Fci Printfile 12 11 2020

Flight Crew Instructions
This booklet of FCI's, which are amendments and changes to the 737-800
FCOMs Volumes 1, 2 & QRH and the Operations Manual Part A, shall be stored
in the "FCI" tab in the Operations Manual Part A.
This booklet contains a Masterlist of contents.
This booklet was revised on the 12th November 2020 and contains all FCIs
published up to the 12th November 2020 that have not been incorporated in the
Boeing FCOM & QRH or Operations Manual Part A.
FCI MASTER LIST
Status: IE – In Effect, INC – Incorporated, CANC – Cancelled
Boeing 737-NG
(In Effect)
Number Date Subject Status Final Manual Reference
18.13 06th December FANS MCDU Fleet Modification IE
18.28 03rd October 2019 Revised Sanded or Gritted Runway Operating Restrictions IE
19.07 24th October 2019 Min 24K Thrust Rating Following De-Icing - Reissued IE
19.08 24th October 2019 Narrow Runway Crosswind Limitations IE
19.09 24th October 2019 Runway Definition Dry and WET IE
19.10 12th December 2019 Monitoring of 121.5 MHz IE
20.04 16th April 2020 Anti-Collision light IE
20.03 30th April 2020 Selection of CON thrust at cruise level IE
20.02 04th June 2020 Sidestep Approaches IE
20.05 04th June 2020 Normal Checklist Gear Pins IE
20.06 13th August 2020 RAAS on ground call outs IE
20.13 20th August 2020 Speedbrake Deployment with F15 or Greater IE
20.11 27th August 2020 FCI B737-NG 20.11 Intercepting the Glide Slope from above IE
20.16 24th September 2020 Fuel Leak on Engine Start IE
20.10 24th September 2020 Engine Out Standard Instrument Departure (EOSID) IE
20.17 08th October 2020 Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC) IE
20.14 05th November 2020 QRH Operator Information Section 1 - Withdrawn IE
Boeing 737-800
(In Effect)
Boeing 737-700
(In Effect)
General
(In Effect)
12/11/2020
FCI MASTER LIST
20.17 04th June 2020 RFFS Cat 5 IE
20.14 11th June 2020 Report to Aircraft / Gate IE
20.07 30th June 2020 Performance Based Specification Operations IE
20.23 23rd July 2020 Updates to OMA Updated Locations of Documents IE
20.24 06th August 2020 Rapid Disembarkation IE
20.27 10th September 2020 Special Load-Notification to Captains (NOTOC) IE
20.29 17th September 2020 OMA update to incorporate EFB changes IE
20.19 24th September 2020 Engine Out Standard Instrument Departure (EOSID) IE
20.28 03rd October 2020 De-icing and Anti-icing on the Ground IE
20.33 08th October 2020 Captain’s Special Report (CPTSR) IE
20.30 05th November 2020 Navblue Charts+ Enroute IE
20.36 05th November 2020 Editorial Updates September 2020 IE
20.25 05th November 2020 Enroute Security Threats IE
20.34 12th November 2020 Editorial changes No2 September 2020 IE
20.38 12th November 2020 Route-Area and Aerodrome knowledge IE
20.37 12th November 2020 Amendment to Jump Seat Policy IE
12/11/2020
B737-800 18.13
FLIGHT CREW
INSTRUCTION
Effective: Immediately 06th December 2018
Validity: Until Further Notice B737-800
Risk Assessment required ___YES____ Risk Assessment Reference FANS MCDU 1.1
Cross Departmental Notification- tick as required
In- Enginee Commer Customer
Flt Ops √ GOps √
flight ring cial Standards
Subject: FANS MCDU Fleet Modification
Ladies and Gentlemen,

The purpose of this FCI is to introduce Future Air Navigation System (FANS) Multi-Purpose Control
Display Unit (MCDU) into the Ryanair DAC fleet. FANS MCDU equipage provides FMC, FMS, and
datalink systems interface when fitted and enabled.
Initially, Ryanair DAC will install FANS MCDUs without operational datalink capability, therefore
MCDU functionality will be the same as the currently installed CDU, apart from a minor keyboard
layout and keystroke differences. FANS MCDUs are identifiable by the absence of DIR INTC, CLB,
CRZ, DES keys. These respective functions are now available through the LEGS key and the new
VNAV key. Also included in the FANS MCDU are the new ATC, FMC COMM (both currently
deactivated) and SP (space) keys.
Aligned with EUROCONTROL’s datalink roadmap, Ryanair will retrofit selected aircraft with the
FANS MCDU starting in the Autumn 2018. Initial FANS MCDU retrofit will have inoperative
datalink selectable menus/features (DLK) and associated keys (ATC, FMC COMM).
TECHLOG’s for aircraft fitted with FANS MCDU will have associated Notice to Crew.
Prior to datalink installation, activation, and operation, Ryanair will facilitate associated training and
FCOM revisions.
The text below takes immediate effect and will be included in the FCOM V1 and V2 at next revision.
__________________________________________________________________________________
FCOM V1
NP21.15
Preflight Procedure – PF ( RYR )
(…)
FANS MCDU equipped aircraft
MENU Key...........................................................................Push
FMC Key (L2) .....................................................................Push
Note: Further NP/SP CDU references also apply to MCDU equipped
aircraft unless otherwise specified.
FMC/CDU ................................................................ Set present position

(…)
NP 21.32
Final CDU Pre-flight Procedure - Captain and First Officer (RYR)
SP 11.5
Proceeding Direct to a Waypoint (DIR/INTC) (CDU equipped aircraft only)
(…)
DIR INTC key ..................................................................................Push
Observe DIRECT TO box prompts displayed in line 6L.
Enter desired waypoint on the DIRECT TO line. Observe the waypoint automatically
transfers to line 1L.
Correct any ROUTE DISCONTINUITY if entered waypoint was not in the original flight
plan.
EXEC key ......................................................................................... Push Observe MOD RTE
LEGS page changes to ACT.
(…)
FCOM V2
11.10.1
Flight Management System Control Display Unit (CDU) / Multi-Purpose Control Display Unit
(MCDU)
(…)
(…)
FAIL Light 
Illuminated (amber) for test purposes only. The MCDU FAIL lamp will not
illuminate for an FMC failure.
CALL Light
Illuminated (white) – a subsystem other than the FMC is requesting control of the CDU.
(…)
11.10.3
Function and Execute Keys
(…)
CDU Function Keys

Push –
INIT REF – shows page for data initialization or for reference data RTE – shows page to input or
change origin, destination, or route
DEP ARR – shows page to input or change departure and arrival procedures
• ATC – INOP. When inoperative key pressed scratch pad message “KEY/FUNCTION
INOP” appears
• VNAV– shows currently active performance page (CLB, CRZ, DES), CLB page is displayed
if no active phase exists  
• FIX – shows page to create reference points on map display  
• LEGS– shows page to evaluate or modify lateral and vertical route data shows page to control
PLAN mode display  
• HOLD – shows page to create holding patterns and show holding  pattern data
• FMC COMM – INOP. When inoperative key pressed scratch pad message
“KEY/FUNCTION INOP” appears
• PROG – shows page to view dynamic flight and navigation data, including waypoint and
destination ETAs, fuel remaining, and arrival estimates  
• MENU – shows page to choose subsystems controlled by CDU  
• N1 LIMIT – shows page to view or change N1 thrust limits  
• PREV PAGE – shows previous page of related pages (for example,  LEGS pages)  
• NEXT PAGE – shows next page of related pages.  
Execute (EXEC) Key

Push –
• makes data modification(s) active  
• extinguishes execute light.  
Execute Light 
Illuminated (white) – active data is modified but not executed.
(…)
Alpha/Numeric and Miscellaneous Keys
(…)
Alpha/Numeric Keys
(…)
Space (SP) Key

Push – puts space in scratchpad
(…)
11.32.6
FMC Failure
Single FMC Failure
(…)  

If the left FMC fails, the FMC alert light will illuminate. The MENU page will appear on both CDUs.
VTK will appear on the left navigation display. LNAV and VNAV will disengage but can be
reengaged if autopilot B is in use or is selected. After 25 to 30 seconds, the left navigation display will
display failure information. To restore full operation, the FMC source select switch must be moved to
BOTH ON R.
(…)
Dual FMC Failure
(…).

If both FMCs fail, the FMC alert light will illuminate. The MENU page will appear on both CDUs.
VTK will appear on both navigation displays. LNAV and VNAV will disengage. After 25 to 30
seconds, both navigation displays will display failure information.
(…)
11.40.48
(…)
Menu Page
The menu page is selected with the MENU key or is automatically displayed when the currently
active subsystem fails or on initial power up if the FMC system is not detected.
The menu page displays subsystems (ACARS, DFDAU, etc.) that require control/display functions
through the MCDU and provides a means to temporarily access to these subsystems. The active
system is indicated by <ACT> displayed next to the system title. A subsystem that requires use of the
CDU displays a request message <REQ> next to the subsystem title. The FMC system or a requesting
subsystem is accessed by using the line select key next to the title. The FMC can be reselected by
selecting the FMC prompt on the MENU page or selecting any mode key (INIT/REF, RTE, etc.). A
subsystem can be temporarily placed on hold <HLD> by selecting the subsystem XXXXXX HOLD>
line select key returning the CDU display to the currently active FMC page (XXXXXX represents the
system name). While the subsystem is on hold the MCDU CALL light is illuminated. To reselect the
subsystem on hold, push the subsystem line select key again. When a subsystem is placed on hold a
XXXXXX LOGOFF prompt appears to allow for release of the subsystem being held. No more than
one subsystem can be selected at a time. If an attempt is made to select more than one subsystem, a
FIRST LOGOFF XXXXXX prompt is displayed as a reminder to logoff the currently active
subsystem.
MENU
< FMC
< DLK
FMC
Push – selects FMC as the system for which the MCDU will be active in providing control/display
function.
DLK
Push – INOP
(…)
11.41.7
Climb Page
The climb page is used to evaluate, monitor, and modify the climb path. The data on the climb page
comes from preflight entries made on the route and performance pages.
The climb page is automatically selected by pushing the CLB function key on the ground and during
takeoff and climb. The TAKEOFF REF page automatically transitions to the climb page after takeoff.
The FMC climb mode can be economy or fixed speed. In either mode, similar data is displayed on the
page.
(…)
The climb page is automatically selected by pushing the VNAV function key on the ground and
during takeoff and climb. The climb page is the first of the three pages selected with the VNAV
function key. Access from other performance pages is via the NEXT/PREV PAGE key. The
TAKEOFF REF page automatically transitions to the climb page after takeoff.
(…)
11.41.11
RTA Climb Page
The RTA climb page is displayed when a required time of arrival is active. The RTA climb page is
automatically selected by pushing the CLB function key when RTA is active. Displays on this page
are the same as other climb pages except as noted.
(…)
During climb, the RTA climb page is automatically selected by pushing the VNAV function key
when RTA is active.
(…)
Access to the various cruise pages is obtained by pushing the VNAV function key while in cruise.
Access from other performance pages is via the NEXT/PREV PAGE key.
(…)
11.42.24
Cruise Page
(…)
(…)
11.42.29
Cruise with Step Climb
(…)
(…)
11.42.33
RTA Cruise Descent
(…)
(…)
11.43.3
Descent Page (During Cruise)
(…)
(…)
11.43.6
Descent Page (During Descent)
(…)
(…)
-END-
_________________
Ray Conway, Captain
Director of Flight Standards & Chief Pilot
FLIGHT CREW B737-NG 18.28
INSTRUCTION
Effective: Immediately
03/10/2019
Validity: Until Further
Notice B737-NG
Risk assessment required ___Yes/No____ Risk assessment Reference __PD32553b
Cross Departmental Notification - tick as required
In- Customer
Flt Ops √ GOps Engineering Commercial
flight Standards
Subject: Revised Sanded or Gritted Runway Operational

Restrictions
The purpose of this FCI is to revise the Operational Restrictions applicable to Take-Off and Landing on
Sanded or Gritted runways allowing operations to continue in conditions of ‘light & variable’ winds with an
additional Captain’s Only Take-Off and Landing operational restriction added
The text below takes immediate effect and will be included in the OPERATIONS MANUAL PART B -
PERFORMANCE (OMB-P) with the next revisions.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OPERATIONS MANUAL PART B - PERFORMANCE B737-800W
OPERATIONS MANUAL PART B - PERFORMANCE B737-8200
4.4 TALPA MATRIX
(…..)
SANDED or GRITTED RUNWAY DOWNGRADE TABLE

On Sanded or Gritted Runways reported Braking Action or Braking Coefficient must
be downgraded by one level for both take-off and landing performance and crosswind
calculations using the table below.
BC BA DOWNGRADED BA
≥0.40 GOOD GOOD TO MEDIUM
0.39-0.36 GOOD TO MEDIUM MEDIUM
0.35-0.30 MEDIUM MEDIUM TO POOR
0.29-0.26 MEDIUM TO POOR POOR

TAKE-OFF &
0.25-0.21 POOR NIL LANDING
PROHIBITED
≤0.20 NIL NIL
Page 1 of 2
OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS
• Anti-skid, auto speed brake, autobrake & thrust-reversers must be fully serviceable.
• Tailwind not authorised (except light or variable wind conditions ≤5kts)
• Captain’s Only Take-Off and Landing
• The most conservative of the three reported braking actions will be used
• Take-off or Landing in POOR or NIL Braking Action, either reported or
downgraded, is prohibited.
(…..)
______________________
Ray Conway, Captain
Page 2 of 2
INSTRUCTION
Effective: Immediately 24th October 2019
Validity: Until Further Notice
B737-NG
st
Risk assessment required __1 Level SRA__ Risk assessment Reference __NPFO Minutes 29Apr19__

Customer
Flt Ops √ In-flight GOPs Engineering Commercial
Standards
Subject: MIN THRUST RATING FOLLOWING DE-ICING

There have been a number of tail strike incidents post de-icing that occurred in benign crosswind conditions.
These incidents are now the subject of formal investigation with Boeing. Until such time that the cause of
these incidents can be established we are increasing the minimum N1 requirements post de-icing. The purpose
of this FCI is to introduce Minimum Thrust Rating following De-icing.
Crew shall plan for Minimum 24K (B737-800W) or 22K (B737-700W) Thrust Rating with No ATM
following aircraft de-icing.
The text below takes immediate effect and will be included in OMB-P at the next revision.
_______________________________________________________________________________________
B737-800 OMB-P
(….)
9.1 OPT PERFORMANCE – TAKE-OFF DISPATCH
(….)
CAUTION
Operation at reduced engine thrust is prohibited in the following conditions:
(….)
1
• If the aircraft has been deiced .
• When operating a landing gear extended flight*.
• Where potential wind shear conditions exist.
• When operating with engine bleeds OFF*.
• If prohibited by the Airfield Brief (e.g. Klagenfurt)*.
• When the crosswind component is in excess of 10 knots**.
1
Assumed Temperature may be calculated by OPT in some cases. Crew must manually select FULL rated
thrust and Minimum 24K fixed derate.
* Assumed Temperature may be calculated by OPT in some cases. Crew must manually select FULL rated
thrust.
(….)
B737-700 OMB-P
(….)
9.1 OPT PERFORMANCE – TAKE-OFF DISPATCH

(….)
CAUTION
Operation at reduced engine thrust is prohibited in the following conditions:
(….)
• If the aircraft has been deiced*.
• When operating a landing gear extended flight*.
• Where potential wind shear conditions exist.
• When operating with engine bleeds OFF*.
• If prohibited by the Airfield Brief (e.g. Klagenfurt)*.
• When the crosswind component is in excess of 10 knots**.
* Assumed Temperature may be calculated by OPT in some cases. Crew must manually select FULL rated
thrust.
(….)
-END-
________________
Ray Conway, Captain
19.08
FLIGHT CREW B737-NG
INSTRUCTION
24th October 2019
Validity: Until Further
Notice B737-NG
Risk assessment required ___Yes/No____ Risk assessment Reference PD49976
In- Customer
Flt Ops √ GOps Engineering Commercial
flight Standards
Subject: Narrow Runway Crosswind Limitations

The purpose of this FCI is to revise the procedure for the calculation of crosswind limitations applicable to
runways where the width, which may include the cleared width, is less than 45m.
Existing crosswind limits for take-off and landing are valid for runway widths of 45m or greater. For
take-off and landing on a runway with a width, including cleared width, of:
• < 45m: narrow runway operating restrictions apply.
• < 40m: narrow runway operating restrictions apply AND the crosswind limitation must
be reduced by 1kt for every 1m reduction in width below 40m.
The minimum runway width remains 30m.
If a more restrictive Crosswind limitation is specified in the Airfield Brief, that limit shall apply.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3.0 DEFINITIONS
(…..)
3.0.2 NARROW RUNWAY – A narrow runway has a width or cleared width of less than 45m. Operations
on runways less than 30m wide (paved or cleared) are not permitted. MEL restrictions apply to
operations on narrow runways. Crew training is required.
The following operating restrictions apply to narrow runways:
Take-Off
• Captains only take-off (unless specifically permitted under conditions specified in the AFB).
• Use reduced take-off thrust and maximum ATM, when possible*, to minimize thrust
asymmetry following engine failure.
*Windshear guidance [FCOM SP16.28] must be followed by crew.
• Both Thrust Reversers must be operative.
• Antiskid must be operative
• Increase VMCG by 5 kt for take-off calculations. Refer to V1(MCG) NARROW PROCEDURE
in section 6.1
Page 1 of 4
Landing
• Captains only landing (unless specifically permitted under conditions specified in the AFB).
• Both Thrust Reversers must be operative.
• Antiskid must be operative. If inoperative during flight, diversion to a 45m wide runway is
recommended.
• Autoland not permitted
• NON-NORMAL: diversion to a ≥45 wide runway is recommended for inflight failures that
affect directional control or braking.
Additional limitations for specific airports may be are published in AFB’s and must be observed.
(…..)
5.0 CROSSWIND LIMITATIONS
(…..)
Crosswind guidelines are based on wind velocity at a 10m height, reported by the tower and apply for
runways 45m or greater in width.
Company Restrictions apply when runway width is less than 45m. For take-off and landing on a
runway with a width, including cleared width, of:
• <45m: narrow runway operating restrictions apply.
• <40m: narrow runway operating restrictions apply AND the crosswind limitation must
be reduced by 1kt for every 1m reduction in width below 40m.
The minimum allowed cleared width is 30 m.
If a more restrictive Crosswind limitation is specified in the Airfield Brief that limit will take precedence
and must be observed at all times.
(…..)
Company Crosswind Restriction
If runway width or cleared width is less than 45m, narrow runway operating restrictions
apply – refer to section 3.0.2 Narrow Runway
AND
If runway width or cleared width is less than 40m, reduce the crosswind limit by 1kt for
every 1m reduction in width below 40m:
(…..)
6.1 TAKE-OFF LIMITATIONS
(…..)
OPTIMUM V1
Optimum V1 is normally used for all Take-off weight calculations, this option calculates the highest
allowable take-off weight taking advantage of available clearway and stopway. Optimum V1 will be
greater than or equal to V1(MCG), and less than or equal to Vr and less than or equal to V1mbe.
V1(MCG) NARROW PROCEDURE
For Narrow Runway operation increase V1(MCG) by 5 kt for take-off calculations
Page 2 of 4
INCREASE V1(MCG) BY 5KTS → V1(MCG) NARROW PROCEDURE
1 Choose one:
V1 > 110Kts:
Use OPT speeds as calculated.
■■■■
V1 ≤ 110Kts:
►►Go to step 2
2 Run OPT for TOW 41000kg.
3 In OPT select
4 Min V1: (VMCG) = V1(MCG)

5 V1(MCG)narrow = V1(MCG) + 5kts
6 Run OPT for actual take-off weight.
7 Choose one:
V1 > V1(MCG)narrow.
Use OPT speeds as calculated.
■■■■
V1 < V1(MCG)narrow.
►►Go to step 8
8 Re-run OPT to calculate max allowable take-off weight for the same conditions and same level
of take-off thrust.
9 Determine take-off speeds for maximum allowable take-off weight.
10 Choose one:
Max allowable take-off weight V1 > V1(MCG)narrow:
Increase V1 for the actual weight to = V1(MCG)narrow.

If VR < V1(MCG)narrow, increase VR to V1(MCG)narrow. Increase
V2 by the same incremental increase as VR.
■■■■
Maximum allowable take-off weight V1 < V1(MCG)narrow:
Take-off is not allowed.
• Consider: Lower flap setting to increase V1,

increased derate to lower V1(MCG).
(…..)
Page 3 of 4
______________________
Ray Conway, Captain
Page 4 of 4
INSTRUCTION
Validity: Until Further Notice 24th October 2019
B737-NG
Risk assessment required ___Yes/No____ Risk assessment Reference __PD97117
Customer
Standards
Subject: DRY and WET Runway Definition

The purpose of this FCI is to remove the damp runway definition and revise the dry and wet runway definitions
in accordance with Air Ops Revision 13. A damp runway is now considered to be WET.
DRY RUNWAY - a runway whose surface is free of visible moisture and not contaminated
within the area intended to be used;
WET RUNWAY - a runway whose surface is covered by any visible dampness or water up to
and including 3 mm deep within the area intended to be used.
_______________________________________________________________________________________

(….)
4.1 RUNWAY CONDITION DEFINITIONS
DRY RUNWAY - A runway whose surface is free of visible moisture and not contaminated within the
area intended to be used.
WET RUNWAY - A runway whose surface is covered by any visible dampness or water up to and
including 3 mm deep within the area intended to be used.
(….)
________________
Ray Conway, Captain
INSTRUCTION
12th December 2019
B737 – NG
Risk assessment required: No Risk assessment Reference : N/A

Customer
In-flight Flt Ops √ Engineering √ Commercial
Standards
Subject: Monitoring of 121.5 MHz
The purpose of this FCI is to introduce revised guidance for the selection and monitoring of 121.5 MHz.
This procedure is designed to reduce the risk of PLOC events by monitoring 121.5 MHz in all airspace above
FL100/10,000 feet. This change of procedure will result in 121.5 MHz being monitored for a greater time
during the flight, particularly when ATC delay an aircraft’s climb to its final cruise level.
Monitoring of 121.5 will begin at FL100/10,000 feet during the climb and end at FL100/10,000 feet during
the descent.
The below text takes immediate effect and will be included in FCOM Vol 1 at next revision.
FCOM VOL. I
NP .21.81
(….)
PILOT FLYING PILOT MONITORING
Challenge:
Call “ALTIMETERS” when passing FL100/10,000 feet.
Response:
Call the exact passing FL/altitude.
“PASSING CLIMBING , TEN CHECKS.”
Ten checks are performed ALOUD as follows:
“FUEL” – Balanced, check status of the crossfeed and
centre tank fuel pumps.
“LIGHTS” – Position all lights on the left forward
overhead panel to OFF and Logo lights (as required)
OFF.
“APU” – OFF, if not required. If on, check the
pressurization panel for possible no engine bleed takeoff.
“AIR COND & PRESS…….XX (DIFF), SET after
verifying using the reverse “L” technique.
“FASTEN BELTS” – Auto at captain’s discretion.
“RECALL” – Check
“121.5” – Monitor. Select 121.5 on VHF 2 to enable
monitoring of distress frequency
Ensure VHF2 volume set at appropriate level.

Page 1 of 2
(….)

When cleared to final cruise Flight Level, confirm MCP, Ensure 121.5 is selected on VHF 2 to enable monitoring
FMC and Pressurization panel flight altitude selection are in of distress frequency.
agreement and monitor 121.5 on VHF 2 to enable monitoring
of distress frequency.
(….)
NP .21.95
(….)

Challenge:
Call “ALTIMETERS” when passing FL100/10,000 feet.
Response:
Call the exact passing FL/altitude.
“PASSING DESCENDING , TEN CHECKS.”
Ten checks are performed ALOUD as follows:
“FUEL” – Balanced, check status of the crossfeed and
centre tank fuel pumps.
“LIGHTS” – Position Runway Turnoff lights ON,
LANDING/FIXED lights ON and Logo lights (as
required) ON.
“ANGLE OF BANK” – 25 degrees
“AIR COND & PRESS” – Check air conditioning and
pressurization panel
“FASTEN BELTS” – Check SEAT BELT sign ON.
“RECALL” – Check
PA; “CABIN CREW, TEN MINUTES TO LANDING.”
Switch the No Smoking sign to ON when Cabin Secure
is received from the CSS.
“121.5 Deselected” – Deselect VHF 2 receiver switch on
ACP.
Deselect VHF 2 receiver switch on ACP
_________________
Ray Conway, Captain
Page 2 of 2
INSTRUCTION
Validity: Until Further Notice 16th April 2020
B737-NG
Risk assessment required ___ No____ Risk assessment Reference ___N/A___

Customer
In-flight Flt Ops √ Engineering Commercial
Standards
Subject: Anti-Collision Light
The purpose of this FCI is to increase flight crew’s situational awareness when switching the anti-collision light off
during the engine shutdown procedure.
There have been a number of recent line events where crew have inadvertently switched off the anti-collision light with
one engine still running on stand. In a number of these events Ground Ops personnel have approached the aircraft after
the beacon light was switched off whilst an engine was running. The risks associated with this type of omission cannot
be over emphasised. This change of procedure requires the PF in future to verbalise the N2 before switching the anti-
collision light off.
The text below takes immediate effect and will be included in FCOM at next revision.
_________________
Aidan Murray, Captain
Chief Pilot
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NP.21.136
Transit Shutdown Procedure – Pilot Flying ( RYR )
(….)
START LEVERS………………………………………………CUTOFF
*Both pilots must verify a reduction in N2 indications on the lower

display unit in line with the start levers being placed to cutoff.
(….)
ANTI COLLISION light switch .......................................................OFF*
*Both pilots must visually confirm that the engines are at or below 20% N2
N2 <20%, PF calls “_%” and places the ANTI-COLLISION light switch OFF
(….)
Page 1 of 2
NP.21.138
Full Shutdown Procedure - Pilot Flying (RYR)
(….)
START LEVERS………………………………………………CUTOFF
*Both pilots must verify a reduction in N2 indications on the lower

display unit in line with the start levers being placed to cutoff.
(….)
ANTI COLLISION light switch.......................................................OFF*
*Both pilots must visually confirm that the engines are at or below 20% N2
N2 <20%, PF calls “_%” and places the ANTI-COLLISION light switch OFF
END
Page 2 of 2
INSTRUCTION
Validity: Until Further Notice 30th April 2020
NG
Risk assessment required: YES Risk assessment Reference :1st Level SRA 19th Feb 2020

Customer
In-flight Flt Ops √ Engineering √ Commercial
Standards
Subject: Selection of CON thrust at cruise level
The purpose of this FCI is to introduce the procedure for setting CON thrust limit upon reaching cruise level.
This procedure forms part of Ryanair’s strategy to mitigate the threat of LOC-I, and is a preventative measure
against high altitude, low speed situations.
Selecting CON from the FMC N1 LIMIT page after reaching cruise level will allow additional thrust reserves
in upset conditions by increased A/T N1 values if additional thrust is required. By selecting CON thrust, the
limiting N1 value available to the A/T is increased by approximately 4%.
Subsequent step-climbs will require the CON limit to be re-selected upon reaching the new cruise level.
Current OMA 8.3.0.2.6 guidance relating to selection of cruise flight levels remains unchanged.
The text below takes immediate effect and will be included in the FCOM Volume 1 at next revision:
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Page 1 of 3
FCOM VOL. 1
NP.21.83
(….)
It is mandatory to select VNAV after all MCP Altitude//Flight Level changes
during climb. It is prohibited to select V/S unless the ROC approaching the
cleared Altitude/Flight Level exceeds the following limits:
• At 3000’ to level off if ROC exceeds 3000ft per min, select V/S and
reduce ROC to maximum 3000ft per min.
Only select V/S when VNAV is providing a sustained climb rate in excess of
3000ft, 2000ft or 1000ft per minute.
Aircraft performance must be closely monitored when using V/S, especially at
high altitudes. Requests/Restrictions from ATC shall be managed through
VNAV.
Upon reaching cruise level select CON

from the FMC N1 LIMIT page, verify
CON is displayed on the Thrust Mode
Display on the upper DU and state:
“CON set”.
Note: subsequent step climbs will
require CON limit to be re-selected
upon reaching the new cruise level.
(…)
SP.16.25
Light and Moderate Turbulence:
(…)
Passenger signs…………………………………………………………………………………………..ON
FMC N1 LIMIT page…………………………………………………………………....Verify/Select

CON*
Advise passengers to fasten their seat belts prior to entering areas of reported or anticipated
turbulence. Instruct the flight attendants to check that all passengers’ seat belts are fastened.
Severe Turbulence:
(…)
• FMC N1 LIMIT page – Verify/Select CON*
(…)
(…)
Page 2 of 3
________________
Chief Pilot
Page 3 of 3
INSTRUCTION
Effective: Immediately 04th June 2020
B737-NG
Risk assessment required ___Yes/No____ Risk assessment Reference _4th Dec 2019_
Customer
Standards
Subject: Sidestep Approaches

The purpose of this FCI is to introduce specific guidance during sidestep approaches.
This procedure is designed to avoid any ambiguity when a sidestep approach is commenced. This change in
procedure provides clear guidance on the roles of PF and PM during a sidestep.
The text below takes immediate effect and will be included in FCOM Vol 1 at next revision.
_______________________________________________________________________________________
FCOM Vol 1
NP.21.122
(….)
Sidestep Approach
When commencing a Sidestep manoeuvre:
1. Disconnect
• PF disconnects the AFDS and maneuvers to the landing runway,
2. De-select
• PM detune the ILS frequency on Nav 1 and Nav 2 if required,
3. Recycle
• PM recycle the FD’s.
Anticipate FMC Alerting Message: RW/APP TUNE DISAGREE. The 300’ landing gate applies to sidestep
manoeuvres.
When the sidestep requires intercepting the PAPI from below a level segment may be required. This will
require increasing thrust (approximately 70%) and increasing pitch until established on the PAPI.
- END -
________________
Chief Pilot
INSTRUCTION
Validity: Until Further Notice 04th June 2020
B737-NG
Risk assessment required ___ No _____ Risk assessment Reference ____NA____

Customer
In-flight Flt Ops √ Engineering Commercial
Standards
Subject: Normal Checklist
The purpose of this FCI is to revise the Normal Checklist ‘GEAR PINS’ response to ensure all 3 gear pins
are removed.
QRH - NC.2
Before Start
(…)
*GEAR PINS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1, 2, 3 REMOVED
(….)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Normal Checklist - Before Start
(…)
*GEAR PINS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1, 2, 3 REMOVED
(….)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FCOM - NP.21.7
Flight Deck Safety Inspection and Preliminary Flight Deck Procedure – PF ( RYR )
(….)
GEAR PINS.........................................................................1, 2, 3 REMOVED
Verify 3 gear pins in rack. If not, establish location of gear pins and reason for removal prior to dispatch.
(….)
__________________
Chief Pilot
1
INSTRUCTION
Validity: Until Further Notice 13th August 2020
B737-NG
Risk assessment required _YES__ Risk assessment Reference __FCI 20.XX__

Flt Ops In-flight GOps Customer Engineering Commercial Compliance Safety SLA OCC
Standards
√ √ √ √
Subject: RAAS on ground call outs

All airlines recognised the risk of Runway Excursion (RE). Ryanair continues to develop RE mitigation
measures. The purpose of this FCI is to formalise the crew response to the RAAS automated ‘on ground’
callout for runway distance remaining in certain operational situations.
RAAS has several callouts associated with the Long Landing and Landing Rollout. These modes aim to
increase crew awareness of distance remaining when ground speed is above predetermined RAAS levels.
This FCI introduces a requirement for PF and PM to react / respond to RAAS 600, 300 and 100 alerts and for
the F/O to immediately call out the Ground Speed.
With the introduction of this new procedure we are working with FOQA to develop two new MyOFDM
triggers, >100kts @ 300m and >40kts @100m remaining. Exceeding these values will in future trigger an
OFDM Class III event and allow the Safety Services to build heat maps of runway rollout performances across
the network. These new triggers will be available on MyOFDM once developing and testing is complete.
The text below takes immediate effect and will be added to FCOM at the next revision.
_______________________________________________________________________________________
NP 40.7
RAAS Callouts (RYR)
The RAAS callout are shown below with required pilot actions. XX is the runway designator and ZZ is meters.
(…..)
RAAS - On Ground Advisories
SYMBOL TITLE AURAL REQUIRED ACTION
(…..)
n/a Distance 900 meters PF Adjust deceleration as necessary to ensure a safe
Remaining (Landing) remaining stop on the available runway
n/a Distance 600 remaining Captain First Officer
Remaining (Landing) “Check” or “I have “XXX kts” or “You have
Control” control, XXX kts”
Capt if PM will take control and adjust deceleration
as necessary to ensure a safe stop on the available
runway.
FO will call the GND speed from the ND.

Capt if PM will take control and adjust deceleration
as necessary to ensure a safe stop on the available
runway.
FO will call the GND speed from the ND.

PM verify maximum use of all stopping and call out
any omissions
-END-
________________
Chief Pilot
INSTRUCTION
Validity: Until Further Notice 20th August 2020
B737-NG
Risk assessment required ___ No _____ Risk assessment Reference ____NA____

Standards
√
Subject: Speedbrake Deployment with F15 and Greater

The purpose of this FCI is to remove the limitation of operating the aircraft with speedbrake deployment whilst flaps 15
or greater is selected and provide guidance in the Normal Procedures section of the FCOM.
During the landing checklist, if crews notice that the speedbrake lever is beyond the armed position and flaps 15 or
greater is selected, the crew should stow the speedbrakes lever and reselect the lever to the “ARM” position in a prompt
manner. At all times speedbrakes should be retracted below 1,000 ft AGL. This 1,000ft AGL criteria remains a limitation
of the aircraft and if exceeded, a report should be filed.
FCOM 1 – L.10.8
Flight Controls (RYR)
(…)
Non–AFM Operational Information
# Do not deploy the speedbrakes in flight at radio altitudes less than 1,000 feet.
Alternate flap duty cycle:

(….)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FCOM 1- NP.21.88
Use of Speed Brakes in Flight
(…)
Use of speedbrakes between the down detent and flight detent can result in rapid roll rates and normally should be
avoided. While using the speedbrakes in descent, allow sufficient altitude and airspeed margin to
level off smoothly. Lower the speedbrakes before adding thrust.
Note: In flight, do not extend the speedbrake lever beyond the FLIGHT detent. Speedbrakes should be retracted before
reaching 1,000 feet AGL
The use of speedbrakes with flaps extended should be avoided, if possible. With flaps 15 or greater, the speedbrakes
should be retracted. If circumstances dictate the use of speedbrakes with flaps extended, high sink rates during the
approach should be avoided. Speedbrakes should be retracted before reaching 1,000 feet AGL.
(….)
__________________
Chief Pilot
1
INSTRUCTION
Effective: Immediately 27th August 2020
Risk assessment required ___Yes/No____ Risk assessment Reference __TD92122
Standards
√ √
Subject: Intercepting the Glide Slope from above
The purpose of this FCI is to introduce revised procedures for the latest point by which the Glide
Slope must be captured. The Glide Slope must always be captured by the 4 or 5nm FMC FIX ring
inserted in the FMC and as displayed on the ND.
This revised guidance is provided to increase flight crew’s situational awareness to the distance
relative to the runway threshold and is based upon recent line events and SMS feedback. There is
no change to the required configuration and the 4 or 5nm FMC FIX ring is a limit, not a target.
_______________________________________________________________________________
NP.21.92
Descent Procedure – Piot Flying and Pilot Monitoring (RYR)
(…)
• FMC FIX – Insert a 3x altitude ring. 10nm ring and a 4 or 5 nm ring depending on the
Landing Gate for all approach types. When flying an ILS/GLS the 4 or 5 nm ring represents
the latest glide slope capture point. All FMC speeds inside the 10nm ring, above 180kts,
must be adjusted to 180B subject to flap load relief limits, landing configuration approach
speeds, and any other airspeed requirements specified in the approach procedure.
(…)
NP.21.104
FMC CDU page selection – Pilot Flying and Pilot Monitoring (RYR)
(…)
Restrictions:
1. When intercepting the G/S from above, the flight crew must ensure that the localizer is
captured before arming APP.
2. Having armed APP and if above the G/S, the G/S must be captured by 5nm or 4nm from the
RW point for all ILS/GLS approaches, as represented by the FIX ring displayed on the ND.
(…)
NP.21.105
FMC CDU page selection – Pilot Flying and Pilot Monitoring (RYR)
(…)
6. Achieve G/S or Path capture by 5nm or 4nm from the RW point for all ILS/GLS approaches
and be fully stabilized by 1,000 feet AFE in IMC or 500ft AFE in VMC.
Note: It is policy to establish on the glideslope by 5nm or 4nm from the RW point for all ILS/GLS
Approaches.
This procedure provides a ‘stabilized’ glideslope capture target of 5nm or 4nm from the RW point
for all ILS/GLS approaches, at or below 180kts, while the 1000ft AFE in IMC and 500ft AFE in
VMC landing gate limits remain in place.
(…)
________________
NPFO - Chief Pilot
INSTRUCTION
Validity: Until Further Notice 24th September 2020
Risk assessment required _No_ Risk assessment Reference _N/A_
Standards
√ √ √ √
Subject: Fuel Leak on Engine Start
The purpose of this FCI is to clarify the guidance on crew actions in the event of a fuel leak during engine
start.
This step-by-step process is best practise and is in line with the latest Boeing guidance.
_______________________________________________________________________________
NP.21.51
Engine Start Procedure – Piot Flying and Pilot Monitoring
(…)
• If, during engine start, the ground crew reports a fuel leak from an engine drain, the engine start may
be continued.
• If the fluid leak continues after the engine is stable at idle, do the following:
1. Shut down and restart the engine.
2. If the leak continues on the second engine start run the engine at idle thrust for up to 5
minutes. If the fluid leak stops during this time, no maintenance action is needed.
3. If the leak continues beyond 5 minutes on the second engine start, or at any time becomes
significant, shut down the engine. Contact Maintrol. A tech log entry will be required.
(…)
________________
Chief Pilot
INSTRUCTION
Validity: Until Further 24th September 2020
Notice B737-NG
Risk assessment required ___Yes/No____ Risk assessment Reference ___ PD28951 ____
Standards
√
Subject: Engine Out Standard Instrument Departure (EOSID)

The purpose of this FCI is to introduce new terminology associated with Engine Out Standard Instrument
Departure (EOSID) procedures. The term ETP is replaced by the term EOSID.Two types of EOSID will be
described in the Operations Manual Part B - Performance, EOSIDs and Special EOSIDs.
An EOSID will be published for every runway end and give clear instructions to crew of the departure path to
be followed in the event of an engine failure during takeoff. EOSIDs will be described using a standard format
with abbreviations as detailed in this FCI and will remove the requirement to annotate Runway designators
with “ET”.
Runway designators may be appended with a reference to Supplement, NOTAM or Descriptive Text to
indicate a change to declared distances or obstacles.
PERFORMANCE (OMB-P) at next revisions.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.0 INTRODUCTION
(…..)
The Manual is divided into two parts. Part 1 is this Manual containing policies, instructions and guidance. Part
2 comprises specific data for airports, available in OPT when used with current Policy, Airport and DDG
databases. RTOW charts are published as a backup if OPT is not available. OPT and RTOW charts describe the
EOSID Procedures. Airfield Briefs are available on Navtech eCharts EFB and the Flight Dispatch Folder (FDF).
EOSID ENGINE OUT STANDARD INSTRUMENT DEPARTURE
2.0 ABBREVIATIONS
(…..)
EOSID ENGINE OUT STANDARD INSTRUMENT DEPARTURE
(…..)
Page 1 of 6
6.2 ENGINE OUT STANDARD INSTRUMENT DEPARTURE (EOSID)
[CAT.POL.A.210]
An EOSID is published for every runway end. If an engine failure occurs during take-off before the deviation
point, obstacle and terrain clearance is assured by following the published EOSID.
There are two types of EOSID.
1. EOSID
An EOSID is a straight-ahead engine inoperative departure with a hold position located at a distance,
usually 15NM or more, from the physical beginning of the take-off runway.
The holding fix is denoted by the airport IATA code, followed by a letter (usually X, Y or Z) and
number, the FMC coordinates for the EOSID hold position are also detailed in the EOSID text and shall
be coded in the FMC where possible. e.g. 'DUBX4' (N5327.4 W00656.7) denotes an EOSID holding
point for Dublin.
EXAMPLE:
EOSID: At 25 NM ['DUBX4' (N5327.4 W00656.7)] enter HLDG (281 INBD,RT)
• This EOSID indicates there is a straight-ahead climb to a hold at 25NM from the physical
beginning of the runway.
• Waypoint (‘DUBX4’) will usually be in the FMC database and can be utilised in the FIX page
where appropriate.
• Holding nomenclature is always INBD and turn direction will be indicated as RT or LT.
2. Special EOSID
A Special EOSID is a more complex engine inoperative departure and one of the following will apply.
a. A turn is required before joining a holding pattern, the turn point may be defined with reference to
an altitude, DME, navaid or waypoint.
EXAMPLE:
Special EOSID: At 4 DME 'BEG' 114.95 LT to 'TZO' 117.25 (325 INBD,LT)
• This Special EOSID indicates a turn is required before joining a holding pattern.
• Climb profile assumes acceleration at MFRA may occur before, during or after the turn.
• 15° AOB is assumed up to V2+20 (V2+15 for B737-700), 25° AOB at or above Flaps Up
Manoeuvring speed.
b. A turn is required before joining a holding pattern with a speed restriction required to protect the
turn path ensuring all obstacles are accounted for.
EXAMPLE:
Special EOSID: At 4 DME 'GRZ' 116.2 RT to 'GBG' 426 (195 INBD,RT) SPEED
LIMITATION APPLIES - DO NOT EXCEED MAXIMUM IAS OF 192 KTS DURING
INITIAL TURN!
• This Special EOSID indicates a turn is required, with a speed limitation during that turn, before
joining a holding pattern.
• Crew MUST observe the speed restriction, even above MFRA.
• Speed restrictions only apply before and during the specified turn. When aircraft is established
on track to the holding fix after the last turn is completed the speed restriction can be
disregarded.
c. A straight-ahead departure is followed by holding at a DME distance on the extended runway

centreline.
Page 2 of 6
EXAMPLE:
Special EOSID: At 7.5 DME 'ALM' 115.0 enter HLDG (174 INBD,RT)
• This EOSID indicates a straight-ahead climb to hold at a Distance (NM) from a DME facility.
d. a straight-ahead departure is followed by holding at a designated navaid/waypoint located along

the extended runway centreline.
EXAMPLE:
Special EOSID: At 'OTRIL' [N5639.1 W11049.2] enter HLDG (075 INBD,LT)
• This EOSID indicates a straight-ahead climb to a hold at a published Waypoint
The EOSID or Special EOSID is specified in the PERFORMANCE – TAKE-OFF or the RUNWAY
COMMENT areas of OPT, on the first page of the RTOWs and may be depicted in the Airfield Brief. The
EOSID or Special EOSID text indicates the route that must be flown in the event of engine failure during
Take-Off.
RTOW charts MFRH/MFRA must be cold temperature corrected. OPT calculated MFRH/MFRA are
temperature corrected.
SOURCES OF OBSTACLE DATA

[CAT.POL.A.230(d)]
The most accurate available obstacle data for a particular airport at the time of analysis is used, including
obstacle data supplied by the airport data supplier. Obstacle heights are corrected to account for charting
accuracy and gradient decrement caused by turning procedures.
SIDs vs. EOSID

SID procedures are designed in accordance with ICAO criteria and are based on normal all engine operations.
Engine out obstacle clearance and all engines SID requirements are independent. There are differences
between SID and engine out criteria, including vertical and lateral obstacle clearance requirement. Compliance
with SID climb gradients does not necessarily assure the engine out obstacle clearance requirements are met.
SIDs typically assumes a climb gradient of 3.3%, unless a greater gradient is specified, and do not have an
acceleration segment.
An engine failure during Take-Off is a non-normal condition, and therefore, takes precedence over SID, noise
abatement, air traffic and other normal operating procedures. Crew must notify ATC of engine failure and the
intended flight path at the earliest opportunity.
TERMINATION OF ENGINE-OUT TAKE-OFF SEGMENT

For the purpose of Take-Off performance analysis, the end of Take-Off flight path is considered to be when
airplane reaches at least one of:
• A hold and minimum altitude (MHA) or upon completion of one round of the hold.
• MSA (25 NM around an airport aid).
Continue climb in holding pattern until completing at least one round in holding pattern and decide on further
action.
FLIGHT PATH AND OBSTACLE ANALYSIS

EOSID obstacle analysis is based on AFM net flight path, considered to begin at a height of 35 ft above the
runway or clearway at the end of the take-off distance and clears all obstacles by a vertical distance of at least
35ft or by a horizontal distance of at least 60m plus 0.125×D, where D is the horizontal distance the aeroplane,
centred on the intended flight path/track to a lateral distance of 900m. In order to avoid higher obstructions
that can limit Max TOW, obstacles may be cleared laterally by specifying the departure path to be followed
in the event of an engine failure on takeoff in a Special EOSID with a turn defined. Loss of gradient during
turn is accounted for by increasing obstacle heights.
[CAT.POL.A.310(b)], [CAT.POL.A.210(a)]
Page 3 of 6
DESCRIPTION OF EOSIDs
Unless otherwise stated in the EOSID procedure, the following criteria apply:
• No turns may be commenced before the Departure End of Runway even if the turn altitude specified
in a Special EOSID has been reached [CAT.POL.A.210].
• When a turn is required below 400’, HDG SEL shall be used for take-off and will be specified in the
AFB.
• The Minimum height above the Departure End of Runway to begin an engine out turn will never be
less than 59’.
• EOSIDs are valid for speeds of V2 to V2+20 (V2 to V2+15 for B737-700) below MFRA increasing
to Flaps UP Maneuvering Speed above MFRA/MFRH. Speed restrictions provided for special EOSID
will take precedence (if applicable)
• Special EOSID speed restrictions, when provided, must be observed.
• Acceleration shall continue until Flaps Up Manoeuvring Speed or Speed Restriction specified in the
EOSID is achieved.
• All turns below MFRA/MFRH are based on a bank angle of 15º. Once at Flaps UP Manoeuvring
Speed bank angle for EOSID must be increased to 25°.
• Continue climbing until MSA, hold or minimum enroute altitude is achieved.
• In the case of an Engine Failure, Bug Up (accelerate for flap retraction) at the MFRH/MFRA
calculated by OPT or shown on the RTOW chart.
• Departure restrictions such as cross wind limits, thrust or flap settings will be stated in the AFB.
• RTOW is calculated based on airport obstacle data and must not be exceeded.
• Calculated Fixed Derate and/or ATRT (Assumed Temperature Reduced Thrust) shall be used on all
runways in accordance with Company Procedure where possible unless specified otherwise. Standard
Bug Up/ Thrust Up procedures apply.
• Holding will be at an AIP published hold where possible, holding point will be defined by a navaid,
AIP waypoint or customised waypoint together with associated hold configuration. Procedure must
be flown as described by the EOSID.
• Customised waypoints for holding purposes will usually be available in the FMC navigation database,
where a customised waypoint is not available, crew shall enter coordinates provided in EOSID text.
• Normal holding pattern is 5NM straight to the holding fix and a turn with a radius of 2NM.
• Obstacles in the EOSID procedure, including the holding area, are accounted for.
• EOSID procedure will be clear of prohibited airspace.
• FMC data (FIX page) may be used in the event of loss of or unserviceable ground-based facilities.
• Maximum continuous thrust (MCT) must be set after 5 min take-off thrust application.
EOSIDs will be shown in the textual format in OPT or RTOW charts. EOSID text which exceeds the character
length available on the OPT TAKEOFF OUTPUT page will be provided in AIRPORT INFO – RUNWAY
COMMENT, a hyperlink to the runway comment page is indicated by blue text in the EOSID text area.
Complex EOSIDs may also be described in the Airfield Brief.
The following abbreviations will be used in the (EOSID) text:
EOSID Standard EOSID

Special EOSID Special EOSID
LT Left Turn
RT Right Turn
ITCPT Intercept
PRCD Proceed
ABM Abeam
INBD Inbound
HDG Heading. (Magnetic).
track Magnetic track above ground with three digits
Waypoint as published in AIP. Usually accompanied by a distance and radial
ABCDE
information to a Navaid and usually available in the FMC database.
Page 4 of 6
'ABCDE'
Waypoint as published in AIP. (Followed by coordinates or Distance and Radial
[N2839.7
from Navaid). Usually available in FMC database.
W01321.5]
Navaid in inverted commas, always followed by the frequency with maximum one
“ABC” 114.4
decimal place
Distance (NM) from a DME facility. No decimal is shown if zero. Always followed
7.5 DME
by the navaid and frequency.
R 007 Radial information with three digits. Always followed by the navaid and frequency.
12 DME R 007 In a combination of the two above items, the DME information is provided first.
QDM 342 Magnetic course towards the navaid
QDR 018 Magnetic course from the navaid
HLDG Holding
Hold between. Holding information if no holding fix is available and the usual
Hold BTN
holding pattern (5NM straight, see below) cannot be used.
Holding pattern, showing track and turn direction at a holding fix. Only inbound
(073 INBD,RT)
information will be provided.
(additional info.) Additional information if required is provided in brackets, e.g. (do not overshoot).
DEVIATION POINT:
The Deviation Point: is the point at which the EOSID diverges from the SID.
ENGINE FAILURE DURING SECOND SEGMENT OR THIRD SEGMENT CLIMB

If an engine fails during climb before 1000’, follow EOSID and observe any speed restriction. If the Deviation
Point or speed for EOSID turn has been passed, continue with SID or ATC instructions. Accelerate at 1000’
or at a safe height above terrain.
If acceleration for flap retraction has begun (third segment) when an engine fails, continue with flap retraction
and follow SID or ATC instructions.
(…..)
9.1 OPT PERFORMANCE – TAKEOFF DISPATCH
OPT PERFORMANCE - TAKEOFF DISPATCH is used to calculate RTOW, take-off N1 and fly speeds. It
also provides EOSID procedures.
OPT RUNWAY DESIGNATOR may include NOTAM or SUPPLEMENT references and/or text describing a
runway which has been updated in association with published data.
For Example:
21L SUP43-19
11 A0282-20
27 ARRESTING GEAR
(…..)
10.0 RTOW CHARTS
(…..)
The first page provides a description of the charts provided including effective date, EOSID procedures and
additional Notes.
Page 5 of 6
(…..)
10.1 RTOW CHART DESCRIPTION
(…..)
2 Runway designator followed where applicable by black highlighted
WIP (WIP on runway), NOTAM (data based on the specific Notam), Taxiway Intersection
designator (for example L1, meaning TORA is from TWY L1 Intersection), THR (Take-Off from
displaced threshold), 2000 (RTOW based on indicated TORA distance, 2000m in this example)
etc.
Caution: When taking-off from a TWY Intersection, always crosscheck the intersecting TWY
designator and TORA on RTOW chart against TWY line-up position and declared distance when
published on Aeronautical chart or by NOTAM.
(…..)
17 Next row down is used for short messages. e.g. EOSID description location
(…..)
___________________
Chief Pilot
Page 6 of 6
INSTRUCTION
Validity: Until Further Notice 08th October 2020
B737-NG
Risk Assessment required ___YES____ Risk Assessment Reference CPDLC 20191023
Standards
√ √
Subject: Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC)

The purpose of this FCI is to rescind FCI B737-NG 19.11 and reissue based on current fleet
configuration, regulation, and manufacture guidance.
Tech Log Notice to Crew entries identify retrofitted/activated aircraft and CPDLC system type. Note
that the Ryanair Group Fleet are not currently equipped with ACARS/ACARS printers.
The majority of the Ryanair Group Fleet are equipped with the Honeywell Mark II+ CMU PM-CPDLC
Installation (ICAO OFP Item 10a “J1”) and the attached Eirtech FCOM Supplement (FCOMS/1175-
001) provides operational guidance. Pilots should refer to Section 3 “Advisories and Expectations” of
this document prior to raising system defects. Datalink ATIS and Departure/Pushback/Oceanic
Clearance, and Terminal Weather Information for Pilots (TWIP) features are not available on Mark II+
systems.
FCOM section 11.34 of this FCI provides system description for the following Tab Nrs / configurations
which are configured with Boeing CPDLC systems:
• YW142 - YW151: Boeing VHF ATN Only, ICAO OFP Item 10a “J1”
• YW140-141, YW152-YW164: Boeing FANS (VHF+Iridium SATCOM DLK), OFP Item 10a
“J1J7”
• Datalink ATIS and Departure/Pushback/Oceanic Clearance, and Terminal Weather
Information for Pilots (TWIP) are not currently approved for operations.
FANS configured aircraft ATC Data Link Alerting Messages are provided in FCOM V2 pages
11.60.24-25 of this FCI.
Boeing FANS VHF + Iridium SATCOM datalinks function via autotuning and flight crew interaction
is not required to transfer between VHF and SATCOM CPDLC networks.
Ryanair CPDLC systems (autotune/multi-frequency capable VDL Mode 2) satisfy current regulation
and EASA.21J.452.
Crews are NOT PERMITTED to conduct CPDLC unless both crew members have completed the
CPDLC E-Learning module and the Tech Log Notice to Crew reflects CPDLC activated.
When conducting CPDLC operations, crews should reference the CPDLC Handy Dandys
available in the EFB.
The below text takes an immediate effect and will be included in the FCOM at next revision.
FCOM V1
NP.10.6
Autopilot flight Director System and Flight Management System Monitoring ( RYR )
(…)
MCP altitude changes following an ATC VHF instruction:
1. ATC gives instruction to change ALT/Level
2. PM responds to ATC
3. PF resets MCP altitude and keeps finger in contact with the MCP selector and calls "SET"
4. PM verifies the correct MCP altitude is displayed on the PFD and calls "XXX CHECKED."
5. PF selects/confirms VNAV on the MCP/PFD, verifies FMA and calls "VNAV" for all MCP ALT
selections.
MCP altitude change following a CPDLC uplink instruction:
Read, Agree, Respond, Action (RARA)
• Read - PM will read the instruction
• Agree - Both crew members will understand and agree on the instruction
• Respond - Respond to the instruction, by selecting WILCO/UNABLE or STANDBY
• Action - Only at the confirmation of the “CLOSED” status of the ATC log dialog:
- PM Call “CLOSED”
- PF Action the instruction.
NP.21.78
Climb and cruise procedure – Pilot Flying and Pilot Monitoring (RYR)
(…)
Change of Radio Frequency
Climb, descent, single pilot on radio or autopilot disengaged: The PM will be responsible for the
frequency change. The PM will enter the new frequency in the standby window on the RTP while
responding to ATC.
Frequency change following a CPDLC instruction (RARA):
Read - PM will read the ATC message
Agree - PF will tune in the new frequency (cross check against ATC log)
- PM will record the new frequency on the flight log
Respond - PM will accept instruction by selecting WILCO

- PM await & call “CLOSED” when ATC dialog message status is “closed”
Action - PM will change the new frequency and contact ATC stating that you are CPDLC enabled
(…)
NP.10.8
Radio and Data Link Management
(…)
CPDLC:
When PM needs to leave the radios:
For Frequencies changes:
- PF will respond to the CPDLC message and action the instruction:
- PM when back on frequency will review frequency change on CPDLC ATC log page
and note it in the OFP.
For HGD’s and ALT changes:
- PF will respond to the CPDLC message & will not action the instruction until:
- PM is returned on the operational frequency and acknowledges the instruction
When one of the flight crew requires to leave the flight deck:
- PF will respond and action the instruction
- PM, when returned to the flight deck, will review all instructions received by ATC via
CPDLC ATC log page and note them in the OFP
(…)
NP.21.26
Prefight Procedure – PF (RYR)
(…)
WHEEL WELL fire warning light - Illuminated
Radio tuning panel ...............................................................Set
PANEL OFF Lights - Extinguished
Set panels – as desired
CPDLC:
RTP3………………………........................................Set “Data” in Active Window
Note: Complete IRS Alignment before commencing CPDLC LOG-ON process
(…)
NP.21.78
(…)
Establish CPDLC Data Communications Procedure - Pilot Monitoring (RYR)
NOTIFY/LOGON with first UAC when above FL100, prior to passing FL285.
Note:
Following a successful NOTIFY/LOGON and prior to entry into the airspace of the concerned ATC
Center (e.g. approximately 10 minutes for Maastricht UAC) the ground system will automatically
initiate CPDLC connection.
The flight crew will receive an uplink confirming CPDLC connections and also an indication on the
DLK ATC NOTIFY/STATUS screen, where the current ATC CENTER is displayed adjacent to LSK
1R.
Note: The flight come under control of the displayed ATC Center when:
• The flight crew has made initial voice contact with the controller of this center, and
• An uplink message is displayed to the flight crew, indicating the name and function of the
current ATC unit.
The Flight crew should not attempt to exchange CPDLC messages until under direct control of
the ATC Center.
(…)
NP.21.81
Climb and Cruise Procedure - Pilot Flying and Pilot Monitoring (RYR)
(…)
Above FL100 NOTIFY/LOGON
CPDLC
Passing FL300, Select 10 degrees angle of
bank and call: “ANGLE OF BANK 10
Degrees”.
(…)
NP.21.95
Descent Procedure -- Pilot Monitoring (RYR)
(…)
Termination of CPDLC
Terminate CPDLC when descending below FL285, latest when passing FL150 or 15 minutes to landing.
(…)
(…)
Passing FL300, Select 25 degrees angle of
bank and call: “ANGLE OF BANK 25
degrees”
When Passing FL150 or 15 minutes to Position FATEN BELTS switch ON
landing, call “Seat belt sign ON” when passing through FL150 or 15
minutes to landing and verify
termination of CPDLC
(…)
(…)
NP.21.139
Secure procedure - Pilot Flying (RYR)
RTP3…………………………………….......Dial 121.500 into STBY window
Frequency transfer Switch………………………………………...………Press
RTP3 OFF Switch………………………………………………………...Press
Offside tuning light…………………………………....Verify OFF on all RTPs
ACPs…………………………………………….Confirm VHF3 NOT selected
VHF3 Volume……………………………………………………....Full Down
(…)
NP.40.1 (RYR)
(…)
CPDLC Callouts (RYR)
When CPDLC message is received and after the call chime or ATC Uplink message is displayed on
MCDU:
Call: “ATC CALL”
When responding to an ATC request:

PM will read the message out laud
PF call “WILCO”/ “UNABLE”/ “STBY” as PM press WILCO/UNABLE/STBY
appropriate as appropriate
When ATC log message status is
closed:
PM call “CLOSED”
(…)
For ATC request: Both flight crew member will review & agree the message to be sent, only after.

PF Call “SEND” Pil
PM will send the message
FCOM V2
5.10.2
Radio Tuning Panel
(…)
Frequency Selector
Rotate - selects frequency in the STANDBY frequency indicator:

• first digit is always 1
• outer selector changes second and third digits in 1 MHz increments
• inner selector changes fourth, fifth, and sixth digits in 8.33 KHz
increments.
• For airplanes equipped with data link, tuning above maximum or below minimum
Frequency displays DATA in Frequency Indicator.
(…)
FCOM V2 11.34.1 - 11.34.48 – Applicable to Boeing FANS configuration (New FCOM Section)
An uplinked ATC message will be accompanied by a white •ATC message on the
primary engine display and a Hi/Lo chime over the flight deck loudspeaker. ATC
MESSAGE will also be displayed in the CDU scratch pad.
FCOM V2 11.60.24-25 (Applies to Boeing FANS Configured Aircraft)
ATC Data Link Messages
These messages relate to ATC data link message status.
ATC Data Link Alerting Messages
ALERTING MESSAGE CAUSE CORRECTIVE ACTION

ATC COMM Active ATC connection Clear message.
ESTABLISHED established.
ATC COMM ATC connection Clear message.
TERMINATED terminated without
transfer to another
service station.
ATC MESSAGE Receipt of valid ATC Clear message and
datalink message. display the received ATC
uplink.
ATC REPORT LIST FULL ATC REPORT buffer is Clear message and send
full. or delete reports listed on
the ATC REPORT page.
ATC ROUTE X DATA Receipt of am ATC Review the route uplink,
UPLINK ACARS uplink message and execute or ERASE.
(U11.0 and later) containing route data.
The route data has been
loaded into the active
RTE 1 or 2 flight plan
buffer.
ATC ROUTE X Receipt of an ATC Clear message.
UPLINK LOADING ACARS uplink message
(U11.0 and later) containing route data.
The route data is
currently being loaded
into the active RTE 1 or 2
FMC flight plan buffer.
ATC ROUTE X Receipt of an ATC Select the active/inactive
UPLINK READY ACARS uplink that RTE 1 or 2 page or
(U11.0 and later) contains route data, and active/inactive LEGS 1
the route data LOAD or 2 page, LOAD route,
prompts are displayed on and execute or ERASE.
the active/inactive RTE 1
or 2 and active/inactive
LEGS 1 or 2 pages.
ATC RTA DATA Receipt of an ATC Review the RTA uplink,
UPLINK ACARS uplink message and execute or ERASE.
(U11.0 and later) containing RTA data.
The RTA data is
currently being loaded
into the active RTE 1 or 2
flight plan.
CLEARANCE The clearance being Perform clearance
CONDITION MET monitored is met. instruction
(U14.0 and later)
CLEARANCE COND The clearance being Review clearance being
NOT MET monitored is executed monitored, select
(U14.0 and later) prior satisfying "MONITOR" on ATC
clearance. INDEX page. Comply with
ATC clearance
CLR COND NOT IN When the waypoint in Review clearance being
RTE the clearance being monitored, select
(U14.0 and later) monitored is deleted "MONITOR" on ATC
from the active route or a INDEX page. Comply with
clearance is accepted and ATC clearance
the waypoint is not in the
active route.
ATN DATA BASE ATN Data Base is not Load ATN Data Base
INVALID available/loaded and
(U14.0 and later) FANS-2 option is
enabled
ATC CPDLC downlink has Resend message
TIMEOUT-RESEND been sent and the
(U14.0 and later) required response has not
been received
DATALINK LOST If a FANS ATC Notify ATC of the loss of
(U12.0 and later) connection is FANS datalink
established, the alert is connectivity.
issued after the system is
in NO COMM for 90
seconds consecutively.
INVALID ATC (ROUTE ATC uplink received by Clear message.
or ROUTE X) UPLINK FMC contains errors.
INVALID ATC UPLINK ATC uplink received by Clear message.
FMC contains errors.
MESSAGE LIMIT Crew attempts to select Clear message.
EXCEEDED more than five message
elements for inclusion in
downlink message.
PARTIAL ATC ROUTE Receipt of an ATC Review the route uplink,
X UPLINK ACARS uplink message and execute or ERASE.
(U11.0 and later) containing route data
which passed syntax
error checks, but
contained errors in the
data, and part of the
active RTE 1 or 2 flight
plan data has been
loaded.
PARTIAL FMC able to load only a Clear message and reject
CLEARANCE portion of data. uplinked clearance.
LOADED
RE–LOGON TO ATC No response to logon Clear message and
COMM message after 10 re-send logon message.
minutes.
RESPOND TO ATC ATC uplink pending Clear message and
UPLINKS storage full. respond to open uplinks.
UNABLE TO LOAD FMC unable to load any Clear message and reject
CLEARANCE data from uplink. uplinked clearance.
UNABLE TO SEND Manual initiation of Clear message.
MSG downlink failed.
-END-
_________________
Chief Pilot
Document Ref:
FCOM FCOMS/1175-001
www.eirtechaviation.ie
Tel: +353 61 471 800
Supplement Issue 5 Sheet 1 of 123
e-Mail: info@etas.ie (EASA.21J.452)
Flight Crew Operation Manual

Supplement
For
Honeywell Mark II+ CMU PM-CPDLC

Installation
Aircraft Applicability: B737NG
Description: This Change installs a new Honeywell ACARS

Mark II CMU with PM-CPDLC functionality.
Written:
Compliance Verified:
Office of Airworthiness:
The technical content of this document is approved under the authority of DOA ref. EASA.21J.452.
 2020 Eirtech Aviation Services Ltd. Form ERT/TEMP/033 Issue 3
Document Ref:
FCOM Supplement FCOMS/1175-001
(EASA.21J.452) Issue 5 Sheet 2 of 123
Document Issue Record
Issue Date Changes WRT CVE OoA

1 03 Sep 2018 Initial issue. BR MM EMcA
Typographical correction.
Document reference number was
2 20 Jan 2019 incorrectly shown as FCOMS/1186-001 BR MM TWM
throughout document.
Corrected now to FCOMS/1175-001
3 06 Dec 2019 Improved image on sheet 9 ML BR TWM
4 13 Dec 2020 Improved image from sheet 6 to 67. WCK BR TWM
Added note to Section 3 for aircraft
5 with Service Bulletin ERT-SB-2315
installed. Added Appendix B.
This document is updated as a whole and not as individual pages.

Document Ref:
1. GENERAL
This Flight Crew Operation Manual Supplement gives operating details for The
Honeywell Mark II+ CMU PM-CPDLC system fitted to the B737NG aircraft by Eirtech
Aviation Services Change ERT/CNG/1175.
2. SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION
The Change installs a Honeywell Mark II+ PM-CPDLC Communications Management
Unit. The operation of the ACARS/PM-CPDLC system is given in the following pages.
The ACARS is a voice and data communication system to manage flight plan data
and maintenance data between the airplane and the airline.
These are the components of the ACARS:
• Airplane personality module (APM)
• Communications management unit (CMU)
• Multipurpose Control display unit (MCDU)
You use the Multipurpose control display unit (MCDU) to control the operation of the
ACARS and to show ACARS messages.
The ACARS airplane personality module (APM) provides logic tailoring, airplane
identification code and airplane registration number code.
The ACARS CMU receives the ground-to-air digital messages (uplink) and controls
the transmission of the air-to-ground digital messages (downlink).
ACARS connects to these components of other systems:
• Printer to print ACARS reports and messages.
• Proximity switch electronics unit (PSEU) to send discrete signals for out, off, on and
in (OOOI) events.
• Remote electronics unit (REU) to distribute the chime annunciation and/or light
annunciation signals.
• SELCAL control panel to signal the flight crew of an incoming ACARS message
requiring flight crew attention.
• VHF transceiver to transmit to and receive data from the ground.
ACARS also connects to these systems to upload information from airline operations
or download information to airline operations:
• Data loader control panel
• Flight management computers
The CPDLC system is in the CMU. The CPDLC can start, manage, and stop
communication between the ground air traffic control system through the Aeronautical
Telecommunications Network (ATN). When there is an applicable connection, the
CPDLC system supplies the crew with a procedure to interchange messages with an
applicable air traffic controller.
The “Protected Mode” of the CPDLC refers to the end-to-end check mechanism. This
occurs on all exchanges to make sure the integrity of the message.

Document Ref:
3. SYSTEMS OPERATION
The PM-CPDLC system is operated using the attached pilots guide in Appendix A*.
NOTE:
On aircraft with GE MCDU Part numbers 174101-03-01 and 174101-03-03 the “ATC”
shortcut key on the keypad is inoperative. The ATC menu can only be accessed
through the “DLK” line select key.
*For aircraft that have had Service Bulletin ERT-SB-2315 installed, refer to Appendix
B for the ATN only pilots guide.

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INSTRUCTION
Validity: Until Further Notice 05th November 2020
FCI B737-NG
Risk assessment required ___Yes/No____ Risk Assessment Reference: OPS43091
Standards
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Subject: QRH Operator Information Section 1 -- Withdrawn
The purpose of this FCI is to withdraw QRH Operational Information Section 1 due to revisions in procedures
regarding actions to be taken by the Commander in the event of an inflight security event.
QRH pages OI.1.1 – OI.1.2 are hereby rescinded and should be removed from the QRH.
FCI GEN 20.25 promulgates current guidance and procedure associated with actions to be taken by the
Commander in the event of an inflight security event.
Crews are to refer to FCI GEN 20.25 when notified of a security related event during operations.
The text below takes an immediate effect and will be incorporated in the Boeing QRH at next revision.
QRH Operational Information Section
OI.TOC.1 – withdrawn, remove page from QRH OI section

OI.TOC.2 – withdrawn, remove page from QRH OI section
OI.1.1 – withdrawn, remove page from QRH OI section
OI.1.2 – withdrawn, remove page from QRH OI section
QRH Checklist Instructions – QRH List of Effective Pages (Section LEP)
(…)
Operational Information (tab)
OI.TOC.1-2 Cancelled (CANC)
OI.1.1 Cancelled (CANC)
OI.1.2 Cancelled (CANC)
(…)
-END-
___________________
Chief Pilot
FLIGHT CREW GEN 20.17
INSTRUCTION
FCI GENERAL
Risk assessment required ___Yes____ Risk assessment Reference PD52348b

Customer
Flt Ops √ In-flight √ GOps √ Engineering Commercial
Standards
Subject: RFFS CAT 5

The purpose of this FCI is to amend the minimum level of fire cover required for specified flights to RFFS
CAT 5.
The current Covid-19 crisis continues to affect air operators and airports, following notification from some
airport operators that they will only be able to maintain Category 5 RFFS for non scheduled flights, Ryanair
has reviewed the requirements for Cargo, Recency and FCF flights.
For Non Scheduled, Maintenance, Cargo, Positioning and Ferry flights where no passengers or dangerous
goods are carried on board the minimum level of cover required is RFFS CAT 5.
Crews should note that when passengers are carried then the requirement s of OM(A) 8.1.2.1.4 shall apply in
full.
The text below takes an immediate effect will remain in effect until revoked by the IAA or 02 Dec 2020 as
mandated by EASA.
8.1.2.1.4 At the planning stage, if the Aeroplane RFFS Category is not available, Ryanair shall ensure
that the Aerodrome RFFS category at each aerodrome required to be specified in the OFP
meets the criteria in Table 1 at the time of expected use.
(…..)
3. If an individual aerodrome serves more than one purpose, the highest required
category corresponding to that purpose at the time of expected use must be available.
4. For Non-Scheduled Maintenance, Cargo, Positioning and Ferry flights as detailed

below, irrespective of the number of movements, the minimum RFFS CAT is 5
Maintenance: Nil Passengers

Cargo: Crew and only essential staff will be carried and No DG
Positioning and Ferry: Crew and essential staff
___________________
Chief Pilot
INSTRUCTION
FCI GENERAL
Risk assessment required ___No____ Risk assessment Reference: PD38564
Customer
Flt Ops √ In-flight √ GOps √ Engineering Commercial
Standards
Subject: Report to the Aircraft / Gate

The purpose of this FCI is to introduce a facility for aircrew to report for duty at the boarding gate or the
aircraft as an alternative to reporting for duty at the base crew room. This facility greatly assists with the
objective of social distancing brought about by the COVID -19 crisis avoiding the risk community transfer in
the crewroom. Report to aircraft / gate will be available at bases where these new reporting procedures can be
supported and implemented. With the introduction of the Electronic Flight Plan there is no longer a need for
crew to print any hard copy documentation for dispatch. Crew can complete check-in and access all required
pre-departure documentation on the EFB and VPOS EFL APP. Bases which facilitate crews reporting to
aircraft / gate will be identified in the report to aircraft/gate list available on EFB and VPOS devises.
The text below takes an immediate effect and will be incorporated in the Operations Manual Part A at next
revision.
7.3 Ryanair Responsibilities as the Operator

(…)
(c) Reporting times in Ryanair allow sufficient time for ground duties. Ryanair expects that the commute from
home/residence to the reporting point is achievable in 60 minutes. Therefore, the report time excludes passing
through staff channels and security in the airport and the commute to the reporting point. The report time for
all locations*, crewroom, boarding gate or aircraft is STD-45 minutes.
*Note: Reporting point will be identified in the Base Information document on FDF/CDF.
This 45-minute report time in every airport has, over many years, proven resilient to achieve the completion
of regulatory and non-regulatory tasks pre-flight. Ryanair has base management in each base lead by the Base
Captain to monitor these activities. Better and faster delivery systems have enhanced pre-flight efficiencies.
The commute to the aircraft is continuously reviewed to ensure it remains reasonable. The necessary
preparations for departure including security checks, PDIs, boarding and fuelling, aircrew briefings and
completion of pre-departure flows, checklists and performance calculations are continually assessed. The
introduction of the Electronic Flight Bag has greatly assisted the Flight crew in the performance of these pre
departure tasks. Where any element of the 45-minute report is challenged as reported by aircrew or detected
from punctuality data, the 45-minute report and/or non-regulatory procedures will be changed to ensure
continued compliance.
The frequency of operations in Ryanair ensures crew familiarity and practice to achieve compliance during
the reporting period and enables expeditious completion of these tasks whilst maintaining high level of
safety – as supported by SMS data. When there are widespread reporting delays and crews are rolled
(reassigned) to other same wave flights, crews reporting may be instructed to report directly to the
aircraft/crewroom/gate.
Crew members called off standby may be instructed to report to the crew room, the gate or directly to aircraft.
If the crew has overnighted away from a Ryanair base or when returning to duty after the break on the ground
during a split duty the most suitable reporting point may be the gate or aircraft. In all cases the standard pre-
flight crew briefings must be completed prior to dispatch.
(…)
8.0.8 Communications
8.0.8.7 Cabin Crew Liaison
Cabin Crew Members are called Customer Service Agents (CCMs) and the Cabin Services Supervisor is called
the Customer Service Supervisor (CSS). Cabin Crew come under the command of the Commander when they
go aboard an aircraft for the purpose of making a flight. To be effective in their safety function
the relationship between cabin and cockpit is reinforced by communications. The operating crew should
introduce themselves to one another at the reporting point.
(…)
8.1 Flight Preparation and Operation Instructions

(…..)
8.1.0.2 Reporting Directly to Aircraft/Gate.
Reporting Directly to Aircraft/Gate:

Report Directly to Aircraft/Gate Bases can be identified in the base information guide located in the VPOS
CDF and the EFB FDF.
• Briefings
Safety Briefing are a vital part of the pre-departure sequence and ensure that all members of the crew
establish and maintain a shared ‘mental model’ for the days operation.
The Commander, or the CSS in the absence of the Commander, are required to ensure that all
applicable safety briefings are completed prior to embarkation of passengers, that they are
completed in full and are not subject to undue interruption.
Under normal Circumstances the briefing will be conducted in the aircraft cabin. Where privacy and
control of the environment is assured. The yellow safety strap will remain in place until briefings are
completed and the aircraft ready for boarding.
If due to the delayed arrival of the aircraft the crew elected to use another suitable, alternate location
for the briefing.
A suitable alternate location must satisfy the following requirements.
(a) It must sufficiently far away from members of the public, that the crew cannot be
overheard.
(b) It must be in a place where the crew are not subject to interruption from members of
the public or ground staff.
(c) If the weather is inclement then it must be conducted inside.
Note: If the above conditions cannot be met then the crew will wait for the aircraft to arrive or proceed
to the base facilities where the briefing can be conducted.
Flight crew briefing
As part of his introduction the commander shall confirm with the first officer that both EFB are up to
date and at the minimum accepted charge as per OM(A) 8.9, and that eFPL is downloaded in EFL
The Commander will then discuss with all members of the flight crew as a minimum the following.
• Aircraft location, defect and status

• Weather conditions above the applicable minima using OMA guidance for destinations and
chosen alternates
• NOTAMs/Co. NOTAMS that are applicable to the flight
• Performance issues affecting the days flying
• Fuel requirements
• Loading and required aircraft weight for the sectors
• De-icing requirement if applicable.
• Review appropriate TEM aspects affecting the planned operation
Training Flights
In addition to the above the Commander will review the Students training file and brief any
training objectives for the duty consistent with the guidance containing in the Line training
techniques document (LTTD).
Flight crew briefing of Cabin crew

As part of the introduction the commander shall confirm with all members of the crew that all
updates on VPOS/EFB have been successfully completed. He will also confirm the report time
of all members of the crew and establish if any member has been called from STBY or has had
their report delayed.
Note. If for reasons of poor mobile network signal or airport WIFI a crew member reports that
this has not been possible then the crew member will return to the base facilities to use the
Company WIFI provided.
The Commander shall conduct a crew briefing in accordance with OM(A) 8.0.8.7, taking the
opportunity to reinforce any current NPFO safety messages.
• Missing crew or crew changes must be notified to Crew Control by the commander prior to dispatch.
• Late crew changes require EFL to be updated prior to dispatch to ensure FTL compliance.
In the event of a delayed inbound aircraft or prolonged delay, crew should agree a time with Operations
Control to return to the gate/aircraft.
Post flight
Once all post flight duties are complete, crews shall check out.
-END-
___________________
Chief Pilot
INSTRUCTION
FCI GENERAL
Risk assessment required ___Yes____ Risk assessment Reference FANS ADSC 20200203
1st Level SRA NPFO 27th Jan’20
Flt Ops √ In-flight GOPs Engineering √ Commercial OCC √
Subject: Performance Based Specification Operations
The purpose of this FCI is to:
• authorise RNP 2 operations in ‘Domestic’ airspace

• authorise RNP 4 operations in Oceanic airspace and
• explain PBCS compliance in NAT HLA airspace (T9, T290 exempted).
• explain ADS-C
Domestic airspace is non-oceanic airspace within the area of operations and is also referred to as
Continental/European and ‘Domestic Offshore’ when referring to T9 and T290.
Crew procedures associated with FANS/ADS-C operations are included in FCI B737-NG 19.11 and
Boeing FCOM Bulletin RYR-96(AS).
The text below takes immediate effect and will be included in the OM(A) at the next revision.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0.1.4 Abbreviations
(…)
DLK Data Link
DLM Data Link Mandate
(…)
PBCS Performance Based Communications and Surveillance
(…)
RCP Required Communication Performance
RSP Required Surveillance Performance
(…)
8.1.10.1.1 Operational Flight Plan AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.175(a)

(…)
B738/M (…)
JX – FANS CPDLC Configuration
•J1 CPDLC-ATN-B1 VDLM2 – Honeywell Mk II+
•J4 CPDLC-FANS VDL MODE 2 (VHF only)
•J7 CPDLC-FANS VHF+ SATCOM (Iridium)
CPDLC
(…..)
Page 1 of 8
D1 - ADS-C with FANS 1/A capabilities
G1 - ADS-C with ATN capabilities
(…)
P2 – indicates FANS RCP 240 compliant aircraft
planning to operate in the NAT HLA
SUR/RSP180 – indicates FANS ADS-C compliant

aircraft planning to operate in the NAT HLA
(…)
L1 - indicates RNP 4 compliant aircraft planning to
PBN/L1
operate in the NAT HLA
OPR/COMPANY
(…)
(…)
8.3.2.2.1 PBN Operations
Page 2 of 8
(…)
8.3.2.2.3 Management of the Navigation Database

AMC3 CAT.OP.MPA.126
1. For RNAV 1, RNAV 2, RNP 1, RNP 2, RNP4, and RNP APCH, (…..)
(…..)
8.3.2.4.2 MNPS
CAT.IDE.A.345, SPA.MNPS.100, 105, AMC1 SPA.GEN.105(a)
All MNPS Airspace between FL 285 and FL 420 inclusive in the North Atlantic
Region has been designated NAT HLA (North Atlantic High Level Airspace)
since Feb 2016. The term ‘MNPS airspace’ remains in use in this Manual and
refers only to NAT HLA. MNPS airspace is a familiar term to flight crew. ‘An
MNPS Approval is required to operate in MNPS airspace’ is easily understood.
Entry into NAT HLA (MNPS) airspace requires HF, RNAV10, RVSM Approval and
MNPS approval. Operations in MNPS/NAT HLA between FL 290 and 410 requires
compliance with Data Link Mandate wef 31 Jan 2020 by having FANS 2 equipage
onboard. FANS2 equipage is indicated in the tech log NOTOC and on the OFP with
J7 (IRIDIUM SATCOM) and D1(ADS-C) in Item 10. This equipage includes
compliance with PBCS requirements.
The relationships are indicated in the table below:
Page 3 of 8
8.3.2.4.2.1 MNPS (NAT HLA) Equipment
(…)
Long Range Navigation System (LRNS)
The Long Range Navigation System (LRNS) on board Company aircraft is an FMC
with GPS and IRS inputs. Dual FMC aircraft have two LRNS. It is Company policy
to assign dual FMC aircraft to operations in MNPS. However, a Company aircraft
may operate on T9 or T290 with one LRNS only. HF is required.
(…)
8.3.2.5 Performance Based Specification Operations
8.3.2.5.1 Performance Based Communications and Surveillance (PBCS)

PBCS standards were introduced in the NAT HLA for aircraft that meet the ‘Required
Communication Performance’ (RCP) and ‘Required Surveillance Performance’ (RSP)
specifications which ensure the ongoing safety and efficiency of ATM operations.
Performance-based operations and monitoring have been implemented in the NAT

HLA to ensure the ongoing safety and efficiency of ATM operations. The performance
of FANS equivalent, CPDLC, and ADS-C aircraft are monitored in the NAT HLA
against RCP 240 and RSP 180 specifications.
RCP 240 reflects the maximum transaction time of 240 seconds between when
controller sends an uplink message to the aircraft and when they receive the downlinked
response. RCP 240 time allocations provide for the pilots to respond within 60 seconds
after receiving an uplinked message.
RSP 180 reflects the maximum transaction time of 180 seconds for ADS contract
processing, beginning from when the avionics generates a contract and when displayed
to ATC.
Within approved airspace, RCP 240 and RSP 180 operational specifications enable
ATC to optimize airspace efficiency by providing 30 nm, 50 nm, or 5-minute
Page 4 of 8
longitudinal separation minima and 23 nm lateral separation minimum between aircraft
which are also RCP 240 and RSP 180 capable.
Separation of PBCS aircraft remains an air traffic control function and responsibility.
When an aircraft does not meet RCP 240 and RSP 180 specifications, ATC shall
provide standard separation criteria.
OMC Flight Supplement, ATC Section 23 provides PBCS guidance associated with
NAT HLA operations.
Aircrew must report any failure or malfunction of GNSS, ADS-C, or CPDLC

equipment to ATC as soon as it becomes apparent.
ANSPs and operators will participate in monitoring performance programmes and

report PBCS deficiencies via established channels.
8.3.2.5.1.1 PBCS Flight Planning

For aircraft planning to operate in the NAT HLA, PBCS capabilities, when
operational, are reflected in the ICAO flight plan as follows:
Item 10a: FANS designator (e.g., J7)

FANS CPDLC RCP 240 compliance designator (e.g., P2)
Item 10b: FANS ADS-C compliance (D1 or G1 for ATN systems)
Item 18: FANS ADS-C RSP 180 compliance (SUR/RSP180)
RNP 4 compliance (PBN/L1)
When noted prior to dispatch, the PIC must advise Operations Control of any
defective PBCS related equipment and revise the ICAO OFP Item 10a/10b/18 codes
and flight plan route accordingly.
8.3.2.5.2. RNP4
RNP4 is a navigation specification developed for operations in oceanic and remote

airspace. GNSS is the primary navigation sensor to support RNP4, either as a stand-
alone navigation system or as part of a multi-sensor system.
8.3.2.5.3. RNP2
RNP2 is a Navigation Specification applicable in Domestic airspace, also called

Continental or European airspace and ‘Domestic Offshore’ airspace designated for T9
and T290. GNSS is the primary navigation sensor to support RNP2, either as a stand-
alone navigation system or as part of a multi-sensor system. All Company aircraft are
RNP2 compliant.
8.3.2.5.4. Data-Link Mandates (DLM)
The HLA Data Link Mandate is effective from 31 Jan 2020. Company equipped with
‘FANS2 VDL (VHF Data Link) MODE 2 + Iridium SATCOM’ aircraft are compliant
with the HLA DLM. This will be indicated by a TechLog Notice to Crew and ‘J7’ in
Item 10 of the OFP. This equipage includes compliance with PBCS requirements.
Page 5 of 8
The European DLM is effective from 05 Feb 2020. Depending on the equipage fitted
to the aircraft to enable compliance with this mandate either J1, J4 or J7 will be
indicated in Item 10 of the OFP.
8.3.2.5.5. Operational Impact NAT HLA,
If RNP4 is not indicated in the FMC when entering NAT HLA airspace, the crew must
manually enter RNP4 at least 10 mins prior to entry to ensure the onboard alerting is
compliant with the Navigation Specification required. The crew must delete RNP4
when departing NAT HLA airspace. The aircraft RNP is then 2 for the remaining
enroute segment.
• Crews must verify that the RNP value displayed in the FMC is applicable to the
intended area of operation.
• Flight crew should not modify waypoints that have been retrieved from the
database. User-defined data (e.g. for flex-track routes) may be entered and used.
• Strategic Lateral Offset Procedure (SLOP) is mandatory for all Tango routes
except T9/T290.
The following ICAO Flight Plan annotations in Items 10 are required for operations in
NAT HLA:
Item 10a (Radio communication, navigation and approach-aid equipment and

capabilities):
▪ ‘J7’ indicates FANS 2 VDL MODE 2 + SATCOM (Iridium)
Item 10b (Surveillance equipment and capabilities):

• ‘D1’ indicates ADS-C (FANS) equipage and operation, and/or
• ‘G1’ indicates ADS-C (ATN) equipage and operation
8.3.2.5.6. NAT HLA Exempted Routes - T9, T290
Tango 9 (T9) and Tango 290 (T290) require RNP2 specification for operations from
FL285 to FL410. T9 is southbound, T290 is northbound. HF is required. VHF
frequency 128.360 is assigned as a required monitoring frequency (in addition to 121.5)
and used for intervention and emergency only. Crews will monitor and only transmit
during emergency or contingency.
Page 6 of 8
• T9 Southbound Route (strategic even levels) requiring; NATHLA–RNP2–
GNSS–ADS-B OUT-VHF.
• T290 Northbound Route (strategic odd levels) requiring; NATHLA–RNP2–
GNSS–ADS-B OUT-VHF.
• SLOP not applicable whilst operating on T9 and T290.
• T9 or T290 are FANS exempt routes.
• Navigational equipage for all RNP2 Domestic/Continental (Offshore)
operations areas must have at least a single GNSS/LRNS.
8.3.2.6 Aircraft Data Communication Systems

ORO.MLR.105
(…)
8.3.2.6.1.3 ADS-C
Company aircraft configured with FANS-2 meet datalink mandates for communication
via CPDLC and position reporting via ADS-C with ATC. ADS-C utilizes onboard
systems to automatically provide aircraft position, altitude, speed, intent and
meteorological reports, or “contracts” to ATC. ADS-C also facilitates emergency
reporting to ATC. ICAO Doc 10037 Global Operational Data Link (GOLD) Manual
refers.
8.3.2.6.1.3.1 ADS Contracts
Periodic: Onboard avionics sends updated position report which will include
level, time and NEXT and NEXT+1 waypoints as per active flight plan.
Event: Event position/reports will be automatically triggered based upon the
following conditions:
Waypoint Change Event – when passing active flight plan waypoint

or crew amends NEXT or NEXT+1 waypoint.
Lateral Deviation Event: when aircraft deviates from cleared route

beyond Strategic Lateral Offset provisions.
Page 7 of 8
Level Range Deviation Event: aircraft deviates from cleared level ≥
300ft.
Vertical Rate Change Event: rate of descent exceeds 5000 FPM.
Demand: ATC function to trigger instantaneous aircraft position report.
Emergency: FMC selection available to advise ATC of a MAYDAY or PAN

situation.
Emergency report page accessible via FMC MCDU ATC INDEX
menu.
8.3.2.6.1.3.2 ADS-C Operations
ICAO OFP Item 10b should reflect D1 to indicate ADS-C equipage and operation.
Prior to entering ADS-C airspace, verify CPDLC (VHF and SATCOM) and ADS-C
serviceability.
Whilst operating in ADS-C airspace, should:

• avoid selecting ADS OFF (FMC ATC LOGON/STATUS 2/2 LSK 2L) unless instructed
by ATC.
• maintain listening watch on assigned HF, VHF frequencies while in the NAT region.
• proactively monitor UIR/FIR boundaries and apply PLOC mitigation TEM, SOPs.
8.3.2.6.2 CPDLC
(..…)
8.3.2.6.3 DLM Airspace Contingency Procedures:
Prior to Departure – Contact Operations Control Centre to refile flight plan to remain
clear of DLM airspace (e.g. NAT HLA).
After Departure But Prior to DLM Airspace – Advise ATC. Expect revised
clearance to remain clear of, or if tactically available, to remain within DLM airspace.
After Entering DLM Airspace – Immediately advise ATC. Expect revised

clearance to exit, or if tactically available, to remain within DLM airspace.
- END -
______________________
Aidan Murray Captain
Chief Pilot
Page 8 of 8
INSTRUCTION
Validity: Until Further Notice 23rd July 2020
FCI GENERAL
Risk assessment required: No Risk assessment Reference : N/a

Customer
In-flight √ Flt Ops √ Engineering x Commercial x x
Standards
Subject: Updates to OMA Updated Locations of Documents
The purpose of this FCI is to make the editorial and administrative changes to Operations Manual Part A in
response to updates in the locations of various forms and reference documents.
The text below takes immediate effect and will be included in Ops Manual Part A at next revision.
1.3.7 Base Captains

(…..)
The TOR (terms of reference) for Base Captains (BCs) are available from the NPFO.
6.1.14 Diabetic Pilot Procedures and OML
The medical treatment regime most visible to other flight crew members is insulin treated diabetes. A Class 1
medical certificate is only issued to a pilot on insulin if they fulfil stringent criteria including demonstration
of excellent control of their diabetes. Pilots with insulin-treated diabetes have to comply with the Medical
protocol including frequent blood sugar testing before and during a flight duty period to ensure their blood
glucose levels remain within an acceptable range. The Diabetic Pilot possesses all the procedures, instructions
and guidance relating to his/her condition and the requirements associated with his/her OML
8.2.4.5.2.2 De-icing Admin: DAR Form
DAR is “De-icing/Anti-icing Request form”. This is a GOPS form, is available on eCrew under the
MISC tab, and spare copies may be carried in the A/c Library Locker.
8.3.0.1.2 Taxiing
(…..)
8. Taxi and Braking on Slippery Surface
(…..)
• On clearways or stopways which may not be de-iced as not actual runway.
The Ryanair policy for external aircraft lighting configurations is presented in Ops Manual Part A, FCOM
Vol 1, Normal procedures available on DocuNet. These policies are incorporated in the Checklist and Standard
Operating Procedures, FCOM Vol 1.
Page 1 of 3
8.3.2.4.2 MNPS
(…..)
Pilots MUST NOT fly within MNPS Airspace unless they are qualified to do so and are in possession of the
appropriate Approval(s). The Ryanair MNPS approval is indicated in the Operations Specifications section of
the AOC.
The following documents, available on EFB, are applicable to MNPS operations in Oceanic Airspace:
8.3.8.2.1 General
(…..)
Crews shall observe the limitations in ops manual part A, Vol 1, Limitations, and shall observe the procedures
presented in Supplementary procedures, Cold weather operations, and the Ryanair Winter Operations Guide,
available on DocuNet. Additional guidance is presented in the Boeing FCTM, Chap 1, and Chap 4- “after
touchdown and landing roll".
8.3.8.6.2.10 Reporting
(…..)
• Operations which are the subject of an actual volcanic ash encounter must be reported by ASR-
Volcanic Ash. Commanders shall utilize the ASR reporting system. The encounter must be recorded
in the aircraft Tech log and MAINTROL advised.
8.4.2.9 Eligible Aerodromes and Runways – AMC6 SPA.LVO.105 LVO Approval
Initial Verification Autoland: How do I know?

The list of runway ends approved for Ryanair CAT III operations is available on DocuNet.
8.3.0.1.11 ATC Communications
(…..)
8.3.0.1.12 ATC Airspace and Speed Policy
(…..)
It is good airmanship to take avoiding action (heading change) whenever radar provides conflicting traffic
information, thereby ensuring that the conflict does not develop to a point where a TCAS warning is received.
(…..)
11.2 Forms to be Used for Reporting
Ryanair has established an electronic reporting system on eCrew accessed through the Coruson Link.
The system is available for crew through the company intranet site and is used for all internal reporting
as well as for mandatory reports forwarded to the Authority by the Safety Officer. Additionally, the
Company EFB may be used to file CSRs or ASRs via the Ryanair safety reporting App.
By reporting in this manner through eCrew or Company EFB devices, company personnel meet their
obligation to report to the Authority as described in this section.
Page 2 of 3
Air Safety Reports (ASR)
Accidents and Incidents are defined in Ireland in SI285 of 2007. If the electronic reporting system is
unavailable, then the SSO will publish a safety bulletin to crews describing the alternative method of
filing a report.
11.3.5 Operational Flight Data Monitoring (OFDM) ORO.AOC.130
(…..)
5. Confirm the effectiveness of any remedial action by continued monitoring.
Full detail of the OFDM process can be found in the OFDM procedures document. Access to the
document is limited to the OFDM trustees and other personnel involved in the OFDM programme
11.4.4 Dangerous Goods Accident/Occurrence – Notification
If an in-flight emergency occurs and the situation permits, the Commander shall inform ATC of any
Dangerous Goods on board.
Ryanair is required to report dangerous goods incidents and accidents to the Irish Aviation Authority
(IAA). An initial report shall be despatched within 72 hours of the event unless exceptional
circumstances prevent this. Content of the report is described in 9.1.3.3
-END-
___________________
Chief Pilot
Page 3 of 3
FLIGHT CREW FCI 20.24
INSTRUCTION
Validity: Until further notice 06th August 2020
GEN
Risk Assessment required YES Risk assessment Reference _PD11380____ _________

Standards
√ √
SUBJECT: Rapid Disembarkation
Flight Safety Foundation figures suggest that approximately 90% of evacuations are performed without
due cause and that almost 100% of evacuations involve death or serious injury. It follows that an
evacuation is not a ‘default option’ but is in fact a dangerous manoeuvre which should be performed
only when the situation truly demands it. Good airmanship requires that all opportunities are taken to
obtain and evaluate any available information prior to initiating an evacuation such that the best possible
decision is reached.
Ryanair has identified that its operation manuals don’t describe a non-normal situation whereby the
passengers should leave the aircraft immediately even though there is no immediate threat to life.
Choices available to operating crew are either a normal disembarkation or a full evacuation. The former
is considered too slow and the latter may unnecessarily introduce a threat of accident or serious injury
The purpose of this FCI is to introduce the concept of and the procedures to be followed for a “Rapid
Disembarkation”.
Rapid Disembarkation sits between an emergency evacuation and a normal disembarkation and
consists of passengers deplaning the aircraft expeditiously and leaving all baggage behind. It is a
precautionary procedure which would be typically used on stand for events such as overheating PEDs,
smoke fumes, external event etc but where full emergency evacuation is not warranted.
This decision is made by the Commander or the person on board qualified to initiate an emergency
evacuation or rapid disembarkation.
A rapid disembarkation can always be escalated to an ‘emergency evacuation’ if required.
The revised text takes immediate effect and will be included in Operations Manual Part A GEN at the next
revision.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
8.10.11 Rapid Disembarkation
A non-normal situation may occur at any time while boarding/disembarking. Rapid disembarkation is
a precautionary egress from the aircraft in situations assessed by the Commander or in his absence the
FO or CSS (following the chain of command) as deviating from normal conditions but not being an
immediate emergency, i.e. not posing an immediate threat to passengers and crew members on board,
but which may escalate into an emergency.
A rapid disembarkation occurs with the aircraft on the ground and an immediate disembarkation is
required. Rapid disembarkation shall be applied when a non-normal situation arises that requires an
expeditious disembarkation but is not immediately life-threatening.
Possible reasons for a rapid disembarkation include a security alert, smoke or fumes in the cabin,
overheating PEDs, a fuel spillage, a fire outside the aircraft which could threaten the aircraft, or any
situation that the Commander, FO or CSS decides that the passengers should leave the aircraft urgently.
The Command to commence a Rapid Disembarkation is similar to that of an evacuation.
“Disembark the passengers immediately using all available doors, disembark the passengers
immediately using all available doors.”
The cabin crew actions will be to stop the boarding if it is in progress and disembark passengers using
the aircraft doors, but not the overwing exits or escape slides.
• L1 door using Airbridge, mobile steps or Airstairs as appropriate,

• L2 door if mobile steps are available,
• R2/R1 door if an Ambulift is available and there are PRMs on board.
The cabin crew will instruct the passengers to leave their belongings behind. The aim will be to
disembark the passengers as quickly as possible but in a controlled manner not using the slides.
At ALL times, the Commander or CSS retains the authority to upgrade to a full evacuation if they
decide that the situation has deteriorated and has now become immediately life threatening.
They will make the Evacuation PA and in response the Cabin Crew will deploy the available escape
slide(s).
Communications with ATC and members of ground staff are critical during this event.

Chief Pilot
INSTRUCTION
Notice FCI GENERAL
Risk assessment required __Yes /_No____ Risk assessment Reference: NA
Standards
√
Subject: Special Load-Notification to Captains (NOTOC)
The purpose of this FCI is to amend Ops Manual Part A to align the current information provided on the
NOTOC with IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations 61st Edition.
The amended text accounts for the fact that there is no requirement to provide a “Telephone number where a
copy of the NOTOC is held” on the NOTOC document.
OMA 9.1.2.11 Special Load – Notification to Captains (NOTOC) Form

AMC1 SPA.DG.110(a)
(…..)
The NOTOC must contain the following information concerning each item of Dangerous Goods:
(…..)
• Destination/Airport for offloading of the Dangerous Goods.
• If an error is suspected in the NOTOC, the Dispatcher and Ryanair Engineering must be informed
and the issue addressed prior to dispatch.
-END-
_________________
Chief Pilot
Page 1 of 1
INSTRUCTION
Notice FCI GENERAL
Risk assessment required ____ No____ Risk assessment Reference: NA
Standards
√ √ √ √
Subject: OMA update to incorporate EFB changes
The purpose of this FCI is to update OMA references following the introduction of EFL as the primary reference for
all flight briefing pack information.
The text below takes immediate effect and will be included in OMA at next revision.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
8.1.0.1 Aircraft Pre-departure Checks and Inspections
The following manuals and publications shall be used for reference as appropriate:
• Airplane Flight Manual/CDL.
• Boeing Flight Planning and Performance Manual.
• FCOM Vol 1,2 and QRH and FCTM.
• Ops Manual Part B.
• Ops Manual Part C, Electronic Navblue Airways and Route Manual.
• Navblue Enroute Charts.
• Ops Manual Part C, Airfield Briefs.
• RYR EFB containing the following approved applications (EFL, Docunet, Boeing OPT, Navblue Charts+).
(….)
8.1.0.1.1 Onboard Performance Tool (OPT)

(….)
OPT software, software updates and a current airport database is installed on each portable EFB device. Normally
operating crew will make all performance calculations using the
Boeing OPT application. The Performance Department shall provide OPT solutions on request to operating crews
where crew are unable to do so.
Crews shall complete the performance calculations in advance of each flight. When the OPT is used to calculate take-
off performance, the result shall be emailed to the default address for archiving. There is no requirement to complete a
manual RTOW calculation unless the OPT or email applications are unavailable. If the RTOW figures have been
manually calculated, they must be attached to the EFL submission (or recorded on the paper OFP or RTOW calculation
table)
Where EFB is not available, an OPT request may be completed verbally between the Commander or a pilot designated
by the Commander, the duty pilot or the Performance Department.
• If a hard copy of the OPT solution is delivered to the Commander prior to take-off it shall be retained in the returned
flight envelop
• If a soft (electronic) copy has been provided (i.e. via email), then the crew/designated pilot/duty pilot/Perf Dept must
forward the calculation to the default e-mail address “takeoffperformance@ryanair.com”.
1
OPT is the primary method of calculating take-off (including Weight and Balance) and landing performance, and may
be used with the following circumstances:
(….)
8.1.0.1.2 Operations Manual Part B – Performance and RTOW Booklets

If required, Operations Manual Part B – Performance will be printed as part of the paper Trip Kit.
(….)
Airfield Briefs
(….)
RTOWs and Airfield Briefs are available on ecrew.ryanair.com for reference. The published date of all RTOW charts
will be listed as a checklist displayed on eCrew and should be crosschecked against the paper charts before departure.
8.1.0.1.3 The Trip Kit System

When EFB is unserviceable and a paper trip kit is required, the trip kit shall be assembled with reference to the
Operational Flight Plan (eFPL).
(….)
If a paper Navblue /RTOW chart is required, the crew shall print a copy from the eCrewWeb Navblue /RTOW link.
The crew will dispose of these charts post flight.
Crews shall verify the contents of the trip kit on-board when checking the ships library.
(….)
8.1.10.2 Computerised OFP

(….)
OFP Changes after STD-45
(….)
Ops will cancel the flight plan for a sector where an updated OFP has not been downloaded by the operating crew at
STD-10 mins. In this case check with Ops for the new flight plan and new flight number/call sign.
8.1.12.1 Information to be Retained on the Ground CAT.GEN.MPA.185

(….)
3. A copy of the NOTOC shall be transmitted to:
a. The destination airport;
b. Flight Operations in Dublin;
c. A copy shall be returned to Flight Operations via EFL (or in the returned Flight Envelope);
d. The alternate airport in the event of a diversion and retained by the addressees for the duration of the flight.
Information to passengers and other persons is provided for in the Ground Operations Manual and SEP Manual.
8.2.1.3 Uplift Check

The Commander shall always perform an Uplift Check using the fuel record figures in the Technical Log after every
refuelling to provide assurance of the fuel quantity system accuracy.
The Uplift Check consists of comparing the sum of the arrival fuel plus the uplift fuel with the total of the gauge
readings after refuelling.
The tolerance is ±200 kg for the Boeing 737 aircraft. If refuellers supply in excess of the fuel requested the Commander
shall annotate the circumstances on the Electronic Flight Log/Paper Voyage Report/Journey Log and ideally on the
fuel docket. In this case, attach the fuel docket to the EFL submission (or return in the flight envelope).
(….)
8.2.4.5.2.2 De-icing Admin: DAR Form

(….)
2
Green Copy: The green copy is retained by the Commander who will clip this to the left hand control column where
it will serve as a reminder when calling for the “Before Take-off Checks ‘Below the Line’” that
(1) the holdover time is still valid, and
(2) have the conditions changed.
Having reviewed these items, the green copy removed from the control column PRIOR to Take-off roll.
8.2.4.5.2.5 Service Provider Declines to Use DAR Form

Pending standardisation of this issue by EASA many airlines and service providers have designed their own forms.
Some providers insist on not using the Ryanair DAR form, using their own documentation instead. This is acceptable,
and a copy of the service providers form shall be attached to the EFL submission (or returned in the flight envelope).
8.3.0.4 SAFA Inspections (Safety Assessment of Foreign Aircraft)

(….)
7. The SAFA report shall be attached to the EFL submission (or returned in the flight envelope), and an ASR shall be
filed on completion of duty.
8.9.1.6.1 EFB Contingency Flow Chart – App(s) unavailable
3
8.9.1.6.2 EFB Contingency Flow Chart – EFB(s) unavailable
(….)
Downloading to iBooks:
Manuals: Select manuals to download as required.
Navblue Charts, RTOWs & AFBs: eCrewWeb > Navblue Charts, RTOWs & AFBs. Select charts to download
or print as required.
8.9.1.6.5 Dual EFB Failure Prior to Departure

(….)
An ASR shall be filed in the event of dual EFB failure.
8.9.1. 6.6 Dual EFB Failure During Flight

(….)
An ASR shall be filed in the event of dual EFB failure.
8.9.1.7 In-flight Charging

The internal battery is the primary power supply for the EFB. A USB power supply is located on each side of the
flight deck if required. EFB may be connected to the USB power supply. Charging is allowed during all phases
of flight.
The EFB being charged must be secured in the mounting device.
The only approved source for inflight charging is the installed USB power supply.
Caution: Disconnect the EFB from the power supply when the flight deck is unattended.
8.9.1.8 Post Flight Procedures

Crew shall ensure the relevant flight documents have been forwarded to the appropriate recipients.
The crew will check to ensure that the following documentation which has been previously submitted electronically
prior to dispatch has been acknowledged:
Note: Flight information must be submitted by the PM at the end of each sector. Flight information must be verified
by the Captain at the end of each duty.
1. OPT take-off performance calculations (including W&B)

2. Electronic Flight Log (EFL).
Any EFB hardware or software defects shall be promptly reported via e >Support or the dedicated EFB support
line as appropriate.
4
Crew will confirm that they are in possession of their own EFB post duty.
8.9.1.9 Boeing OPT (On Board Performance Tool) Application

The Boeing OPT is a software application for computing aircraft mass and balance, all engine climb gradient, take-
off and landing performance. OPT calculates “real-time” RTOWs for all actual conditions existing at time of
departure, such as variations of aircraft configuration, ambient conditions and runway length. The airport, runway,
take-off obstacle database, aircraft weights and W&B envelope is maintained and administrated by the Ryanair
Performance Department. OPT allows crew to adjust performance for MEL & CDL items. Flight crew may also
enter airport/runway & NOTAM information that is unavailable in the database. Dispatch landing distances, In-
flight landing performance data and QRH non-normal configuration landing distances are also available for use.
Crew must ensure the application content is up to date prior to flight by crosschecking database validity against
the Crew Alert section of the OFP.
8.9.1.12 Flight Dispatch Folder (FDF) Application

The FDF App is a secondary source of flight information for crew. FDF provides access to Performance (RTOWs
and AFBs), Navigational (Terminal and Enroute Charts) and Flight Documentation (Flight Manuals) required for
dispatch. Should any operational App become unavailable, then crew should follow the guidance in 8.9.1.6.1(EFB
Contingency Flow Chart – App(s) unavailable). If FDF is required for use as a contingency measure, then crew
must select the required flight documentation within the FDF App and download prior to flight. The FDF App
should only be used in the event of any failure that prevents flight crew from accessing or updating operational
application data (Navblue Charts+, Boeing OPT, or Docunet).
8.9.1.13 Electronic Flight Log (EFL) Application

The EFL App provides required flight information in electronic format. The EFL must be completed correctly and
verified by the Commander on completion of the series of sectors which constitute his assigned flight duty. The
EFL contains details of flight times, delay reports, fuel data, FDT, DT, HIL and weather data and electronic briefing
pack. The electronic flight plan (eFPL) is accessed within the EFL App and submitted to the storage database
electronically at the end of flight. EFL contains all required flight documentation; OFP (eFPL), ATS flight plan,
weather, NOTAMs, company NOTAMs, crew alerts, additional info, RAIM, significant weather charts, upper air
data charts, and vertical profile information.
-END-
_________________
Chief Pilot
5
INSTRUCTION
Effective: Immediately 24th September 2020
FCI GENERAL
Risk assessment required ___No____ Risk assessment Reference ___PD28951___
Standards
√
Subject: Engine Out Standard Instrument Departure (EOSID)

The purpose of this FCI is to introduce new terminology associated with Engine Out Standard Instrument
Departure (EOSID) procedures. The term ETP is replaced by the term EOSID. Standardised acronyms and
phrases are introduced to simplify the description of the engine out procedure requirements. There are no
changes to existing engine out procedures.
FCI B737-NG 20.10 OMB-P Engine Out Standard Instrument Departure (EOSID) which provides detailed
guidance material for EOSIDs.
The text below takes immediate effect and will be included in the OPERATIONS MANUAL PART A (OMA)
with the next revision.
5.1.2.6 Definition for Aerodrome Categories
(…..)
Category B:
An aerodrome which does not meet the Category A requirements, or which requires extra
considerations such as:
• Non-standard approach aids and/or approach patterns;
• Unusual local weather conditions;
• Unusual characteristics or performance limitations, including Special EOSID; or
• Any other relevant considerations including obstructions, physical layout, lighting; etc
(…..)
___________________
Chief Pilot
INSTRUCTION
Validity: Until Further Notice 03rd October 2020
FCI GENERAL
Risk assessment required: YES Risk assessment Reference : FOPS575570
Customer
Flt Ops In-flight GOps Engineering Commercial Compliance Safety SLA OCC
Standards
√ √ √
Subject: De-icing and Anti-icing on the Ground
The purpose of this FCI is to clarify that the cycling of flaps during BEFORE TAXI Checklist in freezing
conditions / precipitation does not affect holdover times (HOT) when following published procedures.
Feedback from the line reflected an unintended interpretation that when applying the FCOM VOL 1 SP 16.7
flap cycling UP-40-UP procedure, holdover times were reduced and/or nullified. Foundational guidance, FAA
Notice N 8900.519, clearly reflects standard HOT tables apply unless the flaps and/or slats are (1) extended
to the take-off configuration prior to anti-icing fluid application and (2) remain in that configuration while
taxiing to take-off.
Therefore, following an extensive review of regulation, industry guidance, B737NG operator procedures, and
a safety risk assessment, it has been determined that when cycling of the flaps in freezing conditions and/or
freezing precipitation as per FCOM SP16, standard HOT tables apply and the resulting HOT is not affected.
8.2.4 De-icing and Anti-icing on the Ground

CAT.OP.MPA.250
(.....)
If, for whatever reason, the flaps are extended prior to the commencement of taxi in Freezing
Conditions or following de-icing and remain in that position, the holdover time is no longer valid or
applicable.
(.....)
- END –
___________________
Chief Pilot
Page 1 of 1
INSTRUCTION
Validity: Until Further 08th October 2020
Notice FCI GENERAL
Standards
√ √ √ √ √ √
Subject: Captain’s Special Report (CPTSR)
The purpose of this FCI is to align Operations Manual Part A text with current policies and procedures
regarding the use of Captain’s Special Reports (CPTSR).
revision.
0.1.4 Explanations, Definition of Terms 1. (EU) 965/2012 Annex 1

(…)
Abbreviations
(…)
CPTSR Captain’s Special Report
CSR Cabin Crew Safety Report
1.3.6 Regional Base Captains

(…)
Detailed terms of reference for RBCs are available from the DCPLO which include the requirements to:
• Monitor regional KPI targets as set out by DCPLO.
• Review all BCRs for their assigned Bases.
• Review all CPTSRs and ASRs for assigned Bases.
1.3.13.4.3 FOPS Safety and FM Review Meeting

(…)
The purpose of the meeting is to have expertise from all relevant Nominated Persons and functional areas present
to enable an operational review of:
• the consolidated report from the daily ASR/FM Ops Review meetings over the previous week.
• investigations arising from the daily ASR/FM review meeting,
• review draft investigations (BI, IBI, GBI, EBI) and FR
• progress any open investigation, formal review, ASR, CSR, etc to closure including internal and external
Safety Recommendations.
8.1.11.6.1 Technical Delays – Boarding

Crews shall embark the passengers on to the aircraft unless a technical defect renders it unsafe to board, reduces
passenger comfort beyond acceptable levels, or is not possible due to fuelling and boarding regulations.
In general wheel changes, seat repairs, brake changes, birdstrike inspections, minor system failures, flight deck
cautions etc are acceptable in terms of boardingunless engineering specifically directs that boarding is delayed.
All boarding delays shall be noted on the Electronic Flight Log/Paper Voyage report.
(Refer to Section 8.1.10.6).
8.3.0.4 SAFA/ SACA/SANA Inspections (Safety Assessment of Foreign/Community/National Aircraft)

Commanders shall request a copy of the SAFA inspector’s report if available, regardless of findings. This is to
maintain the Ryanair database of reports and if findings are made to enable Ryanair to appeal such findings it
considers unfair or inaccurate.
The Captain must inquire with the auditor(s) to determine and action the following:
1. What type of inspection is this (SAFA, SACA, etc)?

2. What is your name or auditor identification number?
3. Were there any findings?
4. For all technical findings, call MAINTROL before departure.
5. If you disagree with findings, call the Duty Pilot for guidance prior to dispatch.
6. Ask for copy of report & take a picture with EFB
7. Email picture of external agency inspection report to FILEAREPORT@RYANAIR.COM
8. File ASR indicating type of inspection, upload picture into ASR, submit ASR during post flight
duties.
(…)
8.4.2.9 Eligible Aerodromes and Runways – AMC6 SPA.LVO.105 LVO Approval

(…)
The Performance Department (PERF) Shall:
• Maintain a Register of all current runways compliant with AMC6 SPA.LVO.105 on
eCrew/Operational/NAVTEC/RTOW/Tab “Register of Initial Verification Autoland”.
• Send flightplanner@ryanair.com an Initial Verification Autoland Co-NOTAM, which is an instruction to an
operating crew conduct a verification autoland.
• The “Register of Initial Verification Autoland” shall be maintained for as long as Ryanair has a valid AOC.
Initial Verification Autoland CPTSR

When instructed by Co-NOTAM to conduct an Initial Verification Autoland the Captain shall file a CPTSR
when this autoland is successfully completed. This CPTSR will inform PERF to enter this successful initial
verification autoland on the Register of initial verification autolands.

All safety related forms can be found on Crewdock under “file a report” and can be printed. Filing instruction
for electronic and hard copy are contained on each form. Additionally, the Company EFB may be used to file
CPTSRs or ASRs via the Coruson App.
11.5.6.2 Formal Review

A Formal Review is conducted by a BC and is for less significant events than warrants a BI. Formal Reviews
are submitted by the BC and all are reviewed at the weekly Safety, Security, and Fatigue Management (SSFM),
review meeting. Recommendations when appropriate are furnished to the NPFO. Any removal of crews from
line operations is to facilitate the completion of the Formal Review.
11.5.6.4 Captain’s Special Reports (CPTSR)
Captain’s Special Reports shall be made when the Commander wishes to draw the attention of Flight Operations
Management to any matter of significance which does not expose the operation to regulatory non-compliance
and/or safety, security, or operational risks. Normally, any event which reflects actual or potential exposure to
hazards, risks or regulatorynon-compliance should be filed as an ASR.
EFL entries and remarks suffice for recording operational events (e.g., delays, track deviations), however, the
PIC shall submit a CPTSR for events when prescribed by AFB or OFP Co-NOTAM (e.g., STN CDA non-
compliances).
Significant breakdowns in pre-flight or turnaround processes (e.g., ground handling, de-icing, catering, PRM
services) require an ASR from the flight crew and CSRs from appropriate cabin crewmembers.
Co-pilots may be asked to submit CPTSRs as appropriate by the Nominated Person Flight Operations or Flight
Safety Officer Manager, FSO or any Investigator.
Captain’s Special Reports are normally handled by the DCP on the Nominated Person Flight Operations behalf
and passed to the appropriate Department for their attention.
All submitted CPSRs are reviewed daily by the duty pilot and a weekly summary is provided to the NPFO.
-END-
___________________
Chief Pilot
INSTRUCTION
Validity: Until Further 05th November 2020
Notice FCI GENERAL
Risk assessment required __Yes___ Risk assessment Reference: Navblue Enroute 1
Standards
√ √ √ √ √
Subject: Navblue Charts+ Enroute
The purpose of this FCI is to include OMA reference to the operational use of the Charts+ App as the
primary reference device for all enroute navigational information. All OMA ‘Navtech’ references to are also
updated to ‘Navblue’.
Charts+ App now contains enroute functionality. Docunet pdf Enroute charts revert to back up status.
The text below takes immediate effect and will be incorporated in the Operations Manual Part A at next
revision.
8.1.0.1 Aircraft Pre-departure Checks and Inspections

The following manuals and publications shall be used for reference as appropriate:
• Airplane Flight Manual/CDL.
• Boeing Flight Planning and Performance Manual.
• FCOM Vol 1.2 and QRH and FCTM.
• Ops Manual Part B.
• Ops Manual Part C, Electronic Navblue Airways and Route Manual.
• Navblue Enroute Charts (EFB Charts+ App)
• Ops Manual Part C, Airfield Briefing Manual, Airfield Briefs.
• RYR EFB containing the following approved applications (EFL, Docunet, Boeing OPT, Navblue Charts).
(….)
8.9.1 Electronic Flight Bag

(….)
The following EFB hardware is approved for operational use:
• iPad Air
• iPad Air 2
• iPad 9.7'
• iPad 10.2’
The following Type B applications are approved for operational use:

• Electronic Flight Log (EFL)
• Boeing OPT (Performance)
• Boeing OPT (Mass and Balance)
• Navblue Charts+
• Docunet
• Flight Dispatch Folder (FDF)
(….)
8.9.1.12 Flight Dispatch Folder (FDF) Application
The FDF App is a secondary source of flight information for crew. FDF provides access to Performance (RTOWs
and AFBs), Navigational (Terminal and Enroute Charts) and Flight Documentation (Flight Manuals) required for
dispatch. Should any operational App become unavailable, then crew should follow the guidance in 8.9.1.6.1(EFB
Contingency Flow Chart – App(s) unavailable). If FDF is required for use as a contingency measure, then crew
must select the required flight documentation within the FDF App and download prior to flight. The FDF App
should only be used in the event of any failure that prevents flight crew from accessing or updating operational
application data (Navblue, Boeing OPT, or Docunet).
-END-
_________________
Chief Pilot
INSTRUCTION
Notice FCI GENERAL
Standards
√ √ √ √ √ √
Subject: Editorial Updates September 2020
The purpose of this FCI is to makes editorial change to document locations and amends the applicability of
the Attestation certificate in the aircraft cert file.
revision.
8.1.12 Documents, Manuals and Information to be Carried CAT.GEN.MPA.180

(……)
The Specified Documentation is Located as Indicated in the Tables Below
Title Location Reg’d for dispatch Amended by

(…..)
Current FCIs EFB 1 copy of all current Flt Ops
FCIs
SEP Manual EFB/VPOS 1 copy of current SEP Flt Ops
Manual.
SPI’s (Safety Procedure EFB/VPOS 1 copy of all current Flt Ops

Instructions) SPI’s
(…..)
Table 12 Cert File
Document Reg’d for dispatch Amended by Electronic Location

(…..)
Airworthiness Review 1 Engineering n/a
Certificate
Attestation Certificate 1 Engineering n/a
Only Required for
YC499 – YF548
_________________
Chief Pilot
INSTRUCTION
Validity: Until Further Notice 05th November 2020
FCI GENERAL
Risk assessment required ___Yes/No____ Risk Assessment Reference: OPS43091
Flt Ops Inflight GOps Customer Engineering Commercial Compliance Safety SLA OCC
Standards
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Subject: Enroute Security Threats (e.g. Explosive Devices)
The purpose of this FCI is to revise procedures regarding actions to be taken by the Commander in the event
of an enroute security event.
Security threats involving explosive devices occur in the aviation industry and are normally hoaxes aimed at
causing unrest, attracting attention, and disrupting schedules. In recent cases, the disruptive passengers were
identified, and legally prosecuted by the Authorities.
Following Safety & Security Management System outcomes, Ryanair revised the Company’s procedures
associated with enroute security threats which require an OCC Threat Assessment.
QRH pages OI.1.1 – OI.1.2 are hereby rescinded. FCI B737-NG 20.14 refers.
revision.
10.1.1 ENROUTE SECURITY THREATS
Security threats are made for a variety of reasons, normally aimed at causing distress and disruption to the schedule.
Often, these sorts of threats are made as a written or verbal bomb threat/warning. Whilst the threats have been
spurious, the level of disruption and inconvenience to our passengers has often been significant and Ryanair will
seek to prosecute any person committing such an act.
Each threat/warning shall be taken seriously, recorded, reported, and relevant departments shall run their approved
procedures with aims to facilitate a safe and secure outcome. When receiving a threat against a dispatched flight,
the Operations Control Centre shall complete a full Threat Assessment according to established procedures to
determine the risk associated and actions to be taken. OCC shall instruct ATC to communicate outcome via
standardized phraseology: “RYR123 Operational Status 1, 2, or 3”.**
• GREEN – No credible threat exists. Diversion not required. Continue to destination as planned.
• AMBER – Credibility uncertain. The flight will divert to a suitable alternate, as designated by OCC or
the national Authorities.
• RED – There is a credible threat and the Commander should land at the nearest suitable airport as
directed by OCC/ATC.
After communicating Operational Status to ATC, OCC shall coordinate security procedures required
at the chosen airport of arrival (enroute alternate or destination) via established channels.
ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY THE COMMANDER IN THE EVENT OF ENROUTE

SECURITY THREAT
The Commander may be alerted to a security threat (e.g., explosive device, poison gas, etc.) through three sources:
• Written threat(s) found on board.
• Verbal threat(s) from passenger(s).
• Notification from Air Traffic Control.
The following procedures shall be used by flight crew when communicating with Air Traffic Control / OCC.
Note: Anytime a credible, clear, and immediate danger threatens the safety/security of the flight, divert to the
nearest suitable alternate.
1. WRITTEN THREAT(S) FOUND ONBOARD

1. Continue as per current ATC Clearance and Operational Flight Plan
2. Contact the CSS and confirm:
a. If anything was found during Security Check/Search prior to boarding,
b. If anything was found whilst conducting on-board duties during the flight.
3. Take a photograph of the written threat with vPOS and/or EFB.
4. Place the message in a sick bag in order to protect it, handle the message as little as possible.
5. Request ATC to pass the following message to OCC: “RYR123 Operations Status X.”*
6. Standby for OCC to complete Threat Assessment and advise on course of action.**
7. Do not make any public announcement to the passengers regarding the potential security threat.
8. Follow OCC / ATC instructions.
2. VERBAL THREAT(S) FROM PASSENGER(S)

1. Is the passenger threatening the safety of the Aircraft, Crew, or Passengers?
2. Does the passenger claim to have some sort of weapon or device?
3. Does passenger appear credible, give plausible information or make specific demands?
4. Has passenger previously been otherwise non-disruptive during the flight?
5. Does the passenger appear to be under the influence of any substance?
If the answer to all of these questions is NO, the passenger may be treated as merely disruptive and
follow normal disruptive passenger procedures.
If the answer to either question 1, 2, or 3 above is YES, then:

2. Request ATC to pass the following message to OCC: “RYR123 Operations Status 8.”*
3. Gather as much information as possible.
6. If the passenger continues to make credible threats and demands, treat as Unlawful Interreference as
per OMA 10.1.5
3. NOTIFICATON FROM AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL

2. If ATC communication does not provide clear instructions, request ATC to pass the following
operational message to OCC: “RYR123 Operations Status 4”.
* Status Codes to be used when communicating Operational Status via ATC to OCC:
Status 4: ATC notifies crew of an Onboard Security Threat
Status 5: Written note, no specific references to Flight Number or destination.
Status 6: Written note with specific reference to your flight number.
Status 7: Written note with specific reference to another flight.
Status 8: Passenger verbally claiming to have an explosive device on his person or in his luggage.
** Status Codes to be used by OCC to communicate Operational Status to the Commander:

Status 3R: Threat Assessment RED. Divert immediately as directed by OCC/ATC.
• Advise ATC the flight is diverting for “Operational Reasons”.
• OCC will notify ATC/Airport and coordinate required arrival procedures.
• After landing, taxi, and park the aircraft as instructed.
• Follow instructions as issued by ATC and local Authorities.
• Consider declaring a MAYDAY call. OMA 10.3.3, OMA 8.9.2.1 – 2 refers.
• Pull the CVR CB in the Shutdown Checklist as per OMA 11.7.5
Status 2A: Threat Assessment AMBER. Divert to enroute alternate as selected by OCC/ATC.
• Advise ATC the flight is diverting for “Operational Reasons”.
• OCC will notify ATC/Airport and coordinate required arrival procedures.
• After landing, taxi, and park the aircraft as instructed.
• Follow instructions as issued by ATC and local Authorities.
• Normally a PAN/MAYDAY call is not required, as OCC communicates the situation,
actions required, and priority to ATC in advance.
Status 1G: Threat Assessment GREEN. Continue to commercial destination as scheduled.

• There is no need to advise ATC of the situation, status, intentions.
If ATC inquires as to meaning of Status Codes, advise “Please contact Ryanair Operations Control Centre
regarding your request.”
In all cases of an alleged or actual security threat(s), the Commander must file an ASR, and the Cabin Crew
file CSRs, upon completion of the flight duty period.
-END-
__________________
Chief Pilot
INSTRUCTION
Notice FCI GENERAL
Standards
√ √ √ √ √
Subject: Editorial changes No2 September 2020
The purpose of this FCI is to make further editorial changes updating the locations of various forms available to crews.
All Safety related reporting is performed through the Coruson Safety reporting system.
Should there be a prolonged failure of the Coruson Safety reporting system the Safety Services Office shall advise all
crew in the following manner:
a. All flight crew will receive an email directly to their EFB advising of the failure and attached will be
an editable Safety report with instructions on submission;
b. All Cabin crew will receive a Safety Memo sent to their VPOS containing instructions on how to
download and submit a hard copy of the Safety report from eCrew.
Should individual crew members experience an issue with use of the Coruson Safety reporting system then Zendesk is
available to individual crewmembers with issues with the app which is addressed within 24 hours.
By reporting in this manner through Coruson, company personnel meet their obligation to report to the Authority as
described in this section
Air Safety Reports (ASR)

Accidents and Incidents are defined in Ireland in SI285 of 2007. Should there be a prolonged failure of the Coruson
Safety reporting system the Safety Services Office will advise crews on the alternative means of reporting.
8.3.8.6.2.10 Reporting
(…..)
Operations which are the subject of an actual volcanic ash encounter must be reported by ASR- Volcanic Ash. The
encounter must be recorded in the aircraft Tech log and MAINTROL advised.
11.4.4 Dangerous Goods Accident/Occurrence – Notification

If an in-flight emergency occurs and the situation permits, the Commander shall inform ATC of any Dangerous Goods
on board.
Ryanair is required to report dangerous goods incidents and accidents to the Irish Aviation Authority (IAA). An initial
report shall be despatched within 72 hours of the event unless exceptional circumstances prevent this.
8.4.2.9 Eligible Aerodromes and Runways – AMC6 SPA.LVO.105 LVO

Approval
Page 1 of 2
(…..)
Initial Verification Autoland: How do I know?
The list of runway ends approved for Ryanair CAT III operations is available on: Pilot EFB and eCrew.
11.3.5 Operational Flight Data Monitoring (OFDM) ORO.AOC.130

(…..)
Full detail of the OFDM process can be found in the OFDM procedures document. Access to the document is limited
to the OFDM trustees and other personnel involved in the OFDM programme.
6.1.14 Diabetic Pilot Procedures and OML
(…..)
The medical treatment regime most visible to other flight crew members is insulin treated diabetes. A Class 1 medical
certificate is only issued to a pilot on insulin if they fulfil stringent criteria including demonstration of excellent control
of their diabetes. Pilots with insulin-treated diabetes have to comply with the Medical protocol including frequent blood
sugar testing before and during a flight duty period to ensure their blood glucose levels remain within an acceptable
range. The Diabetic Pilot possesses all the procedures, instructions and guidance relating to his/her condition and the
requirements associated with his/her OML.
8.3.0.1.11 ATC Communications

(…..)
7. NATS UK has produced a booklet addressing the most common ATC

issues.
8.3.0.1.12 ATC Airspace and Speed Policy

(…..)
It is good airmanship to take avoiding action (heading change) whenever radar provides conflicting traffic information,
thereby ensuring that the conflict does not develop to a point where a TCAS warning is received.
- END -
__________________
Aidan Murray - Captain
Chief Pilot
Page 2 of 2
INSTRUCTION
Notice FCI GENERAL
Risk assessment required __No____ Risk assessment Reference: NA
Standards
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Subject: Route/Area and Aerodrome knowledge
The purpose of this FCI is to align OMA with EASA implementing rule ORO.FC.105 (c). This rule describes
how a Commander maintains Route/Area and Aerodrome knowledge.
revision.
5.1.2.3 Route and Aerodrome Competence Qualifications Route/Area Competence Qualifications

ORO.FC.105 AMC1 ORO.FC.105 (b)(2); (c)
2. Route qualification is maintained by operating at least one sector in the area of operations as described in
the AOC in the previous 12 months or by being rostered as an observer on a sector in the area of operations.
-END-
___________________
Chief Pilot
INSTRUCTION
Notice FCI GENERAL
Risk assessment required __No____ Risk assessment Reference: NA
Standards
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Subject: Amendment to Jump Seat Policy
The purpose of this FCI is to make changes to OMA to amend the applicability of those person(s) who may
avail of Jump Seat privileges. Jump Seat privileges are now available to any person in the Ryanair Group who
is in possession of a Ryanair Group identification card.
revision.
8.3.13.1 Flight Deck Jump Seats
Valid company identification refers to Ryanair DAC and Ryanair Group identification.
-END-
___________________
Chief Pilot

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Flight Crew Instructions

This booklet contains a Masterlist of contents.

Subject: FANS MCDU Fleet Modification

Ladies and Gentlemen,

FMC/CDU ................................................................ Set present position

Final CDU Pre-flight Procedure - Captain and First Officer (RYR)

FANS MCDU equipped aircraft

Function and Execute Keys

FANS MCDU equipped aircraft

CDU Function Keys

Execute (EXEC) Key

Alpha/Numeric and Miscellaneous Keys

FANS MCDU equipped aircraft

Space (SP) Key

Single FMC Failure

FANS MCDU equipped aircraft

Dual FMC Failure

FANS MCDU equipped aircraft

FANS MCDU equipped aircraft

Descent Page (During Descent)

FANS MCDU equipped aircraft

Subject: Revised Sanded or Gritted Runway Operational

4.4 TALPA MATRIX

SANDED or GRITTED RUNWAY DOWNGRADE TABLE

≥0.40 GOOD GOOD TO MEDIUM

0.39-0.36 GOOD TO MEDIUM MEDIUM

0.35-0.30 MEDIUM MEDIUM TO POOR

0.29-0.26 MEDIUM TO POOR POOR

Cross Departmental Notification- tick as required

Subject: MIN THRUST RATING FOLLOWING DE-ICING

9.1 OPT PERFORMANCE – TAKE-OFF DISPATCH

9.1 OPT PERFORMANCE – TAKE-OFF DISPATCH

Subject: Narrow Runway Crosswind Limitations

The minimum runway width remains 30m.

OPERATIONS MANUAL PART B - PERFORMANCE B737-800W

5.0 CROSSWIND LIMITATIONS

The minimum allowed cleared width is 30 m.

Company Crosswind Restriction

6.1 TAKE-OFF LIMITATIONS

4 Min V1: (VMCG) = V1(MCG)

Use OPT speeds as calculated.

Increase V1 for the actual weight to = V1(MCG)narrow.

• Consider: Lower flap setting to increase V1,

Subject: DRY and WET Runway Definition

OPERATIONS MANUAL PART B - PERFORMANCE B737-800W

4.1 RUNWAY CONDITION DEFINITIONS

Cross Departmental Notification- tick as required

Subject: Monitoring of 121.5 MHz

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Ensure VHF2 volume set at appropriate level.

PILOT FLYING PILOT MONITORING

PILOT FLYING PILOT MONITORING

Deselect VHF 2 receiver switch on ACP

Cross Departmental Notification- tick as required

Subject: Anti-Collision Light

Ladies and Gentlemen,

*Both pilots must verify a reduction in N2 indications on the lower

ANTI COLLISION light switch .......................................................OFF*

*Both pilots must verify a reduction in N2 indications on the lower

ANTI COLLISION light switch.......................................................OFF*

Cross Departmental Notification- tick as required

Subject: Selection of CON thrust at cruise level