There is no copy right for these declassified reports and documents within the USA.

For Educational purpose use only.

Documents are accessible from the CIA web site, “Reading Room. However, there is no
Title to the documents other than the assigned numbers. One has to go through
hundreds, if not thousands of documents in order to find out the content of each
document.

Since I will be going through most of these documents for my research, I considered
that compiling some selected documents may be helpful for other researchers.
E.A
CONTENTS

Inner Antagonisms in the Leadership of the All-Russian Communist Party and Stalin’s new government.

Comments on the Change in Soviet Leadership – P17

THE SUCCESSION OF POWER IN THE USSR – P19

Further evidence on "Stalin’s” Role in current Party Indoctrination -P28

INDICATIONS THAT IN MID-JANUARY 1956 THE CPSU PRESIDIUM REACHED THE DECISION TO ATTACK
STALIN PUBLICLY – P61

INDICATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL VULNERABILITIES -P66

MALENKOV AND STALIN’S DEATH – P70

Soviet peace tactics and probable reactions in the non-Communist world to these tactics -P73

PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF DEATH OF STALIN -P75

MATERIALS FOR EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET SENSITIVITIES -P85

CRITICISMS AND QUESTIONS RAISED BY FOREIGN COMMUNISTS IN THE COURSE OF THE DE-
STALINIZATI0N CAMPAIGN – P137

SOVIET DESTRUCTION OF STALIN MYTH -P169

THE COURSE OF DESTALINIZATION IN SOVIET DOMESTIC PROPOGANDA – P178

New Information on Khrushchev’s Attack on Stalin at 20th CPSU Congress – P189

Foreign Policy Implications of Stalin's Death and the Doctors' Plot – P193

STALIN'S UNRULY GHOST – P208

Stalinism; Past and Present – P219

NEO-STALINISM IN THE SOVIET UNION – P227

Neo-Stalinism: Writing History and Making Policy -P247

Forthcoming Book: The Young Stalin by Edward Ellis Smith -P271

THE STALIN ISSUE AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE -P274

Stalin's Ghost in Contemporary Soviet Politics – P292

THE STALIN ISSUE AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE- P304

 COUNTh'i" USSR DATE DISTR. 18 August 1947.
SUBJECT Imler Antagonisms J.n t.'1e LeaderaM,p of the AJ.l�uso1miNQ, OF PAGES 15'
Communist Party and �'talintv mew ,Jover.nment.
NO. OF ENCLS.
25X1 (U..'\Tl£D BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO
25X1 . REPORT NO.

;:.!:;
THI• OOC\JM.:.N1 COl'ilTAINO· lNFORMATION APPICTINci fHS
HATIOf!;.). Cllf'l?NSI. Of' THS UM,YCO 01'ATGS 'IJJTHIN Tl·Ul
JICANfl!':'I 01' THC: RSPONAae ACT. !10 U,:,, c.• $1. ANO 31• .AG
AMRf.,;Oi::), IT4 TffAtctla.llSSIOH on TH� fllVILATION 01' IT(I
CONTll.fTtl 1 .. ANY MAt4Nl?R TO AN UNAUTHDRl%1:D PltA40H
10 Pft(:tfll&ltlO OY LAW, IT "AV NOT Ull Nt.PAOOUC•O IH
25X1
��v:11:Rt�:e�tt�':t:i�=���
WHOI.C. 0(- IN ll'ART. r.v OTHER TUA►t THI OTATI&. WAR. on
DI" fllnwlSISIOU 0,. THll Dtn&CTO"

I I
25X1
·1 0 During the laet .few.::nonths, Stalin h.33- efi'ecterl a. nWllber of .f'undamentq::. changes
both ii.:.' the structure and in the personal. c01I1position o! the most 1111pc:'.•;:aut g-ov­
e:rnmcmtaJ. in.s-liitut;iona of the USSR. Tlle meaning o:t -t,hese elumgos :l.L'J n:::i; ;yl'l'li
clear in detai1, but there ce.n no longer be any doubt as to the general line
they have t&ken, an ever greatei• concentration of power in the hands of stal:i.n--­
himelt is tGld.ng� e. buring ihe war he mil> al-ready, io all intents and pur­
h
poiea, a dlcta£or, w. , unlimited powers, but at that time this w.s comd.dered
as a temporar,y- atate of affairso It has now been made permanent.. fho i.lSSR hos
ncm- c::1terod upon a perlcd of personal. p:i.ctatorsh:l.p in form as well as :, "
practice.
.,' .. Tho meat 14.-po�·tant of the rec�r,t innovations ere:
(a) Ueaaures which lega1ly :u'i'i1n stalin•s position as to the top nlead.l:ll'"
(this title, borr017Gd from the !talo-Qerman FasciElt terminology, it? now .in
universal uee in oi'.fil":l.al Sov.Let literatui•e} 9 who stands high above al'l oliher
state functionaries, and in whose hands are concentrated the maJ.11 thre!A�s or
:itate, party, &.nd military governmen·t;.,

(b) The transformation of nlr:lost all the n:embers of the hig'- 1st organi�,.,.tion
of the ruling party., the :Politica.l Eurea.u of the Ctmtral Coimnittee of t>e All­
Russimi ColDIDWlist Pa,.-ty., men VihOse status ,w,w p1•svlously., i'orne.J.Jy at ;, . a.st,
equal to Sto.lin'a, into the l.s.tter¥s 11 aubatitutes A :ln vai·lous gove:rnme::·_u.
i'wwtions., in other woros, into Stalln 1fl intetlc,rs in the state hierar,:izy-.
(_,

(o) Th<? creation of a speciF..u. boc'W Vlhich hes charge of all the count:ryin mili­
tary af'fail"S - "The Ministry of the Armed Forces of tlle ussa11 - which �,.nducts
all '.1orlc connect�d m.th preparlng ·tha country !or a.r111C.-d conflict with outside
enemies. This ministry ie headed by 11aener·allsairno n s·talin himself', w� has
chosen ns hi::: aasiatants the meat brilliant milltary command1.,1r1:1 of t,he ;;ar.
The. word 11nafens011 ha.CJ bet:n c,;rdttod from the ne.me of the Miniat:ry, and comments
in the Soviet pres::i 1nake it clea.r that ·thio omtsaion is a ,deliberate pm�� and
poli'liioal in character: th:1 tasks of the new rn:lnistcy are Mt 0011£:1.ned �· pra-
ptiring the country merely fol' deferiseu

( d) The complete 11:ltera.tion of the structure of t,he OrganizationuJ. Burf'l!�_,.l o£

thB Coumunist Fart.y, that most iinportant body ...,hich dirE.-Cts rul the 1ri i· ir work
r of the party and diatrlbutea �he J>arliy .1'01.'Cea ( �ndres).; both in 1'01'2u IUld :Ln
fe.ct StaJ.in iti the head of this bureMUo

II II
SISCRET

11
CLASSIFICATION
I ST,\TE 0ISTAISUTI0N
WAR 1 I · 1
 :...:,___ __ l

Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP80-00810A006000360009-0

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains Information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18, u.s.c. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which In any manner to an unauthorized person Is prohibited by
25X1
SECRET

COUNTRY USSR REPORT ------ --------

�' - �
SUBJECT Comments on the Change in Soviet DATE DISTR.
Leadership
NO. OF PAGES 2 25X1
DATE OF INFO. REQUIREMENT NO. RD
REFERENCES

jThis is UNEVALUATED Information!

c.01111ri: EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

25X1
1. Even in Stalin's time there was collective leadership. The Western idea
of a dictator within the Communist setup is exaggerated. Misunderstandings on
that subject are caused by lack of comprehension of the real nature and organi­
zation of the Communist power structure. Stalin, although holding wide powers,
was merely the captain of a team and it seems obvious that Khrushchev will be
the new captain. However, it does not appear that any of the present leaders
will rise to the stature of Lenin and Stalin,so that it will be safer to
assume that developments in Moscow will be along the lines of what is called
collective leadership, unless Western. policies force the Soviets :to stream­
line their power organization. The present situation is the most favorable
from the poin:t of v:i.ew of upsetting the Communist dictatorship since the
death of Stalin�··
2. There wi'll not be a dramatic purge. Inasmuch as the MVD has already been
cleaned up and the Party and .the Army have not been in the hands of Malenkov's
favorites, there can be expect'ed only a normal replacement of officials in
the reorganization of the top-level administration of the Party and the Govern­
ment.

3. It is hard to draw any parallel between present events and those of the 1920 1 s
when Stalin was ascending to power. rrhere is now no organized opposition
inside the Party or in the Soviet Union in general. As the Communist rulers,
and evidently also the Soviet people, see it, there is a grave outside menace.
4. Since the death of Stalin and the blow which was given to the power of the
secret police, the Soviet internal situation has been in a state of flux.
The new Soviet setup needs time for consolidation. The struggle between
national-minded "Titoist" elements in the Soviet leadership and those who
think in terms of the more orthodox international line is still going on.

5. No improvement in the food situation can �e expected. The promises of Malenkov

to improve the poor material conditions of the masses were not kept. Inasmuch
SEC T
STATE X ARMY NAVY AIR FBI AEC
(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".)

][N]lr©�M#\u�©lNl
'------------�------------'�-...,.... ----· -v'R'>�"""---"-
' - ���©�¥
' ----------------,----
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/31 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002800120002-6

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

THE SUCCESSION OF POWER IN THE USSR

ORE9
13 January 1948

)-'"i�-

Copy No. (JI)

5 C

SECRET
_,.,..
�9t'.':l�9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/31 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002800120002-6
,..; , .,
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000200330007-6

T01 ALL PIEll) STA'l'Iors CONCER.Um 25X1A8a

P'ROMa 25X1A2d1
SUBJPm: Atto.ohed mmhange Paper, entitled "P'urthf.a9 Evidtm@•
on Stalin 9 s Jlol<, 111 Om-rent � Indoo1rl.m:t1on"
(E'-12)

lo Tha attached paper is thG eeoom and timl in the emu

begun 'With "Stalln° a Role in �t ·Par't.7 Indoctr:1m.tion and
. rteoruitmant• (E-ll) ..

2,, It ia s1.1ggeoted that, 1n tnnsmitting the paper it be

·pointed out to the reoipimt that we should. like-, rcic;!ve re­
fH'.G."t. on tbe loao.l situation insofar aa aignifioant cbt.ngee oon-­
cern1ng the patt«rn preaented can bo o'bae.'l"Vl4o

3o Such ohanpa should 1noludei

(a) disappearance ot Stalin•a writing rrom Partq

indootr1naM�J

(b) ·emergenoe of nGV Pa1"tJ' 1-tboolm;

(o) inorea.e!ng use of Stalln1 s vorks o

..

s■-

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g

INDICATIONS THAT IN MID-JANUARY 1956 THE CPSU PRESIDIUM

REACHED THE DECISION TO ATTACK STALIN PUBLICLY

1. A review of Pravda and Kommunist and spot checks of Izvestia

and the Cominform Journal between l October 1955 and the advent of
the CPSU 20th Congress (14 February 1956) reveals that all public
favorable mention of Stalin by Soviet Communists ceased as of
23 January. Prior to this date press treatment of Stalin still conformed
to the old party line established in July 1953, whereby Stalin was
pictured as the11great continuer of Lenin's cause". The halt in Soviet
references to Stalin three weeks before the opening of the 20th CPSU
Congress and approximately one month after Khrushchev and Bulganin
returned from their Asian tour indicates the CPSU Presidium :reached
at this juncture a decision on the subsequent overt attack on Stalin.

2. The pattern of positive references to Stalin prior to 23 January 1956

is evident in the following quotations, which include those from speeches
by leading Soviet Communists in November, December and January:

a. Kaganovich, who addressed the Moscow Party's city

organization at the 6 November celebration of the 38th
anniversary of the October Revolution, and who spoke
before an immense dual portrait of Lenin and Stalin,
made four references to Stalin in his speech:

the teachers of the working class, Marx-Engels­

11 • • •

Lenin-Stalin •.• 11

After his death, the Communist Party which had been

11

built by Lenin continued, under the leadership of his

faithful co-worker the great Stalin, to bring the Lenin
plan into actuality. 11

11
• • • the great ideas of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin... 11

We shall continue to walk the path to complete victory

11

under the banner of Marx-Engels -Lenin-Stalin. 11

b. Pospelov, who wrote a review of II The Decembrist Armed

Insurrection of 190511 for the 21 December edition of Pravda,
listed Stalin as one of "the powerful figures in the Party who
took part in the organization and direction of the armed
struggle11 in 1905.

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 51.;.4
HAR 1952 i.;

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CLASSIFICATION FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO. I._____.
INFORMATION FROM
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROADCASTS CD NO.

COUNTRY COMMUNIST CHINA DATE OF Mar. 9-15, 1953

INFORMATION
SUBJECT INDICATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL VULNERABILITIES
HOW DATE DIST. i �R.d 1'153
PUBLISHED
WHERE ILLEGIB
PUBLISHED NO. OF PAGES 4
DATE I
PUBLISHED
SUPP LEM EN1 TO
LANGUAGE RE,POR.T NO.
l'INI.
; 'o, THI UNI TEO ITATU, WITHIN THI MIANINO o, TITLE 11, UCTIONI .7,lf
;t.NO' 7U, Qr THI U,1, COOi, Al AMINHO, ITI TRANIMllll•ON· 0� �l�I• ,,HIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
; ,\.ATION o, ITI CCNTINTI TO 0� �ICll�T IV AN UNAUTHO�IZIO' �l"ldN l'I

SOURCE Monitored Broadcasts

CPW Report No. 6, -- COMMUNIST CHINA

(Mar, 9 - 1,, 19,3)

CLASSIFICATION FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

STATE
ARMY
 r ..
�anitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600150114-8

CLASSIFICATION
CENTRAL ��
c�
REPORT

CD NO. 50X1-HUM
·-
COUNTRY DATE OF
INFORMATION
SUBJECT Politie al - Foreign policy, Caminmist Part.� .Mar 1953
personalities
DATE DIST. b Apr 1953
50X1-HUM

NO. OF PAGES 2

SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

'1111 m<UM'INT CG.UJU ,1'1111,tJHAflQ,B an1cn•• ffl uno,J.A;. Da:Fl II ■

�, nu IIUIITIO IV"RI tnnn• fMI ■U.11H o, Uf'tOIIAH ..(?;1' to
■
1, 1. -t., Ii AJi� 11, U 11>•fllDHI. ITf TUlll �J.'�Jr.-1! 01 ,,_I IUIYIIJ,Ti-01!
Ot 1ft. CC)tHIUITI 1·l Hf ■l',H!Jlt N) ,U &:¢U.Wtllll'JIIIH Pit.ION A'f. f'RG•
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
HllltlD H UW. QfflCHCTIOW 'lit HI! PC"H ,II HfiltU!IJID.

50X1-HUM

MAJ'..EIU..OV AND STALill'8 DEATH

It ia posaibl:? that the advent to pave..- in the United Sta�s of the Repub­
lican Par.ty and the Eioenhower Administration, llDd the active efft)rts, connected
vith this, to organize the armed forces ot the US and the democn.tic countriP.B
r..ave :.i.ade the yo-;mger Kremlin rulers• (Malenkov, Berlya, Bulganin, et al..) decide
to attack the \lest before it bu time to prepare it■elf for defensl!!. Malenltov
and Derlya l!.noll" tbet-1.'l!e USSR, vith China IIJld the SateJ.11tee, baa at present a
military •�riority- avf!.r the US end the West vbich in armed cc:cnict llight gi.ve
the Kremlin a dec:l.ei•re victory (enable it. to seize Europe and .A..aia).

s�.a.lin, cautiOUD by nature, could ac!ll'Cely agre9 Vitb t)lis poim; of vlev;
. be avoiued the risk of a major var, for, aa a true Marxist-Leninist, he vu
convinced that the ��isting vorld situation WO'J.ld sooner or la�er les.d to llJl
econcaic crisis it. the capitalistic vorl.d, e11pecially in the US., and. finally to
a triumph of Cam111miB111 throughout the vorld. Stalin believed in t� inevit.abUity­
of the crisis and of the <lovnfall of capital.ism. He just developed Lenin'111
pr:..nriplP.b -- worked out methods to foster and intensity the .:risis of capital.i1m
Vi thout l"isking a major var "w'ith ii. Stalin respected � faared 03 econooic
power.

tbdoubtedly, Stalin knev of th� iucllnation U10ntl the young maben of the
Pol itburo to take advantase of tbe pre1ent unprepared state of the West IUld to
start e. var b<efo:re the organization of a European UW1J am
thl'I reato.-ation of
the military :;,c:,ver ot Wett Oe%111&DY and Japan. 'l'be 'f'cn:.Dg __,.n or the Pollt,buro
do net h&ve the Sll&UI fa.1"'.h 1n i:.he principles of lllarx1D-t.en1n1a. u djd Stalin
l'l.Dd the Lenin �•nerat1.on ot »ol.lhevib. Xa.lelilcoT, Beriya, Bulpnin, am the
o+.hers believ� that capita1ism has vithin itself the ponr to cb&Dge its fOl"IIIB

. l -

rnr_,
CLASSIFICATION

-�·�,,..::�L.,'"·�.,::J;:11/��2;��:,:i�::@tf· �•.·-.��:�=.::�����:::t.;;��.12.r::::���.:;�:_: :i;:·. .

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600150114-8
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.....-....
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_ ._,
f � Ril9Lsnt]
� Security lnformallon
¼1st 3 . �.

24 April 1953

MEMORANDtM FOR THE DEPUTY DmECTOR/CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

25Xl SUBJECT: Meeting of l ______,lconsultants

....
25Xl

1. Conf our rsation of this Mon, the

next meeting ofJthe j
; Consultants will be on
:
Wednesday and Thurs a:y, and 7. Most of our group
25Xl

2. On Wednesday we shall discuss the current Soviet

peace 11 tactics and probable reactions in the non-Connnunist
11
world to these tactics. As background, the Consultants
will have read the minutes of the last meeting, of which
a copy is attached,! I 25Xl

3. I hope very much that you can attend. We can

make arrangements for transportation and for a room at the
Inn. 25Xl

[v10RI/CDF F'aqes 2-'1 ·1]

-:_ONFiDEi�TiAl
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� ..,,,;

-�=
25X1

muJwmJLT/\NTS' · DISCUSSI<Jl Cl1 l.0-19 UARCH OF SE-39

COl·!IM1!E!IOES Oil 1!!E llE/ITII OF �AUK AIID OF
THE Eth'V'ATION OF WlLEI'lKOV 41'0 .LEADERSHIP DI fflE USSR"
(10 March 19SJ)

l.. The. discussion . focussed on 1he qUeetion of transfer ot power

in the USSR and, epocii'icaJ.li, on whether and with What dearee ot
risk the enortll)us. power concentrated :tn Stalin personally could be
transferred to a succesaor or suocessorso 'lhe majority ot the
consultants leaned to the View thm;. in the process or solving the
tZ"anster ·or powor .prot;ler;i, the Soviet s,stem would probably be
weakened. In this re"PGct, . the msJority doparted from the vin
which has gersrnlly · obtained in O/NE, that the trans.fer of poN8l"
would probably be aeoor.ipllshed vtithout weakening the continuity
and e.tfeat1venese ot the Soviot state.

2o Broadly speaking, two points of viow emarged from the

discussionr

ao The inajo:ri ty� with the degree of con.t'idonce varying

w1th individuals ., argued largely on tho basis ot
historical .analogy that the transfer of power might
ahake the Soviet systemo 'Ibey vie11ed the structure
or power in the USSR as intenselJr personal. 'lbey
said that Malenkov lacks the majeet7 of Stalin and
is surrounded by atlbi t1ous and fearM men who ., it
they cqw.d, would challenge flhat sppeers to be his
pre,.eminent posi tion11 These consul tnnts also believed
that a man such as Ualenkov, reared in. the shadow or
Stalin, m6Jy' have qualities and de.flciencies which
would make it difficult tor him to succeed to Stalin's
pomrD These c9nsulta1:1ts conceded, however. that
despite the dangers which they saw menacing the Soviet
system, the trnnsi'er or power mq nevertheless be
effected 111 thout damago to the ayutem.:i

bo The contrary vieW was based upon nn analysis of Soviet

society itself, and concluded thar. tb.ere was little or
no prospect that the transfer of power would shake or

.....,, __,,
R0040000 50088-9
Approved For Release 2006/09/�-RDP80B01676
 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02771R000200300001-3

•
MATERIALS FOR EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET SENSITl VI'l'IE::>
REVEALED BY THE 30 JUNE CPSU RESOLUTION
AND OTHER SOVIET STATEMENTS

•
July 1956

Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02771R000200300001-3

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A P P E N D I X

CRITICISMS AND QUESTIONS RAISED BY FOREIGN COMMUNISTS

IN THE COURSE OF THE DE-STALINIZATI0N CAMPAIGN

The material herein has been organized to cor­

respond generally with the organization fol­
lowed in the body of the paper, The preponder­
ance of American and Italian materials is ex­
plained by the fact that Communists in these
countries have raised the most penetrating ques­
tions. Extensive use has been made of quota­
tions from Pietro Nenni, the leader of the
Italian Socialist Party, which has been in close
alliance with CP Italy.

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 NSC BRIEFING

SOVIET DESTRUCTION OF STALIN MYTH

I. Clearest view of recent events in USSR comes from hard

look at known facts, and recent history.
A. Fact that, during three years since his death
(5 Mar'53) Stalin's position has been undergoing
gradual and calculated alterations.
1. Pattern consisted of playing Lenin up, Stalin
down: campaign was rolling by Jan '54 (Lenin's
30th anniversary), when Stalin was described as
0
continuator of Lenin s cause n , rather than
independent genius of equal stature. I
2. By time of second anniversary Stalin's death
(5 Mar '55), day went by almost unmarked.
B. Thus, Stalin myth already well-whittled even before
Feb '56 Party Congress. Nonetheless, this occasion-­
first meeting of Party rank-and-file since Stalin's
death--was first when really major, although oblique,
blows were publicly stnuck at remnant of myth.
1. \��ij@Ut a11!'1111i:l!1 iiaJ:1aa.:iu9s1.iMiiS ·, Khrushchev �t,,.u,;,&
mat;le §PY1�1iiPti- bQi�.iFw,_;fl•rt..-ele ''restoration
of the norms of Party life elaborated by Lenin,
which have previously been often violated."

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��'¢lit;>
 - -
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8 February 1957
I.HE Cill/JlliE._01!' DF,i�r.INIZATIQli
.., .
.lli_SOVIET DO!�TIC PROPAGANDA THROIJGE JUN]_l: 1956

I. Introduction

Th_e Problem for Soviet Propagan9.s.

Stalin! Always we iieaz· in our souls his dear name. And here
in the Kremlin, his presence touches us at every step. Vie
walk on stones which he may have trod only quite recently.
Let us fall on our knees and kiss those holy footprints.
from THE RUSSIAN LAND, published
by the Komsornol in 1946.
Thousands of workers :::-epresenting generations of Soviet people
are marching past; their life flons under the sign of love and
gratitude to Stalin, Stalin--the beginning and end of our life.
from Radio J{;oscow 's account of
the celebration of tt.e 35th Octo­
ber Revolution anniversary, 7 No­
vember 1952.
The public defamation of Stalin launched at the XX Soviet Party Congress
in February 1956, setting off a chain of repercussions that continue to
threaten the cohesion of the Soviet Bloc, confronted Soviet propagan­
dists with a challenge of extraordinary magnitude. The propaganda appa­
ratus, which since 1929 had been using its full resources to promote
the adulation of Stalin, had now to direct its efforts toward minimiz­
ing the dangers and reducing the liabilities inherent in the process
of destroying the infallible idol it had itself helped to create.
For 25 years, the peoples of the Soviet world and mernber-s of fol'eign
Communist parties had been taught to bow to Stalin as "the greatest
genius of mankind" and to accept all his dictates 11ithout question.
By the time of Stalin's death, his image had been firmly established
in the pr-opaganda as that of an all-wise, all-knowing genius whose
knmvledge was supreme in almost every conceivable field, from politics,
history, philosophy and science to folk-singing and stocl,breeding. He
was hailed as the inspirer of all the successes of the Soviet Union and
the international Communist movement, including the winning of World
War II.
Three years after his death, Soviet propagandists were called upon by
Stalin's heirs to tear down this overpowering image. That they have
not been altogether successful is manifest in the recent events in the
Satellites and is attested by signs of "re-Stalinization" in the Soviet
world.
Cautious Deflation 0£ Stal�n•s Image After His neath
Following Stalin's death, a decision to deflate his image to some de·•
gree was reflected in the propaganda's deemphasis of the Stalin cult
and grea�er attention to Lenin. . But there was no evident pl'Opi:iganda
prel?aration for the open attack on Stalin at the XX Congress, no indi­
cation in the propaganda that a step-by-step process of denigrating

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SECRET
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

BRIEFS ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

1957

- II -

New Information on Khrushchev ts

Attack on Stalin at 20th CPSU

Congress

11 March 1957
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...
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This DQcwnent contains information atrectinc the Na­
tional Defense of the Unite<J State,, within the mean­
inc of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, u

INFORMATION REPORT
amended. Ita tn.nmilulon or revelation of ita con tenta
to or receipt by an unauthorized peraon Is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form ls prohibited.

-----------...::::====::_______________
SEGJ:?"'1E;£.......,..A =====------....l 25X1
25X1 L
COUNTRY USSR REPORT NO. 25X1A
SUBJECT Foreign Policy Implications of DATE DISTR. 18 June 1953
25X1 Stalin's Death and the Doctors'
Plot NO. OF PAGES 2
25X1

REQUIREMENT

I I REFERENCES

-
;- ,

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS _IN 1HIS lt901tT ARE DEFINITIVE.'

2 5X1 THE A.Pl'lt.AISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

(FOlt «.EY SEE REVERSE)

I I
25X1X·
1. The new regime that was set up after Stalin's death has been formed by two strong
men ., G.M. Malenkov and L.P. Beriya ., who have been bound by a long friendship and
complicity. This regime has come into power by a real coup d 1 eta� and has
destroyed the Stalin structure of government and t,he',9omin.imist Party organization
which had been e�leoted at the 19th Party Congree1 according to the dictatorial
"'.tahes of Stalin. It is doubtful that Mal.enkov 1 s real position V1as as strong as
was indicated by the fact that he had been proclaimed the hE"lr :-i Stalfo by the
international. press and even by Stalin himself. It is highly probable that
Stalin, irritated by and suspicious of the clamor for an heir apparent, had
selehped,.Jiueako¥tilel!ely to guiet the clamor and to. wait for further developments
when other provisions .could be m&de. In any case ., if the composition of the
Presidium of the Central Committee of the CommW1ist Party had been favorable to
Malenkov and Beriya ., there would have been no need to reduce it to approximately
a third (36 in the original, now cut to 14) in such a. drastic and sudden manner.
It was probably' ·� ;· done because Malenkov and Beriya f'el t that the Presidium could
not be trusted. The same argument can be applied to the reduction of federal
ministries by about 50 percent.
2. It has been rumored;th�t, in his last few days., Stalin had been extreme+y nervous .,
almost as though he felt death to be near. He may have had an intuition that
the noted doctors were incorrectly treating him deliberately on specific orders.,
and after their arrest. he forced them ., with approprfate, methods ., to confess to
being nzionist agents and spies". He then capitalized on the event to accuse the
United States of being connected with the plot and adopted the Tsarist trick of
employing anti-Semitism to gain the sympathy of the people. It•is certain that
the seeking of Arab_ s_upport was se,condary.
I
3. In the light of ,.rec�nt. events ., however ., the possibility cannot be excluded that
Stalin may have designed the doctors' arrests as a step against Malenkov and

SE CRETJ
I
STATE E� X I ARMY I I
X NAVY I I
X AIR X I FBI I AEC
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. _903-s

50X1-HUM
STALIN'S UNRULY GHOST

I
some forms of Stalinism* have regained ground in the
USSR since early 1965. Such gains are noticeable in the cultural,
political, economic, and military spheres, as well as in the distinctly
less unfavorable press treatment of Stalin and his era. Evidence of a
trend towards reviving Stalinism, as well as of opposition against this
trend, is discussed below and is given in greater detail in the attached
survey.

Whereas the consistency of the evidence is convincing that there has

been a step back towards Stalinism by the power establishment, it is dif­
ficult to measure the extent of such a reversion. Similarly, there is
evidence of determined resistance to Stalinism by a broad range of intel­
lectuals but it s strength cannot be easily measured, Nor can opular re-
.
actions be gau,q;ed. But it is not the purpose I
fto strike 50X1-HUM
_

the balance between the forces for and against Stalinism. Rather, it is
to provide the background of an issue that now plagues the leaders of the
USSR** , and is expected to continue to cast a long shadow over the future
of the Soviet society.

*We call STALINISM the degenerated form of the "dictatorship of the prole­
tariat" wherein the power of the class, or of the party, is replaced by
one-man rule and wherein the other dignitaries of party and government,
even in the top echelon, are reduced to mere yes-men and tools of the dic­
tator. The decision-making processes that result from the whims of one­
man rule are incompatible with the original teachings of Marx and Lenin
and are devastating not simply in the expenditure of human life but, even
more important for the whole society, politically and historically.

**Neither Brezhnev nor Kosygin has made a meaningful statement of policy

concerning Stalinism; however, as will be pointed out, there is clear evi­
dence that Brezhnev at least has considered Stalinism to be a major prob­
lem.

SEC RET
n Cont . )
50X1-HUM

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li.Ue,uo u .L;;,vv

Stalinism*; Past and Present

Stalin's reign of 30 years left deep imprints on Soviet society:

his influence and the self-serving interests of the CPSU bureaucracy have
resisted subsequent efforts to eradicate the effects of his policies and
personality. These efforts, usually termed de-Stalinization**, have been
sporadic. Right after Stalin's death the Malenkov regime adopted policies
which differed radically from Stalin's. Khrushchev, in bidding for and
rising to power in 1954 and 1955, urged and then reinstated some of
Stalin's policies (e.g., the clear-cut primacy of heavy industry). During
most of his 9 ½ year reign however, Khrushchev's policies led the USSR away
from Stalinism -- a development ,dramatized by his denigration of Stalin at
the 20th Party Congress in 1956 and his removal of Stalin's body from its
resting place next to Lenin's in the Kremlin mausoleum during the 22nd
Party Congress in 1961.

When Brezhnev and Kosygin assumed power in October 196� they at first
paid less attention to Stalinism than to Khrushchev's "subjectivism." Begin­
ning around the first of March 1965, however, evidence has pointed to a
shift away from de-Stalinization and towards policies which smack of a
Stalinist flavor.

In the realm of literature, the most forceful reminder of Stalinism

is seen in the Sinyavsky-Daniel Case. The sudden move of the KGB to arrest
the authors in September 1965, their 5-months' detention incommunicado be­
fore the trial, the patently rigged trial in February 1966, the harsh sen­
tences of 7 years at hard iabor for Sinyavsky and 5 years at hard labor for
Daniel, and the tenuousness of the charges -- producing anti-Soviet propa­
ganda -- all conjured up a grim image of Stalin's ways.

*To some, Stalinism is equated with unprincipled political methods, mass

starvation of peasants, blood baths, ruthless dictatorship, police re­
pressions, concentration camps, and thought control. Observers of con­
temporary Soviet society, when speaking of Stalinism, usually refer to
such subjects as cultural and political orthodoxy, the degree of central­
ized planning and operation of the economy, and priority to the military
in allocations of scarce goods.
**Khrushchev deemed elimination of the deadening effects of Stalin's
methods and psychological climate necessary for. the institution of pro­
gressive changes in the Soviet society. According to Robert.Conquest,
such de-Stalinization could mean the beginning of the end of Soviet com­
munism.

(Cont.)

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 25X1A2G
Approved For Release 2005/08/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030013-2
November 1968

..
NEO-STALINISM IN THE SOVIET UNION

" the serious violations by Stalin of

Lenin's precepts, abuse of power, mass repres­
sions against honorable Soviet people, and other
activities in the period of the personality
cult make it impossible to leave the bier with
his body in the mausoleum of V. I. Lenin."

N.S. Khrushchev at Twenty­

second Party Congress,
October 1961

** ***
Double or triple the guard
beside his grave,
So that he will not rise again,
and with him -- the past •..
We carried him away --
threw him out of the mausoleum,
But how shall we remove Stalin
from within Stalin's heirs? •..
True, there are those who hurl abuse
at Stalin from the platform,
Who secretly at night
ponder their former glory...
They were the former pillars:
with no liking for empty slave camps,
Or halls jammed with people
where poets recite their verses...
As long as the heirs of Stalin
remain on this earth,
I shall feel Stalin is still there
in the mausoleum.

From "Stalin's Heirs," by Yevgeny Yevtushenko.

The term "Stalinism" has come to signify many things -- the arbitrary
rule of a nation by a despot, the rigid control of a nation's economy,
the collectivization of agriculture, the massive displacements of minority
groups, the purge trials, forced labor camps, manic secretiveness, a mas­
sive secret police system, and, pervading everything, a reign of terror,
The word can legitimately be stretched to fit the entire gamut of develop­
ments in the Soviet Union from the late 2O's until Stalin's death in 1953,
during most of which time Stalin literally was responsible for every major
action.

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Secret

"

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Report
Neo-Stalinism: Writing History and Making Policy

Secret
No. 1845/69
27 August 1969

40

. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/29:.CIA-RDP03-02194R000200690001-7

 13 September 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT Forthcoming Book: The Young Stalin

by Edward Ellis Smith

1. Thia memorandum is for �nformation only and is in response

to your request for an evaluation of a fol'thcoming book entitled The
Young Stalin by Edward Ellb Smith (New York: Farrar. Stz-auaT
Giroux, 1967).

Z ley proof• of The Youn& Stalin have been reviewed by

STA of the DDI/Special lleeeareh Staff; hi• review i• attached.
ce,-:__-_-_-_-��-- - - _--_7finda this book to contain a very eubstantiai
J..
I i......,,n,,......,.,,:""l"'.an
==-===-
STA reaearch effort. Unfortunately,
-=- -
it appears that Mr. Smith's conclusions
are frequently awkward and are not always borne out by the facts he
pr•••nta. A great part of the book is devoted to the role of Stalin as a
probable Okhrana aaent. Much of the reaearch for The Yowy Stalin
was done in Okhraua t!lea rec�ntly opened to ac:holara at the Hoover
Library at Stanford Univeraity •• well ae other Ru••ian materials in
its collections.

Walter Pforaheimer
Curator
Hietorical Intelligence Collection

Attachment
Review

Distribution:

I
Orig & 1 - Addressee w/att.

� = �i�:��r.....------- 1:."i-.
l -DDI
l"' Asst. to Dir. (Goodwin) w/att.
,l • DDP w/att.
7

S"TIAT
I
1 :,; _ {------
Approv!i��:Jw2eastos,2ec e1,e,..ROJi
�ffi'r�Roliidiioo3ol),i� __; )
)
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SECRET
25X1

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Report

THE STALIN ISSUE AND

THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE
25X1

SECRET

5 July 1968
RSS No. 0030

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½�0
25X1
.
.

G
Ccnml�"fp,q,
I

.....,.,.DC.20S()S

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
20 December 1985

Stalin's Ghost in Contemporary Soviet Politics

Su■■ ary

After thirty years. the assess ■ ent of Joseph Stalin's

historical role re ■ains a controversial and highly charged
political issue. The Soviet leadership atte ■pts to ■anipulate
the Stalin ■yth to pro■ote regi■ e legiti■ acy--steering clear of
■
any endorse ent of the •negative• aspects of his rule--while
elites use the Stalin sy■bol to pro■ ote or oppose policies
associated with his na■e. Like his i■■ediate predecessors.
Gorbachev has adopted a differentiated approach toward the Stalin
issue. He has publicly praised Stalin's warti■e role and the
highly centralized and disciplined Stalinist econo■ic syste■• but
he has resisted any larger rehabilitation of the dictator. So■ e
straws in the wind suggest that Gorbachev ■ay favor a li■ited
relaxation of Stalinist strictures on cultural life and on intra­
party policy discussions vhil• iontinuing to tighten the screws
on overt dissidents.i- � -
-�� 25X1

This memorandum was prepared bye___��- - - the Office of 25X1

Soviet Analysis. Comments and questions may �be directed to the
author I or the Chief. Domestic Policy Division. on 25X1
\ 25X1

SOVA M 85-10221X
25X1

25X1

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 - -- "-

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<....,..;r--1 '-'-'r·1--� , , --

25X1
SEe'.ltEI

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Report
ANNEX:
•'
THE STALIN ISSUE AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ST RUGGLE
25X1

RSS No. 0030A/68

17 July 1968

25X1
SECRE'f

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