕﺎﻩ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﻛـﺎﺭﺑﺮ ﺯﺑـﺎﻥ ﺑـﻪ ﺟﻬـﺎﻥ ﭘﻴﺮﺍﻣـﻮﻥ ﺧﺒـﺮ ﺩﻫﻨـﺪ‪.‬‬
‫ﻣﺜﺎﻟﻲ ﻛﻪ ﻭﻳﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﻳﻦ ﺩﺭ ﺭﺳﺎﻟﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺑﺎﺏ ﻣﻲﺯﻧﺪ‪ ،‬ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﻨﻈﻮﺭ ﮔﻮﻳﺎﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﻓﻘﺮﻩ ‪ ۶,۴۲۲‬ﻣﻲﮔﻮﻳﺪ ﻛﻪ ﺍﺣﻜـﺎﻡ‬
‫ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲﺍﻱ ﺭﺍ ﮐﻪ ﺩﺭ ﻗﺎﻟﺐ "ﺗﻮ ﻧﺒﺎﻳﺪ ﺩﺯﺩﻱ ﻛﻨﻲ"‪" ،‬ﺗﻮ ﻧﺒﺎﻳﺪ ﻣﺮﺗﻜـﺐ ﻗﺘـﻞ ﺷـﻮﻱ" ‪ ...‬ﺻـﻮﺭﺗﺒﻨﺪﻱ ﻣـﻲﺷـﻮﺩ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ ﻧﻈـﺮ‬
‫ﺑﮕﻴﺮﻳﺪ‪ .‬ﺍﮔﺮ ﻛﺴﻲ ﻛﻪ ﻣﺨﺎﻃﺐ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﺣﻜﺎﻡ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﺑﭙﺮﺳﺪ‪ :‬ﺧﻮﺏ ﺍﮔﺮ ﻣﻦ ﺑﻪ ﺍﻳﻦ ﮔﺰﺍﺭﻩﻫﺎﻱ ﺍﺧﻼﻗـﻲ ﻋﻤـﻞ ﻧﻜـﻨﻢ ﭼـﻪ‬
‫ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ؟ ﺍﮔﺮ ﺩﺭ ﻣﻘﺎﻡ ﭘﺎﺳﺦ ﻭ ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺗﺒﻴﻴﻦ ﺧﻮﺑﻲ ﻭ ﺑﺪﻱ ﺁﻧﻬﺎ‪ ،‬ﺑﻪ ﻋﻮﺍﻗﺐ ﻭ ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﻣﺘﺮﺗﺐ ﺑﺮ ﺍﻳـﻦ ﺍﻓﻌـﺎﻝ ﺍﺷـﺎﺭﻩ ﺷـﻮﺩ ﻭ‬
‫ﺍﺯ ﺁﻧﻬﺎ ﻣﺪﺩﮔﺮﻓﺘﻪ ﺷﻮﺩ‪ ،‬ﺍﺯ ﻭﺍﺩﻱ ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﺧﺎﺭﺝ ﺷﺪﻩﺍﻳﻢ‪ ،‬ﭼﺮﺍ ﻛﻪ ﺑﻪ ﺩﺍﺧﻞ ﺟﻬﺎﻥ ﻗﺪﻡ ﻧﻬﺎﺩﻩﺍﻳـﻢ ﻭ ﻣﻌﻄـﻮﻑ ﺑـﻪ ﺁﺛـﺎﺭ ﻭ‬
‫ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﻋﻤﺎﻝ ﺩﺭ ﺟﻬﺎﻥ ﺧﺎﺭﺝ‪ ،‬ﺍﺗﺨﺎﺫ ﻣﻮﺿﻊ ﻛﺮﺩﻩﺍﻳﻢ؛ ﺩﺭ ﺣﺎﻟﻴﻜﻪ ﭼﻮﻥ ﻧﻤـﻲﺗـﻮﺍﻥ ﺍﺭﺯﺷـﻬﺎ ﺭﺍ ﺩﺭ ﺟﻬـﺎﻥ ﭘﻴﺮﺍﻣـﻮﻥ‬
‫ﺟﺴﺖ‪ ،‬ﭘﺲ ﻧﻤﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﺳﺨﻦﹺ ﻣﺤﺼﻞ ﺍﻳﺠﺎﺑﻲ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺑﺎﺏ ﮔﻔﺖ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﻭﺍﻗﻊ‪ ،‬ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﺑﺎ ﺁﻣﻮﺯﻩﻫـﺎﻱ ﺭﺳـﺎﻟﻪ‪ ،‬ﭼﻴـﺰﻱ ﺗﺤـﺖ‬
‫ﻋﻨﻮﺍﻥ ﺛﻮﺍﺏ ﻭ ﻋﻘﺎﺏ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﺩﺭ ﻣﻌﻨﺎﻱ ﻣﺘﻌﺎﺭﻑ ﮐﻠﻤﻪ ﻧﺪﺍﺭﻳﻢ‪ ،‬ﭼﺮﺍﻛﻪ ﻻﺯﻣﺔ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﻣﺮ ﻧﻈﺮﮐﺮﺩﻥ ﺑﻪ ﭼﮕـﻮﻧﮕﻲ ﺗﺤﻘـﻖ‬
‫ﻓﻌﻞ ﺩﺭ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﺧﺎﺭﺝ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ .‬ﻣﺪﻟﻮﻝ ﻛﻼﻡ ﻓﻮﻕ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛـﻪ ﺍﺣﻜـﺎﻡ ﺍﺧﻼﻗـﻲ ﭘﻴـﺸﻴﻨﻲ ﻫـﺴﺘﻨﺪ ﻭ ﺻـﺪﻭﺭ ﺁﻧﻬـﺎ ﺍﺯ ﻓﺎﻋـﻞ‬
‫ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﻫﻴﭻ ﻧﺴﺒﺘﻲ ﺑﺎ ﺟﻬﺎﻥ ﭘﻴﺮﺍﻣﻮﻥ ﻧﺪﺍﺭﺩ‪.‬‬
‫ﺑﺎ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺣﺴﺎﺏ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ ﻭﺍﺩﻱ ﺍﺧﻼﻕ‪ ،‬ﻭﻳﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﻳﻦ ﻧﻴـﺰ ﻫﻤﭽـﻮ ﻛﺎﻧـﺖ ﻣﻌﺘﻘـﺪ ﺍﺳـﺖ ﻣـﺎﺩﺍﻣﻲ ﻛـﻪ ﻣـﺎ ﺩﺭ ﻋـﺎﻟﻢ ﺗﺠﺮﺑـﻪ ﺳـﻴﺮ‬
‫ﻣﻲﻛﻨﻴﻢ‪ ،‬ﺑﺎ ﻫﻴﭻ ﺍﻣﺮﻱ ﻛﻪ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﻪ ﺳﺎﺣﺖ ﺩﻳﮕﺮﻱ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ )ﻣﺜﻼﹰ ﺍﺭﺯﺷﻬﺎﻱ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ(‪ ،‬ﻣﻮﺍﺟﻪ ﻧﻤـﻲﺷـﻮﻳﻢ‪ .‬ﻫـﺮ ﺁﻧﭽـﻪ ﺑـﻪ‬
‫ﺗﺠﺮﺑﻪ ﺩﺭ ﻣﻲ ﺁﻳﺪ‪ ،‬ﺷﺄﻥ ﻭﺟﻮﺩﺷﻨﺎﺧﺘﻲﺍﻱ ﻫﻤﺴﺎﻥ ﺑﺎ ﺩﻳﮕﺮ ﺍﻣﻮﺭ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ‪ .‬ﻧﻘﻞ ﻗﻮﻝ ﺫﻳﻞ ﺍﺯ ﻭﻱ ﺭﺍ ﺩﺭ ﻧﻈﺮ ﺑﮕﻴﺮﻳﺪ‪:‬‬
‫»ﻓﺮﺽ ﻛﻨﻴﺪ ﺷﺨﺼﻲ ﺩﺍﻧﺎﻱ ﻛﻞ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ ﻭ ﺗﻤﺎﻣﻲ ﻭﻗـﺎﻳﻊ ﻋـﺎﻟﻢ ﺭﺍ ﺩﺭ ﻛﺘـﺎﺑﻲ ﺟﻤـﻊ ﺁﻭﺭﻱ ﻛﻨـﺪ ﺣـﺎﻝ ﻓـﺮﺽ ﻧﻤﺎﻳﻴـﺪ ﺩﺭ‬
‫ﻛﺘﺎﺏ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﻧﻤﺎ ﺻﺤﻨﻪ ﻗﺘﻠﻲ ﻣﻮ ﺑﻪ ﻣﻮ ﻭ ﺑﺎ ﺟﺰﺋﻴﺎﺕ ﻛﺎﻣﻞ ﻭ ﺗﻤﺎﻣﻲ ﺻﺤﻨﻪ ﻫﺎﻱ ﺩﻟﺨﺮﺍﺵ ﻭ ﺁﺯﺍﺭﺩﻫﻨـﺪﻩ ﺷـﺮﺡ ﺩﺍﺩﻩ ﻣـﻲ‬
‫ﺷﺪ‪ ،‬ﺗﻮﺿﻴﺢ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻭﻗﺎﻳﻊ ﺣﺎﻭﻱ ﻫﻴﭻ ﮔﺰﺍﺭﻩ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲﺍﻱ ﻧﺨﻮﺍﻫـﺪ ﺑـﻮﺩ‪ ،‬ﺯﻳـﺮﺍ ﻗﺘـﻞ ﻫـﻢ ﺩﺭ ﻣﺮﺗﺒـﻪ ﺳـﺎﻳﺮ ﻭﺍﻗﻌﻴﺘﻬـﺎﻱ ﻋـﺎﻟﻢ‬

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‫ﻧﻤﺎﻳﺎﻥ ﻣﻲ ﺷﻮﺩ‪ .‬ﻣﻤﻜﻦ ﺍﺳﺖ ﺧﻮﺍﻧﺪﻥ ﻭ ﺍﺯﻧﻈﺮ ﮔﺬﺭﺍﻧﺪﻥ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺗﻮﺻﻴﻔﺎﺕ‪ ،‬ﺧﺸﻢ ﻭ ﻧﻔﺮﺕ ﺭﺍ ﺩﺭ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮﻳﺪﺍ ﻛﻨﺪ ﻭﻟـﻲ ﺑـﺎﺯ‬
‫ﻫﻢ ﭼﻴﺰﻱ ﺟﺰ ﻭﺍﻗﻌﻴﺖ ﻧﺪﺍﺭﻳﻢ«‪.٢٩‬‬
‫ﻫﺮ ﺁﻧﭽﻪ ﻣﺎ ﺭﺍ ﻣﺪﺩ ﻣﻲﺭﺳﺎﻧﺪ ﺗﺎ ﺣﻜﺎﻳﺘﻲ ﻫﺮ ﭼﻪ ﺩﻗﻴﻘﺘﺮ ﻭ ﻭﻓﺎﺩﺍﺭﺗﺮ ﻧﺴﺒﺖ ﺑﻪ ﺁﻧﭽﻪ ﺩﺭﺟﻬـﺎﻥ ﭘﻴﺮﺍﻣـﻮﻥ ﺍﺗﻔـﺎﻕ ﻣـﻲ ﺍﻓﺘـﺪ‪،‬‬
‫ﺩﺭ ﺯﺑﺎﻥ ﺻﻮﺭﺗﺒﻨﺪﻱ ﻛﻨﻴﻢ‪ ،‬ﺑﻪﻛﻠﻲ ﺑﻲﻧﺴﺒﺖ ﺑﺎ ﺍﻣﻮﺭ ﻭ ﺍﺭﺯﺷﻬﺎﻱ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬‬
‫ﻓﻘﺮﺍﺕ ﺫﻳﻞ ﺭﺍ ﻧﻴﺰ ﺩﺭ ﻧﻈﺮ ﺁﻭﺭﻳﻢ‪:‬‬
‫»ﺍﮔﺮ ﺍﺭﺍﺩﻩ ﺧﻴﺮﻳﺎﺷﺮﺑﺘﻮﺍﻧﺪ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﺭﺍ ﺗﻐﻴﻴﺮ ﺩﻫﺪ‪ ،‬ﻓﻘﻂ ﺣﺪﻭﺩ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﺭﺍ ﺗﻐﻴﻴﺮ ﻣﻲ ﺩﻫﺪ ﻭﻟﻲ ﻭﺍﻗﻌﻴﺖ ﺭﺍ‪ ،‬ﻳﻌﻨـﻲ ﺁﻧﭽـﻪ ﺭﺍ ﮐـﻪ‬
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‫ﺑﺎ ﺯﺑﺎﻥ ﺑﻴﺎﻥ ﮐﺮﺩﻧﻲ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﻧﻤﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﺪﻋﻮﺽ ﮐﻨﺪ‪...‬ﺟﻬﺎﻥ ﺳﺮﺧﻮﺷﺎﻥ ﺑﺎ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﻏﻤﮕﻴﻨﺎﻥ ﻓﺮﻕ ﺩﺍﺭﺩ«‬
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‫»ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﺣﺮﻓﻲ ﺍﺯ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﻧﻤﻴﺰﻧﺪ‪.‬ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﻫﻢ ﺑﺎﻳﺪ ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺪ ﻣﻨﻄﻖ ﺍﺯ ﺷﺮﺍﻳﻂ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ«‬
‫ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻴﺎﺕ ﺑﻪﺧﺎﻃﺮ ﻏﻴﺮ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﻲ ﺑﻮﺩﻧﺸﺎﻥ‪ ،‬ﻧﻤﻲ ﺗﻮﺍﻧﻨﺪ ﺗﺎﺛﻴﺮﻱ ﺩﺭ ﺍﻣﻮﺭ ﻭﺍﻗﻊ ﺩﺍﺷـﺘﻪ ﺑﺎﺷـﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﺍﺯ ﺍﻳـﻦﺭﻭ‪ ،‬ﻧﻈﻴـﺮ ﻣﻨﻄـﻖ‪ ،‬ﮐـﻪ‬
‫ﭼﺎﺭﭼﻮﺏ ﻓﻬﻢ ﻣﺎ ﺍﺯ ﺟﻬﺎﻥ ﭘﻴﺮﺍﻣﻮﻥ ﺭﺍ ﻣﻌﻴﻦ ﻣﻲﺳﺎﺯﺩ‪ ،‬ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﻧﻴﺰ ﺣﺪﺍﻛﺜﺮ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﺪ ﺣﺪﻭﺩ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﺭﺍ ﻣـﺸﺨﺺ ﻛﻨـﺪ ﻭ ﺍﺯ‬
‫ﺍﻟﻘﺎﺀ ﺳﺨﻨﺎﻥ ﻣﺎﻫﻮﻱ ﺩﺭ ﺑﺎﺏ ﺟﻬﺎﻥ ﭘﻴﺮﺍﻣﻮﻥ ﻋﺎﺟﺰ ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬‬
‫ﺩﺭﺳﺖ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﺟﻬﺎﻥ ﺍﻧﺴﺎﻥ ﺷﺎﺩ ﺑﺎ ﺟﻬﺎﻥ ﺍﻧﺴﺎﻥ ﻏﻤﮕﻴﻦ ﻣﺘﻔﺎﻭﺕ ﺍﺳﺖ؛ ﺟﻬﺎﻥ ﺍﻧﺴﺎﻧﻲ ﻛﻪ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﻣـﻲﺯﻳـﺪ ﺑـﺎ ﺟﻬـﺎﻥ‬
‫ﻛﺴﻲ ﻛﻪ ﭘـﺮﻭﺍﻱ ﺍﺧـﻼﻕ ﺭﺍ ﻧـﺪﺍﺭﺩ ﻭ ﺍﻓﻌـﺎﻝ ﺿـﺪﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ )ﻣﻄـﺎﺑﻖ ﺑـﺎ ﻓﻬـﻢ ﻣﺘﻌـﺎﺭﻑ ﺍﺯ ﺯﻳـﺴﺘﻦ ﺍﺧﻼﻗـﻲ( ﺍﺯ ﺍﻭ ﺻـﺎﺩﺭ‬
‫ﻣﻲﺷﻮﺩ‪ ،‬ﻣﺘﻔﺎﻭﺕ ﺍﺳﺖ؛ ﺍﻣﺎ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺗﻔﺎﻭﺕ ﺑﺮﮔﺮﻓﺘﻪ ﺍﺯ ﺟﻬﺎﻥ ﺧـﺎﺭﺝ ﻧﻴـﺴﺖ ﻭ ﺻـﺮﻓﺎﹰ ﺍﺯ ﺗﻔـﺎﻭﺕ ﻧﮕـﺮﺵ ﺁﻥ ﺩﻭ ﺑـﻪ ﻋـﺎﻟﻢ‬
‫ﺣﮑﺎﻳﺖ ﻣﻲ ﮐﻨﺪ‪.‬‬
‫ﺑﻨﺎﺑﺮ ﺁﻧﭽﻪ ﺁﻣﺪ‪ ،‬ﻭﻳﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﻳﻦ ﺑﻪ ﺍﻗﺘﻔﺎﻱ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ‪ ،‬ﺍﺯ ﺑﻲﻧﺴﺒﺖ ﺑﻮﺩﻥ ﺍﻭﺻـﺎﻑ ﺍﺧﻼﻗـﻲ ﻭ ﮔـﺰﺍﺭﻩﻫـﺎﻱ ﺍﺧﻼﻗـﻲ ﺑـﺎ ﺟﻬـﺎﻥ‬
‫ﭘﻴﺮﺍﻣﻮﻥ ﺳﺨﻦ ﻣﻲﮔﻮﻳﺪ؛ ﻫﺮ ﭼﻨﺪ ﺻﻮﺭﺗﻨﺒﺪﻱ ﻣـﺴﺌﻠﻪ ﻧـﺰﺩ ﻛﺎﻧـﺖ ﻣﻌﺮﻓـﺖﺷﻨﺎﺳـﺎﻧﻪ ﺍﺳـﺖ ﻭ ﻧـﺰﺩ ﻭﻳﺘﮕﻨـﺸﺘﺎﻳﻦ ﺩﻻﻟـﺖ‬
‫ﺷﻨﺎﺧﺘﻲ ﻭ ﻣﻌﻨﺎﺷﻨﺎﺳﺎﻧﻪ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﻓﻀﺎﻱ ﺭﺳﺎﻟﺔ ﺩﺭ ﺑـﺎﺏ ﺍﺧـﻼﻕ ﻭ ﮔـﺰﺍﺭﻩﻫـﺎﻱ ﺍﺧﻼﻗـﻲ‪ ،‬ﻧﻤـﻲﺗـﻮﺍﻥ ﺳـﺨﻦ ﻣﻌﻨـﺎﺩﺍﺭ ﮔﻔـﺖ؛‬
‫ﭼﺮﺍﻛﻪ ﻓﺎﻗﺪ ﻣﺆﻟﻔﻪ ﺍﺻﻠﻲ ﻣﻌﻨﺎﺩﺍﺭﻱ ﻳﺎ ﺩﺍﺷﺘﻦ ﺗﺼﻮﻳﺮﻧﺪ‪ .‬ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﺑﺎ ﺁﻣﻮﺯﻩﻫﺎﻱ ﻭﻳﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﻳﻦ‪ ،‬ﺍﻳﻦ ﮔﺰﺍﺭﻩﻫﺎﻱ ﻓﺎﻗﺪ ﺗـﺼﻮﻳﺮ‬
‫ﺻﺮﻓﺎﹰ ﺧﻮﺩ ﺭﺍ ﻧﺸﺎﻥ ﻣﻲﺩﻫﻨﺪ ﻭ ﻫﻴﭻ ﺳﺨﻦ ﻣﺤﺼﻠﻲ ﺩﺭﺑﺎﺭﺓ ﺁﻧﻬـﺎ ﻧﻤـﻲﺗـﻮﺍﻥ ﮔﻔـﺖ‪ .‬ﻫﻤـﺎﻧﻄﻮﺭ ﻛـﻪ ﻭﻱ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ ﻧﺎﻣـﻪﺍﻱ ﺑـﻪ‬
‫ﺭﺍﺳﻞ‪ ،‬ﻣﻬﻤﺘﺮﻳﻦ ﻣﺴﺌﻠﻪ ﻓﻠـﺴﻔﻪ ﺭﺍ ﺗﻔﻜﻴـﻚ ﻭ ﺗﻤﻴﻴـﺰ ﻣﻴـﺎﻥ ﮔﻔـﺘﻦ ﻭ ﻧـﺸﺎﻥ ﺩﺍﺩﻥ ﻣـﻲﺩﺍﻧـﺪ‪ .‬ﻓﻴﻠـﺴﻮﻑ‪ ،‬ﺍﺯ ﺁﻥ ﺣﻴـﺚ ﻛـﻪ‬
‫ﻓﻴﻠﺴﻮﻑ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﺑﺎﻳﺪ ﻣﺮﺯ ﻣﻴﺎﻥ ﺍﻣﻮﺭ ﮔﻔﺘﻨﻲ ﻭ ﻧـﺎﮔﻔﺘﻨﻲ ﺭﺍ ﻣﻌـﻴﻦ ﺳـﺎﺯﺩ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﻓـﻀﺎﻱ ﺭﺳـﺎﻟﻪ‪ ،‬ﻣﺒﺎﺣـﺚ ﺍﺧﻼﻗـﻲﺍﻱ ﻧﻈﻴـﺮ‬

‫‪ .٢٩‬ﻟﻮﺩﻭﻳﮓ ﻭﻳﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﻳﻦ‪» ،‬ﺧﻄﺎﺑﻪﺍﻱ ﺩﺭ ﺑﺎﺏ ﺍﺧﻼﻕ«‪ ،‬ﺗﺮﺟﻤﺔ ﻣﺎﻟﻚ ﺣﺴﻴﻨﻲ‪ ،‬ﻓﺼﻠﻨﺎﻣﺔ ﻓﻠﺴﻔﻲ‪ ،‬ﺍﺩﺑﻲ‪ ،‬ﻓﺮﻫﻨﮕﻲ ﺍﺭﻏﻨﻮﻥ‪ ،‬ﺷﻤﺎﺭﺓ ‪ ،١٦‬ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ‪ ،‬ﺗﺎﺑﺴﺘﺎﻥ ‪ ،١٣٧٩‬ﺻﺺ‪.‬‬
‫‪٣٢٥‬ـ‪٣٣٣‬‬

‫‪ .۳۰‬ﻟﻮﺩﻭﻳﮓ ﻭﻳﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﻳﻦ‪ ،‬ﻧﻘﻞ ﺍﺯ‪:‬ﻫﺎﻭﺍﺭﺩ ﻣﺎﻭﻧﺲ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭﺁﻣﺪﻱ ﺑﺮ ﺭﺳﺎﻟﺔ ﻭﻳﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﻳﻦ‪ ،‬ﺗﺮﺟﻤﺔ ﺳﻬﺮﺍﺏ ﻋﻠﻮﻱﻧﻴﺎ‪ ،‬ﻃﺮﺡﻧﻮ‪ ،‬ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ‪.۱۳۷۹ ،‬ﺹ‪.123‬‬
‫‪ .۳۱‬ﻣﻨﺒﻊ ﭘﻴﺸﻴﻦ‪ ،‬ﺹ ‪۱۲۲‬‬

‫‪٩‬‬
‫ﺣﺪﻭﺩ ﻭ ﺛﻐﻮﺭ ﻣﻔﻬﻮﻡ ﺧﻮﺑﻲ‪ ،‬ﺑﺪ ﺑـﻮﺩﻥ ﺍﺿـﺮﺍﺭ ﺑـﻪ ﻏﻴـﺮ‪ ...‬ﻣﺘﻌﻠـﻖ ﺑـﻪ ﺳـﺎﺣﺖ ﻧـﺎﮔﻔﺘﻨﻲ ﻭ ﻋﻠـﻲﺍﻻﺻـﻮﻝ ﺑﻴـﺎﻥﻧﺎﭘﺬﻳﺮﻧـﺪ‬
‫ﻭﻳﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﻳﻦ ﺩﺭ ﺭﺳﺎﻟﻪ‪ ،‬ﭘﺪﻳﺪﻩ ﻫﺎﻱ ﻧﺎﮔﻔﺘﻨﻲﺍﻱ ﻛﻪ ﺧﻮﺩ ﺭﺍ ﻧﺸﺎﻥ ﻣﻲﺩﻫﻨﺪ‪ ،‬ﺍﻣﺮ ﺭﺍﺯﺁﻟﻮﺩ ﻧﺎﻣﻴﺪﻩ ﺍﺳـﺖ‪ .‬ﺭﺍﺯﺁﻟـﻮﺩﮔﻲﺍﻱ‬
‫ﻛﻪ ﻣﻮﺭﺩ ﺍﺷﺎﺭﻩ ﻭﻱ ﻗﺮﺍﺭ ﮔﺮﻓﺘﻪ‪ ،‬ﺑﻴﺶ ﺍﺯ ﺍﻳﻨﻜﻪ ﻣﺘﻀﻤﻦ ﻣﺆﻟﻔﻪﻫﺎﻱ ﺍﻳﺠﺎﺑﻲ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ‪ ،‬ﺣﺎﻭﻱ ﻣﺆﻟﻔﻪﻫﺎﻱ ﺳﻠﺒﻲ ﺍﺳﺖ‪.‬‬
‫‪٣٢‬‬
‫ﺩﺭ ﻋﻴﻦ ﺣﺎﻝ ﻭﺑﺮﻣﺒﻨﺎﻱ ﺷﻮﺍﻫﺪﻇﺎﻫﺮﻱ‪ ،‬ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﺭﺳﺎﻟﻪ ﺭﺍ‪ ،‬ﺑﺮ ﺧﻼﻑ ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﮐﺎﻧﺘﻲ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﻏﻴﺮﺷـﻨﺎﺧﺖﮔـﺮﺍ‬
‫ﺍﻧﮕﺎﺷﺖ‪ .‬ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﺑﺎ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺗﻠﻘﻲ‪ ،‬ﮔﺰﺍﺭﻩﻫﺎﻱ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﻛﻪ ﻣﺸﺘﻤﻞ ﺑﺮ ﺍﻭﺻﺎﻑ ﺳﺒﻚ ﺍﺧﻼﻗـﻲ‪ ٣٣‬ﻧﻈﻴـﺮ ﺧـﻮﺑﻲ‪ ،‬ﺑـﺪﻱ‪ ،‬ﺑﺎﻳـﺪ‪،‬‬
‫ﻧﺒﺎﻳﺪ ﻭ ﺍﻭﺻﺎﻑ ﺳﺘﺒﺮ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ‪ ٣٤‬ﻧﻈﻴﺮ ﻭﻓﺎﻱ ﺑﻪ ﻋﻬﺪ‪ ،‬ﻧﻴﻜﻮﻛﺎﺭﻱ‪ ،‬ﻋﺪﻡ ﺍﺿﺮﺍﺭ ﺑﻪ ﻏﻴﺮ ﻭ ‪ ...‬ﻫﺴﺘﻨﺪ‪ ،‬ﻋﻠـﻲﺍﻻﺻـﻮﻝ ﺻـﺪﻕ‬
‫ﻭ ﻛﺬﺏﺑﺮﺩﺍﺭ ﻧﻴﺴﺘﻨﺪ ﻭ ﻧﻤﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﺩﺭ ﺑﺎﺏ ﺁﻧﻬﺎ ﺑﺤﺚ ﻭ ﻓﺤﺺ ﻋﻘﻼﻧﻲ ﻛﺮﺩ‪ .‬ﺑﻪ ﺗﻌﺒﻴﺮ ﺩﻳﮕﺮ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ ﻭﺍﻗـﻊ‪ ،‬ﻋـﻼﻭﻩ ﺑـﺮ ﺍﻳﻨﻜـﻪ‬
‫ﻭﻳﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﻳﻦ ﻣﺘﻘﺪﻡ ﺩﺭ ﻭﺍﺩﻱ ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﺿﺪﻭﺍﻗﻊﮔﺮﺍ‪ ٣٥‬ﺍﺳﺖ ﻭ ﺟﻬﺎﻥ ﭘﻴﺮﺍﻣﻮﻥ ﺭﺍ ﻋﺎﺭﻱ ﺍﺯ ﺍﺭﺯﺷﻬﺎﻱ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﻣـﻲﺍﻧﮕـﺎﺭﺩ‪،‬‬
‫‪٣٦‬‬
‫ﻫﻤﭽﻨﻴﻦ ﺑﺮ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺑﺎﻭﺭﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﺍﺯ ﺣﺠﻴﺖ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﻭ ﺻﺪﻕ ﻭ ﻛﺬﺏ ﮔـﺰﺍﺭﻩﻫـﺎﻱ ﺍﺧﻼﻗـﻲ ﻧﻤـﻲﺗـﻮﺍﻥ ﺳـﺮﺍﻍ ﮔﺮﻓـﺖ‪.‬‬
‫ﻭﻳﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﻳﻦ ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺖ ﺭﺍ ﻋﻠﻲ ﺍﻻﺻﻮﻝ ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺖ ﮔﺰﺍﺭﻩﺍﻱ‪ ٣٧‬ﻣﻲﺩﺍﻧﺪ ﻭ ﮔﺰﺍﺭﻩ ﺭﺍ‪ ،‬ﺑﻪ ﭘﻴﺮﻭﻱ ﺍﺯ ﺍﺻﻞ ﺑﺎﻓﺖ‪ ٣٨‬ﻓﺮﮔﻪ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﺣـﺪ‬
‫ﻣﻌﻨﺎﺩﺍﺭﻱ ﻗﻠﻤﺪﺍﺩ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﺑﻪ ﺗﻌﺒﻴﺮ ﺩﻳﮕﺮ‪ ،‬ﺑﺎﻳﺪ ﺑﺘﻮﺍﻥ ﻫﺮ ﺁﻧﭽﻪ ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺖﺑﺨﺶ ﺍﺳـﺖ ﺭﺍ ﺩﺭ ﻗﺎﻟـﺐ ﮔـﺰﺍﺭﻩﻫـﺎ ﺻـﻮﺭﺗﺒﻨﺪﻱ‬

‫‪32. non – cognitivist‬‬

‫‪۳۳. thin moral properties‬‬
‫‪۳4. thick moral properties‬‬
‫‪35. anti - realist‬‬

‫‪ .٣٦‬ﻋﻠﻲﺍﻻﺻﻮﻝ ﻣﻲ ﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﺩﺭ ﻭﺍﺩﻱ ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﺿﺪﺍﻗﻊﮔﺮﺍ ﻭ ﺩﺭ ﻋﻴﻦ ﺣﺎﻝ ﺷﻨﺎﺧﺖﮔﺮﺍ ﺑﻮﺩ‪ .‬ﺑﺎ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺗﻮﺿﻴﺢ ﻛﻪ ﮔﺰﺍﺭﻩﻫﺎﻱ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﻛﺎﺷﻒ ﺍﺯ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﻭﺍﻗﻊ ﻧﻴﺴﺘﻨﺪ ﻭ ﻧﺴﺒﺘﻲ‬
‫ﺑﺎ ﻭﻗﺎﻳﻊ ﭘﻴﺮﺍﻣﻮﻥ ﻣﺎ ﻧﺪﺍﺭﻧﺪ‪ ،‬ﺍﻣﺎ ﺩﺭ ﻋﻴﻦ ﺣﺎﻝ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﺩﺭﺑﺎﺭﻩ ﺻﺪﻕ ﻭ ﻛﺬﺏ ﻭ ﺣﺠﻴﺖ ﻣﺪﻋﻴﺎﺕ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ‪ ،‬ﺑﻪ ﻧﺤﻮ ﺑﻴﻦﺍﻻﺫﻫﺎﻧﻲ‪ ،‬ﮔﻔﺘﮕﻮ ﻛﺮﺩ‪ .‬ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺁﺷﻨﺎﻳﻲ ﺑﻴـﺸﺘﺮ ﺑـﺎ‬
‫ﺭﺑﻂ ﻭ ﻧﺴﺒﺖ ﻣﻴﺎﻥ ﻭﺍﻗﻊﮔﺮﺍﻳﻲ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﻭ ﺷﻨﺎﺧﺖﮔﺮﺍﻳﻲ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﻭ ﺍﻗﺴﺎﻡ ﺁﻥ ﻧﮕﺎﻩ ﻛﻨﻴﺪ ﺑﻪ‪:‬‬
‫‪-Miller, A. (2003) An Introduction to Contemporary Meta Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon press), Chapter 1.‬‬
‫‪-Smith, M.(1997) ‘ Realism' in A Companion to Ethics, Singer, P.(ed.), (Oxford: Blackwell), pp.399-410.‬‬
‫‪3٧. propositional knowledge‬‬
‫‪3٨. Context Principle‬‬
‫‪ .٣٩‬ﺑﺮﺍﻱ ﺁﺷﻨﺎﻳﻲ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ ﺑﺎ ﺍﻣﻬﺎﺕ ﺁﻣﻮﺯﻩ ﺭﺳﺎﻟﻪ ﻭ ﺗﻠﻘﻲ ﻭﻳﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﻳﻦ ﺍﺯ ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﺩﺭ ﺩﻭﺭﺍﻥ ﻧﺨﺴﺖ ﻓﻠﺴﻔﻲ‪ ،‬ﻧﮕﺎﻩ ﻛﻨﻴﺪ ﺑﻪ‪:‬‬
‫ـ ﻫﺎﻭﺍﺭﺩ ﻣﺎﻭﻧﺲ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭﺁﻣﺪﻱ ﺑﺮ ﺭﺳﺎﻟﺔ ﻣﻨﻄﻘﻲ ـ ﻓﻠﺴﻔﻲ ﻭﻳﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﻳﻦ‪ ،‬ﺗﺮﺟﻤﺔ ﺳﻬﺮﺍﺏ ﻋﻠﻮﻱﻧﻴﺎ‪ ،‬ﻃﺮﺡﻧﻮ‪ ،‬ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ‪.١٣٨١ ،‬‬
‫ـ ﻧﻮﺭﻣﻦ ﻣﻠﻜﻢ ﻭ ﺩﻳﮕﺮﺍﻥ‪ ،‬ﻭﻳﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﻳﻦ ﻭ ﺗﺸﺒﻴﻪ ﻧﻔﺲ ﺑﻪ ﭼﺸﻢ‪ ،‬ﺗﺮﺟﻤﻪ ﻧﺎﺻﺮ ﺯﻋﻔﺮﺍﻧﭽﻲ‪ ،‬ﻫﺮﻣﺲ‪ ،‬ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ‪.١٣٨٤ ،‬‬
‫ـ ﺳﺮﻭﺵ ﺩﺑﺎﻍ‪ "،‬ﺳﻜﻮﺕ ﺩﺭ ﺗﺮﺍﻛﺘﺎﺗﻮﺱ"‪ ،‬ﻓﺼﻠﻨﺎﻣﻪ ﻋﻠﻤﻲ – ﭘﮋﻭﻫﺸﻲ ﻧﺎﻣﻪ ﻣﻔﻴﺪ‪،‬ﺷﻤﺎﺭﻩ ‪.٦٢‬‬
‫‪- Ayer, J. (1985) Wittgenstein (USA: The University of Chicago press).‬‬
‫‪- white, R. (2006) Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London &New York: Continum).‬‬
‫‪- Barrett, C. (1991) Wittgenstein on Ethics and Religious Belief (UK &USA:Blackwell), Part 1.‬‬

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‫ﻛﺮﺩ‪ .‬ﻫﺮ ﺁﻧﭽﻪ ﺗﺤﺖ ﻋﻨﻮﺍﻥ ﮔﺰﺍﺭﻩﻫﺎﻱ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﺑﻪ ﺣﺴﺎﺏ ﻣﻲﺁﻳﻨﺪ‪ ،‬ﭼﻮﻥ ﺗﺼﻮﻳﺮ ﻧﺪﺍﺭﻧﺪ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ ﻭﺍﻗﻊ ﮔﺰﺍﺭﻩ ﻧﻴـﺴﺘﻨﺪ ﻭ ﺑـﻪ‬
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‫ﺍﻳﻦ ﺩﻟﻴﻞ ﻧﻤﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﻨﺪﻋﻠﻲﺍﻻﺻﻮﻝ ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺖﺑﺨﺶ ﺑﺎﺷﻨﺪ‪.‬‬
‫‪ .۵‬ﺭﺍﺑﻄﻪ ﻣﻴﺎﻥ ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﻛﺎﻧﺘﻲ ﻭ ﻭﻳﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﻳﻨﻲ‬
‫ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻭ ﻭﻳﺘﮕﺸﺘﺎﻳﻦ ﺗﺎ ﺁﻧﺠﺎ ﻛﻪ ﺑﻪ ﻧﻘﺪ ﺍﺧﻼﻕ‪ ،‬ﺑﻪﻋﻨﻮﺍﻥ ﻣﻘﻮﻟﻪ ﺍﻱ ﺗﺠﺮﺑـﻲ‪ ،‬ﻫﻤـﺖ ﻣـﻲﮔﻤﺎﺭﻧـﺪ ﻭ ﺩﺍﻭﺭﻱ ﺍﺧﻼﻗـﻲ ﺑـﺮ‬
‫ﺍﺳﺎﺱ ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﻲ ﺭﺍ ﺭﺩ ﻣﻲ ﻛﻨﻨﺪ‪ ،‬ﻫﻤﺮﺍﻫﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﻋﻴﻦ ﺣﺎﻝ‪ ،‬ﭼﻨﺎﻧﻜﻪ ﺩﻳﺪﻳﻢ‪ ،‬ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﺑﺎ ﺑﻨـﺎ ﻧﻬـﺎﺩﻥ ﻗـﺎﻧﻮﻥ ﻋـﺎﻡ ﻳـﺎ ﺧـﻮﺩ‬
‫ﺁﺋﻴﻨﻲ ﺧﻮﻳﺶ ﺑﺮ ﻣﻔﺮﻭﺿﺎﺗﻲ ﺍﺯ ﺟﻤﻠﻪ ﺁﺯﺍﺩﻱ‪ ،‬ﺍﺧﺘﻴﺎﺭ ﻭ‪ ،...‬ﺗﺄﻛﻴﺪ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﺪ ﻛﻪ ﺣﻜﻤﻲ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﺪ ﺍﺧﻼﻗـﻲ ﺍﻧﮕﺎﺷـﺘﻪ ﺷـﻮﺩ‬
‫ﻛﻪ ﺗﺼﻮﺭ ﻫﻤﺰﻣﺎﻥ ﺁﻥ ﺑﺎﻗﺎﻧﻮﻥ ﻋﺎﻡ‪ ،‬ﻣﻮﺟﺐ ﺑﺮﻭﺯ ﺗﻨﺎﻗﺾ ﻣﻨﻄﻘﻲ ﻧﮕﺮﺩﺩ‪ .‬ﺍﻣﺮ ﻣﻄﻠﻖ ﻭ ﺳﻪ ﺗﻨـﺴﻴﻖ ﺁﻥ ﺩﺭ ﺣﻜـﻢ ﻣﻌﻴـﺎﺭ ﻭ‬
‫ﻣﺤﻜﻲ ﻫﺴﺘﻨﺪ ﻛﻪ ﺑﻪ ﻣﺪﺩ ﺁﻧﻬﺎ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﺍﺯ ﺑـﺮﻭﺯ ﻳـﺎ ﻋـﺪﻡ ﺑـﺮﻭﺯ ﺗﻨـﺎﻗﺾ ﺳـﺮﺍﻍ ﮔﺮﻓـﺖ‪ .‬ﺗـﺸﺨﻴﺺ ﺭﻭﺍﻳـﻲ ﻭ ﻧـﺎﺭﻭﺍﻳﻲ‬
‫ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﻓﻌﻠﻲ ﻣﺸﺨﺺ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ ﻣﻌﻨﺎﻱ ﻛﺎﻧﺘﻲ ﻛﻠﻤﻪ‪ ،‬ﻧﻈﻴﺮ ﻓﻌﺎﻟﻴﺖ ﺷﺨﺺ ﻣﻨﻄﻘﺪﺍﻧﻲ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﺍﺻﻮﻟﻲ ﺭﺍ ﺑـﻪ ﻋﻨـﻮﺍﻥ ﺍﺻـﻮﻝ‬
‫ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﻪ ﻣﻲ ﺍﻧﮕﺎﺭﺩ ﻭ ﺳﭙﺲ ﺑﺎ ﺍﺳﺘﻔﺎﺩﻩ ﺍﺯ ﻗـﻮﺍﻧﻴﻦ ﻣﻨﻄﻘـﻲ‪ ،‬ﮔـﺰﺍﺭﻩ ﻫـﺎﻱ ﺟﺪﻳـﺪﻱ ﺍﺯ ﺩﻝ ﺁﻥ ﺑﻴـﺮﻭﻥ ﺁﻭﺭﺩﻩ‪ ،‬ﺻـﺪﻕ ﻭ‬
‫ﻛﺬﺏ ﺁﻧﻬﺎ ﺭﺍ ﻣﺤﻚ ﻣﻲﺯﻧﺪ‪.‬‬
‫ﺑﺎ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺣﺴﺎﺏ ﺷﺎﻳﺪ ﺑﺘﻮﺍﻥ ﭼﻨـﻴﻦ ﺗـﺼﻮﺭ ﻛـﺮﺩ ﻛـﻪ ﻣﻌﺘﻘـﺪﺍﺕ ﺍﺧﻼﻗـﻲ ﻫـﺮ ﻛﻨـﺸﮕﺮ ﺍﺧﻼﻗـﻲ ﻣـﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧـﺪ ﻧﻘـﺶ ﺍﺻـﻮﻝ‬
‫ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﻪﺍﻱ ﺭﺍ ﺍﻳﻔﺎ ﻛﻨﺪ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺖ ﺧﺎﺭﺟﻲ ﺗﺮﻳﻦ ﻧﻘﻄـﻪ ﺗﻤـﺎﺱ ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋـﻪ ﻣﻌﺘﹶﻘـﺪﺍﺕ ﻭﻱ ﺑـﺎ ﻋـﺎﻟﻢ ﺧـﺎﺭﺝ ﺍﺳـﺖ؛‬
‫ﻫﻤﺎﻥﻛﻪ ﻭﻳﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﻳﻦ ﺍﺯ ﺁﻥ ﺗﺤﺖ ﻋﻨﻮﺍﻥ ﺣﺪﻭﺩ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﻳﺎﺩ ﻣﻲﻛﺮﺩ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﺻﻮﺭﺕ ﺗﻨﺴﻴﻖ ﻭ ﺻﻮﺭﺗﺒﻨﺪﻱ ﻳـﻚ ﺩﺳـﺘﮕﺎﻩ‬
‫ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ‪ ،‬ﻧﻈﻴﺮ ﺁﻧﭽﻪ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﺍﻧﺠﺎﻡ ﺩﺍﺩﻩ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﻣﺎﺩﺍﻣﻲ ﻛﻪ ﻣﻨﺴﻠﺦ ﺍﺯ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﺧﺎﺭﺝ ﺍﺳﺖ ﻭ ﻧﺴﺒﺘﻲ ﺑﺎ ﺍﻣـﻮﺭ ﻭﺍﻗـﻊ ﺩﺭ ﻣﻌﻨـﺎﻱ‬
‫ﺭﺳﺎﻟﻪﺍﻱ ﻛﻠﻤﻪ ﻧﺪﺍﺭﺩ‪ ،‬ﻧﺰﺩ ﻭﻳﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﻳﻦ ﺍﻣﺮﻱ ﻧﺎﻣﻮﺟﻪ ﻧﻴﺴﺖ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ ﻭﺍﻗﻊ‪ ،‬ﻛﻨﺸﮕﺮ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻧﺪ ﺑﺪﻳﻦ ﻧﺤـﻮ ﺍﺯ ﻧﮕـﺮﺵ‬
‫ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﺧﻮﻳﺶ ﺑﻪ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﺧﺒﺮ ﺩﻫﺪ؛ ﻧﮕﺮﺷﻲ ﻛﻪ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ ﺍﺯ ﻫـﺮ ﭼﻴـﺰ ﻣﺘـﻀﻤﻦ ﺍﻳـﻦ ﻣﻌﻨـﺎ ﺍﺳـﺖ ﻛـﻪ ﻭﻱ ﭼﮕﻮﻧـﻪ ﺍﺯ ﻣﻨﻈـﺮ‬
‫ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﺑﻪ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﻧﻈﺮ ﻣﻲﻛﻨﺪ‪.‬‬
‫ﺑﻨﺎﺑﺮﺁﻧﭽﻪ ﺁﻣﺪ‪ ،‬ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﭼﻨﻴﻦ ﻧﺘﻴﺠﻪ ﮔﺮﻓﺖ ﻛﻪ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻭ ﻭﻳﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﻳﻦ ﻣﺘﻘﺪﻡ ﺩﺭ ﺣﻮﺯﻩ ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﺿـﺪﻭﺍﻗﻌﮕﺮﺍ ﻫـﺴﺘﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﺩﺭ‬
‫ﻋﻴﻦ ﺣﺎﻝ‪ ،‬ﮔﺰﺍﺭﻩﻫﺎﻱ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﺩﺭ ﻧﻈﺎﻡ ﮐﺎﻧﺘﻲ ﻇﺎﻫﺮﺍ ﺑﺮ ﺧﻼﻑ ﻧﻈﺎﻡ ﻭﻳﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﻳﻨﻲ‪،‬ﮔﺰﺍﺭﻩ ﻫﺎﻱ ﺗﺮﮐﻴﺒـﻲ‪-‬ﭘﻴـﺸﻴﻨﻲ ﺍﻧـﺪ ﻭ‬
‫ﺍﻓﺎﺩﻩ ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺖ ﻣﻲﮐﻨﻨﺪ‪ .‬ﺑﺪﻳﻦ ﻣﻌﻨﺎ ﮐﻪ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﺩﺭ ﺑﺎﺭﻩ ﺻـﺪﻕ ﻭ ﮐـﺬﺏ ﻭﺣﺠﻴـﺖ ﻣﻌﺮﻓـﺖ ﺷـﻨﺎﺧﺘﻲ ﺁﻧﻬـﺎ‪ ،‬ﺑـﻪ ﻧﺤـﻮﺑﻴﻦ‬
‫ﺍﻻﺫﻫﺎﻧﻲ‪ ،‬ﺑﺤﺚ ﻭﻓﺤﺺ ﮐﺮﺩ‪.‬ﺑﻪ ﺩﻳﮕﺮﺳﺨﻦ ﺍﺯ ﺁﻧﺠـﺎ ﮐـﻪ ﺍﻳـﻦ ﮔـﺰﺍﺭﻩ ﻫـﺎ ﻣـﺸﻤﻮﻝ ﺣﮑـﻢ ﻗـﻮﻩ ﻓﺎﻫﻤـﻪ ﺷـﺪﻩ ﺍﻧـﺪ‪،‬ﻋﻠﻲ‬

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‫ﺍﻻﺻﻮﻝ ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺖ ﺑﺨﺸﻨﺪ‪،‬ﻫﺮﭼﻨﺪﺑﻪ ﭘﺪﻳﺪﻩ ﺍﻱ ﺩﺭ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﺧﺎﺭﺝ ﺍﺭﺟﺎﻉ ﻧﻤﻲ ﺩﻫﻨﺪ‪.‬ﭘﺲ ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﺩﺳﺘﮕﺎﻩ ﺍﺧﻼﻗـﻲﺍﻱ‪ ،‬ﻧﻈﻴـﺮ‬
‫ﺩﺳﺘﮕﺎﻩ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ‪ ،‬ﺻﻮﺭﺗﺒﻨﺪﻱ ﻛﺮﺩ ﻛﻪ ﻣﺘﻀﻤﻦ ﺍﺻﻮﻝ ﭘﻴﺸﻴﻨﻲ ﻭ ﻣﻨﺴﻠﺦ ﺍﺯ ﺗﺠﺮﺑـﻪ ﺑﺎﺷـﺪ ﻭ ﺩﺭ ﻋـﻴﻦ ﺣـﺎﻝ‪ ،‬ﺑـﺮﺍﻱ‬
‫ﺳﻨﺠﺶ ﺣﺠﻴﺖ ﻣﺆﻟﻔﻪﻫﺎﻱ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﺁﻥ‪ ،‬ﺑﻪ ﻣﻼﻙﻫﺎﻱ ﺻﻮﺭﻱ ﻣﻨﻄﻘﻲ ﺑﺴﻨﺪﻩ ﻛﺮﺩ‪ .‬ﺍﻳﻦ ﻧﮕﺎﻩ ﺑـﻪ ﺍﺧـﻼﻕ ﺑـﻲ ﻧـﺴﺒﺖ ﺑـﺎ‬
‫ﺁﻣﻮﺯﻩﻫﺎﻱ ﺭﺳﺎﻟﻪ ﻧﻴﺴﺖ‪ ،‬ﭼﺮﺍ ﻛﻪ ﺩﺭ ﺭﺳﺎﻟﻪ ﻫﻢ ﺑﺎ ﺍﻳﻨﻜﻪ ﺍﺻﻮﻝ ﻣﻨﻄﻖ ﻭ ﺭﻳﺎﺿﻴﺎﺕ ﻣﻨﺴﻠﺦ ﺍﺯ ﻋﺎﻟﻤﻨـﺪ‪ ،‬ﺍﻣـﺎ ﺑـﺎ ﺍﺳـﺘﻔﺎﺩﻩ ﺍﺯ‬
‫ﻣﻼﻙﻫﺎﻱ ﺻﻮﺭﻱ‪ ،‬ﻣﻲﺗﻮﺍﻥ ﻧﺤﻮﻩ ﺑﻪ ﻛﺎﺭ ﺑﺴﺘﻪ ﺷﺪﻥ ﻋﻼﺋﻢ ﺭﻳﺎﺿـﻴﺎﺗﻲ ـ ﻣﻨﻄﻘـﻲ‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ ﺗﺮﻛﻴﺒـﺎﺕ ﻣﺨﺘﻠـﻒ ﻭ ﺻـﺪﻕ ﻭ‬
‫ﻛﺬﺏ ﺩﻻﻟﺖ ﺷﻨﺎﺳﺎﻧﻪ ﺁﻧﻬﺎ ﺭﺍ ﺩﺭ ﻗﺎﻟﺐ ﺟﺪﺍﻭﻝ ﺻﺪﻕ‪ ،‬ﻛﻪ ﺻﺮﻓﺎﹰ ﻣﺒﺘﻨﻲ ﺑﺮ ﻣﻌﺎﻧﻲ ﻗﺮﺍﺭﺩﺍﺩﻱ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻋﻼﺋـﻢ ﻭ ﺑـﻲﻧـﺴﺒﺖ ﺑـﺎ‬
‫ﺍﻣﻮﺭ ﻭﺍﻗﻊ ﻭ ﺟﻬﺎﻥ ﭘﻴﺮﺍﻣﻮﻥ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﻣﺤﻚ ﺯﺩ‪ .‬ﻭﻟﻲ ﺑﺮ ﺧﻼﻑ ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺖ ﺑﺨـﺶ ﺑـﻮﺩﻥ ﮔـﺰﺍﺭﻩ ﻫـﺎﻱ ﺍﺧﻼﻗـﻲ ﺩﺭ ﻣﻨﻈﻮﻣـﻪ‬
‫ﮐﺎﻧﺘﻲ ﻗﻀﺎﻳﺎﻱ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲﺍﻱ ﻧﻈﻴﺮ "ﻭﻓﺎﻱ ﺑﻪ ﻋﻬﺪ ﺧﻮﺏ ﺍﺳﺖ" ﻭ "ﻋﺪﻡ ﺍﺿﺮﺍﺭ ﺑﻪ ﻏﻴﺮ ﺑﺎﻳـﺴﺘﻪ ﺍﺳـﺖ"‪ ،‬ﺩﺭ ﻓـﻀﺎﻱ ﺭﺳـﺎﻟﻪ‬
‫ﺑﺎﻟﻤﺮﻩ ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺖﺑﺨﺶ ﻧﻴﺴﺘﻨﺪ ﻭ ﺻﺮﻓﺎ ﺍﺯ ﻣﻨﻈﺮ ﻭ ﭼﮕﻮﻧﮕﻲ ﻧﮕﺮﻳﺴﺘﻦ ﻛﺎﺭﺑﺮ ﺯﺑﺎﻥ ﺑﻪ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﺧﺒﺮ ﻣﻲﺩﻫﻨﺪ‪.‬‬
‫ﺩﺭ ﺍﻳﻦ ﻣﻘﺎﻟﻪ ﺭﺑﻂ ﻭ ﻧﺴﺒﺖ ﻣﻴﺎﻥ ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﻣﺒﺘﻨﻲ ﺑﺮ ﺭﺳﺎﻟﻪ ﻭﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﮐﺎﻧﺘﻲ ﻣﻮﺭﺩ ﺑﺮﺭﺳﻲ ﻗﺮﺍﺭ ﮔﺮﻓﺖ‪ .‬ﭼﻨﺎﻧﻜـﻪ ﺩﻳـﺪﻳﻢ‪ ،‬ﺑـﻪ‬
‫ﻧﻈﺮ ﻣﻲﺭﺳﺪ ﺩﺳﺘﮕﺎﻩ ﺍﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﺍﺯ ﺟﻬﺎﺕ ﺿﺪﻭﺍﻗﻊﮔﺮﺍ ﺑﻮﺩﻥ ﻭ ﻧﮕـﺎﻩ ﻏﻴـﺮ ﺗﺠﺮﺑـﻲ ﺑـﻪ ﺍﺧـﻼﻕ ﺩﺍﺷـﺘﻦ‪ ،‬ﻣـﺘﻼﺋﻢ ﺑـﺎ‬
‫ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﻣﺒﺘﻨﻲ ﺑﺮ ﺭﺳﺎﻟﻪ ﺍﺳﺖ‪ ،‬ﺍﻣﺎ ﺗﻔﺎﻭﺕ ﻣﻮﺟﻮﺩ ﺑﻴﻦ ﺁﻥ ﺩﻭ ﺩﺭ ﺷﻨﺎﺧﺖﮔﺮﺍ ﺑﻮﺩﻥ ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﻛـﺎﻧﺘﻲ ﻭ ﻏﻴﺮﺷـﻨﺎﺧﺖ ﺑـﻮﺩﻥ‬
‫ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﻭﻳﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﻳﻨﻲ ﺍﺳﺖ‪..‬‬

‫ﻣﻨﺎﺑﻊ‪:‬‬
‫‪ -‬ﺩﺑﺎﻍ‪،‬ﺳﺮﻭﺵ‪",‬ﺳﮑﻮﺕ ﺩﺭ ﺗﺮﺍﮐﺘﺎﺗﻮﺱ"‪ ،‬ﻓﺼﻠﻨﺎﻣﻪ ﻋﻠﻤﻲ‪-‬ﭘﮋﻭﻫﺸﻲ ﻧﺎﻣﻪ ﻣﻔﻴﺪ‪،‬ﺷﻤﺎﺭﻩ ‪٦٢‬؛‬
‫‪ -‬ﺳﺎﻟﻴﻮﺍﻥ‪،‬ﺭﺍﺟﺮ‪ ,‬ﺍﺧﻼﻕ ﺩﺭ ﻓﻠﺴﻔﻪ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ‪ ،‬ﺗﺮﺟﻤﺔ ﻋﺰﺕﺍﷲ ﻓﻮﻻﺩﻭﻧﺪ‪ ،‬ﻃﺮﺡ ﻧﻮ‪ ،‬ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ‪۱۳۸۰ ،‬؛‬
‫‪-‬ﮐﺎﻧﺖ‪ ،‬ﺍﻣﺎﻧﻮﺋﻞ ‪,‬ﺑﻨﻴﺎﺩﻣﺎﺑﻌﺪﺍﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﻪ ﺍﺧﻼﻕ‪،‬ﺗﺮﺟﻤﻪ ﺣﻤﻴﺪ ﻋﻨﺎﻳﺖ ﻭ ﻋﻠﻲ ﻗﻴﺼﺮﻱ‪،‬ﺧﻮﺍﺭﺯﻣﻲ‪,‬ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ‪ ,‬ﺳﺎﻝ؟؟؟؟‪،‬‬
‫‪ -‬ﮐﺎﻧﺖ‪ ,‬ﺍﻣﺎﻧﻮﺋﻞ ‪ ,‬ﻧﻘﺪ ﻋﻘﻞ ﻋﻤﻠﻲ‪ ,‬ﺗﺮﺟﻤﻪ ﺍﻧﺸﺎﺀ ﺍﷲ ﺭﺣﻤﺘﻲ‪,‬ﻧﻮﺭﺍﻟﺜﻘﻠﻴﻦ ‪ ,‬ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ‪۱۳۸۵ ,‬؛‬

‫‪١٢‬‬
 ‫؛‬۱۳۷۹ ,‫ ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ‬, ‫ ﺧﻮﺍﺭﺯﻣﻲ‬,‫ ﺗﺮﺟﻤﻪ ﻋﺰﺕ ﺍﷲ ﻓﻮﻻﺩﻭﻧﺪ‬,‫ ﻓﻠﺴﻔﻪ ﮐﺎﻧﺖ‬, ‫ ﺍﺷﺘﻔﺎﻥ‬,‫ ﮐﻮﺭﻧﺮ‬-
‫؛‬۱۳۷۹،‫ ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ‬،‫ ﻃﺮﺡﻧﻮ‬،‫ ﺗﺮﺟﻤﺔ ﺳﻬﺮﺍﺏ ﻋﻠﻮﻱﻧﻴﺎ‬،‫ ﺩﺭﺁﻣﺪﻱ ﺑﺮ ﺭﺳﺎﻟﺔ ﻭﻳﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﻳﻦ‬,‫ ﻫﺎﻭﺍﺭﺩ‬،‫ ﻣﺎﻭﻧﺲ‬-
۱۳۸۴ ،‫ ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ‬،‫ ﻫﺮﻣﺲ‬،‫ ﺗﺮﺟﻤﺔ ﻧﺎﺻﺮ ﺯﻋﻔﺮﺍﻧﭽﻲ‬،‫ ﻭﻳﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﻳﻦ ﻭ ﺗﺸﺒﻴﻪ ﻧﻔﺲ ﺑﻪ ﭼﺸﻢ‬، ‫ﻧﻮﺭﻣﻦ ﻣﻠﻜﻢ ﻭ ﺩﻳﮕﺮﺍﻥ‬-
،‫ ﻓﺮﻫﻨﮕـﻲ ﺍﺭﻏﻨـﻮﻥ‬،‫ ﻓـﺼﻠﻨﺎﻣﺔ ﺍﺩﺑـﻲ‬،‫ ﺗﺮﺟﻤـﺔ ﻣﺎﻟـﻚ ﺣـﺴﻴﻨﻲ‬،«‫ »ﺧﻄﺎﺑﻪﺍﻱ ﺩﺭ ﺑﺎﺏ ﺍﺧـﻼﻕ‬،‫ ﻟﻮﺩﻭﻳﮓ‬،‫_ ﻭﻳﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﻳﻦ‬
‫؛‬۱۳۷۹ ‫ ﺗﺎﺑﺴﺘﺎﻥ‬،‫ ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ‬،۱۶ ‫ﺷﻤﺎﺭﻩ‬

References:
- Ayer, J. (1985) Wittgenstein (USA: The University of Chicago press);'
- Barrett, C. (1991) Wittgenstein on Ethics and Religious Belief (UK
&USA:Blackwell);
-Hill, Jr. T. E. (2000) 'Kantianism' in The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory,
Lafollete, H. (ed.), (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers);
-Miller, A. (2003) An Introduction to Contemporary MetaEthics (Oxford:
Clarendon press);
-Nordenstam, T.(2001) ‘Kant and the Utilitarians’, Ethical Perspectives, 8(1),
pp. 29-37
-Odel, S. J. (2004) On Consequentialist Ethics (Canada: wadsworth);
-O'Neill, O. (1997) 'Kantian Ethics' in A Companion to ethics, singer, P. (ed.),
(oxford: Blackwell Publishers), Firse Published 1991, pp. 175-185;
-Smith, M. (1997) 'Moral Realism' in A Companion to Ethics, Singer, P.(ed.),
(Oxford: Blackwell);
-Tannsjo, T, (2002) Understanding Ethics: An Introduction to Moral Theory
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press);
- White, R. (2006) Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London
&New York: Continum);

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- Wittgenstein, L. (1961) Tractatus Logico – Philosophicus, translated by Pears,
D. and Mc Guinns, B. (Routledge and Kegan Paul: London and New York),
Revised Edition 1974.

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