Business Horizons (2021) 64, 763e774

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Misinformation, disinformation, and fake

news: Cyber risks to business
Pythagoras N. Petratos a,b

a
Coventry University Business School, William Morris Building, 94 Gosford Street,
Coventry CV1 5DL, UK
b
City University of London, London, UK

KEYWORDS Abstract Misleading information is an emerging cyber risk. It includes misinforma-

Disinformation; tion, disinformation, and fake news. Digital transformation and COVID-19 have
Misinformation; exacerbated it. While there has been much discussion about the effects of misinfor-
Fake news; mation, disinformation, and fake news on the political process, the consequences
Cyber risks; of misleading information on businesses have been far less, and it can be argued
Cybersecurity insufficiently, examined. The article offers a primer on misleading information
and cyber risks aimed at business executives and leaders across an array of indus-
tries, organizations, and nations. Misleading information can have a profound effect
on business. I analyze different misleading information types and identify associ-
ated cyber risks to help businesses think about these emerging threats. I examine
in general the cyber risk posed by misleading information on business, and I explore
in more detail the impact on healthcare, media, financial markets, and elections
and geopolitical risks. Finally, I offer a set of practical recommendations for orga-
nizations to respond to these new challenges and to manage risks.
ª 2021 Kelley School of Business, Indiana University. Published by Elsevier Inc. All
rights reserved.

1. The importance of information technologies that integrates physical, digital, and

The information age is all around us; the third in-
dustrial revolution, grounded in new information
technologies (IT), spread throughout the world and
transformed business (Dosi & Galambos, 2013).
The fourth industrial revolution, building on the
third, is characterized by a fusion of emerging
E-mail address: pythagoras.petratos@coventry.ac.uk
biological spheres and systems. This trans-
formation of businesses and societies also presents
new risks (Schwab, 2016). As defined by Kaplan and
Haenlein (2019, p. 679), digital transformation is
“the integration of digital technology into all areas
of society, and the changes that result from this
integration.” It extends beyond the business world
and impacts governments and public administra-
tion, among others (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2019). The
fourth industrial revolution is disrupting nearly

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bushor.2021.07.012
0007-6813/ª 2021 Kelley School of Business, Indiana University. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
764
every industry worldwide (Schwab, 2016). Thus,
digital transformation is a key challenge for busi-
nesses (Saarikko et al., 2020). Digitized informa-
tion is becoming an essential element of products
and services, and also of enterprise systems and
businesses, in which digital and physical compo-
nents are integrated (Saarikko et al., 2020). In-
formation that businesses use and create, and the
wide spectrum of technologies used to process this
information, can transform industries, reshape
business competitive advantage, and spur innova-
tion (Porter & Millar, 1985). Obtaining quality in-
formation is critical for business transformation,
performance, and survival.
Misleading information usually appears in the
forms of misinformation, disinformation, and fake
news. Although this has been a considerable
problem for some time, factors such as the
continual increase in the frequency and sophisti-
cation of cyberattacks, election interference, and
crises such as the COVID-19 “infodemic,” have
made it a pressing issue for businesses. Misleading
information poses significant threats and risks to
businesses. The 2013 World Economic Forum’s
Global Risk Report highlighted the risk of digital
misinformation and connected it directly to
cyberattacks (Howell, 2013). The risk of digital
disinformation was later realized on a large scale
in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections and
throughout the COVID-19 crisis. The impact of
misleading information in these cases was sub-
stantial, disrupting democratic institutions, asso-
ciated economic and other policies, public health
services, and the economydand most importantly,
resulting in loss of human life. These large-scale
events can have secondary effects on businesses.
At the same time, misinformation at the busi-
nesses level can threaten brand names and
potentially affect the consumption of a business’s
product or services (Zhang et al., 2019).
The U.S. election issues of 2016 highlighted the
urgency of the need to reexamine issues of
cybersecurity (NASEM, 2018). While there has been
much discussion about the effects of misinforma-
tion, disinformation, and fake news on the politi-
cal process, the consequences of misleading
information on businesses have been far less, and
it can be argued insufficiently, examined (ABA,
2019). Research has shown that senior managers
facing the challenge of how to handle the oppor-
tunities and risks of digital transformation are
often unaware of the elements that they should
consider (Hess et al., 2016; Saarikko et al., 2020),
including misleading information. In this article, I
examine the impact of misinformation, disinfor-
mation, and fake news cyberthreats to business. I
P.N. Petratos
first define and analyze the various types of
misleading information. Then, I link misleading
information with cyber risks and examine the
general impact on business. I analyze the impact
of misleading information on the healthcare
sector, media, financial services, and elections and
geopolitical risks, since these present key chal-
lenges for business and society, especially in the
context of COVID-19. Finally, this article attempts
to bridge the divide between academic research
and real-world practice by providing practical
recommendations for risk management amid
misleading information and emerging
cyberthreats.
2. Misleading information:
Misinformation, disinformation, and
fake news
2.1. Misinformation and disinformation
First, it is essential to define and clarify what
misinformation, disinformation, and fake news
mean. The Oxford English Dictionary (2020) defines
misinformation as “wrong or misleading informa-
tion,” a rather broad and inclusive concept. The
term “misinformation” first appeared in the 16th
century, and it can be argued that it included el-
ements of other types of information. Today, the
word is generally used to refer to misleading in-
formation created or disseminated without
manipulative or malicious intent (Ireton & Posetti,
2018). Disinformation (Oxford English Dictionary,
2020) is defined as:
The dissemination of deliberately false in-
formation, esp. when supplied by a govern-
ment or its agent to a foreign power or to the
media, with the intention of influencing the
policies or opinions of those who receive it;
false information so supplied. Cf. black
propaganda.
The United Nations considers disinformation to
refer to deliberate, often orchestrated attempts
to confuse or manipulate people through deliv-
ering dishonest information to them. It includes
information that is false and deliberately created
and disseminated to harm a person, social group,
organization, or country (Ireton & Posetti, 2018).
The European Commission’s (2018) definition of
disinformation includes “all forms of false, inac-
curate, or misleading information” and warns that
the risk of harm concerns threats not only to
democratic processes and values but also to a va-
riety of business sectors, such as health, finance,
Misinformation, disinformation, and fake news
and more. It defines disinformation as “the crea-
tion, presentation and dissemination of verifiably
false or misleading information for the purposes of
economic gain or intentionally deceiving the pub-
lic, and which may cause public harm” (European
Court of Auditors, 2020). Disinformation “is
widely defined as the purposeful dissemination of
false information intended to mislead or harm”
according to the U.S. State Department (Nemr &
Gangware, 2019), which largely coincides with
the other definitions of disinformation.
Disinformation is a substantially loaded term. It
can include black propaganda, although experts
debate the extent to which disinformation and
propaganda overlap (Jackson, 2017). In addition, it
encompasses a wide range of methods, such as:
deceptive advertising (in business and in politics);
doctored photographs and manipulation of visual
images; forged documents; historical fabrications;
fake transmissions; internet fraud; fake websites;
and manipulated Wikipedia entries (Fallis, 2009,
2015). Disinformation can combine a variety of
activities either as covert (cyber) operations (e.g.,
social engineering, hacking, troll farms, bots) or as
overt actions (e.g., dissemination of disinforma-
tion in public media or on websites). In addition,
disinformation can have a diverse and inter-
connected ecosystem of actors, including state-
backed media, social media, proxies, unattribut-
able communication channels, intelligence
agencies, and cyber criminals (Nemr & Gangware,
2019; U.S. Department of State, 2020).
2.2. Fake news and the “infodemic”
Fake news is defined as “originally U.S. news that
conveys or incorporates false, fabricated, or
deliberately misleading information, or that is
characterized as or accused of doing so” (Oxford
English Dictionary, 2020). While the term origi-
nates from the late 19th century, it gained popu-
larity during and after the 2016 U.S. presidential
election (NATO, 2020). It has been used in “two
main ways: to refer to inaccurate stories circu-
lated on social media and the internet, esp. ones
which serve a particular political or ideological
purpose; or to seek to discredit media reports
regarded as partisan or untrustworthy” (Oxford
English Dictionary, 2020). Although there is no
universal definition, fake news “generally refers to
misleading content found on the internet, espe-
cially on social media” (Jackson, 2017). A survey
on the definition of fake news found that there are
six types: news satire; news parody; fabrication;
photo manipulation; advertising and public re-
lations; and propaganda (Tandoc et al., 2018).
765
Some of these definitions overlap with disinfor-
mation. An appropriate definition of fake news for
the purpose of this article is, “news articles that
are intentionally and verifiably false, and could
mislead readers” (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017, p.
213). Additional types of information can be
illegal, such as defamation, hate speech and
incitement, fraud, misrepresentation, and deceit.
The COVID-19 pandemic has severely affected
both health and economy. In addition, it has
instigated a surge of misleading information. World
Health Organization Director-General Tedros
Adhanom Ghebreyesus, referring to COVID-19,
stated, “We’re concerned about the levels of ru-
mours and misinformation.we’re not just fighting
an epidemic; we’re fighting an infodemic. Fake
news spreads faster and more easily than this
virus, and is just as dangerous” (WHO, 2020).
Misinformation and disinformation, both online
and offline, can be harmful to people’s health,
reduce the effectiveness of public health mea-
sures, and endanger countries’ abilities to manage
the pandemic (WHO, 2020). COVID-19 is a crucial
topic for study because it is a rather unusual risk, a
so-called “black swan,” which has lasted for a
considerable period and has raised the profile of
emerging cyberthreats.
3. Cybersecurity, quality of information,
and increased business risks
Many types of cyberattacks use misleading infor-
mation. Social engineering is the most commonly
used type of cyberattack on organizations (ISACA,
2020). The increase in use of IT technologies led
to an increase in social engineering techniques, so
that most cyberattacks nowadays include some
form of social engineering (ENISA, 2020). Social
engineering techniques include pretexting, bait-
ing, quid pro quo, and tailgating, as well phishing
and spear phishing (ENISA, 2020). Phishing, or
sending fraudulent communications, is an
increasingly common cyberthreat (Cisco, 2020).
Thus, by definition, phishing is using misleading
information. Phishing is one of the most potent
threats, especially to businesses, and has evolved
into an industry on its own (Boddy, 2018). It is a
“sustained, all-out assault on business,” with likely
daily or hourly frequency across all businesses, and
with a staggering 77% of businesses experiencing a
phishing attack at least once a month (Boddy,
2018, p. 9). The average wire-transfer cyber-
attack in 2020 resulted in a US $80,183 cost, and
one Russian operation targeted companies for an
average loss of $1.27 million (APWG, 2020).
766
Advanced persistent threats (APTs) form the
second most common type of cyberattack (10%),
after social engineering (15%; ISACA, 2020). APTs
involve sophisticated levels of expertise and sig-
nificant resources. They use multiple attack
methods, most notably deception, to disrupt or-
ganizations’ missions, business functions, and in-
formation systems (NIST, 2015). APTs share
commonalities with disinformation, such as high
sophistication and substantial resources. APTs can
utilize disinformation’s covert cyberoperations
(i.e., social engineering), overt actions, and a
range of actors. Cyberthreat actors (CTAs) can
have a diverse and significant impact on business.
Cybercriminals remain the top exploiters (22%),
often using phishing (ISACA, 2020). Another note-
worthy category of actors is nation/state (9%;
ISACA, 2020). Although this percentage might seem
relatively small, a nation/state cyberattack can
have a devastating impact on organizations. At the
same time, it is likely that the vast majority of
businesses cannot be protected against such so-
phisticated and wealthy actors. Moreover, nation
states can employ other CTAs, such as criminal
groups, insiders, and other hackers, thus
increasing their cyberthreat. The intersection is
such that nation states and APTs have been used
interchangeably (CIS, 2021).
The COVID-19 pandemic has changed the
broader threat landscape. It has not only intensi-
fied the existing risks but has also generated
emerging threats. Large-scale adoption of work-
from-home technologies, increased activity on
customer-facing networks, and greater general use
of online services in response to the pandemic
have exacerbated cyber risks (ICC, 2020). All of
these factors have increased the attack surface
and cyber risks of corporations and customers.
COVID-19 is fueling cyberattacks on businesses as
well as on governments, critical infrastructure,
and homes, and attacks have become more so-
phisticated, targeted, widespread, and unde-
tected (ENISA, 2020). An assessment by Interpol
(2020) of the impact of COVID-19 on cybercrime
found a shift from individuals and small businesses
to major corporations, governments, and critical
infrastructure. At the same time, micro, small,
and medium-sized enterprises and their workers,
as well as entrepreneurs and the self-employed,
remain among the hardest hit (ICC, 2020). It has
also been shown that the rapid spread of misin-
formation and fake news can be used to facilitate
the execution of cyberattacks (Interpol, 2020). It
was found that phishing scams increased by 667%
in one month during the pandemic (ENISA, 2020).
Disinformation, often with a coronavirus theme, is
P.N. Petratos
extensively used by cyberattackers. In the early
days of COVID-19, there was an increase of more
than 6,000% in coronavirus-themed spam (Parham
& Whitmore, 2020). Within the abundance of
COVID-19 themes, there are many hidden threats.
Attackers use COVID-19 disinformation to imper-
sonate brands, thereby misleading employees and
customers in a range of malspams, phishing at-
tacks, and ransomware (Deloitte, 2020). Cyber-
threats and risks remain at high levels, having
increased significantly during the pandemic. In
addition, industries such as healthcare and finan-
cial services face the most security challenges
(Panda, 2020).
4. Misleading information and cyber risks
to business sectors
4.1. COVID-19, misleading information, and
cyber risks to healthcare
The healthcare and public health sector has been
designated as critical infrastructure (CISA, n.d.).
Healthcare is one of the most valuable sectors in
business, encompassing numerous industries and
accounting for more than 10% of the world’s gross
domestic product (Deloitte, 2020). The healthcare
sector is experiencing significant digital trans-
formation and interoperability, fueled by unprec-
edented advancements in technologies such as
cloud computing, open platforms, and a connected
infrastructure of digital health known as the
Internet of Medical Things (Deloitte, 2020). A re-
view of digital transformation revealed that health
information technology faces many challenges
that can affect cybersecurity (e.g., design,
implementation, keeping up with new technolo-
gies). One highly controversial area is the privacy
and security of health information (Agarwal et al.,
2010). While the sector has experienced significant
benefits from digital transformation, as more de-
vices and applications are connected to healthcare
networks, they create cyber risks for business
assurance and operations (e.g., slowdowns, avail-
ability, and vulnerabilities; Haggerty, 2017).
The healthcare sector relies heavily on digital
technologies, which increase cyber risks (Luna
et al., 2016). A systematic review of digital
transformation in the healthcare sector found that
a major concern is the security and privacy of
medical information (Marques & Ferreira, 2019).
Another systematic review of cyber risks in the
health sector identifies significant cyber risks to
the detriment of companies and individuals,
including COVID-19, which has seriously affected
Misinformation, disinformation, and fake news
cybersecurity (Sardi et al., 2020). In addition,
healthcare has inherent weaknesses in its security
and therefore faces larger cyber risks in compari-
son with other sectors (Martin et al., 2017).
Therefore, digital transformation in healthcare
can generate cyberthreats and increase an orga-
nization’s attack surface.
Another important cyber risk is network capac-
ity and operations. There are increasing demands
on healthcare networks, putting them under strain
(Haggerty, 2017). The requirements for more IT
systems, network capacity, and speed, and the
resulting complexity of these systems, also affect
healthcare cybersecurity risks. There are emerging
cyber risks in network infrastructure and protocol
vulnerabilities (Jang-Jaccard & Nepal, 2014). On
top of the already increasing demands for medical
IT services, COVID-19 puts even more of a burden
on healthcare IT systems and networks. First,
COVID-19 boosted the demand for healthcare ser-
vices in general, and therefore also for IT services.
Second, the COVID-19 infodemic generates a great
deal of data, which can further put a strain on the
healthcare IT infrastructure. To counter and stop
misinformation, disinformation, and fake news,
international organizations, governments, health-
care providers, and stakeholders provide COVID-19
information, which requires additional IT resources
(CISA, n.d.; WHO, 2020). Owing to the rapid spread
of coronavirus, and in some cases to lockdowns,
the public relied on and demanded online sources
from which to acquire health information and to
limit misinformation (Le et al., 2020). These
trends have significantly affected demand for IT
services and increased cyber risks, and many of
them are related to misleading information.
Healthcare is one of the most targeted sectors,
and only half of its associated businesses think
they have the ability to defend themselves from
cyberattacks (Martin et al., 2017). Four-fifths of
executives of healthcare providers and payer
businesses said that their information technology
systems have been compromised by cyberattacks
(Bell & Ebert, 2015). Cybersecurity breaches range
from health information theft to ransomware at-
tacks on hospitals and even on implanted medical
devices (Coventry & Branley, 2018). Another major
cyber risk for both providers and payers in
healthcare is financial loss and fraud (Bell & Ebert,
2015). Healthcare has the highest average industry
cost of data breach at $7.13 million (IBM, 2020).
The recent unprecedented attacks on specific
healthcare organizations are another emerging
threat. For example, in the attack on the European
Medicines Agency, hackers accessed COVID-19
vaccine data that could be extremely valuable to
767
certain states and companies (Stubbs, 2020).
There were also attacks on the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, attacks on the Czech
Republic’s largest COVID-19 testing laboratories,
and phishing attacks on the vaccine “cold chain,”
the transportation and storage environment of
vaccines (Stilgherrian, 2020). Cyberattacks against
healthcare and medical organizations have inten-
sified during the pandemic with the participation
of state-backed spies, and state-sponsored groups
have targeted seven COVID-19 vaccine makers
(Stilgherrian, 2020; Stubbs, 2020). The cyber risks
have increased so much that “all CISOs and
healthcare [organizations], are seeing attempted
penetrations by nation-state actors, not just North
Korea, every single minute of every single day”
(Cimpanu, 2020). State-sponsored attacks are
particularly likely to use disinformation in their
campaigns.
4.2. Media, digital transformation, and
misleading information
The media business has been continuously exposed
to technology-induced change and transformation
(Martens et al., 2018). One of the biggest trans-
formations in the media industry occurred toward
the end of the 19th century. This transformation
occurred after the rise of a new form of reporting
and business model called the “yellow” press.
Around the same time, the term “fake news” was
coined in 1890 in an article in the Milwaukee Daily
Journal (Oxford English Dictionary, 2020). Yellow
press encouraged new forms of reporting, such as
fake news, as well as misinformation and disin-
formation, although these terms were not yet in
common use.
Digital technologies have brought about another
media transformation. A key characteristic of
digital transformation is the transition from a
linear business model and offline news publishing
to a multisided market/platform business model
and online news publishing (Martens et al., 2018).
The shift from an offline to an online business
model increases cyber risks. Social media is
another important transformational innovation in
the media industry. It is widely agreed that social
media is internet-based and that it constitutes a
communication media channel (Carr & Hayes,
2015; Kaplan & Haenlein, 2019).
Yellow journalism became widespread through
the efforts of newspaper publishers Joseph Pulit-
zer and William Hearst. Newspapers completed
the transition from stand-alone shops to giant in-
dustrial enterprises of news commercialization;
consequently, this mass communications industry
768
gave rise to mass production and mass marketing
(Daly, 2018). This mass marketing was facilitated
by keen advertisers, and as a result, newspapers
became more dependent on advertising revenue
(Daly, 2018; Griffin, 2019). Yellow journalism in
the 1890s had profound effects not only on busi-
ness but also, and more importantly, on society
and public opinion. Newspapers attracted larger
audiences and grew enormously, partly because of
the sensational style of reporting fake news. The
most noteworthy episode of the Hearst-Pulitzer
yellow press competition is the Spanish-American
War of 1898, which created significant geopolit-
ical tensions. The “incredulous news” played a
significant role in leading the U.S. into this war
(CITS, 2021). The apotheosis of the yellow press
came with the sinking of the USS Maine, and the
uproar for war reached a peak (Daly, 2018). Both
Hearst and Pulitzer published details from a “top-
secret” cable, which turned out to be fake,
involving the secretary of the navy and hinting that
the sinking of the USS Maine was not an accident
(Daly, 2018). Although the yellow press largely
declined in the early 20th century (Daly, 2018),
tabloids continue to retain this style. Tabloid
journalism, “with a sensationalist approach and an
easily digested mix of entertainment and news, it
has often attracted mass audiences . today
considered to characterize a range of other media
content, extending to popular TV programs and
certain kinds of online news,” therefore presents
many similarities with yellow press (Johansson,
2020).
Fake news resurfaced during the 2016 U.S.
presidential election, raising concerns for a num-
ber of reasons: The majority of U.S. adults obtain
their news via social media; the most popular fake
news items were more widely shared on social
media; many people believe in fake news; and
fake news is partisan (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017).
There is substantial literature on fake news and
social media. A literature review of political po-
larization and social media concludes that there is
“broad scholarly agreement regarding the high
prevalence of misinformation and propaganda in
online platforms” (Tucker et al., 2018, p. 15). In
addition to the dissemination of fake news by
particular websites, a review and synthesis of the
literature suggests that mainstream news media
play a significant and important role in further
spreading fake news (Tsfati et al., 2020).
There is not much consensus across the aca-
demic literature on how to define many of the
phenomena associated with fake news (Tucker
et al., 2018). As we discussed in the quality of in-
formation section, different types of misleading
P.N. Petratos
information can overlap. Disinformation is an
important feature of social media. Many state ac-
tors are involved in spreading disinformation on
social media platforms, exploiting them to exer-
cise power (Bradshaw & Howard, 2018). More than
half of regular internet users globally are con-
cerned about the threat posed by disinformation
found in social media platforms (Knuutila et al.,
2020). Fake news websites, politicians, partisan
media outlets, mainstream media, governments,
and other actors have overlapping roles in pro-
ducing and amplifying disinformation in the social
media ecosystem (Tucker et al., 2018). Motivations
can differ too. State-sponsored actors with politi-
cal motivation engage in disinformation cam-
paigns. On the other hand, North Macedonian
teenagers with financial incentives from the small
town of Veles launched more than 140 U.S. polit-
ical websites to spread fake news in order to get
paid for ad clicks (Kshetri & Voas, 2017). The case
of the North Macedonian actors highlights the
broader issue of financial motivation, value crea-
tion, and social media business models. With “in-
fluence” being a key concept in social media
marketing, businesses are trying to increase their
reach and to increase ad clicks, which are a major
revenue stream (Hanna et al., 2011). As with the
yellow press, some social media outlets sensa-
tionalize or distort news and information in order
to become more attractive to specific audiences.
4.3. Misleading information and financial
markets
The first time that the term “fake news” was used
in the Milwaukee Daily Journal, it concerned a
mining business. Mining was an important business
venture in the U.S., especially during that era of
mining exploration. Fake news about mines could
affect the associated investors and stakeholders,
stocks, and industries. And still today, fake news,
and especially fake financial news, can be aimed
at certain domains and themes (Zhang & Ghorbani,
2020). Social media financial bots spread disinfor-
mation and are involved in speculative campaigns
promoting specific stocks (Tardelli et al., 2020).
Kogan et al. (2020) studied fake news in financial
markets and found that it increases abnormal
trading activity by more than 50% and price vola-
tility by approximately 40%, and that misleading
information can impact economic as well as social
and political relationships. Fake news stories
generate significantly more attention regarding
stock price reaction than legitimate news (Clarke
et al., 2020). While fake news can affect trading
volumes around the time of its release, the stock
Misinformation, disinformation, and fake news
market appears to eventually regain its equilib-
rium (Clarke et al., 2020). During the COVID-19
pandemic, the stock market’s reaction to corona-
virus news reveals that fake news has a negative,
nonlinear influence on returns (Cepoi, 2020).
Although existing research suggests that, in gen-
eral, financial markets account for the effects of
fake news appropriately, there are some trading
volume and stock price reactions that indicate
market biases.
Cyberattacks on financial markets have fol-
lowed similar increasing trends during the
pandemic. Globally, up to 90% of banking and in-
surance workers may be working from home
(Krohn, 2020). In addition, the demand for online
financial services has risen owing to technology
trends and the transformation of financial services
by financial technology, and because of the rising
need for online and other digital services during
the pandemic. Therefore, the attack surface of
both employees and customers has substantially
increased, and cyber risks need to be reevaluated
accordingly. With financial gain a primary motiva-
tion of cyberattackers, financial markets and ser-
vices remain a key target. The lockdown also
increased the threats by cyber criminals to commit
financial crime (Mirfin, 2020). Cyberattacks and
anti-money laundering violations could further
exacerbate operational and reputational risks
during the pandemic (Crisanto & Prenio, 2020).
Financial authorities and institutions instruct their
staff, as part of their COVID-19 training, on how to
deal with fraudulent communications, social en-
gineering schemes, and fake reports (Crisanto &
Prenio, 2020), which is further evidence that
disinformation is often used in cyberattacks
against financial services.
Elections lie on the intersection of politics and
financial markets. There is an extensive literature
on the effects of elections on economic perfor-
mance and financial markets (Wisniewski, 2015).
Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2016) studied the 2016 U.S.
presidential election and found movements in
financial market volatility, including effects on the
U.S., U.K., and Asian stock markets, as well as on
oil prices and currencies, suggesting that markets
were responding to election-related news. Some
commentators have suggested that the 2016
presidential election outcome was influenced by
fake news (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). Fake news
can have an immediate effect around the election
period. In addition, fake news and disinformation
campaigns can have a more profound effect on
financial markets and on the economy if they can
determine or influence election outcomes. The
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
769
Chairman Jay Clayton stated that the 2020 U.S.
presidential elections and the pandemic cyber
risks “are there more than ever,” and corporations
should be vigilant about these cyberthreats
(Stankiewicz & Pisani, 2020).
4.4. Elections, disinformation, and
geopolitical risks
The discussion above leads us to a closer exami-
nation of elections. In the 2016 U.S. presidential
election, state actors used social media campaigns
to spread disinformation aimed at dividing the
American electorate and undermining confidence
in U.S. democratic institutions (NASEM, 2018). The
disinformation campaigns were accompanied by
other methods and probes of the U.S. voting
infrastructure (NASEM, 2018). The Joint Analysis
Report identifies that APTs 28 and 29 used spear
phishing campaigns to target U.S. government of-
ficials, and in the course of the campaign, a po-
litical party was compromised (U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, 2016). These were emerging
and unprecedented cyberthreats that deployed
novel forms of misleading information. The Mueller
(2019) Report outlines three findings related to
disinformation: (1) Military units 26165 and 74455
of the General Staff of the Russian Army carried
out computer intrusions while conducting large-
scale spear phishing campaigns; (2) the spear
phishing campaign also targeted corporations and
used their products, such as Google email, Micro-
soft Word documents, and web hosting and voting
technology companies; and (3) social media were
used for obtaining campaign finances, personal
identifying and financial information, fundraising
files and information, information about busi-
nesses, foreign corporations and purchases, money
laundering, and even bitcoins.
Moving from elections to broader geopolitical
risks, the Obama administration ejected 35 sus-
pected Russian intelligence operatives from the
U.S. and imposed sanctions on two leading Russian
intelligence services and companies (Sanger,
2016). The cyber-related sanctions program of
the U.S. Department of the Treasury began in
2015. It declared a national emergency to deal
with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security, foreign policy, and economy of
the U.S. constituted by cyber-enabled activities
originating from outside the country, and it was
amended in 2016 to include sanctions related to
election processes or institutions (U.S. Department
of the Treasury, 2017). It is a framework to protect
businesses from, among other things, misappro-
priation from outside the U.S. through cyber-
770
enabled commercial or competitive advantage or
private financial gain, and from theft of trade se-
crets (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2017). The
department has applied this framework and
imposed sanctions for “cyber operations to inter-
fere with the 2016 election and a wide range of
other malign activities” (U.S. Department of the
Treasury, 2018).
Ahmad et al. (2019) found that APTs are used by
nation-states to attack corporations and govern-
ments, to steal intellectual property, and to gain
competitive advantage. APTs containing disinfor-
mation have targeted the intellectual property of
corporations. For example, APT 1, a Chinese cyber
espionage unit, has systematically stolen intellec-
tual property from over 141 organizations (Ghafir &
Prenosil, 2014). Intellectual property theft vic-
timizes companies of every size, and China is
responsible for most of it (Blair et al., 2017).
Cyberattacks on intellectual property and corpo-
rations are usually performed by states or state-
sponsored actors and are complex, involving APT
phishing and the use of disinformation. Cyber risks
have spread into other areas, such as geopolitics
and trade. Cyber demands were part of the trade
negotiations that aimed to end the trade dispute
between the U.S. and China (Mitchell & Politi,
2019). This indicates this type of cyberthreat
could remain a significant risk for businesses.
5. Recommendations for managing
misleading information cyber risks
Misinformation, disinformation, and fake news
generate significant cyber risks for businesses.
There is an urgent need to establish cybersecurity
policies and best practices to manage these
emerging and multifaceted cyberthreats. I provide
interlinked recommendations that can be used by
business executives and leaders across an array of
industries, sectors, and nations.
5.1. Generate digital transformation
strategies
We have observed that the trend of digital
transformation prevails across businesses, notably
in the healthcare, media, and financial sectors, as
we experience the forces of the fourth industrial
revolution. To embrace digital transformation,
firms must initially identify what technologies are
relevant and how they will be implemented in
their business settings (Saarikko et al., 2020). It is
generally accepted that legacy systems present
vulnerabilities and increase risks. The
P.N. Petratos
development of legacy systems, as well as
contemporary systems, into more effective and
secure forms largely depends on the digital
transformation strategy. Businesses have to
decide which digital transformation strategy to
follow based on a variety of criteria, including
cyber risks.
5.2. Recognize, detect, and assess cyber
risks
First, it is necessary for business executives and
leaders to recognize the existence of cyber risks.
In order to recognize cyberthreats, it is crucial to
have the capabilities to detect them. A main
concern is the limited ability of healthcare busi-
nesses to understand, track, report, and manage
cyberthreats effectively (Bell & Ebert, 2015). This
problem is exacerbated because cyberattacks
have become more sophisticated and because
their volume has increased substantially during the
pandemic. Detection is not only a problem in
healthcare but in other sectors. Attackers improve
and adapt their methods; for example, phishers
may host on a compromised domain to avoid
detection (Jang-Jaccard & Nepal, 2014). Many or-
ganizations fail to detect attacks, and in 2019, a
quarter of all breaches remained undetected for
months (Champion, 2020). Another essential ac-
tion is to understand misleading information cyber
risks and their impacts on business. While some of
these risks, such as fake news, can be detected
and understood rather easily, other complex risks,
such as APTs, are harder to assess. In that sense,
an appropriate risk-assessment framework that
captures the effects of misleading information is
essential.
5.3. Set and adopt standards and norms
Cybersecurity standards can manage risk and
create resilience (Collier et al., 2014). The United
Nations, with the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe and other organizations, is-
sued a joint declaration setting standards on
disinformation and propaganda (OSCE, 2017). The
Code of Practice on Disinformation is a worldwide
self-regulatory set of standards voluntarily signed
by companies (European Commission, 2018). An
effective standard should have two key elements:
It should encompass both risk assessment and
decision-making models so as to bridge the gap
between empirically derived technical data and
qualitative judgments and managerial perspec-
tives, such as risk tolerance and strategy (Collier
et al., 2014).
Misinformation, disinformation, and fake news
5.4. Use and create antimisinformation,
disinformation, and fake news tools
There is a range of tools that combat disinforma-
tion. These tools have many forms, from websites
with human fact checkers to apps using artificial
intelligence to detect bots, and they are grouped
into several categories: (1) bot/spam detection;
(2) codes and standards; (3) credibility scoring; (4)
disinformation tracking; (5) education/training;
(6) verification; and (7) whitelisting (RAND, 2019).
Businesses can select which of them best suits
their digital transformation, their overall strategy,
and their methods of managing misleading infor-
mation cyber risks.
5.5. Form partnerships and increase
capacity building
Partnerships can have many benefits. First, they
can facilitate the development of standards and
national, sectoral, or industry policies. Second,
partnerships create economies of scale and scope
in cyberdefenses. Thirddand most importantly
din many cases, it is impossible or extremely
costly for businesses to mitigate the cyber risks
posed by highly resourceful and sophisticated
state-sponsored attacks. Therefore, cooperation
with the public sector is essential in managing
these cyber risks, possibly in the form of public-
private partnerships. Another crucial feature of
cooperation is capacity building (Awotar-Mauree,
2016). Especially in the case of an infodemic,
when there is a massive flood of misleading in-
formation and cyberattacks, organizations and
nations must cooperate closely to increase de-
fense capacity.
5.6. Invest sufficiently
To implement the above recommendations, busi-
nesses should invest sufficient funds. Although there
are existing antidisinformation tools and methods,
the fourth industrial revolution is evolving, and
along with it, new technologies are emerging. It is
therefore vital to invest in research and develop-
ment and to find innovative cyberdefenses against
misleading information. For example, firms could
invest in technology to find fake news through al-
gorithms and crowdsourcing (West, 2017). At the
same time, digital transformation strategy should be
supported by appropriate investment aimed at
reducing cyber risks and losses.
771
6. Summary
The digital transformation of businesses and soci-
eties presents new risks, and an emerging cyber
risk for business is misleading information.
Misleading information usually appears in the
forms of misinformation, disinformation, and fake
news. This article examined the impact of
misleading information cyber risks on businesses.
It presented some general effects of attacks, and
then it analyzed specific sectors, notably health-
care, media, financial markets, and elections and
geopolitics, that present key challenges for busi-
ness and society, especially in the context of
COVID-19. Finally, this article offered some rec-
ommendations for managing misleading informa-
tion cyber risk: generate digital transformation
strategies; recognize, detect, and assess cyber
risks; set and adopt standards and norms; use and
create antimisinformation, antidisinformation,
and anti-fake news tools; and form partnerships
and increase investment, which can benefit busi-
ness executives and leaders across an array of in-
dustries, sectors, and nations.
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