ODI

Report Part Title: Understanding development power

Report Title: Crafting development power

Report Subtitle: Evolving European approaches in an age of polycrisis
Report Author(s): Yunnan Chen, Raphaëlle Faure and Nilima Gulrajani
Published by: ODI (2023)
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep51669.9

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

ODI is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to this content.

This content downloaded from 52.74.166.170 on Sat, 21 Oct 2023 12:57:32 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
6 ODI Report
2 Understanding development power
In 2011, the United Kingdom’s Secretary of State
for International Development Andrew Mitchell
made a striking comparision between US and
UK engagements in global development: ‘Just
as the Americans are a military superpower,
we are a development superpower – we are in
the lead’ (Brown, 2011).The term ‘development
superpower’ resonated in a former Great Power
like the UK which was looking for alternative
sources of influence to substitute for the
coercive powers of empire it once possessed.
0LWFKHOOUHWXUQHGWRJRYHUQPHQWWRWDNHXSWKH
UROHRI0LQLVWHURI6WDWHIRU'HYHORSPHQWDQG
$IULFDLQWKH8.)RUHLJQ&RPPRQZHDOWKDQG
'HYHORSPHQW2IILFH )&'2 LQ2FWREHU$
GHFDGHRQIURPKLVLQLWLDOUHPDUN0LWFKHOOLVQRZ
FRPPLWWHGWRUHEXLOGLQJWKH8.DVDGHYHORSPHQW
superpower.%XWZKDWH[DFWO\LVDGHYHORSPHQW
SRZHU":KDWDUHLWVEDVLFHOHPHQWVLQDZRUOG
where an aid war chest is but one (diminished)
aspect of the political armoury of the nation
0RUJHQWKDX "$QGKRZLVLWH[SHFWHG
to generate effects that raise national status
DQGLQIOXHQFH",WVHHPVDQHZPRGHORXWOLQLQJ
the relationship between a wider range of
GHYHORSPHQWLQVWUXPHQWVDQGQDWLRQDOSRZHULV
UHTXLUHG7KLVVHFWLRQDLPVWRRIIHURQH
2.1 What is development power?
3RZHUDVSLUDWLRQVDQGFRQWHVWDWLRQVKDYHDOZD\V
LQWHUVHFWHGZLWKWKHSUDFWLFHRIGHYHORSPHQW
6LQFHWKHHQGRIWKH&ROG:DUKRZHYHUJOREDO
GHYHORSPHQWSROLF\KDVODUJHO\VRXJKWWRGLYRUFH
 ZZZGHYH[FRPQHZVPLWFKHOOXNPXVWUHVWUXFWXUHIFGRWRUHJDLQDLGVXSHUSRZHUVWDWXV
This content downloaded from 52.74.166.170 on Sat, 21 Oct 2023 12:57:32 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
LWVHOIIURPWKHH[SOLFLWSXUVXLWRISRZHUHYHQLI
KLJKLQFRPHFRXQWULHVSURYLGLQJDLGWRORZHU
LQFRPHRQHVLVXQGRXEWHGO\DQH[SUHVVLRQRIVWDWH
status and influence.
7KHODQJXDJHRISRZHUGRHVQRWDOZD\VVLWHDV\
ZLWKJOREDOGHYHORSPHQWSUDFWLWLRQHUVZKRDUH
more comfortable trading in the nobler goals of
IUHHGRPVXVWDLQDELOLW\DQGHTXLW\7KLVLVEHFDXVH
WKLVYRFDEXODU\WHQGVWRUHGXFHGHYHORSPHQW
WRDVWUDWHJLFDSSDUDWXVLQWHQGHGWRZLQŒKHDUWV
DQGPLQGVœ 3DPPHQW=LHOLāVND DQG
WKDWSUHVVHVLWVHOILQWRWKHGLUHFWVHUYLFHRISXEOLF
GLSORPDF\DQGJHRVWUDWHJ\<HWWKLVGLVFRPIRUW
needs to be grappled with, both to temper and
FLUFXPVFULEHGHYHORSPHQWSRZHUœVSRWHQWLDOKDUP
DQGWRLQFHQWLYLVHLWVFDSDFLW\WRGRJRRG
 )RUHLJQDLGIRUGRPHVWLFLQIOXHQFH
$LGTXDQWLW\LVDFRPPRQLQGLFDWRUWRDVVHVVWKH
stock of national power and global presence in
PDQ\FRPSRVLWHLQGLFHVZLWK2'$DQDWWULEXWH
of state diplomatic or international economic
strength that sits alongside military prowess
RUFXOWXUDOGRPLQDQFH )LJXUH But foreign
aid is also a platform from which national
influence can be created, allies courted and
agendas diffused. History has shown aid
to be a valuable instrument for advancing
diplomatic and economic interests.7KXVWKH
SRVWZDUUHFRQVWUXFWLRQRI(XURSHXQGHUWKH
86OHG0DUVKDOO3ODQGRXEOHGDVDQ$PHULFDQ
H[SRUWSURPRWLRQVWUDWHJ\E\DWWHPSWLQJWR
UHYLYHJOREDOWUDGHIORZVZKLOHDOVRSURYLGLQJD
democratic bulwark against a growing communist
7 ODI Report

WKUHDW 0RUJHQWKDX(LFKHQJUHHQ  7KHUHLVQRVXUSULVHWKHQWKDWLGHQWLW\DVa

0RUHUHFHQWO\FRXQWULHVLQWKH*OREDO6RXWKKDYH
EHHQSURYLGLQJDVVLVWDQFHWRVLJQDOWKHLUJURZLQJ
economic maturity and capacity to support and
VSRQVRUORZLQFRPHFRXQWULHV *XOUDMDQLDQG
6ZLVV 7KLVVLJQDOLVIHOWHYHQZKHQ
such financing is small and built around singular
WHFKQLFDODVVLVWDQFHSURMHFWV
In international relations, aid is one of the most
frequently cited tools for increasing influence
RYHUVHDV7KHUHLVKRZHYHUDWHQGHQF\IRUWKLV
capacity for influence to be taken as read, without
H[SORULQJLWVH[WHQWQDWXUHDQGRULJLQV /DQJDQ
LQ2OLYL«DQG2œ6KHD :KHUHVXFK
H[SORUDWLRQH[LVWVLWVLWVPDLQO\DVDTXDOLWDWLYH
GLVFXUVLYHDQDO\VLVRIKRZDLGFDQEHXVHGWR
H[HUWSRZHUUHJLRQDOO\DQGJOREDOO\7KHUHDUH
only a handful studies empirically assessing
WKHTXDQWLWDWLYHUREXVWQHVVRIWKHDVVRFLDWLRQ
EHWZHHQDLGJLYLQJDQGSRZHU %R[ 7KHVH
VWXGLHVDGRSWWKHSHUVSHFWLYHRIDVLQJOHSURYLGHU
nation, most often significant global powers like
&KLQDDQGWKH86 'LHWULFK0DKPXGDQG:LQWHUV
(LFKHQDXHU)XFKVDQG%UXHFNQHU
&XVWHUHWDO:HOOQHUHWDO 0LGGOH
SRZHUVIRUWKHPRVWSDUWUHPDLQXQGHUVWXGLHG
7RROVRIGHYHORSPHQWFRRSHUDWLRQEH\RQGDLG
UHPDLQODUJHO\XQGHUVWXGLHGDVYHKLFOHVRISRZHU
ZLWKWKHH[FHSWLRQRIVRPHVWXGLHVRI&KLQDWKDW
cast an eye on the ways both concessional and
QRQFRQFHVVLRQDOSXEOLFILQDQFHDUHPDUVKDOOHGWR
FUDIWQDWLRQDOLQIOXHQFHPRVWQRWDEO\LQ$IULFD
development ‘superpower’ has long been
associated with the size of a country’s ODA
commitments.7KH2'$JURVVQDWLRQDO
LQFRPH *1, WDUJHWLVDQLPSRUWDQWEHQFKPDUN
for donor commitment to, and effort for,
GHYHORSPHQWHYHQLILWKDVQHYHUEHHQIRUPDOO\
UDWLILHGDVDJOREDOREMHFWLYH &OHPHQVDQG0RVV
 /HDJXHWDEOHVUDQNLQJFRXQWULHVE\WKLV
informal target remain a source of competition
DPRQJWKHGRQRUFRPPXQLW\RIWKH*OREDO1RUWK
VXFKWKDWDGRZQZDUGPRYHPHQWLVRIWHQYLHZHG
as a signal of deteriorating global standing, or
ŒPLQQRZKRRGœDPRQJ'HYHORSPHQW$VVLVWDQFH
&RPPLWWHH '$& PHPEHUV 'LVVDQD\DNH
 7KLVLVHYHQDVRWKHUSROLFLHV HJWUDGH
migration, technology) and financial flows (e.g.
QRQFRQFHVVLRQDOGHEWHTXLW\LQYHVWPHQW
UHPLWWDQFHV LPSLQJHRQWKHWUDMHFWRU\RID
ORZLQFRPHFRXQWU\œVQDWLRQDOGHYHORSPHQW
prospects.
$V2'$SURYLGHUVGUDZRQDZLGHUVHWRIIORZV
policies and assets, it seems inaccurate to
UHIHUHQFHWKHLUGHYHORSPHQWSRZHURQO\LQ
terms of the quantity of their aid spend alone.
7KLVPD\KDYHEHHQDSSURSULDWHIRUWKHPDMRULW\
RIWKHSRVWZDUHUDZKHUHVWDWHWRVWDWHDLG
SURYLGHGVWDWXVDQGLQIOXHQFHEXWLWVHHPVULJLGO\
XQLGLPHQVLRQDOLQDZRUOGZKHUHGHYHORSPHQW
SRZHUHVSHFLDOO\DPRQJDJURZLQJVHWRI0,&V
draws from multiple sources, which likely
LQFOXGHVEXWDOPRVWFHUWDLQO\H[WHQGVEH\RQG
2'$FRPPLWPHQWV2XUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKH
UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQGHYHORSPHQWFRRSHUDWLRQ
and national power needs updating.

 )RUDJRRGRYHUYLHZRIVHYHUDOSLHFHVLQWKLVYHLQVHH2OLYL«DQG3HUH]  
 )RUPRVWRIWKLVKLVWRU\WKH86KDVRFFXSLHGDSROHSRVLWLRQDVDQDLGVXSHUSRZHUKDYLQJLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVHG
DQGGLŽXVHGWKHFRQFHSWRIDLGDQGSRVVHVVHGWKHODUJHVWDLGEXGJHWLQDEVROXWHWHUPV VWLOOWKHFDVHWRGD\WKRXJK
WKH86GRHVQRWPHHWWKH2'$*1,WDUJHW 

This content downloaded from 52.74.166.170 on Sat, 21 Oct 2023 12:57:32 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
8 ODI Report

Box 1 Empirical approaches to the study of aid and power

There are two principal empirical approaches used to explore the relationship between aid and
national power. One approach examines the ways aid cultivates public opinion within
recipient countries, for example through branding aid-provided goods and services. The logic
tests whether aid can generate positive public attitudes and win the ‘hearts and minds’ of citizens
in the aid-receiving country (Custer et al; 2015, 2018, 2021; Dietrich, Mahmud and Winters, 2018).
Results suggest that the provision of aid does foster positive perceptions among foreign publics
and improve donor reputational legitimacy.5 A recent contribution by Blair, Marty and Roessler
 H[WHQGVWKLVUHVHDUFKE\ORRNLQJDWWKHHŽHFWVRIDLGRQFLWL]HQSHUFHSWLRQVLQFRXQWULHV
where both China and the US are donors. They conclude that when these geopolitical rivals
GHOLYHUDLGWRWKHVDPHFRXQWU\DWWKHVDPHWLPHWKLVGHFUHDVHVDƀQLLWLHVIRU&KLQDDQGLQFUHDVHV
DƀQLWLHVIRUWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV&KLQHVHLQIUDVWUXFWXUHSURMHFWVKDYHDQHWQHJDWLYHHŽHFWRQ
SHUFHSWLRQVRI&KLQDDQGDQHWSRVLWLYHHŽHFWRQSHUFHSWLRQVRIWKH866 Aid does seem to be a
ZD\WRFXOWLYDWHSXEOLFDWWLWXGHVDQGQDWLRQDOLPDJHRYHUVHDVDQGHQKDQFHLQWHUQDWLRQDOLQſXHQFH
strengthening persuasive, moral and agenda-setting powers.

A second approach focuses on the relationship between aid and measurable increases
in power, for example testing whether US aid induces recipient governments to vote with
the donor country in the United Nations General Assembly (Dreher, Nunnenkamp and Thiele,
 RUZKHWKHUFRXQWULHVFDQHŽHFWLYHO\ŒEX\œDWHPSRUDU\VHDWRQWKH816HFXULW\&RXQFLO
(Reinsberg, 2019). Studies here largely conclude that aid can acquire votes in the General Assembly
and the Security Council. Beyond this econometric work, several qualitative studies have shown
KRZ&KLQHVHVWDWHGLUHFWHGžQDQFLQJIRVWHUVLQWHUSHUVRQDOVRFLDOERQGVDPRQJHOLWHVWRFUHDWH
perceptions of a new ‘China-centric’ world order, develop economic ties, and advance national
interests (Custer et al., 2021; Kassenova, 2022).

 )RUH[DPSOHDPXOWLQDWLRQDOVXUYH\HVWDEOLVKHGWKDW3(3)$5VXEVWDQWLDOO\LPSURYHGSHUFHSWLRQVRIWKH86LQ
UHFLSLHQWFRXQWULHV *ROGVPLWK+RULXFKLDQG:RRG 
 :KLOHWKHDXWKRUVFDQQRWFRQFUHWHO\H[SODLQWKHVHUHVXOWVWKH\K\SRWKHVLVHWKDW&KLQHVHDLGLVQRWWUDQVODWLQJ
LQWRDƀQLW\IRU&KLQDEHFDXVHRISHUFHSWLRQVRIVXEVWDQGDUGSURMHFWDQGSURGXFWTXDOLW\UHOLDQFHRQXQGHPRFUDWLF
OHDGHUVWKHEHKDYLRXURI&KLQHVHFLWL]HQVOLYLQJLQWKHUHVSRQGHQWœVFRXQWU\DQGDORVVRIORFDOMREVDQGEXVLQHVVHVGXH
WR&KLQHVHFRPSHWLWLRQ %ODLU0DUW\DQG5RHVVOHU 

This content downloaded from 52.74.166.170 on Sat, 21 Oct 2023 12:57:32 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
9 ODI Report

Table 1 Composite power indices using ODA to rank countries’ stock of power or global presence

Source Dimensions ODA indicator Rationale for ODA ODA weight

as proxy for

Asia Power /RZ\,QVWLWXWH  (FRQRPLF (FRQRPLF *OREDODQGUHJLRQDO RI

Index7 FDSDELOLW\   relationships 2'$DVPHDVXUHRI RYHUDOOLQGH[
(FRQRPLF economic diplomacy weight
UHODWLRQVKLSV  
0LOLWDU\FDSDELOLW\
 5HVLOLHQFH  
'HIHQFHQHWZRUNV  
)XWXUHUHVRXUFHV  
&XOWXUDOLQſXHQFH  
'LSORPDWLFLQſXHQFH

Soft Power 3RUWODQG  (QWHUSULVH   (QJDJHPHQW 0HDVXUHRIDFRXQWU\œV 8QNQRZQ

Index8 &RPPXQLFDWLRQV &XOWXUH  'LJLWDO VXELQGH[ foreign policy
 *RYHUQPHQW resources,
 (QJDJHPHQW   global diplomatic
(GXFDWLRQ IRRWSULQWDQGRYHUDOO
contribution to the
international
FRPPXQLW\(VVHQWLDOO\
it captures
the ability of
states to engage
with international
DXGLHQFHVGULYH
collaboration, and
ultimately shape global
outcomes

Global 5HDO,QVWLWXWH(O  (FRQRPLF Soft presence 2'$DVDPHDVXUH RIWRWDO

Presence &DQR SUHVHQFH  0LOLWDU\ RIGHYHORSPHQW LQGH[ZHLJKW
Index SUHVHQFH  6RIW cooperation
SUHVHQFH  6FDOLQJ
factors

 KWWSVSRZHUORZ\LQVWLWXWHRUJ
 KWWSVVRIWSRZHUFRP

This content downloaded from 52.74.166.170 on Sat, 21 Oct 2023 12:57:32 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
10 ODI Report

Source Dimensions ODA indicator Rationale for ODA ODA weight

as proxy for

Audit of Henry Jackson  1DWLRQDOEDVH   1DWLRQDO $ODUJH2'$EXGJHW RIWRWDO

Geopolitical Society 1DWLRQDOVWUXFWXUH   instruments RYHUDVXVWDLQHG LQGH[ZHLJKW
Capability 1DWLRQDOLQVWUXPHQWV (diplomatic SHULRG žYH\HDUV 
 1DWLRQDOUHVROYH OHYHUDJH  indicates a
KLJKOHYHORIHFRQRPLF
GHYHORSPHQW
and an ability to
shape the goals of
international
GHYHORSPHQWZLWK
potential
SRVLWLYHIHHGEDFNIRU
JOREDOLQſXHQFHDQG
reputation

 7KHIRXUFDSDELOLWLHVRISRZHU Power over othersFDQEHH[HUFLVHGDVDcoercive

IR literature suggests that power can produce
effects in two main ways. First, power over others
FDQLQFHQWLYLVHRWKHUVWRGRVRPHWKLQJWKH\
ZRXOGQRWRWKHUZLVHGR 'DKO )RU'DKO
this required an immediate and tangible causal
FRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHVXEMHFWDQGREMHFWRI
SRZHU$VHFRQGGLPHQVLRQRISRZHUUHODWHVWR
the ability to influence the decisions of others.
7KLVLVWKHŒpower toœSHUVXDGHDFWRUVUHGXFH
SROLF\FRQIOLFWVLQIOXHQFHYDOXHVDQGSUDFWLFHVDQG
ILQDOLVHGHFLVLRQV %DFKUDFKDQG%DUDW] 
stick, like military force or trade tariffs. Such
SRZHULVDWDQJLEOHH[SUHVVLRQRIPDWHULDOVWUHQJWK
RYHURWKHUV:KLOHKDUGSRZHULVXVHGWR
FRPPDQGE\WKUHDWŒVRIWSRZHUœFRRSWVWKURXJK
DWWUDFWLYHQHVVWKDWŒZLQVKHDUWVDQGPLQGVœ
3DPPHQW=LHOLāVND 1RUPDOO\
GHYHORSPHQWDVVLVWDQFHLVFRQVLGHUHGDVRIW
SRZHUDOWHUQDWLYHWRKDUGFRHUFLYHSRZHUWKRXJK
aid has also sustained brutal internal security
UHJLPHVDQGDXWKRULWDULDQSUDFWLFHVRYHUVHDV
*LURG 

 :HDOVRNQRZWKDWPLOLWDU\SRZHULVQRWDJXDUDQWHHRIFRHUFLYHFDSDELOLWLHVRQHQHHGRQO\FRQVLGHU5XVVLDœV
LQYDVLRQRI8NUDLQHDVDUHFHQWH[DPSOHRIWKHOLPLWVRIRQHRIWKHZRUOGœVODUJHVWDUPHGIRUFHV :RRGV 
 7KHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQŒSRZHURYHUœDQGŒSRZHUWRœPLUURUVWKHGLŽHUHQFHEHWZHHQKDUGDQGVRIWIRUPVRI
SRZHU 1\H 
 ,WLVZRUWKQRWLQJWKDWWKHGHPDUFDWLRQEHWZHHQKDUGDQGVRIWSRZHUFDQEHIX]]\7KLVLVEHVWLOOXVWUDWHG
E\ZKDWVRPHDQDO\VWVQRZFDOOŒVKDUSSRZHUœDVWUDWHJ\RIKDUGSRZHUFRHUFLRQDQGVRIWSRZHUFKDUPH[HUFLVHGE\
DXWKRULWDULDQVWDWHVŒSLHUFLQJœWKHSROLWLFDODQGLQIRUPDWLRQHQYLURQPHQWVLQWDUJHWHGFRXQWULHVWKURXJKGLVLQIRUPDWLRQ
FHQVRUVKLSDQGLQIRUPDWLRQFRQWURO :DONHUDQG/XGZLJ 

This content downloaded from 52.74.166.170 on Sat, 21 Oct 2023 12:57:32 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
11 ODI Report

$QDOWHUQDWLYHPDQLIHVWDWLRQRISRZHURYHURWKHUV
RFFXUVWKURXJKWKHLQWHUQDOLVDWLRQRIEHKDYLRXUV
ZKLFKPD\DSSHDUFRQWUDU\WRDFWRUVœEDVLF
LQWHUHVWV /XNHV 6XFKVWUXFWXUDOSRZHU
GLUHFWVEHKDYLRXUVDFFRUGLQJWRWKHZLVKHVRI
WKHSRZHUIXO /LWWOH )RUH[DPSOHWKH
DFFHSWHGODEHOOLQJRIORZLQFRPHFRXQWULHV /,&V 
DVŒGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHVœUHIOHFWHG:HVWHUQSRZHU
RYHUSRVWFRORQLDOQDWLRQDOLGHQWLWLHV6XFKSRZHU
transforms almost imperceptibly and endows
moral power'RQRUVFXOWLYDWHGVXFKSRZHULQ
WKHODWHVDVSRYHUW\UHGXFWLRQEHFDPHD
FHQWUDODQDO\WLFLQJOREDOGHYHORSPHQWWULJJHULQJ
DSURJUHVVLYHDOWUXLVWLFLQWHUUHJQXPIRUWKH
VHFWRU )XNXGD3DUUDQG6KLJD0DZGVOH\
DQG7DJJDUW 7KLVWXUQWRZDUGVJOREDO
SRYHUW\GHIOHFWHGDWWHQWLRQDZD\IURPWKHGULYHUV
RIXQHTXDOGHYHORSPHQWZKLFKNHSWKLJKLQFRPH
countries economically and politically influential
1RHO3D\QH 
7KHŒpower toœSHUVXDGHRFFXUVZKHQLQFHQWLYHV
DUHPRUHHIIHFWLYHLQVWUXPHQWVIRUFRRSHUDWLRQ
WKDQWKUHDWV :ROIHUV 7KLVKDVOHGWR
FRPSDULVRQVEHWZHHQODUJHDLGEXGJHWVDQGORZ
FRVWŒEULEHVœWKDWFDQSXUFKDVHVXSSRUWDQGEX\
off opposition under the pretense of economic
GHYHORSPHQW 0RUJHQWKDX 7HFKQLFDO
DQGHFRQRPLFDLGWRLPSURYHWKHJURZWKRI
ŒXQGHUGHYHORSHGDUHDVœLVXVXDOO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWK
a desire for such persuasive power 7UXPDQ
 7KHLQYHQWLRQRIDLGFRD[HGDGLYHUVH
VHWRI:HVWHUQDOOLHVWRMRLQIRUFHVZLWKWKH86
DJDLQVWWKH6RYLHW8QLRQDQGHQKDQFH(XURSHDQ
LQIOXHQFHRYHUIRUPHUFRORQLHV5HFHQW1RUWKHUQ
donor engagement on climate change may also
EHXQGHUVWRRGDVDQHIIRUWWRSHUVXDGH/,&VRI
WKHYDOXHRIWKLVVKDUHGFROOHFWLYHFKDOOHQJH:KLOH
*3*VOLNHFOLPDWHDUHDQLPSRUWDQWRULHQWDWLRQLQ
DZRUOGIDFLQJH[LVWHQWLDOFROOHFWLYHFKDOOHQJHVDV
ZHZLOOVHHWKLVDJHQGDFDQDOVRUDWLRQDOLVHGRXEOH
FRXQWLQJDQGVNLUWORQJVWDQGLQJ2'$SOHGJHV
.DXO 7KLVFDQUHVXOW7KLVFDQUHVXOWLQ
VSHQGLQJWKDWODUJHO\EHQHILWV1RUWKHUQLQGXVWULHV
DQGVHFWRUV .HQQ\ RUVLPSO\EORFN
WKH6RXWKIURPIROORZLQJWKHHQHUJ\LQWHQVLYH
SDWKZD\VWRSURVSHULW\WDNHQE\WKH1RUWK 5R\
 
,ISHUVXDVLYHSRZHULVODUJHO\DERXWYLVLEOH
OHYHUDJHagenda-setting power represents the
SRZHUWRFXOWLYDWHDWWUDFWLYHQHVVWKURXJKOHVV
REYLRXVPHDQVIRUH[DPSOHYLDFXOWXUDOFHQWUHV
SROLWLFDOLGHDOVRULQVWLWXWLRQDOKLVWRULHVŒ6KDSLQJ
WKHQDUUDWLYHœWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQœVPRVWVHQLRU
GLSORPDW-RVHS%RUUHOOEOXQWO\H[SODLQHGŒLVWKH
UHDOFXUUHQF\RIJOREDOSRZHUœ7KXVWKHULVH
RI&KLQDDVDPXVFXODUFUHGLWRUWRWKH*OREDO
6RXWK %R[ KDVSURYLGHGDSRZHUIXOWHPSODWH
IRU'$&GRQRUVWRFRQVLGHUWKHZD\GRPHVWLF
LQGXVWULDOSROLF\FRQFHUQVLQWHUVHFWZLWKRYHUVHDV
GHYHORSPHQWHQJDJHPHQW7KHDGRSWLRQRID
ORRVHUFRQFHSWRIGHYHORSPHQWFRRSHUDWLRQ
LQVSLUHGE\&KLQDDQGRWKHUGRQRUVKDVRSHQHG
up a space to consider the returns flowing to the
SURYLGHUQDWLRQDVOHJLWLPDWHŒZLQZLQVœWKDWFDQ
EHDFFHSWDEO\FXOWLYDWHG .HLM]HUDQG/XQGVJDDUGH
*XOUDMDQLDQG6LOFRFN 

 7KLVDJHQGDZDVEHVWH[HPSOLžHGE\YLVLEOHDGYRFDF\HŽRUWVOLNHWKHŒ0DNH3RYHUW\+LVWRU\œFDPSDLJQ
WKHFUHDWLRQRIWKH0LOOHQQLXP'HYHORSPHQW*RDOVDQGWKHVLJQLQJRIWKH3DULV'HFODUDWLRQRQ$LG(ŽHFWLYHQHVV
'HVSLWHWKHXVHRIDLGWRFRPEDW,VODPLFH[WUHPLVPLQWKHDIWHUPDWKRIFRPPLWPHQWVWRSRYHUW\UHGXFWLRQ
UHPDLQHGVWURQJ )OHFNDQG.LOE\ 
 KWWSVZZZHHDVHXURSDHXHHDVHXURSHLQWHUUHJQXPRXUJHRSROLWLFDODZDNHQLQJDIWHUXNUDLQHBHQ

This content downloaded from 52.74.166.170 on Sat, 21 Oct 2023 12:57:32 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 12 ODI Report

7KXVSRZHUFDQEHDQDO\WLFDOO\GLVVHFWHGLQWRIRXU
FDSDELOLWLHVŐFRHUFLYHSHUVXDVLYHDJHQGDVHWWLQJ
DQGPRUDOŐWKURXJKZKLFKJHRSROLWLFDOHIIHFWVDUH
WKHQFUHDWHG )LJXUH 7KLVXQGHUOLQHVWKHSRLQW
WKDWSRZHULVQRWMXVWVLPSO\DQDVVHWRUDWWULEXWH
to be measured; it is also an action that is meant
WRLQGXFHEHKDYLRXUDOFKDQJH 2OLYL«DQG2œ6KHD
2OLYL« ,IDJHQGDVHWWLQJDQGPRUDO
SRZHUODUJHO\RSHUDWHLQWDQJLEO\E\FXOWLYDWLQJ
QRUPVDQGFRJQLWLYHSHUFHSWLRQVFRHUFLYHDQG
SHUVXDVLYHFDSDELOLWLHVDUHSURGXFWVRIPRUH
WDQJLEOHLQFHQWLYHVRUDWWULEXWHV2IFRXUVHWKHVH
four capabilities of power are hard to dissect from
RQHDQRWKHU)RUH[DPSOH2'$FDQEHYLHZHG
simultaneously as an inducement to persuade,
DQRSSRUWXQLW\WRVHWDJHQGDVDQGDQH[SUHVVLRQ
RIPRUDOVWDQGLQJLQWKHZRUOG1HYHUWKHOHVV
dissecting power into its four capabilities
SURYLGHVDPRUHQXDQFHGDQDO\WLFDOIUDPHZRUN
for understanding the relationship that links
GHYHORSPHQWDQGWKHVHDUFKIRUQDWLRQDOLQIOXHQFH
in the world.

Figure 1 A typology of power capabilities

Tangible

COERCIVE
The ability of A to get B
to do what they otherwise
would not through material
threats or punishment
PERSUASIVE
The ability of A to influence B
to do what they otherwise
would not through
incentives or rewards

Power Power
over to

AGENDA-SETTING
The ability of A to influence decisions
of B by shaping agendas, norms and
rules of the system, so B chooses
what A wants from a limited
set of choices
MORAL
The ability of A to influence decisions
of B to do what A wants because
B has internalised A’s
interests as their own and
shares them

Intangible

This content downloaded from 52.74.166.170 on Sat, 21 Oct 2023 12:57:32 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
13 ODI Report

Box 2 China’s competitive advantages as a development actor

China has a historical legacy as a provider of aid, under the umbrella of southŐsouth cooperation
(Bräutigam, 2011). But it was not until the early 2000s that its role as a provider of concessional
žQDQFHUHDOO\WRRNRŽZLWKDJURZLQJSUHVHQFHDVDWUDGHSDUWQHUDQGLQYHVWRULQWKH$IULFDQ
FRQWLQHQW)ROORZLQJWKHJOREDOžQDQFLDOFULVLVRI&KLQDœVGRPHVWLFHFRQRPLFVWLPXOXVDQG
WKHFRQGLWLRQVIRURYHUFDSDFLW\DVZHOODVWKHLQſDWLRQDU\FRQVHTXHQFHVRIODUJHIRUHLJQUHVHUYHV
led to a shift in this model to one characterised by non-concessional lending (Strange et al. 2022).
This culminated in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), announced in 2013, which has since become
enshrined in China’s foreign and development policy.

In China, there is also no clear distinction between the developmental purposes of aid and other
GLSORPDWLFDQGHFRQRPLFSROLF\REMHFWLYHVDLGLVH[SOLFLWO\OLQNHGWRVWUDWHJLFIRUHLJQSROLF\
goals (foremost ostracising and isolating Taiwan) and to creating markets for Chinese exports,
technologies and companies.

7KLVLVUHſHFWHGLQWKHPRGDOLWLHVRI&KLQHVHGHYHORSPHQWžQDQFHWKHEXONRIZKLFKFRPHVIURP
state-owned policy banks and which sometimes blurs the line between foreign aid and commercial
IRUPVRIžQDQFH&KLQDLVQRWSDUWRIWKH2UJDQLVDWLRQIRU(FRQRPLF&RRSHUDWLRQDQG
'HYHORSPHQW 2(&' '$&DQGLVQRWVXEMHFWWRUXOHVDURXQGXQW\LQJDLGQRULVLWDVLJQDWRU\WR
WKH2(&'$UUDQJHPHQWRQH[SRUWFUHGLWVWKDWJRYHUQVWKHŒOHYHOSOD\LQJžHOGœRIWUDGHžQDQFH7KH
SURYLVLRQRIDLGVXEVLGLVHGFRQFHVVLRQDOžQDQFHIURPWKHH[SRUWFUHGLWDJHQF\&KLQD([LPEDQN
is a clear example of this merging of aid and export credit activities. Cultivation of allies among
resource-rich nations has also been notable, aligning with China’s resource diplomacy to secure
key commodity assets for its growing industries. Resource collateralisation has also been a distinct
feature across a portion of China’s overseas lending.

$ORQJVLGHJURZLQJELODWHUDOžQDQFH&KLQHVHFRQWULEXWLRQVWRPXOWLODWHUDOLQVWLWXWLRQVLQFOXGLQJ
WKHPXOWLODWHUDOGHYHORSPHQWEDQNV 0'%V DOVRH[SDQGHGVLJQLžFDQWO\LQWKHHDUO\V0RVW
notably, 2014 saw the creation of two Global South-led MDBs, the BRICS New Development Bank
and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), where China is a primary shareholder. This
SHULRGUHSUHVHQWHGDJROGHQDJHRI(XURSHDQ&KLQHVHFRRSHUDWLRQH[HPSOLžHGE\WKHJURZLQJ
participation of European states in the AIIB and growing bilateral trade and investment, particularly
with the UK and Germany.

&KLQDœVVFDOHRIžQDQFHEDFNHGE\LWVVLJQLžFDQWIRUHLJQH[FKDQJHUHVHUYHVZLWKLQDŒFRRUGLQDWHG
FUHGLWVSDFHœEHWZHHQžQDQFLHUVDQGžUPV &KLQDQG*DOODJKHU DOORZVLWGHSOR\LWV
GHYHORSPHQWžQDQFHDWVSHHGLQWKHVHUYLFHRIFULWLFDOLQIUDVWUXFWXUHDQGQDWXUDOUHVRXUFH
H[SORUDWLRQ7KLVVSHHGŐDVZHOODVWKHFRPSHWLWLYHFRVWRIVWDWHRZQHGžUPVDQGFRQWUDFWRUV
ŐKDVEHHQDNH\VRXUFHRILWVDSSHDO,WVFRXUWLQJRIHOLWHVDQGIXQGLQJRISUHVWLJHSURMHFWV

This content downloaded from 52.74.166.170 on Sat, 21 Oct 2023 12:57:32 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
14 ODI Report

has provided additional advantages. China’s willingness to side-step norms on development

HŽHFWLYHQHVVDQGLWVUHODWLYHODFNRIVDIHJXDUGVDURXQGVRFLDODQGHQYLURQPHQWDOLPSDFWVDQG
good governance – instead often relying on weaker host government institutions and frameworks
– present lower transaction costs for host countries compared to multilateral or bilateral donor
SURMHFWV1RQHWKHOHVVWKLVKDVDOVRUDLVHGDODUPVRYHUWKHZHDNHQLQJDELOLW\RI1RUWKHUQGRQRUVWR
advance these agendas among recipients (Woods, 2008).

6LQFHKRZHYHUELODWHUDOGHYHORSPHQWžQDQFH LQWKHIRUPRIERWKORDQVDQGJUDQWEDVHG
aid) has been in decline as China’s economy has slowed and banking regulations have tightened
*DOODJKHUDQG5D\ OHDGLQJWRDGLPLQLVKHGSURžOHRIWKH%5,LQ&KLQDœVIRUHLJQSROLF\Ő
ZKLOHWKHQHZHU*OREDO'HYHORSPHQW,QLWLDWLYHLQGLFDWHVDGLYHUVLžFDWLRQDQGVKLIWLQKRZ&KLQHVH
institutions approach development cooperation (Chen, 2022). Most saliently, the impact of the
Covid-19 pandemic has reignited controversy and criticism over the role of Chinese lending for
sovereign debt distress, particularly Africa. Backlash against Chinese lending in the Global South,
SDUWLFXODUO\LQLWVUHVSRQVHVWRGHEWUHVWUXFWXULQJRŽHUVDQHZRSHQLQJIRU1RUWKHUQGRQRUVWR
SUHVHQWDQDOWHUQDWLYHRŽHU

 $ZRUNLQJGHILQLWLRQ 1HYHUWKHOHVVYDOXHVPDWWHUJUHDWO\IRUGHILQLQJ

:KLOHUHDOLVWVDQGOLEHUDOVKDYHORQJDUJXHGRYHU
ZKHWKHUGHYHORSPHQWDGYDQFHVJRDOVGHILQHGE\
VWUDWHJLFQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVWVRUPRUDOYDOXHVZH
NQRZDVWDWHGUDZVRQDPL[WRDFKLHYHGHVLUHG
RXWFRPHV /DQFDVWHU9DQ'HU9HHQ
*XOUDMDQLDQG&DOOHMD*XOUDMDQLDQG6LOFRFN
 'HYHORSPHQWFRRSHUDWLRQZRXOGQHYHUEH
SURYLGHGLILWZRUNHGDJDLQVWDFRXQWU\œVQDWLRQDO
LQWHUHVWV 3DFNHQKDP $WDPLQLPXP
JOREDOGHYHORSPHQWHQJDJHPHQWKDVWREHEHQLJQ
WRQDWLRQDOO\GHILQHGREMHFWLYHVDQGSULRULWLHVWR
be initiated.
WKHVHLQWHUHVWVHVSHFLDOO\WRGD\DV:HVWHUQ
VWDWHVSHUFHLYHGHPRFUDF\DQGIUHHGRPDV
EHLQJXQGHUVLHJH'HPRFUDWLFŒIULHQGVKRULQJœ
of supply chains and trade linkages reflects this
LQWHUWZLQLQJRIYDOXHVDQGLQWHUHVWV 3DUNLQVRQ
:RUOH\E<HOOHQ 7RGD\D
FRPELQDWLRQRIGRQRUVœYDOXHVDQGLQWHUHVWV
LQIRUPVGRQRUVREMHFWLYHVIRUGHYHORSPHQW
FRRSHUDWLRQ'HYHORSPHQWSRZHUEHFRPHVERWK
DUHVRXUFHDQGDFDSDFLW\WRDFKLHYHWKHVHGRQRU
REMHFWLYHVXVLQJWRROVWKDWLQFOXGHEXWDOVRJR
EH\RQGDLG7KXVZHGHILQHGHYHORSPHQWSRZHU
as the implicit or explicit use of an array of
development cooperation instruments for
increasing a state’s capabilities to achieve
desired outcomes in global policy.

 8SXQWLOWKHWZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\VWURQJVWDWHVKDGUDUHO\SURYLGHGRXWZDUGžQDQFLDODQGWHFKQRORJLFDOUHVRXUFHV
WRZHDNHUVWDWHVLQVWHDGWKH\W\SLFDOO\VRXJKWWULEXWHRUŒSURWHFWLRQœPRQH\IURPWKHP /XPVGDLQH 

This content downloaded from 52.74.166.170 on Sat, 21 Oct 2023 12:57:32 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
15 ODI Report

$ZLGHUGHILQLWLRQIRUWKLQNLQJDERXWWKHZD\V
GHYHORSPHQWDQGSRZHULQWHUVHFWLVLPSRUWDQW
JLYHQ2'$LVEHLQJDVNHGWRVHUYLFHPXOWLSOH
policy agendas.)RUH[DPSOH2'$LVLQFUHDVLQJO\
GRXEOHFRXQWHGDVFOLPDWHILQDQFHZLWK
FRQVHUYDWLYHHVWLPDWHVVXJJHVWLQJRIWKH
*OREDO1RUWKœVSXEOLFFOLPDWHILQDQFHDFWXDOO\
FRQVWLWXWHVGLYHUWHGGHYHORSPHQWILQDQFHUDWKHU
WKDQDGGLWLRQDOIXQGV +DWWOHDQG1RUGER 
,QWKH8.DLGLVQRZŒVRDNLQJXSFRVWVIURPDFURVV
JRYHUQPHQWGHSDUWPHQWVWKDWILWWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOO\
DJUHHGGHILQLWLRQRIZKDWFDQEHFODVVHGDVDLGœ
QRWDEO\RQDFFRPPRGDWLQJUHIXJHHV &KDPSLRQ
D 7KLVLVSDUWO\GULYHQE\WKHVSLUDOOLQJFRVWV
RIKRVWLQJUHIXJHHVIURPWKHFRQIOLFWLQ8NUDLQH
Donors like Sweden and France are rebalancing
WKHLU2'$EXGJHWVWRWKHGHWULPHQWRIH[LVWLQJ
SULRULWLHVZKLOHRWKHUVOLNHWKH8.DQG*HUPDQ\
DUHDOORFDWLQJDGGLWLRQDOIXQGVIRUDVVLVWLQJ8NUDLQH
WRLQVXODWHFRUH2'$SULRULWLHV DOEHLWZLWKYDU\LQJ
degrees of success).([FOXGLQJH[SHQGLWXUHVLQ
8NUDLQHDQGUHIXJHHKRVWLQJFRVWV2'$ZRXOG
EHELOOLRQORZHUWKDQLWVUHFRUGHGOHYHOV
UHSUHVHQWLQJDQQRPLQDOIDOOIURPWKHSUHYLRXV
\HDU 0LWFKHOO 
$ORQJVLGHWKHLQFHQWLYHVWRGRXEOHFRXQW2'$DUH
escalating pressures to reduce aid budgets in real
WHUPVJLYHQLQIODWLRQDU\SUHVVXUHVDQG&RYLG
GHEWRYHUKDQJ,Q*HUPDQ\WKHDLGEXGJHW
KDVEHHQUHGXFHGE\FRPSDUHGWR
ZKLOHLQWKH8.WKHDEDQGRQPHQWRIWKHOHJLVODWHG
2'$*1,WDUJHWKDVDFFHOHUDWHGFXWV
H[FHHGLQJELOOLRQVLQFH7KHZRUVHQLQJ
economic backdrop is compounded by populist
leaders reframing international generosity as
incompatible with addressing domestic economic
DQGVHFXULW\SULRULWLHVIRUH[DPSOHLQ6ZHGHQ
ZKHUHWKHQHZFRDOLWLRQJRYHUQPHQWXQGHUWKH
0RGHUDWH3DUW\ ZLWKKHDY\EDFNLQJIURPWKH
ULJKWZLQJ6ZHGLVK'HPRFUDWV KDVGHFRXSOHGWKH
DLGEXGJHWIURPLWV2'$*1,WDUJHWDQGDLPV
WRGLYHUWLWWRZDUGVGHWHUULQJLUUHJXODUPLJUDWLRQ
&KDGZLFNE 
$OOWKLVVXJJHVWVGRQRUVDUHXQZLWWLQJO\FXOWLYDWLQJ
GHYHORSPHQWSRZHUZLWKUHIHUHQFHWRDVPDOOHU
2'$SRWWKDWLVPHDQWWRVLWZLWKLQDODUJHU
WRROER[,WLVZRUWKDVNLQJZKDWWKHVHWRROV
are, how they are being used, the institutional
and political backdrop for their utilisation, and
KRZWKH\PLJKWEHDSSOLHGWRFXOWLYDWHSRVLWLYH
influence in the world.

 7KLVHQODUJHGVFRSHIRU2'$LQFOXGHVKRVWLQJUHIXJHHVIURPFRQſLFWDŽHFWHGVWDWHVLQYHVWPHQWVLQ
KXPDQLWDULDQDQGUHFRQVWUXFWLRQHŽRUWVRQ(XURSHDQWHUULWRU\IRUWKHžUVWWLPHVLQFHWKH6HFRQG:RUOG:DU
FDWDO\VLQJSULYDWHLQYHVWPHQWIXQGLQJ&RYLGYDFFLQHVDQGDGDSWLQJWRDQGPLWLJDWLQJFOLPDWHFKDQJH
 ,QKLV1RYHPEHU$XWXPQ6WDWHPHQW8.&KDQFHOORURIWKH([FKHTXHU-HUHP\+XQWDQQRXQFHGWKH
DOORFDWLRQRIeELOOLRQ ELOOLRQ IRU)<DQGeELOOLRQ ELOOLRQ IRU)<RQWRSRIH[LVWLQJ2'$
*HUPDQ\DOORFDWHGDGGLWLRQDOIXQGLQJWRFRYHUWKHFRVWVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKLQFRXQWU\UHIXJHHV6HHKWWSVGRQRUWUDFNHU
RUJSXEOLFDWLRQVRQH\HDULQWRWKHZDULQXNUDLQH

This content downloaded from 52.74.166.170 on Sat, 21 Oct 2023 12:57:32 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
16 ODI Report

2.2 The development DQGREMHFWLYHVRIGHYHORSPHQWFRRSHUDWLRQ

power toolbox
2YHUWKHODVWGHFDGHWKHGHYHORSPHQWWRROER[
KDVEHFRPHIDUPRUHGLYHUVHDVWKHUHODWLYH
LPSRUWDQFHRIFRQFHVVLRQDOILQDQFHLQDFKLHYLQJ
GHYHORSPHQWRXWFRPHVKDVIDOOHQŐHYLGHQFHGLQ
WKHULVHRIŒHPHUJLQJHFRQRPLHVœVXFKDV&KLQD
DQG,QGLDLQWKHODVWWKUHHGHFDGHV7KHVHWUHQGV
KDYHOHGWRDVKLIWLQIRFXVIRUGRQRUVIURPVLPSOH
SRYHUW\UHGXFWLRQWRDEURDGHUUHPLWFHQWULQJ
RQWKHFKDOOHQJHVRIJOREDOGHYHORSPHQW -DQXV
.OLQJHELHODQG3DXOR+RUQHUDQG+XOPH
+RUQHU 
 )RXUGHYHORSPHQWWRROV
7KHGHYHORSPHQWWRROER[FRQVLVWVRItools or
leversWKURXJKZKLFKGRQRUVGHSOR\GHYHORSPHQW
FRRSHUDWLRQILQDQFH$OOIRXUOHYHUVUHVWRQSXEOLF
ILQDQFLQJPRGDOLWLHVEXWWKH\GRVRWRYDU\LQJ
degrees of concessionality and with distinct
GHYHORSPHQWDOSXUSRVHVLQPLQG:KLOHELODWHUDO
2'$JUDQWVDQGORDQVUHPDLQVWKHGHIDXOWPRGDOLW\
IRUGHYHORSPHQWFRRSHUDWLRQLWVEOHQGLQJZLWK
other official flows (OOFs) lubricates economic
GLSORPDF\ZLWK0,&V0HDQZKLOHLQYHVWPHQWV
in multilateral organisations and a functioning
UXOHVEDVHGLQWHUQDWLRQDODUFKLWHFWXUHDUH
JURZLQJSULRULWLHVIRUGRQRUVZLWKWKH0'%V
WKRXJKWWREHHVSHFLDOO\LPSDFWIXODWOHYHUDJLQJ
concessional resources to increase sources of
FDSLWDO$ORQJVLGHVKDUHGWUDQVQDWLRQDOFKDOOHQJHV
like climate change and global pandemic
SUHSDUHGQHVVKDYHEURXJKWDWWHQWLRQWRWKHUROH
WKDWSXEOLFILQDQFHSOD\VLQWKHSURYLVLRQRI*3*V
7KLVZLGHQHGXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHPHDQLQJ
QHFHVVLWDWHVDODUJHUWRROER[LQFOXGLQJPRGDOLWLHV
associated with fostering economic partnerships,
growing multilateral engagement and building
*3*VDVZHOODVDPRUHWUDGLWLRQDOIRFXVRQ
FRQFHVVLRQDODLG )LJXUH 
:KLOHILQDQFLQJLVWKHPRVWYLVLEOHDQGWDQJLEOH
FKDUDFWHULVWLFRIHDFKRIWKHVHOHYHUV)LJXUH
shows how financial modalities can be shaped by,
and deployed through, dynamics, arrangements
DQGFDSDFLWLHVLQWHUQDOWRHDFKSURYLGHUQDWLRQ
6HYHUDOIDFWRUVFRQWRXUDQGGHWHUPLQHWKH
HIIHFWLYHSRZHURIWKLVILQDQFH7KH\LQFOXGH
the technical capacity represented by donor
agencies and staff; the institutional channels
WKURXJKZKLFKJRYHUQPHQWVGLUHFWSXEOLF
finance and resources, and the autonomy of
WKHGRQRUœVGHYHORSPHQWDJHQF\RUPLQLVWU\
and the policies and regulations which in turn
delimit the mandate, budgets and allocations of
DLGDJHQFLHVDQGLQVWLWXWLRQV/DVWO\domestic
political configurations, including the party or
coalition in power, inform the political consensus
RQDLGGHYHORSPHQWDQGWKHOHYHORIVXSSRUW
IRUGHYHORSPHQWVSHQGLQJ7KH\DOVRLQIOXHQFH
GHFLVLRQVDERXWYROXPHVOHYHOVJRYHUQLQJ
regulations, institutional choices and allocations
RIGHYHORSPHQWILQDQFHDQGWKHFKRLFHRI
GHYHORSPHQWOHYHUDQGLWVXVH8OWLPDWHO\
GHYHORSPHQWILQDQFHPRGDOLWLHVDUHQRWDVLQJXODU
technical instrument but are shaped by donor
RUJDQLVDWLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQDODQGSROLWLFDOFRQWH[WV
*DYDV*XOUDMDQLDQG+DUW*XOUDMDQL
*XOUDMDQL0DZGVOH\DQG5R\FKRXGKXU\ 
7KXVthe cultivation of development power

 2XUDQDO\VLVH[FOXGHVWKHODUJHUVHWRISXEOLFGLSORPDF\DFWLYLWLHVWKDWDUHRIWHQVWXGLHGLQUHODWLRQWRVRIW
SRZHUEXWDUHQRWH[SOLFLWO\OLQNHGWRDGHYHORSPHQWDOSXUSRVHDVH[SUHVVHGZLWKLQWKH6XVWDLQDEOH'HYHORSPHQW
*RDOVLQFOXGLQJFXOWXUDOH[FKDQJHVPHGLDDQGSURIHVVLRQDOVHFRQGPHQWVDQGRYHUVHDVVWXGHQWQHWZRUNV

This content downloaded from 52.74.166.170 on Sat, 21 Oct 2023 12:57:32 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
17 ODI Report

partly reflects how donors see themselves in WKHFKRVHQGHYHORSPHQWWRROLQGLYLGXDOO\DVZHOO

the world, and the resulting choices they make
in support of that vision.
 $SSO\LQJWKHWRROER[
)LJXUHSXWVIRUZDUGRXUFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRI
WKHZD\VGHYHORSPHQWLQVWUXPHQWVVXEVWDQWLDWH
DGRQRUœVJOREDOSROLF\JRDOVWKHODWWHUGHILQHG
E\ERWKLWVQDWLRQDOYDOXHVDQGLWVLQWHUHVWV7KH
critical causal mechanism lies in the latent power
FDSDELOLWLHV LGHQWLILHGLQ6HFWLRQ DFWLYDWHGE\
FROOHFWLYHO\ZLWKWKHRWKHUWRROVLQWKHWRROER[7KH
DFKLHYHPHQWRIQDWLRQDOSROLF\REMHFWLYHVFDQDOVR
FRQWULEXWHWRZDUGVDVWDWHœVSRZHUUHVRXUFHVLQ
UHFXUVLYHIDVKLRQZKLFKZLOOGULYHIXWXUHFKRLFHV
UHJDUGLQJWKHXVHRIWKHGHYHORSPHQWWRROER[
7KLVWKHRUHWLFDOPRGHOEHJVWKHTXHVWLRQZKHWKHU
FHUWDLQGHYHORSPHQWLQVWUXPHQWVDUHPRUH
FRQGXFLYHWRWKHFXOWLYDWLRQRIVSHFLILFNLQGVRI
SRZHUFDSDELOLWLHV7RXQGHUVWDQGLIWKHUHDUHDQ\
empirical grounds for a synergistic relationship

Figure 2 The development power toolbox

Bilateral aid
-ODA Grants or ODA loans

TIES OF FIN
DALI AN
MO CE
ICAL CAPAC Economic cooperation
CHN ITY
TE -ODA grants and loans
-OOF grants, loans and investments
NAL CH
UTIO AN
STIT NE
N
LS
I

ION AND
LAT PO
GU
LI
RE

CY

TIC POLIT
ES
M
IC
DO

Multilateral engagement
AL

-Contributions to core capital

-Earmarked funding
O
C

NF O
IG U R A TI

Global public goods

-ODA grants and loans
-Standalone vertical funds

This content downloaded from 52.74.166.170 on Sat, 21 Oct 2023 12:57:32 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
18 ODI Report

EHWZHHQWKHVHYDULDEOHVZHFRQGXFWHGD This suggest that some development tools

preliminary correlation analysis between our may be better placed to deliver certain kinds
IRXUGHYHORSPHQWLQVWUXPHQWVDQGIRXUSRZHU of national power ambitions7KHODUJHUFLUFOHV
LQGLFDWRUVDFURVVDOO'$&GRQRUV$IXOO indicate areas where there may be greater
discussion of our methods and the findings for this possibility for successful instrumentalisation, but
DQDO\VLVFDQEHIRXQGLQ$SSHQGL[ also where the risk of secondary harms is higher. In
WKHLQWHUYLHZVWKDWIROORZZHH[DPLQHDQGSUREH
:KLOHWKLVLVRQO\DQLQLWLDODQDO\VLVWKDWSUR[LHVHDFK these potential opportunities and risks more closely
YDULDEOHZLWKDVLQJOHLQGLFDWRUWKHODUJHUFLUFOHV LQIRXU(XURSHDQGRQRUFRQWH[WV
LQ)LJXUHQRQHWKHOHVVVKRZWKHSRVVLELOLW\IRU
VLJQLILFDQWDVVRFLDWLRQVEHWZHHQ2'$DQGGRQRUVœ
SHUVXDVLYHDQGDJHQGDVHWWLQJSRZHUVEHWZHHQ
GRQRUVœHFRQRPLFLQYHVWPHQWVRYHUVHDVDQGWKHLU
FRHUFLYHDQGDJHQGDVHWWLQJSRZHUVEHWZHHQWKHLU
*3*VSHQGLQJ RQFOLPDWH DQGWKHLUSHUVXDVLYHDQG
DJHQGDVHWWLQJSRZHUVDQGEHWZHHQPXOWLODWHUDO
LQYHVWPHQWVDQGSHUVXDVLYHPRUDODQGDJHQGD
setting power.

Figure 3 A model for cultivating development power

DEVELOPMENT POWER NATIONAL

LEVERS CAPABILITIES OBJECTIVES
Aid Coercive Values
Economic relations Persuasive Interests
Global Public Goods Agenda-setting
Multilateralism Moral

6RXUFH$XWKRUVœFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQ

This content downloaded from 52.74.166.170 on Sat, 21 Oct 2023 12:57:32 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
19 ODI Report

Figure 4 Correlations between power and development, 2015–2020

Coercive uas
Pers ive enda-settin Moral
Ag g

Number of Southern public

Military spending Average % of UN opinion of
destinations
as % of GDP voting alignment donors’ ‘influence’
accesible without visas
ODA

-0.239 0.164 0.249 -0.244

OOF

0.319 -0.121 0.362 -0.046

Core

0.07 0.162 -0.155 0.483

p-value
Multilateral
Eamarked

<0.001
-0.215 -0.033 0.22 -0.155

< 0.01
GPG

-0.217 0.209 0.312 -0.179

< 0.05

Key
0.4 0.3 02 0.1 0 -0.1 -0.2

This content downloaded from 52.74.166.170 on Sat, 21 Oct 2023 12:57:32 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms