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    Gilli Netassessment 2021

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    scaraggi.nicola

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    of 5

    NATO Defense College

    Net assessment: "competition is for losers"


    Author(s): Andrea Gilli
    NATO Defense College (2021)
    Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep32322
    Accessed: 05-02-2024 13:59 +00:00

    JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
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    this content.

    This content downloaded from 37.161.68.61 on Mon, 05 Feb 2024 13:59:29 +00:00
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    NDC Policy Brief
    No.09 - May 2021

    Research Division – NATO Defense College

    Net assessment: "competition is for losers" *


    Andrea Gilli **

    U nder the guidance of the Secretary General


    Jens Stoltenberg, in 2020 NATO embarked
    RQ D UHÁHFWLRQ SURFHVV DLPHG DW HTXLSSLQJ
    the Alliance for the challenges of 2030.1&RPSRVHG
    RI  VHYHUDO SDUWV DFWRUV DQG SKDVHV WKH SURFHVV XO-
    term. This Policy BriefSURYLGHVDVKRUWLQWURGXFWLRQWR
    WKHWRSLFZKDWLVQHWDVVHVVPHQWKRZDQGZK\KDV
    it emerged, how reliable is it and how could NATO
    use it?

    timately aims to make NATO more relevant in the Net assessment: a short summary
    \HDUV DKHDG ZKHQ WHFKQRORJLFDO GLVUXSWLRQ FOLPDWH
    FKDQJH FRPSHWLWLRQ DPRQJ *UHDW 3RZHUV DQG YLR- 1HW DVVHVVPHQW LV D FRQFHSWXDO DSSURDFK WR XQGHU-
    OHQWQRQVWDWHDFWRUVZLOOSRVHQHZDQGPDMRUWKUHDWV standing the critical features characterizing long-term
    ,GHDV SURSRVDOV DQG UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV DUH FRPLQJ FRPSHWLWLYH UHODWLRQV DPRQJ VWUDWHJLF DFWRUV :KLOH
    in from within and from outside the Alliance. Inter- intelligence is about obtaining information about the
    estingly, among the recommendations, several voices adversary, and strategy
    KDYHFDOOHGIRU1$72WRH[SDQGLWVQHWDVVHVVPHQW concerns the formula-
    FDSDELOLWLHV2 For most observers, even in the security WLRQRI SODQVWRDFKLHYH Keywords
    and defence world, net assessment is an esoteric word. goals, net assessment NATO 2030
    While many may have heard of Andrew Marshall and LV FORVHU WR SUHVXUJHU\
    Net Assessment
    WKH86'HSDUWPHQWRI 'HIHQVH·V2IÀFHRI 1HW$V- DQG SRVWVXUJHU\ FRP-
    VHVVPHQWPRVWZRXOGSUREDEO\VWUXJJOHWRGHÀQHWKH SDUDWLYH UDGLRORJ\ LW Strategy
    DLPV DW FRPSDULQJ WKH Innovation
    balance of forces be-
    *
    The subtitle of this Policy BriefGUDZVIURP37KLHO´&RPSHWLWLRQLVIRU
    ORVHUVLI \RXZDQWWRFUHDWHDQGFDSWXUHODVWLQJYDOXHORRNWREXLOGDPR- tween two actors and
    QRSRO\µWall Street Journal6HSWHPEHU WKXVZKLOHKLJKOLJKWLQJGLIIHUHQFHVLWLGHQWLÀHVSRV-
    This Policy BriefLVEDVHGRQD0DUFK1'&5HVHDUFK'LYLVLRQ·VZRUN- VLEOH DV\PPHWULHV LQ UHVSHFWLYH VWUHQJWKV DQG ZHDN-
    VKRSRQNet Assessment: Knowledge, Experience and Implications for NATO. The
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    nesses.3
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    'LHJR5XL]3DOPHU1LQD6LORYH-HII 0F.LWULFN+RZDUG%RG\DQG5X-
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    WKXVDFWRUVH[SORLWWKHLURZQVWUHQJWKVDQGWKHLUDG-
    XVHQHWDVVHVVPHQWLVSUHVHQWHGLQWKHVLVWHUNDC Policy Brief by Niccolò YHUVDULHV·ZHDNQHVVHVWRDFKLHYHJRDOV%HIRUH:RUOG
    3HWUHOOL´1$726WUDWHJ\DQG1HW$VVHVVPHQWµ1R0D\ War I, Wilhelmine Germany tried to build a naval
    **
    Senior Researcher, Research Division, NATO Defense College. ÁHHWFDSDEOHRI KROGLQJ*UHDW%ULWDLQ·VQDYDOSRZHUDW
    1 T. Tardy, “‘NATO 2030. United for a new era·: a Digest”, Policy Brief, ED\+RZHYHUGXULQJWKHFRXUVHRI WKHZDU*HUPDQ
    No.23, December 2020. submarines were able to make the difference because
     7.RVWHUDQG,%DU]DVKND´5HYLWDOL]H1$72·V*UDQG6WUDWHJ\FRO- WKH\H[SORLWHG8.·VNH\YXOQHUDELOLW\LWVGHSHQGHQFH
    OHFWLYHVWUDWHJLFDQDO\VLVLVWKHSDWKZD\WRDPRUHLQFOXVLYHWUDQVSDUHQW
    DQGV\VWHPDWLFSURFHVVIRUFUHDWLQJ1$72·VQH[WVWUDWHJLFFRQFHSWµLQ&
    Skaluba (ed.), NATO 20/2020: twenty bold ideas to reimagine the Alliance after
    the 2020 US Election:DVKLQJWRQ'&$WODQWLF&RXQFLOSS   6 3 5RVHQ ´7KH LPSDFW RI  WKH RIÀFH RI  QHW DVVHVVPHQW RQ WKH
    1$72XQLWHGIRUDQHZHUD$QDO\VLVDQGUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVRI WKH5HÁHFWLRQ American military in the matter of the revolution in military affairs”, Jour-
    Group appointed by the NATO Secretary General1RYHPEHUS nal of Strategic Studies9RO1RSS

    This content downloaded from 37.161.68.61 on Mon, 05 Feb 2024 13:59:29 +00:00
    All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
    2 NDC Policy Brief – No. 09 – May 2021

    on seaborne trade. thanks to a US civil servant and eclectic strategist, An-


    Second, assessing the relative strengths and weak- GUHZ:0DUVKDOOZKRIURPWRKHDGHGWKH
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    ent or available. For in- VWKHHFRQRPLFVHWEDFNVRI WKH6RYLHW8QLRQ
    Net assessment is a VWDQFHLQWKH*XOI  IRUKDYLQJDQWLFLSDWHGWKHUHYROXWLRQDU\SRWHQWLDORI 
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    the critical features in the world, but as ev- revolution in military affairs), and for having foreseen
    characterizing long-term idence later showed, its the rise of China even before the end of the Cold
    level of training was War.
    competitive relations QRW RQ D SDU ZLWK WKDW +RZHYHU RQH FDQQRW XQGHUVWDQG QHW DVVHVVPHQW
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    ative analysis is necessary because only through com- ing Western and NATO countries.:KHQWKH2IÀFH
    SDULVRQFDQQHWDV\PPHWULHVEHLGHQWLÀHG RI  1HW $VVHVVPHQW ZDV FUHDWHG LQ WKH 86 LQ 
    Third, in highlighting asymmetries, the analysis in- WKHLUDWWHPSWVDWJHQHUDWLQJDQDO\WLFDOIUDPHZRUNVIRU
    KHUHQWO\ H[SRVHV SRWHQWLDO ULVNV DQG RSSRUWXQLWLHV VWUDWHJLFDQDO\VLVPHWZLWKPDMRUGLIÀFXOWLHVDQGHYHQ
    vulnerabilities vis-à-vis an adversary and vice-versa. WRWDOIDLOXUHV7KH86H[SHULHQFHZLWKV\VWHPVDQDO\VLV
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    SRZHU²LVDORJLFDOFRQVHTXHQFHZKLFKSROLF\PDN- became goals in the strategy itself, thus leading to a
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    strategies, when successful, would leave the adversary Similarly, the emerging strategies, when
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    have to change course in order to address its weak- and international rela- the adversary basically
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    its own course of action, with no chance of strategic contributions of limited other side would either
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    GHWHFWVPDMRUDV\PPHWULHVLQIXHOVWRFNVDQGDFFHVV XWLOLW\ ZKRVH PDLQ SRO- have to change course
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    “red” ZLOO VSHQG DOO LWV HIIRUWV WR SURFXUH WKLV LQSXW defeat.11 But Andrew give up its strategic
    RULWZLOOÀQGLWVHOI RXWRI JDVLQWKHPLGGOHRI WKH Marshall was not inter- goals, or follow its own
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    he wanted to win. To use
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    thing”7 ti, “winning is the only
    thing that matters”, thus Marshall turned to the liter-
    1HWDVVHVVPHQWJDLQHGSURPLQHQFHLQWKH86ODUJHO\ DWXUH RQ VWUDWHJLFPDQDJHPHQW DQG LQ SDUWLFXODU WKH

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    World War Royal Navy”, Security Studies9RO1RSS WDQNGX3HQWDJRQHµPolitique étrangère,1RSS
      6 ' %LGGOH ´9LFWRU\ PLVXQGHUVWRRG ZKDW WKH *XOI  :DU WHOOV XV  +6WUDFKDQThe direction of war: contemporary strategy in historical perspec-
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    All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
    NDC Policy Brief – No. 09 – May 2021
    3

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    HQWUHSUHQHXUV PXVW ORRN IRU D SRVLWLRQ RI  VWUHQJWK LWZDVOHVVZHOOHTXLSSHGWRIDFH
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    ODQJXDJHWKLVLVFDOOHG´FRPSHWLWLYHDGYDQWDJHµ0DU- view held that the Soviet Union had amassed enor-
    VKDOODGDSWHG3RUWHU·VZRUNWRWKHUHDOPRI VWUDWHJ\ PRXVPLOLWDU\SRZHURQWKH(DVWHUQÁDQNZKLOH86
    by assessing relative forces, and identifying asymme- SURFXUHPHQW ZDV ZDVWLQJ PRQH\ RQ ´JROGSODWLQJµ
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    assessment was thus the necessary analytical effort to RU RSHUDWLRQDO YDOXH Porter’s work to the
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    HG D GLIIHUHQW SLFWXUH assessing relative
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    strategies” which would
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    WULDOSURGXFWLRQWKH\EHFRPH*UHDW3RZHUV7KLVLQ- trained, and its under-
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    identical, but net assessment aims at highlighting their Soviet Union struggled to stay on course in broader
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    ferent X-ray scans to identify divergencies. Since it is
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    DVVHVVPHQWDQDO\VHVKDYHJHQHUDOO\HLWKHUDJHRJUDSK- Like a start-up... to NATO
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      - 0 (SVWHLQ Measuring military power: the Soviet air threat to Europe,
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    13 N. Monteiro, Theory of unipolar politics, Cambridge, Cambridge Uni- 3DOPHU
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    This content downloaded from 37.161.68.61 on Mon, 05 Feb 2024 13:59:29 +00:00
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    4 NDC Policy Brief – No. 09 – May 2021

    LWORRNVPRUHVLPLODUWRDVWDUWXSWKDQDWUDGLWLRQDO Why net assessment is still relevant


    think tank, let alone a defence establishment. As a re-
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    dence and resist micromanagement. This also means goals.20 Strategic thinking elaborated in absolute, rath-
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