PIPELINE LEAK DETECTION

Copyright Shell Group of Companies. No reproduction or networking permitted without license from Shell. Not for resale

DEP 31.40.60.11-Gen.

September 2002
(DEP Circular 41/08 has been incorporated)

DESIGN AND ENGINEERING PRACTICE

This document is restricted. Neither the whole nor any part of this document may be disclosed to any third party without the prior written consent of Shell Global
Solutions International B.V. and Shell International Exploration and Production B.V., The Netherlands. The copyright of this document is vested in these companies. All
rights reserved. Neither the whole nor any part of this document may be reproduced, stored in any retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means
(electronic, mechanical, reprographic, recording or otherwise) without the prior written consent of the copyright owners.

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PREFACE
DEPs (Design and Engineering Practice) publications reflect the views, at the time of publication, of:
Shell Global Solutions International B.V. (Shell GSI)
and
Shell International Exploration and Production B.V. (SIEP)
and
Shell International Chemicals B.V. (SIC)
and
other Service Companies.
They are based on the experience acquired during their involvement with the design, construction, operation and
maintenance of processing units and facilities, and they are supplemented with the experience of Group Operating
companies. Where appropriate they are based on, or reference is made to, international, regional, national and industry
standards.
The objective is to set the recommended standard for good design and engineering practice applied by Group
companies operating an oil refinery, gas handling installation, chemical plant, oil and gas production facility, or any other
such facility, and thereby to achieve maximum technical and economic benefit from standardization.
The information set forth in these publications is provided to users for their consideration and decision to implement.
This is of particular importance where DEPs may not cover every requirement or diversity of condition at each locality.
The system of DEPs is expected to be sufficiently flexible to allow individual operating companies to adapt the
information set forth in DEPs to their own environment and requirements.
When Contractors or Manufacturers/Suppliers use DEPs they shall be solely responsible for the quality of work and the
attainment of the required design and engineering standards. In particular, for those requirements not specifically
covered, the Principal will expect them to follow those design and engineering practices which will achieve the same
level of integrity as reflected in the DEPs. If in doubt, the Contractor or Manufacturer/Supplier shall, without detracting
from his own responsibility, consult the Principal or its technical advisor.
The right to use DEPs is granted by Shell GSI, SIEP or SIC, in most cases under Service Agreements primarily with
companies of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group and other companies receiving technical advice and services from Shell GSI,
SIEP, SIC or another Group Service Company. Consequently, three categories of users of DEPs can be distinguished:
1) Operating companies having a Service Agreement with Shell GSI, SIEP, SIC or other Service Company. The
use of DEPs by these operating companies is subject in all respects to the terms and conditions of the relevant
Service Agreement.
2) Other parties who are authorized to use DEPs subject to appropriate contractual arrangements (whether as part
of a Service Agreement or otherwise).
3) Contractors/subcontractors and Manufacturers/Suppliers under a contract with users referred to under 1) or 2)
which requires that tenders for projects, materials supplied or - generally - work performed on behalf of the said
users comply with the relevant standards.
Subject to any particular terms and conditions as may be set forth in specific agreements with users, Shell GSI, SIEP
and SIC disclaim any liability of whatsoever nature for any damage (including injury or death) suffered by any company
or person whomsoever as a result of or in connection with the use, application or implementation of any DEP,
combination of DEPs or any part thereof, even if it is wholly or partly caused by negligence on the part of Shell GSI,
SIEP or other Service Company. The benefit of this disclaimer shall inure in all respects to Shell GSI, SIEP, SIC and/or
any company affiliated to these companies that may issue DEPs or require the use of DEPs.
Without prejudice to any specific terms in respect of confidentiality under relevant contractual arrangements, DEPs shall
not, without the prior written consent of Shell GSI and SIEP, be disclosed by users to any company or person
whomsoever and the DEPs shall be used exclusively for the purpose for which they have been provided to the user.
They shall be returned after use, including any copies which shall only be made by users with the express prior written
consent of Shell GSI, SIEP or SIC. The copyright of DEPs vests in Shell GSI and SIEP. Users shall arrange for DEPs to
be held in safe custody and Shell GSI, SIEP or SIC may at any time require information satisfactory to them in order to
ascertain how users implement this requirement.
All administrative queries should be directed to the DEP Administrator in Shell GSI.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................4
1.1 SCOPE........................................................................................................................4
1.2 DISTRIBUTION, INTENDED USE AND REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS .........4
1.3 DEFINITIONS .............................................................................................................4
1.4 ABBREVIATIONS .......................................................................................................5
1.5 CROSS-REFERENCES .............................................................................................5
1.6 SUMMARY OF CHANGES FROM PREVIOUS EDITION..........................................5
2. REQUIREMENT FOR LEAK DETECTION ................................................................6
3. PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR LEAK DETECTION.......................................7
3.1 SENSITIVITY ..............................................................................................................7
3.2 RELIABILITY...............................................................................................................7
3.3 ACCURACY ................................................................................................................7
3.4 LEAK LOCATION CAPABILITY..................................................................................7
3.5 ROBUSTNESS ...........................................................................................................7
3.6 COST ..........................................................................................................................8
4. SELECTION OF A LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM .....................................................9
4.1 PRIMARY FUNCTIONALITY ......................................................................................9
4.2 SECONDARY FUNCTIONALITY ...............................................................................9
4.3 ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONALITY.................................................................................9
5. IMPLEMENTATION..................................................................................................10
5.1 RESPONSIBILITY ....................................................................................................10
5.2 PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATION .........................................................................10
5.3 INSTRUMENTATION ...............................................................................................10
5.4 FACTORY ACCEPTANCE TESTING ......................................................................10
5.5 DATA SAMPLING RATE ..........................................................................................10
5.6 ALARMS ...................................................................................................................10
5.7 OPERATOR DISPLAYS ...........................................................................................11
5.8 OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS.......................................................................11
5.9 REMOTE MAINTENANCE .......................................................................................11
5.10 LEAK SENSITIVITY / TUNING .................................................................................11
5.11 TRAINING .................................................................................................................11
5.12 DOCUMENTATION ..................................................................................................11
6. LEAK DETECTION TECHNIQUES..........................................................................12
6.1 GENERAL .................................................................................................................12
6.2 BALANCING OF MASS OR VOLUME INPUT VERSUS OUTPUT..........................12
6.3 PRESSURE AND/OR FLOW ANALYSIS .................................................................13
6.4 DYNAMIC MODELS .................................................................................................14
6.5 MONITORING OF CHARACTERISTIC SIGNALS GENERATED BY A LEAK ........14
6.6 OFF-LINE LEAK DETECTION..................................................................................15
7. REFERENCES .........................................................................................................17
8. BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................18

APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1 SUMMARY OF THE CAPABILITIES AND APPLICATION OF LEAK
DETECTION TECHNIQUES ...........................................................................19

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 SCOPE
This DEP specifies requirements and gives recommendations for the application of Leak
Detection Systems and gives an overview of available pipeline leak detection techniques
and their effectiveness for pipeline applications. This DEP is primarily aimed at continuous
on-line leak detection systems. Discrete off-line systems are only briefly discussed.
This DEP provides guidance on the following:
- when to specify a leak detection system;
- how to specify performance parameters;
- what system to select;
- how to implement a system.
This DEP is a revision of the previous publication of the same number and title, dated
September 1994. A summary of changes from the previous edition is given in (1.6).
Although applicable to onsite lines, this DEP is intended for use with long, cross-country or
subsea transportation pipelines that are outside facility battery limits.

1.2 DISTRIBUTION, INTENDED USE AND REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise authorised by Shell GSI and SIEP, the distribution of this DEP is confined
to companies forming part of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group or managed by a Group
company, and to Contractors nominated by them (i.e. the distribution code is "C", as
described in DEP 00.00.05.05-Gen.).
This DEP is intended for use by all Functions in the Group that are involved in the design
and operation of pipelines, but in particular for use during the conceptual design phase
when the requirement for a leak detection system is being decided.
If national and/or local regulations exist in which some of the requirements may be more
stringent than in this DEP, the Contractor shall determine by careful scrutiny which of the
requirements are the more stringent and which combination of requirements will be
acceptable as regards safety, environmental, economic and legal aspects. In all cases the
Contractor shall inform the Principal of any deviation from the requirements of this DEP
which is considered to be necessary in order to comply with national and/or local
regulations. The Principal may then negotiate with the Authorities concerned with the object
of obtaining agreement to follow this DEP as closely as possible.

1.3 DEFINITIONS

1.3.1 General definitions

The Contractor is the party that carries out all or part of the design, engineering,
procurement, construction, commissioning or management of a project or operation of a
facility. The Principal may undertake all or part of the duties of the Contractor.
The Manufacturer/Supplier is the party that manufactures or supplies equipment and
services to perform the duties specified by the Contractor.
The Principal is the party that initiates the project and ultimately pays for its design and
construction. The Principal will generally specify the technical requirements. The Principal
may also include an agent or consultant authorised to act for, and on behalf of, the
Principal.
The word shall indicates a requirement.
The word should indicates a recommendation.

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1.3.2 Specific definitions

Fluid - substances that are transported through a pipeline in liquid and/or gaseous phase.
Hard liquid - a liquid with a vapour pressure below the prevailing atmospheric pressure,
e.g., gas oil.
Leak - an uncontrolled fluid release from a pipeline.
Pipeline - a system of pipes and other components used for the transportation of fluids,
between (but excluding) plants. A pipeline extends from pig trap to pig trap (including the
pig traps and associated pipework and valves), or, if no pig trap is fitted, to the first isolation
valve within the plant boundaries or a more inward valve if so nominated.
Pipeline section - the user-selected subdivision of a pipeline.
Soft liquid - a liquid with a vapour pressure above the prevailing atmospheric pressure,
e.g., ethylene, NGL, LPG, etc.

1.4 ABBREVIATIONS
ALARP - As Low as Reasonably Practicable
DCS - Distributed Control System
FAT - Factory Acceptance Testing
ISDN - Integrated Service Digital Network
LBV - Line Block Valve
LDS - Leak Detection System
MAOP - Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure
OPC - OLE (Object Linked Editing) for Process Control
PC - Personal Computer
PSTN - Public Subscriber Telephone Network
SCADA - Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
SPLD - Statistical Pipeline Leak Detection

1.5 CROSS-REFERENCES
Where cross-references to other parts of this DEP are made, the referenced section
number is shown in brackets. Other documents referenced in this DEP are listed in (7).
Bibliography references are listed in (8).

1.6 SUMMARY OF CHANGES FROM PREVIOUS EDITION

The previous edition of this DEP was dated September 1994. This edition is a major
revision, with changes in all sections.
The previous DEP described the use of a risk approach, which proved to be difficult to
apply for specifying a Leak Detection System (LDS). In addition, guidance was needed in
the selection and implementation of the leak detection method, making use of lessons
learned. A number of LDSs have been unsuccessful in the past because of the wrong
methodology, e.g., dynamic model based systems which are notoriously unreliable and
expensive, and/or because insufficient attention was paid to system reliability and operator
interface. Suppliers with reliable and relatively cheap systems have entered the market and
application of these systems is seen as good practice.

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2. REQUIREMENT FOR LEAK DETECTION

Group and public awareness of safety and environmental issues puts increasing emphasis
on the potential consequences of a pipeline leak for human safety and pollution of the
environment. Proper pipeline management should ensure technical integrity of a pipeline in
order to prevent failures and fluid releases and to limit the consequences if a leak occurs.
An LDS reduces the consequences of failure by enabling fast emergency response. These
consequences comprise economic consequences, safety consequences, environmental
consequences and the more intangible socio-political consequences. Pipeline leaks can
result in bad publicity and penalties, both of which can be reduced by having a proper
pipeline integrity management and emergency response system in place including an LDS.
Other measures should be in place to prevent and monitor degradation of the pipeline that
in the end may lead to failure, and to consequently reduce the probability of a leak to as low
as is reasonably practicable (the ALARP principle).
Most authorities do not specify an LDS for pipelines as part of the pipeline management
system. However, most countries have some form of legislation and regulations regarding
pipeline safety, and installing an LDS may help to obtain appropriate authorisations. In
recent years, governments have tended to move from specific rules to performance-based
regulations. The risk management concept has now been introduced in both Europe and
the USA. Because an LDS may help pipeline operators reduce the loss of containment and
hence risks, it should be considered as part of the risk management programme.
As a consequence of the above, an LDS for a new pipeline should be specified in the
following cases:
- If leak detection is required by applicable mandatory legalisation. All mandatory
legislation and local codes shall be complied with in full, concessions notwithstanding. If
the requirements of said legislation and codes are less than those that could be
provided by use of SCADA based leak detection, then the latter should be provided as
long as the former are still satisfied. (SCADA based leak detection means leak detection
methods using pipeline data provided by SCADA or DCS systems).
- If a single phase pipeline is provided with remote monitoring and control using
telemetry/SCADA facilities. Most pipelines, especially those with high potential
consequences resulting from a pipeline failure (leak event), should be provided with
telemetry/SCADA to provide operational monitoring and control. If telemetry/SCADA
facilities are available, a SCADA based LDS should also be provided. The LDS may be
fully integrated with the SCADA or stand-alone with appropriate real time
communications with the SCADA system.
Amended per
Circular 41/08
- If leak detection is required as an outcome of a Quantitative Risk Assessment, hence if
it would significantly reduce the failure risk. The safety consequence of a pipeline leak is
directly related to population density, product toxicity, volatility and explosiveness. In
general, the safety consequences for pipelines containing volatile or very toxic products
(see DEP 01.00.01.30-Gen.) are more severe than for other products. Important
features enabling an LDS to limit the safety consequences are fast response time, high
reliability (low false alarm rate) and robustness. The environmental consequence of a
pipeline leak is directly related to the environment itself, the persistence and density of
the product, and the potential leak volume. Generally important features enabling an
LDS to limit the environmental consequences are high localisation accuracy and high
sensitivity.
In all other cases, an LDS should only be specified on an exception basis.

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3. PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR LEAK DETECTION

3.1 SENSITIVITY
Sensitivity is defined as a composite measure of the size of leak that a system is capable of
detecting, and the time required for the system to issue an alarm in the event that a leak of
that size should occur. Some LDSs have a wide variation in the response time as a function
of leak size; for others the response time is relatively independent of leak size.
Leak detection performance is usually defined in terms of detecting a particular leak flow
rate within a specified minimum period of time. Adjustments made to improve sensitivity
can have a negative effect on other aspects of performance. For example, if the minimum
leak detectable is set too low with a specified time period, then false alarms will occur more
frequently.
Sensitivity is generally insufficient to detect corrosion pinhole leaks.

3.2 RELIABILITY
Reliability is defined as a measure of an LDS’s ability to make accurate decisions about the
possible existence of a leak in the pipeline. Reliability is directly related to the probability of
declaring a leak incorrectly, i.e., if none has occurred. A system is considered to be
unreliable if it tends to declare leaks incorrectly.
Reliability pertains only to the functionality of the leak detection software without regard to
SCADA system performance, availability of the pipeline instrumentation and communication
equipment, or any other factor beyond the control of the LDS vendor. Such factors involve a
separate category of performance, namely robustness.
System reliability is directly affected by factors such as instrument reliability/drift in signals,
etc. Model based systems require periodic tuning to ensure the best results.
Poor telemetry performance and inaccurate or malfunctioning instrumentation will result in
degraded system performance with the likelihood of false alarms, whatever LDS technique
is employed.
Many systems make automated adjustments to decision thresholds and other parameters
in order to reduce the likelihood of generating alarms during defined operating conditions.
When such adjustments are made, a corresponding penalty is normally incurred in some
other aspect of performance. For example, decisions based on a higher alarm threshold
might make a system less sensitive to changes by normal pipeline transients, but this
performance gain is achieved at the expense of longer response time and the risk of
greater fluid loss if a leak should occur.

3.3 ACCURACY
In addition to detecting and announcing a leak, some software-based LDSs can provide
estimates of leak flow rate or total volume/mass lost and leak location. Different techniques
can provide different estimates with varying accuracy. For example, mass balance or
compensated mass balance methods can provide an estimate of leak rate but not of leak
location. A compensated method generally provides more accurate leak rate estimates.

3.4 LEAK LOCATION CAPABILITY

The quicker the location of a leak is identified, the sooner remedial action can be taken.
Some LDSs are able to locate a leak. Accuracy of leak localisation is normally dependent
on the leak size.

3.5 ROBUSTNESS
Robustness is defined as a measure of the LDS’s ability to continue to function and provide
useful information, even under changing conditions of pipeline operation, or in conditions

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where data is lost or suspect. A system is considered to be robust if it continues to function

under such less than ideal conditions.
The distinction between reliability and robustness is significant. Reliability is a measure of
performance within a specified operational envelope. Robustness is a measure of the
effective size of the operational envelope as the following examples illustrate:
System I: This system employs a sensitive leak detection algorithm and is normally very
sensitive, but will frequently generate false alarms during certain normal pipeline
operations. The designers of System I have sacrificed a degree of reliability in order to
maintain a high level of sensitivity. Nuisance alarms are not conducive to good operation
and tend to dull the awareness of operations personnel. Therefore this system is normally
not recommended.
System II: This system employs an alternative algorithm which is somewhat less sensitive
than that of System I, but generates only a fraction of the false alarms. The designers of
System II have chosen to sacrifice a degree of sensitivity in order to achieve a high level of
reliability.
System III: This system employs the same sensitive leak detection algorithm as System I,
but inhibits leak detection during pipeline operations that can cause it to generate false
alarms. The designers of System III have sacrificed a degree of robustness in order to
achieve higher levels of reliability and sensitivity.
System IV: This system normally employs the same sensitive leak detection algorithm as
System I, but switches to the less sensitive algorithm of System II when it senses
conditions that generate false alarms. System IV represents an attempt to selectively trade
sensitivity in order to achieve a more reliable and robust system.

3.6 COST
Cost is an important parameter of an LDS. The cost includes capital expenditure and on-
going operating costs. When an LDS is selected, it is necessary to estimate the total life
cycle cost including the following items:
- initial project cost of the leak detection software;
- cost of instrumentation, e.g., additional pressure or density meters and SCADA system;
- cost of continuous support for tuning and troubleshooting in case of false alarms;
- cost of personnel for maintaining the instrumentation and leak detection system;
- cost of training operations and maintenance personnel.

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4. SELECTION OF A LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM

4.1 PRIMARY FUNCTIONALITY

The primary functionality is to detect the occurrence and/or presence of a leak. Unless
there are substantial reasons for doing otherwise, the selected LDS shall be a real-time,
corrected mass or volume balance system, see (6). The LDS can be totally integrated
within the SCADA system, or the leak detection application can utilise a stand-alone
platform and communicate via OPC or similar protocol with the SCADA system.
To preserve operators’ confidence in the system and ensure reliable operation of the plant
facilities, the LDS should not produce nuisance/false leak alarms. Reliability and robustness
shall be the essential performance factors, with sensitivity and accuracy having a
secondary role.

4.2 SECONDARY FUNCTIONALITY

Depending upon requirements (which should be evaluated by cost benefit analysis), the
LDS may have one or more of the following functionalities in addition to the primary
functionality of leak detection.
Leak location
Leak location identification is particularly useful where the location of a leak would be
difficult or expensive to determine by normal procedures.
Leak location identification is even more useful on longer pipelines where there are a
number of pipeline sections that can be shut in with isolation valves. Shutting the whole
network down may be highly undesirable.
Static leak detection
The LDS should ideally accommodate Static Leak Detection if this is an “operational”
condition of the pipeline, i.e., when the pipeline is shut in under a level of line pack. Static
leak detection is not possible with a slack line (when the pipeline pressure is below the
vapour pressure of the product in the pipeline). Positioning of pipeline pressure and
temperature instrumentation should be confirmed with the Supplier.
Batch tracking
For multi-product operation, or for pipelines transporting different compositions of the same
fluid, batch tracking is a useful tool.
Operator training
Some leak detection systems have a simulation capability whereby operators can be
trained.

4.3 ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONALITY

With a SCADA based LDS, additional and/or localised systems may be applied to enhance
performance. These may be of particular use in environmentally sensitive areas, e.g., river
crossings, aquifer areas, etc.
“Smart” sectioning line break valves (LBVs) may be used in association with the SCADA
based LDS to detect major and full-bore rupture leaks. Smart LBVs shall provide automatic
section shutdown and containment to mitigate the consequences of such leaks.

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5. IMPLEMENTATION

5.1 RESPONSIBILITY
The LDS should be designed and engineered in association with the SCADA system.
Ideally the supply of the LDS and the SCADA system should be a single responsibility.
Typically the SCADA system Supplier should be responsible for supplying the LDS as this
will provide seamless factory acceptance testing, installation and commissioning.
Depending upon the contract philosophy, the choice of LDS type and Manufacturer may be
selected by the responsible Supplier. However, regardless of the method used, the
Principal should be fully involved in the process and should be the approving authority in
order to ensure that the system will meet the performance specification.

5.2 PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATION

Some form of performance guarantee should be identified and incentivised, based on
performance monitoring against key targets. The LDS Supplier should provide base
performance indicators as defined in (3), ideally prior to order placement, but otherwise a
Leak Sensitivity Study should be carried out to formulate an agreed contractual
performance.
If possible, a milestone payment should be linked to the validation of sensitivity and location
accuracy performance by simulating a real physical leak. Ideally the leak should not be
simulated close to an instrumented point on the pipeline.
Performance based on a guaranteed minimum of false alarms shall be combined with the
detection time for various leak sizes to dissuade the Supplier from desensitising the sytem.
As a minimum, a performance test period of 60 days shall be employed for system
acceptance testing purposes. During this period the system shall operate without
generating false alarms of failures.

5.3 INSTRUMENTATION
The accuracy, repeatability and positioning of the instrumentation required for the operation
of the LDS should be reviewed with the LDS Manufacturer. For maximum performance,
instrumented measurements should be made as accurate and repeatable as possible. This
requirement may be relaxed if a lower LDS performance is acceptable. Analogue to digital
conversions implemented as part of the SCADA/Telemetry should be 12-bit as a minimum.
Temperature measurement should be conducted sub-surface, or appropriate insulation
should be provided to mitigate any heat-up by the sun.

5.4 FACTORY ACCEPTANCE TESTING

Testing should be rigorous and witnessed by the Principal or its authorised representative.
Pre FAT testing should be conducted and proof submitted thereof by the Supplier before
witnessed FAT is arranged. A full FAT procedure shall be issued (together with SCADA
FAT if the systems are combined) and approved prior to commencement of FAT.

5.5 DATA SAMPLING RATE

The sampling rate for the pipeline measurements collected by the SCADA/Telemetry shall
be compatible with the requirements of the LDS.

5.6 ALARMS
Any alarms generated by the LDS and handed over to the SCADA system should be
considered as advisory only. Automatic control actions, e.g., shutdowns, etc., should not be
generated by the declaration of a leak alarm by the LDS unless LBVs are used. Manual

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intervention by the operator, in conjunction with the appropriate operating procedure,

should be the normal response to a leak alarm.

5.7 OPERATOR DISPLAYS

Data shall be presented in the form of displays, easily interpreted by the operator. Displays
should comprise pipeline ingress (and egress) pressure and flow trends, imbalance trends,
inventory trends and pressure vs. distance displays. Such displays will assist the Operator
if a leak alarm is issued by the LDS.
The operator shall not, therefore, be presented with masses of tabulated data that can
easily become incomprehensible, if not totally ignored. Displays may either reside on the
SCADA system, or on the LDS if a stand-alone system is employed. Common symbols and
practices shall be employed across the SCADA and LDS operator interface.

5.8 OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Consistent start-up/shutdown procedures greatly enhance leak detectability during
transients.
Operational procedures shall be formulated that the pipeline operator is required to comply
with in the event of a pipeline leak. “Blind trials” should be conducted at least once a year to
check the response of operators and associated procedures.

5.9 REMOTE MAINTENANCE

Most LDS tuning and maintenance operations can now be performed remotely with a
corresponding reduction in cost. A dial-up modem (PSTN or ISDN) or similar
communication equipment should be supplied to allow remote diagnostics of the LDS.
Security should be implemented to prevent unauthorised access to equipment and
associated business and process networks.

5.10 LEAK SENSITIVITY / TUNING

The cost of tuning (which can be a prolonged process, particularly for dynamic model
LSDs) should be integrated into the costs of installation, testing and commissioning.

5.11 TRAINING
Training courses with different content and duration are required for engineers and
operators. Operator training should be finalised during the commissioning phase of the
pipeline.
Course notes are essential and should be reviewed and approved.

5.12 DOCUMENTATION
In conjunction with the SCADA Functional Design Specification, the following
documentation shall also be provided as a minimum for the LDS:
- Basis of design and operation, the system performance document;
- Factory Acceptance Test procedures;
- Site Acceptance Test procedures;
- LDS Tuning procedures;
- Operations and Maintenance manual(s).
All documentation should be submitted for review, comment, and approval.

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6. LEAK DETECTION TECHNIQUES

6.1 GENERAL
Leak detection techniques are based on either continuous or intermittent measurements of
specific parameters. Intermittent leak detection methods are often able to detect smaller
leak rates than continuous leak detection techniques can.
Some continuous techniques can only detect transient pipeline conditions during the onset
of a leak, and will not be able to identify the presence of a leak at a later time.
For some intermittent techniques, fluid transportation through the pipeline needs to be
interrupted. With intermittent techniques, the detection time of a leak will be completely
dependent on the frequency of inspection.
Generally, LDSs work in single-phase pipelines only. Techniques for detection of leaks in
liquid lines generally perform better than those for gas pipelines. LDS performance is
limited in two-phase pipelines.
The conflicting balance of sensitivity to leaks and false alarms will determine the sensitivity
setting of the LDS. Large leaks can normally be detected more rapidly than small ones. To
maintain the user's confidence in the system and the effectiveness of the operator’s
response, avoiding false alarms should have a higher priority than attempting to shorten the
leak detection time or reducing the minimum detectable leak rate.
The performance of pipeline leak detection techniques is dependent on fluid type, operating
pressure including fluctuations, batch or continuous operation, pipeline length and size,
metering accuracy and repeatability, etc.
The technique to be adopted should be determined by detailed evaluation. Generally, the
corrected mass or volume balance method or the SPLD method should be used. It may be
necessary to deploy more than one leak detection technique in order to achieve the overall
leak detection performance that is required.
LDSs are categorised into the following groups according to their inherent principle of leak
detection:
1. Balancing of pipeline mass or volume input versus output;
2. Pressure and/or flow analysis;
3. Dynamic Models;
4. Monitoring of characteristic signals generated by a leak;
5. Off-line leak detection.
A summary of the capabilities and application of the various leak detection techniques
follows. Additional information may be found in report SIEP 97-5527.

6.2 BALANCING OF MASS OR VOLUME INPUT VERSUS OUTPUT

6.2.1 General
These LDSs rely on the fact that in a leak-free pipeline the fluid mass or volume flow into
the pipeline equals the flow out. Using this flow balance principle, the flow-in and flow-out
measurements are continuously monitored for any variations over a time interval. Volume
flow readings should be corrected for pressure and temperature variations to reference
conditions, i.e., 1 bar (abs) and 0 °C or 15 °C. To eliminate the effect of flow variations
during normal operation, the flow readings should be statistically processed or totalled over
discrete time periods.

6.2.2 Mass or Volume Balance

The uncorrected mass or volume balance method can be applied only under steady state
operations, as it does not allow for changes in the pipeline inventory, i.e., line pack
variation. Its accuracy depends largely on the accuracy of the flowmeters and on the
steadiness of operations.

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6.2.3 Corrected Mass or Volume Balance

In addition to inlet and outlet flow measurement, the corrected flow balance method uses a
correction factor for any changes in the pipeline inventory. Pressure and, if necessary,
temperature measurements at intervals along the pipeline are used for calculating the
correction factor. The ability to detect small leaks depends upon the number and accuracy
of measurements along the length of the pipeline.
An alternative method is dynamic simulation (6.4), which is a model-assisted balance
method. A real time computer model calculates the inventory of the pipeline and the line
pack variations of the pipeline under steady state and transient operating conditions. It will
correct not only for pressure and temperature effects, but also for changes in fluid
properties, such as where different batches of fluids are present in the pipeline at the same
time. A difference between the flow balance predicted by the model and that actually
measured indicates the presence of a leak. Also, unexpected flow and/or pressure trends
are used as indicators of the occurrence of a leak.
The dynamic simulation method is similar to the corrected flow balance system. The main
difference is that the dynamic simulation method calculates the pipeline inventory whereas
the corrected mass balance method interpolates between the measurements along the
pipeline. The latter is simpler although its accuracy is slightly lower than that of the dynamic
simulation method.
The sensitivity of these methods is generally good. Their disadvantage is that they are
poorly able to locate the leak.

6.2.4 Statistical Pipeline Leak Detection

Shell has developed a Statistical Pipeline Leak Detection (SPLD) system, which is also a
form of the corrected flow balance system. The system does not need complicated
modelling of the pipeline inventory. It continuously calculates the statistical probabilities of a
leak based on fluid flow and pressure measured at the inlet and outlet of a pipeline.
Depending on the control and operation of a pipeline, the statistical technique is used to
identify changes in the relationship between the pipeline pressure and flow that always
occur when there is a leak. The SPLD system works as a statistical filter, which is applied
to a pipeline input/output balance and which decides between a leak-free and a leak-
present hypothesis. Major advantages of this system are its simplicity and robustness
compared with other software based techniques. The SPLD is capable of discriminating
between fluctuations due to operational variations of the pipeline and the actual occurrence
of a leak; it is thus very reliable for leak detection. This high reliability is achieved by
statistically processing the corrected flow balance and analysing the pressure and flow
simultaneously. The SPLD system can also give a good indication of the leak location. The
SPLD system has been put into practice satisfactorily both inside and outside the Group.

6.3 PRESSURE AND/OR FLOW ANALYSIS

6.3.1 General
The operation of a pipeline can be characterised by the flow of the fluid and the pressure
gradient along the pipeline. Pressure drop and flow along a pipeline are related to the flow
resistance of the pipeline. A leak will alter the pressure drop profile of a pipeline and
therefore affect the 'normal' pressure and flow relationships. Detection of such alterations
can be used to indicate the occurrence of a leak.

6.3.2 Low Pressure Monitoring

If a large leak occurs, particularly in the upstream part of a pipeline, the inlet pressure will
drop. A lower than expected inlet pressure indicates the presence of a leak. Detection of
low pressure may be connected to an automatic shut-down system; “smart” LBVs are such
an example. To avoid false alarms the system is usually set so that only major leaks can be
detected.

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6.3.3 Change in Pressure/Flow

A leak will result in an increase in flow upstream and a decrease in flow downstream of the
leak. Consequently, the pressure gradient will increase upstream and decrease
downstream of the leak. The occurrence of a discontinuity in the pressure gradient, which is
calculated from the pressure readings along the pipeline, is an indication of a large leak.
The rate of change of pressure and flow readings can also be monitored and used to detect
sudden changes that indicate the occurrence of a leak.
The combined pressure decrease/flow increase method, commonly referred to as pressure
point analysis, uses the fact that a leak in an operational pipeline will cause an increase in
the flow and a decrease in the pressure upstream of the leak. The simultaneous occurrence
of both is an indication of a leak. It is a relatively inexpensive solution and not model based.
However, pressure decline is not unique to a leak event, and false alarms may be common
on transient lines.

6.4 DYNAMIC MODELS

The dynamic model method uses equations of state to mathematically emulate the fluid
flow within the pipeline. Usually it has to solve three partial differential equations on-line:
conservation of mass, momentum and energy. Deviation between modelled variables and
measured pipeline variables is theoretically indicative of a leak condition. This method,
however, has historically proved difficult to successfully implement for online applications.
This is due to the complexity of the modelling variables and calculations required. Typically
problems of tuning and a high false alarm rate have prevented the successful
implementation of a reliable system of this type. Dynamic models have proved to be of high
initial cost with a high cost of ownership with no great improvement of sensitivity over that
of SPLD.

6.5 MONITORING OF CHARACTERISTIC SIGNALS GENERATED BY A LEAK

6.5.1 Wave Alert

A suddenly occurring leak will cause a sudden pressure drop at the leak location in the
pipeline. This sudden pressure drop will create a pressure wave travelling at sonic velocity
both upstream and downstream from the leak. This pressure wave is an indication of the
occurrence of a leak. The response time of this negative pressure wave technique is very
short because it responds to waves that travel at sonic velocities (in crude oil,
approximately 1000 m/s). When the wave is detected both upstream and downstream of
the leak, the location of the leak may be calculated from the time difference of detection by
the nearest sensors on either side of the leak location. The system will only respond to an
instantaneously occurring leak of measurable size. In practice the sensitivity can be poor
because the alarm thresholds are often set high to avoid false alarms triggered by pressure
transients generated by upstream or downstream processing plant or other noise producing
installations, such as pump or compressor stations.
A system that is less sensitive to pipeline noise than the negative pressure wave system
uses dual transducers, which filter out noise signals. The system is made directional, i.e., it
detects signals originating from either the upstream or the downstream direction of the
pipeline. This is achieved by installing the two transducers at an appropriate distance from
each other and using an electronic signal subtracting system.
Leak detection based on negative pressure wave techniques will only detect the initiation of
a leak and not its presence. If the pressure wave created at the moment of leak initiation is
not detected, the leak will not be noticed.

6.5.2 Acoustic Techniques

Acoustic transmitters and receivers are installed on a liquid pipeline at specific distances.
The correlation between the signals transmitted and received is calculated to determine if a
leak exists and its possible location. This method is based on the fact that the acoustic

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properties will be changed due to the presence of an opening in the pipeline. The distance
between the transmitter and receiver is very short, usually a few hundred metres only.

6.5.3 Hydrocarbon-sensing Cables

Hydrocarbon-sensing cables can be laid along the pipeline. Electrical properties of the
cable change when hydrocarbons come in contact with the cable. Contact with water does
not affect the properties of the cable.

6.5.4 Other Development

A prototype system for the measurement of methane in seawater has been developed. The
device, which is mounted on a remotely operated vehicle, extracts dissolved gas from a
continuous flow of water and determines the methane content using infrared absorption
techniques.

6.6 OFF-LINE LEAK DETECTION

6.6.1 Pipeline Patrolling

A pipeline patrolling program should be in place as a method of leak detection whether an
on-line system is available or not. The frequency of this inspection should be based on the
criticality of the pipeline. A record of this inspection should be maintained throughout the life
of the pipeline.

6.6.2 Static Pressure Test

The pressure in a blocked-in pressurised pipeline will drop when there is a leak. For a static
pressure leak test the pipeline (or a section of it) is pressurised with the transported
hydrocarbon fluid to the MAOP. If pressurising to a higher level is required, the leak test
shall be done with water for safety and environmental reasons. After pressurising, the block
valves are closed and the pressure and temperature are monitored for a specified period of
time (24 hours minimum). A differential static pressure test can be carried out if block
valves are equipped with differential pressure transducers. Differences in the rate of
pressure drop in two adjacent sections that cannot be explained by temperature effects,
inaccuracy of readings, or valve leakage is an indication of a leak.
There are uncertainties about the advantages and disadvantages of pressure testing
existing pipelines for condition monitoring purposes at pressures higher than the MAOP.
Pressure testing above the MAOP is primarily done for strength testing in order to avoid a
pipeline rupture; see DEP 31.40.40.38-Gen. The advantage of pressure testing at high
pressures for leak detection is that an existing leak is detected more easily. Also, long
defects, which have almost broken the surface, can be opened, resulting in a leak that is
also detected. The disadvantage is the risk that existing defects might be enlarged and/or
activated to grow, possibly leading to failures during normal pipeline operations following
the pressure test.
A tracer can be added to the pressurising fluid to assist the detection of small leaks. The
leak is detected by patrolling the pipeline with a detector that is sensitive to the tracer, or by
visual observation of a visible tracer.

6.6.3 Leak Detection Pig

Liquid escaping under pressure through a small opening produces sonic noise. An
ultrasonic leak detection pig, which is equipped with hydrophones and data recording, can
detect and locate the presence of a leak. A very small leak, down to 10 l/hr, can be
detected and fairly accurately located with this technique. Being intermittently operated, the
response time will depend on the frequency of running the ultrasonic leak detection pig.

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6.6.4 Sniffer Tube

A hydrocarbon-permeable tube (sniffer tube) can be laid in close proximity along the
pipeline. Small leaks of hydrocarbons from the pipeline that have permeated into the tube
will be detected when the tube is periodically purged into a gas analyser.

6.6.5 Remote Sensing of Hydrocarbon Emissions

Remote sensing of hydrocarbon emissions, e.g., using an infrared technique from an
aircraft, is becoming commercially available. Particularly for gas and multi-phase pipelines,
this offers a powerful alternative to ground based patrolling techniques.

6.6.6 Acoustic Techniques

The sound that is generated when liquid is forced through a small opening during pressure
testing can be detected by acoustic monitoring. For pipelines transporting hard liquids, leak
detection by an acoustic reflectometry method is feasible. The technique is based on the
phenomenon that a pressure wave travelling through a pipeline is reflected at the position
of a leak, due to a local change of acoustic properties. For lines that are used intermittently,
this technique can be used during downtime when the level of disturbing noise is low.

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7. REFERENCES

In this DEP, reference is made to the following publications:

NOTE: Unless specifically designated by date, the latest edition of each publication shall be used, together
with any amendments/supplements/revisions thereto.

SHELL STANDARDS
Index to DEP publications and standard specifications DEP 00.00.05.05-Gen.
Amended per
Circular 41/08
Definition of temperature, pressure and toxicity levels DEP 01.00.01.30-Gen.
Hydrostatic pressure testing of new pipelines DEP 31.40.40.38-Gen
Note: The DEPs are available for Shell users on the SWW (Shell Wide Web) at address http://sww.shell.com/standards.

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8. BIBLIOGRAPHY

NOTE: The following documents are for information only and do not form an integral part of this DEP:

Jansen, H J M., “Pipeline Leak Detection; State of the Art SIEP 97-5527
Review as of May 1997”. September 1997.

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APPENDIX 1 SUMMARY OF THE CAPABILITIES AND APPLICATION OF LEAK DETECTION TECHNIQUES

LEAK LEAK TYPE MODE OF RESPONSE TIME LEAK LOCATION ROBUSTNESS RELIABILITY COST REMARKS
DETECTION OPERATION CAPABILITY
METHOD
Low Pressure gas: full bore ruptures any seconds to minutes good poor low high thresholds
liquid: major leaks required to avoid
false alarms
Change in gas: major leak steady state seconds to minutes Offshore: None good poor low
pressure / flow liquid: large leaks Onshore: Between
block valves if
pressure readings
available
Wave alert gas: medium to large leaks steady and seconds to minutes within 1 km, good poor medium detects only the
liquid: small to medium transient state depending on onset of a leak
leaks transducer spacing
Mass or volume gas and liquid: medium to steady state minutes to hours none good poor low
balance large leaks
Corrected mass or gas and liquid: small, steady and minutes to hours Offshore: None good medium medium
volume balance medium and large leaks transient state Onshore: Between
block valves
Statistical pipeline gas and liquid: small, steady and minutes to hours at best within 5 % of good good medium low probability of
leak detection medium and large leaks transient state, distance between false alarm
(SPLD) shut in pressure meters
Dynamic gas and liquid: small, steady and minutes to hours at best within 10 % of poor poor high high false alarm rate
simulation model medium and large leaks transient state, pipeline length
shut in
Acoustic liquids: large leaks (on- steady state depends on within 1 km good medium high hard liquids only
techniques line), small to medium leaks monitoring
(shut-in) frequency
Static pressure test hard liquids: small leaks during shut in hours to days none, between block good poor low capabilities depend
soft liquids: medium leaks valves on length and
gas: large leaks temperature effects
Sniffer tube, all fluids, including any hours within 100 m for good good high short lines only
hydrocarbon multiphase: small leaks hydrocarbon sensing
sensing-cables cables

Full bore rupture: ≥ 100 % of flow Medium leak: 5 % - 25 % of flow

Major leak: 50 % - 100 % of flow Small leak: 1 % - 5 % of flow
Large leak: 25 % - 50 % of flow

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