LFI No.

:LFI20210230
LEARNING FROM INCIDENT
Plant Air 10" line leak observed in 681A-Rack near column no-237B
F
I
Title of incident: N
10" Plant Air OSBL Header Leak in 681 A-Rack near col. 237B
A
L
Incident No: IM2020116221
Date: 04th Nov’20
Targeted Recipients: O&M and support teams Risk Rating: Low
What happened:
On 04-11-2020 at 10:29AM, major leak was reported from 10-inch plant air supply header (681-
AP-701-10”-EC12AB-NI) located on 3rd tier of A-rack in Hydrogen plant safety district. Leak
location was near to pillar no 237B of pipe rack.

DTA Refinery plant air shutdown was taken to attend the leak. 5 Mtr. long spool along with elbow
was replaced and plant air supply was restored on 06-11-2020 at 12:13AM.

Why it happened
 Internal corrosion occurred due to moisture condensation and its accumulation at horizontal
portion of line adjacent to expansion loop. Internal corrosion was evident in bottom part of pipeline.
 Due to excess available capacity, a temporary MOC (MOC-JGE1-JFCC-15-093) was carried out
in 2015 to use FCC IR compressor for exporting air to plant air OSBL header in case of air
deficiency from Utility end when any of their compressor is offline for maintenance work.
 During export from FCC end, 8000 Nm3/Hr is consumed by FCC and 4000 Nm3/Hr is exported
to OSBL header.
ACHIEVE GOAL ZERO DTA-SAFETY

RIL CONFIDENTIAL Date : 08/03/2021

 LFI No. :LFI20210230
LEARNING FROM INCIDENT
Plant Air 10" line leak observed in 681A-Rack near column no-237B
F
 PHA for implementation of MOC envisaged presence of higher moisture content in the air supply
from FCC due to absence of moisture traps at intercoolers and higher temperature (approx. 10-
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12 degrees) of air supplied from FCC as compared to air supplied from Utility end. N
 In the PHA as a safeguard, V-notch valves at interstage coolers and FCC-KOD at air discharge
were considered for moisture draining. A
 However, exported air from FCC does not have provision for routing through FCC-KOD to OSBL L
plant air header which was wrongly considered as one of the safeguard for knocking-off moisture
resulting in excess moisture condensation at the tapping of air inlet causing internal corrosion of
air header line at vulnerable locations.
 Post hook-up of excess air piping from FCC to OSBL, no further review or changes were
done and the system continued to operate the same way till date without regularizing the
temporary MOC.
 The above resulted in considerable moisture being carried along with air from FCC side.
 As confirmed by mass balance from CTS, due to major consumption of air at the upstream of
tapping location severity of internal corrosion was more at the horizontal leg of expansion loop at
an upstream location from FCC tapping which leaked in this case.
 Air being a non-corrosive fluid, internal corrosion is not expected in normal condition.

Photographs:

Ruptured 10” OSBL plant air pipe

Internal corrosion at 50% portion was observed while the other half had no damage,
indicating presence of condensation of moisture.

ACHIEVE GOAL ZERO DTA-SAFETY

RIL CONFIDENTIAL Date : 08/03/2021

 LFI No. :LFI20210230
LEARNING FROM INCIDENT
Plant Air 10" line leak observed in 681A-Rack near column no-237B
F
I
N
Similar incidents
A
Leaks in ISBL header have happened in past where presence of acidic species in condensed L
moisture was identified as root cause for failure and ISBL portion of line has been
recommendation for upgradation to higher metallurgy.

Lessons learnt
 All air compressors shall have engineered moisture traps installed at the interstage coolers and
after coolers to prevent moisture going forward into plant air headers.
 A periodic maintenance program shall be in place for all moisture traps and upgrade obsolescent
designs.
 Periodically test for the pH and other contaminants in the moisture separated from traps to
anticipate potential corrosion in the downstream piping.
 Review the capacity of traps periodically whenever addition of new compressors into the air
system is done or process conditions like flow/ temperature changes.
 In case of very large air network involving very long piping in the offsites, review the requirement
of traps in the OSBL and provide accordingly.
 Hazards identified in PHA shall be mitigated through control actions on timely manner for
temporary MOCs also depending on the risk level.
 Develop a risk-based inspection program for utility services including air network in offsites/ OSBL
areas based on the potential degradation mechanisms and vulnerable locations.

IMPACTED PSM ELEMENT IMPACTED OD IMPACTED OMS ELEMENTS

ELEMENT
Process Hazard Analysis -NA- 4.2 Management of Change

Process Technology 5.2 Design & Construction

MoC – Technology 5.4 Inspection and Maintenance

Mechanical Integrity

In case of any further clarification contact to undersign:

Name: Vinayak Gagal Mail ID: Vinayak.gagal@ril.com

ACHIEVE GOAL ZERO DTA-SAFETY

RIL CONFIDENTIAL Date : 08/03/2021

 LFI No. :LFI20210230
LEARNING FROM INCIDENT
Plant Air 10" line leak observed in 681A-Rack near column no-237B
F
Sr.No. 1 What went wrong Incorrect MOC PHA
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Learning from incident
Hazards identified in PHA shall be appropriately addressed and safeguards
shall be ensured during MOC approval process.
N
Recommendation Type Operations A
Moisture trap and KOD provision in FCC - It is recommended to provide
Recommendation
suitable moisture traps in inter-stage & after cooler and re-route the air L
export piping through KOD in FCC IR Compressor discharge. Till then IR
compressor shall not be used for supplying air to OSBL plant air header.
Sr.No. 2 What went wrong Low continuous air consumption in unit d/s of leak
Requirement of providing moisture traps at critical/strategic locations in
Learning from incident
OSBL plant air network shall be studied and recommended.
Recommendation Type Technology
Provision of moisture traps in OSBL PA line - Requirement of providing
Recommendation moisture traps at critical/strategic locations in OSBL plant air network shall
be studied and recommended.
Sr.No. 3 What went wrong Moisture trap inadequate (Utility)
Enduring solution shall be explored to knock-off acidic species present in
Learning from incident
atmospheric air prior to entering into Utility air compressors.
Recommendation Type Technology
Measures to remove acidic species in suction air - Enduring solution shall
Recommendation be explored to knock-off acidic species present in atmospheric air prior to
entering into Utility air compressors.
Sr.No. 4 What went wrong Due to lower elevation close to expansion loop
Periodic inspection of strategic locations vulnerable to moisture
Learning from incident
accumulation making potential sites for corrosion shall be carried out.
Recommendation Type EAM
Inspection strategy for lower elevation locations - Identify and assign a
Recommendation frequency of 5-years for inspecting strategic locations in OSBL plant air
headers.

RIL CONFIDENTIAL Date : 08/03/2021