OSTRAVSKÁ UNIVERZITA V OSTRAVĚ

FILOZOFICKÁ FAKULTA
KATEDRA ANGLISTIKY A AMERIKANISTIKY

Zahraniční politika Spojených

států amerických v Guatemale
BAKALÁŘSKÁ PRÁCE

Autor práce: Jan Kučera

Vedoucí práce: Mgr. Petr Kopecký, Ph.D.
2009
 UNIVERSITY OF OSTRAVA
FACULTY OF ARTS
DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN STUDIES

Foreign Policy of the United

States in Guatemala
BACHELOR THESIS

Author: Jan Kučera

Supervisor: Mgr. Petr Kopecký, Ph.D.
2009
Poděkování
Rád bych tímto poděkoval panu Mgr. Petru Kopeckému, Ph.D. za to, že
ochotně přijal můj návrh na téma bakalářské práce, které mi pomohl blíže
upřesnit. Také mu tímto děkuji za cenné hodnocení stylistiky, gramatiky i
obsahové části v průběhu vypracovávání této práce.
Mé díky dále patří mé mamince a všem, kteří mě během psaní
podporovali nebo mi pomohli k vybranému tématu nalézt cestu. Dále děkuji
společnosti Google za to, že v minulém roce digitalizovala některé z knih, které
se mého tématu týkají, a usnadnila mi tak dohledávání citací. Děkuji autorům
všech citovaných děl a děkuji čtenářům, kteří mi umožnili si jejich knihy
koupit ze zahraničních antikvariátů.
 Prohlašuji, že předložená práce je mým původním dílem, které jsem
vypracoval samostatně. Veškerou literaturu a další zdroje, z nichž jsem při
zpracování čerpal, v práci řádně cituji a jsou uvedeny v seznamu použité
literatury.

Ostrava.......................... ..........................
podpis

Beru na vědomí, že tato bakalářská práce je majetkem Ostravské

univerzity (autorský zákon č. 121/2000 Sb., §60 odst. 1), bez jejího souhlasu
nesmí být nic z obsahu publikováno.
Souhlasím s prezenčním zpřístupněním své práce v Univerzitní
knihovně Ostravské Univerzity.
Table of contents
1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 3
2. EXPOSITION ........................................................................................... 4
2.1. COLONIAL HERITAGE ........................................................................... 4
2.1.1. Influence of Spain, Europe and the United States .......................... 4
2.1.2. Investments of the United States ..................................................... 6
2.2. TRADITIONAL DICTATORSHIPS ............................................................ 7
2.2.1. Jorge Ubico..................................................................................... 7
2.2.2. The Economic Depression .............................................................. 7
2.2.3. Ubico and the United States ........................................................... 8
2.2.4. The Fall of Ubico............................................................................ 9
2.2.5. Federico Ponce ............................................................................. 10
3. RISING ACTION ................................................................................... 11
3.1. FIRST PHASE OF THE DEMOCRATIC ERA ............................................ 11
3.1.1. Arévalo and the October Revolution ............................................ 11
3.1.2. Relations with the United States ................................................... 14
3.1.3. Public Image of UFCO ................................................................. 16
3.2. SECOND PHASE OF THE DEMOCRATIC ERA ........................................ 17
3.2.1. Road to Power of Colonel Jacobo Arbenz.................................... 17
3.2.2. The Land Reform .......................................................................... 19
3.2.3. Arbenz the Communist .................................................................. 20
3.2.4. The First UFCO Press Campaign ................................................ 22
3.2.5. The Second UFCO Press Campaign ............................................ 23
3.2.6. Operation Fortune ........................................................................ 24
3.3. UNITED STATES INVADE GUATEMALA............................................... 25
3.3.1. Eisenhower Becomes President .................................................... 25
3.3.2. Operation PBSUCCESS ............................................................... 26
3.3.3. Arbenz Discovers the Plot............................................................. 28
3.3.4. The War of No Armies .................................................................. 29
3.3.5. An Alternative Conclusion ............................................................ 31
4. CLIMAX.................................................................................................. 31
4.1. “ROLLING BACK” DEMOCRACY ......................................................... 31
4.1.1. Repression Under Armas .............................................................. 31
4.1.2. From Ydígoras to Guerrillas ........................................................ 32
4.1.3. Reestablishment of the Army......................................................... 34
4.2. DISCOVERING NEW HORIZONS OF TERROR ........................................ 36
4.2.1. The Military Government of General Arana Osorio .................... 36
4.2.2. Presidency of Kjell Laugerud ....................................................... 37
4.2.3. Presidency of Romeo Lucas García.............................................. 38
4.2.4. The Government of Ríos Montt..................................................... 39

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5. FALLING ACTION ............................................................................... 41
5.1. FROM TERROR TO COMPROMISES ...................................................... 41
5.1.1. Mejia Víctores and Vinicio Cerezo............................................... 41
5.1.2. Serrano Elías and his Successors ................................................. 42
5.1.3. Alvaro Arzú and Signing of the Peace Treaty............................... 44
6. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 45
7. BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................... 47
7.1. PRINTED SOURCES ............................................................................. 47
7.2. ONLINE SOURCES............................................................................... 48
8. APPENDICES......................................................................................... 48

2
1. Introduction
This thesis tracks the role of the United States in the internal policy of
Guatemala. It does so by compiling various sources, comparing them and
integrating them into the thesis according to their verifiability.
The image produced is supposed to be dynamic, not static or statistic.
The aim of the thesis is not to present every single organization or event, which
took part during the long political, economic, cultural and military
confrontation. The most important aspect which I applied was the analysis of
events and individuals who took the most decisive role in changing the course
of Guatemala.
Interference of the United States in Guatemala is deep-rooted. First,
there was the economic dominance, due to the geographical placement of the
two countries. The character of the international relations of the two countries
changed when the traditional division of power in Guatemala was seriously
threatened in the period from 1944 to 1954. This era was a turning point for
both the attitude of the United States and for changes in Guatemala.
The historical chapters preceding 1944 are an important predecessor to
the armed conflict. The Secretary of State Dulles described the intervention of
the United States as “rolling back communism”. This means rolling Guatemala
back to the pre-1944 era. The consequent 36-year was a conflict of two groups,
of the power-concentrating elites, who wanted to sustain the pre-1944 status
and rest of the population, which tried to sustain the 1944-1954 status.
The thesis is divided into sections that divide the thesis into eras.
Sections are divided into chapters that categorize sub-chapters. The sub-
chapters are divided according to important events or presidents, although the
status of the presidents dramatically changed after the second democratic
period.
The works cited throughout this thesis are arranged according to the
amount of the cited material and according to the importance for the paragraph

3
where the citations occur. If the provided information is compiled from various
sources, the citations are situated at the end of the logical structure. Words
“army” and “military” are used synonymously.
I have presented the most balanced image I was capable of with regard
to both sides of the conflict and the third party – the civilians. For this goal, I
based my thesis on information from different sources, presented by people
with different opinions. My findings are summarized in the conclusion at the
end of this thesis, offering a quick overall view.

2. Exposition
2.1. Colonial heritage
2.1.1. Influence of Spain, Europe and the United States

Before Spain invaded Guatemala in 1524, this Central American country

consisted of many rival Mayan tribes. The European conquerors were looking
for treasures and wealth without respecting the indigenous population of
Central America. Since then, members of the ancient Mayan civilization were
being plundered, displaced, tortured, murdered and forced to accept
Christianity. Nine tenths of them died of the European diseases. However, it
was not worth for the Spaniards to exterminate Mayans, because Guatemala
lacked sufficient amounts of gold or silver and remained a relatively neglected
colony (Cockcroft 106; Taube 7).
Most of the small Guatemalan landowners lost their land to the church and
the Spanish mestizos, the racial caste levelled between the whites and the
indigenous population, before Guatemala gained independence from Spain
(Cockcroft 106). The agricultural indigenous population was dissatisfied with
the situation and organised rebellions.
The United Provinces of Central America (UPCA) were created in an
attempt for a federation. It consisted of the Central American states with
Guatemala as the most powerful unit. The inefficient management and the

4
imbalance of power distribution among the participating countries led to the
dissolution of the federation in 1838 (Immerman 22; Cockcroft 107).
The armed forces increased during the UPCA period. They worked well as
a tool for force drafts of the indigenous highland population (Hey 27). On the
other hand, the first democratic president of Guatemala, Juan José Arévalo,
considered this period a positive progress, describing it as a way to defend
against the “machinations and exploitation of the powerful”. Selfish interests of
the participating countries led to dissolution of the federation (Gleijeses 109).
Rufino Barrios came to power in 1872 and introduced several liberal
reforms, which transformed some of the land to the small middle class, allowed
coffee production and attracted foreign investors. However, this era did not
seek redistribution of the highly concentrated wealth and power. It facilitated
land seizures from the natives instead (Immerman 22, 23).
Presidents who applied nationalistic policies to protect the Guatemalan
wealth from monopolies of the United States were overthrown. This evoked
nationalistic tendencies (Gleijeses 86). James Cockcroft describes the era of
1921 as “a brief democratic interlude” (Cockcroft 108). This basically meant a
limited political democracy, when Congress and the press were relatively free
(Gleijeses 10). The United Fruit Company ruled by its own private armies for
suppression of the organized labour (Cockcroft 108).
The only economic measure the Guatemalan dictators could afford was a
desperate effort to attract investors (Wilkinson 75). The presidential weakness
and corruptibility were caused by the economic dependency on the markets of
Europe and the United States, where coffee and bananas were sold. 90% of the
Guatemalan agricultural production consisted of these two commodities.
Moreover, no exports to Europe were made during World War II. The German
property was confiscated and the United States gained the leading economic
role. Unfortunately for the Guatemalan presidents, the coffee and the banana
prices were very unstable due to vulnerability of the crops and the extremely
low production diversification (Immerman 31, 32). An extreme inequality and

5
poverty were caused by the powerful landowners. They were responsible for
the economic instability of Guatemala (Immerman 27).

2.1.2. Investments of the United States

The economic dominance over Guatemala is represented by the Boston

Fruit Company (BFC) founded in 1885. It was a fast growing corporation, but
it could not buy enough bananas to satisfy the supply. BFC decided to buy
some land for cultivation and started growing on their own crops (Schleisinger
and Kinzer 65, 66).
At this time, a person called Minor Keith was building railroads across
Central America, dreaming of a transport monopoly. His debts forced him to
accept partnership offered by BFC (Schleisinger and Kinzer 67). In 1899,
Keith’s International Railways of Central America (IRCA) and BFC merged
into The United Fruit Company (UFCO).
Dictators of the underdeveloped Central American countries did not have
any use for their land and willingly sold it to UFCO. In 1901, UFCO made a
deal with the Guatemalan president Cabrera for a 99-year concession to build
and operate the Guatemalan railroad. In 1930, UFCO had its assets in Panama,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Colombia and mainly Guatemala (Schleisinger and
Kinzer 16).
Samuel Zemurray was an inventive businessman who organised a coup in
Honduras in 1905 to remove influence of a New York bank, which governed
the country’s treasury to save it economically. The coup gave Zemurray any
concessions he asked for.
By 1915, he became a dangerous competitor to UFCO, which paid him to
stay out of the banana business (Schleisinger and Kinzer 68, 69). In 1932, he
was recalled to save the company. Common methods of UFCO were political
intervention, economic compulsion, contractual imposition, bribery and
propaganda (Schleisinger and Kinzer 72).

6
 This period is further characterized by two military visits by the United
States. In 1885 and 1906, military warships were sent to Guatemala in order to
“protect American citizens and property” (Cockcroft 108).

2.2. Traditional Dictatorships

2.2.1. Jorge Ubico

Jorge Ubico Castaneda was the last despotic ruler before the Guatemalan
revolution of 1944. He came to power in 1931 (Cockcroft 108). At that time,
about one third of the land was under cultivation. By the end of the Ubico’s
rule, 2.2% of the population owned 80% of the land (Immerman 28). 42% of
the Guatemalan land was owned by UFCO (LaFeber 118).
Samuel Zemurray influenced large landowners to support Ubico, while the
State Department of the United States contributed to his victory in elections
where he was a sole candidate (Gleijeses 11). John Foster Dulles was the legal
representative, who mediated communication of UFCO and Ubico. One of his
successes was another 99-year concession that exempted UFCO from virtually
all taxes, including import duties (Immerman 71).

2.2.2. The Economic Depression

The economic depression severely affected Guatemala in 1929 thanks to

the position of UFCO. The depression caused high unemployment rate that
spread unrest among workers. Ubico reduced it by cutting the government
expenditures, by forced labour and by repressing and executing his opposition
(Wilkinson 98; Gleijeses 11; Cockcroft 109). Ubico mainly prosecuted labour
organizers and the Communist Party of Guatemala, which originated in the
limited democracy of 1922 (Gleijeses 12). Founder of this party was a lawyer
and its poor members knew nothing about the Soviet Union or Marxism
(Gleijeses 10).
Guatemalan peasants were subject to indebted peonage before the rule of
Ubico (Gleijeses 12). It equalled the forced labour repaid by a few cents

7
(Wilkinson 44). For the money the Guatemalans received, they could not even
afford to buy staple food, which had to be imported since 1900, because large
pieces of land were either owned by UFCO or the coffee planters (Immerman
24).
In 1932, Ubico changed the indebted peonage into a new system by
imposing the vagrancy laws. From this time on, natives who owned no land
had to work for the local landowners 100 days per year according to Gleijeses
and at least 150 days per year according to Schleisinger and Kinzer (Gleijeses
13; Schleisinger and Kinzer 120). Each worker had to carry a card on which his
employer would write how many hours had already been worked off. It was
common for the employer to retain workers by refusing to sign their cards or
by falsifying data, since 95% of the workers were illiterate (Gleijeses 13,
Schleisinger and Kinzer 38). To secure the situation, military policemen
patrolled the plantations to prevent workers from complaining (Wilkinson
219). Landowners often cooperated to create trusts, which paid each worker 15
cents a day (Gleijeses 13; Immerman 54). There was no working-hour limit
In 1932, Ubico ruled Decree 1816, according to which a landowner could
kill natives to protect his property (Gleijeses 13). In 1944, Ubico extended this
practice by issuing Decree 2795 that allowed any native to be killed while
hunting for food on a private land (Immerman 37). By this time, 92% of the
cultivated land was in hands of 142 people or corporations (Cockcroft 109).

2.2.3. Ubico and the United States

Ubico was a fierce anticommunist who admired Franco, Hitler and

idealized Napoleon (Schleisinger and Kinzer 27). Ubico had a warm relation
with the United States, which was repaid by the military support (Immerman
84).
Ubico preferred U.S. investors, and he even appointed a U.S. officer as the
director of the prestigious school Escuela Politécnica. Other U.S. professors
were employed there too (Gleijeses 19).

8
 Ubico gratefully cooperated with the United States during World War II by
expropriating the German property responsible for 75% of the coffee
production (Hanáková 7). He also allowed FBI agents to move Germans to
detention camps in the United States. U.S. press was originally distrustful of
Ubico, but this turned dramatically into admiration in 1940 (Gleijeses 21).
Ubico was also protected by the secret police, which was modernized by a New
York expert. It earned the title of “Guatemalan Gestapo” (Gleijeses 19).
Furthermore, thousands of American soldiers were stationed in the country “to
defend the Panama Canal” (Jonas 22).
Before the resignation of Ubico, the U.S. embassy evaluated any discontent
of the poorly paid UFCO workers as a result of the “Bosheviki propaganda”.
Ubico himself never tolerated any objections towards the U.S. companies
(Gleijeses 92).
The U.S. officials were praised by Ubico. They supported him and
presented him as the man who could maintain the pro-American stability in
Guatemala (Gleijeses 22). The TIME magazine from 1941 reads: “Handsome,
ice-eyed president Ubico has proved to his own and most people's satisfaction”
(1). In Harper’s Magazine, he was presented as the “honest admirer of
Democracy” (Immerman 84).

2.2.4. The Fall of Ubico

Combination of the military image of Ubico together with his dictatorial

practices, the ethnic conflicts and the economic instability brought him out of
office (REMHI 184; Immerman 36). He was the military strongman produced
by the elites, who resembled autocratic rulers preceding him. But in 1944, the
war against Nazi Germany was over and keeping a U.S. supported dictator with
a pro-Nazi personality in power could damage justification of war presented to
the worldwide public. The United States became convinced that Ubico should
be replaced (Gleijeses 25). Moreover, dictators at El Salvador and Ecuador fell
in the popular revolts (Gleijeses 38).

9
 In June 1944, Ubico was forced to abdicate after series of widespread
protests (REMHI 184). Deeply disillusioned by petitions of the prominent
Guatemalans, he was unable to react (Gleijeses 23, 26). While Gleijeses
assumes that Ubico’s reaction was mild, Cockcroft asserts that 100 protesting
students and workers were executed (Gleijeses 23, Cockcroft 109).

2.2.5. Federico Ponce

A military junta was established. Federico Ponce was one of its members.
He brought a sub-machine gun to the Congress and forced it to elect him a
provisional president. Once in power, Ponce allowed political parties, labour
organisations and pledged land to the natives (Gleijeses 27; Immerman 40). He
also promised to hold free elections. However, he was a manipulator who did
not differ from Ubico (Gleijeses 28).
Hope of the opposition lied in finding a good candidate against Ponce in
the promised elections. They choose Dr. Juan José Arévalo, who was an exiled
nationalist writer, a historian and the doctor of philosophy at the University of
Tacumán, Argentina. Unlike Ubico, he was inspired by Simón Bolívar,
Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the New Deal program.
When Arévalo arrived to Guatemala, the most massive demonstration in
history of Guatemala cheered him. Ponce ordered to arrest Arévalo and pushed
him into hiding (Schleisinger and Kinzer 30). Propaganda was then spread that
Arévalo is an extremist out of touch with the country. The opposition claimed
that he lost right to the Guatemalan citizenship (Gleijeses 28). Mass
imprisonment and censorship were soon in place and it became clear that the
free elections were illusionary (Immerman 40).
The Ponce’s promise of land was one of the keys to his failure. The
Cakchiquel natives rose up against Ladinos and killed about 16-19 of them.
The military reacted by killing 440-640 natives (REMHI 184). If this was not
enough to end Ponce’s dictatorship, then the planned revolt definitely was. The

10
U.S. ambassador Boaz Long predicted a “considerable state of political
ferment” (Schleisinger and Kinzer 29).

3. Rising Action
3.1. First Phase of the Democratic Era
3.1.1. Arévalo and the October Revolution

In 1944, Major Francisco Arana and Captain Jacobo Arbenz killed their
superior officers at Fort Matamoros and distributed stored arms to eager
students. Other units of the army joined them in a raid against the rest of the
military. Last Ponce’s attempt to save his position was to unsuccessfully ask
the U.S. embassy to deliver bombs for his air force. The U.S. embassy then
arranged a settlement with the rebels. Both Ubico and Ponce hid away in the
security of foreign institutions. Arbenz and Arana were heroes of the
revolution, which took fewer than 100 lives. They formed a junta together with
a businessman called John Toriello (Schleisinger and Kinzer 31). Thousands of
people cheerfully marched through the capital and identified themselves with
the revolution (Immerman 42-3). The revolution was also greeted by the
middle class and the elites, who fell strengthened by the doubled price of
coffee (Gleijeses 30). The institutions of legal torture were abolished
(Immerman 42). The police was replaced with the civil guard.
In 1945, Arévalo was elected by 85% of the literate male vote. Members of
the junta supported him. He was a liberal president who praised democracy and
rejected communism as the ideology “contrary to human nature” (Schleisinger
and Kinzer 31, 32). His dream was the unification of the Central American
states in pursuit of economic integration and development (Immerman 50).
A new constitution was enacted, inspired by the revolutionary Spain, Mexico
and ideas promoted by Justo Rufino Barrios. Officials were elected for a
limited period of time. Military officers were prevented to take part in politics.
Rights of individuals were protected. Men and women were guaranteed equal

11
pay, voting rights were expanded, and power of the president was limited by
other legal institutions, whose interaction was extended. Racial discrimination,
censorship, private monopolies and the vagrancy law were outlawed.
Workweek was limited to 48 hours, social security introduced and so on
(Schleisinger and Kinzer 33, 34; Immerman 53). Arévalo called this program
the “spiritual socialism” to distinguish it from the Marxist material socialism
(REMHI 185). He made education and agriculture his priorities. In his
inaugural speech, Arévalo praised Roosevelt’s New Deal program, particularly
the combination of socialism and democracy (Schleisinger and Kinzer 34).
The new economic policies enhanced small-scale industry, small-scale
farmers, business sector and the internal buying power. New unions were
established and legally incorporated. By 1949, there were ninety-two unions
(REMHI 185). Third of the budget was spent on schools, hospitals and housing
(Cockcroft 110). Arévalo introduced the Law of Forced Rental, which sought
to rent uncultivated land in hands of large landowners (Immerman 53).
One of chances for the economic development laid in administration of the
German farms expropriated by Ubico. Gleijeses assumes that with proper
management, these could have produced about 25% of the coffee crop.
Unfortunately, there were no capable administrators at the time and most of
them were corrupt and careless (Gleijeses 43). Corruption in bureaucracy
minimized impact of the Arévalo’s cautious reforms (Immerman 53). These
reforms were supported by the leading capitalist economists like George
Britnell (Immerman 51). The elites assumed that “lazy peasants would lead
Guatemala to hell” as one businessman noted (Wilkinson 214). It was true that
the output of the German coffee plantations gradually dropped, but the
production increased after expropriations under Arbenz.
Although Arévalo was a mild president, he had to escape about 25 coup
attempts organized by the elites during his presidency (Immerman 57). His
opposition consisted of small number of powerful business owners, importers
and agriculturists, who viewed Arévalo’s reforms radical. They never accepted

12
Arévalo and plotted a counter-revolution with Ponce in exile (Immerman 58).
Opinion of the elites was identical to that of the Central American
dictatorships, the Central American elites and the elites in the United States
(Immerman 81).
One diplomat from the United States lamented in 1949 that “no one of the
former governing class of old ‘good families’ was or has since been a member
of this government”. Washington didn’t know Guatemala well. Its sources
came from the upper class, incompetent ambassadors and representatives of the
multinationals (as qtd. in Gleijeses 100; Immerman 85).
But except for the extremists like the Assistant Secretary of State Spruille
Braden, the administration of the United States remained calm and friendly,
until its expectations of things “coming back to normal” were broken
(Immerman 86).
Power of the Guatemalan military was still very strong. After the
revolution, all weapons held by civilians had to be returned to legal offices
under the threat of prosecution (Gleijeses 72, 73). Major Arana strengthened
his position by forcing Arévalo to pass Decree 17, which made him more
powerful then Arbenz, who was the defence minister (Schirmer 11). In
addition, the military successfully gained independence from the executive in
1945. This was unimportant as long as large landowners felt satisfied, because
the military was historically essential for the governments and its role rooted in
1871 (Immerman 44; Schirmer 10).
Arévalo’s spiritual socialism was supposed to uplift the human spirit and
provide better conditions by harder work (Gleijeses 36). There was nothing
more appealing to powerful elites. But formation of the labour organisations
was hardly “spiritual-only”, although Arévalo never considered an agrarian
reform necessary (Cockcroft 110).

13
 3.1.2. Relations with the United States

In 1947, Arévalo introduced the Labour Code, inspired by the U.S. Wagner
model. It guaranteed right of the urban workers to organize unions, to
collectively bargain and to strike. Minimal pay was set. Wages increased by
80%. Child and women labour became regulated. This balanced the preceding
division of power, which supported only the wealthy landowners. Unionization
in the countryside was forbidden for small farms to prevent production
stoppages (Schleisinger and Kinzer 38, 39; LaFeber 112). The law protected
workers in any farm that had more than 500 workers, including UFCO.
UFCO found the Labour Code discriminatory and urged the U.S. State
Department for support through people like Braden, who even demanded
forceful persuasion of the Guatemalan government (Gleijeses 94, 95). UFCO
employed Thomas Corcoran, who indicated that the Labour Code was illegally
threatening investments all over Latin America (Gleijeses 96). Corcoran had
close ties to Democrats and even to Walter Bedell, who was the CIA director in
the 1950s (Schleisinger and Kinzer 91).
Arévalo was under surveillance of the FBI since imposing the Labour
Code. Former supporters of Ubico were afraid that better conditions for their
workers would eliminate the cheap labour force. They claimed that Arévalo’s
government was corrupted, inexperienced, incompetent, and communist
(Schleisinger and Kinzer 40, 58). One of Arévalo’s drawbacks was that he had
no connections to the U.S. administration. This fact supported his publicity in
Guatemala, but undermined his diplomatic options abroad (Immerman 45).
Luckily enough for Arévalo, the U.S. Ambassador from 1945 to 1948 was
Edwin Kyle, who recognized that charges against communism in the
Guatemalan government were without foundation. On the other hand, Kyle put
absolute trust in UFCO and believed in its kindness (Gleijeses 97).
Arévalo called for end to dictatorships through whole Latin America. He
first attempted an unsuccessful union through diplomacy (Gleijeses 110). He

14
then turned his support to the Caribbean Legion, which successfully ousted the
Costa Rican dictatorship (Immerman 50). The United States considered such
interventions illegal and repeatedly asked Arévalo to withdraw his support,
which he denied (Gleijeses 115). Guatemala became haven for the Central
American exiles from Dominican Republic, Honduras and Nicaragua. From
Guatemala, they plotted against the Latin American despots (Gleijeses 110).
The United States claimed that Arévalo’s anticommunism was not strong
enough. While the Communist Party was banned, there was a different problem
– the three exploitive corporations of the United States, which dominated the
Guatemalan economy with their capital of $93 milion in 1944 (Gleijeses 85,
86). The privileges of UFCO, IRCA and the Electric Bond and Share
(electricity monopoly) were not modified during the Arévalo’s presidency, but
the emerging lawful society could, in longer run, threaten the taxation frauds
these companies were conducting (Gleijeses 91).
UFCO gave its workers more money than other employers, but they had to
spend it for preventive measures against dangerous chemicals. Unlike other
landowners, UFCO did not offer small tiles of land for its workers to cultivate
crops (Immerman 75).
The U.S. intelligence report from 1946 reported there was no communist
influence in Central America, except for Costa Rica. Ambassador Patterson
was put into office after Kyle in 1948. The view changed dramatically.
Patterson was an arrogant businessman interested only in allegations of the
communist influence. He knew nothing about Central America (Gleijeses 98;
Immerman 97). Patterson advised UFCO to barrage the U.S. Congress to act
against Guatemala.
He advised Arévalo to withdraw 17 government officials and even
collaborated with the opposition to overthrow the government (LaFeber 114;
Schleisinger and Kinzer 86). The first claims of the communist infiltration
came from UFCO, which was now in harmony with Patterson, who confessed
he was a UFCO agent. He was dismissed after Arévalo raised objections

15
against him. The New York Times praised Patterson for his views. Before 1949,
nobody found the Labour Code dangerous. Patterson instantly turned into a
“drastic document, which ... would greatly facilitate the communist objective
of state or worker control of industry” (Gleijeses 102; Immerman 99).
In 1948, Truman blocked the military support for Guatemala. He also
thought about stopping the student exchange program and the agrarian research
program (Immerman 110; LaFeber 123).
It was unusual for the Guatemalan government to handle internal affairs
before the revolution. Officials of the United States expected absolute loyalty.
When the situation changed with Arévalo, the solution was to demonize him
with allegations of the communist influence, even though he deported
communists out of the country (Gleijeses 120). Arévalo also let the United
States perform military operations from Guatemala to prove his support
(Gleijeses 121). The U.S. press censored all positive articles and reports. The
public opinion soon crystallized to hostility towards Arévalo (Immerman 114).

3.1.3. Public Image of UFCO

A highly positioned U.S. State Department official warned his superiors

that Guatemalans would no longer tolerate the behaviour of UFCO. He was
ignored. The United Fruit did not tolerate any disrespect. Instead of innovation,
it used bribery, lies and false promises (Immerman 72, 78). Behaviour of the
monopolies worsened. 3,746 UFCO workers were fired without pay (Gleijeses
164). IRCA charges were the highest in the world in 1951 (Immerman 79).
Zemurray wanted to improve the image of UFCO, which was notorious
for its exploitive behaviour. Around 1940, he became interested in Sigmund
Freud’s nephew, Edward Bernays, who was a widely acknowledged public
relations expert. Bernays’ career consisted of planning marketing strategies for
the largest U.S. companies and promoting tobacco products. He was a
dominant figure of the public relations sector he invented. Bernays believed
that manipulation was an essential part of democracy. He knew most of the

16
reporters, editors, publishers, and owners of such media as The New York
Times (Schleisinger and Kinzer 79-81).
Bernays decided to invite reporters to see the achievements of UFCO.
He established a specialised institution to present “facts and figures” to the
public. UFCO founded private newspapers in Guatemala, Panama, Costa Rica
and Honduras, but all this was not enough to improve its image, mainly in
Guatemala. Bernays himself soon became bitter about how UFCO treated its
workers. He was dissatisfied with UFCO’s lack of interest towards the U.S.
media (Schleisinger and Kinzer 81, 82).
But according to Patterson, any problem that arose within UFCO as the
result of the reformist Guatemalan policies should be blamed on the
Guatemalan Government (Gleijeses 105). The presence of Bernays in UFCO
was vital to character of the U.S. intervention according to some respected
historians (Grandin “Empire’s Workshop” 43).

3.2. Second Phase of the Democratic Era

3.2.1. Road to Power of Colonel Jacobo Arbenz

The Guatemalan landed elites were hostile to Arévalo and they were
looking for their candidate for the elections of 1950. They found Major Arana,
member of the former revolutionary junta (Gleijeses 54).
Even the U.S. embassy was convinced that Arana “is determined by any
means to succeed Arévalo” (Gleijeses 56). In 1945, a deal was made between
the Revolutionary Party of Arévalo (PAR) and Arana. Arana was promised
support of the party in the 1950 elections in exchange for not overthrowing
Arévalo (Gleijeses 50, 54; Schleisinger and Kinzer 45). However, he did not
live that long.
Arana and Arbenz were rivals since the beginning of the revolution.
Arana’s political incompetence limited him to take power by force (Gleijeses
58). He already tried to seize power as the member of the junta (Schleisinger
and Kinzer 44).

17
 Arana died in 1948 (Schleisinger and Kinzer 44), two days after he came to
the presidential office to give Arévalo a choice: either to be deposed or to
dismiss the cabinet and replace ministers with Arana’s own appointees.
Arbenz, Arévalo and the Permanent Committee of the Guatemalan Congress
agreed that Arana must be exiled (Gleijeses 63). A shootout broke out when
Arana was to be arrested. He was killed. The elites convinced Arana to
overthrow Arévalo. Now they lamented that he was murdered (Gleijeses 60).
A revolt broke out in Guatemala City following the news about the death of
Arana. Arévalo successfully suppressed it with help of the general strike, while
handing out guns to the unions. Total death toll was 150 with 300 wounded
(Immerman 60). Arévalo then had to face the last failed coup by Colonel
Castillo Armaz (Schleisinger and Kinzer 45) and two U.S. pilots.
The U.S. ambassador Patterson cabled his worries to Washington. He was
afraid that killing Arana as “the only positive conservative element” would
swing power to the hands of “the more radical fringe of Arévalo regime”
represented by Arbenz (Gleijeses 24, 25).
The elites picked general Ydígoras Fuentes for an opponent to Arbenz. He
was an opportunistic officer who perpetrated massacres under Ubico, ready to
exterminate “the communists”. The less conservative sectors of the society
chose Garcia Granados, a man who was able to stop the revolution from
turning more left (Immerman 60, 61; Schleisinger and Kinzer 120).
However, Arbenz received support from the rest of the Guatemalan
population and won the elections with 63% of the vote (Cockcroft 110). The
plan of Arbenz was to expand the reforms accepted under Arévalo, to improve
transportation, gain independence from UFCO monopolies, study regional
problems, involve indigenous population in representation and introduce
technological innovations (Immerman 60, 61; LaFeber 118). Arbenz sought
transformation of the oligarchic society into a modern one. Unlike Arévalo, he
did not meddle in the policy of other countries (Gleijeses 272; LaFeber 117).

18
 Jacobo Arbenz was one of the best students in history of Escuela
Politécnica. He was also a teacher of history and science. His political
alignment was formed by his wife, María Vilanova, who convinced him to
recognize problems, which the Guatemalan population had to face. She urged
Arbenz to revolt against Ponce before the revolution. Her two closest
associates were Central American communist leaders (Schleisinger and Kinzer
50, 51).
Reformist attitude of Arbenz was supported by the World Bank, which
issued a voluminous analysis of the Guatemalan economy with suggestions. It
advised regulation of energy companies, increase in wages, foreign capital
regulation, industrialization, taxation and public spending together with
introduction of banks and the credit system (Schleisinger and Kinzer 52, 53;
Immerman 64).
The agrarian situation in 1950 was still very bad. 99.1% of farms were
situated at only 14% of the land, while 0.1% of farms held up 41% of the
Guatemalan surface. There were 200,000 landless peasants (REMHI 185) and
90% of the workers were agrarian (Schleisinger and Kinzer 54). The main
problem was that although the elites owned 70% of the arable land, they
cultivated less than one fourth. More than 1.5 million acres were uncultivated
(Immerman 65; Schleisinger and Kinzer 50).
Arbenz was hated by the conservative press for succeeding in reforming
public works, energy and for imposing a mild tax (Schleisinger and Kinzer 54).

3.2.2. The Land Reform

The most revolutionary moment in Guatemala came when the agrarian

reform bill was passed on June 27, 1952. It was the greatest dream of Arbenz
that could save the malnourished workers. Decree 900, as it was called,
allowed the government to expropriate uncultivated land from the large
plantations. It did not affect farms smaller than 223 acres or farms up to 670
acres with at least two thirds under cultivation. The owners were repaid by

19
25-year government bonds according the value of the land they declared in the
official register (Schleisinger and Kinzer 54; LaFeber 115). The newly
allocated plots benefited 500,000 peasants, most of them were native. Size of
the plots varied from 8.5 to 17 acres (Immerman 65, 66).
Implementation of the land reform faced the problem of corruption as most
of the political parties were only interested in gaining positions in the
government. Arbenz soon found out that the only sincere and incorruptible
party was Partido Guatemateco de Trabajo (PGT), the Guatemalan party of
Labour. The PGT was deeply inspired by Marxism (Gleijeses 245, 194).
The United Fruit had about 85% of its land uncultivated. It used to
undervalue it to evade taxes. In 1953, there was a dispute between UFCO and
the Guatemalan government over the bonds to be repaid for the expropriated
land. The official value was $2.99 per acre, but UFCO and the Secretary of
State Dulles demanded $75 per acre with total difference over $14,000,000
(Immerman 81). The Guatemalan government rejected such demands
(Schleisinger and Kinzer 76).
Hostility between the Guatemalan classes was rising. Few peasants, who
did not yet receive land in 1953, illegally invaded farms. They were supported
by the opportunist PGT leader Carlos Manuel Pellecer. Arbenz tried to stop
such abuses with fines and local agrarian councils (Schleisinger and Kinzer
56). The landowners, in return, corrupted the police force to assault peasants
(Gleijeses 163). The order was re-established by Arbenz.

3.2.3. Arbenz the Communist

In 1947, a section called the Democratic Vanguard was created inside the
PAR by Manuel Fortuny. He sought to create a political party based on
workers and peasants (Schleisinger and Kinzer 56). In 1949, the Democratic
Vanguard was transformed into the PGT that was legalized in 1952.
Communist parties were banned under Arévalo (Schleisinger and Kinzer 56;
Gleijeses 231). Fortuny was the closest friend to Arbenz. Intellectual leaders

20
like Manuel Gutierrez, who was a union leader, also helped to implement the
agrarian reform (Gleijeses 79,145).
These “communists” were generally discredited local reformers with no
foreign delegates (Schleisinger and Kinzer 104; Gleijeses 76). Pellecer, for
example, was inspired by a poem by Julius Fučík, entitled Report from the
Gallows (1947). Gutierrez even left his communist party after a visit to
Moscow (Schleisinger and Kinzer 58). The most distant Soviet country ever
visited by Fortuny was Czechoslovakia. The PGT was never invited to a
congress of the communist parties to Moscow (Gleijeses 186). Pellecer
explains that the PGT was interested in cooperation with the USSR, but “they
didn’t answer” (as qtd. in Gleijeses 186). The PGT even praised Stalin after his
death in 1953 (LaFeber 119).
Although it was useful for Arbenz to work with communists as he had no
other option, not a single communist held a cabinet post in the government and
there was no censorship, no prosecution or collectivization (Schleisinger and
Kinzer 59,60; Gleijeses 160).
Arbenz became interested in the Marxist theories. He was a passionate
reader and only the Marxist theories gave him answers about the development
in Guatemala. As the opposition of the U.S. officials and the U.S. companies
grew stronger, he even found sympathy for the Soviet Union, mainly for “its
ability to defeat illiteracy and raise the standard of living” (Gleijeses 214).
However, Arbenz never wanted to transform Guatemala into a communist
state, at least not in the nearest future (Gleijeses 147). The United States were
fully supported by Guatemala in the United Nations (LaFeber 119).
In her thesis dedicated to the guerrillas in Guatemala, Klára Hanáková
states that the PGT evoked fear of the communist infiltration in the Guatemalan
business circles and inside the United States (Hanáková 10). According to
Gleijeses, however, the worst thing was that PGT was a democratic communist
party, which could inspire the surrounding oppressed nations (Gleijeses 366).
Regarding the close friendship to Fortuny and cooperation with the

21
communists as the only viable way towards the land reform, it is reasonable to
disagree with Cockcroft, who concludes that Arbenz “reluctantly accepted [the
communist] support” when the United States decided to act against him
(Cockcroft 110).
The reforms implemented since 1944 were successful. The balance of
payments was favourable, there were more schools with more pupils, provision
of electricity was extended and more people received newspaper than before
(Schleisinger and Kinzer 62; LaFeber 117). Production of crops also increased
dramatically, including corn and coffee. The production rose to 74% in case of
rice and wheat (compared to 1952), although the U.S. embassy never admitted
it (Gleijeses 158, 159).

3.2.4. The First UFCO Press Campaign

Since strikes against IRCA and UFCO in 1950, UFCO hired various
influential lobbyists and publicists to create an ideal climate for a direct
intervention (Schleisinger and Kinzer 77). Bernays started organizing a
counterattack against the Guatemalan government (Schleisinger and Kinzer
83). He persuaded a Herald Tribune reporter to write series entitled
“Communism in the Caribbean”, based on interviews with the company
officials. The New York Times publisher dispatched a reporter named William
Lissner, who reviewed some presumably staged political disturbances
(Schleisinger and Kinzer 84).
Immerman defends Lissner for doing an independent research and claims
that his conclusions were result of the “cold war ethos” (Immerman 113). I find
it naive, because The New York Times publisher was a close friend to Bernays
and selection of reporters was not random (Schleisinger and Kinzer 84).
Moreover, the “cold war ethos” thesis is invalid if we take a look at the past
U.S. policy towards Central American, which represented business interests
(Grandin “Empire’s Workshop” 30).

22
 Milton K. Wells wrote a report entitled “Communism in Guatemala”,
warning about the communist infiltration and the “strong overtones of class
warfare” (Immerman 89). Moscow was soon predicted to infiltrate Guatemala
through inexperienced workers and people like Gutierrez, although the FBI
investigation identified him as a non-communist (Immerman 90, 91). Various
senators and representatives like Alexander Wiley, Allan Ellender or Henry
Cabot Lodge plotted against Arbenz. The Cabot family owned some UFCO
shares (Schleisinger and Kinzer 83, 90; Immerman 115).
Since 1950, newspapers like The New York Times and Newsweek agreed
with the former ambassador Patterson and presented Arbenz as a “political
opportunist without convictions”. According to British Intelligence Digest read
by Truman, Arbenz “has been approved by Moscow”. The CIA believed that
Arbenz will “follow more than ever a Communist line policy”. The FBI
reported that Arbenz began to actively propagandize the communist cause
within the army in 1948. It was the dream of Undersecretary of State Bennett
to “put the squeeze on the Commies in Guatemala” (Immerman 107-110).

3.2.5. The Second UFCO Press Campaign

In April 1954, Zemurray urged Bernays to launch the second large press
campaign against Guatemala. A second report was scheduled in The New York
Times. Series of the alarming articles about “Reds” in Guatemala were
produced. TIME, Newsweek, U.S. News & World Report, The Atlantic Monthly,
Saturday Evening Post, Chicago Tribune and the Latin magazine Visión were
either interested or directly participated in manufacturing the setup by issuing
misleading articles (Schleisinger and Kinzer 86; Immerman 112). Bernays then
organized least 5 “fact-finding missions” to Guatemala between 1952 and 1954
as a serious attempt to compromise objectivity. He invited reporters and
publishers from TIME, Newsweek, Scripps-Howard newspapers, United Press
International, the Christian Science Monitor, the Miami Herald, Nashville
Banner, Cincinnati Enquirer, New Orleans Item and the San Francisco

23
Chronicle. UFCO was depicted as a progressive company. It was presented to
these reporters by bribed and arranged informants (Schleisinger and Kinzer 87;
Immerman 112).
In 1953, Bernays and one New York Times reporter published a story, in
which people from Central America were turned into red agents in a Prague
training camp (Schleisinger and Kinzer 88). The New Leader executive director
was bribed to publish articles advocating UFCO. Daniel James from The New
Leader published a book entitled Red Design for Americas, where he compared
the reform act to collectivization in China. Bernays bought hundreds of copies
and distributed them to the U.S. press (Schleisinger and Kinzer 89). Bernays
also had various projects like the UFCO newspaper and a few informational
agencies shaped to his image (Schleisinger and Kinzer 90).
Senator Wiley declared Guatemala a country of “the communist octopus at
work”. This claim was the result of UFCO lobby and propaganda. UFCO itself
was widely known for its economic and political influence in Guatemala as “el
pulpo” – the octopus (Immerman 70; Schleisinger and Kinzer 94).
The U.S. press of 1954 presented Arbenz and his military ministers as the
red traitors (Gleijeses 197). The army, in fact, was firmly anticommunist,
opposing any social change and the organized labour. Arévalo and Arbenz
bought the army with high salaries and privileges (Gleijeses 200, 201). Leading
officers had close ties to the United States, where many of their children
studied. They also had close ties to the U.S. attachés (Gleijeses 205).

3.2.6. Operation Fortune

There were people like the Nicaraguan dictator Somoza, who accepted
Truman’s help in attempts to overthrow Arbenz (Gleijeses 226). In 1952, he
came to the United States to be delivered a Medal of Honor for his services
against democracy. Somoza, the CIA and UFCO secretly planned an invasion
to Guatemala. It was entitled Operation Fortune.

24
 The operation was under patronage of general Walter Bedell Smith, the
Undersecretary of State in the Eisenhower administration. It also encompassed
Trujillo from the Dominican Republic and Jiménez from Venezuela, both were
dictators. Weapons were sent to Nicaragua for the Somoza’s protégé Castillo
Armas, but the incriminated UFCO ship was recalled when the plan reached
Truman and his advisors (Gleijeses 230,231; Schleisinger and Kinzer 121).

3.3. United States Invade Guatemala

3.3.1. Eisenhower Becomes President

UFCO and the CIA had to wait for Eisenhower to become president. John
Foster Dulles became the Secretary of State and his brother Allan Dulles
became the director of the CIA (Gleijeses 234).
Zemurray secretly contracted the right-wing political war machine John
Clements Associates, which had close ties to the conservative press and the
Republicans, including Senator McCarthy, the famous crusader against
communism. John Clement was an ex-marine conservative whose side job was
doing business with the Latin American dictators (Schleisinger and Kinzer 94).
Clements dutifully distributed another two bizarre and aggressive studies,
which suggested overthrowing Arbenz. These materials, proclaiming that the
Guatemalan president was preparing an invasion of the Panama Canal, were
accepted by the CIA (Schleisinger and Kinzer 95).
John Foster Dulles received an unprecedented power by Eisenhower,
although he knew very little about Central America. During the 1920s, he
worked as a corporate lawyer for Electric Bond and Share. Dulles did not hide
his affection for dictators. His brother Allen presided in the UFCO’s board of
trustees (Gleijeses 234, 235; LaFeber 118). Moreover, Eisenhower’s private
secretary held a top PR job in UFCO (LaFeber 119).

25
 3.3.2. Operation PBSUCCESS

The coup against Arbenz was underway since September 1953. It was a
stealth operation. Only Eisenhower, the Dulles brothers, and few other top
officials knew about it. It was organized only by the CIA’s Directorate of
Plans. Name of the action was operation PBSUCCESS. The first two letters
mean “presidential board” and the attached word reflected the general
optimism about the outcome of the operation (Gleijeses 233, 234).
The plan was to wage a psychological warfare against Arbenz and turn his
own army against him. The purpose of the invasion, led by the Guatemalan
exiles, was to give the army officers a chance to either give up or to face anger
of the United States. The main condition was to keep the U.S. involvement
secret at the same time in order to protect the U.S. image in Latin America
(Gleijeses 246, 247). The counter-revolutionaries, or “the liberators”, were
presented as widely supported freedom fighters, defeating the communists
closely tied to Kremlin (Immerman 144). John E. Peurifoy was appointed to
Guatemala as the ambassador to cooperate on the mission. He was a forceful
diplomat, who would accept no compromises. His nickname was “the butcher
of Greece” for his aggressive behaviour during the previous assignment
(Immerman 137, Jonas 30, Schleisinger and Kinzer 132).
In the same year, UFCO paid $64,000 to the right-wing officers in the army
of Arbenz to stage an uprising that sparked off in Salamá, where 200 rebels
held the city for 17 hours. They were soon crushed by the government forces.
Other uprisings failed.
The U.S. government hardened its stance towards Guatemala through the
Secretary of State official John Moors Cabot, brother to former president of
UFCO. Other UFCO lobbyists were also taking their part.
Toriello tried hard to explain the agrarian reform to the United States from
his position of the Guatemalan ambassador. He was ignored. Arbenz was not a
communist according to the U.S. administration, but a fellow-traveller unable

26
to oust the communists out of his government (Schleisinger and Kinzer 103,
104). This is a strange opinion if we realise that Arbenz was inspired by
Marxism, while only 4 out of 56 delegates in the Guatemalan Congress were
members of the PGT (Jonas 31).
The operational headquarters for PBSUCCESS were set at Opa Loca in
Florida. Cost of the intervention ranges between $5 and $20 million.
PBSUCCESS involved 10 U.S. pilots, 100 CIA agents and about 300
mercenaries from Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama and Honduras (Immerman
138, Schleisinger and Kinzer 111, 112, 116). The army of Guatemala was
about 20 times stronger, counting 6200 men (Gleijeses 198).
The elites favoured Ydígoras as the task force leader, but he did not accept
the conditions offered by the CIA (Schleisinger and Kinzer 121). Immerman
states that the CIA rejected him because he was too authoritarian (Immerman
141). Such claims make no sense if we take a look at the conditions stipulated
by the CIA: to establish a government in the style of Ubico (Schleisinger and
Kinzer 121). The CIA picked a man who already tried to overthrow Arbenz.
His name was Castillo Armas, a treacherous military rival to Ydígoras
(Immerman 142, Schleisinger and Kinzer 123,127).
The sharpest propaganda to bring up the right climate for the invasion was
attempted by J.F. Dulles at the Inter-American Conference in 1954. In his
Declaration of Caracas, he advocated measures “against the international
communism”, which was said to have come from outside the hemisphere. The
applauded speech of Toriello, which followed, was not enough to turn the
declaration down (Immerman 144-147). The participating countries voted for
the declaration in fear of the United States, as they confessed right after Dulles
left the conference (LaFeber 121). The work of Bernays has paid off as the
U.S. Congress called for an intervention under false pretexts (Immerman 151,
152). Meanwhile, Allen Dulles met UFCO officials to assure them that the
privileges of UFCO from the times of Ubico would be regained after the CIA
removes Arbenz (Schleisinger and Kinzer 120).

27
 The CIA first tried to unsuccessfully bribe Arbenz. Early attempts to cause
uprising also failed (Schleisinger and Kinzer 113). Several hidden jamming
and broadcasting communication stations were placed around Guatemala,
programmed to disrupt regular radio waves and to replace them with “terror
broadcast” on the 1st of May (Schleisinger and Kinzer 114, Gleijeses 295). A
company called InterArmco was founded to equip the exiles with U.S.
weapons. Some 30 planes including 3 P-51 bombers were distributed under the
cover of “arms assistance” to countries neighbouring Guatemala through a
dummy charity organization and private companies (Schleisinger and Kinzer
115). As the operation intensified, some participating U.S. officials suspected
that the coup could initiate a bloody civil war. Dulles remained unworried
(Schleisinger and Kinzer 117).

3.3.3. Arbenz Discovers the Plot

In January 1954, the Panamanian diplomat Jorge Isaac Delago provided a

full photocopy of the plot plans to Arbenz, presumably for $100,000. The CIA
continued the operation as if nothing had happened and the U.S. press hardly
even reacted (Schleisinger and Kinzer 128). Arbenz responded by secretly
importing weapons from Czechoslovakia. He wanted to arm peasants and
members of the PGT to fight against the army, should it defect (Gleijeses 279,
280). The shipment included two thousand tons of weapons seized from
Germans during World War II (Gleijeses 283).
Arbenz had to face an internal enemy, the head of Catholic Church of
Guatemala, Archbishop Rossell y Arellano. The Archbishop labelled the
president and his followers the “scum of the Earth”, enemies of the Church and
dangerous ruthless evildoers, who reject “Guatemala’s generous hospitality”
(Gleijeses 287).
On May 16, a Swedish freighter chartered by Čechofracht arrived to
Guatemala (Schleisinger and Kinzer 150). It was loaded with the promised
weapons. Unfortunately for Arbenz, most of them were non-functional

28
(Schleisinger and Kinzer 152). As soon as Eisenhower found out about the
shipment, it was used to justify PBSUCCESS, which was already underway
(Gleijeses 296). The Washington Post, Wall Street Journal and The New York
Times were now convinced that a Soviet plot was discovered. Hysteria seized
the U.S. press and the Congress, where danger of the shipment was paralleled
to a Soviet atom bomb in New York (Gleijeses 297-299).
The Guatemalan army officers became distressed and unhappy, because
Arbenz persistently led Guatemala to conflict with Washington (Gleijeses 304,
305). On May 26, a C-47 airplane started dropping leaflets over the Guatemala
City, informing that the liberation from Arbenz was near (Gleijeses 309).
Guatemalan railways were facing sabotage and the U.S. press came up with a
fantasy of Guatemala attacking Honduras (Gleijeses 310). Operation
PBSUCCESS was accompanied by the operation Hardrock, which allowed the
United States to search and damage every ship destined to Guatemala.
Hardrock violated the international law and added to the Guatemalan distress
(Gleijeses 312, 313).

3.3.4. The War of No Armies

The invasion began on June 17 and it took 10 days to remove Arbenz. The
Guatemalan president did not consider Castillo Armas a threat. What terrified
him was support of the United States provided to Armas. Both armies were
equipped similarly, but “the liberators” had airplanes (Gleijeses 319-322).
Kinzer and Schleisinger believe that these airplanes and the terrorist radio
broadcasts were crucial for outcome of the war (Schleisinger and Kinzer 185).
Gleijeses disagrees, but he admits that it triggered demoralization of any
possible civilian militia volunteers (Gleijeses 341).
Arbenz selected three trusted friends led by Colonel Díaz to defend
Guatemala against “the liberators”. The defence was centred in the junction
city of Zacapa (Gleijeses 323, 324). Morale of the liberating army was low.

29
150 “liberators” were defeated by only 30 Guatemalan soldiers and armed
civilians (Gleijeses 326, 327).
Toriello appealed to the United Nations for help. France and the United
Kingdom wanted to send UN observers to Guatemala. This stance made Dulles
furious and he pressed hard on the opposing two nations and the Secretary
General. The first U.S. veto against UN in history was not an option as it would
make participation of the United States in the invasion more obvious. Dulles
eventually persuaded the United Kingdom and France to abstain (Gleijeses
330, 331; Schleisinger and Kinzer 181).
The army of Castillo Armas was not advancing (Immerman 161).
Meanwhile, Peurifoy was desperately trying to intimidate several Guatemalan
officers (Gleijeses 336). They were terrorized by the idea of the United States
sending in marines once Armas is out of the game. Several Guatemalan army
officers were defeated or refused to fight (Gleijeses 338, 9). The one who
learnt a lesson about the character of the U.S. intervention was a young doctor
passing through Guatemala, whose name was Ernesto Guevara (Grandin
“Empire’s Workshop” 45).
Instead of war, people alleged for being communists were tortured by “the
liberators”. Dulles did not hesitate to report the story the other way around
(Gleijeses 317). The TIME magazine described Arbenz as a ruthless
totalitarian murderer (2).
The top Guatemalan officers were demoralized. They offered a deal to
Peurifoy: resignation of Arbenz to the military junta headed by Díaz and
removal of the communists in exchange for withdrawal of the U.S. support
from Castillo Armas. Peurifoy demanded resignation without any guarantees
(Gleijeses 334, 335). Arbenz resigned (Gleijeses 346, Hey 33). Two CIA
agents forced Díaz to follow suit, an air strike ordered by Peurifoy persuaded
him. On July 3, Peurifoy brought Armas to Guatemala on an embassy plane
from El Salvador. Castillo Armas could not believe they won (Gleijeses 357,
Schleisinger and Kinzer 209). Dulles was happy to publicly announce that

30
“Guatemalans cured the situation, in which UFCO played an insignificant role,
themselves” (Schleisinger and Kinzer 217).

3.3.5. An Alternative Conclusion

While Immerman (Immerman 166), Schleisinger and Kinzer found

propaganda essential in the operation PBSUCCESS and Gleijeses assumes the
problem lied in the threat of the United States, at least one more aspect might
have been in effect. It was known that Díaz was a heavy drinker, while father
of Arbenz was a morphine addict (Schleisinger and Kinzer 50; Gleijeses 136,
199). Arbenz himself had problems with alcohol (Schleisinger and Kinzer
231).
One could assume that if Arbenz had any predisposition for alcoholism, he
could have selected a heavy drinker for the highest military officer in the
country. Not for the similarity of addiction, but because the predispositions of
Díaz for alcoholism could have been similar to that of Arbenz. For Díaz,
alcohol was a solution of overcoming his weakness (Schleisinger and Kinzer
209). Arbenz used it to escape his failure.

4. Climax
4.1. “Rolling Back” Democracy
4.1.1. Repression Under Armas

The operation named PBHISTORY followed to identify the ties of Arbenz

to Moscow. The presidential office was thoroughly searched, but no useful
materials were found among 150,000 documents (Wilkinson 182).
Armas established a committee “against communism”, supported by the
law to detain any person without habeas corpus. 1,200 people were arrested
and 2,000 went into exile. 72,000 people were listed as extremely dangerous,
including every government critic (REMHI 189). Most of the PGT leaders

31
were tortured, murdered by the U.S. “action unit” and dropped into the ocean
(Gleijeses 388, Colonial 98).
The Labour Code and the 1944 constitution were now banned. Two thirds
of the Guatemalan people were disfranchised and Castillo’s own men replaced
the administration (Immerman 199). Officers from the United States gained
control over Escuela Politécnica (Schirmer 14). Disobedient workers were
eliminated by the police.
The Petroleum Code was enabled in 1955 to entitle foreign companies to
subsoil rights (Cockcroft 111). Companies from the United States moved back
into the country. The old economic, political and ethnic order was re-
established (LaFeber 125). The formerly weak communism was now growing
stronger (Immerman 200).
Armas received $80 million from the U.S. government during first three
years after the invasion (not counting the military assistance). The sum rose to
$45 million annually after his death.
Reformation and industrialisation were reversed, the economy destabilized.
Peasants were driven off their land, unions were illegalized and the press was
censored. Armas banned every political party except for the MLN, which was
his own (Schleisinger and Kinzer 232,233; Cockcroft 111).
Vice-president Nixon praised “the liberator” for accomplishing so much for
the people, while Armas and his corrupted government embezzled the
Guatemalan national funds (Schleisinger and Kinzer 234) and expelled 30
student leaders from the country, because they opposed his drastic measures.
Castillo Armas was assassinated by his personal bodyguard three years
after taking the office. His funeral was honoured by Eisenhower’s own son
(Schleisinger and Kinzer 235).

4.1.2. From Ydígoras to Guerrillas

Ydígoras was now determined to take power, although the CIA donated
$297,000 to support his less conservative and repel his more conservative

32
rivals. Ydígoras threatened to use force, but he was eventually elected,
although the army openly intervened in the elections (Schleisinger and Kinzer
236, 237; Schirmer 15; Jonas 59).
Officials from the United States approached Ydígoras to give them a piece
of land where they could build their base for the Cuban invasion. Ydígoras
agreed, seeking to strengthen his position (Schleisinger and Kinzer 238). A
person involved with both the CIA and UFCO offered them southern land in
the department of Retalhuleu (Schleisinger and Kinzer 238). This was a fatal
mistake.
Several young, unpaid, nationalistic military officers saw this as the final
straw. In 1960, they organized a chaotic coup together with 120 disgruntled
officers (half of the army) in pursuit of social justice. Half of the remaining
government officers respected the rebels’ cause, but they remained loyal and
the coup failed, partly thanks to help of the bombers and a warships provided
by the CIA.
However, most of the defeated went underground to forge a guerrilla
opposition together with remnants of the PGT. They went to the hills, inspired
by support of the ladino peasants in the southern regions. Indigenous
population did not support the guerrillas. Three leading rebels were Yon Sosa,
Turcios Lima and Paz Tejada, former chief of staff who replaced Arana. The
first two were originally trained by the United States (Hey 34, 35; REMHI 190,
191; Schleisinger and Kinzer 239; Schirmer 16, Gleijeses 199). In 1962, the
guerrillas called for a national rebellion against humiliation and tyranny,
seeking a quick overthrow. Several strikes against military installations were
conducted since 1962. The secret police chief was murdered, igniting hatred
between the guerrillas and the friendly military officers. One of the guerrilla
groups trained by the PGT was eliminated due to incompetence. A new student
guerrilla movement called Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) emerged. FAR
officers were trained in Cuba for tactics of the focal guerrilla warfare (REMHI
193; Hey 35).

33
 Guatemalan people, political parties and even businessmen demanded
resignation of Ydígoras. 20 students were killed in demonstrations and the
United States grew restless about the public resentment of the despotic
Ydígoras (Schleisinger and Kinzer 240, 241; Schirmer 16; REMHI 195). The
Guatemalan ruler alerted the military and replaced his cabinet with army
officers. J. F. Kennedy aided him with sharp increase of military assistance
against people of the southern regions (Schleisinger and Kinzer 241).
The Guatemalan army was reinforced with U.S. jets, U.S. Special Forces
and the anti-guerrilla warfare specialists. In cooperation with the U.S.,
Ydígoras successfully suppressed the uprising, killed or jailed hundreds of
students, labour organizers, peasants, professionals and ex-soldiers. Even
Archbishop Arellano was now frustrated by the sickness, rampant infant
mortality rate, malnutrition, illiteracy, social disintegration and conditions
resembling the concentration camps.
In November, Arévalo announced he was ready to run for presidency.
Kennedy allegedly reacted by authorizing the defence minister Peralta Azurdia
to overthrow Ydígoras to prevent Arévalo from winning the elections promised
for 1964 (Schleisinger and Kinzer 242-244; REMHI 194, 195; Immerman
201).

4.1.3. Reestablishment of the Army

In 1963, Azurdia took over the presidential palace, using tanks. The
Congress and the constitution were replaced by the “war against communism
and terrorism” (REMHI 195, Schleisinger and Kinzer 244). The United States
increased the military aid from $280,000 to $1.4 million. Private investments
of the United States rose from $50 million to $131 million. Azurdia
successfully minimized corruption, imposed a disregarded minimum wage and
insufficient economic reforms. He further militarized the country and killed
many people. Forced disappearances were used in 32 political cases. The

34
victims were reportedly dropped into the ocean in secrecy (Anderson 25,
Sanford 225, LaFeber 166).
In 1966, Azurdia agreed to hold new elections. Mendéz Montenegro was a
university professor who emerged victorious and FAR put their weapons down
in expectations (REMHI 195). The reinforced military put Montenegro under
the pressure to eliminate guerrillas, while he was looking for a diplomatic
solution (REMHI 196). Montenegro was forced to give full autonomy to the
army and amnesty its members. Weakness of the government became evident
(REMHI 197).
The United States sent Green Berets into Guatemala to train the anti-
guerrilla forces for general Arana Osorio. They also provided equipment worth
$11 million and the sum of $4 million through the Military Assistance Program
(Schleisinger and Kinzer 245). The army was modernized and it doubled in
size. The Mobile Military Police (MPA) was created and some 9,000
paramilitary commissioners were introduced.
Meanwhile, the guerrillas stopped attacking the army as they expected the
government to be more tolerant. President decreed an amnesty on behalf of the
guerrillas, asking them to return to their civilian lives. Unfortunately, Turcios
Lima was then murdered and the army launched an offensive accompanied by
torture, rape and killing (REMHI 200, 201). Such purges pushed the guerrillas
through phases of unpredictable transitions. Response of the FAR was to
murder the U.S. ambassador, the U.S. Military Mission leader and his advisors.
They also killed the German ambassador. The whole guerrilla movement was
almost eliminated by the army during the end of the 1960s (REMHI 202, 203;
Schleisinger and Kinzer 248).
The new interesting phenomena were the clandestine death squads, partly
financed by the elites. Some of them were organized by the MLN, others by the
military. The army killed from 8,000 to 50,000 peasant and anti-government
activists between 1966 and 1968 (REMHI 199-200; Hey 36; Schleisinger and
Kinzer 246; LaFeber 258).

35
 However, The New York Times characterized the Guatemalan government
only as “a willing partner” and the U.S. officials as observers (Schleisinger and
Kinzer 247). The CIA became an integral part of the Guatemalan army. It
provided all resources, money and training, because the United States needed
to control outcome of the war (Schirmer 171).

4.2. Discovering New Horizons of Terror

4.2.1. The Military Government of General Arana Osorio

The presidential elections became a game of the right-wing sections

(Schleisinger and Kinzer 249). The FAR wanted to escalate violence and
advised people to vote for Arana, who won the elections in 1970. Fertilizers
spread in the 1960s and allowed production to increase. The new value of soil
led to further land seizures from the natives.
The guerrillas killed 30 military officers. Labour organizing was not
tolerated by the growing industrial sector or the president (REMHI 202, 206;
LaFeber 257; Anderson 29). The army murdered 2,000 political opponents
during the first year of Arana’s presidency, including Yon Sosa (Anderson 27;
LaFeber 257). Natives trying to reclaim their land were bloodily suppressed by
the chief of staff Ríos Montt. The death squads were in full operation. From
3,500 to 15,000 people were murdered (Schleisinger and Kinzer 249).
Arana fully cooperated with Somoza and protégés of president Nixon to
gain control over the economy. Private investments of the United States rose to
$186 million in 1970 (REMHI 207). The United States used the Office of
Public Safety program to increase the national police force from 3,000 to
11,000 under provision of $2.6 million from 1966 to 1970. The right-wing
elites had their power from the times of Ubico fully restored (Schleisinger and
Kinzer 247, 248).
In the early 1970s, two new guerrilla units were introduced. They were the
northern Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) and the Organization of People in
Arms (ORPA) from the south. Both were successfully gaining support of the

36
indigenous population (Hey 37). Their aim was to fight against the political
enemy (the army) and the economic enemy (the agro-industrial sector)
(REMHI 221). The EGP planned to build a defence network for the natives and
it successfully eliminated Hérnandez Castellón, the man presumably
responsible for much of the killing (Hey 37; Schleisinger and Kinzer 249).
Some members of the army started gaining economic power. This situation
resulted in conflicts with the traditional elites. A business-military alliance was
established (REMHI 228).

4.2.2. Presidency of Kjell Laugerud

The elections of 1974 were preceded by murder of 12 Christian Democratic

Party officials, who backed Ríos Montt. He would probably have won the
elections, but the army manipulated the results to protect its investment policy
and declared Kjell Laugerud the president (LaFeber 257; REMHI 210).
There was an earthquake in Guatemala in 1976, which claimed 25,000
lives. It forced Guatemalans to create local authorities. Most of the foreign
organizations were prevented from entering the country to help the survivors
(Schleisinger and Kinzer 249; REMHI 210).
Jimmy Carter became president in 1977. He recognized the atrocities
supported by the United States in Guatemala. Carter imposed a military aid ban
in 1978, but the U.S. State Department continued to support the Guatemalan
military with arsenal and money. Israel was used as a proxy to transport
weapons and aircrafts (LaFeber 258; REMHI 211; Wilkinson 328).
The labour organizations were revived during the Laugerud’s presidency.
By 1976, about 80,000 workers were organized, but hatred of the business
sector remained the same. The presidency was shaken by 119 stoppages and by
demonstrations.
Approaching massacres of the 1980s rooted in the removal of natives from
their land. The rising military oppression now swelled the guerrilla ranks with
volunteers (REMHI 209-10; Anderson 29; LaFeber 258).

37
 4.2.3. Presidency of Romeo Lucas García

In 1978, Lucas García was elected president in a fraudulent election. His

aim was to harshly suppress the guerrillas, because he feared a revolution
similar to that of El Salvador. Lucas faced a heavy civil opposition, but he did
not hesitate to suppress it firmly, killing and abducting at least 7,601 opponents
since 1979 to 1981. Lucas dismantled student movements and labour
organizations.
The size of the army increased to 14,000 and it was economically powerful
enough to establish its own bank. The Guatemalan military supported Reagan’s
presidential campaign with $4 million, although relations between Guatemala
and the United States cooled down (REMHI 211,212; Schleisinger and Kinzer
251; LaFeber 260). Transition to the Reagan’s presidency meant increased
interest in Central America, because a war took place in El Salvador and
Sandinistas started a revolution in Nicaragua. Position of the United States was
threatened (Jonas 196).
The military oppression moved from relatively selective to global in the
1980s. The country was now run by the army, the death squads and mafia of
several private armies. The army introduced a new terrorist military
intelligence (G-2). Bodies of tortured and mutilated labour organizers, students,
church officials and journalists were either disappeared or found on along the
streets every day (Anderson 37; REMHI 213; Schirmer 184).
Cooperation with the CIA moved from non-systematic in the 1960s and the
1970s to continuous in the 1980s. Former CIA agents were involved too. The
CIA provided computers, special communications, weapons, helicopters and
the financial aid of $50 million. Guatemalan Defence Minister general
Gramajo served as a liaison between the United States and Guatemala
(Schirmer 170, 171). The oil and mining corporations from the United States
stared their businesses, pushing more natives out of their land (LaFeber 259).

38
 The army was unstoppable. It burned a Spanish embassy to ashes,
including the Spanish officials together with the Guatemalan peasants
demanding justice. In 1981, the EGP proclaimed it was still fighting in the
name of the agrarian reform undertaken by Arbenz (Schleisinger and Kinzer
252). The military wiped out the official political spectrum and reduced it to
either the extreme right “democracy” or anything else, described as
communism. It introduced a sophisticated strategy and tactics independent of
the United States (Schleisinger and Kinzer 251; REMHI 217). Attacks of the
army were either random or targeted against entire communities when the army
lost control over them.
The guerrilla consisted of about 12,000 people with large support base and
it succeeded in killing 57 important military officers (Schirmer 57). Guerrillas
also led a terrorist campaign against local authorities under pretext of their
collaboration with the army. Both sides of the conflict were exposed to
corruption (REMHI 222, 223). The death toll of Lucas regime was 35,000
altogether (Schirmer 44).

4.2.4. The Government of Ríos Montt

A dispute between the army and the business sector provoked a coup in
1982 (REMHI 227). It was heavily supported by the CIA (Schirmer 21). Fifty
public officials were murdered in a sweep and Ríos Montt took the presidency.
Montt shuffled hierarchy of the army and started looking for new ways to
legalize terror (REMHI 228). Political parties were banned (Schirmer 21).
Montt was a member of the evangelical church and therefore an ideal candidate
to eliminate reformed Catholics, who were helping the poor (Schirmer 26).
New equipment for the army was delivered by 200 Israeli military experts,
who retrained the army in 1982. The CIA secretly provided Montt with $65
million. A pacification campaign called Victoria 82 was launched to rescue
civilians from the guerrillas. The plan consisted of psychological, political,
anthropological and military parts. Ríos Montt paraphrased Mao Zedong with

39
his aim to “dry up human sea in which the guerrilla fish swim” -or simply: to
eliminate the guerrilla support base. Various areas were selected as the killing
zones for the army to burn and kill all the living things within.
The Beans and Bullets campaign was introduced, targeting 70% of the
effort for recovery of civilians through model villages and 30% of the effort for
extermination. The original plan was a widespread holocaust (Schirmer 23, 45,
165; REMHI 229). The army ranks increased to 30,000 in 1983 (Schirmer 7).
Plan Victoria 82 hit the guerrillas hard. They reacted by a few sporadic, mainly
defensive actions due to increased disorganization in their ranks.
In 1982, the army introduced the Civil Patrols, consisting of up to 300,000
forcedly recruited peasants without pay, acting as “eyes and ears” of the army
(there were 1.3 million patrollers in 1984). They either had to kill persons on a
list prepared by the army or be killed themselves. Meanwhile, the guerrillas
united and created Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG).
The NSC Planning Group ignored the Carter’s ban and channelled $10
million to Guatemala in 1982. Reagan considered Montt a man “totally
dedicated to democracy”, lifted the ban, cancelled all embargoes and provided
him with economic and military aid, including $6.3 million in spare parts for
the village-exterminating helicopters.
The army destroyed 400-500 towns and villages between 1982 and 1983,
exterminating from 50,000 to 75,000 people, mostly unarmed peasants. One
million people fled their homes in fear. Refugees were deported from the
United States to almost certain death (Schleisinger and Kinzer x; REMHI 232;
Schirmer 90, 91, 33, 42; Cockcroft 117). The TIME magazine refused to
mention a single dead civilian (3).

40
5. Falling Action
5.1. From Terror to Compromises
5.1.1. Mejia Víctores and Vinicio Cerezo

In 1983, Montt and his appointed stooges were overthrown by the defence
minister, general Mejia Víctores. The new government decided to change its
course to a less oppressive system. Agricultural production was in disarray and
assistance programs for the surviving population were inefficient. The business
sector realized that any further damage to production would be harmful. New
ways for reaching the internal stability through a civilian government were
sought for. However, the power of the military remained unchanged and
tendencies from 1982 continued, although not that dramatically (REMHI 243,
261).
In 1985, Vinicio Cerezo and the Democratic Christian party won the
elections after series of strikes by the new labour union, a pattern typical
throughout Latin America at that time. Cerezo promised many reforms,
assigned less conservative military officers to the government, but an amnesty
was issued for both the guerrillas and the army (REMHI 245, 246; Hanáková
53; Cockcroft 118). Similarly to Arévalo, Cerezo refused to analyze the past
against the public will. Only a few reforms were undertaken in the end
(Schleisinger and Kinzer 258; Hanáková 55). On one hand, he legally enacted
taxes, set a minimum wage and accepted the international relieve programs.
But Cerezo also supported the army in development of its war plans. The
powerful still defended themselves with the rhetoric of democracy and the
national security (REMHI 247, 253). Most of military pressed hard against any
democratizing tendencies (Schirmer 173).
The attitude towards the United States slightly changed. Cerezo refused to
help suppress the Sandinista movement in Nicaragua, but the USA supplied the
Guatemalan military with transport helicopters and transport services.

41
The military aid reached $30 million. The United States further provided $75
million in compensation for unpaid taxes and the destabilizing army budget.
The government also needed money to bribe some of the officers in prevention
of coups. About 100,000 U.S. civilians founded a “sanctuary movement” to
help the Guatemalan refugees. They were infiltrated by the disruptive FBI
agents. The government started communicating with the guerrillas and
mediated negotiations between them and the army. Public tensions were
diminishing, although the death squads kept on operating. Violence increased
and the guerrilla warfare continued and spread to formerly peaceful areas
(Schleisinger and Kinzer 259; REMHI 254, 258, 263; Cockcroft 119).

5.1.2. Serrano Elías and his Successors

Serrano Elías was elected in 1990 with 68% of the vote, although his party
won only 24.3% of the vote, indicating weakness of the government against the
power-craving business sector, whose own candidate was. Conflict of the army
and its opponents continued, opposed by the growing struggle for human rights
(REMHI 264, 267, 269; Cockcroft 118).
Schleisinger and Kinzer assume that when George H. W. Bush became the
U.S. president, he decided to remove the military aid after Michael Devine
from the United States was murdered (Schleisinger and Kinzer xxii).
According to REMHI, however, it was Serrano who publicly refused the
military help of $100,000 (REMHI 271). Government of the United States
continued to sell weapons to the Guatemalan military anyway. The CIA was
secretly cooperating with the Guatemalan military and provided various
equipment and at least $44,000 (Harbury 36, 37; Schirmer 171). Many of the
Guatemalan military officers were still trained inside the United States (Jonas
206). Serrano also continued the process of negotiations towards peace. There
was a shuffle in the army in 1991 to remove the most militaristic officers
(REMHI 271).

42
 In 1993, Bill Clinton won the U.S. presidency. In the same year, Serrano
abruptly dissolved the Congress, the Supreme Court of Justice and the
Constitutional Court. He also suspended certain individual rights, explaining
that he was trying to eliminate corruption. This act was opposed by the
administration, the business circles and the army. The United States withdrew
the economic aid of $30 million.
Serrano had to leave his office. A consensus group was formed by
businessmen, political parties and various individuals. It demanded purging of
the Legislative and Justice. Ramiro de León Carpio was elected president from
the group of three candidates (REMHI 273, 274; Hanáková 59). In 1994, the
new government and the guerrillas asked the United Nations to participate in
the peace process. Guatemala also invited Mexico, Spain, Colombia and
Venezuela. They had to be convinced by the Clinton administration
(Schleisinger and Kinzer xxiv). The peace process was accelerating. A lawyer
named Jennifer Harbury was determined to find out who killed her husband. In
1995, she discovered participation of the CIA in his murder and murder of
Devine. The responsible CIA officers were dismissed for misleading the
president (Schleisinger and Kinzer xxv, xxvi).
Guatemalan business circles and the military received better position for
the peace accords as the result of the coup. Carpio was still under pressure of
these groups (REMHI 275, 276). Privatization tendencies were harshly rejected
by the protesting public. Several treaties to promote the human rights were
reached, but none of them was taken seriously (Hanáková 61). The real change
came with the following president.

43
 5.1.3. Alvaro Arzú and Signing of the Peace Treaty

Alvaro Arzú was elected president in 1996, winning 51% of the vote. He
dismissed 8 of 16 active generals and removed more than 100 infamous
policemen during the first month in his office. In December 29, a treaty entitled
the “Global Agreement for a Firm and Lasting Peace” was signed by the
government and the guerrillas.
The 36-long war was over. The size of the army diminished and some of
the former soldiers joined newly formed criminal gangs. All Civil Patrols were
dismissed. Political killings and disappearances stopped. The treaty was
supplemented by another accord signed on September 19. It aimed to transform
the power to the civilian government and to facilitate transition to the real
democracy. However, less then 5% of the population still held more than two
thirds of the ecologically threatened land. Rates of poverty, malnutrition, infant
mortality and illiteracy remained high. Guatemala was blighted with rampant
criminality and drug trafficking.
The “Commission of Historical Clarification” was founded to analyze
recent Guatemalan history, although it was forbidden to provide names of
people responsible for the massacres. Members of the historical research were
still threatened with death in 1996. The Roman Catholic Church launched its
own “historical memory project” (REMHI) that is thoroughly cited in this
thesis (Schleisinger and Kinzer 262-264; Wilkinson 296, 302; Schirmer 269;
REMHI 283). A leading figure of the church project was murdered 6 days after
releasing it in 1998 (Goldman 25). The Commission of Historical Clarification
found out that casualties totalled 150,000-200,000 lives, mostly civil. The
military was responsible for 93% of deaths. The guerrillas were responsible for
3% (CEH; Schleisinger and Kinzer 264). In March 1999, Bill Clinton visited
Guatemala to apologize to president Arzú and the public for involvement of the
United States in the conflict (Goldman 155).

44
6. Conclusion
The conflict inside Guatemala started with colonization. Invaders from
Europe and the United States usurped the entire national wealth and pretended
that there are no natives or that the lands upon which natives depend are
uncultivated. The sad truth is that it was only these usurpers who left half of
Guatemala uncultivated and inaccessible. Private property was respected as
long as it was not the natives who made claims (Anderson 32).
If I were looking for a phrase to describe attitude of the powerful right-
wing elites towards Guatemalan people, I would pick one of the Stalin’s
famous quotes: “No people, no problem.” This attitude started with arrogance
and culminated in genocide. Was the U.S. “Good neighbour policy” only a
domesticated version of the Soviet International?
The rejection of reality and proclamation of lies is a tradition long utilized
by Europeans and Americans to oppress the Mayan nation. The reason is
obvious. The thirst for land and power was so strong that they had to come up
with a solution to clear up their conscience. It seems incredible that the CIA
put Rios Montt in office to “purge the communists”. The murderous strategies
of Montt were inspired by Mao Zedong. This was a showcase of democracy for
most of the U.S. presidents. It is not pleasant to think about which other
regimes resemble democracy according to this logic.
Immerman would argue that this was “the cold war ethos”. No, it was not.
Exactly the opposite is true. The situation was the same in 1944 as it was in
1524. The United States supported and installed the most despotic regimes in
Guatemala during and before the Cold War. We would find comparable cases
of corruption, crimes against humanity and totalitarian language beyond the
Iron Curtain. The attitude of the United States was based on goals presented
under false flags. A caricature of a disguised Stalin saying “just call me José”
was produced against Arbenz by the U.S. press. When a Guatemalan soldier
asked his U.S. military trainer for his name, he answered: “just call me José”.

45
When the United States mistakenly bombed Honduras, they blamed it on
Arbenz.
Wilkinson claims that the United States lost control over the situation in
Guatemalan. It is not true. However, Carter lost control over the State
Department. The United States lost control over the CIA during the Bush
administration. October Revolution was the only real democratic hope
Guatemala ever had. While Arévalo evaded direct promotion of social justice
in fear of the elites, Arbenz was not afraid to fully speak his mind and even let
the communists support him. The United States made no difference between
Arévalo and Arbenz though. “They would have overthrown us even if we had
grown no bananas”, Fortuny lamented (as qtd. in Gleijeses 4). There is not
enough evidence to elaborate on his attitude. However, we could assume that
the USA would overthrow Arévalo if he somehow managed to remain the
president. Such hypothesis makes the whole communist affair irrelevant.
Even members of the guerrilla movement were trained in the United States.
Guatemala was transformed into a scorched playground of nationalistic ladino
soldiers and power-craving upper classes. 80% of Guatemalan people are
Mayan. They were left to watch these intruders kill each other until the EGP
was established for them to join the game. It is hard to speak about the civil
war if we map the role of the United States – I would rather mark the conflict
“a colonial war”.
This was neither the first, nor the last time when democracy meant totality
and totality meant democracy. When the innocent were labelled murderers and
murderers were praised by those in power. Guatemala is an example of a
contradictory country where everything has been turned upside down for most
of the time. Majority meant minority, truth meant lies, protection meant torture,
amnesty meant prosecution, liberation meant enslavement, life meant death and
“the country of eternal spring” remained the inferno of the eternal suffering. I
thereby finish this conclusion by quoting general Gramajo: “Something what
doesn’t seem possible in one country, may well be normal in another”.

46
7. Bibliography
7.1. Printed Sources
o Anderson, Thomas. Politics in Central America (New York: Praeger,
1988).
o Cockcroft, James. Neighbors in Turmoil (San Francisco: Harper & Row,
1989).
o Gleijeses, Piero. Shattered Hope (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1991).
o Goldman, Francisco. The Art of Political Murder (New York: Grove Press,
2008).
o Grandin, Greg. Empire’s Workshop (New York: Metropolitan Books,
2006).
o Grandin, Greg. The Blood of Guatemala (Durham: Duke University Press,
2000).
o Hanáková, Klára. Střední Amerika: od guerilly k současnému mírovému
ujednání – případ Guatemaly (Praha: Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze,
1998)
o Hey, Hilde. Gross Human Rights Violations: a Search for Causes (Berlin:
Springer, 1995)
o Immerman, Richard. The CIA in Guatemala (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 1984).
o LaFeber, Walter. Inevitable Revolutions (New York: W.W. Norton, 1984).
o REMHI. Guatemala, Never Again! (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1999).
o Schirmer, Jennifer. The Guatemalan Military Project (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998).
o Schlesinger, Stephen and Stephen Kinzer Bitter Fruit (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2005).
o Taube, Karl. Aztécké a mayské mýty (Praha: Kma, s.r.o., 2007).
o Wilkinson, Daniel. Silence on the Mountain (Durham: Duke University
Press, 2004).

47
 7.2. Online Sources
o Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification.
”Guatemala, Memory of Silence” CEH. 1994. CEH. 28 February 2009
<http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/conc1.html>
1. Unknown. “Third Term” TIME online archive. Sep. 22 1941. TIME Inc. 28
February 2009
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,795500,00.html>
2. Unknown. “After the fall” TIME online archive. Jul. 12 1954. TIME Inc.
28 February 2009
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,860973,00.html>
3. George Russel, James Willwerth “Surprise in the Sermon” TIME online
archive. May 23 1983. TIME Inc. 28 February 2009
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,953896-2,00.html>

8. Appendices
Appendix 1: Acronyms Used in the Thesis
Appendix 2: CD with Digital Version of the Thesis

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 Appendix 1: Acronyms Used in the Thesis

EBS - Electric Bond and Share

BFC - Boston Fruit Company
EGP - Guerrilla Army of the Poor
(Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres)
FAR - Revolutionary Armed Forces
(Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes)
IRCA - International Railroads of Central America
MPA - The Mobile Military Police
(Policia Militar Ambulante)
ORPA - Organization of People in Arms
PAR - The Revolutionary Party
(Partido de Acción Revolucionario)
PGT - Guatemalan Party of Labour
(Partido Guatemateco de Trabajo)
REMHI - Historical Memory Project
(Recuperação da Memória Histórica)
UFCO - The United Fruit Company
UPCA - The United Provinces of Central America
(Organización Revolucionario del Pueblo en Armas)
URNG - Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity
(Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca)

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