MITIGATION 1

Jessica Navarro
3/16/2022

Puerto Rico Left in the Shadows

Natural disasters cannot be avoided while manmade disasters can be prevented, but

there are ways to soothe the damage they cause to communities and the environment. As

Bullock et al. (2020) mention, mitigation is defined as “a sustained action to reduce or eliminate

the risks to people and property from such hazards and their effects” (p. 87). Mitigation efforts

are everything done to make sure a disaster does not happen or, if it does, does not harm as

much as it could.

For that reason, the function of emergency managers in mitigation is significant, since

they work with local, state, and federal governments to implement structural actions in the

communities which help to reduce the impact of the event, and therefore reduce the damage.

For example, the damage caused by an earthquake can be reduced by building more resistant

houses and in places where the ground is solid. Also, there are also non-structural mitigation

measures such as reforestation, the use of building codes, crop rotation, vegetative

conservation barriers, soil retention, among others.

Despite this, throughout the history of emergency management there have been

occasions where mitigation phase has clearly failed. The 2017 hurricane season in Puerto Rico

has been one of the great disasters that reflects the lack of mitigation, and consequently, the

great damage it caused to the island belonging to the territory of the United States. What

mitigation actions were being taken before 2017? Was there a mitigation plan available? Could
MITIGATION 2
Jessica Navarro
3/16/2022

this have been prevented? Several aspects that led to failures will be addressed through this

document.

Mitigation Before and After 2017

Before the 2017 hurricane season, much could have been done to prevent damage to

affected communities, such as Puerto Rico. The 2017 Hurricane Season FEMA After-Action

Report (2018) shows the failures occurred before, during and after these events, as well as the

recommendations for improvement. Key findings and recommendations are shown below:

Table 1

2017 Hurricane Season FEMA After-Action Report: Key Findings and Recommendations.

2017 Hurricane Season FEMA After-Action Report

Key Findings Recommendations
1. Scaling a response for concurrent, complex incidents.

▪ FEMA leaders at all levels made major
adaptations to Agency policy and
programs to respond to significant
operational challenges during the
hurricane season.
▪ FEMA’s plans guided response
operations, but enhancements to the
planning process and format are
needed to improve usability during
operations.
▪ FEMA could have better leveraged
open-source information and
preparedness data, such as capability
assessments and exercise findings, for
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin
Islands.
▪ Revise the National Response
Framework and, as required, the
Response Federal Interagency
Operational Plan to emphasize
stabilization of critical lifelines and
coordination across critical
infrastructure sectors.
▪ Leverage the new FEMA Integration
Teams and technical assistance to
help states build capacity.
▪ Work with whole community partners
to improve risk management and
strengthen capabilities.
▪ Create preparedness and planning
products that are easily accessible,
modular, inclusive, and readily
executable.
MITIGATION
2. Staffing for concurrent, complex incidents.
▪ FEMA entered the hurricane season
with force strength less than its
target, resulting in staffing shortages
across the incidents.
▪ The Agency has made progress on
disaster workforce certification but
had not achieved its targets. Field
leaders reported some resultant
inefficiency in program delivery.
▪ FEMA strategically consolidates
ongoing disaster operations facilities
across the country to reallocate
personnel to the hurricane-affected
field operations, which increased
capacity to deliver FEMA programs.
▪ FEMA augmented its disaster
workforce through a combination of
initiatives it has used before, as well
as innovative and newly expanded
methods—these initiatives met their
stated intent but can be matured.
3. Sustained whole community logistics operations.
▪ FEMA assumed a more active role in
coordinating whole community
logistics operations for Puerto Rico
and the U.S. Virgin Islands due to
these territories’ preparedness
challenges, geographic distance, and
3
Jessica Navarro
3/16/2022
▪ Drive outcome-based recovery
through expanded use of Stafford Act
Section 428 Authorities for Public
Assistance Alternative Procedures.
▪ Revise the National Response
Framework and, as required, the
Response Federal Interagency
Operational Plan to emphasize
stabilization of critical lifelines and
coordination across critical
infrastructure sectors.
▪ Support states in building a greater
capacity to respond to and recover
from disasters by maintaining
financial support while right-sizing the
federal deployment footprint.
▪ Build and maintain a national incident
workforce that includes emergency
managers from state, local, tribal, and
territorial governments.
▪ Use the Urban Search and Rescue
Task model to further build Incident
Management Assistance Teams’
capability.
▪ Complete a disaster workforce review
within the Agency, to include incident
management, incident support, and
mission essential functions.
▪ Streamline and increase certifications
across FEMA’s incident workforce.
▪ Revise the National Response
Framework and, as required, the
Response Federal Interagency
Operational Plan to emphasize
stabilization of critical lifelines and
MITIGATION
pre-existing, on-the-ground
conditions.
▪ While FEMA mobilized billions of
dollars in commodities, the Agency
experienced challenges in
comprehensively tracking resources
moving across multiple modes of
transportation to Puerto Rico and the
U.S. Virgin Islands due to staffing
shortages and business process
shortfalls.
▪ FEMA provided logistical coordination
to move and distribute commodities
from staging areas to survivors in
Puerto Rico, supplementing a role
that should largely be managed and
coordinated or territory level.
▪ In the three-month period, FEMA
issued more contract actions than in
an entire previous fiscal year to meet
disaster requirements, which strained
the Agency’s contracting personnel.
4. Responding during long-term infrastructure outages.
▪ To overcome limited situational
awareness created by the loss of
communications in Puerto Rico, FEMA
executed creative solutions to assess
the situation and prioritize response
activities, including emergency repairs
to infrastructure.
4
Jessica Navarro
3/16/2022
coordination across critical
infrastructure sectors.
▪ Promote federally supported, state-
managed, locally executed logistics
operations.
▪ Increase FEMA readiness stocks
outside the continental United States.
▪ Increase transportation planning,
management, and contract support
capacities.
▪ Broaden FEMA’s capability to quickly
get teams on the ground to stage and
deliver key commodities to disaster
survivors, even in the most remote
locations.
▪ Streamlines storage and movement
across multiple modes of
transportation that facilitate and
speed delivery.
▪ Develop a more comprehensive
understanding o local, regional, and
national supply chains, as well as
stronger relationships with critical
private sector partners to support
rapid restoration in response to
catastrophic incidents.
▪ Support state, local, tribal, and
territorial governments in improving
capability for disaster cost recovery,
pre-event contracting and contract
enforcement, and vendor-managed
inventory.
▪ Revise the National Response
Framework and, as required, the
Response Federal Interagency
Operational Plan to emphasize
stabilization of critical lifelines and
coordination across critical
infrastructure sectors.
MITIGATION
▪ Challenged by an inoperable
telecommunications environment in
Puerto Rico, FEMA had to adapt field
communications, program delivery,
and command and control activities.
▪ FEMA and its federal partners
installed a record number of
generator to provide temporary
power to critical infrastructure while
facing significant challenges in
identifying generator requirements
and shortfalls in available generators.
5. Mass care to initial housing operations.
▪ FEMA supported American Red Cross
and Emergency Support Function #6
partners to provide more than one
million shelter nights within the first
60 days, while facing challenges
transitioning survivors out of
congregate sheltering.
▪ In Texas and Florida, FEMA helped
survivors quickly transition from
congregate shelters to other options
such as hotels. However, across all
operations, FEMA face challenges
implementing non-congregate
sheltering programs.
▪ FEMA created new, streamlined
housing inspection procedures to
reduce inspection delays.
▪ FEMA applied lessons learned from
recent housing operations and
exercises to expand temporary and
permanent housing solutions,
including supporting a state-managed
housing mission.
5
Jessica Navarro
3/16/2022
▪ Establish a standing Power Task Force
as a collaborative, steady-state
partnership, and transition it to a
crisis action planning cell under
Emergency Support Function #12
partners during disaster operations.
▪ Encourage investment in redundant
assets to maintain communications
and supply temporary power.
▪ Encourage critical infrastructure
owners and operators, and state and
local governments, to invest in more
resilient infrastructure.
▪ Include continuity and resilient all-
hazards communications capabilities
in plans and guidance.
▪ Revise the National Response
Framework and, as required, the
Response Federal Interagency
Operational Plan to emphasize
stabilization of critical lifelines and
coordination across critical
infrastructure sectors.
▪ Build capability and empower the
implementation of federally
supported, state-managed, locally
executed sheltering and housing
solutions.
▪ Improve the deliver and effectiveness
of housing options, including
exploring grant-making authority.
▪ Clarify deferral roles and
responsibilities for housing programs,
including approaches to long-term
housing.
▪ Evaluate and implement appropriate
housing solutions, including the use of
Recreation Vehicles, Direct Repair,
and Direct Lease options.
MITIGATION 6
Jessica Navarro
3/16/2022

▪ Promote all-hazard insurance so that

individuals can reduce their losses
and speed their recovery.

As shown in the table above, many limitations were found and several of them could be

mitigated in previous years. The following section explores some limitations with the greatest

impact during the 2017 hurricane season. In addition, the measures implemented to avoid

them are explained.

One of them is the lack of infrastructure maintenance in Puerto Rico, where many

buildings and facilities were not prepared for the impact of hurricanes. FEMA could not

determine if some or all of the post-hurricane damages were caused by the disasters (The 2017

Hurricane Season FEMA After-Action Report, 2018, p.7). Additionally, FEMA tried to rebuild

public infrastructure but later determined that Puerto Rico did not have the capacity or

experience to accomplish it. That is why, the Congress passed the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018

which gives FEMA additional authorities under Section 428 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster

Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988. Under this law, FEMA can provide assistance to

replace or restore components of the facility or system that are not damaged by the disaster

when those repairs are necessary to fully effectuate the replacement, or disaster-damaged to

restore their function to standards. (The 2017 Hurricane Season FEMA After-Action Report,

2018, p. 8).
MITIGATION 7
Jessica Navarro
3/16/2022

Another issue reported is that the planning assumptions under-estimated the actual

requirements in 2017, which necessitated FEMA depend on crisis action planning during the

incident to address the shortfalls in the planning assumptions (The 2017 Hurricane Season

FEMA After-Action Report, 2018, p. 10). Figure 1 shows the comparison of planning

assumptions and 2017 hurricane impacts in Puerto Rico.

Image 1

Comparison of Planning Assumptions and 2017 Hurricane Impacts in Puerto Rico.

These assumptions led FEMA to implement a cross-sector approach to the Agency's

planning, organizing, response and recovery operations. FEMA should work with its partners

and the White House to revise the current National Response Framework and, as required, the

Response Federal Interagency Operational Plan to emphasize stabilization of critical lifelines

and create a cross-sector coordination emergency support function and coordinating structures

(The 2017 Hurricane Season FEMA After-Action Report, 2018, p. 13). This includes leveraging

new FEMA Teams and technical assistance to help states build their capacity, working with
MITIGATION 8
Jessica Navarro
3/16/2022

whole community partners to improve risk management and strengthen capabilities, focusing

on making preparedness and planning products easily accessible, modular, inclusive, and

readily executable, and reviewing the effectiveness of the use of Section 428 of the Stafford Act

authorities to achieve outcome-based recovery.

Lastly, the limited sea transport of food and water as well as transit of the U.S. Naval

response assets to the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. As a result, FEMA increased its

readiness stocks outside the continental United States and transportation planning,

management, and contract support capacities. Also, broaden FEMA's capabilities to quickly get

teams on the ground to stage and deliver key commodities to disaster survivors even in the

remotest locations and streamline storage and movement across multiple modes of

transportation that facilitate and speed delivery. FEMA must accomplish these measures by

reviewing and adjusting planning factors for the Caribbean, adding 300 new emergency

generators to its inventory with a new contract that simplifies generator maintenance and

support, repairing and expanding its Caribbean logistics distribution center to accommodate

additional commodities.

Of the above, FEMA, and agencies working alongside, must improve in many areas. The

planning update and staff training play a very important role in the security of all communities

belonging to the United States.

Education after the 2017 hurricane season

MITIGATION 9
Jessica Navarro
3/16/2022

The 2017 hurricane season in Puerto Rico has been one of the worst in years. As

explained in the previous section, the lack of investment in recovery has caused many buildings

to remain in poor condition, including schools throughout this island. According to Korn (2017),

“Hundreds of Puerto Rican students have resettled on college campuses across the mainland

U.S. in recent weeks—and many more are considering leaving the island territory in the

spring—grateful for the opportunity to resume their studies in the wake of Hurricane Maria”

(paras. 1). While the conditions worsened, the population declined 12 percent, from 3.9 million

to 3.4 million, according to the Center for Puerto Rico Studies at Hunter College. (Katz, 2019,

paras. 13).

The decrease in population, and students, could increase the probability of economic

and financial problems that keep the island growing. This will affect the people who stayed, for

example, prices would increase, less work force, and it could lead to a greater economic

depression. Infrastructure recovery is the solution so many of those who stayed can keep

growing with their island.

MITIGATION 10
Jessica Navarro
3/16/2022

References

Bullock, J., Haddow, G., & Coppola, D. P. (2020). Introduction to Emergency Management.

Elsevier Science. Kindle Edition.

Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2018). 2017

Hurricane Season FEMA After-Action Report. FEMA. Retrieved March 16, 2022, from

https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-08/fema_hurricane-season-after-

action-report_2017.pdf

Katz, J. M. (2019). The disappearing of school in Puerto Rico. The New York Times Magazine.

Retrieved March 16, 2022, from

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/09/12/magazine/puerto-rico-schools-

hurricane-maria.html

Korn, M. (2017). Puerto Rico Sees Hundreds of College Students Leave in Hurricane’s Aftermath.

The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved March 16, 2022, from

https://www.wsj.com/articles/puerto-rico-sees-scores-of-college-students-leave-in-

hurricanes-aftermath-1510146001