Module 3: Process theories of Motivation

Unit 1: Motivational concepts: hedonism, homeostasis, instincts, needs, drives, incentives,

motivational cycle.

Unit 2: Drive: Hull & Spence Psychoanalytic: (in brief)

Unit 3: Instinct/ Ethology: Lorenz & Tinbergen.

Unit 4: S-R: Skinner. Associationism: Watson.

Unit 5: Cognitive view: Tolman, Lewin , Expectancy- valance: Rotter, Vroom, Weiner.
Opponent process: Solomon &Corbit, Wagner (SOP) theory.

Unit 1: Motivational concepts: hedonism, homeostasis, instincts, needs, drives,

incentives, motivational cycle.

What is Motivation?

To understand the nature and meaning of motivation let’s take some examples: A small
bird collects the material to build it’s nest in the upper corner of our drawing room. We try to
remove it as soon as we see it. The bird, however again brings the small pieces of straw, leaves
etc and gets back to building it’s nest. What makes it so work hard?

A student slogging day and night during exams days, a boy constantly trying to learn
cycling even after getting many cuts and bruises: What makes them engage in one or other type
of learning and continue their effort even after facing many handicaps and obstacles?

Answers to such questions related to why of learning lie in a keyword “Motivation”. The
bird, which is building its nest; the student, who is studying hard; and the boy, who is learning to
cycle- all do so because of the ‘motivation.’ They learn because they are motivated to learn.
They act because they are persuaded to act in order to satisfy their basic needs and attain the
desired goals.

Understanding Motivation

Motivation is the general term for all the processes involved in starting, directing and
maintaining physical and psychological activities. The word motivation comes from the Latin
word movere, which means ‘to move.’ All organisms move toward some stimuli and activities
and away from others, as dictated by their appetites and aversions. Theories of motivation
explain both the general patterns of “movement” of each animal species, including humans and
the personal preferences and performances of the individual members of each species.

Motivation is the process that initiates, guides, and maintains goal-oriented behaviors. It
is what causes one to act, whether it is getting a glass of water to reduce thirst or reading a book
to gain knowledge.

Motivation involves the biological, emotional, social, and cognitive forces that activate
behavior. In everyday usage, the term "motivation" is frequently used to describe why a person
does something. It is the driving force behind human actions.

Some Characteristics of Motivation

1. Motivation is a personal and internal feeling.

Motivation is a psychological phenomenon which generates within an individual.

2. Motivation is need based.

If there are no needs of an individual, the process of motivation fails. It is a behavioural concept
that directs human behaviour towards certain goals.

3. Motivation is a continuous process.

Because human wants are unlimited, therefore motivation is an ongoing process.

 4. Motivation may be positive or negative.

A positive motivation promotes incentives to people while a negative motivation threatens the
enforcement of disincentives.

5. Motivation is a planned process.

People differ in their approach, to respond to the process of motivation; as no two individuals
could be motivated in an exactly similar manner. Accordingly, motivation is a psychological
concept and a complex process.

Major Concepts in Motivation

A number of major concepts are frequently used in motivational theory. An

understanding of some of these major concepts can be useful for comparing the different theories
because the theories differ in regard to the way these concepts are handled.

1. Hedonism

Why is it so hard to choose the fruit salad instead of the chocolate cake? Why do we
dread our daily workout? And why do some find it so difficult to quit smoking, quit drinking too
much, or stop using drugs?

These unhealthy behaviors are largely a function of hedonic motivation: an automatically

triggered motivational state that manifests in a felt desire to perform behaviors that have
previously brought immediate pleasure, or dread of performing behaviors that have previously
brought immediate displeasure.

Perhaps the oldest explanation for the purpose of motivated behavior is the idea of
hedonism, which assumes that we are motivated by pleasure and pain. We learn to approach
situations that are pleasurable and similarly learn to avoid situations that are painful.

Hedonism can be defined as the seeking of pleasure and avoidance of pain. Hedonic
theories emphasize the idea that cues or stimuli have motivational properties because they have
become associated with positive or negative experiences. Hedonic motivation is the willingness
to initiate behaviors that enhance positive experience (pleasant or good) and behaviors that
decrease negative experience.

This term has been used in two contexts. First, it has been used to account for the general
principle in human behavior, i.e., that individuals are more likely to initiate behaviors which lead
to rewards or away from punishments.

Second, hedonic motivation has been considered in the context of well-being where
hedonic motivation (seeking pleasure and avoiding pain) is contrasted against eudaimonic
motivation (seeking personal excellence) to explain how people differ in their pursuit of
happiness.

2. Homeostasis

Humans seek balance in their lives. When things are out of order or imbalanced, it tends
to cause problems. This is true particularly with regard to our internal state or well-being.
Homeostasis refers to this tendency to maintain a balanced or constant internal state that is
optimal for functioning.

For example, you have a specific "balanced" or "normal" body temperature that is
approximately 98.6 degrees. When there is a problem with the internal functioning of your body,
this temperature may increase, signaling and imbalance. As a result, your body attempts to solve
the problem and restore homeostasis; your normal body temperature.

Deviations from homeostasis create physiological needs that result in psychological drive
states that direct behavior to meet the need and ultimately bring the system back to homeostasis.
Homeostasis can be simply defined as a psychological and physiological state of stability.

3. Instinct

The term instinct denotes inborn patterns of behavior that are biologically determined
rather than learned. For example, curiosity, flight, repulsion, reproduction, mating, parental care
etc. are instincts.
 These are innate tendencies found in all the members of a species that direct behavior in
predictable ways. Instinct most approximately refers to “an urge to do something”. Thus it has an
“impetus” which drives the organism to do something.

Instincts are goal-directed and innate patterns of behavior that are not the result of
learning or experience.For example, infants have an inborn rooting reflex that helps them seek
out a nipple and obtain nourishment, while birds have an innate need to migrate before winter.
Both of these behaviors occur naturally and automatically. They do not need to be learned in
order to be displayed.

In animals, instincts are inherent tendencies to engage spontaneously in a particular

pattern of behavior. Examples of this include a dog shaking after it gets wet, a sea turtle seeking
out the ocean after hatching, or a bird migrating before the winter season.

In humans, many reflexes are examples of instinctive behaviors. The rooting reflex, as
mentioned earlier is one such example, as is the suckling reflex in babies. In other words, the
behavior must occur naturally and automatically in all organisms of that species.

Every organism is born with different biological traits and tendencies in order to help
them survive. These aren’t learned or experienced behaviors, rather patterns of behavior that
occur naturally and are goal-directed. These patterns of behavior are referred to as instincts.

Unit 2: Drive: Hull & Spence Psychoanalytic: (in brief)

Drive Reduction Theory: Hull and Spence

The drive reduction theory of motivation became popular during 1940s and 1950s as a
way to explain behavior, learning and motivation.
The theory was created by behaviorist Clark Hull and further developed by his collaborator
Kenneth Spence. According to the theory, the reduction of drives is the primary force behind
motivation.
 Hull based his theory on the concept of homeostasis idea that the body actively works to
maintain a certain state of balance. Hull suggested that all motivation arises as a result of
biological needs. In this theory, Hull used the term drive to refer to the state of tension or arousal
caused by biological or physiological needs. According to this theory, deviation from
homeostasis create physiological needs.
These result in psychological drive states that direct behavior to meet the need and bring
the system back to homeostasis When a physiological need is not satisfied ,a negative state of
tension is created ;when the need is satisfied ,the drive to satisfy that need is reduced and the
organism returns to homeostasis. In this way, a drive can be thought of as an instinctual need that
has the power to motivate behavior. eg: it's been a while since you had food, your blood sugar
level will drop below normal. Low blood sugar induces a physiological need and a
corresponding drive state ( ie; hunger) that will direct you to seek out and consume food .Eating
will eliminate the hunger, and ,ultimately, your blood sugar level will return to normal.

Conditioning and Reinforcement

Hull is considered a neo - behaviorist thinker.

He believed that human behavior could be explained by conditioning and reinforcement.
The reduction of the drive acts as a reinforcement for that behavior. Reinforcement increases the
likelihood that the same behavior will occur again in future when the same need arises.
 In a S- R relationship, when the stimulus and response are followed by a reduction in
need, it increases the likelihood that the same stimulus will elicit the same response again in the
future. Hull theory was further developed by his student Kenneth Spence.
Spence disagreed with Hull's assumption that improvement in performance come only
due to habit forces. In his opinion, this was the influence of motivation. He also believed
reinforcement does not have a role in learning itself. Reinforcement can serve as a motivator for
learning and enhance a response ,yet it does not necessarily enhance learning of a response.
It was Spence idea that performance in learned behavior cannot be attributed to
habituation, but rather to motivational factors behind it.

Limitations

One of the biggest problems with Hull's drive reduction theory is that it does not
account for how secondary reinforces reduce drives.
Unlike primary drives such as hunger and thirst, secondary reinforces do nothing to
directly reduce physiological and biological needs.

Drive reduction theory does not explain why people engage in behaviors that do not
reduce drives. eg: people often eat when they are hungry or drink when they are not thirsty. In
some cases, people actually participate in activities that increase tension such as sky diving .Why
would people seek out activities that do nothing to fulfill biological needs and that actually
place them in considerable danger? Drive reduction theory cannot account for such behavoirs.
The empirical data that support Hullian theory are derived almost entirely from infra- human
population, especially rats.

Application

Although Drive reduction theory is now considered inadequate to explain the entirety of
human behavior and motivation.
Elements of it have been used in other psychology theories, and it has also been adapted
for a wide variety of practices including, education , scientific research ,health science
( particularly dieting and body building theories) and marketing tactics (eg:promoting brand
loyalty or impulse buys) .

Unit 3: Instinct/ Ethology: Lorenz & Tinbergen.

Konrad Lorenz was undoubtedly one of the main founders of ethology as a biological
discipline. Ethology, the biological study of behaviour, rose to prominence in Europe in the late
1930s under the leadership of Austrian zoologist Konrad Lorenz and Dutch zoologist Nikolaas
Tinbergen. To account for the timing and duration of instinctive acts, Lorenz postulated the
continuous internal generation of “action-specific energy”. This energy was expended in
performance of the act and accumulated between performances, when, after reaching a certain
threshold level, it drives the relevant appetitive behaviour.

This motivational model recalls the analogies of Freud, but it bore little comparison to
what was known of how nervous systems work, and thus it drew criticism from physiologists.
Even Lorenz’s ethological colleagues had problems with it. For example, Tinbergen rejected the
idea that there is a distinct kind of energy for each fixed action pattern; he sought a more
integrated conception of the control of behaviour.

Crucial for Lorenz’s view was that behavioral patterns have to be analyzed into
sequences of innate and learned behavior components. Only the innate components qualify as
instinctive behavior. Lorenz’s taxonomic approach is the main factor guiding Lorenz’s views on
instincts, and the taxonomic approach is part of Lorenz’s research practice from the very
beginning

Lorenz’s view that the concept of ‘instinct’ ought to refer to motor patterns— observable
bodily movements rather than drives or disposition to behavior or even certain subjective states.
On Lorenz’s account, the importance of intelligence can increase only when the role of
instinctive behaviour diminishes. Instinctive behavior is broken up by newly introduced flexible
behavior components, reducing the amount of rigid instincts that are part of the overall behavior.

Innate behavior pattern may be completely lost and experience-based components fill the
corresponding functional positions. The overall behavioral sequence involving different
components is modified, by the addition or deletion of specific instinctive or experience-based
components. Lorenz’s general picture is that instead of evolving into more flexible components,
instincts atrophy, are lost, and replaced by new and distinct experience-based behavior
components. This is the reason why Lorenz can claim that instincts are not homologous to novel
components that are based on learning.

He regards all goal-directed behavior as appetitive, in the sense that such acts are directed
toward getting the animal into a situation in which some instinctive act can be released. For him,
appetitive behavior can be of enormous complexity, involving instincts, taxes, and learned
behavior of various kinds. Such behavior normally occurs when the level of excitation in the
central nervous system for any instinctive act becomes high enough.

What specific kind of activity may occur depends on the kind of animal, and on which
instinct is the source of the appetitive restlessness. For example, a rat set into activity by a high
level of energy specific for the instinctive act of eating (i.e., he wants to eat) may turn toward a
corner of the cage, walk toward it, pick.

Lorenz and Tinbergen developed their instinctive theory from years observing animal
behavior. In 1938, Lorenz and Tinbergen reported their observations of the egg-rolling behavior
of the greylag goose. This species builds a shallow nest on the ground to incubate its eggs. When
an egg rolls to the side of the nest, the goose reacts by stretching toward the egg and bending its
neck, bringing its bill toward its breast. This action causes the bill to nudge the egg to the center
of the nest. If, during transit, the egg begins to veer to one side, the goose adjusts the position of
its bill to reverse the direction of the egg. What causes the goose to react to the rolling egg?
Lorenz’s energy model addresses this question.

Energy Model
 According to Lorenz (1950), action-specific energy constantly accumulates. This
accumulation of energy resembles filling a reservoir with water; the more liquid in the reservoir,
the greater the internal pressure for its release.

In behavioral terms, the greater the pressure, the more motivated the animal is to behave
in a specific way. The internal pressure (action-specific energy) motivates appetitive behavior,
which enables the animal to approach and contact a specific and distinctive event called a sign
stimulus. The presence of the sign stimulus releases the accumulated energy. In our goose
example, the stretching movement and adjustment reaction are appetitive behaviors directed
toward the rolling egg, which is the sign stimulus.

The goose does not exhibit the retrieving behavior until it has reached the egg. The
retrieving behavior is an example of a fixed action pattern, an instinctive behavior that the
presence of a specific environmental cue, the sign stimulus, triggers.

An internal block exists for each fixed action pattern, preventing the behavior from
occurring until the appropriate time. The animal’s appetitive behavior, motivated by the buildup
of action-specific energy, allows the animal to come into contact with the appropriate releasing
stimulus.

According to Lorenz and Tinbergen (1938), the sign stimulus acts to remove the block by
stimulating an internal innate releasing mechanism (IRM). The IRM removes the block, thereby
releasing the fixed action pattern. The sight of the egg stimulates the appropriate IRM, which
triggers the retrieving response in the goose. After the goose has retrieved one egg and its energy
reserve dissipates, the bird will allow another egg to remain at the side of the nest until sufficient
action-specific energy has accumulated to motivate the bird to return the second egg to the
middle of the nest.

Environmental Release
 The likelihood of eliciting a fixed action pattern depends upon both the accumulated level
of action-specific energy and the intensity of the sign stimulus. Research (Lorenz, 1950;
Tinbergen, 1951) indicates that the greater the level of accumulated energy, the weaker the sign
stimulus that can release a particular fixed action pattern.

Lorenz (1950) envisioned an IRM as a gate blocking the release of stored energy. The
gate opens either by pulling from external stimulation or by pushing from within. As the internal
pressure increases, the amount of external pull needed to open the gate and release the behavior
decreases. And because the amount of accumulated energy increases during the time since the
last fixed action pattern, the reliance on a sign stimulus to activate the IRM and release the fixed
action pattern decreases.

Another view, proposed by Tinbergen (1951), suggested that sensitivity to the sign
stimulus changes as a function of time passed since the occurrence of the specific behavior.
According to Tinbergen, the sensitivity of the innate releasing mechanism to the sign stimulus
increases when no recent fixed action pattern occurs.

Hierarchical System

Lorenz proposed that action-specific energy exists for each fixed action pattern.
Tinbergen (1951) suggested that a central instinctive system (e.g., the reproductive instinct of
stickleback fish) controls the occurrence of a number of potential behaviors. Energy accumulates
in a specific brain center for each major instinct, and numerous systems can contribute energy for
each instinct. Internal impulses can develop from the release of energy from a higher center
following the occurrence of a fixed action pattern, from energy buildup at the level on which the
animal is presently operating, or from both.

Hormones or other internal stimuli as well as external forces can also generate energy.
All of these factors influence the level of accumulated energy and the likelihood of additional
behavior.

Once an effective sign stimulus releases energy, this energy flows to lower centers. The
next fixed action pattern (or patterns) occurring in the chain depends on prevailing
environmental conditions. Several fixed action patterns might be released, but the sign stimulus
determines the specific fixed action pattern that occurs.

An often-observed phenomenon occurs when two incompatible sign stimuli are

experienced. The response is different from the fixed action patterns typically released by either
sign stimuli acting alone. According to Tinbergen (1951), when a human or nonhuman animal
experiences conflict due to the presence of two antagonistic sign stimuli, energy overflows into
another motivational instinct system and releases a behavior from this other system. The process
of activating a third instinct system, different from the two involved in the conflict, is called
displacement.

The Importance of Experience

According to Lorenz (1950), a conditioning experience can alter instinctive behavior, the
releasing mechanism for instinctive behavior, or both. Only the consummatory response at the
end of the behavior chain, according to Lorenz, is resistant to modification.

Conditioning can alter the effectiveness of existing appetitive behavior or change the
sensitivity of the releasing mechanism to the sign stimulus. Depending on the nature of the
conditioning experience, this change can be either increased or decreased sensitivity. In addition,
conditioning can establish new behaviors or new releasing stimuli. All of these modifications
increase the organism’s ability to adapt to the environment.

Unit 4: S-R: Skinner. Associationism: Watson.

B F Skinner expanded the Law of Effect in the 1940s and 1950s into a system called
Operant Conditioning. Operant Conditioning is learning produced by the active behavior of an
organism interacting with the environment. Skinner renamed some terms B (Behavior) leads to C
(Consequence) to R (Response) leads to Sr (Stimulus reinforcer).

Skinner characterize two types of Sr(s)

Sr+ (pleasant or rewarding)

Sr- (aversive or noxious)

He also characterized two types of effects that Sr can have on behavior: increase the
probability of the behavior occurring again (Reinforcement). decrease the probability of the
behavior occurring again (Punishment). Thus we have four possible ways to change behavior.

1. Positive Reinforcement

Increases the probability of behavior by the behavior introducing a positive (pleasant)

consequent (Sr+). An anorexic woman was treated by therapists making social visitation and
other privileges (a pleasant stimulus) contingent on her eating. Thus the behavior of eating (R)
was increased because it had the consequent of a positive reinforcer (Sr+).

2. Negative reinforcement

Increasing the probability of avoidant or escape behavior by removing a negative

(noxious) consequent (SR-). A person with difficulty stuttering was given negative reinforcement
by wiring him up so that whenever he stuttered, he would get delayed auditory feedback (a
noxious stimulus). Thus the behavior of normal speech (R) was increased because such behavior
avoids the noxious stimuli (Sr-) that was made a contingency of stuttering.

3. Punishment

Decreasing the probability of behavior by it being followed by a negative (noxious)

consequence (Sr-). Sometimes that is called Positive Punishment because Sr is introduced or
added to the situation. Autistic children have been shown to stop antisocial behavior when a mild
shock was made contingent. The probability of antisocial behavior was decreased by introducing
a contingent aversive reinforcer (Sr-).

Problems with punishment - Mindless/enraged application, Fear in recipient, Effect is

temporary, Not immediate enough, No shaping of appropriate behavior.

4. Extinction

Decreasing the probability of behavior by having a positive (pleasant) reinforcer

removed. Sometimes that is called Negative Punishment because Sr+ is taken away or removed
from the situation. A child who throws temper tantrums when his parent leave the child’s
bedroom at night has his temper tantrums reduced by the parents merely ignoring them. The
attention of the parent was supporting the tantrums, so to reduce their probability of occurring,
the positive reinforcer (Sr+) supporting the unwanted behavior was removed.

 Shaping-Procedure in which successive approximations of a desired behavior are reinforced

 Chaining

 Schedules of reinforcement

Watson’s Motivation Theory

John B. Watson and J. J. B. Morgan published an article in 1917 in which they introduced
the term "drive" as a motivational construct.

The following represents an extraction of the assumptions and postulations Watson and Morgan
made about drive.
 (1) The original sources of drive are the three innate emotions: rage, fear, and love (sex).

(2) Drive is a generalized motivation process. Although drive can be stimulated by anyone of
the three innate emotions, all behavior is motivated by the same drive.

(3) The emotions are the original sources of drive; however, through the process of classical
conditioning, drive can become attached to other, non-emotional behaviors. This is the basis for
what we today call "acquired drive."

(4) The level of performance is a function of drive and not of habit. If the motivational level is
altered through "added drive," there will be an increase in the level of performance.

(5) The endocrine system (ductless glands) is the physiological mechanism of drive. The
hormones secreted by the endocrine glands were thought to provide the basis for the drive of all
behaviors.

Unit 5: Cognitive view: Tolman, Lewin , Expectancy- valance: Rotter, Vroom, Weiner.
Opponent process: Solomon & Corbit, Wagner (SOP) theory.

Tolman (1932) argued that in order to understand behavior we must study it as a

phenomenon in its own right. He argued that behavior has both descriptive and defining
properties and is more than just sequences of muscle twitches. Thus, Tolman advocated a
holistic study of behavior, in contrast to reductionistic approaches (e.g., those of Clark Hull,
1943) that attempted to understand behavior by reducing it to its smallest individual elements.
According to Tolman, behavior is molar—something to be studied as a whole and not reduced to
its component parts.

Purpose and Cognition

For Tolman, whether the behavior in question is that of a rat or a human, it is

characterized by cognition and purpose.
 Tolman was careful to define what he meant by purposiveness. First, the purposiveness
of behavior is objectively defined by the behaviors observed and not by inference to anything
subjective. That an organism will learn a series of behaviors in order to reach some goal is
evidence, Tolman argued, for the purposiveness of behavior. As an example, consider my cat. As
a kitten it would sometimes claw the furniture. In typical psychological fashion, I thought to
break this habit by quickly following the clawing response with a period of nonreinforcement
(putting the cat outside whenever it clawed the furniture). The furniture clawing decreased but
did not disappear. When the cat, now an adult, desires to go outside, as you can probably guess,
it gets me to let it out by perfunctorily clawing the couch, then running to the door. It seems hard
to deny, at least from Tolman’s point of view, that the behavior of clawing the couch has the
purpose of reaching the goal of getting outside (it may also be instructive in pointing out that
when we try to modify behavior, we don’t always get what we expect!).

The example of my “cognitive” cat is perhaps an appropriate place to mention another

point made by Tolman, which is often called the learning-performance distinction. My cat did
not initially learn to claw the furniture in order to be let out. Clawing things is a behavior most
cats seem to do; however, because I created a contingency between this behavior and being put
outside, the cat learned and, from Tolman’s point of view, came to expect that this particular
behavior in the future would lead to the goal of being put out. At times when the cat does not
want to be outside, no evidence exists that it knows this particular relationship; it must be
motivated to go out before this particular behavior is performed.

In the process of learning that particular behaviors lead to particular goals, Tolman
asserted, expectancies are established. Recall that in this study monkeys became agitated when
the banana that they expected to find under a container had been replaced with less desirable
lettuce. Thus, for Tolman, organisms do not learn specific stimulus–response connections; they
learn which behaviors lead to which goals.

Tolman’s approach emphasized the idea that organisms develop a cognitive map of their
environment. This map indicates the places in which particular goals may be found. Tolman’s
ideas were in sharp contrast to the strict stimulus–response approaches emphasizing the idea that
learning consists of chains of responses (e.g., turn left, then right, then right again). Thus, for
Tolman, an organism learns a general concept about the place where reinforcement can be found,
not a series of responses to

reach a goal.

Tolman’s theory has had its detractors. Most of the strict stimulus–response theorists of
his time took issue with his emphasis on the cognitive aspects of behaviors. The major criticism
of Tolman’s theory centers on its lack of detail (Hilgard & Bower, 1975); because of the theory’s
imprecise nature, definite predictions could not always be made. Nevertheless, Tolman’s
research proved to be particularly difficult for stimulus–response theories to explain. Perhaps
more than anyone else, he brought about a reevaluation of the strict stimulus– response approach
that has, in turn, led to a greatly increased emphasis on cognitive processes such as expectancies
as explanations for behavior.

Kurt Lewin’s Force Field Theory

Another early psychologist who recognized the value of a molar approach to

understanding motivation was Kurt Lewin. Lewin (1936, 1938) described a homeostatic
cognitive model of behavior motivation. His approach was a dynamic one, emphasizing that the
forces acting to initiate behavior are constantly changing. Instead of postulating a single motive
to explain behavior, Lewin pointed out that several forces may simultaneously exert influence on
an organism; thus, the behavior observed is the result of the total forces acting upon the
individual.

To emphasize his belief that behavior can be understood only as the result of all the
forces acting on an individual, Lewin described behavior in terms of field theory. Field theory
emphasizes the idea that the reaction of an object is the result of all the forces acting upon that
object within the field containing it. The field in field theory is actually a field of conflicting
forces. For example, the reaction of a kite depends upon the field of forces acting upon it.
Changing wind conditions, gravity, and counter force applied by the kite flyer all serve to define
the ultimate behavior of the kite.

Lewin argued that human behavior can be similarly understood to result from all the
forces acting upon an individual at the time the behavior occurs. Lewin therefore described
behavior (B) as a function (f) of two major components, the person (P) and the psychological
environment (E):

B = f (P + E)

Lewin’s theory is thus a variation of a familiar theme in psychology—the interaction between the
individual and the situation in the determination of behavior.

Behavior of a person depends on the: genetic and other factors that contribute to the brain
structure on which personality of this person develops in a given environment; dynamic
approach that involves forces determining actions; psychological perspective of a person
subjectively perceiving her/his “life space”, relevant internal-external factors; analysis of the
situation, reflection, associations, understanding; finally behavior as a function of the total field
containing all these elements changing in time, described in topological spaces divided into some
regions.

In his theory cognitive dynamics is represented as a movement in phenomenological (he

has used the word “hodological”) space, a “life space” or a field that includes person's values,
needs, goals, motives, moods, hopes, anxieties, and ideals. Forces in this field arise in social
situations, driving cognitive movement toward or away from goals of the person. His description
of the process of mental change include 3 stages: unfreezing or escaping the inertia, transition
without clear idea where it leads, and freezing or crystallizing new behaviors. These ideas can be
linked to activity of neural networks, simulated in computer or observed in neuroimaging.

Expectancy-Value Theory
 The basic idea underlying expectancy value theory is that motivated behavior results
from the combination of individual needs and the value of goals available in the environment.
Expectancy-value theories also stress the idea that the probability of behavior depends not only
upon the value of the goal for the individual but also upon the person’s expectancy of obtaining
the goal. For example, almost everyone would place a high value on winning the lottery, but a
much smaller number of people truly expect that it will happen.

The general expectancy-value model assumes that motivation is best understood from a
molar perspective. This idea is, once again, congruent with the perspective of Tolman and
Lewin, but not with the stimulus–response explanations of incentive motivation proposed by
Hull and Spence. Instead of analyzing the effects of goal objects in terms of fractional
consummatory responses and their feedback, expectancyvalue theory argues for a cognitive
representation of goal objects. This cognitive representation includes both an expectation that
certain behaviors will lead to certain goals and the value of those goals for the organism.

The concept of expectancy is important because it assumes that behavior is a function of

one’s estimation of obtaining the valued goal. Thus, even a highly valued goal such as winning
the lottery may not generate much behavior if the expectancy of successfully reaching the goal is
very small. Expectancies are generally regarded as being built up through experience, and the
motives that expectancy-value theories generally attempt to explain are usually psychological in
nature rather than physiological (Korman, 1974). Moreover, expectancy-value approaches
emphasize an active organism that is shaped by its own unique experiences. Unlike the one-size-
fits-all approach of Hull, expectancy value theorists take a more idiographic approach, meaning
that they often include individual differences as part of their explanation of motivation (Graham
& Weiner, 1996). Expectancyvalue theory has been applied to a number of psychological fields,
including social learning theory,achievement motivation, the relationship between attitudes and
behaviors, and an intriguing phenomenon known as social loafing.
Rotter-LOC

Locus of control is where an individual placed accountability for an outcome– positive or

negative. Neck et al. (2017) described locus of control as a spectrum in which a person or group
felt they had control over their circumstances.

Curtis and Trice (2013) conducted a study with 322 college students assessing academic
locus of control. Corresponding with prior research, they established a statistical significance
between an internal locus of control and other measures including “grade point average, number
of absences, academic entitlement, procrastination, anxiety, and depression”.

Another study performed by Mooney, Sherman, and Lo Presto (1991) explored the
relationship among academic locus of control, self-esteem, and the distance from the student’s
home (as perceived by the student) and applied those factors to determine whether or not they
would be predictors of adjustment in college.

The study discovered that the student’s adjustment to college was not due to one variable
in particular, but the culmination of multiple variables. As related to locus of control, the study
results showed that “female students possessing an internal academic locus of control and a high
level of self-esteem reported a more effective adjustment to college (academic, personal, social,
and attachment) than female students possessing either an external locus of control or low self-
esteem”.

If locus of control was identified in each student early in his or her respective academic
career, by the time the student entered a university, he or she should be able to self-identify
scenarios in which the previously identified external locus of control could potentially limit him
or her from being successful in the future.
Weiner- Attribution

Locus dimension refers to the perception of the cause of any event as internal or external.
This dimension is related to feeling of pride and self-esteem. People feel the sense of pride in
their accomplishment, especially when they believe that it was their effort which lead them to
success. Stability dimension refers to whether the cause of the event is stable or unstable across
time and situations. In case of unstable attributions, this dimension is related to feelings of
hopelessness or hopefulness.

Controllability dimension refers to whether or not the cause of any event is under the
control of the learner. Guilt and shame are the kind of emotions experienced in this dimension.
Learners who believe they failed because of their lack of effort experience a sense of guilt. On
the other hand, those who deem themselves unworthy are more likely to experience the feelings
of shame or similar emotions.

According to Rotter (1966), expectancies are determined by the percentage of

reinforcements of a particular response in a particular setting, the percentage of reinforcements
of this response in similar situations, and individual differences in the belief that reinforcements
are under personal control.

The attributional position is that the stability of a cause, rather than its locus, determines
expectancy shifts. If conditions (the presence or absence of causes) are expected to remain the
same, then the outcome experienced in the past will be expected to recur. A success under these
circumstances would produce relatively large increments in the anticipation of future success,
and a failure would strengthen the belief that there will be subsequent failures.

On the other hand, if the causal conditions are perceived as likely to change, then the
present outcome may not be expected to repeat itself and there is likely to be uncertainty about
subsequent outcomes or a belief that something different will result. A success therefore would
yield no increments in subsequent expectancy and could give rise to decrements in the subjective
probability of future success. Similarly, a failure will not augment the belief that there will be
future failures.

Opponent process: Solomon & Corbit

Solomon (1980) proposed an opponent process theory to account for motivational and
affective dynamics. This theory asserts that the brain avoids extremes of emotional experience by
countering the stimulation it receives with an opposite or “opponent” reaction. For example;
fear-relief or pleasure-pain. When one is experienced (A), it triggers an opposing emotion after a
period of time. With repeated stimulations (B), the opposing emotion becomes stronger,
weakening the experience of the primary emotion and providing an aftereffect (Solomon &
Corbit, 1974).

Wagner (SOP) theory

The Rescorla-Wagner Model of Pavlovian conditioning assumes that learning is

determined by the discrepancy between what is expected to happen and what actually happens.
Memory is conceptualized in SOP as a connectionist system with unitized, representative nodes
connected with directional links. It is assumed that each node, corresponding in some manner to
an isolable experimental stimulus, consists of a large but finite set of informational elements that
have the characteristics.

Wagner’s (1981) SOP model, was originally formulated as a real-time, process based
theory of Pavlovian conditioning and first applied to causal learning by Dickinson and Burke
(1996). In SOP, stimuli are represented by nodes in associative memory, each composed of a
number of elements. Wagner proposed that these elements could have three different activation
states: an inactive state, I, and two active states, A1 and A2.

Unpredicted presentation of a cue or outcome activates a proportion of the elements in

the corresponding node from I into A1. Over time, the A1 state of these elements decays into A2,
and then back into I. Importantly, activating a node by an associative connection bypasses A1
and leads to a direct transition from I to A2. This property of the model is critical because it
allows SOP to explain a variety of learning effects. Wagner (1981) identified two forms of
learning that occur whenever the elements of nodes are concurrently active;-

 First, there is an increment in the strength of an excitatory association between nodes

representing these stimuli to the extent that the elements of the nodes are concurrently in A1.
This excitatory learning occurs when a novel cue is paired with an unpredicted outcome
because at the outset of training, the presentation of the cue and outcome excites the
elements of their respective nodes into A1

 Blocking also follows, at least in part, from the conditions for excitatory learning.
Pretraining of the treatment cue T enables the presentation of this cue to activate some of the
outcome elements into A2 prior to the presentation of the outcome, so that when the
outcome occurs during TX compound training, fewer of its elements are available for
activation from I to A1. Consequently, the reduced number of outcome elements
concurrently in A1 with target cue X elements attenuates the amount of excitatory learning
to cue X.

.In a typical blocking procedure, a compound of a treatment cue T and a target cue X is paired
with an outcome (TX). The amount learned about the target cue X is reduced if the outcome is
predicted by the treatment cue T as a result of prior training with the outcome (T). Under this
blocking (TTX) contingency, learning about the target cue X is said to be blocked by the
treatment cue T.

 A second learning process also makes a contribution to blocking. The blocking (TTX)
contingency ensures that cue X elements are in A1 concurrently with outcome elements in
A2, the latter elements having been driven from I directly into A2 by the presentation of the
pretrained treatment cue T. Within SOP, concurrent activation of cue elements in A1 and
outcome elements in A2 leads to the strengthening of an inhibitory association between the
cue and outcome nodes.

An application of SOP to causal learning assumes that judgments of the causal status of a cue are
determined by the overall associative strength of the cue when aggregated across its excitatory
and inhibitory associations with the outcome. If the aggregate associative strength is excitatory,
then the cue is judged to cause the outcome, with the effectiveness of this generative causation
being determined by the aggregate excitatory associative strength. Therefore, blocking reflects a
reduction in this aggregate excitatory strength produced by both a reduction in the excitatory
association and an increment in the inhibitory association between cue and outcome
representations.

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