A Brief Moment in Time Kedah-Siam Relations Revisited

A BRIEF MOMENT IN TIME: KEDAH-SIAM RELATIONS REVISITED
Author(s): KOBKUA SUWWANNATHAT-PIAN

Source: Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. 72, No. 2 (277),
JOHN M. GULLICK FESTSCHRIFT (1999), pp. 65-90
Published by: Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41493393
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A BRIEF MOMENT IN TIME: KEDAH-SIAM
RELATIONS REVISITED
by
KOBKUA SUWWANNATHAT-PIAN
I
Translation of Texts
the official correspondence of the Minister of Kalahom, who was in charge of the
The affairs the fiveaffairs
officialofofthedispatches
southerntheregion
correspondence
of Siam, to thesouthern
ruler offromKedah,
the Chao
regionPhraya
of Documents the of Minister Siam, Reign to of the Kalahom, II's ruler Files of who translated Kedah, was in Chao charge below1 Phraya of form the
Zaiburi, and other governors of the southern provinces. All of the dispatches were sent in
1811. All were impregnated with Bangkok's sensitivity over the security of the south,
particularly the western seaboard which, it was believed, needed to be strengthened
against the much expected renewed attacks from Burma. These official dispatches are of
interest for a number of reasons: the obsessive concern of Bangkok during the early
years of the reign of King Rama II (1809-24) about impending danger from Burma; the
painful awareness that the south was unable to withstand Burmese attacks without
assistance from the capital; and the fact that the weakness of the south stemmed from
personal conflicts, rivalries and jealousies among its leading officials, especially within
Kedah and between Kedah, Songkhla and Nakhon - the bulwarks of the 'health* of the
south.
In these five dispatches certain details emerge about Kedah-Siam relations during
the years leading up to the Siamese invasion of Kedah in 1821. The translated texts are
used in support of an analysis, here argued, that is contrary to the accepted version of the
relations between Kedah and Siam: first, that Kedah-Siam relations in the period
between 1808 and 1811/12 were within the context of tributary relations and there was
no abuse of power on the part of the Siamese; secondly, that Kedah* s political instability
after 1803 had its roots in Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin's decision to apply for military help
from Bangkok to unseat his uncle, and was not caused by any direct interference from
Bangkok or even Nakhon, though the fact that the Siamese could intervene did
complicate the local situation; and, thirdly, that far from being forced by and dictated to
by Siam, Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin was very much the master of the internal affairs of his
state as displayed by the freedom he enjoyed to dispense favours to whoever pleased
him.
1 The five dispatches are selected from the records of the reign of King Lert-la or Rama II. The official
documents of the early Bangkok period, i.e. the reigns of King Rama I to King Mongkut/Rama IV, are kept
in the Manuscripts Section, National Library, Bangkok. Part of the Reign II manuscripts have been
published on various occasions, the latest being in 1971 in celebration of the 203r(* anniversary of Rama
II's birthday. All five texts are translated from the published texts of 1971. See Chotmaihet Reign II J.S.
1173 , Bangkok: Rama II Memorial Foundation under the royal patronage of the King, 1971.
65
PART 2, 1999
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Fig. 1. Siam and Kedah.
66
JMBRAS VOL. LXXII
Text No. 1: Bangkok Correspondence to Chao Phraya Zaiburi on Gifts and Things
Sent on the Occasion of the Royal Cremation of Rama I's Remains
Letter from Chao Phraya Akkramahasenathibodi to Chao Phraya Zaiburi.2
According to your correspondence, you have appointed Phra Aphainurat,3 Tunku

Ahmad RayaPatana-inthra,4 Tuan Kaya Pakrama Mata-Mata [as officials] bringing [the
following namely] white cloth of 100 reels [which is divided into] 20 pieces of the length
of 40 feet, 50 pieces of the ma-ngada material, and 30 pieces of the ashan material, and
other accompanying items as token of your appreciation and loyalty [to Bangkok], and as
a contribution to the preparations of the royal cremation.5 You also sent a pair of the
bunga mas dan perak trees together with the tributary gifts accompanying the bunga mas
dan perak. They consist of:
A pair of spears with silver-gilded handles
A pair of spears with gold-gilded handles
Ten pairs of spears with brass-gilded handles (altogether 12 pairs of spears)
Two pairs of hand-painted wooden shields
Five pairs of rattan shields (altogether 7 pairs)
Two reels of the red sakrat cloth, and
Ten reels of white cloth
The above-mentioned are accompanied by the non-tributary gifts consisting of:
Forty reels of white cloth of 40 feet length each
Twenty reels of the ashan cloth
Twenty reels of the ma-ngada cloth (altogether 80 reels)
One reel of the red sakrat cloth
A European clock
Four crystal plates
These are accompanied by the gifts for Krom Phra-ratchawang Boworn,6 which are:
Twenty reels of white cloth of 40 feet length each
Twenty reels of the ma-ngada cloth (altogether 40 reels)
One reel of the red sakrat cloth
One European sundial
Ten pieces of carpet
The above-mentioned gifts arrived together with your report [of which I] have
informed His Majesty the King.7 I also presented Phra Aphainurat at a royal audience in
2 Chao Phraya Akkramahasenathibodi is the official title of the minister of Kalahom whose personal title
may be different from this official one. Chao Phraya Zaiburi is Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin Halim Shah (r.
1803-21 ; 1841-3) who, as Tunku Pangeran, went to plead his case with Rama I, and in 1803 was appointed
Sultan of Kedah.
3 Tunku Bisnu, a younger full brother of Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin. His full title was Phra Aphainuratraja.
4 This may be another brother of Ahmad Tajuddin. According to Prince Damrong-rajanubhab, Tunku Raya
was one of the ten brothers of the Sultan whose father was Sultan Abdullah Mukarram Shah.
5 This was the cremation of the remains of Rama I. However, the Kedah contribution to the event came too
late. The cremation ceremony had been performed before the arrival of the Kedah mission.
6 Krom Phra-ratchawang Boworn Maha-senanurak, a full brother of King Rama II, was the heir presumptive
to the throne and therefore the No. 2 man in Siam at the time.
7 King Rama II ascended to the throne in 1809, after being named by his father on his deathbed as his (Rama
I's) successor as well as being elected by the Council as King in place of Rama I. Of all the kings in the
early Bangkok period, he was renowned not so much for his martial prowess but rather for his artistic
ability and gentle nature.
67
PART 2, 1999
order that he could officially submit the bunga mas dan perak together with the tributary
and non-tributary gifts to His Majesty. Unfortunately, other items that Chao Phraya
Zaiburi has sent as contributions to the royal cremation rite arrived after the ceremony.
The programme for the royal cremation ceremony was fixed on the fifth day of the
waxing moon, the sixth month. It was followed by a grand celebration of ten days and
ten nights duration. Those attending the occasion included the tributary lords of both big
and small states and the royal officials in full force.8 The cremation festivities came to an
end on the fifteenth waxing moon, the sixth month, the year of the Goat, Trisok. Phra
Aphainurat only arrived in the capital on Tuesday of the seventh waning moon, the sixth
month. His Majesty had ordered that all items [presented by Kedah] be accepted.
At the royal command of His Majesty, the ashes [of His Late Majesty] were again
celebrated in a religious rite. Once this was completed, the [Kedah] officials in charge of
the bunga mas dan perak were given, as symbols of royal appreciation of their
contribution, medals, clothes and money accordingly. His Majesty the King has
bestowed the following on Chao Phraya Zaiburi:
One big silver table
One small silver table (altogether 2 tables)
Two big sets of platinum utensils
Two small sets of platinum utensils (altogether 4 sets)
Two water containers [khan]
Two trays
Two spittoons (together with the 2 sets of utensils 10 items )
One bhumsen- styled jacket
One khemkhab jacket with Indian-styled (i.e. square) motif
Two khemkhab jackets with Japanese-styled motif
One piece of gold-thread sarong
Two pieces of pha-poom sarong (altogether 3 pieces of sarong)
The list of gifts from Krom Phra-ratchawang Boworn to Chao Phraya Zaiburi includes:
One green khemkhab jacket
One piece of green Japanese silk
One piece of red Japanese silk (altogether 2 pieces)
One piece of red pha-poom sarong
Two reels of Chinese silk
A box of five Chinese fans
A box of potpourri
Two wooden ( kayu jati ) boxes
[Together with these particular gifts to the Sultan] Bangkok also sends clothes to
be given to those who have served in the Thalang war against the Burmese.9 All the said
items are passed on to Phra Aphainurat who is commanded by His Majesty to distribute
them to those whose names are listed in the document accompanying the gifts.
It is hereby commanded that Chao Phraya Zaiburi, Phra Palat [his assistant?] and
Seri Tuan councillors [of Kedah] respectfully receive these items [and follow the
8 From other documents and records, the tributary lords attending the cremation included the rulers of
Vientiane, Luang Phrabang, Champasak, and a representative from Annam.
9 A detailed account of this war, and Kedah s role in it, is recorded in Muhammad Yusoit fiasnim, ¿y air
Sultan Maulana, Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Universiti Malaya, 1980. Thalang is the old town of Phuket town,
which was one of the significant provinces in the south both for its strategic and economic values.
68
JMBRAS VOL. LXXII
instructions of] this thong-tra 10 and the accompanying list.

The tra is issued in Thai, one copy, and in Malay, one copy, of the same contents.
The correspondence is dated the sixth day of the thirteenth waxing moon, the ninth
month, the year of the Goat, Trisok [J.S. 1 173].
Fig. 2. King Rama I (r. 1782-1809). Fig. 3. King Rama II (r. 1809-1824).
Text No. 2: Bangkok Correspondence to Chao Phraya Zaiburi on Thalang Affairs
Letter from Chao Phraya Akkramahasenathibodi to Chao Phraya Zaiburi
His Majesty the King commands [that this be instructed to the governor of Zaiburi].
In the past, Thalang acted as a buffer for Muang Zai[buri]. Now Thalang has been
defeated and ruined by the hostile Burmese because the governor and the councillors
were negligent in their duty and responsibility. They failed to be in a state of
preparedness [namely] they did not take care of the foodstock nor of their arms stockpile
for the safety of [Thalang]. Suddenly an attack appeared, and Thalang could not defend
itself. It seems that in spite of Bangkok's wish to restore Thalang to its former strength, it
is clear that the town and the people still reel under the destruction of war. For this
reason, His Majesty has commanded that Luang Yokkrabat [assistant governor] Muang
Takua-thung takes over as acting governor of Thalang and mobilizes the people who
have been scattered [by the last attack] to work on the paddy fields around Phung-nga for
10 Tra or thong-tra is an official dispatch.
69
PART 2, 1999
the time being. By the gracious power and merit [phra barmii ] of His Majesty, the
Burmese who attacked Thalang were eventually forced to withdraw. Be that as it may, it
is of concern that the Burmese may still hatch up another plot to launch a sudden attack
[on Thalang] once more. [If not prepared] we may again be surprised and defeated.
[It has been decided that] to set up the command headquarters only at Trang, as we
normally did, would limit our movement [especially] in the transport of the foodstuffs
which could be done only by land. This would impose too heavy a burden on our men [in
time of war]. In the same manner, to wait for a relief from the grand army sent from
Bangkok creates further risks. For these reasons, orders have been sent to the governor of
Chaiya to set up headquarters in the Pak-lao district; to the governor of Nakhon to set up
[command] centres at Trang and Pakasai; while Phattalung is to set up its [command]
centre at the mouth of the river Palian. The aim is to plant rice, maintain food stocks, and
to be ready [if required] with the boats and fleet in every port within these towns.
Muang Songkhla, however, has yet to find a location for its [command] centre on
the western seaboard. At the same time, we are aware that Setul and Lu-ngu, which were
returned by Phra Aphainurat, are strategic areas whereby enemies could easily take
control and block the [southern] armies from a quick mobilization in assistance of one
another. Presently Phra Aphainurat has shifted his administration to Parapok [Merbok],
Kuala Muda and Kerian. [Since he has left] there are hardly enough people at Setul and
Lu-ngu [to work on the land]. Yet, [because of their strategic position] the two districts
cannot be left to simply rot away. It is decided that the Songkhla authorities will
temporarily take over [Setul and Lu-ngu] and mobilize the people to settle and cultivate
the paddy fields there. Songkhla will also take charge of the defence of the waters of
Setul and Lu-ngu and help lighten the burden put on Chao Phraya Zaiburi. In the case of
sudden attacks, [both Setul and Lu-ngu and Kedah] would be able to come to the
assistance of each other and together overcome the enemy.
Until Thalang is fully recovered, His Majesty orders that this arrangement be
executed for the security and safety of the land. Chao Phraya Zaiburi [must look at the
arrangement as a necessity in difficult times and] must not look upon it as a power
contest with Songkhla. Such an [negative] attitude can lead to disruptions in the defence
of the south. It is hereby stated that all inhabitants in Setul and Lu-ngu be left to pursue
their livelihood as they have been accustomed to.
As for Perlis, which has been deserted by the Raja Muda11 who has set up his
residence in Prai, it is most important that the affairs of Perlis must not be left
unattended. If the Raja Muda no longer desires to administer Perlis, it is hereby
instructed that Chao Phraya Zai[buri] consults with the former Phraya Zaiburi [on who
should replace the Raja Muda in Perlis].12 Perhaps Tengku Nulah [Abdullah], Chao
Phraya Zai's own son, should be sent to take charge of Perlis. Can this be arranged? If
Chao Phraya Zai[buri] concurs that the affairs of Perlis could be entrusted to Tengku
Nulah, then [Chao Phraya Zaiburi] must take up the recommendation made in this tra ,
and [immediately] send Tengku Nulah and the relevant senior state councillors to take
charge of the Perlis administration. It is imperative that Chao Phraya Zai[buri] and the
[Kedah] state councillors be ever alert to the safety and welfare of the state. Don't ever
1 1 Tunku Ibrahim, who took over the post from Tunku Bisnu, around 1807-8.
12 Sultan Muda Tunku Dhiauddin, the uncle of Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin. He succeeded his brother, Sultan
Abdullah, in 1798 with the consent of the state council of Kedah, and ruled until he was forced to step
down by the Siamese authorities in favour of Tunku Pangeran in 1803.
70
JMBRAS VOL. LXXII
be negligent and repeat mistakes of the past. Set up intelligence units [among the
people]; bring in Burmese traders who come to trade in Penang and interrogate them for
information; report new findings regularly [to Bangkok].
The tra is issued in Thai, one copy, and in Malay, one copy, of the same contents.
The correspondence is dated Friday of the thirteenth waxing moon, the ninth month, the
year of the Goat, Trisok [J.S.I 173].
Text No. 3 : Official Correspondence from Chao Phraya Akkramahasenathibodi to

Chao Phraya Zaiburi
This dispatch is about the petition made by Phra Aphainurat, the younger brother [of
Chao Phraya Zaiburi]. Phra Aphainurat has submitted a request to His Majesty the King
expressing his desire to return the districts of Setul and Lu-ngu [to Bangkok] on the
pretext that he is no longer able to serve His Majesty in [the said areas] because the two
areas are so infertile. [Phra Aphainuratraja] asks for royal leave to move to the three
districts of Parapok [Merbok], Kuala Muda and Kerian. He also reports that he has
discussed the matter with Chao Phraya Zai[buri] and Chao Phraya Zai[buri] agrees to the
new arrangement. [Kedah] has also sent correspondence to inform Chao Phraya
Songkhla, Phraya Surinthararatchaseni, [so that the latter could] bring up the matter with
Bangkok.
Having heard the request [of Phra Aphainuratraja], His Majesty the King with
grace and kindness comments as follows:
Since the time of His Late Majesty,13 the affairs of Muang Zaiburi have been one
of conflicts and quarrels. [Because of such conflicts], Chao Phraya Zaiburi and his
brother, Raja Muda, came to see Chao Phraya Songkhla and pleaded with him to bring
them [to Bangkok] for a royal audience with His Late Majesty. During the audience with
His Late Majesty, Phra Aphainurat pleaded for the control of Setul and Lu-ngu [and
Chao Phraya Zaiburi concurred]. His Late Majesty graciously granted the request to both
Phra Aphainurat and Chao Phraya Zaiburi. His Late Majesty also ordered Phraya
Ratchamontri, Phra Sombatbodi [and] Phra Sinaowarat to accompany Chao Phraya
Songkhla back [to the southern region]. The royal order was for [these officials] to work
out with Chao Phraya Songkhla details of the partition of [the Kedah administration
following the request made by Phra Aphainurat]. Now Phra Aphainurat no longer wishes
to stay and administer Setul and Lu-ngu, but would prefer the districts of Parapok
[Merbok], Kuala Muda and Kerian. It is said that his wish has received the consent of his
elder brother, Chao Phraya Zaiburi. However, in spite of the report of the change to Chao
Phraya Songkhla, the latter has yet to report on the matter to Bangkok.
It is unbecoming to listen to one side of the affair only. There will be no problem if
there is consensus between the two brothers, as here stated. The concern is that this
might not be the case, and Chao Phraya Zaiburi and Phra Aphainurat might, in fact, be in
conflict [over this request].
His Majesty ordered that [an inquiry be conducted] and Tengku Ahmad
RajaPattana-inthara and Tuan Kaya Pakamaha Mata-Mata, the two officials in charge of
the bungamas dan perak mission from Kedah to Bangkok, were called in to verify the
13 King Rama I, who had been instrumental in the elevation of Tunku Pangeran to the throne of Kedah.
71
PART 2, 1999
story. Both Tengku Ahmad RajaPattana-inthara and Tuan Kaya Pakamaha Mata-Mata
confirmed to His Majesty that Phra Aphainurat had requested the three districts from
Chao Phraya Zaiburi, and the latter has agreed to the request.
Once the matter was confirmed, His Majesty the King opined that the fact that
Chao Phraya Zaiburi willingly welcomed the assistance of his younger brother to
administer the affairs of the three districts displayed his maturity and statesmanship.
[With the new responsibility, Phra Aphainurat deserved a promotion] His Majesty
elevated Phra Aphainurat [from the rank of a phra to the rank of a phraya] to the title of
Phraya Aphainurat[raja], and graciously bestowed upon him [the following]:
Five с hang [400 baht]
One red khemkhab jacket (with a Thai motif of small flowers)
One dark purple khemkhab jacket (with an Indian motif)
Two Japanese-styled jackets (altogether 4 jackets)
One piece of sarong with gold embroidery
Two pieces of pha-poom sarongs (altogether 3 pieces)
One elephant saddle
Two three- tiered ruby rings
One gold-gilded sword
One set of gold utensils [consisting of] one spittoon, two containers, one container
with cover, one oblong cup, two knives (altogether 8 items)
One set of thorn utensils [consisting of] one face-washing container, one tray, one
oblong cup (altogether 3 items)
One big silver table
One small silver table
One set of platinum utensils [consisting of] two large tables, two small tables, two
face-washing containers, two spittoons, two trays (altogether 10 items).
His Majesty graciously consents to the agreement made by Chao Phraya Zaiburi
and ordered Phraya Aphainurat and his followers to move to the three districts of
Parapok [Merbok], Kuala Muda and Kerian. His Majesty the King also instructs him to
be diligent in his service to His Majesty.
When this tra arrives [in Kedah], it is the duty of Chao Phraya Zaiburi, together
with the state councillors, to copy out the order [for their own reference] and to return the
original copy to Phraya Aphainurat [for safe-keeping].
This tra is issued in Thai, one copy, in Malay one copy, of the same contents.
The tra is dated the sixth day of the thirteenth waxing moon, the ninth month, the
year of the Goat, Trisok [J.S. 1 173].
Text No. 4: Official Correspondence from Chao Phraya Akkramahasenathibodi to

Chao Phraya Zaiburi and State Councillors
His Majesty the King has instructed [that the following be conveyed to Chao Phraya
Zaiburi]. Recently, Chao Phraya Nakhon14 came to pay homage [to His Majesty]. During
the royal audience, he stated that he had become old, his eyes were failing and he tended
14 His personal name was Phat. He became the governor and ruler of Nakhon during the reign of King Taksin
(1768-82). His wife was a younger sister of one of Taksin's minor wives. As the viceroy of the south, Phat
had proved himself a competent official though he was quite a disappointment in time of war, such as
during the Burmese attack in 1808-9.
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JMBRAS VOL. LXXII
to be rather forgetful. Chao Phraya Nakhon confessed to His Majesty that he did not
think he could competently serve His Majesty and wished to be relieved of his duty.
At the same time, there was a report from Songkhla, stating that Chao Phraya
Songkhla15 had passed away after an illness. [This is worrying] as both Nakhon and
Songkhla are important and are in charge of other small muang in the area. [Both] are
coterminous with the Malay states with a big volume of trade trafficking [between the
borders]. Chao Phraya Nakhon, who has long been in charge of the affairs of the state [in
the south], now wishes to retire because of old age. [His Majesty the King] opines that to
allow Chao Phraya Nakhon to completely retire [is unwise]. Moreover, Chao Phraya
Nakhon has contributed a great deal to the success of the administration [of the south].
He is well versed in the past and present affairs of the area, of which much still remains
incomplete. His Majesty thus graciously elevates Chao Phraya Nakhon to the rank of
Chao Phraya Suthammontri-sisokaratwong Chettaphongluechai-anuthaithibodi-
aphaiphiriyaprakromphahu [supervising commissioner of the affairs of Nakhon]. His
Majesty then appoints Phra Borirakphubet,16 [Chao Phraya Nakhon's] son and assistant,
to the position of Phraya Nakhonsithammarat, responsible for the welfare of the people
and other matters in accordance with the traditional duties of the governor of Nakhon.
As to the Songkhla affairs, His Majesty the King is of the opinion that if Bangkok
were to send someone from the capital to administer Songkhla, such an official would
be at a disadvantage as he is very much ignorant of the affairs and customs of
[Songkhla]. As Songkhla is responsible for much of the royal trade and property thereby
accrued, it is obvious that Phra Wisetsunthon, nephew of the late Chao Phraya Songkhla,
who has been for some time sent to serve His Majesty in Bangkok and who serves His
Majesty with loyalty and honesty, is [a suitable candidate]. His Majesty has decided to
appoint him [governor of Songkhla] and sends him back to administer the affairs of that
province. It is to be remembered that during the Burmese attack [of the southern region],
Phra Wisetsunthon had acquitted himself admirably. His Majesty deems it appropriate to
elevate Phra Wisetsunthon to the rank of Phraya Wisetphakdi-sisurasongkhram,
governor of Songkhla. His Majesty also promotes Luang Sombatphirom to the position
of Phraya Sisombat Jangwang; Nai Seng, a younger brother of Phra Wisetsunthon, to the
rank of Luang Sunthonnurak, assistant governor of Muang Songkhla. Both are now sent
back to Songkhla to take up their duties and to take care of the people as customarily
required of such officials of the realm.
All these changes and developments have been recorded in the tra sent out to
Songkhla.
The letter is issued in Thai, one copy, and in Malay, one copy. The tra is dated the
second day of the eighth waning moon, the ninth month, the year of the Goat, Trisok
[J.S. 1173].
15 Chao Phraya Songkhla (Boon Hui), the first viceroy of the eastern seaboard.
16 The famous Chao Phraya Nakhon (Noi), who was widely believed to be a natural son of King Taksin as his
mother was said to have already been pregnant when she was presented by King Taksin to Chao Phraya
Nakhon (Phat). He would rise to become a successful viceroy who put the south in order and created much
fear among the Malay tributary lords, especially after the invasion and occupation of Kedah in 1821. It is
often said that his personal rivalry with Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin led to Bangkok's aggressive policy towards
Kedah. Noi was also well connected in Bangkok. One of his sisters became a minor wife of King Rama I,
and a son from the union, Prince Sakdipholasep, was later appointed the Prince of Wang Na, the heir
presumptive, in the reign of Rama III (1824-51). Noi's advice and suggestions concerning Kedah and the
southern region were favourably received by the Bangkok court throughout his term of governorship.
73
PART 2, 1999
Text No. 5: Official Correspondence from Chao Phraya Akkramahasenathibodi to

Muang Trangphura 17
Sarn-tra Chao Phraya Akkramahasenathibodi to Luang Sena, official in charge, Khun

Sisanom, member of the council.
His Majesty the King comments that in the past Muang Trangphura was under the
supervision of Muang Nakhon, but in the year of the Mouse Chasok, Phraya Palibong18
and Chao Phraya Nakhon found themselves in conflict. His Late Majesty decided [to
solve the problem by taking] Muang Trangphura out of Nakhon' s jurisdiction and make
it answerable directly to Bangkok. After the death of Phraya Palibong, His Majesty
appointed Luang Ritsongkhram as chief of Muang Trangphura. However, Luang
Ritsongkgram was inexperienced in the affairs of the state. Whenever difficulties arose
in the administration, he was left with no reliable advisers/guidance as the distance
between Trangphura and Bangkok is quite far. His Majesty has decided to put back
Trangphura under the jurisdiction of Songkhla.
Now Luang Ritsongkhram is no longer with us; and Chao Phraya Songkhla, who
was his supervisor, has also passed away. It seems [an unwise move] if Trangphura
remains under the jurisdiction of Songkhla at a time when Nakhon is in need of
manpower in defence of the western seaboard. [Remember] the Burmese army which
attacked Muang Thalang only retreated because of the fear of His Majesty's great merit
and baramii. They did not retreat because of the military manoeuvres on the part of the
Siamese commanders or rank and file who were reluctant to pursue the withdrawing
Burmese troops. It is His Majesty's concern that because the Thai army did not actually
defeat the Burmese invaders, Burma might want to wage war on the south again, and
[without due preparations] we would again be overrun.
In this context, Muang Nakhon, Phattalung and Songkhla are big towns with more
manpower than any other muang in the south. It is here instructed that every one [of
these towns] must be well prepared [for any sudden attack] with river mouths
[protected], with well cultivated paddy fields, well-stocked barns, and a fleet of men-of-
war in a state of readiness in all the three western seaboard towns. This is most necessary
and, if required, each must be able to mobilize in support of the others.
[Also important is the war strategy] which in the last war was concentrated on
Trangphura alone. [As we have found out], such arrangement was difficult, particularly
to the food transport line which had to be done by land and therefore posed a seriously
heavy burden on the army. Such a strategy [is full of weaknesses]. If our enemies find
out [our weaknesses], they can prolong the war to our disadvantage, because we will not
be able to transport foodstuffs by land as fast and as efficiently as by waterway.
Now Phra Aphainurat has come to pay respects to His Majesty and has returned
the districts of Setul and Lu-ngu to Bangkok. In return, he has moved his family to the
district of Parapok [Merbok]. Setul and Lu-ngu are now vacated. [This raises another
strategy problem] as they can easily be occupied by the enemy and employed by them as
bases to prevent the southern towns from assisting each other in time of war. This is a
worrying situation which cannot be left unattended. His Majesty the Kin<* instructs [the
17 Now known as the Trang province, which is also the constituency of the incumbent prime minister of
Thailand, HE Mr Chuan Leekpai.
18 Governor of Trangphura.
74
JMBRAS VOL. LXXII
following]:
- That Phraya Sisombat Jangwang and Phraya Songkhla arrange for the defence
of the river mouths at Setul and Lu-ngu by sending loyal officers to be in charge of such
undertakings.
- That Muang Trangphura returns to the jurisdiction of Nakhon as formerly.
- That Phraya Nakhon sends reliable officials to encourage the Thai and Malay
population to take up residence in Muang Trangphura and help build up food stocks and
defend the river mouths of Trangphura in readiness for war.
- That the men formerly registered as manpower with Nakhon or Phattalung or
Songkhla who remain with their nai continue to do so.
- That those men who either registered as manpower in Trangphura and those
who escaped unofficially to find a living in Trangphura and are now unwilling to remain
in that town, are allowed to move to Setul, Lu-ngu or Songkhla in accordance with their
choices. They are also allowed to stay at Trangphura or Nakhon if they wish.
- That those men who are debtors in Nakhon and/or Songkhla can only move out
of the said town after Phraya Nakhon agrees to pay their debts; if they choose to move to
Setul, Lu-ngu or Songkhla, then it is Phraya Songkhla who must clear their debts in
Nakhon before their departure to the chosen towns.
- That Bangkok will be sending commissioners who are in charge of the
registration of the lek in the south. [Once the registration by the Bangkok commissioners
begins] any lek who have problems with their registration will have to come and resolve
the problem with the registration commissioners within a period of three months.
Whatever is decided by the commissioners is final. There can be no free movement of
lek after the registration exercises by the commissioners. Those registered men must
remain with their nai.
- That the 13 boat cannons which were bought by Phraya Palibong and Luang
Ritsongkhram for the use of Muang Palibong and other armaments in the stockpile be
divided equally between Songkhla and Nakhon.
- That the Trangphura birds' nest concession which was first granted to Muang
Songkhla between the year of the Goat, Trisok, and the year of the Monkey, Jattawasok,
remains with Songkhla for one year (namely the harvesting of the nests in the year of the
Goat but the tax collected was to be sent to Bangkok in the year of the Monkey). [The
harvesting] in the year of the Monkey will be done by Nakhon. Bangkok has already sent
a tra to inform Songkhla about the [new arrangement].
You are also reminded that although Bangkok has sent correspondence to Zaiburi
reminding both Chao Phraya Zaiburi and the state council of their obligation to deliver
boats [for official purposes in preparation for war] to Trang, Chao Phraya Zaiburi might
not realize the urgency of the matter and might not act promptly. [In such a case], the
boats concerned will surely fail to arrive before the monsoon season begins. Phraya
Nakhon is hereby ordered to send a mission to Zaiburi to remind Chao Phraya Zaiburi
[of his obligation] and [urge him] to deliver the boats to Trang as soon as possible. It is
hoped that these boats can be employed in the transport of the elephants [to Trang for
defence preparation] before the monsoon begins. ...
This tra is dated the fourth day of the third waxing moon, the tenth month, the year
of the Goat, Trisok [J.S. 1 173].
75
PART 2, 1999
II
Explanation and Analysis
All five dispatches deal, in general, with the affairs of the western seaboard of the
southern region which came under the political orbit of Bangkok, and with
Kedah-Bangkok affairs, in particular. The significance of these short documents is self-
evident for those who are familiar with the history of Kedah-Siam tributary relations in
the nineteenth century. They are contemporary records of the events leading up to the
breakdown in Kedah-Siam relations and of the eventual invasion and occupation of
Kedah by the Siamese army in 1821. As mentioned earlier, the significance of these
documents lies in the fact that they tell a totally different story from that which is
accepted as fact concerning the slow and complex development of hostilities between the
two parties in the first quarter of the nineteenth century.
Before proceeding to examine the significance of the events recorded in the five
documents above, it will be useful to give a brief history of Kedah-Siam relations during
the crucial years between 1803 and 1818.
The eventful reign of Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin Halim Shah (r. 1803-21; 1841-3)
began in 1803. 19 Born Tunku Pangeran to Wan Mas, one of the two major consorts of
Sultan Abdullah Mukarram Shah, and the eldest of Sultan Abdullah's nine sons, Sultan
Ahmad Tajuddin II came to the throne with the help of the Siamese troops sent to Kedah
to make certain that the Siamese royal command appointing Tunku Pangeran as ruler of
Kedah was obeyed and acted upon. The return of Kedah to the political orbit of Siam in
1803 marked the beginning of a new era in the traditional relations between the two
states. It was the first time that a ruler of Kedah, which had intermittently recognized the
loose overlordship of Siam in the context of traditional Southeast Asian intraregional
relations, had received the throne of Kedah as 'a gift from the King of Siam'.20 In return,
the then Tunku Pangeran willingly performed homage to Rama I (1782-1809), his
chosen overlord, and declared himself a tributary vassal ( chao prathetsarat) to
Bangkok.21 However, Tunku Pangeran's success in wresting the throne from his paternal
uncle, Sultan Dhiauddin (r. 1798-1803) by force became, ironically, one of the root
causes of the continuous political turbulence throughout the first part of his reign.22 If
Tunku Pangeran/Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin could win the throne by involving an outside
power to topple a legitimate ruler, there was no reason why other aspiring Kedah princes
should not adopt a similar strategy to fulfil their royal ambitions. That was exactly what
19 Bonney has made an exhaustive study of the events leading to the accession of Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin to
the Kedah throne in 1803. See R. Bonney, Kedah 1771-1821: The Search for Security and Independence ,
Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1971, pp. 104-11. Cyril Skinner called Bonney Sultan Ahmad
Tajuddin's 'ablest defender'.
20 These words were used by Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin to the British authorities, and are quoted in Kobkua
Suwannathat-Pian, Thai-Malay Relations: Traditional lntra-regional Relations from the Seventeenth to the
Early Twentieth Centuries , Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 75.
21 Ibid., pp. 74-5.
22 In return for agreeing to relinquish the Kedah throne in favour of Tunku Pangeran, Sultan Dhiauddin was
allowed to return to Perlis, with his former title of Sultan Muda, where he had been appointed by his father
before he occupied the Kedah throne in 1798. Interestingly, Sultan Dhiauddin was the ruler who decided to
lease Province Wellesley to the English East India Company (EIC) in return for an additional $4,000 yearly
rent. The Sultan also believed that he had secured a pledge from the EIC to come to Kedah' s assistance in
times of difficulty with Siam. However, the English governments in Penang and India did not concur with
his understanding. Dhiauddin died around 1810.
76
JMBRAS VOL. LXXII
occurred repeatedly during the crucial years leading to the invasion and occupation of
Kedah by the Siamese.
It is important to remember that Sultan Abdullah, the father of Sultan Ahmad
Tajuddin, left behind a large family of nine sons and eleven daughters from five different
wives.23 As was common in Malay royal families, the relationship among the royal
children of Sultan Abdullah was an unhappy one. There appeared to be covert and overt
rivalries, conflicts and competitions among the royal brothers for both the throne and
other socioeconomic interests within the state. By 1803, when Tunku Pangeran
succeeded in snatching the throne from Sultan Dhiauddin, it was evident that in
eliminating one political rival he had, in the process, gained many more. Ahmad
Tajuddin tried to control the situation by acquiescing to the appointment of his main rival
and full brother, Tunku Bisnu, as the Raja Muda.24 If he thought such a move would
solve the problem of sibling rivalry, he very much misread the tenacity and ambitions of
his royal brothers.
Almost from the beginning, Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin's brothers were bent on
getting what they believed to be theirs by birthright. This included a fair share of the
$10,000 paid annually by the Penang authorities for the lease of Penang and Province
Wellesley. Disputes ensued between the Sultan and his brothers, especially between the
ruler and Tunku Ibrahim, Tunku Bisnu, Tunku Yaakob and Tunku Daud. At one time, it
was reported that Tunku Daud launched an armed insurrection against the ruler but failed
to dislodge him.25 During these difficult times with his brothers, Ahmad Tajuddin often
requested assistance and advice from the Penang government, something very much
frowned upon by Nakhon and Bangkok. However, between the years 1803 and 1808 his
main challenger was Tunku Bisnu. The latter managed to establish a good relationship
with the Siamese governor of Nakhon who was also the superintendent of the affairs of
Kedah. This naturally resulted in a tense and uneasy relationship between the Sultan and
his immediate Siamese superior. To offset the apparent disadvantage, Ahmad Tajuddin
cultivated close and friendly ties with the governor of Songkhla, the Siamese viceroy in
charge of the eastern coastal area of the south. The move complicated the intense rivalry
23 According to Anderson, Sultan Abdullah had two major wives (permaisur i) and four favourite minor wives
( gundik ). One major wife, Wan Mas, bore the Sultan three sons -Tunku Pangeran, Tunku Bisnu and Tunku
Petra - and six daughters, while the other major wife, Wan Meh, was childless. Other sons and daughters
were born of the four minor wives. See J. Anderson, Political and Commercial Considerations Relative to
the Malayan Peninsula and the British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca, Penang, 1824, pp. 154-5;
reprinted in Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society , 35(4), 1962. Prince Damrong,
however, claims that Sultan Abdullah had ten sons and gives their names as follows: Tunku Raya, Tunku
Pangeran, Tunku Bisnu, Tunku Ibrahim, Tunku Sulaiman, Tunku Su, Tunku Daud, Tunku Mom (also
known as Tunku Embun), Tunku Ahmad and Tunku Yusuf. See Prince Damrong, 'Introduction',
Chotmaihet Luang Udomsombat , Bangkok: Kurusabha, 1996.
24 Prince Damrong-rajanubhab, Phongsawadan Krung Rattanakosin Reign 2, Bangkok: Kurusabha, 1962,
Vol. 1, p. 118; Cyril Skinner, 'Prince Damrong's Introduction to the Dispatches of Luang Udomsombat',
Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society , 54(2), 1981, p. 80. The story concerning
Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin' s attempt to sort out the competitions among his brothers varies. According to
contemporary Thai sources, Ahmad Tajuddin first appointed Tunku Bisnu as Raja Muda, then replaced him
with another younger brother, Tunku Ibrahim. According to Bonney, who cites British sources, the Sultan
appointed his half brother, Tunku Ibrahim, as Raja Muda. The confusion probably arises from the fact that
by 1811 Tunku Ibrahim had replaced Tunku Bisnu as Raja Muda as the Sultan became more and more
suspicious of Tunku Bisnu.
25 Mohammad Isa Othman, Politik Tradisional Kedah 1681-1942 , Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan
Pustaka, 1990, p. 26.
77
PART 2, 1999
that existed between the governors of Nakhon and Songkhla.

What began as plain infighting among royal siblings for power and riches in Kedah
increasingly developed into an international sociopolitical entanglement that eventually
resulted in Kedah losing its sovereignty in 1821. 26 The main players in this tragic period
in the history of Kedah included the Sultan and his royal brothers, the governors of
Songkhla and Nakhon, the English governments in Penang and India, the Burmese court,
and the Siamese King and his aristocratic advisers in Bangkok. Within academic circles,
it is generally accepted that the political instability in Kedah from the year 1803 could
have been managed in the strong hands of Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin had it not been for the
fact that his rivals were able to call upon the intervention of outsiders, especially upon
the authority of the King of Siam, in support of their causes. The story is clearly told by
Bonney, who bases his analysis on sources found in the archives of the East India Office,
that the intervention and the excessive demands made on the Sultan by Bangkok actually
put the Sultan in such straits that he was unable either to put his own house in order or to
fulfil his proper obligations to Bangkok.27 The five documents above tell a different
story, at least as far as the intervention or interference and excessive demands are
concerned.
It is relevant to comment here on the part played by the Siamese authorities in the
conflicts and rivalries between Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin and his ambitious brothers.
According to Thai sources, the power struggle between Sultan Dhiauddin and the sons of
Sultan Abdullah Mukarram Shah around the year 1803 prompted Tunku Pangeran and
his younger brother, Tunku Bisnu, to make a trip to Nakhon to solicit the help of
Bangkok against their uncle, the reigning Sultan Dhiauddin. At the time, for reasons
which are not clear, Chao Phraya Nakhon (Phat) preferred Tunku Bisnu to be appointed
the new ruler of Kedah. However, both brothers were brought to Bangkok and presented
at an audience with King Rama I. As mentioned earlier, Rama I endorsed the claim of
Tunku Pangeran, the eldest son of Sultan Abdullah, to succeed his father. Tunku Bisnu
was, at the same time, appointed Raja Muda with the Siamese tile of Phra
Aphainuratraja.28 Both were then sent back to Kedah, together with a Thai army unit, to
be installed respectively as ruler and Raja Muda of that state. It is clear that from the
very beginning of his personal contact with Nakhon, Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin found his
relationship with Nakhon difficult. More than likely, the experience must have
influenced his subsequent behaviour towards Nakhon and Songkhla.
Historically, since the time of Ayudhya (up to the last years of the eighteenth
century), the southern region, including the Siamese Malay tributaries, had been under
the jurisdiction of Nakhon Si Thammarat, commonly known as Ligor, which acted as
Siam's viceroy for the south. However, during the reign of King Rama I of Bangkok, the
southern region increasingly became a target for Burmese invasions and attacks. During
one such attack, in 1785, for example, the southern region proved itself unprepared and
26 Kobkua, Thai-Malay Relations , Ch. 3.

27 Bonney, Kedah , especially Ch. 5. His analysis is commonly quoted and followed by scholars, both local
and foreign. For example, see Mohammad Isa Othman, Politik Tradisional Kedah .
28 Prince Damrong, Phongsawadan , Vol. 2., pp. 117-19. Normally a ruler of a Siamese tributary would be
given the rank of phraya while his assistant that of phra , i.e. equivalent to the rank and dignity of a Siamese
governor of a first-class province. However, such a title could be elevated in accordance with the
outstanding achievements of an individual governor or ruler. As we shall see, Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin was
promoted in 1809-10 to the exalted rank of chao phraya , making him a peer of his superintendent, the
governor of Nakhon (Phat).
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JMBRAS VOL. LXXII
incapable of defending its own territory. Most of the main towns, including Chumphon,
Chaiya, Takua-pa and Takua-thung, fell easily to the Burmese onslaught. Burmese
troops then successfully lay siege to Phattalung, Songkhla and Thalang (Junk Ceylon).29
These southern provinces repeatedly proved unable to withstand the military might of
King Badawpaya. It was evident, therefore, that Nakhon alone was unable to effectively
administer the security of the whole of the southern region. It was during the campaign
led by Prince Wang Na Surasi, the heir presumptive to Rama I, in 1785, to expel the
Burmese invaders from the south and to reestablish the Siamese sphere of influence over
the Malay states which had traditionally recognized the Siamese political superiority,
that the governor of the then second-class town of Songkhla, Luang Suwannakhiri (Boon
Hui), proved himself a capable commander against Pattani.30 It was likely also that Rama
I was looking for an excuse to curb the wide power given to the governor of Nakhorn,
Chao Phraya Nakhon (Phat), by his predecessor King Taksin. To the founder of the
Chakri Dynasty, Phat posed a worrying link in the loyal chain of command to the newly
founded dynasty in Bangkok. As result, Boon Hui was promoted to the rank of Phraya
Songkhla; the town itself was also elevated to the status of a first-class province, while
Boon Hui' s younger brother became his assistant with the tile of Phra Anantasombat.
Nevertheless, Songkhla remained within the jurisdiction of Nakhon.31 The fact that there
were now two first-class provinces in the south, both vying for dominant sociopolitical
and economic influence within the region, did little to help smooth the relationship
between the ambitious governors of these two provinces. By 1791, the governor of
Songkhla, Boon Hui, had been elevated to the rank of chao phraya and viceroy of the
eastern coastal provinces, including Pattani (now divided into seven principalities) and
Trengganu. Nakhon remained the viceroy of the western seaboard and was responsible
for the affairs of Kedah and, later, Kelantan.32 By the beginning of the nineteenth
century, the rivalry and hostility between Chao Phraya Nakhon (Phat) and Chao Phraya
Songkhla (Boon Hui) became common knowledge, even in Bangkok. Although the new
division of power and responsibility improved the security of the south, it did nothing to
improve the bitter and personalized feud between the two leading aristocratic families.
The fierce Songkhla-Nakhon rivalry provided a sociopolitical backdrop to the conflicts
among the Kedah royal brothers. Intentionally or otherwise, the Tunku Bisnu/Tunku
Ibrahim camp allied itself with the Nakhon clique while the Sultan found his friend and
benevolent supporter in the Songkhla clique. Thus, the power struggle in Kedah became
a part of the rivalry and bitter conflict between Songkhla and Nakhon, each apparently
bent on obtaining 'victory' for their respective protégé.33
Another relevant development in Thai politics of the early Bangkok period was
29 On the Burmese attack and the restructure of the administration of the south, see Chao Phraya
Thipakorawong (trans. Thadeus and Chadin Flood), Phongsawadan Krung Rattanakosin Reign /, Tokyo:
Centre of East Asian Cultural Studies, 1978, Vol. 1, pp. 109-18.
30 In the campaign, only Pattani among the Malay states resisted the demand of the Prince of Wang Na that
they accept the traditional status of tributary to Siam. An army was sent to subjugate Pattani. It was during
this military campaign that Boon Hui's ability attracted the attention of the Prince. Kedah and Trengganu
meekly obeyed the demand. Kelantan at the time was still a part of Trengganu. See Prince Damrong,
'Introduction'.
3 1 Phraya Songkhla was eventually promoted to a Bangkok viceroy, with the title of Chao Phraya, in charge of
the eastern coastal tributaries, i.e. Pattani and Trengganu after 1791.
32 Prince Damrong, Phongsawadan, Vol. l,pp. 146-50.
33 Ibid., Vol. 2.
79
PART 2, 1999
Bangkok's apparent concern, at times bordering on paranoia, over the question of

security of the kingdom, particularly the southern region. This was obviously a
consequence of the continuing struggle for the survival of Siam since the fall of the old
capital at Ayudhya in 1767. Since then, Thonburi-Bangkok had been facing a series of
attacks and invasions from Burma. In the short reign of King Taksin alone (1767-82),
the Siamese had to repel unrelenting Burmese attacks more than ten times. Burma's
continuous pressure continued in the reigns of Rama I and Rama II. In the last years of
Rama I, for instance, the Burmese suddenly diverted their forces intended for an attack
on Bangkok and instead conducted a lightning strike on Thalang. Only the news that the
main Siamese army was being sent from Bangkok to assist the southern forces, who were
in disarray, caused the Burmese troops to withdraw. The traumatic experience of the fall
of Ayudhya, plus an awareness of the danger threatening the survival of the kingdom,
particularly from the weakened and often unreliable southern region, helped to explain
why Bangkok during the time of King Rama II was so keenly sensitive to the question of
loyalty and reliability of its front-line states, be they Nakhon, Songkhla or Kedah. It was
unfortunate for Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin and Kedah that the power struggle in that state
became intertwined with the local Nakhon-Songkhla conflict, thus highlighting further
the persistent concern of Bangkok with the loyalty of its southern tributaries.
The sensitivity of Bangkok concerning the security of the kingdom from Burmese
attack was heightened with the discovery of a letter sent by the Burmese general, after
the Burmese had managed to take control of Thalang in the 1808-9 invasion, to Sultan
Ahmad Tajuddin soliciting his cooperation: 'Formerly, Muang Zai was a tributary to
Muang Phama [Burma]. Now that Thalang is within the hands [of Phama], [we] decide
to award the birds' nest island to [Muang Zaiburi if] Phraya Zai sends the bunga mas dan
perak [to Phama] as required by custom.'34 However, unbeknown to the Sultan, by the
time the Burmese letter got to Ahmad Tajuddin, the Burmese had been forced to
withdraw from Thalang at the news of the approaching Bangkok army. Thinking that he
was still in a very tight situation because the outcome of the war was as yet uncertain,
Ahmad Tajuddin did the only thing possible for a ruler of a small state lying under the
shadow of two great military powers: he tried to cultivate the Burmese. A letter was sent
to the Burmese general through the Sultan's representative, together with appropriate
gifts.35 Under the circumstances, such a move would not have been misinterpreted if
Ahmad Tajuddin had reported his action to Nakhon or Bangkok. That he failed to do so
raised much concern in Bangkok and, in the long run, damaged his own stand vis-à-vis
Bangkok. The incident increased the credibility of Nakhon in the eyes of Bangkok when
it came to Nakhon's dealing with Kedah and Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin.36
A final point before our story begins regards the Thalang war. Thalang, or Junk
Ceylon (present-day Phuket), was a major Siamese port on the Adaman Sea and Indian
Ocean. It also commanded a strategic position in the defence of the western seaboard.
Thalang became a prime target of the Burmese southern thrust in their plans for a multi-
pronged attack and the subjugation of Bangkok. There were two successive Burmese
34 Chotmaihet Reign //, the confession of one Nga-sa-ton, a Burmese prisoner of war, on Muang Phama and
the attack of the Malay Peninsula.
35 Ibid.
36 Perhaps a good example of Bangkok* s obvious trust in Nakhon is the Kalahom letter of appointment of the
new Phraya Nakhon in 181 1. See Chotmaihet Reign //, Kalahom Letter to Phraya Nakhon Si Thammarat,
dated Wednesday of the fourth waning moon, the ninth month, J.S. 1 173/181 1.
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JMBRAS VOL. LXXII
attempts to occupy Thalang between 1809 and 1811. It was during the second attack, in
1810-1 1, that Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin and the Kedah force proved themselves most able
in the war against the Burmese.37 Yet, it is ironical that Thalang was the cause of
Bangkok's first seed of suspicion of Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin's loyalty and liability.
Thalang was also the reason for his being awarded the highest rank of chao phraya ,
making him, in 1811, even higher than his immediate supervisor, Phraya Nakhon
(Noi).38 His elevation to such a high status must have irked Phraya Nakhon, whose
personal and official relations with the ruler of Kedah were fraught with mutual tension
and suspicion, partly due to the fact that Nakhon entertained complaints and reports from
Tunku Bisnu, Tunku Ibrahim and Tunku Yaakob, all of whom adopted a negative stand
towards the Sultan, and partly because the Sultan had been elevated to the rank of chao
phraya. One of the main outcomes of this personal animosity was the attitude and policy
of Nakhon towards Kedah, which often differed from the general policy mapped out by
Bangkok.39
***
Our story begins one year after the second attack on Thalang. In
bunga mas dan perak mission to Bangkok, which doubled up as an m
state's contribution to the cremation of the remains of Rama I. A
representing the tributary mission was Tunku Bisnu Phra Aphainur
time, no longer carried the title of Raja Muda. Tunku Bisnu came
message to report to his overlord - that he had surrendered the fiefs
which had been given to him at the beginning of the reign of Sulta
More important was his message that Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin had ag
Tunku Bisnu, apparently in exchange for Setul and Lu-ngu, the three
Kuala Muda and Kerian.40 His report was confirmed by other Kedah
sure that the report was accurate, Rama II instructed that a letter be s
confirmation. The correspondence shows that Bangkok was neit
initiated the fief exchange desired by Tunku Bisnu, nor an active pa
Bonney and other scholars believe.42 From this correspondence,
decision, regardless of the rationale behind it, was reached between th
Bangkok was then asked to give its approval to th с fait accompli don
went along with the new arrangement and, as a sign of Bangkok
Bisnu was promoted to the rank of Phraya Aphainuratraja and was gi
garments of honour and utensils denoting his new rank.
From various sources, it can be deduced that Tunku Bisnu ha
position as Raja Muda before his trip to Bangkok in 1811, most likel
1808. Since the appointment of Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin in 1803, both
37 Muhammad Yusoff Hashim, Syair Sultan Maulana' Prince Damrong, Phongsa

1809-10, when he was promoted to the rank of Chao Phraya, Sultan Ahmad
commended for his effort in helping Bangkok in the Thalang war against Burma.
38 As Text No. 4 records, Noi was appointed governor of Nakhon only in 1811 with
achieved the highest rank of chao phraya in 1821, after he had subjugated Kedah.
39 See Kobkua, Thai-Malay Relations, Ch. 3.
40 Not Yen district as stated by Skinner, 'Prince Damrong's Introduction', fn. 27.
41 See Text No. 3 above.
42 Bonney, Kedah , pp. 125-6.
81
PART 2, 1999
his other brothers had not been happy with the Sultan's decision, inter alia , not to share
the $10,000 annual income from the lease of Penang and Province Wellesley with his
royal siblings. The disputes became so serious that the Sultan had to seek the assistance
of the governor of Songkhla. An amicable solution was reached only after the governor
of Songkhla brought both Ahmad Tajuddin and Tunku Bisnu to Bangkok around
1807-8.
King Rama I granted Tunku Bisnu his request for the districts of Setul and Lu-ngu
apparently in return for his surrendering the title of Raja Muda, which was then bestowed
on Tunku Ibrahim, another brother-contender of the Sultan.43 As far as Bangkok was
concerned, the royal mediation had solved the bickering and conflict among the Kedah
princes. Thus, to Bangkok and Rama II, the development reported in 1811 by Tunku
Bisnu was unexpected. Nevertheless, they were willing to go along with it. The King
even praised the Sultan for behaving in a manner becoming of a mature ruler and a phu
yaai (senior).44 Soon after the 1811 trip to Bangkok, as reported in Texts 1 and 2, the
conflict between Tunku Bisnu and the Sultan again flared up. In 1813, it was reported
that Ahmad Tajuddin had refused to let Tunku Bisnu take over the Kuala Muda area as
promised and unsuccessfully negotiated for his brother to look for another district as a
replacement to the districts promised earlier. Bangkok sent an order that Phraya Nakhon
(Noi) was to bring both parties to Bangkok to settle the matter once and for all.45 From
the subsequent correspondence, and for inexplicable reasons, Phraya Nakhon failed to
present the two princes to the Bangkok court as instructed.
A year after the flare-up of their on-and-off conflict, Phraya Aphainuratraja/ Tunku
Bisnu was granted the birds' nest farm in the western seaboard area. In that year, it was
reported that the governor of Phattalung was sent to settle a serious dispute between the
Sultan and Tunku Bisnu, presumably arising out of the Sultan's unilateral decision to
bestow the district of Kuala Muda on the new Raja Muda, Tunku Ibrahim.46 This time,
though, Tunku Bisnu did not mind taking over Perlis as a quid-pro-quo compensation for
the loss of Kuala Muda. However, this solution was not possible since Perlis had been
earmarked by the Sultan for his son, Tunku Abdullah.47 The Sultan again tried to
persuade his younger brother to accept only Merbok and Kerian. The offer was flatly
refused. Bangkok found the ensuing conflict most disturbing, particularly since there
seemed to be no solution in sight. Meanwhile, the King and the Senabodi were very
much concerned with the situation in the south and the ability or otherwise to effectively
handle any external threats. Rama II was also sympathetic to the plight of Tunku Bisnu:
4 [As the dispute cannot be resolved] Phraya Aphainurat becomes impoverished with no
income even to sustain his wives and children. Because of this, His Majesty graciously
grants Phraya Aphainurat the birds' nest farm which formerly was given to Phraya
43 Text No. 3; Bonney, however, states that it was Phraya Songkhla who decided that Tunku Bisnu was given
Setul and Lu-ngu and Tunku Ibrahim confirmed as Raja Muda with control over the Sungai Muda basin.
See Bonney, Kedah , pp. 1 13-14. The translated documents clearly show that this analysis is inaccurate.
44 Text No. 3.
45 Chotmaihet Reign II. Correspondence from Chao Phraya Akkramahasenathibodi to Phraya Nakhon, dated
the fourth day of the tenth waning moon, the ninth month, J.S. 1 175/1813.
46 This account, and the subsequent development, is based on Chotmaihet Reign //, Correspondence to Phraya
Si Thammasokrat [Phraya Nakhon], dated Monday of the eighth waxing moon, the first month, J.S.
1176/1814.
47 Presumably Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin had accepted Bangkok's suggestion that Perlis be given to his eldest
son, Tunku Abdullah. See Text No. 2.
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JMBRAS VOL. LXXII
Nakhon and Phraya Songkhla.'48 Unfortunately, Tunku Bisnu did not live long to enjoy
this lucrative source of income. He passed away the following year, the same year as
Raja Muda Tunku Ibrahim.49
Why Ahmad Tajuddin should promise to let his brother and main rival take
possession of the three lucrative districts in 1811 is puzzling. It is possible that the Sultan
was simply buying time and had no intention whatsoever of keeping his promise. This
became clear when, in 1813, Phraya Nakhon reported on the continuing feud between the
two brothers arising from the fact that Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin refused to hand over
Kuala Muda and the other two districts to Tunku Bisnu. The Sultan also refused to
consider Perlis as an alternative to Kuala Muda as put forward by his younger brother.50
In fact, after his so-called consent for Tunku Bisnu to exchange Setul and Lu-ngu for the
three districts in the Sungai Muda area in 1810-11, Ahmad Tajuddin had done nothing
but discourage his younger brother and rival from taking him up on his promise. Thus,
instead of losing his power and territories to his brother, as analysed by Bonney and
Mohammad Isa Othman, the Sultan continued his successful run against Tunku Bisnu
between 1810 and 1815, who eventually lost both Setul and Lu-ngu and the promised
three districts of Merbok, Kuala Muda and Kerian to his cunning brother.51
The most serious threat to the position of Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin came, in fact,
not from Tunku Bisnu but from Tunku Ibrahim, whom the Sultan had selected to replace
Tunku Bisnu as Raja Muda around 1807-8. Even in 1811, when Tunku Bisnu and the
Sultan appear to have succeeded in patching up their differences, it was implied in a
letter that the Sultan had failed to appease the Raja Muda, Tunku Ibrahim, who had
abruptly left Perlis and taken up residence in Prai.52 If Mohammad Isa Othman is correct,
it was also Tunku Ibrahim who launched an armed revolt to dislodge the Sultan in 1815,
losing his life in the process.53 The death of Tunku Ibrahim, so soon after that of Tunku
Bisnu, effectively reduced the opposition to Ahmad Tajuddin. The Sultan finally chose
another half brother, Tunku Yaakob/Embun/Mom, to replace Tunku Ibrahim.54 As it
48 Chotmaihet Reign //, Correspondence to Phraya Nakhon, dated Monday of the eighth waxing moon, the
first month, J.S. 1 176/1814. On the birds' nest concession to Nakhon and Songkhla, see Text No. 5.
49 Chotmaihet Reign //, Correspondence to Phraya Nakhon, dated Friday of the sixth waning moon, the eighth
month, J.S. 1177/1815, and another dated Saturday of the third waning moon, the eighth month, J.S.
1178/1816.
50 Chotmaihet Reign //, Correspondence from Chao Phraya Akkramahasenathibodi to Phraya Nakhon, dated
Thursday of the tenth waning moon, the ninth month, J.S. 1 175/1813.
51 Both Bonney and Mohammad Isa conclude that Bisnu had ingratiated himself to both Phraya Songkhla [?]
and Rama II by getting more and more territories from his brother and by informing on Ahmad Tajuddin' s
alleged disloyal acts. Neither of these were reported in the Thai documents between the period under study
- that the Sultan was put under undue pressure to improve himself to his overlord. Mohammad Isa Othman,
Politik Tradisional Kedah , pp. 26-7; Bonney, Kedah , pp.1 14,125-6.
52 Text. No. 2.
53 Mohammad Isa Othman, Politik Tradisional Kedah , p. 27.
54 Muhammad Yusoff Hashim, Syair Sultan Maulana , pp. 419-22. There is confusion among the sources as to
the role of Ahmad Tajuddin's numerous brothers. From the argument above, it is reasonable to conclude
that the much maligned Tunku Bisnu had little role in the downfall of Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin at the hands
of Bangkok. His conflict with the Sultan was more on a personal level and in which he came out the loser.
Muhammad Hassan is more accurate than both Bonney and Burney when he identifies the royal brother
who informed the Thai authorities about the Sultan and his unsavoury activities against Bangkok, though he
is confused when it comes to the details of these activities. It was Tunku Yaakob, often referred to as Tunku
Embun, who seriously damaged Ahmad Tajuddin's reputation in the eyes of the Siamese. See Muhammad
Hassan bin Dato' Kerani Muhammad Arshad, Al-Tarikh Salasilah Negeri Kedah , Kuala Lumpur: Dewan
Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1968, pp. 144-7.
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turned out, this was an unfortunate choice. The new Raja Muda soon proved to be even
more daring in his efforts to undermine the position of the Sultan vis-à-vis Nakhon and
Bangkok.55
The translated documents also reveal that Bangkok-Nakhon-Kedah relations were
not as bad as portrayed in the accounts analysed by Bonney and recorded by the Burney
Papers, which principally accept the story sent from Kedah without knowing the actual
circumstances behind it.56 The gist of the conflict between Kedah and Siam is eloquently
stated in a letter from Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin to the Governor-General of India, dated 24
December 1810. In the letter, the Sultan accused Kedah' s overlord, namely Siam, under
King Rama II, of abuse of power. In the Sultan's words, Rama II and Bangkok had
violated the custom and tradition of their relationship:
Violence and severity have been exercised by the Siamese against Quedah
[Kedah], in demands and requisitions exceeding all former custom and
usage, and which I cannot support for a length of time.... During my
Administration their demands have been beyond measure increased, and
heavy services have been required of me, inconsistent with the custom of the
Country; these however I submitted to, as far as I have been able, for the
sake of the people, and to prevent the danger of a rupture with
them;... [ho we ver in spite of all his compliances] I cannot obtain any good
understanding with them, nor any peace, nor any termination to their injuries
and oppressions; they no longer confide in me and seek to attach blame,
alleging that I have joined with the Burmahs [sic], with whom this year, they
have made war, and their intention is to attack Quedah for the purpose of
reducing the Country under their Government.. . .57
I have argued elsewhere about the inaccuracy of these accusations, particularly in

light of the fact that Rama I had passed away in September 1809 and Rama II had ruled
for just over a year when this letter of complaint and appeal against Siamese
excessiveness was sent to the British authorities in India.58 The documents here
translated also confirm that Kedah-Siam relations were harmonious, with Bangkok
apparently allowing the Sultan a free hand in the internal affairs of Kedah. In 1809,
Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin himself, together with his entourage, made a presentation of the
bunga mas dan perak in conjunction with the celebration of the new king.59 All evidence
points to the fact that there was nothing seriously amiss in Kedah-Bangkok relations. On
the Thai side, in spite of the fact that Bangkok was informed of Ahmad Tajuddin's
political faux pas during the Burmese flash attack in 1808-9, Bangkok and Nakhon were
evidently willing to give Ahmad Tajuddin the benefit of the doubt and to overlook the
small lapse in loyalty of their tributary lord. Conversely, Ahmad Tajuddin, far from
being abused and maltreated, was, as discussed above, elevated to the highest rank to
which any Siamese vassal could aspire. The reason was obvious. Bangkok was very
anxious to secure Kedah* s co-operation in building up and strengthening the defence of
the southern region, especially along the western coastline. The five documents carry a
55 Ibid., pp. 150-1; Prince Damrong, 1962, Phongsawadan , Vol. 2, pp. 122-3.
56 H. Burney, The Burney Papers , Vols. 1-5, Bangkok: Vajirayan Library, National Library, 1910-14.
57 Ahmad Tajuddin's letter is quoted from Anderson, Political and Commercial Considerations , pp. 75-81.
58 Kobkua, Thai-Malay Relations , pp. 69-70.
59 Cyril Skinner, 'A Malay Mission to Bangkok during the Reign of Rama II , Journal of the Malaysian
Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society , 56(2), 1983, pp. 135-40.
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JMBRAS VOL. LXXII
common theme: the security of the southern area against possible Burmese attacks, and
the desire that there be no repetition of the disaster of 1809-10 which saw, as stated
above, the total fall of the main towns in the defensive chain of the kingdom. These
documents stress the significant role played by Kedah in strengthening the security of the
region.
In Text 2, for example, the correspondence dwells on the 1809-10 episode when
Thalang was lost to the Burmese because of the negligence of the officers in charge of
security in the south. It outlines the concerns and the rearrangements of strategy for the
western seaboard in which Kedah had a significant role to play. Rama II was most
concerned that a relocation of Tunku Bisnu to the Sungai Muda valley would leave Setul
and Lu-ngu defenceless. Because of his anxiety over the weak link in the defence line,
Rama II ordered that Songkhla take charge of the defence of Setul and Lu-ngu for the
time being to ease the burden on Chao Phraya Zaiburi. The new arrangement was to
remain in place until Thalang had recovered from the damage of the two wars which had
occurred within a span of two years. Bangkok had anticipated Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin's
unhappy response, and thus was anxious to soothe his doubts and suspicions about
Bangkok's moves. Rama II gently requested his tributary lord to put aside any
misgivings he might have and to cooperate with the governor of Songkhla to ensure the
success of the arrangement. Text 2 also reflects Bangkok's prime concern to strengthen
the western seaboard; the Senabodi of Kalahom instructed the Sultan to see to the affairs
of Perlis, which 'cannot be left unattended' .
Bangkok's efforts to make certain that the southern region was in a state of
readiness were stressed throughout the dispatches sent to other governors in the area. For
this reason, Bangkok quickly moved to appoint the new governors and leading officials
of Songkhla and Nakhon, as well as to reorganize the administration of the south with
the intention of making the region secure from external threat. The determination to put
the south in a state of preparedness was an outcome of the bitter experiences during King
Rama I's reign and the disaster of the first encounter with Burma in 1809-10. The
prevailing feeling among the ruling elite was that Burma would soon repeat its multi-
pronged attacks on Bangkok and once again exploit the weakness of the southern
defence system which, if found wanting, could easily lead to an attack on the capital
itself. Fortunately, Bangkok's defence efforts were never put to the test after 1810 as
Burma became engrossed in its internal and western border affairs. By the 1820s, the
conquest of Siam no longer held the prime attention of the Burmese king.
Much has been written about the excessive demands made by Bangkok after 1809
which climaxed in Kedah invading Perak and claiming it on behalf of the King of Siam
in 1816. It is sufficient to point out here that from both Thai and Malay sources it is clear
that Kedah contributed meaningfully to and participated in the Thalang war of
1809-10. 61 Thus, apart from the triennial bunga mas dan perak tribute mission to
60 Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin's over-anxiety in his letter must have come from his realization that Bangkok had
been informed of his contact with Burma, and he thus wished to secure assistance from the British more
against future retaliatory actions by Bangkok than against the so-called abuses by King Rama II. Maybe
one can argue that his willingness to accommodate the desire of his brother and main rival to swap Setul
and Lu-ngu with the three districts in the Sungai Muda area was the result of this apprehension. It is likely
that Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin wished to show Bangkok through the report of Tunku Bisnu his reasonable
approach towards ending the feud with his brother.
61 See Prince Damrong, Phongsawadan , Vol. 2, pp. 118-19; Muhammad Yusoff Hashim, Syair Sultan
Maulana.
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Bangkok, Kedah was asked in 1809-10 to fulfil its obligations as Siam's tributary by
providing military assistance. The state complied unhesitatingly and was praised and
rewarded for its contribution to the success of the war.62 It can thus be concluded that up
to 1811 Kedah-Siam relations were very much within the traditional norms of tributary
diplomacy, and that the claims made by Ahmad Tajuddin in his letter to the Governor-
General in India were unsubstantiated.
It is now relevant to look into the invasion of Perak. The Burney Papers mention
talks among some Perak chiefs about making an appeal to Songkhla and Nakhon for help
against the 'misgovernmenť of their own sultan even before 1813. This revelation is not
surprising; in fact, the Perak chiefs and the ruling elite were in the habit of calling upon
Siam to assist them in resolving internal crises and conflicts.63 Anderson's account,
written in 1824, has this to say: 'Kedah was reported to have suggested to the Penang
authorities that the Siamese plan to invade Perak was broached to the Kedah officials
around 1812/13. In Kedah's opinion, the plan had its origin in Nakhon and Songkhla,
and not in Bangkok.' Anderson further claims that the Kedah officials accompanying the
tributary mission to Bangkok sometime in 1814, were informed by King Rama II of the
Siamese desire to subjugate Perak. Ahmad Tajuddin then came to the conclusion that
Kedah would suffer badly if it did nothing to stall the Siamese invasion plan. The only
alternative open to Kedah was that Kedah would have to take over the invasion in order
to spare itself from being overrun by the Siamese forces on their way to conquer Perak.
Finally, it is an accepted fact that Kedah was either directly or indirectly compelled by
Bangkok to become an instrument executing Siam' s expansionist policy.64
Thai sources are inconsistent on the subject. Prince Damrong states that, on behalf
of Bangkok, Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin attacked and defeated Perak in 1812. Partly for this
great service and partly for his part in the Thalang war, the Sultan was elevated to the
rank of chao phraya.65 The Prince's assumption is inaccurate both concerning the date of
the Perak invasion and the bestowing of the chao phraya title. The Phongsawadan
Krung Rattanakosin , written by Chao Phraya Thiphakorawong, on the other hand,
completely overlooks this episode. Apparently, the great chronicler of the Bangkok
period did not think the affair deserved to be included in his Phongsawadan . The
collection of Documents Reign II first mentions Perak affairs in a letter from the chief
administrator of Prince Sakdipholasep to the Sultan of Kedah in 1816. The letter refers to
Ahmad Tajuddin' s earlier report that he had persuaded the Sultan of Perak to become a
vassal of Siam.66 According to this dispatch, Bangkok had sent an official to seek
62 Text No. 1, and the fact that the Sultan was promoted to the high rank of chao phraya by Rama 11 as an
expression of Bangkok's appreciation of his and Kedah's contribution to the war, leaves little doubt about
the Siamese court's satisfaction with its tributary lord. From this time onwards, all correspondence to
Kedah addressed the Sultan as Chao Phraya Zaiburi. On the confusion caused by the inaccuracy of Prince
Damrong' s account as to when the chao phraya rank was bestowed on the Sultan, see Prince Damrong,
Phongsawadan , Vol. 2, pp. 118-19; also Skinner, 'Prince Damrong's Introduction', especially pp. 80-1.
From my own research on Thai sources, I concur with Skinner that Ahmad Tajuddin was given the chao
phraya title after the Thalang war.
63 Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, 'The Quiet Affairs in the Siamese-Malay Relations in the Nineteenth Century',
Jebau 13, 1984/5, pp. 19-28.
64 Bonney, Kedah , Ch. 6.
65 Prince Damrong, Phongsawadan , Vol. 2, p. 1 19.
66 Chotmaihet Reign //, Correspondence from Meun Sakdipholaseb, Chief Administrator, to Chao Phraya
Ritsongkhram, Governor of Zaiburi, dated Friday of the eighth waning moon, the first month, J.S.
1178/1816.
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JMBRAS VOL. LXXII
confirmation from Kedah as to the truth of the earlier report concerning the Sultan of
Perak's willingness to accept Siam's overlordship and to ask Kedah to arrange for the
presentation of the Perak bunga mas dan perak mission. 'If Phraya Perak has agreed to
become a loyal subject of His Majesty the King as reported in the Nakhon
correspondence [citing a dispatch from Kedah], what are Chao Phraya Zaiburi and the
state councillors waiting for? [Let Chao Phraya Zaiburi] arrange for the sending of the
bunga mas dan perak mission by Phraya Perak [to Bangkok] as required by the
custom/67
The above correspondence confirms the fact that Kedah had approached Perak on
the subject of accepting tributary status from Siam (which was true), that Perak had
agreed to accept tributary relations with Bangkok (which was not true), and that
consequently Bangkok wished to receive the bunga mas dan perak mission from Perak
(also true). However, some equally important facts have been left out. For instance, who
took the initiative to revive the Perak-Siam tributary relations, Bangkok or Kedah? Why
should Nakhon and Songkhla agree to Kedah taking the lead in the subjugation of Perak?
Why should Bangkok choose to launch an 'expansionist' policy at a time when it could
hardly afford it, that is, in 1812? It is clear from the five documents under study that the
years 1811-12 saw Bangkok preoccupied to the point of obsession with dangers from
Burma who had sufficient power to subjugate Siam. Bangkok was primarily concerned
with the defence of the vulnerable western seaboard and the south. Serious dangers
posed by Burma did not begin to subside until the 1820s, by which time Bangkok
quickly grasped the first available opportunity to subjugate Kedah, by then believed to be
a disloyal and treacherous vassal. It is important to bear in mind that both Anderson and
Burney, the main sources employed by Bonney and other scholars, were not
contemporaries of the events they recorded. Their sources comprise correspondence
between Kedah and Penang and India. They were in no position to validate what had
been presented by Kedah concerning its role in the invasion of Perak. As argued above,
one such letter from Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin has proven, under scrutiny, to be woefully
unreliable and baseless.68
Documents Reign II talk of a report by Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin around 1814-15
on his role in persuading the Sultan of Perak to accept tributary status to Siam, implying
that the mission had been successful. It was clear that Ahmad Tajuddin had sent a
mission to Perak in 1813 to persuade the latter to accept vassal status to Siam, but he did
not receive a response from the Sultan of Perak until January 1814. In fact, only after
much more persuasion and prodding did he manage to obtain a definite answer - a
negative one - in May 1815.69 Ahmad Tajuddin was shocked because this was not the
answer he had been expecting. The answer was a disaster for the Sultan of Kedah as he
had already promised Bangkok that Perak would toe the Siamese line. The letter quoted
above must have reached him sometime in February 1817. Long before the letter asking
him for clarification of his earlier report, Ahmad Tajuddin knew what he had to do. He
launched an attack on Perak. He justified his move to the Governor of Penang, saying, 'I
have no alternative left but to invade Perak before a Siamese army comes ,70 (emphasis
67 Ibid.
68 See Ahmad Tajuddin' s letter to the Governor-General of India quoted above.
69 Bonney, Kedah, p. 139.
70 Raja of Kedah to Governor of Penang, 1 June 1816 , Straits Settlements Factory Record, quoted in Bonney,
Kedah , p. 146.
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added). It was certainly true that the Sultan had no alternative but to subjugate Perak by
force. But the attack was not done at the behest of Bangkok. It seems illogical, in the
light of Thai sources, that Bangkok was sending an army (as stated by the Sultan), and
that Bangkok had ordered Ahmad Tajuddin to launch an immediate attack' on Perak in
late 1816.71 As the quotation above reveals, in December 1816 Bangkok was still
puzzled as to why Ahmad Tajuddin had not arranged for a bunga mas dan perak
mission to be sent from Perak to the Bangkok court as required by the new relationship.
As far as Bangkok was concerned, Perak appeared to have already accepted the status of
tributary of Siam. There was no reason for an army to be sent to occupy the state. This
conclusion is confirmed by the fact that an official only was sent in 1816 to Kedah to
pursue the matter of the bunga mas dan perak mission due from Perak to the Bangkok
court.72
For lack of evidence, certain parts of the Perak episode in the Kedah-Siam
relationship remain a mystery, particularly that dealing with the initiators of the plan to
project Perak into the political orbit of Siam. Yet, as far as the actual Kedah attack of
Perak is concerned, it can only be surmised that Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin was forced to
send troops to defeat Perak in 1816 because of Sultan Mansur' s rejection of Siamese
tributary status. The attack on Perak in November 1816 was decided by the Sultan of
Kedah without reference to Bangkok. It is also clear that the move was made once
Ahmad Tajuddin realized that his assurance to Bangkok on the voluntary submission of
Perak had backfired. To save himself from an unthinkable fate at the hands of his
overlord, the Sultan chose to go to war. His account of being pressured by Bangkok to
wage war against Perak to the governor of Penang was a move aimed as much at gaining
sympathy and assistance as at forestalling Penang' s objection. Whatever lingering doubts
he might have had about launching a military operation against Perak, Ahmad Tajuddin
must have felt justified and relieved when he received the dispatch from Bangkok on the
Perak affair. Now he could report his genuine efforts of living up to the commitments
made to Bangkok. He could, with justification, point out that it was the ruler of Perak
who was the culprit. Conversely, Kedah was doing all it could to bolster the political and
military prestige of Siam. It was clear that throughout the Perak episode, Sultan Ahmad
Tajuddin received much sympathy and understanding from the English, and yet he was
definitely in the good books of his Siamese overlord, so much so, in fact, that Prince
Damrong mistakenly concludes that the Sultan was honoured with the title of chao
phraya after the subjugation of Perak to the envy of Phraya Nakhon (Noi), his immediate
supervisor.
A final observation is required as to why Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin sent the
December 1810 letter to the Governor-General of India. An educated guess would go
something like this: Ahmad Tajuddin's obvious desire for the assistance and protection
of the English governments in India and Penang at the time when, from all existing
evidence, the Kedah-Siam relations looked most satisfactory (the end of the Thalang
war, the confidence and appreciation displayed by Bangkok through the bestowal of the
grand title of chao phraya) must have stemmed from insecurity arising out of the
ongoing dispute with his royal brothers. This, together with the fact that the Sultan had
71 Raja of Kedah to Governor of Penang, 19 November 1816, Straits Settlements Factory Record, quoted in
Bonney, Kedah , p. 151.
72 The official sent was Luang Thepmontri. Chotmaihet Reign //, Dispatch from Muen Sakdipholaseb to Chao
Phraya Zaiburi.
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JMBRAS VOL. LXXII
overplayed his hand in accepting the invitation of the Burmese to become the latter' s
tributary and that his secret move must have been known to his brothers, thus
endangering the Sultan's stand with Bangkok, must have added more pressure on Ahmad
Tajuddin to look for support and assistance in the case of retribution from Siam. I have
argued above that because of this apprehension, the Sultan had uncharacteristically
agreed to the request of Tunku Bisnu to exchange his administrative fiefs from Setul and
Lu-ngu to the three fertile districts of Merbok, Kuala Muda and Kerian, an agreement he
had no intention of honouring. It must have been Ahmad Tajuddin's hope that his
brother, having been satisfied, would not report negatively on him and his activities
while in Bangkok. The move succeeded in mollifying Tunku Bisnu, who behaved
impeccably as a loving and responsible brother while in Bangkok in 1811. Fortunately
for Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin, his illicit contact with India in 1810 escaped Siamese
vigilance. In fact, the Bangkok court was full of praise and expectations of Kedah, to the
point that it prepared to toss aside the report on the Sultan's indiscretion with Burma. I
would like to speculate that from Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin's perspective, it seems either
Siam' s appreciation of his service was not convincing enough an assurance for the
security of his position, or with the death of King Rama I the Sultan considered it timely
to break away from Bangkok's political sphere and to 'search for security and
independence' under the protection of another stronger power. The 24 December 1810
letter seems a good indication in support of the latter suggestion.
It was only after 1818 that Bangkok became increasingly suspicious of its Kedah
vassal, but that, of course, is another story. The five texts studied here supply details of
the events that occurred between 1809 and 181 1, a very brief moment in the relationship
between Kedah and Siam, and clarify some of the facts about events leading to the
showdown - the invasion of 1821.
References
Anderson, J., Political and Commercial Considerations Relative to the Malayan

Peninsula and the British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca, Penang, 1824;
reprinted in Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society , 35(4),
1962.
Bonney, R., Kedah 1771-1821 : The Search for Security and Independence , Kuala
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1971.
Burney, H., The Burney Papers , Vols. 1-4, Bangkok: Vajirayan Library, National
Library, 1910-14. Published by the Siam Society.
Chao Phraya Thipakorawong (trans. Thadeus and Chadin Flood), Phongsawadan Krung
Rattanakosin Reign /, Vol. 1, Tokyo: Centre of East Asian Cultural Studies, 1978.
Chotmaihet Reign II J.S. 1173 , Bangkok: Rama II Memorial Foundation under the royal
patronage of the King, 1971.
Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, The Quiet Affairs in the Siamese-Malay Relations in the
Nineteenth Century', Jebat, 13, 1984/5.
to the Early Twentieth Centuries , Singapore: Oxford University

Mohammad Isa Othman, Politik Tradisional Kedah 1681-1942 ,
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90

A Brief Moment in Time Kedah-Siam Relations Revisited

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A Brief Moment in Time Kedah-Siam Relations Revisited

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A BRIEF MOMENT IN TIME: KEDAH-SIAM RELATIONS REVISITED

Author(s): KOBKUA SUWWANNATHAT-PIAN

I UmpmV 'bURMA' BANGKOK

Q IJQ ç> ^/TPrachuapkhiri khan 0 4

Fig. 1. Siam and Kedah.

Letter from Chao Phraya Akkramahasenathibodi to Chao Phraya Zaiburi.2

According to your correspondence, you have appointed Phra Aphainurat,3 Tunku

instructions of] this thong-tra 10 and the accompanying list.

Text No. 2: Bangkok Correspondence to Chao Phraya Zaiburi on Thalang Affairs

Letter from Chao Phraya Akkramahasenathibodi to Chao Phraya Zaiburi

10 Tra or thong-tra is an official dispatch.

Text No. 3 : Official Correspondence from Chao Phraya Akkramahasenathibodi to

Text No. 4: Official Correspondence from Chao Phraya Akkramahasenathibodi to

Text No. 5: Official Correspondence from Chao Phraya Akkramahasenathibodi to

Sarn-tra Chao Phraya Akkramahasenathibodi to Luang Sena, official in charge, Khun

that existed between the governors of Nakhon and Songkhla.

26 Kobkua, Thai-Malay Relations , Ch. 3.

Bangkok's apparent concern, at times bordering on paranoia, over the question of

37 Muhammad Yusoff Hashim, Syair Sultan Maulana' Prince Damrong, Phongsa

I have argued elsewhere about the inaccuracy of these accusations, particularly in

Anderson, J., Political and Commercial Considerations Relative to the Malayan

to the Early Twentieth Centuries , Singapore: Oxford University

Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1990.

Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic S

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