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The Tripartite Realist
War: Analysing
Russia’s Invasion of
Ukraine
Danny Singh
The Tripartite Realist War: Analysing Russia’s
Invasion of Ukraine
Danny Singh
The Tripartite Realist

War: Analysing
Russia’s Invasion
of Ukraine
Danny Singh
Humanities and Social Sciences
Teesside University
Middlesbrough, UK
ISBN 978-3-031-34162-5 ISBN 978-3-031-34163-2 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34163-2
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Preface
The purpose of this book seeks to explain in summary form the reasons
for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in late February 2022 and the goals of
its main participants, Russia, Ukraine, the United States and allied North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). This topic is needed because it
harnesses an understanding why this war happened. In Western countries,
the mainstream is dominated by a one-sided; propaganda perception of
the war in Ukraine in the dichotomy of evil Russia, good Ukraine and the
West is rightly on the side of good. There is little explanation why this
war has taken place, and of the interests of the parties to the conflict.
The book examines the main international relations theories to explain
the war. It includes realism, liberalism and constructivism. It is argued that
the most useful theoretical tool to understand the war is realism, applied
in three of its varieties, classical, offensive neorealism and defensive neore-
alism. The book also demonstrates how this can be studied from a liberal
and constructivist perspective. The cause of this war is largely due to the
aggravation of Russia by the West through NATO’s systematic expansion
near its borders. Moscow documented that Kyiv’s declared accession of
Ukraine to NATO threatened its vital security interests and had taken
pre-emptive action, resorting to war and clear abuses of international law.
Many works from the West on war provide a dominant narrative from a
liberal perspective that tends to support American global policy, including
towards Russia. This is a dangerous war of the United States and virtually
the entire West against Russia, to the final Ukrainian.
v
vi PREFACE
I would like to thank my loving family for support whilst writing

this book. This includes my gorgeous wife (Sonali) and beautiful chil-
dren (Ishaan and Shanaya). My father (Gurmit), mother (Palbinder) and
brother (Paul) have also encouraged me with my academic career, so
thanks to you all. On a professional note, I would like to thank Professor
Anthony Lloyd at Teesside University for reading a draft on the overall
argument of the book. Thanks to Dr. Anca Pusca for taking an interest in
this topic once I approached Palgrave Macmillan.
Middlesbrough, UK Danny Singh

Contents
1 Introduction 1
References 6
2 Main International Relations Theories 7
An Explanation of Realism 7
An Explanation of Liberalism 24
Constructivism: An Alternative Explanation 35
Contributions of International Relations Theory 53
References 56
3 NATO During the Cold War and Dissolution
of the Soviet Union 67
Formation of NATO 67
The Counterbalancing Warsaw Pact 70
The Economic and Political Demise of the Soviet Union 71
NATO’s Expansionism and Containment of Russia 73
References 79
4 Ukrainian Desire for Political Autonomy and NATO
Accession 83
Orange Revolution 83
NATO Membership Action Plan and National Security
Strategy 85
vii
viii CONTENTS
Western Support for Ukraine 88

United States Motives of the War 92
References 112
5 Russian Responses, the Invasion, Sanctions
and International Law 121
Russian Retaliation 121
Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February 2022 133
Just War Debate 150
International Condemnation of the Invasion and Western
Sanctions 157
International Law Efforts 167
References 187
6 Conclusion 209
References 216
Bibliography 217
Index 257
About the Author
Dr. Danny Singh is Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Rela-

tions at Teesside University, where he is Course Leader for M.A. in
International Relations/M.A. International Relations Applied. He holds
a Ph.D. in Politics and Criminology. His research interests include police
corruption and anti-corruption in war-torn environments, just war and
military ethics, international relations theory and conflict studies. He is
author of Investigating Corruption in the Afghan Police Force: Insta-
bility and Insecurity in Post-Conflict Societies (Policy Press) and co-editor
of Comparative Just War Theory: An Introduction to International
Perspectives (Rowman & Littlefield).
Dr. Singh’s current book projects are situated within political philos-
ophy and international relations. A book titled Afro-Communitarian
Ethics and Foreign Armed Intervention (Springer) is due for publication
in early 2024. For forthcoming works, Singh is working on several sample
chapters and seeking a book contract on The Failure of Neoconservative
Nation-Building in Afghanistan: A Liberal-Realist Muddle and Realist-
Constructivist Ethics: The “Normative” Morality and Ethics of Western
Intervention.
ix
Abbreviations
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation

CBS Columbia Broadcasting System
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CNBC Consumer News and Business Channel
CNN Cable News Network
DCFTA Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy
EU European Union
G7 Group of Seven
GDP Gross Domestic Product
ICC International Criminal Court
ICISS International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICJ International Court of Justice
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IDPs International Displaced People
IMF International Monetary Fund
MAP Membership Action Plan
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDTV New Delhi Television Limited
OPEC Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OUN Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists
PoWs Prisoners of War
R2P Responsibility to Protect
RTS Radio Television Serbia
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
xi
xii ABBREVIATIONS
UK United Kingdom
UN United States
UNMIK United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo
US United States
WMD Weapon of Mass Destruction
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been its largest European interven-

tion since the Second World War. The conflict has devastated major
cities in Ukraine as the Russian-armed forces surrounded Kyiv and then
captured Mariupol. At the time of writing, according to the United
Nations (UN), there have been 24,862 civilian casualties (with 9,083
killed and 15,779 sustaining injuries) via explosive weapons, such as heavy
artillery shells, missiles, airstrikes and rocket launch systems.1 Equally, as
of early 2023, the number of “refugees from Ukraine recorded across
Europe” has reached almost 8 million (7,915,287) with most located in
Poland (1,553,707) and almost 5 million (4,905,293) Ukrainian refugees
have been listed for “Temporary Protection” or comparable European
“national protection schemes.”2 The number of Ukrainians crossing their
border to enter European states exceeds 14 million (14,270,682) and
over 6.5 million Ukrainians have been internally displaced.3
Russia has been condemned by the international community and sanc-
tions have been placed on the Kremlin and Russian oligarchs. Moreover,
1 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner, “Ukraine: Civilian Casualty

Update,” June 19, 2023.
2 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Operational Data Portal: Ukraine
Refugee Situation,” January 3, 2023.
3 International Organization for Migration, “Ukraine: International Displaced People
(IDPs) Estimates,” November 4, 2022.
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2023
D. Singh, The Tripartite Realist War: Analysing Russia’s Invasion
of Ukraine, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34163-2_1
2 D. SINGH
Ukraine has been supported by the United States (US) and European
states with military equipment and financial and humanitarian aid. Diplo-
macy has failed. Russian and Ukrainian officials have met in Belarus—a
Russian ally—on at least three occasions to create a short ceasefire and
open humanitarian corridors to safely evacuate Ukrainian civilians, but
the agreements do not consolidate with Kyiv’s political ambitions and
thus Russian airstrikes still hit major Ukrainian cities.
The purpose of this book is to provide an overview of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and how it has engaged in expan-
sionism policy to further contain Russia in contemporary international
affairs with the accession of additional former Soviet states. To attain this
objective, the book covers a realist understanding of the initiation and
continuation of the current Russia-Ukraine conflict by responding to the
research question; how can realism explain power politics of the current
Russian invasion of Ukraine? Alternative explanations can be reached
with different theories, but realism (and its variations) is selected, and
proven when compared with liberalism and constructivism, to under-
stand the dynamics of power politics due to the historical legacy of
NATO, the former Soviet Union and its dissolution and the relation-
ship between Russia and Ukraine. It is specifically argued that NATO,
Russia and Ukraine pursued realist interests that serve as the main cata-
lyst of this conflict, making diplomacy and collective defence measures
difficult to implement. An understanding of classical realism and struc-
tural realism during the Cold War is initially presented to harness an
understanding of NATO, Ukrainian and Russian geopolitical interests. To
reach this argument, the book addresses two further international rela-
tions theories—liberalism and constructivism—as competing theories,4
when analysing the role of NATO, Ukraine’s ambitions of accession to the
4 This follows a similar structure with Posen on security of the European Union
explained with the tenets of realism, principally structural realism to present the balance
of power theory on US unipolarity, which is contrasted with liberalism as a competing
international relations theory (Barry Ross Posen, “European Union Security and Defence
Policy: Response to Unipolarity?” Security Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (April–June 2006),
pp. 149–186). The former theory, realism, presents the debate on how European states
have expanded security initiatives since 1999 with the European Security and Defence
Policy (ESDP) as an alternative security provider to NATO and the latter theory on
how balancing is not required because European states are liberal democracies that share
similar liberalist values (Barry Ross Posen, “ESDP and the Structure of World Power,”
The International Spectator, Vol. 39, No. 1 (April 2008), pp. 6–9; Posen, “European
Union Security and Defence Policy,” pp. 153–164).
1 INTRODUCTION 3
Western Alliance, which has been supported by the West and American
motivations of the war, Russian responses, the February 2022 invasion,
and international condemnation, imposed sanctions and legal debates
against the Kremlin.
Although the book examines the events of the Russian invasion of
Ukraine from a realist perspective (including most of its variations), this
purpose serves to develop an understanding of the conflict, and principally
the role of power politics, between NATO, Ukraine and Russia. It will
endeavour an analysis of what tenet(s) of realism best explain(s) Russia’s
recent invasion of Ukraine. In doing so, the book covers the main variants
of realism, namely classical realism, structural realism (both offensive and
defensive neorealism ) and applies them to the war within the historical
and contemporary analyses (Chapters 3–5).
Despite a strong leaning towards realism, competing international rela-
tions theories—namely liberalism and constructivism—are also presented
to provide alternative explanations of the war. The book will later demon-
strate the limits of liberalism when analysing the deficits of regime
theory, condemnation, sanctions, just war ethics and international legal
efforts against Russia. However, the variations of constructivism, namely
conventional and critical, also provide valid explanations on the ideational
politics of Russian and Ukrainian ideology, historical symbols and myths
and language (discourse) that can supplement realist national security
interests (the material realities/outcomes). Although the accounts of
liberalism and constructivism are less substantive than realism to explain
the war, they provide useful explanations of state behaviour, the role of
institutional alliances, international law and standardization and socially
constructed myths, symbols and accounts of the enemy.
The forthcoming chapter presents realist, liberalist and constructivist
theories. After a discussion on realism, demonstrating a principal focus on
statism, survival and self-help to deal with anarchy by seeking relative gain
within the international political system, liberalism is covered. It includes
the basis on respecting international law and upholding the rule of law,
meaning that even heads of states are accountable for war crimes. This
part also engages with the role of other regional security organizations
that are pivotal for peace, cooperation, trade and the rules of collective
security and self-defence for the absolute advantage of states within the
international society. These aspects are relevant to endorse and promote
sanctions and international law, and internationally condemn the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. It will be argued that regime theory explains how
4 D. SINGH
international organizations promote rules, norms and standardization that

are respected by member states. These rules include the Responsibility to
Protect doctrine that has promoted rules to undermine state sovereignty
in the event of a state manifestly failing to protect the lives of their civilians
by reiterating instruments pertained within Chapter VII of the Charter of
the United Nations on sanctions and potential intervention. The final part
of this chapter covers constructivism to outline that identity politics of a
state and its principal actors, and how political leaders socially construct
and produce ideas such as national security interests and foreign policy.5
Following the discussion of realism, liberalism and constructivism, the
role of NATO during the Cold War is covered. This chapter reflects on
the structural realist explanations of NATO that attempted to contain the
Soviet Union that was met with the counterbalance of the Soviet Union’s
allied Warsaw Pact. An overview on the demise of the Warsaw Pact and
impact of the Soviet Union’s dissolution follows. The fall of the Iron
Curtain placed NATO in an advantageous position for expansionism to
further contain and weaken Russia with the accession of former Soviet
Union occupied Baltic states, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.
Coverage on the role of Ukraine desiring NATO membership and its
revolutions that has formed further inimical relations with Russia follows
in the subsequent chapter. It is contended that Ukraine wanted to avoid
another scenario of the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and changing poli-
cies to suit Russian interests by pursuing Kyiv’s national security policy
and amended constitution motivated for the security that NATO could
provide.
The subsequent parts of the chapter cover US objectives of the war and
how Russia has distanced itself from the international community due to
perceptions of violations of international law from both NATO and the
5 It must be stressed that all the broad tents of realism, liberalism and construc-
tivism as meta-theories span beyond the scope of this book. Therefore, the basis of
these three mainstream international relations theories is covered to analyse Russia’s inva-
sion of Ukraine and the role of power politics that has undermined regime theory
and liberalism. Moreover, the book does not criticize each theory from its own meta-
theories. For a comprehensive review of the separated components of realism, liberalism
and constructivism, consult Robert Jackson, Georg Sörensen and Jörgen Möller, Intro-
duction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches, 7th ed. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2019), pp. 69–142, 234–261 or Joseph Grieco, Gliford John Ikenberry
and Michael Mastanduno, Introduction to International Relations: Perspectives, Connections
and Enduring Questions, 2nd ed. (London: Red Globe Press, 2019), pp. 78–93.
1 INTRODUCTION 5
United States. The political motives of the United States are then brought
to attention because it had led to the containment of the Soviet Union
and subsequently Russia since the outset of the Cold War, ultimately
forming security allies from Canada and Europe with the formation of
NATO.
Russia’s criticism of NATO and the United States overriding interna-
tional law to pursue their geopolitical interests are raised with the contexts
of Serbia in 1999, Iraq in 2003 and Libya in 2011. The latter contexts
specifically focus on the political stalemate within the United Nations
Security Council, Putin’s legal criticism of NATO intervening in Kosovo
and Libya and the United States in Iraq to further sway the Kremlin away
from the international community and pursue an illiberal authoritarian
regime. Russia’s position has undermined the Responsibility to Protect
doctrine due to Moscow and often China, protecting the state sovereignty
of Syria when under scrutiny of using chemical weapons against civil-
ians to foster amicable relations with Damascus as a crucial Middle East
client state. Russia and China share the belief of complying with tradi-
tional Westphalian sovereignty and interpret the Charter of the United
Nations to protect state sovereignty from the encroachment of other
states pursuing their international relations.6
The penultimate analysis chapter builds on the evaluation of Kyiv’s
ambitions to provide a discussion on Russia’s security dilemma of poten-
tial Ukrainian accession into NATO that would also contain Russia from
its western border. This covers Russian responses from namely 2008 to
date that has included supporting Georgian separatists, shutting off gas
supplies to Ukraine, annexing Crimea, supporting the separatist move-
ments of Luhansk and Donetsk during the Donbass War, and eventually
invading Ukraine in late February 2022. The latter has resulted in
the further annexation of four oblasts located in the Donbass region,
positioned in eastern Ukraine, in September 2022.
The discordant relations between Russia and Ukraine are followed
by the relevance of international responses of condemnation, sanctions,
just war theoretical responses and international legal debates. The inter-
national law arguments will address the inability of NATO to directly
defend a non-member via a military intervention in Ukraine, and the
unlikely viability of holding Putin accountable for the crime of aggression
6 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, October 24, 1945, 1 United Nations
Treaty Series XVI, Article 2 (4).
6 D. SINGH
and war crimes. It will be argued that Russia has contravened just war
ethics by targeting Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and energy sources
that stretches beyond military necessity, but power politics presently, and
historically, advocates that just war is merely a justification of war that
Putin has marketed to his populace with discourse, myths and symbols.
The conclusion argues that a tripartite realism of NATO, Ukraine and
Russia is fundamental to understand the conflict that has made collec-
tive security measures, NATO’s collective defence for a non-member
(Ukraine), diplomacy and accountability for the crime of aggression and
war crimes difficult to implement. The shift from NATO’s bipolar balance
of power to expanding Western influence has further antagonized Russia.
After engaging in alternative liberalist and constructivist explanations, a
realist account of the current war is reached because the principal focus
rests on power politics to understand the context that can promote better
diplomatic relations between Russia and Ukraine.
References
Grieco, Joseph, Gliford John Ikenberry, and Michael Mastanduno. Introduction
to International Relations: Perspectives, Connections, and Enduring Questions,
2nd ed. London: Red Globe Press, 2019.
International Organisation for Migration. “Ukraine: IDP Estimates.” November
4, 2022, https://data.humdata.org/dataset/ukraine-idp-estimates.
Jackson, Robert, Georg Sörensen, and Jörgen Möller. Introduction to Interna-
tional Relations: Theories and Approaches, 7th ed. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2019.
Posen, Barry Ross. “European Union Security and Defence Policy: Response to
Unipolarity?” Security Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (April–June 2006), pp. 149–
186, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410600829356.
Posen, Barry Ross. “ESDP and the Structure of World Power.” The International
Spectator, Vol. 39, No. 1 (April 2008), pp. 5–17, https://doi.org/10.1080/
03932720408457057.
United Nations. Charter of the United Nations. October 24, 1945, 1 United
Nations Treaty Series, XVI.
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Operational Data Portal:
Ukraine Refugee Situation,” January 3, 2023, https://data.unhcr.org/en/sit
uations/ukraine.
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner. “Ukraine: Civilian Casu-
alty Update.” June 19, 2023, https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2023/06/
ukraine-civilian-casualty-update-19-june-2023.
CHAPTER 2
Main International Relations Theories
This chapter provides the basis of realism, liberalism and constructivism.

These theories will then be utilised to explain the Cold War rivalry
between the United States aligned with NATO and the Soviet Union
united with the Warsaw Pact, Ukraine’s objectives to join NATO, Russia’s
retaliation and the events of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
An Explanation of Realism
Realism undertakes a pessimistic perspective of human nature that focuses
on a global desire for power and the inescapability of egoism.1 All actions
cannot be free of egoism because states, as with individuals, advance their
self-interests and are power hungry.2 The basic foundations of realism rest
on the calculation of primacy of state interests and “unregulated compe-
tition of states,” with states functioning as the highest rational actors
seeking power in relative terms within an anarchic international system
vying for state survival.3 These aspects of egoistic human nature coupled
1 Hans Joachim Morgenthau, Scientific Man Versus Power Politics (Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 1946).
2 Hans Joachim Morgenthau, Dilemmas of Politics (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press, 1958), pp. 55–58.
3 Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2000), p. 7.
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 7

Switzerland AG 2023
D. Singh, The Tripartite Realist War: Analysing Russia’s Invasion
of Ukraine, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34163-2_2
8 D. SINGH
with anarchy, and the absence of a central governing authority, result in

constraints on state behaviour in international politics. Based on egoistic
human nature and anarchy, international politics is primarily conflictual
and competitive.
This section is split into four parts. The initial part introduces the
older explanations of realism deriving from political and classical realism
regarding power politics and the repudiation of diplomacy. This is
followed by neorealist assertions of offensive and defensive realists on how
states deal with anarchy in the international political system. Subsequently,
the realist ethics of mainly prudence and scepticism address calculations of
national security interests and problems with stretching ambitious liberal-
idealism beyond domestic interests. Finally, the theory of realism will be
justified as the main lens of international relations theoretical analysis for
Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
Political/Classical Realism
Realism is an archaic theory in international relations. Classical realism
focuses on: (i) power among states; (ii) self-interests holding main moti-
vation; and (iii) the negation of a moral outlook to idealism.4 It has
roots to ancient Greece and the famous Melian dialogue. The Melian
dialogue comprises the Siege of Melos (416 BC) that entailed a war
between two rival city-states: Athens and Sparta. This besieging is notably
narrated by an Athenian historian and general, Thucydides, who was in
exile during the negotiations between the Athenians and heads of Melos.
Athens was the superior nation that invaded Melos, the weaker nation,
which was positioned in the Aegean Sea (an island east of Greece) inhab-
ited by Dorian islanders.5 The Melian population were ethnically similar
to Spartans and opted to preserve neutrality during the war.
Once Melos was invaded, the Athenians ordered the Melians to
concede to Athens or be slaughtered by a greater army. The Melians
would not surrender and stressed they were a neutral city, and thus did
not constitute an enemy, meaning Athens should hold no interest to
4 Steven Forde, “International Realism and the Science of Politics: Thucydides, Machi-
avelli, and Neorealism,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 2 (June 1995),
p. 143.
5 Thucydides, Speeches from Thucydides, trans. Henry Musgrave Wilkins (London:
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1873), p. 171.
2 MAIN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES 9
conquer them. Despite the Melian declaration of neutrality, the Athenian

army seized their city, killing their men of military ages, and captured
women and children because morality had no place in the real world
as the strong conquer and the weak must suffer this tragedy of interna-
tional politics.6 This example of the Melian dialogue leaves no room for
diplomacy.7 This well-cited example of the Peloponnesian War demon-
strates that hope and pride are fruitless because it is selfishness and
pragmatism that motivate wars.8 The Athenians contended that they had
no alternative but to conquer Melos, or they would be perceived as
weak. Thucydides contended that Athenian imperialism was justified by
Euphemus for rulers to avert ascendancy by others and balance power
due to the anarchic structure in international politics as an alternative
of profiting or augmenting honour.9 Thucydides endeavoured to supple-
ment anarchy with human nature to moderate realism but recognised that
the balance between state interests and morality could not be associated
in global politics.10
The Melian dialogue thus offers a traditional context of political
realism at odds with liberal-idealism. This pragmatism emphasises the
selfish motivations of a sovereign opting to wage war that trumps
moral peaceful resolution.11 Early classical realists, notably Thucydides,
acknowledged a scientific approach but also asked “normative ques-
tions.”12 This structural argument justifying imperialism is ethically vindi-
cated by the need for a state to survive and preserve its standing against
threats by force, which has influenced contemporary realist ethics on the
selfishness of human nature and state interests.
6 David Kinsella, Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, World Politics: The Menu for Choice,
10th ed. (Boston, MA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2013), p. 40.
7 Robert B. Strassler, The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the
Peloponnesian War (New York: Free Press, 1996).
8 Philip Nel, “Theories of International Relations,” in Power, Wealth and Global Equity:
An International Relations Textbook for Africa, 3rd ed., eds. Patrick J. McGowan, Scarlett
Cornelissen and Philip Nel (Lansdowne, PA: UCT Press, 2006), pp. 23–24.
9 Forde, “International Realism and the Science of Politics,” p. 149.
10 Forde, “International Realism and the Science of Politics,” pp. 145, 154.
11 W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz, A History of Political Philosophy: From Thucydides to
Locke (New York: Global Scholarly Publications, 2010), p. 13.
12 Forde, “International Realism and the Science of Politics,” p. 143.
10 D. SINGH
Hobbes later stressed that if a government, civilisation and laws are

absent, then human nature would be unrestrained, meaning that a state
of nature concerns war between all, including neighbours, in a human
struggle to pursue power.13 This results in a security dilemma when
states will maximise their security agenda that may include developing
new technology or weapons procurement that decreases the security—at
least ideologically—of another state(s).
Human motives and the prominence of state interests makes realism
traditionally hostile to morality even if questioned, but Niccolò Machi-
avelli in his 1513 work “The Prince” contended that rulers should
maintain themselves and the state that cannot be value free and thus
contains no room for morality.14 Rather, state behaviour and the actions
of statesmen can be changed to amplify rationality to oust morality. For
example, imperialist ancient Rome provided a rational response to the
system of anarchy and thus warfare was the only method to cope.15 Polit-
ical outcomes and gain are predicted due to little room for diplomacy,
and thus selfish interests drive international relations.16 If diplomacy is
utilised, then it merely complements military action.
Morgenthau devised six principles of political realism. One, objective
laws are rooted in human nature. Two, interests should be defined in
terms of power to avert the agenda of statesmen by concentrating on
maximising gain and minimising risk. Three, the interest of power is
not rigid and universal because it is dependent on each political and
cultural context. Four, the recognition on the moral implications of polit-
ical action that must be sifted through tangible conditions of time and
place. Five, refuting a single nation’s moral ambitions and laws to govern
the world order. Six, differentiate national interests from legalistic and
moralistic perspectives.17 These principles of political realism can form
skilful diplomacy to promote stability through the preservation of the
balance of power.
13 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, or, the Matter, Form, and Power of a Common-Wealth
and Ecclesiastical and Civil (London: Green Dragon, 1651).
14 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press,
1985).
15 Machiavelli, The Prince, pp. 11–13.
16 Hans Joachim Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and
Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948).
17 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 1948 ed.
Political realism separates the feasibility from the desirable within

a particular space, time and place/political occurrence.18 Hurrell has
normatively questioned what can be done within the limits of the polit-
ical landscape, which constitutes the reality, at a given time—thus sharing
traits with Morgenthau’s postulation on practicality.19 Based on this
thinking, classical realists would be inclined to stress that moral percep-
tions are incompatible when a state is faced with the task of considering to
wage war or engage with their foreign policy.20 Pragmatism in particular
contexts is the bedrock of political and classical realism.
Neorealism: Offensive and Defensive Realists

Other types of realism are equally prevalent. Structural realists (neoreal-
ists) stress that the power of nations is most important within interna-
tional relations due to the global anarchical structure and lack of trust
in international politics.21 State centrism is a principal focus of realism to
motivate the interests of state behaviour intending to pursue survival in an
anarchical world.22 Waltz contended that a global government is unlikely
to surface due to the risk of an international civil war.23 This assertion
runs in contravention of liberalist ideals establishing a new Leviathan
or a cosmopolitan democracy seeking to apply democratic norms and
values globally, as envisioned by David Held,24 due to a breakdown
of a functioning global authority to properly govern and regulate state
Peace, brief ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), p. 7.
19 Andrew Hurrell, “Norms and Ethics in International Relations,” in Handbook of
International Relations, eds. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons
(London: SAGE Publications, 2000), p. 137.
20 In contrast, pacifists would argue that war is never morally permissible.
21 Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York City, NY: McGraw-
Hill, 1979), p. 97.
22 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 1948 ed., p. 13; Waltz, Theory of International
Politics, pp. 74–77.
23 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 112.
24 David Jonathan Andrew Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern
State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995).
12 D. SINGH
behaviour(s).25 This debate is why neorealists argue that states must adopt
a policy of self-help and thus decide for themselves to survive. Morgen-
thau similarly argued that international relations had to place power
politics at the centre of international politics.26
Classical realism and neorealism can be separated. Classical realists
focus on the core causes behind war and conflicts because human nature is
flawed. It is the overconfidence of political actors that escalate war rather
than fear from the structural conditions of anarchy.27 Conversely, neore-
alists stress that it is the conditions of anarchy within the international
political system that produces the engrained roots of war and conflict that
is coupled with weak controls and the presence of a competent interna-
tional authority of global governance. Such modern approaches to realism
frame security as the main objectives of states (as the main rational actors)
that do not believe in the potential of progress.28 Neorealists, and espe-
cially offensive realists, contend that state behaviour is driven by material
structures within the global system that creates “security competition,”
especially for great powers.29
Mearsheimer, the main protagonist of offensive realism, defines power
with its relational toll, meaning that the amount of power stands on
the material outcomes and capabilities.30 Offensive realists perceive that
the state, and its national interests, must be the main priority because
abstract ideals such as promoting or promising human rights, democratic
peace and/or just war ethics in intervened states can weaken national and
25 Fiott has presented several criticisms with Kantian cosmopolitan order based on its
linear approach and the beliefs of sovereign equality because realists examine the plurality
of discreet political communities, based on sovereign inequality, geopolitical time and
space (Daniel Fiott, “Realist Thought and Humanitarian Intervention,” The International
History Review, Vol. 35, No. 4 [September 2013], pp. 766–782). Based on this realist
argument, cosmopolitanism can hinder the strategic realities of separated, unequal and
distant, state interests rather than foster democratic peace and the alleged good life.
26 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 1948 ed., p. 15.
27 Richard Ned Lebow, “International Relations Theory and the Ukrainian War,”
Analyse & Kritik, Vol. 44, No. 1 (July 2022), p. 118.
28 Lebow, “International Relations Theory and the Ukrainian War,” p. 111.
29 Adrian Hyde-Price, “Realism: A Dissident Voice in the Study of the CSDP,” in The
Routledge Handbook of European Security, eds. Sven Biscop and Richard G. Whitman
(London: Routledge, 2013), p. 22.
30 John Joseph Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York City, NY:
W.W. Norton, 2001), pp. 57–60.
security interests. In this sense, moral good can also do wrong. There-
fore, realists assume that states behave as rational actors that exercise
conflictual intentions, meaning that material capabilities matter.31 Ratio-
nality is required to analyse and predict trends of behaviour.32 The global
anarchic structure lacks a formal and centralised organisation, government
or entity to counteract states from pursuing a system of self-help. Self-help
comprises states attempting to reach their internal interests and forming
competition with other states by evading to reduce or dispose of their
primary interests. Competition between states is prevalent insofar that
each sovereign state maintains some form of equality within international
anarchic system. In sum, the main aspects of realism rest on states oper-
ating as rational principal actors and pursue own interests to survive that
are built on the preponderance of material outcomes and capabilities.33
For “offensive realists,” the formation of state behaviours in foreign
interventions operates as part of offensive military abilities to enhance
relative power due to uncertainty and other states enhancing power to
threaten other state’s survival.34 Based on this assertion, prevalent uncer-
tainty pushes states to maximise power (even if excessive) to remain
secure.35 In other words, states are driven to increase their relative
power because this is the most favourable method to maximise a state’s
security.36 This increases the likelihood of aggression and war, as a
consequence of vying for security, because order mostly serves great
powers.
As Mearsheimer argues, powerful states seek regional hegemony
and attempt to dominate most material resources, namely military and
economic, but also strive to constrain or influence the actions and
behaviours of smaller neighbouring states with the threat of consider-
able repercussions if these rules are disobeyed.37 Based on this premise,
31 Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” International
Security, Vol. 24, No. 2 (October 1999), pp. 5–55.
32 J. Samuel Barkin, Realist Constructivism: Rethinking International Relations Theory
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 23.
33 Donnelly, Realism and International Relations.
34 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 3.
37 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 49–51.
14 D. SINGH
great powers have the highest military and economic capabilities and
thus constitute the most important players in global politics.38 As a reac-
tion to uncertainty deriving from “anarchy and the security dilemma,”
states try to protect themselves by controlling or neutralising their border
areas.39 From such realist thinking, wars are initiated because a central
authority is absent (anarchy) to protect states and prevent them from
warring.40 Snyder similarly noted that “imperial expansion” contains few
problems because, as reminiscent of Thucydides’ Melian dialogue, “the
strong conquer the weak” due to its benefits.41 A powerful state may
thus harm another state so trust is lacking in the international system,
which forms uncertainty.42 Hence, major powers are driven “to build
regional spheres of influence near their borders” by dominating their
neighbours.43 This strategy of conquering, controlling and/or influ-
encing neighbours is easier to achieve than global dominance because
the projection of power deteriorates with distance.44 The work of Götz
is useful to extend neorealism to consider geographical influence insofar
that powerful states will try to “prevent smaller neighbouring states from
becoming military bridgeheads or allies of extra-regional powers” due to
rivalry from other powers “on its doorstep.”45 The balance of power is
what all countries have to deal with so states make calculations concerning
power and seek it for own maximisation as a means of survival and relative
gain over other rival states.46
38 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 17–18.

39 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, Vol. 30,
No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167, 169.
40 Stephen Martin Walt, “Liberal Illusions Caused the Ukraine Crisis,” Foreign Policy,
January 19, 2022.
41 Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambitions (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 302.
42 Walt, “Liberal Illusions Caused the Ukraine Crisis.”
43 Elias Götz, “Neorealism and Russia’s Ukraine Policy, 1991–Present,” Contemporary
Politics, Vol. 22, No. 3 (July 2016).
44 Stephen Martin Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1987), pp. 23–24.
45 Götz, “Neorealism and Russia’s Ukraine Policy,” p. 303.
Offensive realism is thus based on the uncertainty of states, namely

neighbours, and vying for survival to deal with anarchy in the interna-
tional system that presents the security dilemma. This tenet of realism
thus focuses on material factors that are important for states to maximise
relative advantage over rival states to survive within an international anar-
chical world. Great powers, irrespective of regime, will act in a similar
way, so it can be contended that offensive realism ignores, or substantially
disregards, moralism in international politics.
A state pursues self-interests by competition as a means of survival to
adapt in the absence of a centralised global authority. This is termed
defensive neorealism 47 and it urges states to retain reserved policies
to bring about their security.48 Waltz focuses on a structured anar-
chical system of states measured by their capabilities, meaning that the
balance of power for state survival ensures that rivals do not grow too
powerful.49 Defensive neorealists take the position that offensive expan-
sion policies downcast states conforming to the balance of power. Waltz
defended bipolarity to manage great powers that hold higher capabili-
ties in the international system to avert nuclear war and criticised US
incursions abroad.50 This pragmatism was normative, although not iden-
tified by Waltz, insofar that the balance of power could manage the
bipolarity of great powers by resisting over-extension in the interna-
tional political system to prevent a nuclear war.51 Posen has taken this
debate on structural realism further by studying European states, namely
the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).52 Europe has rid
of Soviet then allegedly Russian threats with European states bandwag-
oning with NATO, as a main instrument of US hegemony regarding
Eurasian land, and have improved unstable European economies.53 In
47 Conversely, offensive realism places emphasis on how states can maximise power and
authority to accomplish security via domination and work towards becoming a hegemon.
48 Waltz, Theory of International Politics.
51 Adam R.C. Humphreys, “Waltz and the World: Neorealism as International Political
Theory?” International Politics, Vol. 50, No. 6 (September 2013), p. 863.
52 Barry Ross Posen, “European Union Security and Defence Policy: Response to
Unipolarity?” Security Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (April–June 2006), pp. 149–186.
53 Barry Ross Posen, “ESDP and the Structure of World Power,” The International
Spectator, Vol. 39, No. 1 (April 2008), pp. 9–10.
16 D. SINGH
addition to European states arming to mainly please the United States,

the unlikely immanent threat from America has still resulted in balancing
the unipolarity of US power because even allies find America’s potential
international political world uncomfortable.54 This explains why Euro-
pean states, and the European Union, have become more involved in
security and started acting autonomously with security threats since the
late 1990s to provide an alternative security outlet than NATO.55
To explain the security dilemma more comprehensively, defensive
neorealism explains that antagonistic expansion policies endorsed offen-
sively downcast states compliant to the balance of power. Snyder identifies
that states seek survival against apparent threats by enhancing armed
forces or redrawing borders to frighten rival states.56 Due to anarchy,
states pursue modest strategies for security because attempting to gain
further power via aggression for expansion usually backfires.57 Anarchy
within the international system makes states and their fearful leaders
strive for survival, resulting in the enhancement of arms, alliances and
attempt to balance against prospective aggressors.58 Offensive realists
recognise that the world system is anarchical and thus survival is pivotal
for states, but by maximising their relative power rather than pursuing an
appropriate segment of power as Waltz previously argued.59 Therefore,
defensive realists, unlike offensive realists, prefer balancing than direct war
between great powers due to the risks associated.
The balance of power was historically applicable with the Cold War
bipolar axis, the United States and former Soviet Union, and subsequently
growing humanitarian and human rights concerns.60 The bipolar axis of
power then formed competition, namely the arms race or threat of nuclear
54 Posen, “European Union Security and Defence Policy,” pp. 149–150.

55 Posen, “ESDP and the Structure of World Power,” p. 12.
56 Snyder, Myths of Empire, p. 11.
57 Valerie Morkevičius, Realist Ethics: Just War Traditions as Power Politics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2018), p. 13.
58 Lebow, “International Relations Theory and the Ukrainian War,” p. 118.
59 Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou, “Waltz, Mearsheimer and the Post-Cold War World:
The Rise of America and the Fall of Structural Realism,” International Politics, Vol. 51,
No. 3 (April 2014), pp. 295–315.
60 Anja Hanish, “From Helsinki to Afghanistan: The CSCE Process and the Beginning
of the Second Cold War,” in The Nuclear Crisis: The Arms Race, Cold War Anxiety, and
the German Peace Movement of the 1980s, eds. Christoph Becker-Schaum, Philipp Gassert,
power, due to reinforced bipolar burdens within Europe which intensified

the security dilemma.61 During the Vietnam War, the United States and
its allies supported pro-Western South Vietnam to fight against commu-
nism in North Vietnam that was backed by the Soviet Union, China,
North Korea and further allies.62 Moreover, in the 1980s, the Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan aimed to support the crumbling communist
regime that was met with the United States allying “with radical Islamism
in Pakistan and Afghanistan” to support “a jihad [the Mujahideen]
against the Soviet invasion.”63 Therefore, proxy wars and the arms race
were fought between two great powers, the United States and former
Soviet Union, which constrained international law but direct warfare was
averted. During this time, smaller—and indeed weaker—states bandwag-
oned with great powers to demonstrate their backing for an alliance with
expected reciprocal (military and economic) support.
Realist Ethics
Rather than think of realism as a bold-headed and selfish theory unmarred
by ethical considerations, it is of importance to understand the ethics
that realists display. To illustrate this point, Morkevičius undermines the
“overly simplistic view” that “realists push states into wars” to present
the argument that realism considers ethics (when waging war).64 Realist
ethics are based on namely prudence, scepticism and reciprocity.
Prudence considers political repercussions of perceived “moral
action.”65 Based on prudence, realists refrain from evil intent but also
sway away from doing good by merely pursuing justice within the
Martin Klimke, Wilfried Mausbach and Marianne Zepp (Brooklyn, NY: Berghahn Books,
2016), pp. 37–38.
61 Robert S. Ross, “Bipolarity and Balancing in East Asia,” in Balance of Power: Theory
and Practice in the 21st Century, eds. T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michel Fortmann
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 290.
62 Andrew Wiest, Essential Histories: The Vietnam War 1956–1975 (New York:
Routledge, 2005), pp. 9–12.
63 Amin Saikal, “Afghanistan: During the Cold War,” in Superpower Rivalry and
Conflict: The Long Shadow of the Cold War on the Twenty-First Century, ed. Chandra
Chari (Oxon: Routledge, 2010), p. 58.
64 Morkevičius, Realist Ethics, p. 10.
65 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, brief ed., 1993, p. 12.
18 D. SINGH
international order. Morgenthau argued that politics and ethics rest on

the tension of weak “universal standards” and the multitude of state
morality.66 Realists calculate with prudence whether an intervention is
in the state’s self-interests, considering the risk of their soldier’s lives
and constraint on resources to avoid spending more on finances beyond
national state interests.67 States maintain primary interests and it cannot
relinquish to morality issues (based on individuals). This challenge rests
on normative desires and potential attainments.
Even if lives are at stake, political choices whether to intervene are part
of decisions who is invoking a threat to the peace that is based on interests
and the unavoidable selectivity of protection that often invokes support
of a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.68
The “logic of consequences” places priority of strategic objectives and
behaviour over the “logic of appropriateness” that supports legitimised
norms to supersede instrumental or strategic calculations of gain.69 The
parameters of possibility are constrained within an anarchic international
system that inevitably promotes a culture of self-help and state primacy to
survive in international politics. For Walt, war is always feasible so states
engage in self-help by seeking security and other gains—with uncertainty
on what other states will do later in time.70
In short, states hold primary interests, and a state cannot surrender to
morality (based on individuals). It should be acknowledged that realism
does reflect moral considerations of dealing with practical issues in the
world.71 Realist principles rest on survival, impetus for self-interests—due
Peace (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985), pp. 241–242.
67 Kenneth Neal Waltz, “A Strategy for the Rapid Deployment Force,” International
Security, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Spring 1981), p. 51.
68 Martti Koskenniemi, “The Place of Law in Collective Security,” Michigan Journal of
International Law, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1996), p. 464.
69 James Gardner March and Johan Peder Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of Inter-
national Political Orders,” International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998),
p. 949.
71 Jennifer M. Welsh, “Taking Consequences Seriously: Objections to Humanitarian
Intervention,” in Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations, ed. Jennifer
M. Welsh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 58.
to anarchy—and prudence that considers ethics and morality as a comple-

mentary measure for national security interests.72 Realists would stress
that when vital security issues or economic opulence interests are absent,
then norms may have an impact on shaping state behaviour. However,
contemporary realists have contended that normative attributes to foreign
policy influence inferior national interests, meaning that normative values
will be ignored when there are essential national security and economic
interests at concern.73 For realists, states function as rational actors. If
there are no security or economic interests of concern, then powerful
states may provide support to encourage better relations.
Some realists act as moral philosophers because they believe in liberalist
ideals by heart, but pragmatism is deemed as the predominant factor(s)
of national decision-making. For instance, E.H. Carr has discussed what
the international political system ought to be but prefers to examine it
with a rationalist perspective.74 Carr was writing in the interwar period
and the aftermath of the Second World War that observed the fiasco of
international institutions and international law that reinvigorated realist
notions of states functioning as the main actors in global politics, with the
betterment of chasing power politics and material capabilities. Carr had
controversially defended the policies of Britain’s Arthur Neville Chamber-
lain on appeasement towards Adolf Hitler’s of Germany with the premise
that Germany’s strength would not hinder principal British interests.75
Hence, especially for classical realists, political and ethical behaviour is
condemned to failure except if the practicality and rationality of states are
considered. Morality must be filtered within the particular political time
and space.
72 Fiott, “Realist Thought and Humanitarian Intervention.”

73 Adrian Hyde-Price, “Realist Ethics and the “War on Terror”,” Globalizations, Vol.
6, No. 1 (March 2009), p. 26.
74 Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939: An Introduction to the
Study of International Relations (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 135–136.
75 Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939. It was Chamberlain’s successor of the
leader of the Conservative Party Sir Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill who turned
against previous appeasement to prevent Nazi Germany’s territorial ambitions.
20 D. SINGH
The practicality of state decision-making, behaviour and functionality is

based on a state’s resources, structure and geographic position.76 If politi-
cians focus on overly idealistic aspects on what should be, it is hazardous
and immoral if it causes political and economic policies that result in states
and its populace prone to brutality and coercion from other actors.77
For this reason, prudence is needed for realists to estimate foreign policy
conduct; and to appreciate power and anarchy in the international system.
Hence, statecraft considers ethics and morality, but it also provides ethical
constraints. Realist choices are needed on alternatives for morality to
proceed. If there are no choices, then there is no room for morality. Real-
ists look at the constraints and political choices to make calculated rational
choices to reflect vital state interests with effort to attach morality and
ethics if possible to do so. One such realist thinker, Carr, demonstrated
this in his well-known support for the careful/normative realist strand
by his emphasis on the need to balance military power with morality
when conducting intervention, via maintaining the dialogue of realism
and idealism to some degree.78
The reasons behind prudence resulted in scepticism. Realists are scep-
tical of the production of the “good life” and progression in human
development (via economic liberalism or political means).79 International
human rights, democratisation and economic liberalisation have been
spread by the West undertaking coercion instead of appeal or persuasion
that has doubted neoliberal institutionalism.80 Realist scepticism presents
contradictions on the idea of crusading that is masked with moral garb.
Agreements among a group of democracies does not mean that these
agreements or ideals are beneficial for other states. The interests of a state
or collection of states can be contained within an international society or
multilateral institution to impose “universal” interests on other states.81
“Social morality” can thus serve dominant group interests and enforce
76 Henry Alfred Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper &
Brothers Council on Foreign Relations, 1957), p. 5.
77 Hyde-Price, “Realism: A Dissident Voice in the Study of the CSDP,” pp. 22–23.
78 Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis: 1919–1939: An Introduction to the
Study of International Relations (New York: HarperCollins, 1939), p. 100.
79 Hyde-Price, “Realist Ethics and the “War on Terror”,” pp. 31–32.
80 Michael Lind, “The Alternative to Empire,” 2006, in Stephen McGlinchey, “Neo-
conservatism and American Foreign Policy,” E-International Relations (June 1, 2009).
81 Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939, 2001, p. 71.
ideals of social justice on subordinate groups as a method to justify

and maintain their standing of authority.82 Realist scepticism contradicts
imposed democratic imperialism that crosses outside of national security
interests.
If applying realist scepticism to external interventions, foreign incur-
sions need careful attention due to the contrasting perspectives from
discreet political communities that contradict linear cosmopolitan forms
of justice and rights.83 By way of illustration, humanitarian intervention
contains different connotations and objectives of external states overriding
the sovereign affairs of another state to save lives and install democracy
and justice that intensify conflict because states hardly share the same prin-
ciples and assurances.84 When a state contravenes a state’s sovereignty
with humanitarian intervention, long-term vows are frequently watered
down or belated from the deficiency of “compelling” self-interests that
verify commitment.85 In other words, the feasibility and pragmatism to
strive for ethical and self-interests (politics) at the forefront of issues, such
as humanitarian intervention, are debates that realists pursue on prudence
and scepticism.86 Finally, reciprocity is based on the restraint, compromise
and shared accommodation between each discreet political community.
These communities can pursue political policies to respect other state
interests if protecting and promoting own interests.87
82 Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939, 2001, pp. 74–75.

83 Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939, 2001, pp. 78–80.
84 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (1985).
85 Michael Wesley, “Toward a Realist Ethics of Intervention,” Ethics & International
Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 2 (September 2005), p. 70.
86 Humanitarian intervention has been famously defined by Holzgrefe as a definite
or threat of force that perseveres past state borders by either an additional state, or
collective group of states, to prevent serious human rights abuses without the voli-
tion of state territorial authority where a force has intruded (Jeff L. Holzgrefe, “The
Humanitarian Intervention Debate,” in Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and
Political Dilemmas, ed. Jeff L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane [Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003], p. 18).
87 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, brief ed., 1993, p. 13.
22 D. SINGH
Justification and Summary of Realism

Based on the points raised in this section, realpolitik is relevant in inter-
national politics. The main justification of pursuing the theory of realism
to the context of Russia’s invasion in Ukraine rests on the importance
of powerful state’s strategic interests and what they do once these are
repeatedly threatened. The book adopts the structural realist position that
NATO’s expansionism towards Russia’s borders significantly threatened
its central strategic interests. This had driven Russian power politics on its
periphery, leading to an inevitable invasion of Ukraine. Although this is a
matter of intense public debate, the main argument is that power politics,
in the context of the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine, reflects elements
of realism, namely classical and structural, and the Ukraine invasion is
undoubtedly a first-order international problem.
The realist ethics of scepticism help explain the pitfalls of liberalism
regarding the Russia-Ukraine war. As Mearsheimer has argued, Western
liberals have wrongly dismissed realism and continually pursued democ-
racy, economic interdependence and the rule of law to promote Ukraine
as a Western grip to border Russia.88 Several other realists have convinc-
ingly argued that liberalist ideals have proven hazardous to national
security interests and foreign policy by ignoring the importance of power
politics. To provide one of many examples, Porter has argued that
restoring ideals of a liberal order, which is important for US hegemony,
has resulted in unattainable ideals merging politeness with the risk of
force.89
As will be demonstrated in the book, there are many accounts
warranting investigations for war crimes against Russian military conduct
but the Responsibility to Protect doctrine has been criticised by Cunliffe
due to the prerogative resting on states, meaning that powerful states
determine criteria of when and how the doctrine is discharged.90 Walt
has also criticised liberalism for heightening risks of perceiving opponents
as evil or seeing a state as fully virtuous engaging in “open-ended moral
88 John Joseph Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal
Delusions That Provoked Putin,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 93, No. 5 (September–October
2014), pp. 77–78.
89 Patrick Porter, The False Promise of Liberal Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2020),
pp. 2–3.
90 Philip Cunliffe, “Dangerous Duties: Power, Paternalism and the ‘Responsibility to
Protect’,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 36, No. S1 (October 2010), pp. 79–96.
crusades.”91 Realism, and in particular its classical and neorealist forms,

acknowledge the importance of power politics due to an anarchical world
that undermines international law, human rights and other standards and
provide scepticism of ambitious idealist schemes with promises of ending
conflict, inequality and injustice.
In sum, realism is based on survival, motivation of self-interests,
anarchy and prudence that provide a complementarity approach to diplo-
macy, ethics and international law but predominantly for national interests
rather than saving lives. Realism is grounded on statism, survival and self-
help. The strands of realism presented reveal similarities on a pessimistic
view of human nature, the competitive nature of groups and states
focusing on managing chaos in the anarchical international system due
to the uncertainty of other state’s actions and or policies.92 Sovereign
inequality is a main feature and power politics remain as animals (states)
fight without control or containment from a zoo (international organ-
isation). International organisations and globalisation cannot constrain
great powers, because states have adequate power to interpret and explain
sovereignty to complement their interests.93 Within the jungle (anarchical
international system), some animals (states) are a lot stronger than others.
Therefore, a collection of animals will have to ally as a group and/or
within a zoo against powerful predators to contain them.
Therefore, classical realism and structural realism are the most appro-
priate meta-theories of realism to frame the significance of the argument
and intended scholarly contribution relevant for the Russo-Ukrainian war.
Realism has been selected as the theory to provide an analysis on under-
standing the historical legacy of relations between NATO, Russia and
Ukraine that has reached the February 2022 invasion. This is to focus on
the main tenets of realism, namely classical and structural realism (offen-
sive and/or defensive), to assess which realist theory does it better than
others to answer the set research question concerning power politics of
the contemporary Russian invasion of Ukraine.
91 Stephen Martin Walt, “The World Wants You to Think Like a Realist,” Foreign
Policy, May 30, 2018.
92 Morkevičius, Realist Ethics, p. 17.
93 Charles E. Ziegler, “Conceptualising Sovereignty in Russian Foreign Policy: Realist
and Constructivist Perspectives,” International Politics, Vol. 49, No. 4 (May 2012),
pp. 400–417.
24 D. SINGH
Despite a leaning towards realism, liberalism is provided as an alter-

native international relations theory to foster problems with the incon-
sistency of international law, regime theory and unheroic bandwagoning,
and the fallacy of sovereign equality between states within the interna-
tional political system. Even though the author is critical of liberalism,
the explanations of democratic peace, bangwagoning with NATO and its
rules of standardisation, the application of international law, international
humanitarian law, collective security, humanitarian intervention and the
Responsibility to Protect are useful to assess why and how states and
international institutions strive for absolute, rather than relative, advan-
tage. Furthermore, constructivism is offered with the purpose to harness
an understanding of the beliefs, language, interactions, history, culture
and actions of political leaders representing states (social actors), meaning
that international politics contains ideational, rather than solely material,
forces. This theory intersubjectively explains how states behave and deal
with issues such as a security dilemma or anarchy.
An Explanation of Liberalism
In contrast to realism, liberalism is based on the mutual coopera-
tion between states to provide better security and economic stability.
It includes diplomatic relations within a collection of states that share
“sovereign equality” and “multilateral cooperation” to promote collec-
tive security and mutual economic advantage.94 This notion of “liberal
states” striving for absolute gain includes democratisation to achieve
individual autonomy and the constitutional protection of basic civil
and political rights and an opportunity to form cooperation and free
trade with other democratic states.95 Within democratic states, liberalism
promotes individual equality, autonomy and protections of human rights
and fundamental freedoms against the state and other private actors.
This section is spilt into four components. It initially covers the alleged
benefits of democratic peace spanning from utopian liberalism to provide
better trade, increased democracies and equitable rights for global citizens
94 Peter G. Danchin and Horst Fischer, “Introduction: The New Collective Security,”
in United Nations Reform and the New Collective Security, eds. Peter G. Danchin and
Horst Fischer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 5), pp. 1–31.
95 Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy & Public
Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Summer 1983), pp. 205–208.
within the international system. This is followed by neoliberalism, regime

theory and institutional liberalism to explain how international organi-
sations shape norms and standardise behaviour that result in reciprocal
expectations. A specific example of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine
is provided in the event of the international community responding to
atrocity crimes. Finally, a summary of liberalism is provided on its main
ideals comprising democratic standards, absolute gain, welfare and human
rights ideals and humanitarian intervention.
Democratic Peace Theory and Cosmopolitanism

Aspects of democratisation and economic liberalism can be traced to
former US President Thomas Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points Speech
in 1918 that underpinned utopian liberalism. Points 1 and 3 focused on
diplomacy and the removal of economic trade barriers to form better
relations with the assumption that democratic states that trade with
one another are less likely to wage war with one another.96 This was
later framed by peace advocates as the democratic peace thesis.97 Doyle
contended that the absence of war between democratic states is due to the
“mutual respect” of liberty, citizenship rights and political independence
to prefer restraint and diplomacy—with such publics being against war.98
Other liberalists similarly argue that large-scale wars are too costly on a
society which is why democracies are promoted as a strategy for peace.99
Democracies do not fight each other but fight wars with authori-
tarian states. For instance, in June 1982, Ronald Reagan’s speech in
the United Kingdom parliament called for “a crusade for freedom”
against communism and claimed that the Soviet Union was the empire
of “evil.”100 “For liberals, the solution is to topple tyrants and spread
96 Thomas Woodrow Wilson, The Fourteen Points Speech (Boston, MA: Squid Ink
Classics, 1918).
97 Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United
Nations Peace Operations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).
98 Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), p. 10.
99 Andrew Moravcik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International
Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1997), p. 531.
100 Ronald Wilson Reagan, “Address to Members of the British Parliament,” Ronald
Reagan Presidential Library & Museum, June 8, 1982.
26 D. SINGH
democracy, markets and institutions based on the belief that democra-

cies don’t fight one another, especially when they are bound together by
trade, investment and an agreed-on set of rules.”101 The former Soviet
Union allegedly exercised aggressive foreign policy without restrained and
peaceful intentions to assert that authoritarianism makes war.
Doyle has further stressed that totalitarian regimes infringe all
cosmopolitan rights.102 It has been contended that the default status
of liberal democratic states produces peaceful relations in comparison
with authoritarian states because democracies tend to prefer restraint and
diplomacy, and thus the democratic public is usually against war.103 By
way of illustration, the United States in Vietnam and German and French
publics desired later withdrawal from Iraq. The policy of democratic peace
encourages the formation of additional democracies to foster stronger
peace that will result in international politics being less conflictual and
more peaceful. This was evident in American foreign policy since the end
of the Cold War and more so since 9/11 in the Middle East. Terrorism
is debatably grown from the deficiency of democracy in the Middle East
and US objectives directed democratic peace theory to thwart instability
since the end of the Cold War era.
Republican liberalism shares similarities with the democratic peace
thesis. For Kant, republicanism pertains legitimacy and the ideals for
perpetual peace.104 To attain a long-lasting peace, a set of certain
basic rights and fundamental freedoms can be shared between states
under cosmopolitan law—or what is often referred to as universalism.
Cosmopolitans strive for liberal states within a flat moral universe to judge
wrongful actions as a package, an independent judiciary and promote
all human rights, civil and political rights, avert arbitrary detention and
demand democratic elections at home and abroad.105

102 Michael Doyle, “International Ethics and the Responsibility to Protect,” Interna-
tional Studies Review, Vol. 13, No. 1 (March 2011), p. 78.
103 Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs”; Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism
and World Politics,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986),
pp. 1151–1169.
104 Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (Königsberg: F. Nicolovius,
1795).
105 Hadley P. Arkes, First Things: An Inquiry into the First Principles of Morals and
Justice (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).
This cosmopolitan thinking has set standards that have been agreed by
a collection of states in international law, e.g. the rule of non-intervention
and the respect for sovereignty in the 1648 Treaties of Westphalia. The
respect for state sovereignty results in the non-intervention of states force-
fully interfering with a government or constitution of another state.106
Peremptory norms ( jus cogens ) function as part of customary interna-
tional law outlawing piracy on the high seas, the right to life, freedom
of torture, abolition of slavery and genocide that have been taken seri-
ously as the gravest crimes by the international community. In the
event of a contravention of customary international law, the interna-
tional community is obligated erga omnes to respond because a violation
is deemed an attack on all its members. Russett and Oneal argue that
the Kantian influence of democratic states on norms and international
institutions concerning the use of force by all states increases these
international norms to constrain non-democratic states’ behaviour or by
states not member to an international organisation.107 Based on this
liberalist notion on the democratic peace ideal, it is also beneficial to
constrain rogue states because they can learn democratic peace theory
and liberalism.
Neoliberalism, Regime Theory and Institutional Liberalism

Rather than engage in conflict due to the international anarchical system,
neoliberals argue that there are a variety of structures to police and
govern state behaviour and a state can lose advantage if they do not
cooperate within such structures.108 Keohane asserts that neoliberalism
comprises two motives: (i) the benefits of agreements between states
that were previously unreached; and (ii) such agreements are difficult to
attain.109 States can attain mutual cooperation with other states even if
they wish to exploit weaker states. The work of Klein suggests that neolib-
eralism and democracy can contain anti-ethical standards, but neoliberal
106 Kant, Perpetual Peace.

107 Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence,
and International Organisations (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), p. 181.
108 Alexandros Petersen, Integration in Energy and Transport: Azerbaijan, Georgia, and
Turkey (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016), p. 66.
109 Robert Owen Keohane, “International Institutions: Two Approaches,” Interna-
tional Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 4 (December 1988), p. 386.
28 D. SINGH
policies in the United Kingdom and America were dubiously voluntary,

and not opposed, and thus democracy and policies embraced are usually
not resisted in strong states.110 States may accomplish mutual coopera-
tion with other states even if they possess intentions to exploit weaker
states. According to Oye, this cooperation is likely to commence because
the transparency, monitoring of uncooperative behaviour, predictable
sanctions, rules and appreciation for the gains form the predictable
cooperative relationship.111
In the anarchic international system, international institutions or
regimes impact on state behaviour, meaning that cooperation—rather
than conflict—is feasible because institutional arrangements and regimes
facilitate norms, rules, procedures and expectations that cement inter-
national cooperation.112 Norms define “rights and obligations” to set
behavioural standards; rules present prescriptions “for action”; and
decision-making rests on principal practices for “implementing collective
choice.”113 In other words, regimes govern “arrangements” that include
a system of mutual norms, rules and procedures to standardise behaviour
in approved ways and control its outcomes.114
Although an international organisation may be a permanent institu-
tion that exercises rules, norms and procedures on collective security and
human rights, a regime can be temporary. For neoliberals, realist short-
term strategies to maximise power and instant calculations of interest
should be disregarded, because general obligations sacrifice such interests
to expect states to reciprocate as part of a mutual transactional exchange
to benefit both parties—even if not obligated to do so.115
110 Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (New York:
Penguin, 2007).
111 Kenneth Akito Oye, “Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and
Strategies,” in Cooperation Under Anarchy, ed. Kenneth Akito Oye (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 1–24.
112 Stephen David Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes in
Intervening Variables,” International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring 1982), p. 185.
113 Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences,” p. 186.
114 Robert Owen Keohane and Joseph Samuel Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence
(Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1977), p. 19; Hedley Bull, The Anarchical
Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977),
p. 54.
115 Fred Hirsch, The Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1976), p. 78.
Based on regime theory, it can be postulated that institutional liber-

alism focuses on optimism to maintain peace and mutual cooperation
between states within structured governance provided by institutional
arrangements. Therefore, international institutions endorse cooperation
by promoting these conditions to punish rule-breakers that preserve
confidence in amicable behaviours. States within international institutions
exercise equality and a hierarchical system is annulled for equivalent diplo-
macy rights. These international political systems can curb conflict and
increase economic advantage by assisting states with diplomacy and inter-
vention on humanitarian grounds, namely in events of persecution and
economic struggles.
Institutional liberalism intends to reinforce norms by advocating
“sovereignty as responsibility” with the use of international organisa-
tions, international law and the voice of international and national civil
society.116 The United Nations has reinforced institutional liberalism. It
has placed pressure on a state’s sovereign responsibilities and failure to
protect own citizens from human rights violations and atrocity crimes
can eventually lead to Chapter VII collective security. Atrocity crimes
within this rhetoric includes war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic
cleansing and genocide.117 Traditional cosmopolitan rights—as presented
by Kant—on sovereign independence and non-intervention have also
formed the basis of contemporary international law.118
International law and institutional arrangements are encouraged to be
respected to ensure that mutual cooperation, standards, rules, procedures
and sanctions are followed when states decide with collective security
or preventive humanitarian intervention to enter war and police ethical
conduct within war. Democracies tend not to wage war on each other
and respect international law that provides restraint and diplomacy that is
based on mutual norms, obligations and expectations.
116 Anne Orford, “Moral Internationalism and the Responsibility to Protect,” European
Journal of International Law, Vol. 24, No. 1 (February 2013), pp. 83–108.
117 United Nations Summit Outcome Document, “2005 World Summit Outcome,”
UN General Assembly Doc. A/RES/60/1, 60th session, October 24, 2005, paras. 138–
139.
118 Kant, Perpetual Peace; United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, October 24,
1945, 1 UNTS XVI, Article 2(4), Chapter I—Purposes and Principles.
30 D. SINGH
The Responsibility to Protect

The United Nations has supported institutional liberalism. It has stressed
that a state has sovereign responsibility to enjoy its sovereign status;
namely, freedom from external intrusion. However, if a state fails to
protect its own citizens from human rights abuses and/or atrocity crimes,
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations can authorise sanctions
and potentially collective security. In 2005, the World Summit Outcome
provided the fortification of the norms underlying the national and global
responsibilities on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).119
Although R2P is not legally binding, its norms are institutionally
spread to encourage legal obligations on states in the event of atrocity
crimes and other treaties such as the 1948 Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention)
and prompting Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. The
ambitions of R2P utilise liberalist, and institutionalised norms, to protect
populations from atrocity crimes and when states manifestly fail to do so,
then diplomacy is initially undertaken.
There are three pillars of R2P that: (i) place preliminary importance on
the state to protect their state and civilian lives; (ii) demand international
support if they lack the capacity to protect their citizens; and (iii) collec-
tive security procedures can commence under Chapter VII of the Charter
of the United Nations if diplomacy under its preceding Chapter VI has
been exhausted. The third pillar of R2P can authorise Chapter VII sanc-
tions and a prospective use of force on a case-by-case basis.120 Regional
arrangements can be adopted if regional organisations seek consultation
and permission from the United Nations Security Council.121 The third
pillar has raised scepticism but the preceding International Commission
on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) claimed that R2P would
119 United Nations Summit Outcome Document, “2005 World Summit Outcome,”
paras. 138–139.
120 Carsten Stahn, “Between Law-Breaking and Law-Making: Syria, Humanitarian
Intervention and ‘What the Law Ought to Be’,” Journal of Conflict & Security Law,
Vol. 19, No. 1 (April 2014), p. 29.
121 Article 53 (1) of the Charter of the United Nations. Regional arrangements may
include NATO or the Economic Community of West African States.
not be used as an excuse for intervening powers to pursue their geopolit-

ical interests under the guise of incursions to protect victims from atrocity
crimes.122
R2P reflects cosmopolitan ideology that has been widely endorsed
by American and European democratic powers after the Cold War to
advocate liberalist values of international constitutionalism.123 The ICISS
movement was initiated on the premise that sovereignty would carry
specific responsibilities for governments being held accountable for failing
to protect and assist civilians in conflict of basic human rights and “sur-
vival needs.”124 The ICISS interprets that a state retains its sovereign
independence if it holds the responsibility to protect citizens and if it
manifestly fails to do, then the state in question must be held accountable
for their actions.125 If this social contract embedded on these institutional
liberalist norms is breached, then the sovereign rights of a state, namely
non-interference from external states, are annulled. In other words, a
humanitarian intervention that contravenes the sovereign domestic affairs
of a state can be justified if a state continues to fail protecting their
civilian lives. Although a humanitarian intervention shares comparable
norms with R2P by halting a humanitarian catastrophe to challenge state
sovereignty, R2P seeks legitimacy within the rules of the Charter of the
United Nations.
Liberalists stress that the Responsibility to Protect doctrine advocates
international norms to expand the legitimacy of pre-existing international
law—principally the Charter of the United Nations and several conven-
tions that prohibit torture and genocide—to prevent the four atrocity
crimes: war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and geno-
cide. The third pillar of R2P specifically seeks to address “global threats to
peace.”126 The language concerns “responsibility” to provide normative
weight rather than operate as separate legal duties.
122 Ramesh Thakur, “R2P After Libya and Syria: Engaging Emerging Powers,” The
Washington Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2 (May 2013), p. 65.
123 Yukiko Nishikawa, “The Reality of Protecting the Rohingya: An Inherent Limitation
of the Responsibility to Protect,” Asian Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (November 2020), p. 99.
124 Francis Mading Deng, Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild and
Ira William Zartman, Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1996), pp. 1–2.
125 Nishikawa, “The Reality of Protecting the Rohingya,” pp. 98–99.
126 Doyle, “International Ethics and the Responsibility to Protect,” pp. 82–83.
32 D. SINGH
Liberal communitarians also concentrate on attempts to avert serious

humanitarian abuses. The earlier work of Mill places emphasis on the
notion of freedom to foreign people in a foreign state that is incapable to
attain, which would have severe consequences.127 Mill prefers local forces
to settle a conflict, but choices of intervention can be negotiated when a
protracted civil war causes non-combatant casualties.128 Liberal commu-
nitarians would contend that intervention is justified if severe abuses of
human rights impact on survival that may entice outsiders option to
intervene.
Interveners can intervene if decided as a last resort once peaceful
and diplomatic resolutions have failed and calculate if the lives saved
will outweigh the costs of war with minimal force.129 Thakur supports
this liberalist argument with R2P that should only utilise military force
as a final option.130 For liberal communitarians, an external intervenor
must possess the objective of halting a slaughter and establishing a self-
determination for the people. By way of illustration, in 1971, India
engaged with a humanitarian intervention by invading East Pakistan
to protect the mass lives of Bengalis and defeat its “old enemy.”131
Walzer argued that this humanitarian intervention was rapid and legiti-
mate because Bengalis were saved and Bangladesh was accorded their own
self-determining state with India enforcing “no political controls.”132
Communitarians warrant intervention to save lives from external forces
if local forces fail to bring an end to the civil matter and one group is at
the verge of extinction. It can be argued that liberalism shares traits with
contemporary just war thinking, particularly communitarian ethics and
127 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London: John W. Parker and Son, 1859).
128 Mill, On Liberty.
129 Doyle, “International Ethics and the Responsibility to Protect,” p. 77.
130 Thakur, “R2P after Libya and Syria,” p. 73.
131 Michael Laban Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical
Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977), p. 105.
132 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 1977, p. 105.
the legalistic paradigm.133 The latter concerns international law and insti-
tutional arrangements encourage mutual standards, cooperation, rules,
procedures and sanctions as a last resort when states intervene to save
lives.
The West has set norms like R2P to restrict sovereignty that devi-
ates from the traditional rules of non-intervention established from
Westphalia. However, Western norms on limiting sovereignty have
caused contradictions between Russia and the West. Due to this frus-
tration of Moscow failing to align with this new humanitarian adap-
tation to sovereignty, it has aligned with amenable states, such as
China, to continue defending the traditional Westphalian standard of
sovereignty.134
Summary of Liberalism
Democratic peace theorists believe that a collection of democratic states
results in an absence of war because these states mutually respect citizen-
ship rights, liberty and political independence.135 Other liberalists have
stressed that large-scale and/or protracted wars are too damaging and
costly on a society and thus democracies are encouraged as a strategy
to ascertain peace.136 According to Kant, republicanism applies to legit-
imacy and the ideals to nurture perpetual peace.137 Protagonists of the
democratic peace theory would attempt to empirically demonstrate how
illiberal states can transcend from a challenging rogue state to a peaceful
state to join a community of democratic states that are less prone to war.
133 Chapter 5 covers a just war debate that is also applied to the Russian-Ukraine war.
Just war theory is not covered in depth here. Although Walzer would claim that just
war theory under the legalistic paradigm contains similarities with liberalism by respecting
international law, other just war theorists, namely Morkevičius, have argued that just war
is, and always has been, war justified for realist interests (Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars,
1977; Morkevičius, Realist Ethics ). For this reason, it would be unfair to place a full
discussion on just war theory within the section covering liberalism.
134 Ziegler, “Conceptualising Sovereignty in Russian Foreign Policy.”
135 Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, p. 10.
136 Moravcik, “Taking Preferences Seriously,” p. 531.
34 D. SINGH
Kant’s influence of republicanism has been advanced by democratic

peace theorists to focus on states bound by norms and international insti-
tutions that may consider the use of force to encourage international
norms by constraining the behaviour and actions of non-democratic states
or by states that are not party to the particular international organi-
sation.138 Based on this liberalist postulation on the democratic peace
model, it is also advantageous to restrain rogue states because they
can learn democratic peace theory and liberalist values. The work of
Mitchell controversially interprets Kant by arguing that war may be neces-
sary to create more democracies in the international political system as
a means of fostering republicanism and furthering democratic govern-
ments resulting in widespread and enduring peace.139 Although Kant was
against the end of republicanism justifying the means with war, regime
change has been advocated to establish the formation of additional demo-
cratic states—even if by violent means—for better pertinence with an
ethics of universality to respect an international order confined by inter-
national law.140 As democracies expand, it is assumed that a system in
which war is minimised, after some initial fighting to build peace (or in
other words, might making rights), can be successful because democracies
have better chances of winning wars than autocratic regimes.141
Once states transition to democracies, state sovereignty can be
respected resulting in non-intervention for citizens if the state governs
and sort problems out themselves.142 The ideals of the democratic peace
thesis can intensify a “spillover effect” on aspiring citizens aiming to repli-
cate successful transitions from dictatorship to democracies.143 This can
138 Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, p. 181.

139 Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, “A Kantian System? Democracy and Third-Party Conflict
Resolution,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 46, No. 4 (October 2002),
p. 752.
140 Wade L. Huntley, “Kant’s Third Image: Systemic Sources of the Liberal Peace,”
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 56, 61.
141 Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, p. 275. However, the Cold War fight to
topple for North Vietnamese communist regime was an unsuccessful intervention because
Russia and China were powerful allies that eventually contributed to US departure.
143 Zeev Maoz, “Democratic Networks: Connecting National, Dyadic, and Systemic
Levels of Analysis in the Study of Democracy and War,” in War in a Changing World,
eds. Zeev Maoz and Azar Gat (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press), p. 173.
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Sydäntäni tykytti. Minä en voinut enää hallita itseäni.
"Vartokaa, vartokaa!" huusin minä hänelle korottaen käsiäni häntä

kohden, sillä nyt minä tahdoin että hän olisi jäänyt läheisyyteeni.
"Ei nyt on vuoro teidän vartoa", sanoi hän nauraen. "Te

kummallinen mies…"
Ja nauraen poistui hän huoneesta.
Me söimme illallista. Tanja oli iloinen, kuin ainakin; kaksoiset

istuivat ääneti. Mieltäni kirveli, enkä koko aikana puhunut
sanaakaan.
"Lankeenkohan nyt minäkin… olenko jo niin syvälle paatunut?"

Tämä ajatus ja toiset samallaiset pyörivät mielessäni. "Enköhän saa
itseäni hillityksi? Sitten on kaikki mennyttä."
"Jumalani, ovatko sitten kaikki ihmiset voimattomia näissä

tapauksissa!"
Ljudmila Ivanovna kehoitti minua säestämään lauluansa, kunnes

lapset nukkuisivat. Tahdotonna tottelin häntä tohuisen aistillisuuden
valtaamana. Hänen mielensä oli kovin liikutettu ja alinomaa hän
nojasi minuun.
"Hän lauloi joitakuita lauluja, mutta minä olin saanut tarpeeksi

hänen laulustaan; äänensä kuului minusta yksitoikkoiselta enkä
kuunnellut lauluansa. Olihan vaan niin suloista tuntea hänen
ruumiinsa lämmön niin lähellä selkäni takana, ja minä tunsin
polttavan halun saada vetää häntä vielä lähemmäksi itseäni.
"Me menimme saliin. Ensin täytyi antaa lasten ja Dundjashkan
nukkua… Kuinka Aleksander Dmitrijevitsh sallikaan minun olla
hänen kanssaan kahden? Ehkä hän kuitenkin palaa kotia meidän
sitä aavistamattamme", päätin minä ja ilmoitin Ljudmilalle
epäilykseni.
"Ehkä Aleksander Dmitrijevitsh tulee äkki-arvaamatta kotia

nähdäkseen, miten me täällä aikaamme vietämme", sanoin puoleksi
leikillisesti.
Hän nauroi.
"Ah ei, sitä hän ei tee koskaan; hän ei koskaan valehtele, ja

luulenpa, että hän on jäänyt tänään kaupunkiin minun tähteni, että
minä tänä iltana saisin olla teidän kanssanne kahden kesken ja
hankkisin itselleni huvituksen. Hän on oikullinen, eikä näe mitään,
miesparka."
Hän naurahti taas äänekkäämmin ja teeskennellen.
Aleksander Dmitrijevitshin käytöstapa oli minulle käsittämätön.

Uskoin kuitenkin Ljudmilan sanoja enkä sen enempää puhunut siitä.
"Kuka tiesi?", päätin itsekseni, "vaikkapa hänellä olisikin ollut

kaupungissa tehtäviä, mutta ehkä Ljudmilakin on oikeassa;
mahdoton on tunkeutua ihmissieluun ja sen salaisuuksia tutkia."
Saadakseni aikamme kulumaan, pyysin Ljudmilan pelaamaan

kanssani "tammea." Hän suostui, ja me istuimme sohvaan. Hänen
valkoinen kätensä kosketteli kättäni, hänen napeloita siirtäessään.
Polvemme viistäytyivät. Levotonna hän yhä vääntelihe paikallansa.
Hänen poskillansa puna yhä kirkkaammin hohti ja kosteilla silmillään
hän minua yhä tarkasteli.
Jo kävi kello yhtätoista. Nyt voi varmuudella otaksua, ettei

Aleksander Dmitrijevitsh enää palaisi. Kauhistumistani kauhistuin,
kun täytyi siinä hänen kanssaan kahden olla, mutta en voinut
myöskään mennä tieheni. Ei ollut enää minulla valtaa itseni yli, vaan
kiihoituin vaan kiihoittumistani.
"Mitä te siinä teette?… Pettäjä!.. huudahti Ljudmila, kun leikilläni

otin häneltä napelon.
"En minä…"
"Antakaa se heti takaisin!"
Hän tarttui käteeni koettaen avata nyrkkini.
Tuo kosketus vei minulta viimeisenkin malttini. Minä siirryin ihan

lähelle häntä, kiivaasti tartuin hänen olkapäihinsä ja vedin häntä
luokseni kaikilla voimillani.
"Ei, päästäkää, jääkää paikallenne… tyttö on viereisessä

huoneessa", sanoi hän kuiskaten, riistihe irti ja uhkasi minua
sormellaan.
Terävästi tuijottaen minuun, osoitti hän sormellaan ruokahuoneen

selällään olevaa ovea; siellä oli pöytä vielä katettuna.
Minä päästin hänet, ja huokasin syvään. Hän heittihe loikomaan

sohvan selkää vasten hymyillen teeskentelevästi.
Minä nousin divoonilta ja rupesin rauhoittuakseni kävelemään
edestakaisin huoneessa.
Ruokahuoneessa näyttäytyi Dunjashka.
"Nukkuvatko lapset?" kysyi Ljudmila Ivanovna niin tyynenä kuin ei

mitään olisi tapahtunut.
"Nukkuvat", vastasi Dunjashka lyhyesti, korjaten ruoat pöydältä.
"Sitten menen minäkin levolle", sanoi Ljudmila, niin että

Dunjashkan piti kuuleman, "minä olen väsynyt."
Mutta hän jäi kuitenkin istumaan paikallensa.
"Aleksander Dmitrijevitshia ei vaan kuulu tänä iltana kotia", sanoi

hän valitellen.
Dunjashka pian katosi ruokahuoneesta, sammutettuaan Ljudmilan

käskystä lamput käytävissä. Minä yhä vaan levottomana kävin
edestakaisin, sillä tunsin, etten voinut olla rauhallisena.
Oi kurjuuttani! Kuinka kipeästi koskeakaan ja kuinka surkeata

onkaan olla eläimenä, tuntea eläimellisen saavan valtoihinsa kaiken
inhimillisen meissä, koko meidän olentomme, tuntea sen tappavan ja
huumaavan meissä kaiken järkevän ja inhimillisen. Eikö millään
tavoin voi sitä voittaa, karkoittaa, kukistaa? Sehän on surkeata ja
masentavaa.
Talossa vallitsi hiljaisuus; levolle oli Dunjashkakin mennyt. Me

vaan olimme kahden. Minä kuulin sydämmeni kovin lyövän. En
tietänyt mikä olisi tapahtuva ja odotin.
"Tästähän kuitenkin täytyy tulla loppu", lohdutin mieltäni, ihaillen
Ljudmilan rintaa ja kaulaa. "Loppu tästä tulee tavalla tai toisella".
Hetkisen kuluttua Ljudmila Ivanovna nousi seisoallen. Hän oli

nähtävästi odottanut juuri tätä hetkeä.
"Me tavataan vielä", kuiskasi hän äkkiä korvaani; "minä tulen;

menkää vaan huoneesenne."
Hän kiiruhti pois ruokahuoneesta, ja heti sen jälkeen kuulin

lastenhuoneen oven narisevan.
"Jumalani, kuinka syvälle olemme langenneet! Minä tulen…"

kaikui vielä minun korvissani. Minä tunsin olevani niin kiihoittunut,
kuin olisin valmistautunut hirveimpään rikokseen.
Ymmärtämättäni oikein mitä tein, menin huoneeseni, riisuin siellä

kiireesti ja heittäydyin vuoteelleni. Tahallani sammutin kynttilän ja
jätin Aleksander Dmitrijevitshin työhuoneen oven selälleen.
Kuun valo tunkeutui ikkunasta huoneesen. Minä makasin silmät

auki polttaen paperossin toisensa perään. Olin kuumeessa.
"Nythän kaikki on yhdentekevää, on jo myöhäistä…" tämä ajatus

ei jättänyt minua. "Hän tulee kohta, hän tulee kohta! … ah, joudu,
joudu."
Viereisessä huoneessa kuun valo muodosti lattialle ja

huonekaluille kaksi valkoista pilkkua, joissa leveänä ja mustana
akkunapuite kuvastui.
Minä katsahdin tuohon salaperäisesti valaistuun huoneeseen.

Aleksander Dmitrijevitshin kirjoituspöytä, sille asetettuine
kynttiläjalkoineen ja koirineen pronssista, hänen nahalla peitetty
nojatuolinsa ja hänen kirjakaappinsa, kaikki tuo saattoi
käsittämättömän pelon minuun. Koko ruumistani värisytti. Päässäni
sekaisin vierivät ajatukset toisensa perään.
"Hän tulee kohta… kohta… jouduhan… tule, tule… niin kyllä, olen
häijy, irstas, mutta sille nyt en voi enää mitään… joudu, joudu… nyt
on jo myöhäistä."
Kului puoli tuntia täynnä tuskallista ja jännittävää odotusta. En

luullut ajasta tulevan koskaan loppua. Minä kuuntelin. Talossa oli
hiljaa kuin haudassa.
"Heti ovi avataan ja hän tulee. Lapset ja Dunjashka nukkuvat kyllä

raskaasti. Ulko-ovi on lukossa, eikä kukaan voi nähdä meitä…"
"Joudu, joudu… mutta tulehan…" kerroin taukoamatta, tuntien

tuskallisen pistoksen sydämessäni.
Minä kohotin yläruumistani, nojautuen kyynäspäilleni; silloin kuulin

lastenhuoneen oven hyvin hiljaa narisevan.
"Hän on ollut makuuhuoneessaan ja tulee nyt lastenhuoneen

kautta, siellä ensin katsottuaan, että kaikki on kunnossa."
Sydämmeni aaltoili. Olin valmis sulkemaan hänet syliin ja

kohoutuin vielä enemmän. Hirveä kiihoitus sai veren kiehumaan
suonissani.
Mutta silloin tapahtui jotain aavistamatonta. Hiipien tuli joku

ruokahuoneen kautta suoraan minua kohden; kuului niinkuin pienet
avonaiset jalat olisivat hissutelleet lattialla.
Ensi silmänräpäyksessä en voinut päästä selville siitä, mitä näin;
luulin jo tulevani mielipuoleksi.
Aleksander Dmitrijevitshin huoneesen astui avojaloin pieni olento,

käsivarret ja kaula paljaina. Kuun valaisemalle paikalle se seisahtui,
arasti katsoen ympärillensä huoneessa. Tarkemmin sitä katsottuani,
tunsin sen; se oli Tanja. Hänen mustat silmänsä loistivat kuutamossa
ja olivat auki selällään; tukkansa oli hajallaan. Vielä kerran katsahti
hän hämillään ja peloissaan ympärillensä.
"Isä kulta, kulta isä", kuului hänen äänensä, rauhallisena, mutta

selvänä… "Hän on poissa", lisäsi hän sitten surullisesti, hymyillen
kauhistuneena.
Tuota hymyä en unhoita koskaan… Vielä hetkisen seisoi hän

siinä, sitten hän juosta hissutteli paljailla pikku jaloillaan huoneesta.
Ensin en käsittänyt tuosta mitään; se oli jotain käsittämätöntä.
"Mitä tämä on?" kysyin itseltäni. "Olisikohan tuo ollut pelkkää

mielenkuvitusta? … Tanja?… Isä kulta, kulta isä!… Niin, se oli hän.
Mutta kuinka olisi hän tullut tänne yksin keskellä yötä?… Kuutamo
yössä?… Käyneekö hän unissaan?…"
Muuta selitystä ei ollut.
"Hän on kai noussut vuoteeltaan ja kiiruhtanut tänne. Onhan

Aleksander
Dmitrijevitsh kertonut minulle, että Tanjan on niin tapana tehdä…
Mutta Ljudmila Ivanovna?… Hän lienee vielä makuuhuoneessaan.
Miksei
hän siellä olisi?… Ah niin, hänhän tahtoi tulla minun luokseni…
Jumala, mitä olen aikeissa tekemään?"
"Mitä olen aikonut tehdä?… Mikä minun oikeastaan oli?… Olenko

sairas, vai olenko tullut mielipuoleksi?"
Minua puistatti ja samalla minä selvisin.
Minä en osaa kertoa kaikkea, mikä sinä hetkenä heräsi minussa,

mutta minä häpesin siihen määrään ja tunsin sellaisen kauhun siitä,
mitä olin aikonut tehdä, kuin en ole koskaan ennen elämässäni
tuntenut. Minä juoksin vuoteeltani ja sytytettyäni kynttilän rupesin
kiireesti pukeutumaan.
"Minä lähden heti kohta, tuossa tuokiossa", päätin vahvasti ja

vakavasti. Äkkiä minä taas tulin kokonaan tunnoilleni.
"Oli kuin olisi ollut ilmestys, joka oli ihan minua varten tarkoitettu",
toistin itsekseni.
"Mikä paatunut ilkiö minä olenkaan!" huudahdin itsekseni täydellä

vakaumuksella. "Kuinka olenkaan niin langennut ja ilettävä ja
heikko!… Ja sinä, tyttöseni, sinä puhdas, rakas lapsi, sinä olet
pelastanut minun huudollasi: 'kulta isä, isä kulta'!"
Minä kumarsin ottamaan saappaat vuoteen toisesta päästä.
"Kuinka, oletteko pukeutumaisillanne?" kysyi äkkiä joku vieressäni.
Vavahtaen hyppäsin seisomaan. Ovessa seisoi Ljudmila Ivanovna

tuijottaen minuun. Hänen kasvoissaan ilmeni levottomuus ja
hämmennys. Hän oli heti minusta huomannut, että jotakin oli
tapahtunut.
"Mitä nyt?" kysyi hän epävarmalla äänellä.
En tietänyt, mitä minun piti hänelle vastaaman.
"Menkää täältä, Jumalan tähden", sanoin hänelle äkkiä

liikutettuna, niinkuin olisin puhunut vaan itsekseni, "minä lähden
heti… Hän tuli työhuoneesen paitasillaan, seisahtui ja huudahti äkkiä
'kulta isä, isä kulta'… hän on poissa… oli kuin ilmestys… hän on
pelastanut meidät… ymmärrättekö?… Mutta menkäähän pois täältä,
minä pyydän teitä".
Ensin alussa hän ei ymmärtänyt mitään, hämmästyneenä vaan

tuijotti minuun. Kuinka kurjalta ja inhoittavalta hän nyt minusta
näyttäkään!
"Kuka tuli tänne? Mitä te puhutte?" kysyi hän minulta hiljaisella

äänellä ja katsellen minua, niinkuin olisin ollut mielipuolena.
"Tanja, Tanja! Ettekö te vieläkään ymmärrä minua? Hän kävi

unissa."
"Tanja?" kertoi hän.
Mutta minä huomasin, että hän vallan hyvin ymmärsi, mitä oli
tapahtunut. Hän kääntyi äkkiä ja katosi työhuoneeseen.
"Odottakaa kaikella muotoa, älkää lähtekö", sanoi hän hetken

kuluttua piilopaikastaan hiljaisella ja rukoilevalla äänellä. "Jumala
tiesi, mitä Aleksander Dmitrijevitsh vielä taitaisi luulla… jättäkää
matkanne ainakin huomisaamuksi. Minä rukoilen teitä, älkää nyt
matkustako!"
Minä en ottanut huomiooni hänen sanojansa, pikaisesti vaan yhä
pukeuduin. Pian hän vaikeni.
"Voiko luulla lankeavansa niin syvälle", ajattelin halveksien itseäni

ja mieleni ollessa kauhistuneena, "lankeavansa niin syvälle, että
ainoastaan sokea kohtalo voi meitä pelastaa ja avata silmämme."
Olin pukeutunut ja menin työhuoneesen. Nojaten seinää vasten

seisoi siellä Ljudmila Ivanovna ääneti ja odottaen minua. Hän rupesi
taas rukoilemaan minua, etten lähtisi nyt, vaan viipyisin seuraavaan
aamuun. Hän näytti kovin levottomalta ja puhui hiljaa syyllisen
äänellä. Hänen tuskansa vaikutti minuun. Minun tuli häntä sääli,
vaikka hän yhä vielä olikin minusta sanomattoman vastenmielinen.
"Hän on oikeassa", päätin minä, "minkätähden tekisin hänelle

pahaa ja — mikä olisi vielä pahempi — pahoittaisin Aleksander
Dmitrijevitsh paran mieltä herättäen hänen epäilyksiään. Saatanhan
yhtä hyvin lähteä huomenna… Ylipäänsä se ei paljoakaan vaikuta
asiaan."
"Olkoon menneeksi, minä jään vielä huomiseen", sanoin minä.
Ljudmila Ivanovna meni vaieten Aleksander Dmitrijevitshin pöydän

luo ja seisoi siinä vartalo eteenpäin nojautuneena. Kirkas kuutamo
tunkeusi ikkunasta valaisten hänen tuuheata tukkaansa.
Minä menin takaisin huoneeseni. Kynnyksellä seisahduin ja

katsoin vielä kerran taakseni.
"Ihmeellinen nainen", päätin, katsellen Ljudmila Ivanovnan

liikkumatonta, syyntunnon painamaa vartaloa, "minä en ymmärrä
häntä".
Minun piti juuri vetää ovi lukkoon, kun Ljudmila Ivanovna äkkiä
ojensihe ja kuulumattomin kissantapaisin askelin astui eteeni
korottaen kätensä minua kohden.
"Rakas ystäväni, tämä kaikkihan on vaan tyhmyyttä", sanoi hän

äkkiä ja imarrellen. "Miksi olette niin liikutettu? Älkää ajatelko sitä
enää. Saanenhan nyt tulla?"
Hän lähestyi minua, verkallen nostaen oikeata kättänsä, niinkuin

olisi tahtonut laskea sen rinnalleni ja mielitellen minua katseellaan.
Olin jo vähällä antaa hänelle perää. Silloin tunsin itsessäni
varoituksen ja minä peräydyin hänestä niinkuin paatuneen ihmisen
edestä samalla torjuen häntä kädelläni luotani. Hän horjahtui tuosta
odottamattomasta lyönnistäni, kompastui ja oli jo kaatua. Mutta heti
hän taas pääsi tasapainoon ja juoksi pikaa työhuoneesen.
"Houkkio!" suhisi hän katsellen minua salamoitsevilla silmillään ja

puristaen minulle nyrkkiä, "minä en luullut teidän olevan sellainen
houkkio, niin tuhma, niin sivistymätön ja…"
Minä vedin kiireesti huoneeni oven kiinni ja salpasin sen…
*****
Seuraavana aamuna palasi Aleksander Dmitrijevitsh kaupungista,

ja samana päivänä illalla lähdin minä asemalle, huolimatta hänen
pyynnöstään, että vielä jäisin hänen luoksensa.
Syyksi sanoin vaan ehdottomasti, täytyi olla seuraavana päivänä

läsnä yliopistossa, seikka, jonka muka olin kokonaan unhoittanut.
Aleksander Dmitrijevitsh ei niinmuodoin huomannut mitään, jos

kohta häntä ihmetyttikin äkkinäinen poislähtöni.
Siten estelyni kyllä kävi täydestä, mutta minä en voinut enää
katsoa häntä suoraan silmiin.
Vähät minä enää Ljudmilan kanssa puhuin, mutta hän oli niinkuin
ei mitään olisi tapahtunutkaan.
Jättäessäni hänelle hyvästi, huomasin katseessa, jonka hän loi

minuun, ainoastaan närkästymistä ja kylmää halveksimista.
Minä palasin Moskovaan, josta olin lähtenyt hakemaan parannusta

taudilleni… Mutta millaisena palasinkaan?… Silminnähtävästi ei
tämä parannustapa ollut oikea tätä tautia varten. Hoidon täytyi alkaa
toiseen tapaan, mutta kuinka?.. Toisentaakko nuorison elämäntavat
ja kasvatuksen?… Niin on!
Mutta minä puolestani olen jo kasvatettu, olen täysi mies, eikä

minun auta muu kuin taistella kovaa ja tuskallista taistelua itseäni
vastaan…
*****
"Tähän päättyy kertomus", sanoi Vasilij Nikolajevitsh, katsellen yhä

sinistä päiväkirjaa, joka minusta näytti vapisevan hänen kädessään.
Minun ei ole ollut helppo lukea sitä, varsinkin tietäessäni, miten poika
paran vastedes kävi.
"Hän kuoli, niinkuin jo kerroin, keuhkotautiin. Pian sen jälkeen, kun

hän oli kirjoittanut tämän kertomuksen, heittäytyi hän
auttamattomasti heikkoutensa valtaan. Silloin en vielä tuntenut
häntä. Kuitenkin kuulin silloin tällöin kerrottavan, että hän eli hyvin
irstaisesti, turmellen siten sekä ruumiinsa että sielunsa. Hän vietti
koko aikansa kapakoissa ja kaupungin syrjäosissa olevissa taloissa,
juoden ja seurustellen siellä kaikemmoisten naisten kanssa. Hän sai
hyvin vaarallisen keuhkotaudin. Silloin hän selvisi jälleen. Siihen
aikaan minä tutustuin häneen. Muistan vielä kuinka, kuin näin hänet
viimeisen kerran vuoteellaan makaavan ja syvästi hengittävän, en
voinut katsella häntä, vaan poistuin huoneesta. Viimeisiä sanoja,
jotka kuulin hänen lausuvan, en unhoita koskaan. Hänen huulensa
olivat kuivat, ja ainoastaan suurella vaivalla hän kuiskasi minulle:
"Näetkö, veliseni, minä en osannut hillitä itseäni, aistillisuuteni on

saattanut minut perikatoon; minun olisi pitänyt taistella."
Sen jälkeen hän ei enää lausunut sanaakaan.
Usein olen päätellyt, että hän yhä eläisi ja taistelisi, jos vaan
aikoinaan olisi löytänyt tuen. Mutta harva meistä se on joka sellaisen
tuen löytää… näemmehän jokainen päivä ympärillämme ihmisten
lankeavan… toinen vetää alinomaa mukaansa toisen… Mieltäni
liikutti varsinkin tuo heikkouden ja ainaisen innostuksen
yhteensovitus hänen luonteessaan sekä ne ankarat vaatimukset,
jotka hän vaati itseltään, ja hänen tahtonsa tehdä oikein. Hän tiesi,
että se oli hänen elämänsä korkein tehtävä, pyrkien alinomaa
voittamaan tuon eläimellisen, joka saattoi hänelle ja meille kaikille
saattaa tuskaa. Mutta onneton nääntyi taistelussa.
Vasilij Nikolajevitsh vaikeni. Kohta kävi keskustelu yleiseksi. Kello

oli jo 12 yöllä, kun uninen Aljoshka sulki oven jälkeemme.
Parin päivän päästä poikkesin Vasilij Nikolajevitshin luo

pyytämään häntä lainaamaan minulle sinisen päiväkirjan,
saadakseni jäljennöksen kertomuksesta.
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The Tripartite Realist War: Analysing

Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Danny

The Tripartite Realist

ISBN 978-3-031-34162-5 ISBN 978-3-031-34163-2 (eBook)

I would like to thank my loving family for support whilst writing

Middlesbrough, UK Danny Singh

Western Support for Ukraine 88

Dr. Danny Singh is Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Rela-

BBC British Broadcasting Corporation

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been its largest European interven-

1 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner, “Ukraine: Civilian Casualty

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

international organizations promote rules, norms and standardization that

Main International Relations Theories

This chapter provides the basis of realism, liberalism and constructivism.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 7

with anarchy, and the absence of a central governing authority, result in

conquer them. Despite the Melian declaration of neutrality, the Athenian

Hobbes later stressed that if a government, civilisation and laws are

Political realism separates the feasibility from the desirable within

Neorealism: Offensive and Defensive Realists

38 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 17–18.

Offensive realism is thus based on the uncertainty of states, namely

addition to European states arming to mainly please the United States,

54 Posen, “European Union Security and Defence Policy,” pp. 149–150.

power, due to reinforced bipolar burdens within Europe which intensified

international order. Morgenthau argued that politics and ethics rest on

to anarchy—and prudence that considers ethics and morality as a comple-

72 Fiott, “Realist Thought and Humanitarian Intervention.”

The practicality of state decision-making, behaviour and functionality is

ideals of social justice on subordinate groups as a method to justify

82 Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939, 2001, pp. 74–75.

Justification and Summary of Realism

crusades.”91 Realism, and in particular its classical and neorealist forms,

Despite a leaning towards realism, liberalism is provided as an alter-

within the international system. This is followed by neoliberalism, regime

Democratic Peace Theory and Cosmopolitanism

democracy, markets and institutions based on the belief that democra-

101 Walt, “Liberal Illusions Caused the Ukraine Crisis.”

Neoliberalism, Regime Theory and Institutional Liberalism

106 Kant, Perpetual Peace.

policies in the United Kingdom and America were dubiously voluntary,

Based on regime theory, it can be postulated that institutional liber-

The Responsibility to Protect

not be used as an excuse for intervening powers to pursue their geopolit-

Liberal communitarians also concentrate on attempts to avert serious

Kant’s influence of republicanism has been advanced by democratic

138 Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, p. 181.

"Vartokaa, vartokaa!" huusin minä hänelle korottaen käsiäni häntä

"Ei nyt on vuoro teidän vartoa", sanoi hän nauraen. "Te

Ja nauraen poistui hän huoneesta.

Me söimme illallista. Tanja oli iloinen, kuin ainakin; kaksoiset

"Lankeenkohan nyt minäkin… olenko jo niin syvälle paatunut?"

"Jumalani, ovatko sitten kaikki ihmiset voimattomia näissä

Ljudmila Ivanovna kehoitti minua säestämään lauluansa, kunnes

"Hän lauloi joitakuita lauluja, mutta minä olin saanut tarpeeksi

"Ehkä Aleksander Dmitrijevitsh tulee äkki-arvaamatta kotia

"Ah ei, sitä hän ei tee koskaan; hän ei koskaan valehtele, ja

Hän naurahti taas äänekkäämmin ja teeskennellen.

Aleksander Dmitrijevitshin käytöstapa oli minulle käsittämätön.

"Kuka tiesi?", päätin itsekseni, "vaikkapa hänellä olisikin ollut

Saadakseni aikamme kulumaan, pyysin Ljudmilan pelaamaan

Jo kävi kello yhtätoista. Nyt voi varmuudella otaksua, ettei