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CHAPTER ONE
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background to the Study
Human migration is a strong dynamic component of the globalized world (Adenike, 2021). “All
around the world, the figure of international migrants arrived at about 272 million in 2019, an
expansion of 51 million since 2010. As of now, international migrants represent 3.5% of the
world’s total populace, equated to 2.8% in 2000” (United Nations, 2019).

Nations have since found ways of converting migration to development, thus the era of
perceiving migration as negative has been overtaking by positive contributions of migration to
national development (Foresti & Hagen-Zanker, 2017). Several factors drive migration including
socio-economic, educational, cultural, environmental, political and demographic (Adewale,
2005). Migration ensues when for example an individual, family or group escaped from
politically induced violence (political), natural disasters- such as flood, landslide, erosion,
earthquake, insects and pests, soil infertility (environmental- Adewale, 2005), economic
recessions/depressions (economic), and suspected or real persecution (socio-cultural and
religious). As Gay (2015) cited in Adebayo (2020) asserts, “migration is not only differentiated
by its causes or rationale; it can also be classified by the pattern of its effects and consequences
on the origin and destination. For instance, out-migration of youthful men and fathers has
particularly deleterious consequences on their vulnerable dependent however, the need to
overcome poverty and attendant powerlessness is often irresistible also notwithstanding the
implications of such migration for individuals, families and groups in destination locations.”
Migration can also be classified in terms of the gender and age groups of the migrating
populations (Adebayo, 2020).

It is, therefore, not surprising that human mobility becomes more and more important and
inevitable, because it affects the socio- economic life of the sending and receiving nations
(Adenike, 2021). One of the benefits of this human mobility is remittances transferred by
migrant workers which represent a huge percentage of countries’ foreign exchange earnings and
GDP growth and contribute significantly to the economic improvement of migrant families
(Muhammad & Muhammad, 2019) and this is an aspect of national development. IMF stated that
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“remittances represent the income of migrants’ households in overseas which occur primarily
from the temporary or permanent movement of men and women to these nations. It includes cash
and non-cash items that were transferred through formal channels, such as transfer from financial
institution or informal channels through friends or items transported throughout borders. The
significance of remittances lies inside the position they play on receiving economies, as they aid
the poor households to fulfill their primary needs, finance monetary and non-monetary
investments, motivate new businesses, finance education, pay off money owed and, additionally
promote increase of the economic system” (IMF, 2014).

This must be why “the term national development is a term that refers to a sustainable growth
and development of a nation to a more desirable one and is people oriented while its success is
evaluated in terms of the impact it has had in improving the lot of the masses (Odoh & Eme,
2014). According to Lawal, and Oluwatoyin (2017) national development can be described as
the overall development or a collective socio-economic, political as well as religious
advancement of a country or nation. It denotes positive changes or improvements in some or all
aspects of the national life of a country. National development comprises the holistic array of
policies, programmes and actions detailed in confrontation of national challenges, with the
intention of improving the internal workings of government, the private sector and the entire
citizenry (Achimugu et al, 2013).

In defining the concept, the Third National Development plan of 1980 says; True development
must mean the development of man, the unfolding and realization of his creative potentials,
enabling him to improve his material conditions of living through the use of resources available
to him. It is a process by which man’s personality is enhanced, and it is that enhanced personality
creative, organized and disciplined which is the moving force behind the socio-economic
transformation of any society (FGN, 1980 cited in Eme & Odoh, 2014).

According to Onabajo & M’Bayo in Eme & Odoh (2014), ‘national development should be man-
oriented and not institution-oriented, that is, individually in collectiveness and not individual. To
Elugbe, (1994), ‘national development refers among other things, to the growth of the nation in
terms of unity, education, economic well-being and mass participation in government. In
summary, development entails the provision of all the necessary materials and equipment that
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will guarantee that man in every society make a living and essence out of life (Eme & Odoh,
2014).

Since this is the case, it is not surprising that “international migration is a phenomenon that has
witnessed increasing policy focus over the two decades” (Okikiola, 2022). While this
phenomenon is driven by a variety of factors that range in complexity and tend to be mutually
interconnected, it remains one of the fundamental drivers of development and social
transformation in all the regions of the world (Castles, 2000). This has resulted in the
liberalization of migration policies, with a shift in policy focus from the curtailing of migrants, to
the selection of migrants by immigration countries (De Haas, Czaika, Flahaux, Mahendra,
Natter, Vezzoli & Villares‐Varela, 2019).

Migration governance is the essential elements for facilitating orderly, safe, regular and
responsible migration and mobility of people through planned and well-managed migration
policies. It is not any different in Nigeria where “the migration policy of Nigeria focuses on how
to ensure security for Nigerians in diaspora and also to discourage irregular emigration”
(Olubiyi, 2021). However, “there is no aspect of the policy that directly prohibits or limits the
movement of Nigerians to another country. People are left to decide on their own, either to stay
or leave the country” (IOM, 2015). ‘The country is a signatory to International Labor
Organization ILO and consequently, has ratified both the migration for employment convention
in 1964. Also, Nigeria is a signatory to the International Convention on the Protection of the
Rights of all migrant workers and members of their families (1990 and 2009). Aside the
multilateral migration agreements, Nigeria also ratified bilateral immigration agreements with
some developed countries such as the United States, Italy, Republic of Ireland, and Spain”
(Olubiyi, 2021). Other countries that Nigeria ratified bilateral agreement are contained in
Adepoju (2007), IOM (2009), Afolayan (2001) and IOM (2015). All these examples are
reflection of migration governance. Migration governance represents the platforms, and
structures set-up in a country to organise and harmonize migration into development. IOM
(2015,p.82) in the report of the national migration policy highlighted the Nigeria migration
governance structure as thus:

1.1.1 Four levels of coordination

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The migration governance structure has four levels of coordination, namely:

(a) Ministerial committee: The committee, also known as the Sector Policy review
Committee(SPRC)/National Consultative Commiteee (NCC), is the highest level of coordination
and consultation in all migration related matters. It is composed of ministers and heads of
parastatals with migration-related mandates, chaired by the Attorney-General of the Federation
and Minister of Justice and co-chaired by the Supervising Minister for NCFRMI. The NCFRMI
shall serve as the Secretariat.

(b) Technical working group (TWG): The group is the second level of coordination and
consultation in migration-related matters. It consists of representatives of State and non State
actors involved in operational activities related to migration and makes recommendations to the
SPRC for approval. Its chair is the NCFRMI.

(c) Thematic groups: There are five sectoral groups working on various thematic areas of
migration, namely: (a) Standing Committee on Diaspora Matters (SCDM); (b) Labour Migration
Working Group (LMWG); (c) Migration Data Management Working Group (MDMWG); (d)
Forced Migration and Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (FMAVRR); and (e)
Stakeholders Forum on Border Management (SFBM). Each sectoral group has a lead agency
with several agencies with a related mandate under it. The lead agency provides coordination
and periodically reports to the TWG. The activities of each sectoral group is guided either by a
sectoral policy (as in the case of the Labour Migration Policy) or by a strategic implementation
document upon which an MoU is signed.

(d) State and non-State actors: These are organizations whose activities are related and have an
impact on migration. These actors operate at their individual institutional level and have
migration desk officers who are members of their respective working groups as well as members
of the TWG.

Since human migration is inevitable and Nigeria in recent years is in the front line of
international migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. There is also the national policy on migration
which was revised in 2015 and was adopted as a working document that has set-up structures for
migration governance which involved many governmental agencies and non-state actors, The
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present study explore if migration and migration governance has impacted the national
development from state actors perspective.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Nigeria as a nation is facing challenges that impede its development; because of poor
implementation of the existing national policies design to guide development. This perhaps gives
birth to increase poverty, diseases, youth unemployment, poor medical care, poor housing
facilities, lack of portable water, epileptic power supply, lack of access to power and poor
equitable distribution of resources (Egharevba & Chiazor, 2013). The worrisome part of these
challenges facing the nation, is that its leaders are not perturbed, and these are some of the major
push factors for migration from Nigeria to other countries in search of greener pasture without
minding the consequences associated with migration. However, debate on how the migration
could be governed, in order to bring needed development among nations tend to suffers from a
number of shortcomings. Additionally, there seem also limited studies that explain and integrate
migration, migration governance and national development. A review of existing literature
shows that studies the reported migration, migration governance and national development at the
international, national, regional and local levels sparse. Thus exploring the impact of migration
and migration governance can add to the understanding and direction to the discourse.

1.3 Research Questions

The following questions guided the study:
1. Does migration impact national development?
2. Can migration governance impact national development?
3. How does migration impact national development?
4. How does migration governance impact national development?
5. what can be done to improve the relationship between migration and national development

1.4 Purpose of the Study

The purpose of the study was to examine the role of migration and migration governance will
impact national development. With the following specific objectives:
1. To ascertain if migration has an impact national development.
2. To investigate whether migration governance has an impact national development.
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3. To assess how migration impact national development.

4. To assess how migration governance impact national development.
5. To explore ways of improving the relationship between migration and national development
1.5 Significance of the Study
This study will have both theoretical and practical significance.This study has professional,
academic and theoretical significance. Professionally, this study will make the government see
the need to always make and adopt migration policies that will lead to the massive development
of Nigeria in all aspect. It will make them see the need to wake up to their responsibility of
making the country secure, liveable and prosperous for all Nigerians irrespective of their
religious, tribal and cultural differences. In the area of academics, this study will add
significantly to the body of literature on migration and migration governance and help future
researchers do their studies in other research areas that has to do with migration and migration
governance. There is a general understanding of researchers that research produces theory and
theory provokes another research which eventually leads to formulation or revision of theories.
So, theoretically, the outcome of this research can lead to the formation of a new theory which
will be available for adoption by future researchers for their own research in areas that the
researcher will not cover in this current study.

1.6 Operational Definition of Study Terms

Migration: This refers to a person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence,
whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a
variety of reasons. The term includes a number of well-defined legal categories of people, such
as migrant workers; persons whose particular types of movements are legally-defined, such as
smuggled migrants; as well as those whose status or means of movement are not specifically
defined under international law, such as international students.

Migration Governance: This refers to the complex framework of laws, regulations,

partnerships, that national, sub-national and international institutions adopt to manage and shape
migration across countries, settlement and returns. In its process, governance interacts with
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several non-institutional actors, both in countries of destination and origin, and the agency of
individuals.

National Development: This refers to all-round and balanced development of different aspects
and facets of the nation viz. political, economic, social, cultural, scientific and material.

CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
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This chapter reviewed migration, migration governance, and national development under the
following subheadings: Conceptual review, theoretical review, Theoretical framework, empirical
review, and summary of literature reviewed.
2.0 Conceptual Review
2.1 National Development
The term national development is a term that refers to a sustainable growth and development of a
nation to a more desirable one. National development is people oriented and its success is
evaluated in terms of the impact it has had in improving the lot of the masses. In defining the
concept, the Third National Development plan of 1980says: True development must mean the
development of man, the unfolding and realization of his creative potentials, enabling him to
improve his material conditions of living through the use of resources available to him. It is a
process by which man’s personality is enhanced, and it is that enhanced personality creative,
organized and disciplined-which is the moving force behind the socioeconomic transformation of
any society (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1980).

According to Onabajo and M’Bayo (2009), says ‘national development should be man oriented
and not institution oriented, that is, individually in collectiveness and not individual. To Elugbe,
(1994), ‘national development refers among other things, to the growth of the nation in terms of
unity, education, economic well-being and mass participation in government. In summary
development entails the provision of all the necessary materials and equipment that will
guarantee that man in every society make a living and essence out of life.

Anaeto and Anaeto (2010) citing Todaro and Smith (2003), identified three objectives of
development which are: Increase availability and widen the distribution of basic life sustaining
goods such as food, shelter, health and protection; to raise levels of living in addition to higher
incomes, the provision of more jobs, better education, and greater attention to cultural and
human values, all of which will serve not only to enhance material well-being but also to
generate greater individual and national self-esteem and to expand the range of economic and
social choices available to individuals and nation by freeing them from servitude and
dependence, not only in relation to other people and nation states but also to the forces of
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ignorance and human misery. Development is the socio-cultural, political, economic and the
spiritual well-being of a society. In a truly developed state there is assurance of good quality of
life, exercise of all human rights, and freedom to participate in the democratic process. From the
foregoing, development implies enhanced quality of life, equity and justice, as it takes into
consideration the wellbeing, growth and advancement of individuals within the society.

2.1.1 Component of National Development as a Multidimensional Process

The term national development is very comprehensive. It includes all aspects of the life
of an individual and the nation. It is holistic in approach. It is a process of reconstruction and
development in various dimensions of a nation and development of individuals. It includes full-
growth and expansion of our industries, agriculture, education, social, religious and cultural
institutions. Below are the process of national development:

Economic Dimension: Economic development is a multidimensional process involving major

changes in social structure, popular attitudes and national institutions as well as acceleration of
economic growth, the reduction of inequality and the eradication of absolute poverty (Todaro,
1977). Economic development is the advancement of a community along with the evolving of
new and better methods of production and acquisition of capital resources. It
has been realized that there is no alternative to eradicate poverty except rapid economic
development. Pattern of economic development involves economic, social and behavioral
changes that take place in an underdeveloped country.

According to INVESTOPEDIA, GNP is a measure of a country’s economic performance, or

what its citizens produced (goods and services) and whether they produced these items within its
borders, whiles GDP is the monetary value of all the finished goods and services produced
within a country’s borders in a specific time period, usually on an annual basis. Thus they argued
that the higher the GDP/GNP of a country, the higher its per capita income and the vice versa.
This economic dimension was adopted by planner in their attempt to ensure development. This
idea was so dominant that even the UN believed that economic progress was synonymous with
development in general. As a result, between 1960 and 1970 was declared The Decade of
Development.
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Political participation: The Democratic society came into existence through political
participation, and the existence, survival and development of such society can only be possible
through political participation (Abubakar, 1981). For without authentic political participation,
good, leadership and good followership; the political society cannot and will never attain a
meaningful and sustainable development. In order words, political participation is the creator, as
well as the major determinant of the successful commitment of the government to meaningful
development.

Social Dimension: According to Gandhi the ³realization of the human potential ́ is the way
toward development. From this view of development deprivation, degradation, poverty all
indicate under development wherever they are found, and it is crucial to do certain things in
order to reduce poverty. Development therefore seeks to remove the three central challenges
which are outline in Dudley Seers definition. Thus poverty, unemployment, and inequality must
all be on a decline if not mitigated. Thus much of the concern of this dimension is to bring about
visible and significant change in people’s circumstances. The implication here is that
development entails high degrees of capacity, equity, empowerment, sustainability, and
interdependence. (Bryant & White, 1982). Other indicators of development are decrease in
human mortality, maternal mortality, high doctor-patient ratio, high life expectancy rate, low
infant mortality, and adult literacy, among others.

Scientific Dimension: This dimension of development looks at development from the scientific
achievement of the country. Scientific discoveries, innovation, inventions etc. is the other of the
day in this dimension. Just as the economic looks at the growth in industrialization and GDP as
the basis of development, the scientific dimension looks at the advancement in science as the
base line for development in the country (Ablu, 1982).

Material/Environmental Dimension of Development: This dimension views national

development as relates to the development of materials which includes natural resources. This
boils down to the concept of sustainable development which is defined as development that
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
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their own needs (Gboyega, 2003). In this view development is achieved when the material
(Natural Resource) are well harnessed for the benefit of the nation. It also seems the damage to
the environment because of development and how to minimize this damage.

Cultural Dimension of Development: In this dimension of development, the development of

cultural heritage of the people is considered. This includes peaceful coexistence between
different culture in the nation and improved intergroup relations. Cultural development give rise
to tourism, as tourist would want to come and see for themselves the cultural heritage of the land.
This can in turn bring about cultural development.

Per Capita Income: Per capita income is widely accepted as a general measure of development.
It is customary to identify whether a region has been backward or advanced in the levels of
development using the estimates of per capita income. The regions which enjoy higher per capita
income are deemed to be more developed than the states or regions with low per capita income.
Generally per capita income has been taken at current price. This variable or component is
commonly used for measuring economic development. Under-developed economies are
distinguished from the developed economies on the basis of their low per capita income.
Agricultural Development: Agricultural development is a pre-requisite of economic growth in
our country. Agriculture is important not only to meet the ever growing and ever pressing
demand for food and fibers for human consumption but also for providing forage for animals,
raw materials for non-agricultural sector, employment opportunities to rural population and
improves their standard of living. Agriculture is the mainstay of almost all the states of the
nation. According to experts, agriculture can contribute to growth by increasing efficiency of
popular and releasing resources to other sector by adjusting the consumption and of agricultural
production in proportion with the growth in internal and external demands.

Industrial Development: Industrialization is a key force of rapid development of any economy.

Most of the economists have accepted industrialization as the most pre-dominant component of
their development strategies. Industrial units of organize sectors generally provide life blood to
the economic system by their leading role in transmitting growth impulses to the surrounding
area through their backward and forward linkages. Most of the infrastructure facilities such as,
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means of transportation and communication, power and banking expand along with industrial
development, while, their availability in the area causes concentration of industries.
Industrialization not only provides employment opportunities and reduces the dependence of
workforce on agriculture but also acts as an agent of socio-cultural transformation by bringing
about urbanization.

Urbanization: Urbanization means that an increasing proportion of human society become

towns folk, and as this happen towns grow in population, spread in area, and make an ever
increasing impact upon the countryside, both upon its appearance and upon the life of its
inhabitants. More and more of the landscape becomes townscape and people come to live in an
environment that is both physically and socially urban.

Occupational Structure: The occupational structure of a region is known with the

distribution of its working population among different economic activities which are most
significant aspect of an economy. Occupational structure of a society is one of the good
indicators of social and economic inequality, because to a large extent it determines the level of
living. Study intended to understand the pattern of disparity should, therefore, give due attention
to this feature. In addition to providing an insight into the nature of economy it also throws light
on socio-economic, cultural and political conditions of the society.

Educational Development: Education is a crucial factor of social, economic and cultural

development. It provides economic opportunities and helps to overcome social barriers. It also
enhances earning potential and productivity of people through acquisition of skill and
information for various opportunities and jobs. Educational achievement not only in the stepping
stone to job opportunities and hence earnings, but in the words of Horace Mann, education is
beyond all other devices of human origin, a great equalizer of the conditions of men, the balance
wheel of social machinery. Thus, the level of education determines the quality of people and
development of a region.

Health Status: The term 'health' has been defined in different ways by scholars and
organizations. In view of World Health Organisation (2016), health is a state of complete
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physical and mental well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity. It has also
been seen as optimum capacity of an individual for effective performance of the role and task for
which he has been socialized. Thus, health is a state of soundness of mind and body of an
individual in which he is free from any sort of disorder. The ultimate aim of all economic
policies is to achieve a healthy nation. A healthy nation can emerge only when there is adequate
supply of proper balanced food, when people are not undernourished or malnourished. Poverty
and health do not go together and hence in order to improve the health standard it is imperative
to eliminate poverty.

Transport and Communication: Transport and communication is an essential economic

infrastructure for the rapid development of any region. In a planned economy, location of
industries, development of backward areas, decentralization of economic activities, better
distribution of products, better maintenance of law and order, justice, defense and security all
necessitate a proper system of transport and communication. The modem concept of growth
issues can meaningfully be implemented only if there is proper transport network within a
region.

Population Structure: Population structure included population growth, population density,

age, sex, fertility, mortality etc. Population structure determines the nature and magnitude of
demand pressure on resources as well as the quantity and quality of workforce to operate
economic production mechanism. no regional and socio-economic development plan can afford
to neglect them but at its own risk. Population structure is having great subjective significance in
the fields of Sociology, Demography and Economics. Presently, all governments irrespective of
their socioeconomic and political ideologies are undertaking regional planning to optimize
economic production and to minimize regional disparities in economic and social development.
Population structure and development are closely interrelated; they both influences each other.

Human Development Index (HDI): The HDI defines well-being in terms of combinations of a
measure of income, a health indicator and an access to knowledge indicator. The process of
development should at least create a conducive environment for people, individually and
collectively, to develop their full potential and to have a reasonable chance of leading a
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productive and creative life according to their needs and interests (UNDP, 1992). The Human
Development Index (HDI) measures achievements in three aspects of human development:
health, education and living standards. Unlike the GDP or GNP, which give income and
productivity only, HDI was introduced as an alternative to such conventional measures of
economic development. With the imperfect nature of economic wealth as a gauge of human
development, the HDI offers a powerful alternative to conventional measures for measuring
well-being and socio-economic progress. For a developed country, the literacy, education, and
health levels are high. When considering HDI, access to good health care and child mortality rate
at birth is considered while access to quality and free education, years spent in school and ability
to incorporate learned knowledge to real-life situations are considered. In a developed nation, the
rate of child mortality at birth is extremely low, and the education is accessible to all.

Infrastructure: Infrastructure is an umbrella term for many activities usually referred to as

"social capital" by development economists. Precisely, infrastructure refers to a network of
transport, communication and public (social) services - all functioning as a system or as
a set of interrelated and mutually beneficial services provided for the improvement of the general
well-being of the population (Ogbuozobe, 1997). Public or social services refer to those services
or facilities meant for the common goods of the people. They include water supply,
health care delivery, education, postal and telecommunication facilities, electricity, etc.
Sufficient infrastructural services are indispensable for economic development. The adequacy of
infrastructure helps to determine a country's success or failure in diversifying production, coping
with population growth, reducing poverty, improving environmental conditions, etc. Indeed,
socio-economic development can be facilitated and accelerated by the presence of infrastructure.
If these facilities and services are not in place, development will be very difficult and in fact can
be likened to a very scarce commodity that can only be secured at a very high price and cost.
Adequate access to social welfare services, such as medical services, education, potable water
supply, roads, electricity, employment opportunities etc, are strong indices of development
(Adeyemo, 1989). In any discourse on infrastructure, it is important to note that infrastructure
can be broadly classified in two: physical (roads, electricity, telecommunication, etc) and social
(education, health, recreation, housing etc.). In some clime, physical infrastructure is often
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referred to as economic infrastructure. Thus, the role of infrastructure in economic development

will be discoursed along this line.

Political Stability: The index for measuring political stability was developed by World Bank
and it is a measure of the level of development of a country (Marthia, 2020). Developed
countries have stable political environment, low or no corruption, and high level of respect to the
country's laws. Good Governance ensures that the level of corruption is low, transparency in
running the government is high, and employment is based on merit and qualifications.

General Living Standards: The cost of living in a developed country is high compared to the
less developed country, and this is because the majority of the population is willing and has the
financial ability to afford quality goods and services which are expensive (Khalil, & Junaidu,
2019). Secondly, goods produced by local industries are mostly consumed as opposed to
imported products which might be inferior. The general public has access to clean water and
environment, affordable and quality housing and access to other social and economic amenities
in the country like access to emergency services are fast.

Freedom: A developed country has freedom for its citizens and respects the law. The freedom to
worship, marry, own property, and access to information characterizes a developed nation
(Jethro, & Mann, 2019). In the less developed countries, there are a lot of restrictions and
citizens cannot do whatever they like freely.

2.1.2. Challenges of National Development in Nigeria

The problems of national development in Nigeria are indeed enormous. The question is ‘why is it
still difficult to generate meaningful development in Nigeria despite the huge resources at the
disposal? Numerous factors work together to undermine national development in Nigeria. The
following are some of the challenges of national development in Nigeria.

Lack of Good Governance: This has hindered national development in the country. In the
absence of good governance, development becomes a mirage. Poor governance results from bad
leadership in the country (Ogwumike, 1995). Majority of our leaders lack any sense of
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commitment to development. The leaders have no vision of development, all they were
interested in was access to power and privileges and not development.

Pervasive Corruption: High level of corruption and indiscipline is another challenge of

development in Nigeria. Unfortunately, the Nigerian state is managed by corrupt leaders who
have made the state an instrument of capital accumulation, rather than using it to project the
interest of the citizenry.

Nigeria’s Over-dependence on Crude Oil: Another important challenge of development in

Nigeria is the mono-economic base of the country. The country largely depends on crude oil for
her survival to the detriment of other resources. Consequently, all other sectors of the economy
are neglected. For instance, agriculture, which constituted the mainstay of the Nigerian economy
in the 1950s and 1960s, has been neglected over the years. The Nigerian economy is not
diversified and this is not suitable for a sustainable development (Mimiko, 1998).

Lack of Executive Capacity: In most cases, there is the lack of executive capacity needed for
the formulation and implementation of development plan (Todaro, 1977). What Nigerians
usually see as officials entrusted to a position are officials that lack meaningful executive
authority capacity.
2.2 Migration
Migration is hardly ever a simple individual action in which a person decides to move in search
of better life-chances, pulls up his or her roots in the place of origin and quickly becomes
assimilated in a new country. Much more often migration and settlement are long-term processes
that will be played out for the rest of the migrant's life, and affect subsequent generations too.
Migration can even transcend death: members of some migrant groups arrange for their bodies to
be taken back for burial in their native soil (Tribalat 1995). Migration is often a collective action,
arising out of social, economic and political change and affecting entire communities and
societies in both origin and destination areas. Moreover, the experience of migration and of
living in another country often leads to modification of original plans, so that migrants' intentions
at the time of departure are poor predictors of actual behaviour.
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Conventional wisdom holds that migration is driven by geographical differences in income,

employment and other opportunities. However, the paradox is that economic and human
development in poor societies tends to initially increase movement. Improved access to
education and information, social capital and financial resources typically increase people's
aspirations and capabilities to migrate (see de Haas 2014a). Development typically expands
people's access to material resources, social networks and knowledge. This explains why most
migrants do not move from the poorest to the wealthiest countries, why the poorest countries
tend to experience lower levels of long-distance emigration and why industrializing societies
have the highest levels of internal and international mobility. However, if it is true that
development and global inequality boost migration, it is difficult to understand why the volume
of international migration as a share of the world population has remained remarkably stable at
levels of around three per cent over the past decades. Such paradoxes show that the relation
between migration and broader processes of development is intrinsically complex, and that
patterns and trends of real-world migration often defy intuition.

2.2.1. Types of Migration

There are two major types of migration: a) internal migration, which takes place within a
country; and b) international migration that takes place across international boundaries (Bhende
& Kanitkar, 2006). The processes, causes and consequences of internal migration are very
different from those in international migration. The former is a response to the socioeconomic
spatial situations within a country, while the latter is related to international socioeconomic and
political conditions, especially the immigration and emigration laws and policies of these
countries. The relatively permanent movement of people across territorial boundaries is referred
to as in-migration and out-migration, or immigration and emigration when the boundaries
crossed are international. The place of in-migration or immigration is called the receiver
population, and the place of out-migration or emigration is called the sender population. There
are two basic types of migration studied by demographers:

Internal Migration: This refers to a change of residence within national boundaries, such as
between states, provinces, cities, or municipalities. An internal migrant is someone who moves
to a different administrative territory. It is the migration of people within the country. The
 18

characteristics and patterns of a country’s internal migration are vital indicators of the pace and
process of its development. For instance, the United States, is quite literally a nation on the
move, and it always has been (Weeks, 2008), on the other hand population of many developing
countries is less mobile. However, the mobility of people within national boundaries is very
difficult to measure. For this reason, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the
definition of internal migration. People constantly move from one place to another; and these
movements are diverse in nature. The distances covered vary from a few kilometers to several
kilometers. Moreover, the duration of stay involved in the new location may vary from a few
hours to several years. Many movements are casual, such as commuting to and from the place of
work, shopping, visiting, and travelling for business or for pleasure etc. Such movements do not
involve a sustained or a permanent change of residence and must, therefore, be distinguished
from migration, which involves a change of place of usual residence-a taking up of life in a new
or different place.

Thus, it may be said that a migrant is a mover who changes her (or his) residence from the
political area of her usual residence. It is obvious that the civil division, as a migration-defining
criterion, lacks uniformity, for divisions vary widely in size, shape and length of the border. This
criterion is, therefore, not suitable when comparisons of migration in different countries are
made. However, the United Nations has recommended that the areal unit should be as small as
possible (Bhende & Kanitkar, 2006). Internal migration therefore is classified based on various
criteria which are described as follows: Rural-rural migration stream; rural-urban migration
stream; urban-urban migration stream; and urban-rural migration stream.

Rural-Rural Migration Stream: In villages where economy is based on agriculture, people

migrate from one village to another either for harvesting or sowing the crops or both. This is
rural to rural migration. The problem is that the native village does not have a scope for work on
agricultural farms. In other words, the supply of labour is more than the demand. The assumption
is that the native village is over-crowded and agriculturally less productive as compared to the
village of destination. In this form of migration, the migrants are mostly males. Sometimes,
women also migrate along with the male members of the family. In countries like India, young
women are married to a person living at a certain distance from their parental village. The reason
 19

is that the marriages cannot be contracted within a radius of 4-5 miles (6-8 kms.) This no-
marriage field is treated as the taboo zone. However, this practice is a feature of North India
only. There is no such practice in the south, where the girls are generally married to their
paternal or maternal cousins. Thus a substantive proportion of the movement of women in North
India is related to the marriage customs. Women are often ignored in the migration studies. They
are considered to be following their male counterparts in their capacity as mothers, daughters,
sisters, and wives. But in recent years a change has been observed regarding the established myth
about female migration. Now women move from one place to the other to seek higher education
or in search of new economic opportunities. This reveals a favourable change in the pattern of
female migration towards urban as well as long-distance destinations (Bhattacharya, 2003;
Premi, 1980; Singh, Thandani et al., 1984).

Rural-Urban Migration Stream: In the less developed countries, like Nigeria, India, Nepal and
Bangladesh, rural to urban migration is a common phenomenon. In regions where the rural
population densities are very high and the pace of urban-industrial development is fast, rural-
urban stream is most common. These towns/cities attract the ‘surplus labour’ from nearby or far-
off villages. In rural areas the burgeoning poverty, meagre employment opportunities, low and
uncertain/irregular wages, lack of education and health facilities are the main push factors. These
conditions induce people to migrate to the urban places. In some cases, labour moves out of the
village. They have no other alternative but to move out to the urban places in search of work,
which can sustain them and their families (Trewartha, 1969). On the other hand, the pull of the
urban places induces the rural population to migrate. This process is related to the expectations
of the migrant labourers for better employment opportunities, regular and fixed wages and
supposedly the better quality of life. But these expectations are often proved to be dreams only.
A related problem is the out-migration of the educated youth for whom employment
opportunities are rarely available in the native villages/towns. This forces them to migrate to the
urban places. Such unguided migration to the city leads to the problems of housing in the
towns/cities. The rural poor find a place in bustees and squatter colonies called slums in the city.
For such migrants, habitat changes, but not the quality of life.
 20

Urban to urban migration: Is a common phenomenon both in the highly urbanised 141
parts of the world as well as in the less developed countries. People move out from one urban
place to the other. The motive is to find jobs to improve their economic status. It is a common
feature that large cities attract people from small towns in their neighbourhood (Chandna, 1986).
This is especially true in the case of skilled workers. This practice is known as step-wise
migration. The first step is to move out from a village to a small town; the second step is to move
out from a small town to a large city. Urban to urban migration is due to multiple factors,
economic as well as socio-cultural. It is the main channel of labour supply to the fast growing
city.

Urban-Rural Migration Stream: Is a kind of reverse flow. This is so because large

metropolises/mega cities in developed countries attain a high degree of urbanisation, which
widens the scope for absorption of rural labour in the informal sector of economy (Premi et al.
1983). This also leads to the problems of housing due to over-congestion of cities and the
resultant problems of environmental pollution and poor health. This often forces the migrants to
return to their native villages. It may be noted that the rural areas in the developing countries are
generally underdeveloped. They lack infrastructure facilities to accommodate the rural poor. The
story of developed countries is entirely different. Their cities have a developed network of
transportation which functions efficiently. The people travel daily between the place of residence
and the place of work without much difficulty. In Nigeria many of the retired persons tend to
settle in their native villages or small towns where they own property or acquire it later. It may
be noted that the urban to rural stream is not very common.

International migration: This refers to change of residence over national boundaries. An

international migrant is someone who moves to a different country. International migrants are
further classified as legal immigrants, illegal immigrants, and refugees. Legal immigrants are
those who moved with the legal permission of the receiver nation, illegal immigrants are those
who moved without legal permission, and refugees are those crossed an international boundary
to escape persecution.
 21

Jay Weinstein and Vijayan Pillai (2001) denote a third classification: forced migration. Forced
migration exists when a person is moved against their will (slaves), or when the move is initiated
because of external factors (natural disaster or civil war). The distinction between internal and
international migration is crucial because they happen for different reasons. Because structural
barriers are more likely to impede the mobility of a potential international migrant than an
internal migrant—international migration involves more administrative procedures, greater
expense, and more difficulties associated with obtaining employment, accessing state services,
learning a new language, and the like—the motivations behind international migration are
usually stronger than those behind internal migration (Weeks 1999).

2.2.2. Determinants of Migration

According to Timmerman et al. (2014) identified macro-, meso- and micro-level determinants of
migration. The macro-level refers to factors that are common to all potential migrants in a
particular country, such as the socio-economic and political context or migration governance and
policies of origin and destination countries, regions or other entities. The meso-level
encompasses sub-national or local factors, including networks or cultural reasons. Individual and
household characteristics of potential migrants, such as gender, age, educational level, and social
status, as well as behavioural factors, such as risk aversion, are part of the micro-level.

Determinants of migration: the macro-level

The macro-level encompasses the traditional determinants of voluntary and forced migration: the
political and economic context. However, there are additional factors that are likely to influence
the migration decision that are located on the macro-level, such as migration policies or
environmental drivers. All of them can affect a person’s aspirations and decision to move from
his or her home. They should be seen in their interrelated complexity and not as singular factors
but rather as reinforcing or impeding each other.

Violence and conflict: There is broad agreement in the literature that violence and conflict are
the main drivers that lead people to move from their homes (Adhikari, 2012; Cummings, Pacitto,
Lauro, & Foresti, 2015; Melander & Öberg, 2006). Quantitative cross-country studies have
found that violence is the dominant factor why people leave (Davenport et al., 2003; de Haas,
 22

2011; Melander & Öberg, 2007; Schmeidl, 1995, 1997). These studies have focused on
aggregate country-level data of refugee and internally displaced populations as dependent
variables. Moving to the subnational-level, and hence taking into account individual decisions,
exposure to violence has again been found to be a major determinant with respect to international
as well as internal movements (see, for example, Adhikari, 2012; Czaika & Kis-Katos, 2009;
Ibáñez & Vélez, 2008). Using village-level data on Aceh Province in Indonesia, Czaika and Kis-
Katos (2009) found that conflict is a major push factor for leaving one’s home. Applying an
event history analysis at the community-level, Lundquist and Massey (2005) observed that
households in Nicaragua migrated to the United States when faced with violence, which was
supported by Alvarado and Massey (2010) who presented similar evidence. Using individual-
level data in Colombia, Ibáñez and Vélez (2008) also established that violence was an important
factor driving people from their homes. Building a theoretical framework to capture determinants
of displacement while applying it to Colombian household level data, Engel and Ibáñez (2007)
reported that already the threat of violence and the presence of guerrilla and paramilitary groups
also increased levels of out-migration. This is likewise supported by a large-scale qualitative
investigation undertaken by the IOM (2016) which found that the main reason for the
displacement of young African men arriving in Italy was violence. It is important to note that the
large majority of studies already mention the multitude of other factors affecting the decision to
move apart from the threat of and exposure to conflict.

Engel and Ibáñez (2007) postulated that, even in a conflict environment, economic incentives
and individual characteristics also played a role. In addition, Davenport et al. (2003) put forward
a theoretical model suggesting that other factors apart from violence influenced peoples’
decisions to move. Ibáñez and Vélez (2008) found that individual socio-economic household
characteristics and personality traits also mattered. This helps to explain the fact that people
make heterogeneous decisions in reaction to conflict. While there is general agreement on the
effect of violence upon human mobility decisions, there is some debate on the type and scope of
conflict causing people to move. Schmeidl (1997) found that a country’s involvement in
international wars was a significant determinant for forced migration, while this was not
supported by the analysis conducted by Davenport et al. (2003). Rather they argued that state or
dissident threats to personal integrity were important factors. Moore and Shellman (2004)
 23

observed the presence of international troops to be a driver of forced displacement. Using a large
quantitative crosscountry dataset, Dreher, Krieger, and Meierrieks (2011) showed that terror
attacks increase skilled migration though not average migration flows. Skilled migration seems
to also increase with general political instability as found by Docquier, Lohest, and Marfouk
(2007). Investigating current refugee flows from Syria to Jordan, Byrne (2016) established that
varying forms of violence affect migration decisions in different ways. There is some evidence
that the duration, location and scope of the conflict also have an effect on the number of
displaced people. Melander and Öberg (2007) and Melander, Öberg, and Hall (2009) found that
the geographical scope – and particularly whether urban centres were affected – seemed to have
a significant impact on the number of persons displaced whereas the intensity of the conflict did
not. They suggested that it tended to be more important where the conflict took place than how
intense the fighting was. Also, contrary to previous research, they observed that over time the
magnitude of migration flows in response to a conflict not only did not increase but actually
declined.

Overall, people face different costs and benefits from relocating, which influences their
migration decision generating a selection effect in the remaining population (Melander & Öberg,
2007). Bohra-Mishra and Massey (2011) suggested curvilinear effects of violence on migration
decisions: only high levels of violence override people’s concerns and the costs related to leaving
their homes. While there is a plethora of evidence suggesting the importance of violence as a
determinant for a positive migration decision, there is a significant gap in the literature on the
interdependency of violence with other potential factors as well as its relative importance, for
instance, with respect to economic stability and opportunities, along with individual level
characteristics (such as educational background, age, gender) that can explain heterogeneous
movement decisions.

Human rights violations: Additional political factors that have been suggested and investigated
are the lack of human and political rights. In general, quantitative research suggests that this
seems to increase the probability of people moving from their homes (Davenport et al., 2003;
Kirwin & Anderson, 2018; Moore & Shellman, 2004; Schmeidl, 1997). Moore and Shellman
(2004) found that human rights violations (proxied by the Political Terror Scale (PTS)) have a
 24

positive impact on the number of refugees that a country produces, which was also supported by
Rubin and Moore (2007) using similar data. However, Schmeidl (1997), who uses the Freedom
House Index (FHI), established only a weak link. Wong and Celbis (2015) presented evidence
that the extent of human rights protection was also an important determinant for more general
migratory movements. Additionally, they expanded the spectrum of human rights to include
economic and political freedom. Particularly focusing on religious repression, Kolbe and Henne
(2014) found that higher levels of discrimination against religious minorities as well as policies
that ban certain religious groups increased the aggregate number of refugees. Earlier studies
observed a significant impact of ethnic discrimination on displacement (Clay, 1984; Kaufmann,
1996). This was contested by Kirwin and Anderson (2018) who found that, in Nigeria,
dissatisfaction with the political system was a strong predictor for aspirations to leave the
country whereas this was not true for ethnic discrimination. Investigating political rights as a pull
factor, Fitzgerald, Leblang, and Teets (2014) found them (proxied by citizenship policies and
vote shares of the radical right) to be significantly related to international migration flows.

Overall there is a broad agreement that lack of political freedom and violations against human
rights increase the number of people leaving their homes (Adhikari, 2012). However, political
repression does not necessarily lead to mass exodus if economic opportunities still exist (de
Haas, 2010). Further, when judging the evidence at hand, one has to consider that more
autocratic regimes also have greater capabilities of curtailing the migratory plans that people
might have if they do not want them to leave the country, for instance, through exit controls or
high migratory costs (de Haas, 2011; McKenzie, 2007). This is particularly important for regular
migration but less so for those choosing irregular routes. The studies presented here mostly use
aggregated quantitative country-level data and there is a lack of studies investigating the effects
of human rights violations and of the absence of political freedoms on migration at the
household- or individual-level, particularly on groups other than legally categorised refugees.

Institutions, the welfare state, and state fragility: Some studies have investigated the effects
of institutional quality upon migration decisions. Overall they find that good, well-functioning
institutions at the place of destination can act as an incentive to migrate, particularly for highly
educated migrants, while bad governance at home pushes people to leave their homes (Ariu,
 25

Docquier, & Squicciarini, 2014; Bergh, Mirkina, & Nilsson, 2015; Bertocchi & Strozzi, 2008).
Using a gravity model approach with a large cross-country dataset, Bergh et al. (2015) found that
institutional quality explains migration flows even after controlling for several country-level
indicators, including income levels at origin and destination. Poprawe (2015) showed that the
prevalence of corruption is a push factor for migration, and this is supported for the high-skilled
by Dimant, Krieger, and Meierrieks (2013). There is a lack of studies using individual-level
corruption-perception data in relation to migration levels. But, in opposition to popular public
perception, the support system of the destination country does not seem to be of high relevance
to the migration choice.

Robinson and Segrott (2002) reported that among asylum seekers arriving in the United
Kingdom (UK) very few had detailed knowledge of potential state benefits. Onward movement
within a region, such as the European Union, might however be influenced by differences in
support services (Kuschminder, de Bresser, & Siegel, 2015). Further, weak welfare systems in a
country of origin increase out-migration (Kureková, 2011). It is likely, however, that this factor
varies with the degree of voluntariness or urgency of the movement. Some authors have
proposed links between concepts of state fragility and migration (Araya, 2013; Martin-Shields,
Schraven, & Angenendt, 2017). State fragility is generally defined as encompassing several
dimensions of macro-level drivers such as legitimacy of the state; authority of the state to
prevent conflict or violence; and the provision of basic services to the population. Negative
values in these dimensions are related to violence, human rights abuse or the socio-economic
deprivation of the respective population.

The deficits in these dimensions are positively related to out-migration. Further, in the event of
external or internal stress situations, countries with weak institutions are not able to respond
adequately and are particularly vulnerable to violence. A thorough empirical investigation of
these propositions has not yet been undertaken. However, recently there have been some studies
investigating the effects of the satisfaction people have with local amenities – such as public
services and security – on migration intentions. Using individual-level quantitative data,
Dustmann and Okatenko (2014) showed that higher contentment with services provided in the
current location decreased migration aspirations. This was supported by Cazzuffi and Modrego
 26

(2018) for the case of Mexico. While there are also a few studies which investigate the role of
institutional quality on migratory patterns using cross-country data, there is hardly any
individual-level evidence that could then be more directly linked to people’s aspirations and
decisions. These might be an interesting avenue to take in order to start investigating the
hierarchies of the various different macro-level determinants of migration and to establish an
early warning system for movements both within, and across, borders.

Economic opportunities: Differences in economic opportunities, particularly employment and

wage differentials, have traditionally been seen as the primary drivers of migratory movements.
Here, the individual’s rational cost-benefit analysis of an existent wage differential between
country of origin and country of destination, proxying better economic opportunities, is regarded
as the determining factor. These considerations have been studied using a great deal of empirical
evidence including aggregated country- as well as more refined individual-level data (Amara &
Jemmali, 2018; Bertoli, 2010; Cummings et al., 2015; Czaika, 2015; Damm, 2009; Konseiga,
2006; Neumann & Hermans, 2017; Radnitz, 2006). The studies investigating whether fewer
economic opportunities (proxied by economic development based on, for instance, gross
domestic product (GDP) or gross national income (GNI)) lead to larger migration flows resulted
in mixed results: While Davenport et al. (2003) and Melander and Öberg (2006) did not find
higher levels of economic development to be significantly related to the number of refugees,
Schmeidl (1997) and Moore and Shellman (2004) reported that it was indeed associated with
fewer refugees. This is likely due to the crudeness of the measure, which tends to relate to the
more general level of socioeconomic development of a country and a phenomenon termed the
“migration hump”.

This describes the non-linear relationship between migration rates and a country’s economic
development (Martin, 1993). Increased GDP in developing countries typically leads to initially
rising levels of emigration. Hence, it is not the poorest people who migrate in the event of
positive economic trends, resulting in welfare increases, but rather those who have access to
sufficient resources and are able to fund their journeys. This is closely related to the notion of
capability, namely, whether people are able to realise their migration aspirations or whether
poverty hinders them. In their quantitative analysis of Afghan refugees, Loschmann and Siegel
 27

(2014) found that vulnerable households had lower migration intentions indicating that the
households made a realistic assessment of their migration potential.

Potential migrants require the economic resources, and hence capabilities, to migrate from their
country while their aspirations need to be higher than the opportunities in their country of origin
(Cummings et al., 2015; de Haas, 2007; de Haas et al., 2018). Cross-country analyses of
historical and contemporary migration data have supported the notion that the migration hump
does indeed exist (Clemens, 2014; de Haas, 2010; de Haas et al., 2018). However, taking into
account relative differences between countries paints a clearer picture: Using bilateral migration
flows, studies generally established larger economic opportunities to be a significant pull factor.
Investigating migration flows from 1980 to 2005, Ortega and Peri (2009) found income gaps
between origin and destination country to be a significant determinant for international
migration. This was supported by Clark, Hatton, and Williamson (2007) for migration flows to
the United States. Using a large cross-country dataset, Czaika and Hobolth (2016) reported
income opportunities at the destination to be an important driver, even for irregular international
migration. A metaanalysis of factors explaining migration in the Sahel region showed that better
economicopportunities are a primary driver (Neumann & Hermans, 2017). This was supported
by qualitative evidence by Wissink, Düvell, and van Eerdewijk (2013) who studied the intentions
of transit migrants in Turkey; and by Schapendonk and van Moppes (2007) with respect to
irregular Senegalese migrants where greater economic opportunity in Europe was reported to be
an important motivating factor.

Overall, better economic opportunities elsewhere and/or the lack of them in the region or country
of origin have been shown to be important driving factors for rural-urban and international
migration movements. It is not always clear if it is the lack of economic opportunities pushing
people rather than the possibility of larger income gains pulling them. Particularly, studies
investigating rural-urban migration flows have also intensively studied heterogeneous effects
across individual and household characteristics. However standard migration models have been
criticised for oversimplifying heterogeneous and complex migration decisions to an individual’s
goal of maximising income, even more so in insecure environments (Loschmann & Siegel,
2014). More recent papers take the multitude of other factors that explain past and current
 28

migration into account, such as the social, political and geographical environment. However,
even accounting for those determinants, economic factors continue to play a major role in
migration movements (Byrne, 2016; de Haas, 2011). This also applies to insecure settings.
Evidence shows that –even in the face of violence and conflict – people still make a deliberate
choice to move or stay (Engel & Ibáñez, 2007; Ibáñez & Vélez, 2008). If economic opportunities
still exist, or if they continue to have assets, they are less likely to leave.

There are ambiguous results regarding the importance of the economic environment at the place
of destination for the migration choice in the face of violence. In her qualitative study of Somali
refugees, Zimmermann (2009, 2011) observed that, more than just seeking safety, they continue
their journey to places that offer them economic opportunities. “Safety was not all that they [the
refugees] sought because it was not all that they had lost” (Zimmermann, 2009, p. 93). However,
this claim is contested by quantitative studies focusing on refugees: Byrne (2016) found that,
while economic conditions in the country of origin (Syria) affected refugee flows, the economic
opportunities in the country of destination (Jordan) were less important. Also Engel and Ibáñez
(2007) noted that in typical displacement situations negative income differentials or economic
risk do not deter people from leaving as other factors tend to dominate the decision process.

Migration policies: Changes to migration policies – in origin, transit and destination country or
region – are likely to influence migration. However, the evidence is not straightforward to
interpret. There are several studies showing that effects are often fairly different from what the
policies aimed at or what was expected. Tightened border controls or more restrictive asylum
policies do not seem to influence the absolute number of people migrating but rather the routes
chosen, pushing migrants into irregular movements (Czaika & Hobolth, 2016; de Haas, 2007,
2011; EC [European Commission], 2009; Mbaye, 2014; UNODC [United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime], 2018). It has been shown that restrictive immigration policies increase the
permanent stay of guest workers while decreasing circular migration and return migration (de
Haas, 2007). Based on a large quantitative study of European migration policies, Czaika and
Hobolth (2016) found that more restrictive asylum and visa policies led to an increased
deflection into irregularity. On the other hand, migration policy “optimists” argue that, overall,
immigration policies have been effective in curbing migration (Bonjour, 2011; Carling, 2002;
 29

Geddes, 2003). There is some qualitative insight and a growing number of quantitative studies
that give support to this claim (Castels, 2004; Hatton, 2005; Karemera, Oguledo, & Davis, 2000;
Kuschminder et al., 2015; Ortega & Peri, 2013).

Czaika and de Haas (2017) argued that, while more restrictive visa policies decrease inflows,
they also deter outflows creating motivations for long-term settlement. Studies have also put
forward the notion that, once a certain threshold has been passed, other factors such as networks
or migrant agents support the further movement of people irrespective of migration policies.
Hence, migration can become self-reinforcing (Cummings et al., 2015; Czaika & de Haas, 2013).
Additionally, most studies have only considered the migration policy of destination countries
ignoring the potential effect of emigration policies by states of origin. More authoritarian states
seem to restrict emigration levels more effectively (de Haas, 2011). In general, evidence suggests
that migration policies seem to affect migratory movements, though possibly in unexpected
ways. They seem to be a challenging tool with which to influence the overall volume of people
migrating. Differing results may be explained by the difficulty of measuring the effectiveness of
migration policies or by the endogeneity of migration policy, namely that these are often shaped
by a broader economic or political development (de Haas, 2011). Here, interdependencies
between the various different determinants of migration should be considered in future research.
Also there is a lack of quantitative empirical research investigating how migration policies are
perceived and acted upon by individuals. All in all, existent evidence suggests that, compared to
other determinants of migration, the effect of migration policy on overall numbers of migrants
would appear to be fairly small.

Environmental changes and threats: In recent years, environmental threats have been
discussed more prominently in the context of migratory movements. Soil degradation, drought or
flooding, anomalies in rainfall or temperature, as well as natural disasters have been identified as
potential causes of large migration flows, a development which is expected to increase even
more so in the future (IPPC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change], 2014; UNFPA
[United Nations Population Fund], 2009). Empirical research predicts that the geographical
distribution of the damages of climate change will be uneven. Developing countries in particular
will be affected – while already hosting the most vulnerable populations with less adaptive
 30

capacities (Mendelsohn, Dinar, & Williams, 2006; Tol, Downing, Kuik, & Smith, 2004).
Livelihood dependence on agriculture and exposed coastal zones will reinforce this. As climate
change directly affects other important drivers of migration – such as economic opportunities,
livelihoods, or the political environment – it is difficult to identify environmental changes as a
direct determinant as such (Cattaneo et al., 2014; Maurel & Tuccio, 2016; McCubbin, Smit, &
Pearce, 2015; Raleigh, Jordan, & Salehyan, 2010). Their effect is likely to be indirect in many
cases and, while they can increase the incentive to leave, they can simultaneously limit the
capacity to do so (Black et al., 2011; Findley, 1994).

Typical adaptation strategies to short-term climate risks, such as flooding or droughts, are
circular or seasonal (labour) migration. This often takes place within a country and does not lead
to movements across international borders (Alem, Maurel, & Millock, 2016; Raleigh et al.,
2010). Cattaneo et al. (2014) described diversity in human mobility with respect to both slow-
onset events, such as land degradation or droughts, and fast-onset events, such as storms or
floods. While the latter are mostly associated with forced, sudden internal movement, the former
are more difficult to relate to specific climate events due to their delayed human response.
Hence, slow-onset events are frequently perceived as voluntary movements and often considered
to be economically motivated.

There are several quantitative studies at individual- and household-level investigating the linkage
between climate change and internal migration (Gray, 2009; Henry, Schoumaker, &
Beauchemin, 2004). In Sub-Saharan Africa, Barrios, Bertinelli, and Strobl (2006) as well as
Henderson, Storeygard, and Deichmann (2017) observed a significant effect of climate change
on rural-to-urban population movements. Joseph and Wodon (2013) reported that there was a
significant effect of climatic factors on internal migration in Yemen. In recent years, these were
complemented by an increasing number of quantitative studies focusing on international
migration flows (Afifi & Warner, 2008; Bettin & Nicolli, 2012). Investigating rainfall and
temperature anomalies in Sub-Saharan Africa, Marchiori, Maystadt, and Schumacher (2012)
suggested that they initially led to increased internal rural-to-urban migration, as well as, in a
second step, to increased international outmigration due to reduced wages (induced by a growth
in the labour supply) in urban centres. Looking at migration from developing countries to OECD
 31

(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries in response to adverse

climatic events, Coniglio and Pesce (2015) found significant direct and indirect effects on
outmigration.

This is particularly true for agrarian societies. Investigating climate factors as well as natural
disasters using data from 1960 to 2000, Beine and Parsons (2015) observed no statistically
significant long-run effect of either factor on international migration. However, they reported
that natural disasters significantly affected internal migration flows, proxied by the rate of
urbanisation. Abel, Brottrager, Cuaresma, and Muttarak (2019) were the first to establish a
causal link between climate change – particularly drought severity – and the occurrence of
conflict with subsequent increased numbers of asylum seekers.

Overall, the link between climate change and international migration – through heightened
internal rural-urban migration and increasing urbanisation followed, in a second step, by
international out-migration as urban wages are suppressed – is supported by several studies
(Marchiori et al., 2012; Maurel & Tuccio, 2016; Skeldon, 2006). However, individual-level
studies investigating the direct relationship between environmental change and international
migration are still underrepresented in this research field. Nonetheless, the difficulty of causally
relating climate change directly to international human mobility (which is mostly expected to be
driven by slow-onset events) remains. In reaction, some research has instead started to
investigate the sensitivity of established rootfactors of migration to changing climate (Black et
al., 2011; Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2016; Foresight, 2011). Due to the interdependency of these
factors as well as the interplay with the respective characteristics of the individuals and
households, studying the heterogeneity of reactions to climate change is particularly interesting.
While this has been conducted for some characteristics, such as wealth, other interdependencies,
such as gender, are still under-researched and a systematic assessment would provide important
future research fields (Cattaneo et al. 2014). As argued above, fast-onset events are easier to
relate to mobility decisions (due to the immediate human reaction). However, in general, their
effects on long-term international displacements are judged to be limited. Investigating further
the effects of increased frequency of such event types (as one manifestation of environmental
 32

change) on human mobility patterns would likewise provide interesting future research areas
(Cattaneo et al.,2014).

Development-induced displacement: Displacement through development projects, such as

dams, mines or urban infrastructure, such as roads, ports or industrial parks, can occur on a
massive scale (Cernea & Mathur, 2008; Gellert & Lynch, 2003). Nonetheless, while such
displacement can be regarded as one factor forcing people to move, it does not represent one of
the root causes. Hence, for reasons of comprehensiveness, it is covered briefly in this review but
kept to a minimum. While development projects often have positive implications for part of the
local population by providing new employment opportunities and offering improved public
services, they can at the same time force people from their homes to make room for a new dam
or road (Scudder, 2005). Development-induced displacement is characterised by a permanent
relocation of all people living within a certain geographical area as a result of a development
project. This usually affects thousands or occasionally also ten-thousand people (Cernea, 2003).

Further, there are several so-called secondary implications, which are indirect consequences of
the projects, such as environmental degradation, destruction of flora and fauna, changing water
levels, or land loss (Gellert & Lynch, 2003). In particular, indigenous communities or ethnic
minorities as well as smallholder farmers are often negatively affected (Doutriaux, Geisler, &
Shively, 2008; Randell, 2016). In addition to the people directly affected by the displacement,
there are sometimes groups that are indirectly affected: for instance, host communities who have
to receive the displaced population, or people living in the area, who did not have to move but
whose access to resources or social networks was negatively affected (de Wet, 2001). In general,
little longitudinal – particularly quantitative – evidence on development-induced displacement
exists.

Determinants of Migration: the meso-level

Apart from country-level determinants there are also several factors at the societal-, community-
and household-level that have been shown to impact strongly on an individual’s migration
aspiration and decision. While the importance of networks was already acknowledged in several
 33

studies some decades ago, the role of the internet and smugglers has only recently drawn more
attention. Also, at the meso-level, interdependencies between factors exist while they are
simultaneously related to determinants at the macro- and micro-level.

Migration culture, networks, and information: Migration networks are defined as “sets of
interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and
destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin” (Lundquist &
Massey, 2005, p. 42). Garip and Asad (2013) describe two mechanisms on how networks can
influence the migration process. The first pathway is social facilitation, describing the act of
providing useful information or actual support by helping to find a job or shelter and hence,
making the migration less risky and costly. Normative influence, the second pathway, points to a
situation where network peers influence prospective migrants through social rewards or
sanctions. The latter is related to the idea of a migration culture, which again is closely connected
to the existence of migration networks. Based on the theory of cumulative causation, increased
migration from a particular country or locality strengthens migrant networks (for example, based
on kinship, religion, or another social form), which gives rise to a culture of migration and
translocality. As migratory movements become more prominent within certain regions, migration
can become an accepted and desired strategy for families to mitigate risks and to achieve
improved social and economic outcomes. Having at least one household member who leaves the
home can become part of the family’s expectations and value system (Heering, van der Erf, &
van Wissen, 2004; Timmerman et al., 2014). This creates a general tendency, particularly of
young people, to choose migration as a primary strategy either not considering other options or
perceiving them as failure (Heering, van der Erf, & van Wissen, 2004; Massey et al., 1998).
Migration culture and the corresponding factors have been discussed by researchers as important
determinants of movement (de Haas, 2011).

Several studies, mostly qualitative investigations, have demonstrated the vital importance of
migrant networks during the entire migration journey – before, during and at the end of the route
(Palloni, Massey, Ceballos, Espinosa, & Spitted, 2001; Schapendonk, 2012, 2015; Schapendonk
& van Moppes, 2007; Vogler & Rotte, 2000). Networks lower risks and costs of movement for
potential migrants by making information and resources accessible (Cummings et al., 2015).
 34

Networks can help in finding shelter and jobs in the country of destination and provide necessary
resources for the route. The access to information both prior to and during the migration process
is vital to reduce risks. Simultaneously, they transmit information back home, which in turn
informs the migration decision (Edwards, 2009; Ros, González, Marín, & Sow, 2007).
Qualitative and quantitative studies using country-level data sources as well as more
disaggregated data sources have found that this triggers increased migration, also in conflict
situations (Barthel & Neumayer, 2015; Beine, Docquier, & Özden, 2011; Davenport et al., 2003;
Herman, 2006; Moore & Shellman, 2004; Schmeidl, 1997). The various different feedback
mechanisms functioning throughout the networks and supported by the formation of a migration
culture are factors triggering the self-perpetuating character of migration. This is not only true
for regular migration but also for irregular migration (Cummings et al., 2015; Van Mol et al.,
2018).

The negative information on obstacles in the destination country seems to be underreported by

migrants in order to demonstrate the success of their migration back home. Recently, however,
some studies have emerged – mostly of a qualitative nature suggesting that there are also
negative feedback mechanisms working through networks that sometimes discourage
movements (Engbersen, Snel, & Esteves, 2016; Fussell & Massey, 2004; Van Mol et al., 2018).
Reporting about difficulties, such as employment misfits, hostile host societies, restrictive
immigration policies, or the challenges of learning a new language, can potentially decrease
migration (de Haas, 2010; Snel, Faber, & Engbersen, 2016; Timmerman et al., 2014). Also,
access to other sources of information, such as the internet or social media, can lead to a more
balanced and realistic picture of a potential migration outcome (Mai, 2004; Riccio, 2005).
Hence, the size of migration flows can be increased or decreased on the basis of these feedback
mechanisms operating through networks.

Studies found that networks led to a self-selection of migrants with lower education and skill-
levels (Beine et al., 2011; Bertoli, 2010; McKenzie & Rapoport, 2010). Also recently researchers
have started to investigate the heterogeneous network effects on women and men with respect to
their migration decision: men’s networks seem to be larger and more diffuse than those of
women (Liu, 2013; Toma & Vause, 2014). On the other hand, networks at home are thought to
 35

enable people to stay and cope more easily with the implications of conflicts (Adhikari, 2012;
Harpviken, 2009; Wood, 2008). Conflicts can also strengthen social networks in the place of
origin and increase social connectedness. Overall, there is a general agreement in the literature
that migration networks and culture have a significant impact on migration aspirations and
decisions. Whereas it is clear that they reduce the cost and risk of the undertaking and herewith
trigger migration, the impact of transmitted information – containing encouraging or
discouraging content – is yet to be further researched.

Technology: Technology has changed access to social networks and how they operate.
Information and communication technologies (ICTs) – traditionally television, radio and mobile
phone technology but recently also particularly social media – have shaped the way networks are
built and sustained. They make it possible to maintain strong ties with family members and
friends while at the same time enabling people to build weak (that is, temporary) ties helpful to
organising and facilitating the migration process. They function as a means of communication,
especially mobile phones which are of vital importance on the migration route and through
which important information is shared (Dekker & Engbersen, 2014; Schaub, 2012). Anecdotal
evidence suggests that the majority of migrants use some form of ICTs for their migration
process, starting in the country of origin, during the route and upon their arrival in transit or
destination countries (Kirwin & Anderson, 2018). Collyer (2010) suggested that access to
modern technology is likely to lead to longer-tem fragmented migration patterns with long
overland journeys also allowing poorer individuals to consider migration an option.

ICTs not only influence the migration process by making it easier to access information and
establish different types of networks but have also become drivers of migration themselves
(Hamel, 2009; IOM, 2005). It has been suggested that modern technology, such as television or
the internet, influences the way people think about borders and strengthens their global
interconnectedness (Pries, 2005; Timmerman et al., 2014). They are likely to shape ideas and, as
Hamel (2009, p. 10) puts it, “the act of migration begins in the mind”. The images on global
media are important sources in forming migration aspirations, often based on an idolised
“paradise” which shapes expectations (Kirwin & Anderson, 2018).
 36

Particularly for those who already consider migration as an option, these pictures can have an
important impact on their final decision to move (Hamel, 2009; Schapendonk & van Moppes,
2007). Simultaneously, some qualitative research has suggested that access to ICTs increases
peoples’ awareness of the difficulties of the migratory process and supports a more balanced and
nuanced understanding (Horst, 2006). As a side note, the ICT sector itself has led to major labour
migration, for example of engineers and computer scientists. The movement is then often in
response to a concrete job offer (Hamel, 2009). More generally, online job postings offer more
certainty by facilitating the search for employment in the country of destination beforehand.
Also, the use of social media for recruitment purposes has recently been documented
(McAuliffe, 2017). While there is extensive anecdotal evidence on the relationship between
international (in particular irregular) migration decisions and the use of ICTs, there is generally
still very little empirical research on this (Cummings et al., 2015).

Migrant smugglers: As recent research suggests; migrant smugglers can often be seen as part of
the migration network. There is not necessarily a clear distinction between social and smuggling
networks; they can overlap in the course of the migration process and the relationships that
emerge are highly complex and less black and white as often displayed in the media (Sanchez,
2017; Schapendonk, 2012; UNODC, 2018). Smugglers are important if irregular migration is to
take place and several studies have reported the frequent use of smugglers during the migration
process as well as their influence on the routes and destinations (Jandl, 2007; Koser &
Kuschminder, 2015, 2017; Kuschminder et al., 2015; Wissink et al., 2013). However, there is
very scant empirical research on smuggling and its relationship to migration (Sanchez, 2017).
The globalisation of transport and increasing access to communication technologies have been
put forward as reasons for the professionalisation of smuggling services (Triandafyllidou &
Maroukis, 2012). It is important to acknowledge that the need to rely on smuggling services can
also be seen as evidence of how stricter immigration policies and fewer possibilities for legal
migration push people (including asylum seekers) towards irregular means of migration and their
need to search for and rely on alternative means of travel (Bhabha & Zard, 2006; Kassar &
Dourgnon, 2014; Sanchez, 2017). This increasing demand for alternative routes naturally gives
rise to an increased supply of these services. Additionally, there is anecdotal evidence that it is
 37

also smugglers themselves who proactively recruit and (sometimes) misinform migrants
(UNODC, 2018).

Geography and infrastructure: Leaving the home inherently involves travelling, which is not
only impacted by infrastructure, such as roads or transport, but also by certain geographical
features, such as mountainous terrain. Impassable terrain or destroyed roads are obstacles to
flight and likely to impact an individual’s decision to move (Adhikari, 2012; Edwards, 2009).
However, Schmeidl (1997) and Moore and Shellman (2006) did not observe any significant
effect of terrain characteristics upon the movement of refugees. Although mobility and transport
are closely linked in more general terms, there is neither theoretical nor empirical consensus on
the impact of transportation. Mixed results of transportation costs were found by Czaika and Kis-
Katos (2009) in Indonesia. Improvements in the road system in Tanzania and Nepal were found
to significantly decrease the individual probability of migrating (Fafchamps & Shilpi, 2013;
Gachassin, 2013). While improved availability and access to transport lower the cost of
movement, they are also often simultaneously linked to better livelihoods or to greater state
presence. There is agreement, though, on the fact that distance deters international as well as
internal movement (Lucas, 2001; Mazumdar, 1987).

Determinants of migration: the micro-level

Micro-level determinants have often only recently been acknowledged in quantitative studies
(Engel & Ibáñez, 2007). While they have been investigated in more detail in more established
research fields, such as those studying rural-urban migration flows, they have not been taken into
consideration in the majority of other studies. In addition, it would also be necessary to integrate
them in a stronger way into theoretical models. Investigating demographic distributions among
migrants worldwide, it becomes obvious that certain people seem to be more likely than others to
leave their homes. While it is important to take individual characteristics into account, they
should in general not be regarded as primary drivers but as factors that nevertheless have a
significant influence on migration decisions and lead to the self-selection of migrants.

Age: It is well-documented that the majority of migrants are of working age. This applies to
those moving both within and across borders, including people who seek refugee status, as well
 38

as those entering as labour migrants (IMF [International Monetary Fund], 2016; Kassar &
Dourgnon, 2014; van Dalen, Groenewold, & Schoorl, 2005). Working-age migrants have the
highest probability of successfully overcoming the burdens they encounter both before and
during the journey and of making a living at the destination, which is often part of a risk-
diversification strategy of households (Dasgupta, Moqbul Hossain, Huq, & Wheeler, 2014;
Lauby & Stark, 1988; Schwartz, 1976). What is more, those of working age are the ones subject
to disappointment and despair if the local opportunities are too limited to enable them to earn a
living both for themselves and their households (Holtemeyer, Schmidt, Ghebru, Mueller, &
Kosec, 2017). Generally speaking, there is evidence showing that, and explaining how,
increasing age affects the intention to migrate and migration decisions negatively. However, few
quantitative studies focus on the role of age within their research setting. This is particularly true
of irregular migration flows. Varying selection effects across different factors, such as the role of
age in conflict versus non-conflict settings or across distance, would be interesting to study.

Educational level: With respect to traditional labour migration, there seems to be a positive
relationship to education (IMF, 2016). The inability to find adequate employment that fits their
education is a major motivation for skilled, educated migrants to leave their home (Kirwin &
Anderson, 2018). Having said that, there seem to be heterogeneous effects across countries:
While van Dalen et al. (2005) found that higher educated people tended to migrate more often in
Ghana and Egypt, the opposite was true for Morocco. This migration of lower educated
individuals has been reported by several authors in recent studies covering various different
world regions. They argue that, in countries with dense migration networks, the costs of
migration are reduced significantly, which leads to a selection of lower-skilled migrants (Beine
et al., 2011; Bertoli, 2010; McKenzie & Rapoport, 2010). Furthermore, irregular migration
seems to be dominated by people with lower levels of education as those with higher skill levels
have greater opportunities to migrate legally (Mbaye, 2014). Grogger and Hanson (2011) use a
large cross-country dataset on emigration in OECD countries to show that, in general, it is the
more educated who emigrate and that they also settle in countries with high rewards for their
level of skills. All in all, the evidence suggests that there is an initial positive sorting with respect
to education for the first movers but, as migration costs are reduced with increasing networks,
 39

less-skilled migrants also decide to move. It would also be interesting to consider the combined
effects of skill levels and gender as underlying motivations for migration have been shown to
differ across sexes.

Gender: Descriptive studies suggest that women are less likely to migrate across country borders
than men and that they seem to be more sensitive to migration costs (Beine & Salomone, 2010;
Kirwin & Anderson, 2018). Women are more risk-averse towards irregular migration as they
face higher risks than men on the route, such as violence (Donato & Patterson, 2004). Added to
this, they are more often constrained by a lack of financial means (Kirwin & Anderson, 2018).
As a result, they frequently rely on close family networks to migrate internationally while men
also trust friends and less dense network relations (Beine & Salomone, 2010; Curran & Rivero-
Fuentes, 2003; Toma & Vause, 2014). While domestic labour migration, particularly for poor
women, is common in several countries (for example, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, see Afsar
(2011)), cultural and social norms might prevent them from rural-urban as well as international
movements (Fleury, 2016). Women’s and men’s decisions to leave the home seems to be driven
by different factors (Heering, van der Erf, & van Wissen, 2004). While men are more frequently
driven by individual, economic factors, women’s motivations to move are often to help the
family or due to family reunification, but also to escape gender-based violence or discrimination
(Afsar, 2009; UNFPA, 2006; van Dalen et al., 2005). Gender-based structural inequalities are
another factor mentioned by several studies (Erulkar, Mekbib, Simie, & Gulema, 2006; Ferrant,
Tuccio, Loiseau, & Nowacka, 2014).

Risk aversion and personality traits: It is a well-known fact that economic, demographic and
sociological factors are important in explaining the variation in migration intentions and
decisions. But variations in personality characteristics are also likely to be significantly related to
the heterogeneity of movement. It is a well-established fact in psychological research that risk
aversion as well as personality traits impact the decision processes of an individual (Beyer,
Fasolo, de Graeff, & Hillege, 2015). Migration is a major decision that starkly affects an
individual’s life as well as the household or even community. While previous studies have
established the importance of risk aversion for typical (regular) labour migration, only recently
have scholars investigated its role for those travelling on irregular routes. The evidence suggests
 40

that risk aversion is lower for all types of migrants in high- as well as low- and middle income
countries (Jaeger et al., 2007; Mbaye & Arcand, 2013; Mbaye, 2014; Wissink et al., 2013).
Knowing of the risks involved in travelling on dangerous routes, they still make a positive
migration decision. Along with this, time preference seems to be lower for migrants than for
non-migrants4 (Goldbach & Schlüter, 2018; Mbaye & Arcand, 2013).

Due to a lack of reliable data the empirical evidence on time and risk preferences, however,
remains scarce. Interest in the field of “migration psychology” has grown of late. There have
been research attempts to look at the influence of different personality traits on migration
decisions. Canache, Hayes, Mondak, and Wals (2013) investigated the effects of openness to
experience and extraversion on migration intentions using a large cross-country dataset in the
Americas. Both personality traits showed a modest positive influence on the intent to migrate.
This is supported by Silventoinen et al. (2007) for migration between Finland and Sweden.
Fouarge, Özer, and Seegers (2016) studied the relationship of the “Big Five” personality traits on
individual migration intentions among German students. Also they observed a positive impact of
openness and extraversion on migration intentions while agreeableness, conscientiousness, and
emotional stability are negatively related with intentions to move abroad. Also, sensation-
seeking and preference for meeting new people has been found to be positively related to
migration undertaken by Indian men (Winchie & Carment, 1988). While there is still very scant
research on this point, there is an even larger gap with respect to the potential impact of
personality traits on migration in and from developing regions. Studies have also revealed
heterogeneous effects with respect to additional individual characteristics such as ethnicity,
marital status, and household size (Bohra-Mishra & Massey, 2009; Root & de Jong, 1991;
Rosenzweig & Stark, 1989).

2.2.3 Consequences of Migration

The consequences of migration are diverse. But few were discussed in this study which are as
follows:
Economic: Migration from a region characterised by labour surplus helps to increase the average
productivity of labour in that region, as this encourages labour-saving devices and/or greater
work participation by the remaining family workers. On the other hand, there is a view that
 41

migration negatively affects the emigrating region and favours the immigrating region, and that
migration would widen the development disparity between the regions, because of the drain of
the resourceful persons from the relatively underdeveloped region to the more developed region.
But the exodus of the more enterprising members of a community cannot be considered a loss, if
there is lack of alternative opportunities in the rural areas. As long as migration draws upon the
surplus labour, it would help the emigrating region. It will have adverse effects only if human
resources are drained away at the cost of the development of the region.

Another important point is that when migration draws away the unemployed or underemployed,
it would enable the remaining population of the region to improve their living conditions as this
would enable the remaining population to increase the per capita consumption, since the total
number of mouths to be fed into is reduced as a result of emigration. However, the labour-
sending regions may gain economically by the money brought in by the emigrants. In India, the
influx of the rural migrants to cities and towns has resulted in a steady outflow of cash from the
urban to rural areas. Most migrants are single males, who after securing urban employment
generally send a portion of their income to their village homes to supplement the meagre
incomes of their families. At the same time, it also affects the savings of the family as sometimes
the migrants take money (family savings) with them, which is necessary for their travel and stay
in a new place. In recent times, a sudden increase in migration to the Middle East has resulted in
steep rise in the remittances of foreign money in our country. In 1979, it was found that the
annual remittances to the tiny state of Kerala were estimated to Rs.4000 million. The rising
inflow of money from the Gulf countries has resulted in the building of houses and buying of
agricultural land, and even investments in business and industry. This has also resulted in the rise
in the levels of consumption in the family. Money is also being spent on children’s education. On
the other hand, the outflow of men has caused labour shortages and has pushed wages upwards.

Demographic Imbalance: Migration has a direct impact on age, sex and occupational
composition of the sending and receiving regions. Migration of the unmarried males of young
working age results in imbalances in sex ratio. The absence of many young men from the
villages increases the proportion of other groups, such as, women, children and old people. This
 42

tends to reduce the birth rate in the rural areas. Further the separation of the rural male migrants
from their wives for long durations also tends to reduce the birth rate.

Social and Psychological: Urban life usually brings about certain social changes in the migrants.
Those migrants who return occasionally or remain in direct or indirect contact with the
households of their origin are also likely to transmit some new ideas back to the areas of origin.
Several studies attribute technological change to the dynamism of the return migrants, who bring
money as well as knowledge and experience of different production techniques, and this may
lead to mechanisation and commercialisation of agricultural activity. A number of ex-
servicemen, on retirement go back to their native areas and promote such practices in the
villages. Contact with the urban and different cultures also brings attitudinal change in the
migrants, and helps them to develop more modern orientation, including even the consumerist
culture in their own areas. On the other hand, migration which results in the absence of the adult
males for long periods of time may cause dislocation of the family, and, under such
circumstances, women and children often have to take over more and different types of work and
other more important roles in household decision-making.

2.3 Migration Governance

Migration governance can be conceived as “the multi-phase, multi-site, multi-stage, multiarea,
and multi-scale system of actors, relations, resources, policies and practices that effectively
regulates international migrations while respecting the principles of protection and sustainable
development”. It is worth noting that this definition embraces the two main modes for evaluating
the governance’s “goodness” identified in the literature while keeping them apart. On the one
hand the instrumental approach is followed to the extent that effectiveness is assessed, namely
considering how effectively the system of governance regulates international migration. On the
other hand, normative considerations also come into play as long as the quality of the governance
system is assessed in relation to compliance with protection principles and sustainable
development. The idea, again, is to have a conceptual benchmark for reviewing existing
indicators of good migration governance, analysing whether and how such datasets assess
governance system’s effectiveness and capacity to ensure migrants’ protection and sustainable
development.
 43

The character of migration governance mirrors the character of governance illustrated in the
previous section. To capture the complexity of actors, layers and relationships involved in the
governance of migration, scholars in this field of study usually employ the concept of multilevel
governance (MLG) According to Hooghe and Marks (2001), MLG can be understood as the
“dispersion of authority away from central government - upwards to the supranational level,
downwards to subnational jurisdictions, and sideways to public/private networks”. On the same
line and following recent contributions on the topic, which delve into its multidimensionality,
migration governance can be thought of embracing various phases, sites, stages, areas, scale and
actors (Garcés-Mascareñas & Penninx 2016; Panizzon & Riemsdijk 2018; Zincone & Caponio
2006).

Migration governance is multi-phase in the sense that it covers the key phases of the migratory
process trajectory, which go from the moment in which the person leaves the origin country to
the moment in which he or she reaches another country, passing through different dynamics and
patterns of circularity5. In this regard, the literature distinguishes 2+1 phases that make up the
migratory process, the phase of entry, the phase of exit and the phase of circularity (covering
temporary movements between home and host countries) (Bjerre et al. 2014; Peters 2013).

Migration governance is multi-sited. If international migration takes place across countries, then
the system governing such phenomenon is dispersed across different sites. The streams of
research on the externalization of migration control and the migration-development nexus
provide illuminating insights in this regard (Faist & Fauser 2011; Lavenex and Kunz 2008;
Nyberg–Sørensen, Van Hear and Engberg–Pedersen 2002). For the aim of this inquiry it is
sufficient to bear in mind that migration governance takes place across different sites, situated in
country of origins, transit countries and destination countries.

Migration governance is also multi-stage in that it encompasses different stages of the

policycycle, from policy formulation to policy evaluation, passing thorough executive and
implementation steps. In this regard, the scholarship emphasises three main stages: (i) the stage
of normative framework setting, (ii) the stage of policy implementation and (iii) the stage of
 44

evaluation. The first stage concerns the development of legal apparatuses and, analytically, it
points to policy-outputs (Knill & Tosun 2014) or to the “rules of the games”, to say with
Knoepfel et al. (2007) Policy implementation regards the stage in which policy outputs are put
into practice. As pointed out by Ambrosini and Van der Leun (2015), the way in which
bureaucrats and administrators implement the normative framework highly affects migratory
experience. Finally, migration governance also includes the stage of evaluation in which control
mechanisms and assessment tools are employed to evaluate the effectiveness and the efficacy of
the system.

Migration governance is multi-area inasmuch as it encompasses different domains of

policymaking. These include classical policy-areas, such as that of citizenship (Freeman 2006)
and employment (e.g. Robertson, 2014), and areas that have only recently aroused the interest of
literature, such as the area of health (Zimmerman, Kiss & Hossain 2011). To this regard, it is
worth pointing out the agreement among scholars to identify the area of development as a proper
and specific domain of policymaking within the governance of migration (Faist & Fauser 2011;
Lavenex & Kunz 2008)

Finally, migration governance is multi-scalar and multi-actor. Garcés-Mascareñas and Penninx

(2016) organize them over two orthogonal axes along which the governance system can be
structured. The vertical axis captures the multitude of actors distributed over the different
geopolitical scale, including municipal actors and civil society placed at the local level, actors
working at the level of the central state, supranational actors such as European Institutions. The
horizontal axis captures instead the scope of actors involved, classifying them on the basis on
their institutional nature, distinguishing between state (e.g. administrative entities and bodies
concerned with immigrant integration) and non-state actors (e.g. NGOs and immigrant
associations) In this line, Scholten and Penninx (2016) have gone a step further and have
identified 4 ideal-types of multilevel governance configurations: centralist, localist, multilevel
and decoupled.

The centralist configuration is characterized by a top-down hierarchy among governance levels

and a strong and formalized institutional structure. The localist type involves a more bottom-up
 45

and horizontal perspective in which the role of municipal actors goes beyond policy
implementation and includes policy formulation based on locally grounded agendas. The
multilevel type refers to a specific mode of interaction and coordination in which there is no
clear dominance of one level over another and usually takes the shape of forums or networks
horizontally and vertically articulated. In the decoupled ideal-type different levels of governance
pursue and bring about contrasting actions, possibly ending up in tensions and conflicts between
actors placed at different governance scales. Looking at the variety of phases, sites, stages, areas,
scale and actors helps to bring into focus the constitutive elements of migration governance,
namely the building blocks in which the concept can be theoretically decomposed and
empirically investigated.

In other words, building blocks represent the necessary elements for developing a definition of
migration governance that is as complete, clear and unambiguous as possible. Migration
governance building blocks include:
Actors: set of single/collective, state/non-state and public/private actors involved in the
regulation of international migration, distributed over the various levels of governance.
Relations: formal and informal links and relationships among actors involved in migration
governance. Formal connections get back to the procedural architecture described by King et
al (2012) while informal relations concern the organization and coordination among actors as
they occur in putting measures into practice.
Resources: in-cash and in-kind means and assets dedicated to the regulation of international
migration.
Policy: policy-outputs meaning “policymaker’s statements of what it intends to do or not do
in regard to regulation of international migration”, paraphrasing Knill and Tosun (2014, 336)
Practices: measures and processes through which policymakers’ goals and policy-outputs
are brought into practice given the different actors, relations and resources.

2.3.1. Actors, Modes of Migration Governance by Global Forum on Migration and

Development (2016)
 46

Migration has the potential both to impact, and be impacted by, decisions made at multiple levels
and spheres of government, both vertically and horizontally. While policy making around
migration often falls primarily to a specific department of government, policy makers engaged
with issues such as education, housing, health care, transportation and infrastructure must also
engage with migration, at local, national, regional and international levels of governance.
Building effective partnerships among stake holders (including States, local authorities, regional
and international organizations, private sector and civil society) will require the forging of
stronger linkages within and between these various spheres of governance.

Global Governance of Migration: At the international level, a range of institutions and actors
are involved in issues of migration governance, which presents both opportunities and challenges
in terms of leadership, responsibility, and coordination. Multilateral institutions engaged in
various aspects of international migration governance include the IOM, the UNHCR, the
International Labour Organization (ILO), the World Bank (including its Global Knowledge
Partnership on Migration and Development project (KNOMAD)), the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Further, in 2016, the IOM was formally
incorporated into the UN system as the UN Migration Agency. However, given the nature of
migration, other institutions and organizations also have important overlapping functions around
migration, including, amongst others, the World Health Organization, the United Nations

Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) and UN Women and the United Nations
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA). Inter-agency mechanisms such as the
Global Migration Group assist in bringing together heads of various agencies to advance the
application of relevant international and regional instruments and norms relating to migration,
and to encourage the adoption of more coherent, comprehensive and better coordinated
approaches to the issue of international migration (Wickramasekara, 2016).

Bilateral Governance: The State has traditionally been the main actor in migration governance,
and in many ways, it remains the primary unit on which the majority of migration governance
 47

arrangements is based. While the very nature of international migration requires transnational
cooperation in governance, States are often reluctant to cede even small degrees of sovereignty
by entering into formal global or multilateral governance agreements regarding migration, an
issue which can have significant implications and sensitivities in domestic politics. Many States
have undertaken multiple initiatives at the national level towards the promotion of orderly, safe,
regular and responsible mobility, but also, many important agreements have been made at the
bilateral level. The negotiation of bilateral agreements has numerous advantages for States in
terms of their approaches to migration governance. For example, they can be more tailored to
specific migration contexts, and they can be pursued with specific countries with which there is
already a basis of shared experience and trust. Further, with fewer actors at the table, the terms
and conditions of bilateral agreements can often be negotiated more quickly and easily than in a
multilateral forum. However, for many of the same reasons, bilateral agreements can also present
challenges to ambitions of longer-term regional or global approaches to migration governance, or
promote only short-term or stop-gap solutions to urgent issues or crises of migration governance.
Nonetheless, bilateral agreements continue to represent an important component of global
migration governance arrangements.

Regional Governance: In recent years, States have also increasingly turned to regional forums
as a way to address issues of migration governance cooperatively. Regional Economic
Communities (RECs) such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) and Mercusor,
amongst others, are all engaged to various degrees in issues of migration governance,
particularly given the relationship between the processes of regional economic integration and
labour migration. Further to this, State-led Regional Consultative Processes (RCPs), which bring
together representatives from States, international organizations, and sometimes NGOs for non-
binding and informal dialogue around migration issues, now function in many parts of the world
(Thouez & Channac, 2006). Originally, the focus of many RCPs was migration management and
control, but as Crush notes, issues of migration and development, have increasingly come onto
their agendas (Crush, 2015). Importantly, there are also regular global meetings of the Chairs and
Secretariat of RCPs, to allow for the exchange of information, practices and dialogue across
 48

regions. As with State-led non-binding processes and forums at the global level, these RCPs
continue to make a significant contribution to the landscape of global migration governance.

Urban and Municipal Governance: International cooperation, dialogue and policy forums
around migration have largely taken place at the bilateral, regional and global levels. However,
migration governance necessarily involves a much broader range of actors and institutions, and
there has been a growing recognition of the pivotal role that local and urban authorities play in
the governance of migration, and particularly in facilitating the conditions that promote the
potential contributions of migration for development. Cities are already home to over half of the
global population, a share that is expected to rise steadily in coming years. While migration is
often conceptualized as a move from one country to another, in reality, the movement of people
also often entails moving from one major urban centre to another. Because of this, cities are
often at the forefront of addressing many of the immediate, day-to-day challenges that migration
can present, including issues such as housing, service provision, employment access, and the
facilitation of integration of migrants at the local level. Local and urban authorities are also well-
positioned to make important contributions to the resettlement, reintegration and engagement of
returning migrants and diaspora communities. Further, meeting the migration-related goals and
targets in the new 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda will require the input, cooperation and
commitment of sub-national levels of government.

Around the world, local and urban authorities, researchers, and other stakeholders are engaged in
finding ways to meet these challenges. The International Metropolis Project, for example, is an
international network of researchers, policy makers and community groups engaged in issues of
migration and diversity, while the Cities of Migration project seeks to improve local integration
practice in major immigrant receiving cities around the world, though learning exchange and
information sharing. One important and recently established city-led initiative is The Mayoral
Forum on Mobility, Migration, and Development, supported by the United Nations Institute for
Training and Research (UNITA), with the IOM as a partner and co-sponsor. Launched in
Barcelona in 2014, the Mayoral Forum aims to advance migration and development-related
dialogue and cooperation amongst the world’s municipal leaders, regional authorities and
mayors. Such a platform creates new opportunities for local and urban authorities to share
 49

information around good practices and challenges, and also highlights, on a global stage, the
important position of this level of governance in the facilitation of migration for development.

The UNDP’s Joint Migration and Development Initiative (JMDI) is another current international
programme which has recognized the importance of decentralized levels of governance in
migration and development interventions. Five other agencies (IOM, ILO, UNHCR, UNFPA and
UN Women) contribute their knowledge, expertise and networks to the JMDI, which has found
in its own work that the most successful and sustainable migration and development
interventions they have identified “are those with strong anchorage with the local governments in
countries of origin and destination....” One JMDI project in the Bicol region of the Philippines
provides a useful example of how cities can represent an important starting point for the
implementation of policies and practices which can then be shared with other local authorities,
scaled up and integrated across regional and national levels of governance.

Despite the success and potential of migration governance at local and urban levels, in many
respects, migration policy is still deeply attached to the national state level, despite growing
initiatives by local governments to address the social and economic challenges that arise from
immigration and integration. Further, tensions can be created between different levels of
governance when local initiatives do not align well with national imperatives or functions, such
as ongoing controversies regarding “Sanctuary Cities” in the United States, Canada, and the
United Kingdom, a broad term for some cities in which local governments implement policies
that offer various degrees of protection to irregular migrants around detection, detention and
deportation. Some cities, such as Vancouver, Canada, have stopped short of declaring themselves
a Sanctuary City, but are nonetheless taking steps to protect migrants “with uncertain or no
immigration status.”

Civil Society and other Non-state Actors: Migration governance necessarily consists of more
than the policies and practices of different levels of governments. Indeed, one of the hallmarks of
“global governance” has been the increasing influence and engagement of a wide range of non-
state actors across a host of global issues, including issues such environmental protection,
climate change, health and migration. NGOs and civil society organizations, for example, can
 50

play a critical role in generating research, partnering with government authorities, providing
direct services, advocacy, enhancing government accountability and transparency, helping to
shape global norms, and influencing policy across different spheres of governance. Importantly,
NGOs and other civil society organizations may also have the capacity to act and respond to
emergencies or crises more quickly and flexibly than states sometimes can. The numbers and
diversity of civil society actors contribute to challenges of determining how best to effectively
involve and integrate civil society organizations into the various migration-related global policy
forums and initiatives that currently exist, particularly at the global and regional levels. Further,
the agendas and interests of civil society organizations may be, at times, considerably different
than those of States and policymakers. However, examples abound from around the world of
NGOs and civil society organizations actively engaged in effectively promoting the interests and
well-being of migrants, and advancing global agendas of protection, rights, and development.

Academia, foundations, and the private sector are also often over-looked, yet critical players in
migration processes and governance efforts, both formal and irregular. Like civil society
organizations and NGOs, academia can play an important role in shaping discourse and global
norms around migration, particularly (though not exclusively) through research and
dissemination. Foundations also contribute to governance through the creation of funding
opportunities and dispersal of resources (both to researchers and civil society organizations) that
target specific aspects or dynamics of migration. As with other major arenas of global
governance, the private sector also plays a pivotal role in shaping issues of migration
governance, particularly through labour demand and recruitment practices.

However, private sector actors can also be important partners in interventions related to issues as
diverse as migrant integration, protection, and the lowering of remittance costs. One of the five
transformative shifts identified in the new 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda is the
necessity of forging a “new global partnership,” which calls for a new spirit of solidarity,
cooperation, and mutual accountability to underpin the post-2015 agenda. As part of this, the
Agenda calls for the inclusion of civil society organizations, multilateral institutions, local and
national governments, the scientific and academic community, businesses, and private
philanthropy. Taken together, these are the actors that make up the landscape of migration
 51

governance. Given the complexity of migration, and the urgency of finding longterm solutions
for the many challenges it presents, new forms of cooperation, collaboration, and partnership
have never been more necessary.

2.4 Theoretical Review

2.4.1.National Development
Modernisation Theory by Smelser (1964)
This is the oldest theory of development. Modernisation theory sees development from the prism
of western civilisation. According to this School of Thought, development simply means
industrialisation and modernity which are exemplified by the Western industrialised capitalist
nations. The theory believes that the Politics of Developing Areas” argued that development is
the evolution of a political system through series of stages, from a traditional state to modernity
characterised by equality, cultural secularisation and structural differentiation. Cultural
secularisation is the process whereby members of the society become rational, critical and
analytical in their socio-political actions. Their orientations towards politics become pragmatic
and participatory as a result of the increase in their knowledge of the political objects, norms and
values (Cognitive Orientation) and also because of the increase in their feeling of attachment,
involvement and rejection of the political objects and issues (Affective Orientation), as well as
the increase in their objective judgments and opinions about the political objects and issues
(Evaluative Orientation). When this happens, a participant or civic political culture replaces
parochial and subject political culture which initially characterised the political system.

On the other hand, structural differentiation is the process whereby roles change in the society.
Old roles are transformed and new roles accompanied by new structures to perform them
emerge. Division of labour and specialisation ensue, and this results in the total transformation of
the society. At this point, the society achieves development having attained its optimum cultural
secularisation and structural differentiation, and as a result, acquired the capacity to maintain law
and order, to attract socio-political participation, distribute resources and privileges accordingly,
and to win the loyalty, support and commitment of its citizens which is nation building. From
this perspective, it is very well known that the national development is based on the five stages
 52

of development from Rostow’s (1960) model. In summary, these five stages are: traditional
society, precondition for takeoff, the takeoff process, the drive to maturity, and high mass
consumption society. The model asserted that all countries exist somewhere on this linear
spectrum, and climb upward through each stage in the development process:
 Traditional Society: This stage is characterized by a subsistent, agricultural based
economy, with intensive labor and low levels of trading, and a population that does not
have a scientific perspective on the world and technology.
 Preconditions to Take-off: Here, a society begins to develop manufacturing, and a more
national/international, as opposed to regional, outlook.
 Take-off: Rostow (1960) describes this stage as a short period of intensive growth, in
which industrialization begins to occur, and workers and institutions become
concentrated around a new industry.
 Drive to Maturity: This stage takes place over a long period of time, as standards of
living rise, use of technology increases, and the national economy grows and diversifies.
 Age of High Mass Consumption: At the time of writing, Rostow (1960) believed that
Western countries, most notably the United States, occupied this last "developed" stage.
Here, a country's economy flourishes in a capitalist system, characterized by mass
production and consumerism.

The theory also noted that a society is developed to the extent it has “development syndrome
which includes: equality (popular involvement in political activities and socio-political
recruitment based on achievement rather ascription), capacity (government’s ability to influence
its subjects and execute policies), and role differentiations (division of functions and
specialisation). With attributes, the society would be able to manage crisis of identity, crisis of
legitimacy, crisis of participation, crisis of distribution and crisis of integration. They all agreed
that a society’s development is tied to its capacity to strike a balance between demands and
support or inputs and outputs, and restore system equilibrium by performing satisfactorily rule
making, rule application and rule adjudication functions. For these scholars, the industrialised
capitalist countries have achieved these attributes and that is why they are developed. The Third
world countries lack these characteristics and that is the reason for their underdevelopment.
 53

Therefore, the Underdeveloped World can achieve development by imbibing the development
attributes of the Capitalist West.

All in all, the modernisation theorists see development from the prism of western civilisation.
For them, development means industrialisation and modernity or Westernisation. They argued
that the West is developed because it has certain socio-political and economic attributes that are
amenable to positive change and development. The underdeveloped states don’t possess such
attributes; thus they lack development. But, they can achieve development by trying to be like
the West via the imbuement of Western culture. Today such Western culture expresses itself in
form of capitalism or globalisation which advocates for liberalisation and market economy where
the so-called “invisible hands of the forces of demand and supply” regulate the economy.

However, criticisms of the theory include the following: Modernisation theory is ethnocentric,
euro-centric and teleological. It regards western culture and institutions as the best
and superior to other nations’ cultures. It presents western values as progressive and amenable to
development, while others are not. In essence, it regards development as a unilinear process
which can only be achieved by imbibing western culture and adopting its institutions. In this
way, development becomes synonymous with “trying to be like the West” or Westernisation.
Another misleading argument of Modernisation school of thought is that the Third World can
develop by acquiring the artifacts of Western civilisation, or better put, western technology. For
years now, underdeveloped states have been importing Western-made cars, electronics, textiles
(suites, shoes etc), and even western type of buildings, yet the Third world is still not developed.
Although few elites in the Third world drive the best of Western- made cars and build mansions
as their houses, in most cases there are no good roads to drive those cars, and their mansions
exist side-by-side with slums.

The Third world in some instances lack the technical-know-how to operate and maintain these
technologies, and thus depend on the West for their operations and repairs. The West has even
capitalised on this deficiency of skills and knowledge in the Third world countries and made
them a dumping ground for Western products and obsolete technologies. Moreover, across the
Third world states today, there is the presence of all the artifacts that make the West developed,
 54

but in all these states, it is either these artifacts are in short-supply, or substandard, or
dysfunctional. Thus, there are roads but they are full of potholes, there are schools but they are
ill-equipped, there are hospitals but they are not functional, there is electricity but it is epileptic.
All these indicate that importation of western technology does not translate to development. In
fact, it appears that the more the Third world states import western technology and culture, the
more underdeveloped they become.

2.4.2 Migration
New economics and household theory approaches by Stark (1991)
The economist Stark (1991) argued that, in the context of migration in and from the developing
world, migration decisions are often not made by isolated individuals, but usually by families or
households. NELM also highlights factors other than income maximization as influencing
migration decision-making. First, NELM sees migration as risk-sharing behaviour of families or
households. Such social groups may decide that one or more of their members should migrate,
not primarily to obtain higher wages, but to diversify income sources in order to spread and
minimize income risks (Stark & Levhari 1982), with the money remitted by migrants providing
income insurance for households of origin. Importantly, NELM sees migration as an investment
by families, who pool resources to enable the migration of one or more household member. For
instance, the addition of an extra source of income can make peasant households less vulnerable
to environmental hazards such as droughts and floods. This risk-spreading motive is a powerful
explanation for the occurrence of internal and international migration even in the absence of
wage differentials. This helps people to explain the continuation of large-scale rural-to-urban
migration in developing countries that has so frequently puzzled - and frustrated - policy makers.
Notwithstanding the frequently challenging conditions in cities, rural-to-urban migration allows
families to diversify their income besides improving their access to education, health care and
economic opportunities.

Second, NELM sees migration as a family or household investment strategy to provide resources
for investment in economic activities, such as the family farm or another small business. NELM
 55

examines households in the context of the imperfect credit (capital) and risk (insurance) markets
that prevail in most developing countries (Lucas & Stark 1985; Stark & Levhari 1982; Taylor
1999). Such markets are often not accessible for non-elite groups. In particular, through
remittances, households can overcome such market constraints by generating capital to invest in
economic activities and improve their welfare (Stark 1980). While international remittances
usually receive most attention, internal remittances are also an important source of livelihood
improvement (Housen et al. 2013).

Third, NELM argues that relative deprivation (or poverty), rather than absolute poverty, within
origin communities are important migration-motivating factors. While the extremely poor are
generally deprived of the capability to migrate over larger distances, the feeling of being less
well-off than other community members can be a powerful incentive to migrate in order to attain
a similar of higher socioeconomic status. This corroborates empirical evidence showing that
although international inequality can obviously motivate people to migrate, it has limited
explanatory power compared to the role of community-level income inequalities (Czaika & de
Haas 2012; de Haas et al. 2019a). This complements Piore's (1979) dual labour market theory,
which argued that migrants are often motivated to do jobs that seem underpaid and unattractive
to native workers (as long as the origin community remains their prime social reference group)
as such work allows them to make huge progress in comparison to what they could have earned
at home. With NELM, economists began to address questions of household composition
traditionally posed by anthropologists and sociologists (Lucas & Stark 1985). NELM has
therefore strong parallels with so-called 'livelihood approaches' that evolved from the late 1970s
among geographers, anthropologists and sociologists conducting micro-research in developing
countries. Questioning dependency theory, they observed that the poor cannot
be reduced to passive victims of global capitalist forces but exert human agency by trying
to actively improve their livelihoods despite the difficult conditions they live in (Lieten &
Nieuwenhuys 1989). This went along with the insight that - particularly in circumstances of
uncertainty and economic hardship - people organize their livelihoods not individually (as neo-
classical theories assume) but within wider social contexts. The household or family was often
seen as the most appropriate unit of analysis, and migration as one of the main strategies which
households employ to diversify and secure their livelihoods (McDowell & de Haan, 1997).
 56

Rather than a response to emergencies and crises or a 'desperate flight from misery', field studies
showed that migration is often a pro-active, deliberate decision to improve livelihoods and to
reduce fluctuations in rural family incomes by making them less dependent on climatic vagaries
and market shocks (de Haan et al. 2000; McDowell & de Haan 1997). This shows that migration
cannot be sufficiently explained by focusing on income differences alone. Factors such as social
insecurity, income risk and inequality, difficult access to credit, insurance and product markets
can also be important migration determinants. Household approaches seem particularly useful to
explain migration within and from developing countries and also of disadvantaged social groups
in wealthy countries, where the lack of socioeconomic security and the risk of falling into
absolute poverty increase the importance of mutual help and risk sharing within families.

Household models have been criticized because they can obscure intra-household inequalities
and conflicts of interest along the lines of gender, generation and age (de Haas & Fokkema
2010). It is thus important not to lose sight of intra-household power struggles, and the fact that
families may disagree about migration decisions. For instance, some migrants leave without
consent of knowledge of their family members. Instead of a move to help the family, migration
can also be an individual strategy for rebellious youngsters to escape from asphyxiating social
control, abuse and oppression within communities, wishing to cut ties with their families (de
Haas 2009). Conversely, male or female family members may feel forced to migrate as they are
socially pressured to assume the role of breadwinner although they may not aspire to leave
themselves, and suffer from the loneliness, separation and estrangement from loved ones that
migration often involves.

2.4.3.Migration Governance
Multiple streams theory by Kingdon (1984)
MST was developed by Kingdon (1984) in his landmark agendas, alternatives, and public
policies. This theory explains how issues reach the political agenda and how policy comes to
pass in terms migration governance. Kingdon (1984) described how issues acquire agenda status
and the basis on which policy alternatives are developed, and the theory focuses on how ideas fit
policy problems (as cited in Cairney & Joans, 2016). MST was developed from the garbage can
model, which describes the muddled reality of decision- making processes. Cohen, march, and
 57

Olsen (1972) postulated that a decision is an outcome of four major streams: the problem,
solution, participants, and choice-opportunities streams. Kingdon (1984) uses the same metaphor
to demonstrate how policymaking is shaped through the problem, policy-proposal, and politics
streams, which converge at specific times in manners that open the window of opportunity for
policy change to come about (Ackrill & Key, 2011). In essence, the problem stream contains
issues that gain policymakers’ attention; the politics stream expresses factors generating a
conducive environment in which to influence the agenda; and the policy stream represents the
proposed solutions and ideas to deal with the issue (Cairney & Joans, 2016). Policy
entrepreneurs and policy advocates play pivotal roles in agenda setting and the policymaking
process as policymakers who take advantage of opportunities to influence policy outcomes to
maximize their self-interest (Kingdon, 1995). In reality, the convergence of these three streams is
deliberate, and entails architecting of issues, symbolic politics, and salient tactics and emotions
(Eising, 2013). In addition, Kingdon pointed to the role of focusing events as crucial events that
push publics and elites to become aware of an issue’s importance. It is tantamount to exogenous
factors that open the window of opportunity.

Indeed, the multiple streams theory is a powerful tool to comprehend governance, policy
processes and analyze the policymaking process, particularly agenda setting (Knaggård, 2015;
Winkel & Leipold, 2016). Knaggård (2015) argued that utilizing the multiple streams theory
requires special attention to the dynamics of the problem stream to understand the role of
problem brokers to frame the problem. Moreover, the multiple streams theory explains the
agenda-setting process under ambiguous and complex conditions (Winkel and Leipold, 2016).
The multiple streams theory has been applied to different contexts and perspectives. For
instance, it has been utilized to understand health care policies, foreign policy, and
transportation, energy, and environmental policies (Weber, 2014; Travis & Zahariadis, 2002;
Brunner, 2008; Carter & Jacobs, 2014; storch & winkel, 2013). The multiple streams theory has
been applied at the national and local levels to ensure better understanding of public
policymaking with an emphasis on agenda setting (Sabtier, 2007). However, debate exists
between those who believe that MST is universal and that its components are valid to apply in
any state and at any time and it to be of value when addressing universal issue (Cairney & Jones,
2016) and others who consider MST to have a universality issue, as Kingdon examined health
 58

policies and transportation policies in the united states during the postwar period. In essence,
Ackrill and Key (2011) employed MST to understand European union policymaking and
asserted that it is essential to decontextualize the theory in order to adjust for the variations
between American and European union legislation. The increasing number of studies employing
the MST demonstrate its universality (Howlett, Mcconnell, & Perl, 2014; Jones et al., 2016;
Sanjurjo, 2020).

2.4.4. Theoretical Framework

New economics and household theory approaches by Stark (1991) served as theory that anchored
the study variables (migration, migration governance, and national development) because the
theory argued that, in the context of migration in and from the developing world, migration
decisions are often not made by isolated individuals, but usually by families or households.
NELM also highlights factors other than income maximization as influencing migration,
governance, decision-making, and development. NELM sees migration as risk-sharing behaviour
of families or households. Such social groups may decide that one or more of their members
should migrate, not primarily to obtain higher wages, but to diversify income sources in order to
spread development and minimize income risks with the money remitted by migrants providing
income insurance for households of origin, and also contribute to national development (Stark &
Levhari 1982). Importantly, NELM sees migration as an investment by families, who pool
resources to enable the migration of one or more household member. This risk-spreading motive
is a powerful explanation for the occurrence of internal and international migration even in the
absence of wage differentials. This helps people to explain the continuation of large-scale rural-
to-urban migration in developing countries that has so frequently puzzled-and frustrated-policy
makers. Notwithstanding the frequently challenging conditions in cities, rural-to-urban migration
allows families to diversify their income and improve the development of the nation through
education, health care and economic opportunities. Since international remittances usually
receive most attention, internal remittances are also an important source of livelihood and
national development (Housen et al. 2013). This shows that migration cannot be sufficiently
explained by focusing on income differences alone, but also by governance which helps to
reduce unpleasant factors that affect national development such as social insecurity, income risk
and inequality, difficult access to credit, insurance and product markets can also be important
 59

migration determinants. Household approaches seem particularly useful to explain migration,

migration governance, and national development within and from developing countries.

2.5 Empirical Review

2.5.1 Migration and National Development
Sanlitturk, Zagheni, Dańko, and Akbaritabar (2023) explored global patterns of migration of
scholars with economic development. They leverage metadata on over 36 million journal articles
and reviews indexed by Scopus in order to estimate migration of scholars based on information
on changes in their institutional affiliations over time. They also produce a database of yearly
international migration flows of scholars, for all countries from 1998 to 2017. Further, they use
the open-access database to provide descriptive evidence on the relationship between economic
development and the emigration propensity of scholars. Statistical analysis using generalized
additive mixed models revealed that emigration rates initially decrease as GDP per capita
increases. Then, starting from around 25,000 dollars (2017 constant international dollars at
purchasing power parity), the trend reverses and emigration propensity increases as countries get
richer.

Faruk, and Abdullahi (2022) examined net migration and economic growth nexus: empirical
evidence from Nigeria, using time series secondary data spanning the period of 1970 to 2017,
applying the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) Bounds testing approach. The results of
the cointegration test shows that, there is a long run cointegrating relationship between net
migration and economic growth alongside other control variables. Specifically, the findings of
the study revealed a negative significant long run relationship between net migration and
economic growth.

Yaw-Atiglo et al. (2022) examined rural out-migration from Ghana’s development zones and
household food security, Migration and Development. Using data from the nationally
representative Ghana Living Standards Survey (Round 7), Yaw-Atiglo et al. (2022) employed
multinomial logit functions to examined the food security status of migrants relative to their non-
migrant counterparts in their rural origins across Ghana’s three development zones i.e. Coastal,
Middle Belt and Northern. The results showed that compared to their respective non-migrants,
 60

whereas rural out-migrants from the Coastal and Middle Belt development zones to urban areas
were significantly more likely to be severely food insecure, rural out-migrants from the Northern
Development Zone were less likely to be food insecure. Increase in household size and decrease
in household expenditure were both associated with an increased likelihood of being food
insecure across all development zones.

Bang, Mitra, and Wunnava (2022) investigated the impact of migration, and remittances on
poverty and inequality in Nigeria. Bang, et al. (2022) using methodology of instrumental variable
quantile regression (IVQR) explicitly demonstrated the differential marginal impact of
remittances for households at different levels of the conditional expenditure distribution. In
tracing the heterogeneous impact, Bang, et al. (2022) addressed the effect of remittances on
poverty and inequality simultaneously in one econometric model. The study results based on the
Nigerian Migration Household Survey 2009 showed that remittances reduce poverty by
increasing household expenditures revealed a positive marginal impact of remittances at all but
the highest quantiles of the conditional distribution of household expenditure, with the impact
being the greatest up to the 12 th quantile. While the unambiguously supports the poverty
alleviation role of remittances documented in the literature, the distributional impact is more
nuanced: The marginal effect of remittances follows a U-shape over most of the household
expenditure distribution, which suggests that remittances may ‘hollow out’ the middle class.
Specifically, households lying between the 13th to the 35th quantile gain less from receiving
remittances than households on either side of this range.

Eshetu, and Beshir (2022) examined the determinants of the level of remittance from urban
migrants to their families in rural areas using a sample of 665 rural-urban migrants and Tobit
regression in Southern Ethiopia. Descriptive results revealed that most of rural-urban migrants
were unmarried, better educated, and young. For instance, 84 percent of rural-urban migrants
were unmarried, while 68 percent of rural-urban migrants aged between 15 and 25 years. The
education level of 74 percent of rural-urban migrants was found between 5 and 10 years of
schooling. The mean income, saving, and remittance of female migrants were lower than their
male counterparts. Regression results of Tobit model indicated that age, gender, education level,
frequency of visits, income, and saving of migrants positively and significantly related with the
 61

level of remittance from migrants. But family size of migrant-sending household and the
intension to return back negatively and significantly related with the level of remittance.
Provision of better education in origin areas and better-paying jobs in receiving areas would lead
to higher remittance from migrants.

Duru (2021) examined the leading causes and consequences of international migration in
Nigeria. A survey research design was utilized for the study. The data was collected through a
structured questionnaire. The opinions of 100 respondents selected through the purposive
sampling technique were obtained on the principal causes and consequences of international
migration in Nigeria. The findings revealed that the principal causes of international migration in
Nigeria were job opportunities, unemployment, wealth prospects, safety and security, better
conditions of service, low salaries and higher standards of living. These foremost causes of
international migration in Nigeria were mostly economic factors. Furthermore, the findings
showed that the foremost positive and negative effects of international migration in Nigeria were
integrated development, increase in remittances, cheap and surplus labour, urban services and
social infrastructure under stress, stricter immigration norms, multi-ethnic society and increased
tolerance, Xenophobia, close gaps in skills and cultural dilution.

Amare et al. (2021) determined the implications of urban growth on youth migration decisions in
Nigeria. They use night light intensity data combined with Living Standards Measurement
Study-Integrated Surveys on Agriculture data, as an indicator of urban growth and associated
economic opportunities. Employing alternative econometric approaches that exploit the spatial
and temporal differences in urban growth as proxied by night light intensity, they found that
urban growth in potential migrant destinations encourages youth migration. Amare et al. (2021)
also found heterogeneous responses to urban growth among various groups of youth as well as
varying responses to different types of migration. Broadly, women and those youths with more
education were more likely to migrate, while those in households with livestock were less likely
to migrate.

Schewel, and Asmamaw (2021) examined the impact of Ethiopia’s historical development on the
nature, volume, and direction of internal and international migration. They described three
 62

important trends associated with an emerging ‘mobility transition’: the sedentarization of

nomadic and semi-nomadic populations; the urbanization of internal migration trajectories; and
the diversification of international migration. Within these overarching trends, we discuss
periods of political conflict, resettlement, and famine that led to significant internal and
international displacement. They also then explored the drivers of these mobility shifts,
evaluating the relative influence of various political, economic, cultural, and technological
developments on migration patterns over time. The study analyses distinguish between the deep
drivers of an emerging mobility transition (e.g. nation-state formation, rising educational
attainment, infrastructure development, and industrialization) and the drivers of displacement
(e.g. political conflict or resettlement programs) that can suddenly affect the movements of large
population segments.

Sanderson and Kentor (2020) assessed the migration-development nexus from a new, relational
perspective, providing a closer test of existing theories of cross-national dynamics, including
migration and development. Using bilateral data, they also assess the relationship between
migration (im)balances and wage differentials between pairs of countries in the Americas, from
1970 to 2010. The analysis revealed a positive feedback between international migration and
cross-national inequalities. Migration responds strongly to wage gaps, which motivate more uni-
directional, or imbalanced migration flows in country-pairs. The relationship was particularly
strong in contiguous countries. Similarly, wage gaps respond to migration imbalances, which
increase per capita income differences in country-pairs, although the effect of migration on wage
differentials was smaller than the effect of wage differentials on migration.

2.5.2. Migration Governance and National Development

Wilson, and Anoruo, (2022) examined e-governance and socio-economic development of Imo
state, Nigeria within the period of 2015-2021. Basically, the objectives of the study are to
examine the effects of e-governance on socio economic development of Imo State; and to
examine the challenges of e-governance in socio economic development of Imo State. The study
used both primary and secondary data to achieve its objectives.  Technological determinism
theory was used as the theoretical framework of analysis to explain the role of technology in
 63

actualizing effective administrative system in Imo State. The study findings proved that e-
governance has effects on socio economic development of Imo State on such areas as enhancing
easy and faster communication between government and the citizens, promoting fiscal policies,
transparency and accountability, easy access to government information and policies, effective
service delivery, etc. Other findings are bureaucratic challenges, inadequate power supply in
different parts of Imo State, technological imbalance between the urban and rural areas,
insufficient trained ICT personnel, unwillingness on part of the government personnel to learn
ICT, among others as the challenges facing e-governance in socio economic development of Imo
State.

Ahmed, Marcelline, and Mouhamadou-Nazirou (2021) tested whether the governance has a
positive impact on the structural change in SSA or not. For the cause, we used the six indexes of
the Institutional Quality namely Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law, Control of Corruption,
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Regulatory Quality, Voice of
Accountability to see their impact on the structural change in SSA. We use 46 SSA countries
from worldwide governance indicator of World Bank from 1996 to 2016 in a Generalized
Method of Moment and Generalized Least Square regressions. The results show that only the
Government Effectiveness is positively affecting the value added (proxy of structural change) of
three sectors (agriculture, industry and service) of the SSA economies. Some affect positively
one sector and negatively another sector, while the rest were insignificant for one sector and
negative for other as example.

Nikzad (2021) investigated the relationship between a country’s economic performance and
governance indicators in 1996-2019. Economic performance indicators include GDP per capita
and GDP. Governance indicators are adopted from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance
Indicators. The paper showed that while most governance indicators have a positive and
statistically significant impact on economic growth, their importance varies with the income
level of the country. As such, improvements in different aspects of governance become more
effective for economic growth as countries move through different stages of economic
development.
 64

Audi, and Salisu (2021) examined democracy, good governance and development in Nigeria: a
survey of Karu Local Area. Social contract theory was used as theoretical framework. The study
adopted survey research method; data was collected from the primary and secondary sources.
The study reveals that Democracy has enhanced good governance and development for the
people in Keffi Local Government. Karu Local Government council to some extent has provided
the people of Karu Local Government Area with social amenities like roads, pipe born water,
functional hospital, schools and others essential service for the citizens.

Adegboyega, and Arikewuyo (2020) examined the impact of governance quality on economic
development in Nigeria. The study used the Autoregressive Distribution Lag (ARDL) method of
analysis and granger causality test on secondary data collected from World Bank data base and
CBN statistical bulletin between 1982 and 2019. The results from the analysis showed that even
though all the variables do not have significant impact on GR, CC and FDI_GDP exhibit a
positive relationship with the GR while MC_GDP, RQ and VOA have negative relationship with
GR. Also, the approximate ECM coefficient of -0.89 indicates that any deviation from the long-
term equilibrium between variables was corrected by about 89% each year. Consequently, the
study concluded that successful good governance mechanisms depend on good legal framework
which was the bedrock for entrenching good governance measures in any country.

Ologundudu, and Olanipeku (2019) study empirically examined the mutual link between
Corporate Governance, Entrepreneurship and Economic development in Nigeria using primary
data by employing structure questionnaires to obtain information from the respondents in
selected banks in Ogun State as a population representative. In this research questionnaire were
analyzed and interpreted using simple percentage table for tabular analysis and Spearman’s Rank
Correlation Coefficient for the testing of the formulated hypotheses to enhance robustness of the
result. It was proved in the study that good corporate governance determines the success of an
organization. In the analysis, corporate governance policy has really helped Nigerian
entrepreneur to grow financially. In addition, it was also discovered from the study that corporate
governance was seen as a panacea for Entrepreneurship Development in Nigeria.
 65

Amoateng, Osei, Ofori, and Gyabaa (2017) examined the impact of corporate governance
practices on the performance of SMEs in Ghana. Both descriptive and correlational research
design were employed for the study. Convenience sampling technique was used to select one
hundred (100) SMEs from two regions in Ghana. The study utilised the annual reports of the
SMEs from 2012 to 2016 financial years. Net profit margin (NPM) and return on assets (ROA)
were used as proxies for performance and Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression model was
used to estimate the level of impact of corporate governance on the performance of SMEs in
Ghana. The study found empirical evidence to support the view that the board size (BS) has a
negative impact on NPM, though insignificant. In addition, the evidence obtained indicate that
board gender (BG) and management ownership (MO), all have positive impact on NPM. The
evidence also showed that role difference for CEO and board chairman (DR) has a negative and
positive impact on both ROA and ROE. Similarly, the results showed that board size (BS) has an
insignificant negative impact on ROA. Additionally, it was ascertained that board gender (BG)
and management ownership (MO) have positive impact on ROA, though the level of impact of
board gender (BG) and management ownership (MO) are statistically insignificant. The results
further provide evidence that the control variables: firm age (Fage) and industry of the firms
(FInd) have a significant positive impact on both NPM and ROA. Generally, the evidence
obtained show that corporate governance has positive but insignificant impact on performance of
SMEs.

2.6. Summary of Literature Reviewed

The variables of the study were appropriately. Conceptually, factors of the study migration,
migration governance, and national development were defined, types, processes, and
consequences were detailed and explained. Theoretically, three theories were reviewed one for
each of the variable. For national development Modernisation Theory by Smelser (1964) was
reviewed the theory sees development from the prism of western civilisation. It also believes that
the politics of developing areas” argued that development is the evolution of a political system
through series of stages, from a traditional state to modernity characterised by equality, cultural
secularisation and structural differentiation. On the hand, New economics and household
migration theory approaches by Stark (1991) argued that, in the context of migration in and from
the developing world, migration decisions are often not made by isolated individuals, but usually
 66

by families or households. NELM also highlights factors other than income maximization as
influencing migration decision-making. However, multiple streams migration governance theory
by Kingdon (1984) explains how issues reach the political agenda and how policy comes to pass
in terms migration governance. Kingdon (1984) described how issues acquire agenda status and
the basis on which policy alternatives are developed, and the theory focuses on how ideas fit
policy problems (Cairney & Joans, 2016). Empirically, studies were reviewed, from the studies
there were lacunas which this study tried to bridge because the studies were not able to connect
the factors of the study (migration, migration governance, and national development) together.
 67

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research Design

Research design is the plans and step by step strategies for executing research. These plans
include how sample for the study will be selected, how data will be collected and analyse. This
study utilizes the mixed design (phenomenological qualitative approach: which allows the study
to capture the participants experience and examine how it make sense or answer the research
questions) and Descriptive quantitative approach.

3. 2 Population of the Study

The participants for this study were Twenty (20) migration desk officers listed as the national

agencies involved in the formulation and implementation of the National migration policy 2015.
they comprise of the following: Federal Ministry of Education, Federal Ministry of
Finance ,Federal Ministry of Health, Federal Ministry of Information ,Federal Ministry of
Labour and Productivity ,Federal Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development, Federal
Ministry of Youth Development, Ministry of Foreign Affairs ,Ministry of Interior ,Central Bank
of Nigeria, National Agency for the Prohibition of Traffic in Persons and Other Related Matters,
National Bureau of Statistics ,National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally
Displaced Persons ,National Planning Commission ,National Population Commission, Nigeria
Immigration Service, Nigerian National Volunteer Service, Office of the National Security
Adviser and other relevant security agencies, Nigeria Employers’ Consultative Association,
Nigeria Labour Congress and Trade Union Congress. The migration desk officers were selected
because they are knowledgeable and have participated in the various national migration matters.
All the participants has worked as desk officers for an average of seven years

3.4 Sample and Sampling Technique

Purposive sampling technique was applied since the population used is a homogenous one (only
migration desk officers from each of the agencies).
 68

3.5 Instrument for Data Collection

The main instrument for data collection was questionnaire designed using Google forms. The
questionnaire was divided in three sections: See Appendix A. Section A was designed to gather
information about the participant’s characteristics. Section B utilized a three point scale 2= Yes,
1= not sure and 0= No to gather responses of respondents perception of the relationship between
migration, migration governance and national development. Section C is an open ended
questions on how migration, and migration governance has contributed to national development.

3.6 Method of Data Collection

The perception and opinions from the respondents were `captured by the study with the use of
questionnaire. The questionnaire was administered through on-line google form to the selected
desk officers of agencies that participate in the 2022 National migration dialogue.

3.7 Methods of Data Analyses

The on-line assisted data collection, was coded, grouped into frequencies, and arranged into
tables for ease of reference. Data from section B were analyzed using simple percentages. And
thematic analysis was used to analyse the section C.
 69

CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 RESULTS

The result of the responses of the 20 key informants to the questions in section B were used to
answer research question one and two. And the tree interview questions responses from section
C were used to answer questions three, four and five.

Table 1 :Key informants response to questions on the impact of migration and migration
governance on national development

S/no. Item Yes Not No

sure

1. Overall Migration has been contributing to National 20 =100%

development

2. Diaspora remittance is contributing to national 20=100%

development

3. Nigeria has benefited from Brain gain. 18=90% 2=10%

4. My agencies have coordinated migration activities 20=100%

that led to national development

5. Migration governance has increased Orderly, safe 16=80% 4=20%

and regular migration

6. Inter-agency cooperation has lead to improved 20=100%

migration governance and national development

4.1 Question one: Does migration impact national development?

Table1 the responses on items 1,2 and 3 show that the participants agreed that migration has
some impacts on national development. The participants reported an overall impact of migration
on national development to be 100%, diaspora remittance on national development 100%, and
brain gain 90%.
4.2 Question two : Can migration governance impact national development?
The participants responses in items 4, 5 and 6 show that they agreed that migration governance
has impact on national development. The participants reported that agencies have coordinated
migration activities that led to national development 100%, evidence that migration governance
 70

has increased orderly, safe and regular migration 80% and inter-agency cooperation has led to
improve migration governance and national development 100%

4.3 Question three: How does migration impact national development?

From the coding of the responses of the key informants to question 1 section C, the following
themes were generated.
a. Diaspora remittances
b. Bain gain from citizens who returned with new and improve expertise.
c. Reduction of level of poverty
d. Improved education through partnership and cooperation
e. Improved health care through partnership and cooperation
f. Promotion of international labour cooperation
g. Infrastructure development
h. Industry
One of the Respondents wrote: “ migration has opened a lot of opportunities for Nigeria, in all
sectors of national developments including health, education, agriculture and financial stability”
Another respondent wrote: “ …it is a fact the migration is contributing to our GDP, this is
expected to in turn improve other areas of national development”
Yet another respondent wrote: with migration and exchange of ideas from returned migrants
bring new ways of doing things to the table, also remittances from the diaspora help a lot in
poverty reduction.
Question Four: How does migration governance impact national development?
The coding of question 2 section C, the following themes were deducted from the respondents
a. Coordination of diaspora participation in national development.
b. Recognition of Nigerians in diaspora and through them gaining partnerships that lead to
development
c. Coordinating and sensitizing the people to ensure orderly, safe and regular migration.
d. Putting machineries that help to check trafficking, labour slavery and unlawful maltreatment
of Nigerians in diaspora.
One of the respondents wrote: “… our agency ensure fair treatment of Nigerian working in
various countries around the world”.
 71

Another respondent wrote: “ Nigerians in diaspora are doing well in various fields of works,
we try to identify with them and encourage them to cooperate and partner with developing our
country”
Yet another respondent wrote: “…orderly, safe and regular migration is essential to national
development, we ensure that people are sensitize on these vital notion”.

4.4. Question Five: What can be done to improve the relationship between migration and
national development
The coding of question 3 section C, the following themes were deducted from the respondents
a. Inter-agencies cooperation and sharing of information
b. Formulating and maintaining a feasible and flexible migration policies
c. Implementing the adopted international acts on human rights, and labour migration
d. Providing fund to drive advocacy and sensitization for orderly, safe and regular migration

One of the respondents wrote: “… agencies need fund to mobilize advocacy and sensitization
campaign against irregular migration in all forms”.
Another respondent wrote: “…there is need for fair and flexible migration policy to reduce the
frustrations faced by migrants”
Yet another respondent wrote: “… state and non-state actors in migration need to work
together and ensure implementation of existing policies and review weak policies”
 72

CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The study explored the impact of migration and migration governance on the overall national
development, whereby national development was conceptualized as an all-round and balanced
development of different aspects and facets of the nation viz. political, educational, security,
economic, social, cultural, scientific and material. The results of the analyses utilizing descriptive
quantitative for questions 1 and 2, and thematic qualitative approach for questions 3, 4 and 5
revealed that overall, migration and migration governance were believed to contribute
significantly to national development. These affirmative responses that migration and migration
governance have impacts on national development by key informants who have several years of
experience as migration desk officers in their various agencies were similar to what previous
studies in migration and national development found. Studies such as Amare et al., 2021; Bang
et al., 2022; Duru, 2021; Schewel & Asmamaw, 2021 found that migration is related to national
development. Similarly, studies in migration governance and nation development such as
Adegboyega & Arikewuyo, 2020; Amuateng et al., 2017; Audi & Salisu, 2021; Ologundudu &
Olanipeku, 2019; Nikzad, 2021 showed that good governance is related to national development.
These studies were duly reviewed in the chapter two.

The higher responses by the participants that migration and migration governance is related to
national development can also be explained by Stark (1991) new economics and household
theory which believe that decision to migrate is usually collective and purposeful. And the
purpose is usually to spread the possible source of income, assess better and stable opportunity
and improve standard of living. When remittance begin to flow in from migrants this purposes is
fulfilled. Such remittance contributes to micro and macro economy and has impact on the overall
national development. While this is true about migration and national development, the nature,
type and implementation of different policies also create an enabling environment for people to
migrate in orderly, safe and regular manner. Without which it may be impossible to migrate with
dignity and earn decently and send back remittances. In other words how much migration can
contribute to national development could be said to also depend on how strong are the
institutions that manage the migration processes in a country(migration governance).
 73

Questions 3 and 4 inquired on how migration and migration governance contribute to national
development. For migration the common themes are: Diaspora remittances, Bain gain from
citizens who returned with new and improve expertise, Reduction of level of poverty from the
supports of the diaspora, Improved education through investment, partnership and cooperation,
Improved health care through investment, partnership and cooperation, Promotion of
international labour cooperation, Infrastructure development and industries.

Similarly, migration governance structure through the various state and non-state actors has
equally contributed to national development through the following means: coordination of
diaspora participation in national development, recognition of Nigerians in diaspora and through
them gaining partnerships that lead to development, coordinating and sensitizing the people to
ensure orderly, safe and regular migration, putting machineries that help to check trafficking,
labour slavery and unlawful maltreatment of Nigerians in diaspora.

Question 5 explores what can be done to enhance the contributions of migration and migration
governance to national development and the following was deducted from the findings: Inter-
agencies cooperation and sharing of information, formulating and maintaining a feasible and
flexible migration policies, implementing the adopted international acts on human rights, and
labour migration, providing fund to drive advocacy and sensitization for orderly, safe and regular
migration.

5.1 Limitation of the study and suggestion for future studies

The study participants were only key informants working with some state agencies. There are
many other agencies both state and non-state actors in migration that were not considered.
Similarly, the are other source of information for migration and national development that was
not within the scope of this study such as the volume of remittance and index of national
development over time. Also, households can be interviewed to ascertain whether their members
in diaspora contribute to their development. While overall and key informant approach we
adopted in the present study, future studies can explore these other source of data.
 74

5.2 Implication of the Study

The study has both theoretical and practical implications. Theoretically, migration is believed to
be driven by society force to have an alternative and better means of supporting themselves as
portend in new economics and household theory (Stark,1991). Migration is toward places with
better opportunities to be rewarding and contribute to visible development (modernization
theory: Smelder,1964) and to be effective and rewarding must be done in orderly, safe and
regular manner( governance) as seen in multiple stream theory (Kingdon, 1984). The current
study brings to live the important of these theories in understanding how migration and migration
governance contribute to national development. Practically, the study suggested ways of enhance
processes of migration and migration governance to ensure that national development is
maximized. These includes feasible and flexible policies, inter-agencies cooperations, advocacy
and equitable implementation of existing migration policies.

5.3 Conclusion
The thesis of the present study was to assess whether migration and migration governance impact
national development. This is important giving that national development covers all sectors and
facets of the national well-being which in turn determine the well-being of the citizens of any
nation. Interestingly, and as expected, migration and migration governance were perceived to be
an important determinants of national development. Confirming the assertion that the era of
conceptualizing migration as a negative phenomenon has transited to migration as a driver of
human and overall national development (Adenike, 2021; Foresti & Hagen-Zanker, 2017).
 75

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