Test Bank for Elementary and Intermediate Algebra 4th Edition by

Carson and Jordan ISBN 0321925149 9780321925145

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MULTIPLE CHOICE. Choose the one alternative that best completes the statement or answers the question.

Evaluate the rational expression.

x
1) when x = -2, y = - 1)
y2 9

1 1 2 2
A) B) - C) - D)
9 9 81 81

x
2) when x = 1, y = - 2)
y2
4

1 1 1 1
A) B) - C) - D)
8 8 16 16

x
3) when x = -5 3)
x-5

1 1
A) - B) C) 0 D) Undefined
5 2

x
4) 4)
x + 6 when x = -6

1 1
A) B) 0 C) - D) Undefined
2 6

2x -1
5) when x = 3 5)
6x

22 5 1 7
A) B) C) - D)
63 18 18 18

1 - 9x
6) when x = 6)
2
2x

17 17 19
A) B) - C) - 23 D)
4 4 4

-8 x
7 x2 - 4 x 2
7) when x = 3 5
1
 17
7)

25 17
A) B) - C) - D)
8 8 8 8

(- 6 x)3
8) when x = 3 8)
7x -3
A) 324 B) 243 C) - 324 D) -
243

2x -4
9) when x = -4 9)
2
4 x + 5x + 7
4 4 12 4
A) - B) - C) - D)
17 51 77 51

2
 8 - 4x
10) when x = -3 10)
2 x2 - 3 x + 7
5 10 2 1
A) B) C) - D) -
4 17 17 4

Find every value for the variable that makes the expression undefined.
17
11) 11)
-2z
A) 8 B) 0 C) -2 D)
2

6
12) 12)
a-6
A) 6 B) 0 C) -6 D)
None

3
13) 13)
b+5
A) 5 B) -5 C) 0 D)
None

d-2
14) 14)
8-d
A) -8 B) 8, 2 C) 8 D)
None

b-8
15) 15)
8b - 24
A) 3 B) 0 C) -8 D)
24

x2 - 49
16) 16)
x2 + 6x + 8
A) 0 B) -2, -4 C) 2, -4 D) -7,
7

x2 - 81
17) 17)
x2 - 11x + 24
A) -9, 9 B) 0 C) -3, -8 D) 3,
8

x2 - 4
18) 18)
x2 - 3x - 18
A) -3, 6 B) -6, 3 C) -2, 2 D)
0

x2 - 4 A
19)
x2 + 4x - 21 )
-
3
 2, 2 B) -3, 7 C) 0 D) -7, 3
19)

x2 + 2x - 35
20) 20)
x2 - 81
A) -7, 5 B) -9, 9 C) -5, 7 D) -
5

4
Simplify, if possible.
15m 3 p2
21) 21)
3m 8 p

A) 5mp B) 5m 5p2 C) 5p
5m D)
m5
5
p

10k3
22) 22)
5k
A) 5 B) 2k C) 2k2 D)
5k2

9x5y4
23) 23)
12x3 y
3x3 y2 4x2 y3 3x2 y3 3x2 y3
A) B) C) D)
4 3 12 4

6x + 18
24) 24)
8x + 24
4 3
A) 3 B) C) D) 1
3 4

5x + 25
25) 25)
5x - 25
5x + 25 x + 25 x +5
A) B) C) D) -1
5x - 25
x - 25 x-5

20x - 4
26) 26)
8
5x - 1 5x 5x - 1
A) B) C) D) 5x - 1
2 2 8

5x + 25 27)
27)
x2 + 5x
5 25 5 5
A) B) C) D)
x2 + x x x2 x

-2y + 6
28) 28)
-12y
y +3 2y - 6 -y + 3 y-3
A) B) C) D)
6y 12y 6y 6y

A + 2m + 5
3m 2 + 3m 5
29) )
6m 2 + 15m m
+
1 m+1
m B)
5
 29)

m+3 m2 +
C) D)
2m + 5
1
2m 2 +
5

6
 2x2 - 4x
30) 30)
6x2 - 12x
x-2 1
A) B) 3 C) 1 D)
3x - 6 3

m 2 - 36
31) 31)
m 2 - 12m + 36
1 m-6 m+6
A) B) 1 C) D)
m-6 m+6 m-6

2x + 2
32) 32)
2
10x + 18x + 8
2x + 5 2x + 2 2x 1
A) B) C) D)
5x + 18 2
10x + 18x + 8 5x + 4 5x + 4

y2 + 7y + 12
33) 33)
y2 + 12y + 32
7y + 12 y2 + 7y + 12
A) B) -
12y + 32 y2 + 12y + 32
7y + 3 y+3
C) D)
12y + 8 y+8

y2 + 3y - 10
34) 34)
y2 - 4y - 45
3y - 10 y-2 y2 + 3y - 10 3y - 2
A) B) C) - D)
-4y - 45 y-9 y2 - 4y - 45 -4y - 9

a 2 - 16 35)
35)
a+4

a2 - C) a + 4 D) a - 16
A) a - 4 B)
16
a+
4

t2 + 64 36)
36)
t+8

t2 + C) t - 64 D) t + 8
A) t - 8 B)
64
t+
8

x2 - 9 37)
37)
(x - 3)2
x-3 x2 - 9 x+3
A) B) x + 3 C) D)
x+3 x-3
(x - 3)2
7
 tx + t + 6x + 6
38) 38)
2x + 2
t-2 t+2 t+6 t- 6
A) B) C) D)
6 2 2 2

a 2 - b2 - 5a + 5b
39) 39)
3a + 3b - 15
a +b a 2 - b2 b-a a-b
A) B) C) D)
15 15 3 3

z 3 + 64
40) 40)
z - 4z 2 + 16z
3

z + 16 z +4 z-4 z-4
A) B) C) D)
z z z 4

x-6
41) 41)
6-x
x-6
A) 1 B) C) -x D) -1
6-x

5-m 42)
42)
m-5
5-
A) 1 B) -1 C) -m D)
m
m
-5

x +6 43)
43)
x-6
x+
A) -6 B) -1 C) 1 D)
6
x-
6

6t - 30
44) 44)
5-t
1
A) - B) -6 C) 6 D) -
6
1

5k - 15
45) 45)
12 - 4k
5 5
A) -1 B) 1 C) - D)
4 4

3x + 9
46) 46)
3x - 9
x +3
A) 1 B) C) -1 D) -3x
x-3

8
 b-a
47) 47)
6a - 6b
b-a 1 1
A) B) C) - D) -6
6a - 6b 6 6

m 2 - 16m
48) 48)
16 - m
A) m B) -m C) -(m + 4) D) m +
4

8x2 - 8y2
49) 49)
9y2 - 9x2
8x2 - 8y2 9 8
A) B) -1 C) - D) -
9y2 - 9x2 8 9

7s2 - 21t2
50) 50)
21t2 - 7s2
7s2 - 21t2 1 1
A) -1 B) C) - D)
21t2 - 7s2 3 3

SHORT ANSWER. Write the word or phrase that best completes each statement or answers the question.

Find the mistake, then find the correct answer.

5x5 y
51) = 3xy 51)
15x4

x - 15 x - 15 x-
52) = = 52)
3

5y 5y y

53) 4 53)
x + 21y x + 21 y
= =x+
7
3y 3 y
1
54) 9 54)
x - 36 x - 36 x-9
= = =
1
4x - 9 4x-9 x-9

6x - 24 6(x -
55) = 55)
4)
x-4 4-x
9
MULTIPLE CHOICE. Choose the one alternative that best completes the statement or answers the question.
Solve.
56) In analyzing circuits, electrical engineers often have to simplify rational expressions. 56)
Suppose the following rational expression describes an electrical circuit:
a 2 - 36
a 2 + 8a + 12
Simplify the expression to lowest terms.

a +6 a +6 a-6 a-6
A) B) C) D)
a +2 a-2 a-2 a +2

57) The formula for the slope of a line passing through two points 57)
is:
y2 - y1

m= .
x2 - x 1
Find the slope of a line passing through the points (7, -2) and (5, 1).
2 9 3 4
A) - B) C) - D)
3 4 2 9

1
58) The formula for the volume of a pyramid is V = ℓwh. Use this formula to find the height 58)
of a
3
pyramid with a volume of 40 in.3 , a width of 5 in., and a length of 6 in.
4
A) in. B) 4 in. C) 12 in. D) 400
in
3

SHORT ANSWER. Write the word or phrase that best completes each statement or answers the question.
Provide an appropriate response.
7 (x - 1 ) 59)
59) For x ≠ 1 , the rational expression is equal to 7 . Can the same be said
for x - 1

7x- 1
? Explain why or why
not. x - 1

x- 6 0
60) If 6 is substituted for x in the rational expression , the result is . 60)
Mathematicians
x2 - 36 0
have been known to say "Any number divided by itself is 1." Does this mean that
this expression is equal to 1 for x = 6 ? Explain why or why not.

61) How can you tell just by looking at a rational expression, if it is equal to -1? 61)
6x + 5
62) Why is not equal to 6 ? 62)
x +5

1 1
63) Explain why the expressions and are opposites. 63)
2-x x-2
1
0
64) What is the difference between rational numbers and fractions? 64)

1
1
 4x + 8 4x + 8
65) What is wrong with the following? = = 4x 65)
8 8

66) How are a - b and b - a related to each other? 66)

A
67) If A and B are opposites, what is ? 67)
B

MULTIPLE CHOICE. Choose the one alternative that best completes the statement or answers the question.
Multiply.
2z 3
68) ∙ 68)
10

5 z2
4 z 4z 2
A) B) C) D) 4z
z 4
z3

7x2 16
69) ∙ 69)
8 x3
14 x x5 14x2
A) B) C) D)
x 18 18
x3

4
70) ∙ 70)
2p4
p 5p
8p 5 8p2 8p3
A) B) C) D)
5 8p2 5 5p

2x2
71) ∙ 71)
42y6

7y2 x3

12y4 x5 y4 12y3 xy4

A) B) C) D)
x 147 x 147

7p - 7 5p2
72) ∙ 72)
p 9p - 9
35p 63p2 + 126p + 63
A) B)
9 5p3
9 35p3 - 35p2
C) D)
35p 9p2 - 9p
1
2
 7x x-2
73) ∙ 73)
3 x +6

A)
7x(x - 2) 7x2 - 2 7x(x + 6) 7(x - 2)
B) C) D)
3(x + 6) 3x + 6 3(x - 2) 3(x + 6)

1
3
 x2 - 17x + 42 6x
74) ∙ 74)
x5 x - 14
(x - 3) 6(x - 3) 6(x + 3) 6(x + 3)
A) B) C) D)
6x4 x4 x6 x4

12v2 4v + 4
75) ∙ 75)
4v2 - 4v - 8 4v
3v 4v 3v
A) 3v(v - 2) B) C) D)
v+2 v+2 v-2

y2 - 49 y-5
76) ∙ 76)
2y + 14 y-7
1 (y - 5)(y - y-5
A) B) y - 5 C) D)
2 7) 2
2(y - 7)

x-6 x2 - 2x -
77) ∙ 77)
24

(x + 4)2 (x - 6)2
1 x-6 1
A) B) C) x + 4 D)
x-6 x +4 x +4

z 2 - 20z + 100 z-6

78) ∙ 78)
z2 - 36 z - 10
z - 10 z + 10 z - 10 z - 10
A) B) C) D)
z-6 z+6 (z + 6)2 z+6

x2 + 25 x-9
79) ∙ 79)
x2 + 18x + 81 x - 5
x+5 (x2 + 25)(x - (x + 5)(x - x2 + 25
A) B) C) D)
x+9 (x + 9)(x - 5)
9) (x + 9)2 (x - 9) (x + 9)2
5)

m 2 - 81 m2
80) ∙ 80)
8m m 2 - 3m - 54
(m + 9) m(m - 9) m(m + 9) m(m - 9)
A) B) C) D)
8m(m - 6) 8(m - 6) 8(m + 6) 8(m + 6)

2x + 2 2x2 - 8x +
81) ∙ 81)
8
1
4
x-2 x2 - 1

4(x - 2) 4(x - 2) 2(x - 2) 4(x + 1)(x - 2)

A) B) C) D)
x +1 x-1 x-1 x2 - 1

1
5
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 upon the enemy was complete.

{612}

"At 2 p. m. on this date, the 11th, the surrender of the city

was again demanded. The firing ceased and was not again
renewed. By this date the sickness in the army was increasing
very rapidly as a result of exposure in the trenches to the
intense heat of the sun and the heavy rains. Moreover, the
dews in Cuba are almost equal to rains. The weakness of the
troops was becoming so apparent I was anxious to bring the
siege to an end, but in common with most of the officers of
the army I did not think an assault would be justifiable,
especially as the enemy seemed to be acting in good faith in
their preliminary propositions to surrender. On July 11 I
wrote General Toral as follows: 'With the largely increased
forces which have come to me, and the fact that I have your
line of retreat securely in my hands, the time seems fitting
that I should again demand of your excellency the surrender of
Santiago and of your excellency's army. I am authorized to
state that should your excellency so desire the Government of
the United States will transport the entire command of your
excellency to Spain.' General Toral replied that he had
communicated my proposition to his general-in-chief, General
Blanco.

"July 12 I informed the Spanish commander that Major-General

Miles, commander-in-chief of the American Army, had just
arrived in my camp, and requested him to grant us a personal
interview on the following day. He replied he would be pleased
to meet us. The interview took place on the 13th, and I
informed him his surrender only could be considered, and that
as he was without hope of escape he had no right to continue
the fight. On the 14th another interview took place, during
which General Toral agreed to surrender, upon the basis of his
army, the Fourth Army Corps, being returned to Spain, the
capitulation embracing all of eastern Cuba east of a line
 passing from Acerraderos on the south to Sagua de Tanamo on
the north, via Palma Soriano. It was agreed commissioners
should meet during the afternoon to definitely arrange the
terms. … The terms of surrender finally agreed upon included
about 12,000 Spanish troops in the city and as many more in
the surrendered district. It was arranged the formal surrender
should take place between the lines on the morning of July 17,
each army being represented by 100 armed men. At the time
appointed, I appeared at the place agreed upon with my general
officers, staff, and 100 troopers of the Second Cavalry under
Captain Brett. General Toral also arrived with a number of his
officers and 100 infantry. We met midway between the
representatives of our two armies, and the Spanish commander
formally consummated the surrender of the city and the 24,000
troops in Santiago and the surrendered district. After this
ceremony I entered the city with my staff and escort, and at
12 o'clock noon the American flag was raised over the
governor's palace with appropriate ceremonies."

Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898,

volume 2, pages 157-159.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898

(July-August: Army administration).
Red-tape and politics.
Their working in the campaign.

"The Cuban campaign had been foreseen by intelligent officers

for more than a year, but the department which clothes the
army had taken no steps toward providing a suitable uniform
for campaigning in the tropics until war was declared. The
Fifth Army Corps, a comparatively small body of 17,000 men,
was concentrated at Tampa on the railroad within reach of all
the appliances for expediting business. Between April 26, when
war was declared, and, June 6, when the corps embarked for
Cuba, sufficient time elapsed to have clothed 1,000,000 men if
the matter had been handled in the same manner a wholesale
clothing firm would handle similar business. Yet the corps
went to Cuba wearing the winter clothing it had brought on its
backs from Montana, Wyoming, and Michigan. It endured the heat
of the tropics clad in this, and was furnished with light
summer clothing by the department to wear for its return to
Montauk, where the breezes were so bracing that the teeth
chattered even when the men were clad in winter clothing. The
only reason for this absolute failure to properly clothe the
army was that the methods of the department are too slow and
antiquated for the proper performance of business. There was
no lack of money. It was a simple case of red-tape delays.
There can be no doubt that the intention was that the summer
clothing should be worn in Cuba and that there should be warm
clothing issued at Montauk. It was issued after the troops had
shivered for days in their light clothes. The delays
unavoidably connected with an obsolete method caused great
suffering that should not have been inflicted upon men
expected to do arduous duty. A sensible man would not put a
heavy blanket on a horse to do draught work on a hot day; but
the red tape of an antiquated way of doing business caused our
soldiers to wear heavy woolen clothes in torrid heat, when every
nerve was to be strained to the breaking point in athletic
exertion. This is not pointed out in a fault-finding spirit.
The men are proud to have been in the Fifth Corps and to have
endured these things for the country and the flag; but these
unnecessary sufferings impaired the fighting strength of the
army, caused much of the sickness that visited the Fifth
Corps, and might have caused the failure of the whole
expedition. …

"The difficulty here depicted was one which beset the

department at every turn in the whole campaign. It is a
typical case. Transports, tentage, transportation—it was the
same in everything. With the most heroic exertions the
department was able to meet emergencies only after they had
passed. This was caused partly by lack of ready material, but
mainly by an inelastic system of doing business which broke
 down in emergencies. This, in turn, was caused mainly by the
illiberal treatment accorded to this, as well as to every
other department of the army by Congress. It uniformly cuts
mercilessly all estimates of this, as of every other
department, and leaves no margin of expenditure or chance of
improvement. It dabbles in matters which are purely technical
and require the handling of expert executive talent. …

"Plans for war should be prepared in advance. This was

especially true of the last war, which had been foreseen for
years and considered a probability for several months. All
details should have been previously worked out, all
contingencies foreseen before hostilities began. Such plans
would require some modifications, of course, but would form a
working basis.
{613}
Neither Santiago nor Manila Bay would have been foreseen; but
any plans for war would have involved the consideration and
solution of the following problems: How to raise, arm, equip,
organize, mobilize, clothe, feed, shelter, and transport large
bodies of soldiers. The point where the battle might occur
would be a mere tactical detail to be worked out at the proper
time. The above problems could all be solved in time of peace and
should have been solved. The general staff performs this
function in foreign armies, but we had no such body in our
service and nothing to imperfectly take its place. …

"The most urgently needed reform is the absolute divorcement

of the army in all of its departments from politics. … No
department of the army should be more exempt from political
influence than the staff. This points at once to the most
urgent reform, viz., make the commanding general the real
working head of the army, instead of the Secretary of War. No
good results have come to the service by the extension of the
Secretary's powers in Grant's first administration. Most of
the evils of the service can be traced to the fact that the
general commanding has since that time been practically
 deprived of his proper functions, and the real head of the
army has been a politician."

Lieutenant J. H. Parker,
Our Army Supply Department and the need of a General Staff
(Review of Reviews, December, 1898).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (July-August: Cuba).

The War with Spain.
Sickness in the American army at Santiago.
Its alarming state.
Hurried removal of troops to Montauk Point, Long Island.

"After the surrender of General Toral's army General Shafter

urged the War Department from time to time to hasten the
shipment of the Spanish prisoners to their homes, in order
that the American Army, whose condition was now deplorable,
might be transported to the United States. At this time about
half the command had been attacked by malarial fever, with a
few cases of yellow fever, dysentery, and typhoid fever. The
yellow-fever cases were mainly confined to the troops at
Siboney, and the few cases found among the troops at the front
were at once transferred to that place. … There was great
fear, and excellent grounds for it, that the yellow fever, now
sporadic throughout the command, would become epidemic. With
the command weakened by malarial fevers, and its general tone
and vitality much reduced by all the circumstances incident to
the campaign, the effects of such an epidemic would
practically mean its annihilation. The first step taken to
check the spread of disease was the removal of all the troops
to new camping grounds. … It was directed that the command be
moved in this way every few days, isolating the cases of
yellow fever as they arose, and it was expected that in a
short time the yellow fever would be stamped out. … But the
effect produced on the command by the work necessary to set up
the tents and in the removal of the camps increased the number
on the sick report to an alarming degree. Convalescents from
malarial fever were taken again with the fever, and yellow
fever, dysentery, and typhoid increased. It was useless now to
attempt to confine the yellow-fever cases to Siboney, and
isolation hospitals were established around Santiago. It was
apparent that to keep moving the command every few days simply
weakened the troops and increased the fever cases. Any exertion
in this heat caused a return of the fever, and it must be
remembered that the convalescents now included about 75 per
cent. of the command. The Commanding General was now directed
to move the entire command into the mountains to the end of
the San Luis railroad, where the troops would be above the
yellow fever limit; but this was a physical impossibility. …

"The situation was desperate; the yellow-fever cases were

increasing in number, and the month of August, the period in
which it is epidemic, was at hand. It was with these
conditions staring them in the face, that the officers
commanding divisions and brigades and the Chief Surgeon were
invited by General Shafter to discuss the situation. As a
result of this conference the General sent the following
telegram giving his views [and those of the General Officers
and Medical Officers]. … 'In reply to telegram of this date
[August 3], stating that it is deemed best that my command be
moved to end of railroad, where yellow fever is impossible, I
have to say that under the circumstances this move is
practically impossible. The railroad is not yet repaired,
although it will be in about a week. Its capacity is not to
exceed 1,000 men a day, at the best, and it will take until
the end of August to make this move, even if the sick-list
should not increase. An officer of my staff, Lieutenant Miley,
who has looked over the ground, says it is not a good camping
ground. … In my opinion there is but one course to take, and
that is to immediately transport the Fifth Corps and the
detached regiments that came with it, and were sent
immediately after it, with the least delay possible, to the
United States. If this is not done I believe the death-rate
will be appalling. I am sustained in this view by every
 medical officer present. I called together to-day the General
Officers and the senior Medical Officers and telegraph you
their views.' …

"On August 4th instructions were received from the War

Department to begin the removal of the command to Montauk
Point, Long Island. Some of the immune regiments were on the
way to Santiago, and other regiments were at once ordered
there to garrison the district as General Shafter's command
was withdrawn. The first of the fleet of vessels to return the
Spanish troops arrived in time to be loaded and leave August
9th, and by the end of the month nearly all were transported.

"After the surrender the relations between the American and

Spanish troops were very cordial. There could be little or no
conversation between individuals, but in many ways the respect
each had for the other was shown, and there seemed to be no
hatred on either side. Most of the Spanish officers remained
in their quarters in town, and they shared in the feeling
displayed by their men. Salutations were generally exchanged
between the officers, and American ways and manners became
very popular among the Spaniards. …
{614}
"By the 25th of the month General Shafter's entire command,
with the exception of a few organizations just ready to
embark, had departed, and, turning over the command to General
Lawton, he sailed that day with his staff on the 'Mexico,' one
of the captured transports, and at noon September 1st went
ashore at Montauk Point, Long Island."

J. D. Miley, In Cuba with Shafter,

chapter 12 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (July-August: Philippines).

Correspondence between the General commanding
United States forces at Cavite and Manila,
and Aguinaldo, the Filipino leader.
On the 4th of July, General Thomas M. Anderson, then
commanding the "United States Expeditionary Forces" at Cavite
Arsenal, addressed the following communication to "Señor Don
Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy, Commanding Philippine Forces":

"General: I have the honor to inform you that the United

States of America, whose land forces I have the honor to
command in this vicinity, being at war with the Kingdom of
Spain, has entire sympathy and most friendly sentiments for
the native people of the Philippine Islands. For these reasons
I desire to have the most amicable relations with you, and to
have you and your people co-operate with us in military
operations against the Spanish forces. In our operations it
has become necessary for us to occupy the town of Cavite as a
base of operations. In doing this I do not wish to interfere
with your residence here and the exercise by yourself and
other native citizens of all functions and privileges not
inconsistent with military rule. I would be pleased to be
informed at once of any misconduct of soldiers under my
command, as it is the intention of my Government to maintain
order and to treat all citizens with justice, courtesy, and
kindness. I have therefore the honor to ask your excellency to
instruct your officials not to interfere with my officers in
the performance of their duties and not to assume that they
can not visit Cavite without permission."

On the following day Aguinaldo replied:

"General: Interpreting the sentiments of the Philippine

people, I have the honor to express to your excellency my most
profound gratefulness for the sympathy and amicable sentiments
with which the natives of these islands inspire the great North
American nation and your excellency. I also thank most
profoundly your desire of having friendly relations with us,
and of treating us with justice, courtesy, and kindness, which
is also our constant wish to prove the same, and special
satisfaction whenever occasion represents. I have already
ordered my people not to interfere in the least with your
officers and men, orders which I shall reiterate to prevent
their being unfulfilled; hoping that you will inform me of
whatever misconduct that may be done by those in my command,
so as to reprimand them and correspond with your wishes." …

To this communication General Anderson returned the following

on the 6th: "General: I am encouraged by the friendly
sentiment expressed by your excellency in your welcome letter
received on the 5th instant to endeavor to come to a definite
understanding, which I hope will be advantageous to both. Very
soon we expect a large addition to our forces, and it must be
apparent to you as a military officer that we will require
much more room to camp our soldiers, and also storeroom for
our supplies. For this I would like to have your excellency's
advice and co-operation, as you are best acquainted with the
resources of this country. It must be apparent to you that we
do not intend to remain here inactive, but to move promptly
against our common enemy. But for a short time we must
organize and land supplies, and also retain a place for
storing them near our fleet and transports. I am solicitous to
avoid any conflict of authority which may result from having
two sets of military officers exercising command in the same
place. I am also anxious to avoid sickness by taking sanitary
precaution. Your own medical officers have been making
voluntary inspections with mine, and fear epidemic diseases if
the vicinity is not made clean. Would it not be well to have
prisoners work to this end under the advice of the surgeons?"
…

On the 9th of July General Anderson reported to the War

Department at Washington: "General Aguinaldo tells me he has
about 15,000 fighting men, but only 11,000 armed with guns,
which mostly were taken from the Spaniards. He claims to have
in all 4,000 prisoners. When we first landed he seemed very
suspicious, and not at all friendly, but I have now come to a
better understanding with him and he is much more friendly and
seems willing to co-operate. But he has declared himself
dictator and president, and is trying to take Manila without
our assistance. This is not probable, but if he can effect his
purpose he will, I apprehend, antagonize any attempt on our
part to establish a provisional government."

On the 17th the American commander caused another

communication to be addressed to "General Emilio Aguinaldo" as
follows: "Sir: General Anderson wishes me to say that, the
second expedition having arrived, he expects to encamp in the
vicinity of Paranaque from 5,000 to 7,000 men. To do this,
supply this army and shelter, will require certain assistance
from the Filipinos in this neighborhood. We will want horses,
buffaloes, carts, etc., for transportation, bamboo for
shelter, wood to cook with, etc. For all this we are willing
to pay a fair price, but no more. We find so far that the
native population are not willing to give us this assistance
as promptly as required. But we must have it, and if it
becomes necessary we will be compelled to send out parties to
seize what we may need. We would regret very much to do this,
as we are here to befriend the Filipinos. Our nation has spent
millions of money to send forces here to expel the Spaniards
and to give good government to the whole people, and the
return we are asking is comparatively slight. General Anderson
wishes you to inform your people that we are here for their
good, and that they must supply us with labor and material at
the current market prices. We are prepared to purchase 500
horses at a fair price, but can not undertake to bargain for
horses with each individual owner. I regret very much that I
am unable to see you personally, as it is of the utmost
importance that these arrangements should be made as soon as
possible."

To this communication there seems to have been no written

reply until the 24th; and, on the 20th, the Chief
Quartermaster reported to General Anderson "that it is
 impossible to procure transportation except upon Señor
Aguinaldo's order, in this section, who has an inventory of
everything. The natives have removed their wheels and hid
them." On the 23d General Anderson repeated his request, as
follows:

{615}

"General: When I came here three weeks ago I requested your

excellency to give what assistance you could to procure means
of transportation for the American Army, as it was to fight
the cause of your people. So far we have received no response.
As you represent your people, I now have the honor to make
requisition on you for 500 horses and 50 oxen and ox carts. If
you can not secure these, I will have to pass you and make
requisition directly on the people. I beg leave to request an
answer at your earliest convenience."

The next day Aguinaldo replied: "I have the honor to manifest
to your excellency that I am surprised beyond measure at that
which you say to me in it, lamenting the nonreceipt of any
response relative to the needs (or aids) that you have asked
of me in the way of horses, buffaloes, and carts, because I
replied in a precise manner, through the bearer, that I was
disposed to give convenient orders whenever you advised me of
the number of these with due anticipation (notice). I have
circulated orders in the provinces in the proximity that in
the shortest time possible horses be brought for sale, but I
cannot assure your excellency that we have the number of 500
that is needed, because horses are not abundant in these
vicinities, owing to deaths caused by epizootic diseases in
January and March last. Whenever we have them united (or
collected), I shall have the pleasure to advise your
excellency. I have also ordered to be placed at my disposal 50
carts that I shall place at your disposition whenever
necessary, always (premising) that you afford me a previous
advice of four days in anticipation."
Meantime, General Anderson had written to the War Department,
on the 18th: "Since reading the President's instructions to
General Merritt, I think I should state to you that the
establishment of a provisional government on our part will
probably bring us in conflict with insurgents, now in active
hostility to Spain. The insurgent chief, Aguinaldo, has
declared himself dictator and self-appointed president. He has
declared martial law and promulgated a minute method of rule and
administration under it. We have observed all official
military courtesies, and he and his followers express great
admiration and gratitude to the great American Republic of the
north, yet in many ways they obstruct our purposes and are
using every effort to take Manila without us. I suspect also
that Aguinaldo is secretly negotiating with the Spanish
authorities, as his confidential aid is in Manila. The city is
strongly fortified and hard to approach in the rainy season.
If a bombardment fails we should have the best engineering
ability here." And, again on the 21st, he had written: "Since
I wrote last, Aguinaldo has put in operation an elaborate
system of military government, under his assumed authority as
dictator, and has prohibited any supplies being given us,
except by his order. As to this last I have written to him
that our requisitions on the country for horses, ox carts,
fuel and bamboo (to make scaling ladders) must be filled, and
that he must aid in having them filled. His assumption of
civil authority I have ignored, and let him know verbally that
I could, and would, not recognize it, while I did not
recognize him as a military leader. It may seem strange that I
have made no formal protest against his proclamation as
dictator, his declaration of martial law, and publication and
execution of a despotic form of government. I wrote such a
protest, but did not publish it, at Admiral Dewey's request,
and also for fear of wounding the susceptibilities of
Major-General Merritt, but I have let it be known in every
other way that we do not recognize the dictatorship. These
people only respect force and firmness. I submit, with all
deference, that we have heretofore underrated the natives.
They are not ignorant, savage tribes, but have a civilization
of their own; and although insignificant in appearance, are
fierce fighters, and for a tropical people they are
industrious. A small detail of natives will do more work in a
given time than a regiment of volunteers."

On the 24th General Anderson received from the Philippine

leader a very clear and definite statement of his attitude
towards the "Expeditionary Forces of the United States," and
the intentions with which he and the people whom he
represented were acting. "I came," he wrote, "from Hongkong to
prevent my countrymen from making common cause with the
Spanish against the North Americans, pledging before my word
to Admiral Dewey to not give place [to allow] to any internal
discord, because, [being] a judge of their desires, I had the
strong convictions that I would succeed in both objects,
establishing a government according to their desires. Thus it
is that in the beginning I proclaimed the dictatorship, and
afterwards, when some of the provinces had already liberated
themselves from Spanish domination, I established a
revolutionary government that to-day exists, giving it a
democratic and popular character as far as the abnormal
circumstances of war permitted, in order that they [the
provinces] might be justly represented, and administered to
their satisfaction. It is true that my government has not been
acknowledged by any of the foreign powers, but we expected
that the great North American nation, which struggled first
for its independence, and afterwards for the abolition of
slavery, and is now actually struggling for the independence
of Cuba, would look upon it with greater benevolence than any
other nation. Because of this we have always acknowledged the
right of preference to our gratitude.

"Debtor to the generosity of the North Americans, and to the

favors we have received through Admiral Dewey, and [being]
more desirous than any other person of preventing any conflict
 which would have as a result foreign intervention, which must be
extremely prejudicial, not alone to my nation but also to that
of your excellency, I consider it my duty to advise you of the
undesirability of disembarking North American troops in the
places conquered by the Filipinos from the Spanish, without
previous notice to this government, because as no formal
agreement yet exists between the two nations the Philippine
people might consider the occupation of its territories by
North American troops as a violation of its rights.

"I comprehend that without the destruction of the Spanish

squadron the Philippine revolution would not have advanced so
rapidly. Because of this I take the liberty of indicating to
your excellency the necessity that, before disembarking, you
should communicate in writing to this government the places
that are to be occupied and also the object of the occupation,
that the people may be advised in due form and [thus] prevent
the commission of any transgression against friendship.
{616}
I can answer for my people, because they have given me evident
proofs of their absolute confidence in my government, but I
can not answer for that which another nation whose friendship
is not well guaranteed might inspire in it [the people]; and
it is certain that I do this not as a menace, but as a further
proof of the true and sincere friendship which I have always
professed for the North American people, in the complete
security that it will find itself completely identified with
our cause of liberty."

In the same strain, on the 1st of August, Aguinaldo wrote to

United States Consul Williams, as to a "distinguished friend:"

"I have said always, and I now repeat, that we recognize the
right of the North Americans to our gratitude, for we do not
forget for a moment the favors which we have received and are
now receiving; but however great those favors may be, it is
not possible for me to remove the distrust of my compatriots.
These say that if the object of the United States is to annex
these islands, why not recognize the government established in
them, in order in that manner to join with it the same as by
annexation? Why do not the American generals operate in
conjunction with the Filipino generals and, uniting the
forces, render the end more decisive? Is it intended, indeed,
to carry out annexation against the wish of these people,
distorting the legal sense of that word? If the revolutionary
government is the genuine representative by right and deed of
the Filipino people, as we have proved when necessary, why is
it wished to oppress instead of gaining their confidence and
friendship?

"It is useless for me to represent to my compatriots the

favors received through Admiral Dewey, for they assert that up
to the present the American forces have shown not an active,
only a passive, co-operation, from which they suppose that the
intentions of these forces are not for the best. They assert,
besides, that it is possible to suppose that I was brought
from Hongkong to assure those forces by my presence that the
Filipinos would not make common cause with the Spaniards, and
that they have delivered to the Filipinos the arms abandoned
by the former in the Cavite Arsenal, in order to save
themselves much labor, fatigue, blood, and treasure that a war
with Spain would cost. But I do not believe these unworthy
suspicions. I have full confidence in the generosity and
philanthropy which shine in characters of gold in the history
of the privileged people of the United States, and for that
reason, invoking the friendship which you profess for me and
the love which you have for my people, I pray you earnestly,
as also the distinguished generals who represent your country
in these islands, that you entreat the Government at
Washington to recognize the revolutionary government of the
Filipinos, and I, for my part, will labor with all my power
with my people that the United States shall not repent their
sentiments of humanity in coming to the aid of an oppressed
people.

"Say to the Government at Washington that the Filipino people

abominate savagery; that in the midst of their past
misfortunes they have learned to love liberty, order, justice,
and civil life, and that they are not able to lay aside their
own wishes when their future lot and history are under
discussion. Say also that I and my leaders know what we owe to
our unfortunate country; that we know how to admire and are
ready to imitate the disinterestedness, the abnegation, and
the patriotism of the grand men of America, among whom stands
pre-eminent the immortal General Washington."

United States, 56th Congress, 1st Session,

Senate Document Number 208.

In an article published in the "North American Review,"

February, 1900, General Anderson discussed his relations with
Aguinaldo very frankly, in part as follows: "On the 1st of
July, 1898, I called on Aguinaldo with Admiral Dewey. He asked
me at once whether 'the United States of the North' either had
recognized or would recognize his government—I am not quite
sure as to the form of his question, whether it was 'had' or
'would.' In either form it was embarrassing. My orders were,
in substance, to effect a landing, establish a base, not to go
beyond the zone of naval co-operation, to consult Admiral
Dewey and to wait for Merritt. Aguinaldo had proclaimed his
government only a few days before (June 28), and Admiral Dewey
had no instructions as to that assumption. The facts as to the
situation at that time I believe to be these: Consul Williams
states in one of his letters to the State Department that
several thousand Tagals were in open insurrection before our
declaration of war with Spain. I do not know as to the number,
yet I believe the statement has foundation in fact. Whether
Admiral Dewey and Consuls Pratt, Wildman and Williams did or
did not give Aguinaldo assurances that a Filipino government
would be recognized, the Filipinos certainly thought so,
 probably inferring this from their acts rather than from their
statements. If an incipient rebellion was already in progress,
what could be inferred from the fact that Aguinaldo and
thirteen other banished Tagals were brought down on a naval
vessel and landed in Cavite? Admiral Dewey gave them arms and
ammunition, as I did subsequently, at his request. They were
permitted to gather up a lot of arms which the Spaniards had
thrown into the bay; and, with the four thousand rifles taken
from Spanish prisoners and two thousand purchased in Hong
Kong, they proceeded to organize three brigades and also to
arm a small steamer they had captured. I was the first to tell
Admiral Dewey that there was any disposition on the part of
the American people to hold the Philippines, if they were
captured. The current of opinion was setting that way when the
first expeditionary force left San Francisco, but this the
Admiral had had no reason to surmise.

"But to return to our interview with Aguinaldo. I told him I

was acting only in a military capacity; that I had no
authority to recognize his government; that we had come to
whip the Spaniards, and that, if we were successful, the
indirect effect would be to free them from Spanish tyranny. I
added that, as we were fighting a common enemy, I hoped we
would get along amicably together. He did not seem pleased
with this answer. The fact is, he hoped and expected to take
Manila with Admiral Dewey's assistance, and he was bitterly
disappointed when our soldiers landed at Cavite. … A few days
thereafter, he made an official call, coming with cabinet and
staff and a band of music. On that occasion he handed me an
elaborate schedule for an autonomous government which he had
received from some Filipinos in Manila, with a statement that
they had reason to believe that Spain would grant them such a
form of government.
{617}
With this was an open letter addressed to the Filipino people
from Pedro Alexandre Paterno, advising them to put their trust
in Spain rather than America. The day before, two German
officers had called on Aguinaldo and I believed they had
brought him these papers. I asked him if the scheme was
agreeable to him. He did not answer, but asked if we, the
North Americans, as he called us, intended to hold the
Philippines as dependencies. I said I could not answer that,
but that in one hundred and twenty years we had established no
colonies. He then made this remarkable statement: 'I have studied
attentively the Constitution of the United States, and I find
in it no authority for colonies and I have no fear.' It may
seem that my answer was somewhat evasive, but I was at the
time trying to contract with the Filipinos for horses, carts,
fuel and forage. …

"The origin of our controversies and conflicts with the

Filipinos can … be traced back to our refusal to recognize the
political authority of Aguinaldo. Our first serious break with
them arose from our refusal to let them co-operate with us.
About nine o'clock on the evening of August 12, I received
from General Merritt an order to notify Aguinaldo to forbid
the Filipino insurgents under his command from entering
Manila. This notification was delivered to him at twenty
minutes past ten that night. The Filipinos had made every
preparation to assail the Spanish lines in their front.
Certainly, they would not have given up part of their line to
us unless they thought they were to fight with us. They,
therefore, received General Merritt's interdict with anger and
indignation. They considered the war as their war, and Manila
as their capital, and Luzon as their country. … At seven
o'clock I received an order from General Merritt to remove the
Filipinos from the city. … I therefore took the responsibility
of telegraphing Aguinaldo, who was at Bacoor, ten miles below,
requesting him to withdraw his troops and intimating that
serious consequences would follow if he did not do so. I
received his answer at eleven, saying that a Commission would
come to me the next morning with full powers. Accordingly the
next day Señors Buencomeno, Lagarde, Araneto and Sandeco came
to Division Headquarters in Manila and stated that they were
 authorized to order the withdrawal of their troops, if we
would promise to reinstate them in their present positions on
our making peace with Spain. Thereupon I took them over to
General Merritt. Upon their repeating their demands, he told
them he could not give such a pledge, but that they could rely
on the honor of the American people. The General then read to
them the proclamation he intended to issue to the Filipino
people. …

"There is a great diversity of opinion as to whether a

conflict with the Filipinos could not have been avoided if a
more conciliatory course had been followed in dealing with
them. I believe we came to a parting of the ways when we
refused their request to leave their military force in a good
strategic position on the contingency of our making peace with
Spain without a guarantee of their independence."

T. M. Anderson,
Our Rule in the Philippines
(North American Review, volume 170, page 275).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (July-August: Porto Rico).

Occupation of Porto Rico.

"With the fall of Santiago the occupation of Porto Rico became

the next strategic necessity. General Miles had previously been
assigned to organize an expedition for that purpose.
Fortunately, he was already at Santiago, where he had arrived
on the 11th of July with reinforcements for General Shafter's
army. With these troops, consisting of 3,415 infantry and
artillery, 2 companies of engineers and 1 company of the
signal corps, General Miles left Guantanamo on July 21st,
having 9 transports, convoyed by the fleet, under Captain
Higginson, with the 'Massachusetts' (flagship), 'Dixie,',
Gloucester,' 'Columbia' and 'Yale,' the two latter carrying
troops. The expedition landed at on July 25th, which port
was entered with little opposition. Here the fleet was joined
by the 'Annapolis' and the 'Wasp,' while the 'Puritan' and
'Amphitrite' went to San Juan and joined the 'New Orleans,'
which was engaged in blockading that port. The major general
commanding was subsequently reinforced by General Schwan's
brigade of the Third Army Corps, by General Wilson with a part
of his division and also by General Brooke with a part of his
corps, numbering in all 16,973 officers and men. On July 27th
he entered Ponce, one of the most important ports in the
island, from which he thereafter directed operations for the
capture of the island. With the exception of encounters with
the enemy at Guayama, Hormigueros [the Rio Prieto], Coamo, and
Yauco and an attack on a force landed at Cape San Juan, there
was no serious resistance. The campaign was prosecuted with
great vigor and by the 12th of August much of the island was
in our possession and the acquisition of the remainder was
only a matter of a short time. At most of the points in the
island our troops were enthusiastically welcomed.
Protestations of loyalty to the flag and gratitude for
delivery from Spanish rule met our commanders at every stage."

Message of the President of the United States

to Congress, December 5, 1898.

"During the nineteen days of active campaign on the island of

Puerto Rico a large portion of the island was captured by the
United States forces and brought under our control. Our forces
were in such a position as to make the positions of the
Spanish forces, outside of the garrison at San Juan, utterly
untenable. The Spaniards had been defeated or captured in the
six different engagements which took place, and in every
position they had occupied up to that time. The volunteers had
deserted their colors, and many of them had surrendered to our
forces and taken the oath of allegiance. This had a
demoralizing effect upon the regular Spanish troops. … The
loss of the enemy in killed, wounded and captured was nearly
ten times our own, which was only 3 killed and 40 wounded."