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Perception
 Perception
First Form of Mind

TY L E R B U R G E
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 Acknowledgments

Chapter 1: Iris Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics: Writings on

Philosophy and Literature, © 1950, 1951, 1952, 1956, 1957, 1958,
1959, 1961, 1962, 1964, 1966, 1969, 1970, 1972, 1977, 1978, 1986,
1997 by Iris Murdoch. Used by permission of Penguin Books, an
imprint of Penguin Publishing Group, a division of Penguin Random
House LLC. All rights reserved.

Chapter 3: Stephen E. Palmer, Vision Science: Photons to

Phenomenology, The MIT Press, 1999, p. 32.

Chapter 6: W.G. Sebald, translated by Michael Hulse, from The Rings

of Saturn, © 1995 by Vito von Eichborn GmbH & Co Verlag KG.
Translation © 1998 by The Harvill Press. Reprinted by permission of
New Directions Publishing Corp.

Chapter 11: William Blake, Notebook, British Library Add MS 49460,

3rd and 4th lines from first draft of the poem.

Chapter 16: Excerpt from Vladimir Nabokov, Speak, Memory: An

Autobiography Revisited © 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951, 1967 by
Vladimir Nabokov. Used by permission of Alfred A. Knopf, an imprint
of the Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, a division of Penguin
Random House LLC. All rights reserved.

Chapter 19: Hans Moravec, Mind Children: The Future of Robot and
Human Intelligence, © 1988 by Hans Moravec. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
 Contents

Preface
Animal Eyes
Figures
Abbreviations

PART I. PERCEPTION

1. Introduction
Biological Function, Action, Sensing, and Perception—The
Emergence of Mind
Principal Aims of the Book
The Fregean Source of Key Semantical Notions for Perception
2. Perception
Perceptual States as Sensory States
Representation and Information Registration
Representation and Veridicality Conditions
Representations and Representational Contents
The Three Fundamental Representational Constituents in
Perceptual States
The Basic Representational Form of Perceptual States
Perception as Objectification
Perceptual Constancy—First Mark of Representational Mind
3. Perceptual Constancy: A Central Natural Psychological Kind
Scientific Practice Demarcates Perceptual Constancies from
Other Invariances
 Two Misguided Ways of Thinking About Perceptual Constancies
Even Non-Perceptual Invariances Contribute to the Fitness of
Individuals that Sense
Efference Copy: An Example of a Non-Perceptual Invariance
Path Integration: Another Non-Perceptual Invariance
Very Simple Perceptual Color and Lightness Constancies
Retinal Image Contour Registration and Surface Contour
Perception
Visual Spatial Property and Relation Constancies
Visual Body Categorization
Visual Spatial Perceptual Constancies and Body Categorization
Visual Temporal Perceptual Constancies

PART II. FORM

4. Some Basics about Perceptual Systems

Principles Governing Transitions Contrasted with
Representational Contents
Perception, Computation, and the Language-of-Thought
Hypothesis
Representational-Dependence Hierarchies in Perceptual
Attribution
Two Methodological Points About Natural-Kind and Functional
Attributives
Taxonomic Hierarchies in Perception
5. Perceptual Reference Requires Perceptual Attribution
Basic Form of Perceptual Contents
Perceptual Reference is Partly Guided by Perceptual Attribution
Support for (AA1)
Support for (AA2)
General Remarks on Attributives and Perceptual Discrimination
Criticism of Two Attempted Rejections of (AA1) and (AA2)
6. Form and Semantics of Representational Contents of Perceptual
States
Review of Basic Form of Perceptual Representation
Perception of Property-Instances
Betokening and Four Types of Perceptual Attribution
Perceptual Attribution of Relations
Scope Hierarchies in Perceptual Content
Scope and Modificational Attribution Hierarchy
Absence in Perception of Negations, Conditionals, Disjunctions,
Quantifiers
Perceptual Contents, Propositions, and Noun Phrases
7. Perceptual Attributives and Referential Applications in Perceptual
Constancies
Perceptual Constancies and Frege’s Sense–Bedeutung
Distinction: Similarities
Perceptual Constancies and Frege’s Sense–Bedeutung
Distinction: Differences
Minimalism: Defocus and Color Constancy
Minimalism and Iconic Representation in a Spatial Coordinate
System
Perceptual Units in Packages in Iconic Visual Spatial
Representation
Linkage of Different Perceptual Attributives in Perceptual
Constancies
The Form of Perceptual Attributives in Linkages
Accuracy Conditions for Perceptual Attributives in Perceptual
Constancies
Referential Applications in Accuracy Conditions for Tracking
Particulars
8. Egocentric Indexing in Perceptual Spatial and Temporal
Frameworks
Egocentric Spatial Indexes in Perception
 Egocentric Temporal Frameworks and Perceptual
Representation of Motion
Is Temporal Representation Constitutive to Perceptual
Representation?
9. The Iconic Nature of Perception
Noun-Phrase-Like Structure and Iconic Representation in
Perception
Iconic Aspects of Perceptual Spatial Representation
Temporal, Qualitative, and Packaging Iconic Aspects of Visual
Perception
Iconic Visual Perception and Maps or Pictures
Some Ways Not to Think about Iconic Representation
Iconic Perception, Iconic Concepts, Iconic Representation in
Propositional Thought
Part–Whole Representation in Pictures and Visual Perception
Compositionality in Iconic Perceptual Representation
Spatial Mapping in Visual Perception Again: The Non-Planar
Surface of the Scene
Relations Between Iconic Format and Representational Content
The Tractability of Iconic Attributional Complexity

PART III. FORMATION

10. First-Formed Perception: Its Richness and Autonomy

What are First-Formed Perceptual States Like?: Three Limitative
Views
Framework
Marr’s 2½-D Sketch
Change Detection
Treisman’s Binding Theory
Two Lines of Empirical Criticism of Treisman’s Theory
Philosophical Views Influenced by Treisman’s Binding Theory
Two Types of First-Formed Perception
11. Intra-Saccadic Perception and Recurrent Processing
Two Changes in Scientific Understanding of Perception-
Formation
Some Main Brain Areas Involved in Visual Processing
Timing of Visual Processing; Some Main Types of
Representation
Categorization and Timing
Levels of Specificity in Perceptual Categorization
Perceptual Constancies in Categorization Processing
12. Further Attributives: Primitive Attribution of Causation, Agency
Methodology for Finding Perceptual Attributives
Primitive Attribution of Mechanical Causation
Primitive Attribution of Agency
Attribution of Further Structural Elements of Agency

PART IV. SYSTEM

13. Perceptual-Level Representation and Categorization

Perceptual Categorization is Perceptual
Richer Perceptual Categorization and Perceptual Processing that
Contributes to It
14. Conation: Relatively Primitive, Perceptually Guided Action
Action Imperialism
Relatively Primitive Action
Form of Relatively Primitive Conative States
Broader Structure of Conation in Causing Relatively Primitive
Action
Summary: Philosophical Issues
15. Perceptual Attention
Forms of Perceptual Attention
Attention and Accuracy
Sources and Levels of Attention
 Perceptual-Level Attention Commands and Guidance of
Saccades
The Executive Control System and Propositional Drivers
Supra-Perceptual Effects on Perceptual-Level Operations: An
Example
16. Perceptual Memory I: Shorter Term Systems
Perceptual Memory and Consciousness
Priming and Memory
Visual Sensory Memory
Fragile Visual Short-Term Memory
Trans-Saccadic Memory
Visual Working Memory
Conceptual Short-Term Memory
17. Perceptual Memory II: Visual Perceptual Long-Term Memory
Overview
Ability-General Long-Term Visual Perceptual Memory
Episodic Visual Memory; De Re Long-Term Non-Episodic Visual
Memory
Perceptual and Conceptual Attributives in Long-Term Memory
Summary of Relations Among Major Types of Visual Perceptual
Memory
18. Perceptual Learning, Perceptual Anticipation, Perceptual
Imagining
Perceptual Learning
Perceptual Anticipation
Perceptual Imagining
19. Perception and Cognition
The Original Epistemic Grounds for Reflecting on Cognitive
Influence on Perception
Fodor and Pylyshyn’s Conceptions of Modularity; The Visual
System as a Module
Uses and Misuses of the Term ‘Cognition’
 The Issue of Cognitive Penetration
Framework Issues
Conceptions of Penetration
The Cognitive Penetration Controversy
A Computational Construal of Modularity
Psychological Systems and Psychological Kinds
The Empiricist Model of Perception and Conception: Degrees of
Abstraction
What Should Count as Cognition?
20. Conclusion
Emergence of Representational Mind
Empirical Characteristics of First-Formed Perceptions
Changes in the Science; Reading the Changes Philosophically
Perception: Form and Representational Content
Perception: The Seed of New Things to Live and Die For

Bibliography
Author Index
Subject Index
 Preface

This book is not the one that I set out to write over twelve years
ago. I had intended to follow Origins of Objectivity with an account
of what is distinctive about the main representational capacity more
advanced than perception. I thought, and still think, that that
capacity is propositional representation. I took some steps in that
direction in the Petrus Hispanus Lectures, Lisbon, 2009, and the
Nicod Lectures, Paris, 2010, and developed an argument for
connecting propositionality, constitutively, with propositional
deductive inference. I remain interested in that other book, and
hope to complete it. But it was pre-empted.
In writing a lead-up to discussing propositional capacities, I
wanted to elaborate an account of perception. Perception is, I think,
the first representational capacity to evolve. It is the main pre-
propositional representational capacity. The lead-up was intended to
be a relatively concise refinement of the account of perception in the
last chapters of Origins of Objectivity, a refinement that now
occupies approximately Chapters 1–3 of this book.
I became interested in vision just before I spent a semester
teaching at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in 1982.
My interest resulted in part from reading David Marr’s important
book, Vision. Although Marr died before I arrived at MIT, I audited
courses in perceptual psychology by Marr’s former colleagues during
the visit. I later wrote some articles on vision and made it a central
theme of Origins of Objectivity (2010). During work on that book
and later, I benefitted from discussions of vision science with my
son, Johannes Burge, who is currently a vision scientist at the
University of Pennsylvania. After 2010, I came to understand the
science more thoroughly, and developed ideas about structural and
semantical issues associated with perception. I did so through giving
a series of graduate seminars at University of California Los Angeles
(UCLA), and through discussing the science with various scientists—
especially in person with David Brainard, Bill Geisler, and Shimon
Ullman, and via correspondence with Jeffrey Schall and Yaffa
Yeshurun—and with Ned Block, one of few philosophers who
seriously engages with the science. In writing the refinement of the
Origins account of visual perception, I soon realized that I had too
much material to present in a run-up to another topic, in a single
book. The preliminary became the whole.
The book is about first form of representational mind. I take
perception to be the most primitive type of representational mind.
Relevant first form is three-fold.
One type of first form is the representational structure of
perception. Here, first form is the first representational form that
emerges in the evolution of representational mind. This form is
center-stage in Chapters 1–9. I had the main ideas about this
structure when I wrote Origins, but I discovered much more in
thinking through its details, applying it to cases, developing a
semantics for it, and reflecting on how it is embedded in the iconic
format of perception.
A central theme in the book, centered in Parts I and II, is
developing the foundations for a systematic semantics for perceptual
states. Perceptual psychology takes perceptual states to be accurate
or inaccurate. One of its main aims is to explain, causally, how
accurate and inaccurate perceptual states are formed. It has,
however, paid little attention to explaining what it is for such states
to be accurate or inaccurate, or to reflecting on how representational
capacities combine to yield a form of representation. Nor have these
issues been related to the obvious iconic nature of perceptual
representation. I take steps toward remedying this situation. In the
course of doing so, I think that I have discovered some basic aspects
of attribution, the root of predication. Predication in language and
thought has been a longstanding topic of philosophical reflection,
beginning with Aristotle and Kant, and developing mainly in Frege,
but also in Tarski and Strawson. Traditionally, the topic has been
pursued by reflection on logic. I have found it enlightening to reflect
on its roots in perception.
The second type of first form of representational mind is the first-
formed states in the order of perceptual processing. What is the
nature of the perceptual states that are formed fastest? What
properties in the environment do they represent? What sort of
processing leads to them? There are empirical answers to these
questions, at least for mammalian vision. These answers provide a
starting point for reflecting on what the fastest-formed perceptual
states are like in lower animals and even in evolutionary history. Of
course, each species must be considered on its own. I do not much
discuss lower animals, nor do I provide an evolutionary account,
although I occasionally comment on those topics. This second type
of first form is center-stage in Chapters 10–11. Issues about later-
formed perceptual representations, such as those used in perceptual
recognition of individuals, and perhaps for causation, agency, and
functional attributes, such as mate or edible, are touched on in
Chapter 12.
The third type of first form of representational mind is a natural-
kind system of representational capacities, with perception at the
representational center of the system. The systems that I highlight
are the visual-perceptual system and the visuo-motor system. The
two systems intersect and overlap. What it is to be part of these
systems is the central theme of Part IV, Chapters 13–19. I believe
that perception shares its representational structure and content,
outlined in Chapters 2–12, with several other representational
capacities. Generically, the capacities are conation, attention-
initiation, memory, affect, learning, anticipation, and imagining. I
think that the listed generic capacities have perceptual-level species
—species that have representational structures and contents that are
essentially those of perception. These capacities differ from
perception in mode (memory vs. perception) and transition-
operations, not in form or content. The notion of representational
level is explained in Chapter 1, the section The Principal Aims of the
Book, and again, more fully, at the beginning of Chapter 13.
Perceptual-level species of the listed capacities share attributional
content with perception. They share attributional and iconic
structure with perception. And they involve operations or
transformations that are either similar to those in perception-
formation itself, or at least not more sophisticated than they are.
These sub-species join with perception to form two large, natural-
kind psychological systems—the perceptual system and the
perceptual-motor system. These systems are unified (a) in sharing a
function (contributing to perception in the first case, contributing to
perceptually guided action in the second), and (b) in sharing the
representational structure of perception. They are also unified (c) in
using only representational attributive contents in or borrowed from
perception; and (d) in being held together by computational causal
processes both within perception and between perception and the
perceptual-level species of the listed generic capacities. Again, the
relevant perceptual-level species are perception-guided conation,
perceptual-attention initiations (or attention commands), perceptual
memory, perceptual affect, perceptual learning, perceptual
anticipation, and perceptual imagining.
I think that these two large, overlapping systems—the perceptual
system and the perceptual-motor system—constitute the natural-
kind center of lower representational mind. I conjecture that variants
of these systems, sometimes perhaps omitting one or two of the
auxiliary capacities—such as perceptual imagining—or adding other
auxiliary capacities—like amodal mapping—occur in all animal
perceivers, from insects to human beings. These systems and the
perceptual-level capacity-species are discussed in Chapters 13–19,
focusing on visual perception and visually guided action.
The three notions of first form are associated with the general
plan of the book. Parts I and II discuss what perception is. Part III
centers on how perception works—how it is formed and the nature
and scope of its processing. Part IV treats relations between
perception and satellite capacities, and wherein they form a unified
perceptual system and perceptual-motor system.
A further theme runs through nearly all parts of the book. The
theme is opposition—sometimes implicit, sometimes explicit—to a
way of thinking about perception started by the classical empiricists,
Locke and Hume. In trying to understand the main features of
perception, this approach takes too seriously intuitive groupings and
senses of similarity via introspection of conscious perceptual
experience. It also errs by distinguishing perception from conception
primarily in terms of differences in abstraction. Perception is
supposed to operate toward the concrete end. Conception, toward
the abstract end. The spectrum is intuitive—not very carefully
explained. My opposition is centered in reflecting on the explanatory
practice of perceptual psychology. It also derives from reflecting on
the form, content, function, capacities, and uses that turn up in
systematic explanation—causal and semantical.
As with language, so with perception, understanding
representational form and content depends not on introspection of
intuitively salient features of the vehicle of representation (sentence
or image-like-representation), but on competencies that underlie use
of the representation. Intuitive reflection on sentential structure
would treat it as linear and as simply being composed of a string of
words. Reflection, in logic and linguistics, informed by systematic
consideration of sentential use, reveals a hierarchical structure with
words forming phrase units that are not immediately obvious to
intuition. Finding representational structure in perception is parallel.
It depends not primarily on introspection of conscious perceptual
images, but on systematic reflection on the capacities evinced in
uses and transformations of perceptions. This reflection must
consider the representational functions of perception and the
structures of capacities discovered in empirical science. Most of what
there is to be understood about perception is unconscious. All
operations that lead to perceptions are unconscious, and there are
many unconscious perceptions. Moreover, given the way in which
perceptual discriminative capacities, and their use in guiding action,
are molded, in evolution and learning, by perceiver-needs and by
frequently unobvious causal and statistical patterns in the
environment, one cannot rely on introspection of images, and
intuitive types of image-similarity to understand perception—even
the iconic, broadly image-like character of vision. Perceptual
grouping does not in general conform to intuitive image-similarity.
Yet all perceptual groupings are grounded, at least partly, in shape-
size-motion attributions, plotted iconically in an image-like way in
perceptual representation.
The book is resolutely a work in philosophy of science—
specifically philosophy of psychology. Perceptual psychology,
centrally the psychophysics of vision, has become a mature science
in the last fifty years. It gives philosophy an opportunity to
understand important features of psychological capacities at a level
of depth, rigor, and empirical groundedness that has never before
been attainable. Philosophy should leap at the opportunity to make
use of such a powerful and rapidly advancing science, as a basis for
philosophical understanding. Some philosophy of perception makes
no use at all of perceptual psychology. Much philosophy of
perception makes at best decorative use. I think that it is no longer
intellectually responsible to philosophize about perception without
knowing and seriously engaging with that science. I believe that the
practice of centering philosophical reflection about perception on
phenomenology, or on analysis of ordinary talk about perception,
without closely connecting the reflection with what is known from
science (a centering that is a residue of the early empiricist model of
perception), and the practice of allowing epistemology to guide
reflection on what perception must be like, will all soon become
museum pieces of past, misdirected philosophy.
Most of the book’s claims are, of course, supported only
empirically, by interpreting the empirical results of the science. Some
of the claims are, however, supported apriori. One should not
confuse apriority with innateness, certainty, obviousness, infallibility,
dogmatism, unrevisability, or immunity from revision based on
empirical considerations. To be apriori supported, or apriori
warranted, is to have support or warrant that does not depend for its
force on perception or on sensing. Most apriori warranted judgments
in this book are warranted by reflection that yields understanding of
key concepts or principles used or presupposed in the science. All
the relevant apriori judgments are synthetic, certainly in the sense of
being non-vacuous and the sense of not being truths of logic. I think
that the judgments are also synthetic in the sense of not being the
products of analysis of conceptual complexes into concepts
contained in the complexes. I think that most concepts that are
central to our discussion are not complexes. They are simple. They
are, however, necessarily and apriori embedded in networks with
other concepts. Reasoning through such networks sometimes yields
synthetic apriori understanding of foundations of mind.
Apriori supported judgments can be further supported empirically,
by the science. But insofar as they are apriori warranted, they have
sufficient warrant to support belief; and the warrant derives from
reasoning or understanding, independently of support from
perception, perceptual experience, or sensory registration. An
example of an apriori warranted judgment, I think, is that perceptual
states can be accurate or inaccurate. Another example is that
perceptual states have a representational function—to accurately
pick out and characterize particulars via causal relations to them:
perceptual states fail in some way (representationally) if they are not
accurate. I doubt that one can know apriori that any individual has
perceptual capacities. Our empirical knowledge that we do have
such capacities is, however, firm. It is more certain than some things
that we know apriori about perception. As noted, being apriori does
not imply some super-strong type of support. Apriori warrant for
belief in simple arithmetical truths is super-strong. But much apriori
support is not stronger, often less strong, than strong empirical
support.
Our firm empirical knowledge that individuals have perceptual
states does not require a detailed, reflective, philosophical
understanding of what perception is. Knowing that individuals have
perceptual states requires only a minimal understanding. One must
be able to distinguish perception, at least by some cases, from just
any sensing. And one must be able to recognize various examples of
perception. Detailed philosophical understanding requires reflection,
articulation, and elaboration of a minimal understanding of the
concept perception and of relations between perception and other
matters—semantical, functional, biological, causal, and so on.
Elaboration is mainly empirical, but partly apriori. Given an
elaborated understanding of what perception is, it is possible to
draw, apriori, some further conclusions about the form, semantics,
and functions of perceptual states. Such conclusions are abstract
and limited. They are important in being basic to understanding.
Again, most of the book’s claims are empirical. For example, the
accounts of how perceptual and perceptual-motor systems work in
Parts III and IV, and the accounts of what these systems are in Part
IV, are warranted partly by appeal to explanations in the science.
Those accounts and those explanations are certainly empirically, not
apriori, warranted.
I became interested in perception partly because it promises
insight into basic types of representation of the world, and partly
because it is a key factor that must be understood if one is to
understand empirical knowledge. This book shows some fruits of the
first motivation. In investigating the structure and semantics of
perceptual representation, one investigates primitive and basic types
of reference and attribution. My interest in the role of perception in
empirical knowledge remains. But I take understanding perception to
owe almost nothing to epistemology, whereas understanding
epistemology absolutely requires understanding perception.
Epistemology investigates epistemic norms for capacities that can
contribute to obtaining knowledge. One cannot understand the
norms without understanding the capacities. One understands
perceptual capacities by reflecting on empirical science and its basic
commitments, not by reflecting on epistemology. Understanding
perception is the task of this book. Epistemic use of an
understanding of perception is posterior. For epistemic work in this
direction, see my ‘Perceptual Entitlement’, Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 67 (2003), 503–548; and ‘Entitlement:
The Basis for Empirical Warrant’, in P. Graham and N. Pedersen eds.,
Epistemic Entitlement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020).
I have some slight hope, even in this specialized world, that this
book will interest not only philosophers, but at least some scientists
in perceptual psychology and other areas of psychology. The best
science is informed by a breadth and depth of perspective that is
philosophical. This point is particularly relevant to perceptual
psychology. A central, often stated, aim of the science is to
understand conditions in which accurate perception occurs, and
conditions under which illusions occur. (See Chapter 1, note 25.)
Accuracy is a semantical concept.
So the science is committed at its very core to there being a
semantics for perception—a systematic account of relations between
perceptual representation and its subject matters. The account must
explain what it is for perception to be accurate or inaccurate. Of
course, the science is mainly concerned with causal patterns and
mechanisms. Much of it, indeed probably most of it to date, focuses
on pre-representational, pre-perceptual states that register the
proximal stimulus. But the point of this scientific work is partly to
build toward understanding perception of the physical environment.
Part of understanding perception scientifically is to understand not
only the causal patterns that lead to accurate and inaccurate
perception, but also to understand the form and content of
perceptual states, and what it is for them to be accurate or
inaccurate.
Yet the science has paid no serious attention to these issues—
specifically to semantics. It has not developed a vocabulary or set of
principles that enable it to discuss accuracy and inaccuracy of
perception with the precision and clarity of its accounts of causal,
formational aspects of psychological states and processes. It
provides no answers to questions like ‘What is it for a perceptual
state to be accurate or inaccurate?’, ‘What sorts of representational
competencies are involved in forming a state that is accurate or
inaccurate?’; ‘In what ways can a perception be partly accurate and
partly inaccurate?’; ‘What is the representational form or structure of
perceptual states?’. Such questions are addressed in Parts I and II of
the book.
Scientific understanding of perception is incomplete if it does not
incorporate a systematic semantical understanding of perceptual
states into its understanding of principles according to which
perceptual states are causally generated. Semantical understanding
is understanding of the representational contents, their forms, and
their accuracy conditions—the conditions for representational
success. Perceptual psychology would benefit from mastering the
vocabulary necessary to think systematically about the semantics of
perception.
Philosophy is the source of modern work in semantics—first the
semantics of mathematics and logic, later the semantics of natural
language. The basic semantical concepts, in something like their
modern form, come from Gottlob Frege, about 130 years ago. In the
last section of Chapter 1, I explain some of Frege’s basic concepts. I
think that these concepts, with some modification, are valuable in
understanding perception, even though they were first developed for
understanding much higher-level representation—representation in
mathematics.
I think that parts of the science need not only a deeper grip on
semantics, but a much more rigorous terminology. Uses of terms like
‘representation’, ‘knowledge’, ‘cognition’, ‘recognition’, ‘judgment’,
‘belief’, ‘concept’, ‘prediction’, ‘intention’, ‘voluntary’ are far from
reflective, much less standardized, in the science. Assimilating the
whys and wherefores of terminology, is often the beginning of better,
more fruitful empirical inquiry. Centrally, in Chapter 19, the section
Uses and Misuses of the Term ‘Cognition’, but also throughout the book,
there is a concerted effort to emphasize sharper uses of key
mentalistic terms so as to respect basic differences in
representational level. Such differences correspond to important
differences in representational kinds—that is, representational
capacities.
 This is a long, complex book. Understanding anything well
requires effort and patience. Genuine philosophical and scientific
understanding cannot be grabbed off the shelf. The time and effort
required to understand this book will be considerable. One cannot
get there in a few sittings. The key point is to read and reread
carefully and slowly, noting and reflecting on nuances and
qualifications, mastering terminology, reading in context, connecting
different contexts together, reading the footnotes, going back to
earlier passages—all the while, reflecting. Few readers outside
philosophy ever read this way. Most philosophers have, I think, lost
the art. Iris Murdoch, in harmony with the marvelous quote that
heads Chapter 1, wrote: ‘In philosophy, the race is to the slow’. Too
many race at high speeds. The psychological and sociological
pressures to form opinions and publish them quickly, and often, are
very strong. Academic pressures and computer fluency have yielded
much more writing, with no more time to master the increasingly
complex topics written about. Careless reading, misdirected criticism,
uninformed opinions, simplistic proposals abound. Perhaps it was
always so. However, as knowledge grows—and grows more complex
—lack of patience in pursuing understanding is an increasingly
debilitating vice. Given that philosophical understanding of this
book’s topics has become harder—because more is known and what
is known is more complex—patience is more required than ever.
For those who may have some interest in the book, but are not
initially willing to invest large of amounts of time in it, I set out a
plan for getting some of the book’s gist. My hope is that after
achieving an overview, some readers will be tempted to go back for
more—not just noting fine points, but mastering the book’s
conceptual framework and conceptual intricacies.
For vision scientists, Parts I–II deal with the least familiar ideas—
principally, the representational form and semantics of perception.
Part III and Chapters 13–18 in Part IV mainly describe matters that
many vision or visuo-motor scientists are familiar with, although
these passages cast those matters in a conceptual form that may be
more unified than specialized accounts provide. Chapter 19 of Part
IV, supported by Chapters 13–18, presents a large view of the visual
system and visuo-motor system that uses perhaps familiar empirical
materials to develop a possibly less familiar, or more sharply
articulated, view of those systems as wholes.
For those, either vision scientists or others, who simply want to
get a sense for the main lines of thought, I offer the following,
tentative guide.
I recommend, in Part I, the first two sections of Chapter 1 and all
of Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, I recommend the prologue and the
section Retinal Image Contour Registration and Surface Contour
Perception. This section illustrates concretely how I think perceptual
constancies are distinguished from other invariances in visual
perception.
In Part II, I recommend the prologue at the beginning of Chapter
4, and the third and fifth sections of the chapter (Representational-
Dependence Hierarchies in Perceptual Attribution and Taxonomic
Hierarchies in Perception). In Chapter 5, I recommend the first two
sections (Basic Form of Perceptual Contents and Perceptual Reference is
Partly Guided by Perceptual Attribution). In Chapter 6, I recommend
the first three and the last of the sections (Review of Basic Form of
Perceptual Representation; Perception of Property Instances; Betokening
and Four Types of Perceptual Attribution; and Perceptual Contents,
Propositions, and Noun Phrase). Chapter 7 gives the central account of
the semantics of perception. This may be hard to follow if one has
skipped too much of the slow development of concepts that lead up
to it. The key section is the next-to-last one (Accuracy Conditions for
Perceptual Attributives in Perceptual Constancies). Chapter 8 centers on
the way space and time are represented in visual perception. It can
be skipped by those not interested in details of perceptual
representational structure. Chapter 9 connects basic representational
structure (the structure of reference and attribution) with the iconic
form of visual perception. The key sections are the first and the last
two (Noun-Phrase-Like Structure and Iconic Representation in Perception;
Relations Between Iconic Format and Representational Content; and The
Tractability of Iconic Attributional Complexity).
 In Part III, I recommend the prologue at the beginning of
Chapter 10 and the first and last sections of that chapter (What Are
First-Formed Perceptual States Like?: Three Limitative Views and Two
Types of First-Formed Perception). In Chapter 11, I recommend the
prologue and the first section (Two Changes in Scientific Understanding
of Perception-Formation). The second section is a brief run-through of
the course that visual processing takes in the brain. The main points
will be familiar to any vision scientist. The remaining sections provide
basic facts about timing and about perceptual categorization. They
may be skimmed or skipped by those seeking only gist. All these
sections in Chapter 11 are mainly descriptive—with some
improvements, I think, in conceptual rigor—of facts familiar to many
vision scientists. Chapter 12 has a methodological discussion of
considerations that bear on whether an attributive is, or should be,
considered a perceptual attributive—an attributive, or characterizer,
generated in the visual system (Methodology for Finding Perceptual
Attributives). That section tries to codify and state more precisely
methods already in place in the science.
Part IV treats the visual system at a level of generality far from
the focused empirical studies that make up most of the science. The
prologue for Chapter 13 is recommended. It sets the plan of Part IV.
Readers trying for an overview can pick and choose within, or skip,
Chapters 13–18. These chapters discuss categorization, conation,
attention, various forms of short-term memory, long-term memory,
affect, learning, anticipation, and imagining. The chapters develop
the idea that all these capacities have functions at the
representational level of perception. As noted, the notion of level is
explained briefly in Chapter 1 and in more detail at the beginning of
Chapter 13. The chapters are part of an extended argument that the
perceptual-level functions and operations of these capacities occur
within the visual system or the visuo-motor system, in a specific
sense of ‘occur within’. Chapter 19 can be read by sampling the
beginning of each section, then determining how much further to
read. Chapter 19 uses work in Chapters 13–18 to develop the idea
that the perceptual system—for which the visual system is
paradigmatic—and the perceptual-motor system are lower
representational mind. A proposal for understanding the unity of
lower representational mind is advanced in A Computational Construal
of Modularity. Although I explore some intermediate territory in What
Should Count as Cognition?, I think that lower representational mind
contrasts most dramatically with capacities for propositional
inference and language, the more primitive of which constitute the
first capacities in upper representational mind. I believe that the
most important feature of upper representational mind is
competence to produce explanations. This capacity develops into
science, moral thinking and practice, and, most broadly, into
understanding. The section The Empiricist Model of Perception and
Cognition: Degrees of Abstraction brings together criticisms, which
recur throughout the book, of an old way of thinking about the
relation between perception and thought that, while not prevalent in
psychophysics of perception, remains widespread in other parts of
psychology and in philosophy. This section might be useful to
psychologists as well as philosophers. Chapter 20 summarizes main
themes, and concludes.
For valuable input, I am grateful to: Marty Banks, John Bartholdi,
Blake Batoon, Ned Block, David Bordeaux, David Brainard, Denis
Buehler, Daniel Burge, Dorli Burge, Johannes Burge, Susan Carey,
Sam Cumming, Will Davies, Frank Durgin, Chaz Firestone, Julian
Fischer, Bill Geisler, Katherine Gluer, Peter Godfrey-Smith, Peter
Graham, Gabe Greenberg, Michael Hansen, Catherine Hochman,
Gabby Johnson, Nancy Kanwisher, Ed Keenan, Philip Kellman, Ela
Kotkowska, Bill Kowalsky, Kevin Lande, Hakwan Lau, Gavin
Lawrence, Yannig Luthra, Tony Martin, Peter Momtchiloff, Bence
Nanay, Peter Pagin, Alexi Patsaouras, Christopher Peacocke, Sam
Pensler, Atthanasios Raftopoulos, Jacob Reid, Michael Rescorla,
Pieter Roelfsema, Jeffrey Schall, Brian Scholl, Wesley Seurat,
Houston Smit, Sheldon Smith, Irene Sperandio, Galen Strawson, Paul
Talma, Shimon Ullman, Tamar Weber, Fei Xu, Yaffa Yeshurun. Thanks
also to three anonymous reviewers. The two complex drawings,
Figures 9.2 and 9.3, are by Bill Kowalsky, as are the other drawings,
except for one by Johannes Burge.
My immediate family—sons and wife—has supported and taken
interest. I am especially grateful to my wife, Dorli, for patience in
understanding her often distracted husband and for helping me to
look more carefully at the world, especially appreciating details and
finding joy in the beauties of little things.

Tyler Burge
Animal Eye Grid
Animal eye grid credit lines:
(1) Tarsier monkey, © nikpal/Getty Images; (2) Horse, © Magdalena
Strakova/EyeEm/Getty Images; (3) Cat, © Dobermaraner/Shutterstock.com; (4) Racing
pigeon, © triocean/Getty Images; (5) Red-eyed tree frog, © Mark Kostich/Getty Images;
(6) Indian elephant, © Volanthevist/Getty Images; (7) Bearded vulture, ©
Slowmotiongli/Dreamstime.com; (8) Robber fly, © suwich/Getty Images; (9) Blue-spotted
pufferfish, © Shahar Shabtai/Shutterstock.com; (10) Deer fly, © ekamelev/Unsplash; (11)
Goat, © Tsuneya Kudoh/EyeEm/Getty Images; (12) Iguana, ©
Gaschwald/Dreamstime.com; (13) Grey butterfly, © egor-kamelev/Pexels; (14) Emerald
tree boa, © George lepp/Getty Images; (15) Ant, © Visual&Written SL/Alamy Stock Photo;
(16) Jumping Spider, © Razvan Cornel Constantin/Dreamstime.com; (17) Discus Fish, ©
tunart/getty Images; (18) Tokay Gecko, © Spaceheater/Dreamstime.com; (19) Octopus, ©
iStock.com/leventalbas; (20) Eurasian Eagle Owl, © GlobalP/Getty Images; (21) Sumatran
tiger, © ekamelev/Unsplash; (22) Human, © Tatiana Makotra/Shutterstock.com; (23)
Chameleon, © aluxum/Getty Images; (24) Bee, © ekamelev/Unsplash; (25) Chimpanzee,
© Karl Ammann/Getty Images; (26) Green tree python, © Zoran Kolundzija/Getty Images;
(27) Finschs Imperial Pigeon, © Marc Dozier/Getty Images; (28) Sparrowhawk, © Katie
Kokoshashvili/Shutterstock.com; (29) California grey whale, © Michael S. Nolan/Alamy
Stock Photo; (30) Lion, © Ben Puttock/Alamy Stock Photo; (31) Northern harrier eagle, ©
Wildlife World/ Dreamstime.com; (32) Mantis shrimp, © Alex Permiakov/Shutterstock.com;
(33) Napoleon wrasse fish, © ifish/Getty Images; (34) Caiman crocodile, © Jonathan
Knowles/Getty Images; (35) Fly, © egor-kamelev/Pexels; (36) Parrot, © Couleur/Pixabay.
Animal Eyes
 Figures

3.1. Geisler Contours

7.1. Drawings conveying the different modes of representation for the top edge
and side edges and their lengths in two orientations of the same surface, or
two orientations of two different but similarly sized and shaped surfaces
9.1. A sample surface made up of six smallest-discriminable cells
9.2. A model of the iconic representational content of a perceptual state
representing the 6-cell surface.
9.3. Depiction of a scene showing different points of view
10.1. Illustration of a simple example of the Rapid Serial Visual Presentation
(RSVP) experimental paradigm. Source: M. Potter, B. Wyble, C. Hagmann,
and E. McCourt, ‘Detecting Meaning in RSVP at 13 ms per Picture’
11.1a. Diagrammatic section through the head, sketching major features of the
main visual pathway linking the eyes to the striate cortex (V1). Source: J.P.
Frisby and J.V. Stone, Seeing, second edition, figure 1.5, p. 4, © 2010
Massachusetts Institute of Technology by permission of The MIT Press
11.1b. Illustration of two visual pathways underneath the cortical areas of the
brain.Source: J.P. Frisby and J.V. Stone, Seeing, second edition, figure 1.6,
p. 5, © 2010Massachusetts Institute of Technology, by permission of The
MIT Press
11.2. Some main visual areas of the brain
12.1. The launching (top row) and entrainment (bottom row) effects, discovered
by Michotte
12.2. Habituated launching sequence and the same sequence in reverse
12.3. William Ball experimental paradigm
12.4. Causation and overlap
14.1. Important states in Relatively Primitive Action-Motor System
15.1. Sequence of display in each trial of flashed discs
 15.2. A visibility map of a 15-degree-circumference-sized part of a retinal image.
Source: J. Najemnik and W. Geisler, ‘Simple Summation Rule for
OptimalFixation Selection in Visual Search’, figure 2a, p1288, © 2009,
withpermission from Elsevier
15.3a. Flow chart for computational program of Tsotsos and Kruijne for visual
discrimination task. Source: Adapted from J. Tsotsos and W. Kruijne,
‘Cognitive Programs: Software for Attention’s Executive’, Figure 1, p. 4,
open-access distributedunder the terms of the Creative Common Attribution
License (CC BY)
15.3b. Abstract diagram of the structure of the functional components necessary
to support the executive control of attentive processing with information-
passing channels indicated in red arrows. Source: Adapted from J. Tsotsos
and W. Kruijne, ‘Cognitive Programs: Software for Attention’s Executive’,
Figures 5–6, p8, open-access distributed under the terms of the Creative
Common Attribution License (CC BY)
15.3c. Diagram of model for system of processing of visual executive-control
system’s (vAE’s) attention commands for visual task execution. Source:
Adapted from J. Tsotsos and W. Kruijne, ‘Cognitive Programs: Software for
Attention’s Executive’, Figures 5–6, p8, open-access distributed under the
terms of the Creative Common Attribution License (CC BY)
16.1. A typical Sperling test display
18.1. Examples of figures used in mental rotation experiments. Source: Adapted
from Roger N. Shepard and Lynn A. Cooper, Mental Images And Their
Transformations, figure, page 495, © 1982 Massachusetts Institute of
Technology by permission of The MIT Press
19.1. Causal analogy
 Abbreviations

CSTM conceptual short-term memory

FEF frontal eye fields
FFA fusiform face area
FFE fast field echo
fMRI functional magnetic resonance imaging
FVSTM fragile visual short-term memory
IT inferior temporal cortex
LGN lateral geniculate nucleus
LOT language of thought
LTM long-term memory
MST medial superior temporal area
MT middle temporal area / medial temporal cortex
ms millisecond
OFC orbital frontal cortex
PFC pre-frontal cortex
PHC para-hippocampal cortex
RC retrosplenial cortex
RDS random dot stereograms
RSVP rapid serial visual presentation
SM simple model
SOA stimulus onset asynchrony
TSM trans-saccadic memory
V1–V5 visual cortical areas
VLTM visual long-term memory
VWM visual working memory
WM working memory
 PA RT I
PERCEPTION
 1
Introduction

In philosophy, if you aren’t moving at a snail’s pace, you aren’t

moving at all.
Iris Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics

In the grand array of occupants of the universe, from sub-atomic

particles through higher animals, the animals with minds stand out
as special. Some of the specialness derives from our being in this
group. We interest ourselves. This interest extends to animals like
us.
The natural interest is grounded in more than self-interest. It is
grounded in a deep joint in nature—the joint between the minded
and the mindless. The joint may be ragged. It may have borderline
cases. But it is real. It is relevant to matters of great value and
importance—science, understanding, morality, art. Without mind,
none of these pursuits or goods exist. They seem good
independently of whether we engage with them. They depend for
being good on realizing functions of certain types of minds. The
mindedness and the type of mind ground the goodness, not their
being ours. My project is understanding—understanding some
central aspects of mind.
Understanding the mind–mindless joint requires understanding
mind in its most basic forms. Of course, mind depends on the
mindless and makes use of it. Without the regularities of organic
chemistry, minds could not be minds. Without the regularities of the
broader macro-physical world, minds could not navigate through it.
In many ways, the non-minded physical world stamps itself into the
very natures of mental states. In understanding mind, however, it is
important to understand what is new and different about it, at its
most elementary levels. Such understanding aids understanding
richer forms that guide the listed pursuits. Those pursuits are not
possible where mind begins. They are not possible for the first forms
of mind. However, they depend on and employ these forms. A
central aim of this book is to understand forms of mind at this initial
juncture—forms of perception.

Biological Function, Action, Sensing, and

Perception—The Emergence of Mind
Before mind emerged, another deep and interesting joint in nature
had already developed. Brief attention to this joint is valuable in
understanding the joint on which mind hinges. Most of the universe
is fire, rock, or emptiness. Already with life, there is a momentous
difference. Life occupies small crevasses in the universe. However, it
marks a large change from the chemical mixes from which it
emerged. Although the living share a material basis with the non-
living, the living comprise a genuinely new and different group of the
universe’s occupants.
The point is not just intuitive. It shows up in new terms and
methods in the scientific study of life. Notions of function, growth,
reproduction, natural selection, adaptation, life-cycles, ecology have
no place in physics or chemistry. They are central to biology. The
historical study of evolution and a lesser emphasis on law, are
foreign to physics and chemistry. These scientific differences signal
subject-matter differences. The living are very different from the
rest.
A key aspect of life, lacking in the lifeless natural world, is
function. Rock and fire have no functions in themselves. Biological
functions are patterns of operation whose existence derives from
their contributions to success in reproduction.1 The function of
photo-synthesis is to convert light energy into chemical energy that
subsequently is transformed in a way that feeds an organism’s other
operations. The process exists in plants and other organisms
because it contributed to their reproduction. It was naturally
selected.
Like other types of function, biological function is conceptually
linked with doing well, being successful. These types of goodness
are not moral, or products of plans or purposes. They are good for
the system, or individual, or species, because they aid survival long
enough to reproduce. Being a biological function is an objective
matter: functions are what they are independently of whether
anyone recognizes them. They are open to objective evaluation,
even scientific evaluation, by rational standards. Whether and to
what degree a process fulfills one of its functions can be empirically
assessed. Either a process functions well or it does not.
Some functions are attributable to plants and animals as whole
organisms. Others are attributed only to subsystems or parts of a
plant or animal. For example, functions to grow and reproduce are
functions of the whole plant. By contrast, production of pollen grains
is a function of the anther in a plant’s flower. Photo-synthesis is an
operation in each individual cell. The whole plant, its sub-systems,
and its parts can succeed or fail in realizing their functions.
Functional processing in plants responds in ways sensitive to the
environment. Photo-synthesis depends on features of the plant that
are specialized to be sensitive to light. Photo-synthesis yields
responses, such as directional growth, that depend on chemical
reactions in the plant that transform the light’s energy into chemical
energy. These are antecedents of sensing and action that occur in
animals. I think it well to follow common sense in thinking that these
are not strictly cases of sensing or acting. I say that plants are
sensitive to the environment, whereas animals sense it. Animals, but
not plants, act. Directional growth and pollination are not actions. A
plant’s absorption of water and nutrients is not drinking or eating.
The Venus Fly Trap’s engulfing of visitors is not eating. I conjecture
that this is so because the relevant changes in the plant can be too
easily explained in terms of summations of changes that occur in
plant cells. There is no need to postulate a central locus of conation,
as we do for agents.
Some speak metaphorically, even poetically, of sensing and acting
by plants. Some scientists like to say that plants communicate with
one another. Perhaps there is a broad enough notion of
communication to allow such talk to be non-metaphorical. I believe
that any such communication is not action. Calling functional, cross-
individual patterns of sensitivity and response among plants’
“communication” serves advertisement more than understanding.
True understanding depends more here on exploring differences
than on engaging in assimilation.
I think that serious conceptual and scientific investigation of these
matters will confirm some variant of what common sense assumes.
Plants may communicate. They do not act. Some or all animals, and
perhaps other organisms that are neither plants nor animals, do.
I think that action has to do with a coordination among central
capacities of an organism—typically, but not necessarily,
endogenously causing movement by the individual.2 As noted, I
conjecture that plants do not act, because their changes derive not
from a central coordinating capacity, but from a mere aggregation of
changes in plant parts. Photo-synthesis occurs in every plant cell.
Growth is not action partly because it is a summation of aggregate
increases in various cells. Directionality in growth stems from the
fact that more stimulated cells multiply faster. Plants are sensitive to
light. Relevant stimulation for growth is often from light. Plants grow
toward the light. Directional growth is an aggregate response of
changes in the plant’s most stimulated cells. This is not action.
Similarly, for absorption of water and nutrients. Such absorption is
not drinking or eating. These points are at best a gesture at a
position on a complicated topic.
I take the notion of sensing, as distinct from that of sensitivity, to
be tied to action. Plants are sensitive to stimuli. Animals sense
stimuli. Sensing and action emerge together.3
 The distinction between plant responses and animal (or other
organisms) action is not central to the present project. It is
background. What I have pointed to is a broad analogy between
plant sensitivity and functional growth-like responses, on one hand,
and animal sensing and functional behavioral responses that include
action, on the other.
The sensing-action nexus is very old, older than the emergence of
mind. Organisms that surely lack minds—paramecia, simple worms,
snails—act. They eat, swim, or crawl. They depend on elementary
sensing capacities in fulfilling these activities’ functions.
Here again, biological functions of the organism are to be
distinguished from biological functions of organs and operations
within the organism. For example, eating, mating, swimming,
crawling, and navigating are biological functions of the whole animal.
All meet earlier-discussed conditions for being a biological function.
All depend for being functional on the well-functioning operation of
biological systems or organs within the organism. For example,
eating’s fulfilling its function depends on the well-functioning
operation of a digestive system. The whole-animal functions are
relevant to understanding success and failure for the whole animal,
not just sub-systems or sub-parts of the animal. Acting and sensing
are functional pursuits at the level of the whole animal. They form
the womb out of which basic forms of mind are born.
Philosophical tradition has come to a broad consensus on the
most general marks of mind. They are consciousness and
representation.4 Thought and perception—both of which are types of
representation—can be conscious or unconscious. Consciousness, I
think, can be either representational or not. A representational state
like a perception can, obviously, be conscious. A feel of a pain or a
tickle can, I think, be distinguished from a proprioceptive
representation of its location. Such feels are conscious, but not in
themselves representational in the ordinary sense of representation
—the sense that I will refine and develop.
This book focuses on representation, not consciousness. I take
perceptual representation to be a basic mark of mind and a mark of
nature’s mind–mindless joint. This view does not compete with the
idea that consciousness is also a basic mark of mind. There may be
two joints in nature between minds and the mindless. Many minds
are both representational and at some times conscious. But it may
be that there are conscious beings that do not represent and
representational beings that are not conscious. I focus on the first
mark of mind—representation. Vastly more is known about it. The
science of consciousness is in its gestation stage. The science of
perceptual representation is in its early maturity.
There is no consensus about how consciousness and
representation are related in being marks of mind. The issue is
complicated by the fact that there are importantly different historical
understandings of the putative subject matter here—mind. The
notions of mind, psyche, soul, psychological system, and so on, each
has different historical associations. I ignore nuance here, in the
interests of providing a broad-brushed setting for the main project. I
think that having consciousness and having representation are each
sufficient for having a mind.
Neither is by itself necessary for having a mind. An animal that
feels pain—and hence is conscious—has a mind. It may or may not
have a capacity to represent, in the sense of ‘represent’ that will
occupy us. For example, it may or may not have perceptual states.
An animal that perceives, and hence represents, has a mind. It may
or may not be capable of consciousness.
So I think that representation and consciousness are in principle
separable. Each is a mark of mind.5 It follows that there could be
two paths to mind in the evolution of animals—one through
consciousness, one through representation. If one wants to
distinguish mind—marked by consciousness—from psychology—
marked by representation—,I have no strong objection. Then there
may be minds without psychologies, and psychologies without
minds. I do not, however, write in these ways. I do sometimes write
of conscious mind or representational mind.
I assume that the two marks of mind—consciousness and
representation—are each sufficient for having mind. Having at least
one is necessary. Neither is by itself necessary.
Of course, many animals that are conscious are capable of
representation, and many animals capable of representation are
conscious. All higher animals, certainly all mammals, have
representational capacities and are (often) conscious. So if there are,
in evolutionary history, separate streams into mind—animals that are
conscious but do not represent and/or animals that represent but
are not conscious—, these two streams flow back together in more
complex animals.
The point about the separability of consciousness and
representation is a very general, conceptual point. There is no
necessary connection between consciousness and representation.
The point is not just of general conceptual importance. It bears
on understanding the kind of representation that figures in this
book. I have said that, for all we know, there may be animals that
have perception and lack consciousness. Bees and other arthropods
have perception. They may lack consciousness. We do not know
enough about consciousness to settle the question. One day,
unconscious robots might be produced so as to have visual
perception.
I think that perception without even a capacity for consciousness
is epistemically, metaphysically, and nomologically possible.
Epistemically: I think that nothing that we know, either empirically or
apriori, rules out perceptual representation without consciousness
(or vice-versa). Metaphysically and nomologically: I think it a real
possibility that an animal have perceptual representation and lack
any capacity for consciousness. Representation is primarily a
functional matter. It hinges on what an individual or the individual’s
sub-systems can do. Consciousness is not a functional matter; it
hinges on an individual’s material basis.
Psychophysical explanations posit human perceptual states that
are not and cannot become conscious.6 Much of the science of
perception is carried on without specifying whether a perception is
conscious. These points form the ground for the conjecture that
there is nothing in the nature of things that requires some
association between consciousness and representation.
Of course, conscious perceptions are an interesting topic. They
have different psychological-representational, as well as
phenomenological, properties from unconscious ones. But
consciousness itself is not yet a central scientific topic. Perceptual
science has been spectacularly successful without theorizing much
about it. Eventually, more will be known.
Some philosophers claim that perception must be conscious.
Some claim that perception that picks out bodies, or perception that
is not guesswork and could support knowledge, requires
consciousness. None of the arguments that I know of for such
positions has any force. I discuss some in Chapter 10, the section
Philosophical Views Influenced by Treisman’s Binding Theory. Several are
incompatible with what is known from science. Issues about
consciousness are not central in our story, but they arise recurrently.
I mention them here both to acknowledge their natural interest and
to motivate not centering on them. My primary focus is
representation.
More specifically, I focus on perceptual representation. Perceptual
representation is where representational mind begins. I reflect on
the joint in nature between mind and the mindless by reflecting on
differences between perceptual representation and those non-
perceptual sensory capacities that underlie it. I center on perception
—and related capacities like perceptual memory and perceptual
anticipation—because it is functionally the most basic
representational capacity. No other representational capacity evolved
earlier. If other representational capacities (perceptual memory, for
example) evolved equally early, they depend functionally on
perception.
Perception is, evolutionarily, the first known manifestation of
representational mind. Arthropods—bees, praying mantises, and
certain spiders—are known to have visual perception. Visual
perception is distinct, in ways to be discussed, from other types of
light-based sensing. Snails, molluscs, and tapeworms sense light,
even light-direction. Ants respond to light-produced templates that
correspond to surface shape.7 These capacities for visual sensing are
not perception. Snails and molluscs are not known to have visual
perception. I think it unlikely that animals that evolved much earlier
than the arthropods had perceptual representation. So we have a
rough sense of where representational mind begins. It begins among
the arthropods.8
I do not center on the evolutionary emergence of
representational mind, despite its great interest. My topic is
different. Given that perception is the earliest form of representation,
and that other forms develop from it, what can be learned about
representation and the earliest form of representational mind by
reflecting on perception? I center on what perception is—its
structure and function—not on how it evolved. Evolution will,
however, recurrently come up.
I also want to understand relations between perception and
closely, almost inevitably associated capacities—perceptual attention,
primitive perceptually guided action, perceptual memory, perceptual
anticipation, perceptual imagining, perceptual learning. I argue later
that these capacities participate, with perception, in a psychological
system all of whose capacities share representational form and
representational content with perception itself.
Philosophy is fortunate to be able to reflect on science. A science
of perception, particularly vision science, has bloomed into a
rigorous enterprise over the last fifty years. It is by far the most
impressive psychological science. It is more advanced in
mathematization, and in predictive and explanatory power than
many biological sciences. Especially in the second half of the book, I
make extensive use of what is known from this science. Doing so is
part of gaining a philosophical understanding of issues attaching to
perception and perceptual-level representation.
Such understanding is inevitably affected by scientific change. A
lot of detail that I discuss will turn out to be mistaken and
superceded. Some of it is probably already known by someone to be
mistaken. The science is so vast that no account can keep up with
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 So fare they all that haue no vertue[1798] cand.

19.

The plowman first his land doth dresse and tourne,

And makes it apt or ere the seede hee[1799] sowe,
Whereby hee is full like to reape good corne,
Where otherwise no seede but weede would growe:
By which ensample men may easely knowe,
When youth haue welth before they can well vse it,
It is no wonder though they do abuse it.

20.

How can hee rule well in a common wealth,

Which knoweth not himselfe in rule to frame?
How should hee rule himselfe in ghostly health,
Which neuer learnde one lesson for the same?
If such catch harme theyr parents are too blame:
For needes must they be blinde, and blindly led,
Where no good lesson can be taught or read.

21.

Some thinke theyr youth discret and wisely taught,

That brag, and boast, and weare theyr fether braue,
Can royst, and rout, both lowre, and looke aloft,
Can sweare, and stare, and call theyr fellowes knaue,
Can pill, and poll, and catch before they craue,
Can carde and dice, both cog and foyste at fare,
Play on vnthrifty, till theyr purse bee bare.

22.

Some teach theyr youth to pype, to sing, and daunce,

To hauke, to hunt, to choose and kill theyr game,
To winde theyr horne, and with theyr horse to praunce,
To play at tenis, set the lute in frame,
Run at the ring, and vse such other game:
Which feats although they be not all vnfit,
Yet cannot they the marke of vertue hit.

23.

For noble youth, there is nothing so meete

As learning is, to knowe the good from yll:
To knowe the toungs and perfectly endyte,
And of the lawes to haue a perfect skill,
Things to reforme as right and iustice will:
For honour is ordeyned for no cause,
But to see right mayntayned by the lawes.

24.

It spites my heart to heare when noble men

Cannot disclose their secrets to t’ire frend
In sauegarde sure, with paper, inke, and pen,
But first they must a secretary fynde,
To whome they shewe the bottome of theire mynde:
And bee hee false or true, a blab or close,
To him they must theyr counsayle needs disclose.

25.

And where they rule that haue of lawe no skill,

There is no boote, they needes must seeke for ayde:
Then rulde are they, and rule as others will,
As hee that on a stage his part hath playde:
But hee was taught, nought hath hee done or sayde:
Such youth therfore seeke science of the sage,
As thinke to rule when that ye come to age.

26.

Where youth is brought vp in feare and obedience,

Kept from yll company, brydled of theyr lust,
Do serue God duly and know theire allegiaunce,
Learne godly wisdome[1800] which tyme nor age can rust:
Theire prince, people, and peers needes prosper must:
For happy are the people, and blessed is that land,
Where truth and vertue haue got the ouer hand.

27.

I speake this, Baldwine, of this rufull lord,

Whome I, perforce, do here present to thee,
He faynts so sore hee may not speake a word:
I pleade his cause without rewarde or fee,
And am enforc’d[1801] to speake for him and mee:
If in his youth hee had bene wisely tought,
Hee should not now his wit so deare haue bought.

28.

For what is hee that hath but halfe a wit,

But may well know that rebelles cannot speede:
Marke well my tale, and take good heede to it,
Recount it well, and take it for good reede,
If it proue vntrue[1802] I will not trust my creede:
Was neuer rebell before the world, nor since,[1803]
That could or shall preuayle agaynst his prince.

29.

For ere the subiect beginneth[1804] to rebell,

Within him selfe let him consider well,
Foresee the daunger, and beate [well] in his brayne,
How hard it is his purpose to obtayne:
For if hee once bee entred to the brears,
Hee hath a raging wolfe fast by the ears.

30.
And when hee is once entred to[1805] rule the [beastly]
rout,
Although hee would, he can no way get out:
Hee may bee sure none will to him resorte,
But such as are the vile and rascall sorte:
All honest men, as well the most as lest,
To tast of treason will vtterly detest.

31.

Then let him way how long hee can bee sure,
Where fayth nor frendship may no while endure:
Hee whom hee trusteth most, to gayne a grote
Will fall him from, and assay[1806] to cut his throate:
Among the knaues and slaues where vice is rooted,
There is no other frendship to bee looked.

32.

With slashers, slaues, and snuffers so falshode is[1807] in

price,
The simple fayth is deadly sinne,[1808] and vertue
counted vice:
And where the quarell is so vile and bad,
What hope of ayde then is there to bee had?
Thinks hee that men will run at this or that,
To do a thing they knowe not how or what?

33.

Nor yet what daunger may thereof betyde,

Where wisdome would they should at home abyde,
Rather then seeke, and knowe not what to fynde:
Wise men will fyrst debate this in their minde:
Full suer they are if that they goe to wrecke,
Without all grace they loose both head and necke.
 34.

They lose their lands and goods, their childe and wife
With sorrowe and shame shall leade a wofull lyfe:
If hee bee slayne in fielde hee dyeth accurst,
Which of all wrecks wee should accompt the worst:
And hee that dyeth defending his liege lord
Is blist, and blist agayne by God’s owne worde.

35.

And where the souldiers wages is vnpayde,

There is the captayne slenderly obayde:
And where the souldier is out[1809] of feare and dreede,
Hee will bee lacke when that there is most neede,
And priuatly hee seekes his ease and leasure,
And will bee ruled but at his will and pleasure.

36.

And where some drawe forth, [and] other doe drawe

backe,
There in the end must nedes bee woe and wracke:
To hope for ayde of lords it is but vayne,
Whose foretaught wit of treason knoweth the payne:
They knowe what powre a prince hath in his hand,
And what it is with rebells for to stand.

37.

They knowe by treason honour is defaced,

Their ofspring and their progeny disgraced:
They knowe to honour[1810] is not so worthy a thing,
As to bee true and faythfull to their king:
Aboue cognisaunce or armes, or pedigrewe a far,
An vnspotted coate is lyke a blasing star:

38.
Therefore the rebell is accurst and mad,
That hopeth[1811] for that which rebell neuer had:
Who trusting still to tales doth hang in hope,
Tyll at the last hee hang fast by the rope,
For though that tales bee tolde that hope might feede,
Such foolishe hope hath still vnhappy speede.

39.

It is a custome [that] neuer will be broken,

In broyles the bag of lyes is euer open:
Such lying newes men dayly will inuent,
As can the hearer’s fancy best content:
And as the newes do runne and neuer cease,
So more and more they dayly do encrease.

40.

And as they encrease,[1812] they multiply as fast,

That ten is ten hundred, ten thousand at the last:
And though the rebell had once got the fielde,
Thinks hee therby to make his prince to yeelde?
A prince’s power, within his owne region,
Is not so soone brought vnto confusion.

41.

For kings by[1813] God are strong and stoutly harted,

That they of subiects will not bee subuerted:
If kings would yeelde, yet God would them restrayne,
Of whom the prince hath grace and power to raygne:
Who straytly chargeth vs aboue all thing,
That no man should resist agaynst his king.

42.

Who that resisteth his dreade soueraign lorde,

Doth dampne his soule, by God’s owne very worde,
A christian[1814] subiect shoulde with honour due
Obay his souerayne, though hee were a Jewe:
Wherby assured[1815] when subiects do rebell,
God’s wrath is kindled, and threatneth fire and hell.

43.

It is soone knowne when God’s wrath[1816] is kindled,

How they shall speede with whom hee is offended:
If God gieue victory to whom hee liketh best,
Why looke they for it whom God doth most detest?
For treason is hatefull, and abhord in God’s sight,
Example of Iudas that most wicked wight:

44.

Which is the chiefe cause no treason preuayles,

For yll must hee spede whom God’s wrath assayles:
Let traytours and rebelles looke to speede then,
When God’s mighty power is subiect to men:
Much might bee sayde that goeth more nere the pith:
But this sufficeth for a rurall smith.

45.

Baldwine, when thou hearest my reason[1817] in this

case,
Belike thou thinkest[1818] I was not very wise,
And that I was accurst, or else wanted[1819] grace,
Which knowing the end of my fond enterprise,
Would thus presume agaynst my prince to rise:
But as there is a cause that moueth euery woe,
Somewhat there was whereof this sore did growe.

46.

And to bee playne and simple in this case,

The cause why I such matter tooke in hand,
Was nothing els but pryde and lacke of grace,
Vayne hope of helpe, and tales both false and fond:
By meane whereof I did my prince withstand,
Denied the taxe assest by conuocation,
To mayntaine war agaynst the Scottishe nation.

47.

Whereat the Cornish men did much repine,

For they of golde and siluer were full bare,
And liued hardly, digging in the myne,
They sayd they had no money for to spare:
Began first to grudge, and then to sweare and stare,
Forgot theyr due obeysaunce, and rashly fell to rauing,
And sayd they would not beare such polling and such
shauing.

48.

They fyrst accusde the king as authour of their greife,

And then the bishop Moreton, and sir Reinold Bray:
For they then were about the king most cheife,
Because they thought the whole[1820] fault in them lay:
They dyd protest to rid them out of the way:
Such thanke haue they that rule aboue a prince,
They beare the blame of other[1821] men’s offence.

49.

When I perceiude the commons in a roare,

Then I and Flamoke consulted both together,[1822]
To whom the people resorted more and more,
Lamenting and crying, help vs now or neuer,
Breake this yoake of bondage,[1823] then are wee free for
euer:
Wherat [wee] inflamed in hope to haue a fame,[1824]
 To bee their captaynes tooke on vs the name.

50.

Then might you heare the people make a shout,

[And cry] “God saue the captaynes, and send vs all good
speede:”
Then hee that fainted was counted but a lout,[1825]
The ruffians ran [abroade] to sowe seditious seede:
To call for company [then] there was no neede,
For euery man laboured another to entice,[1826]
To bee partaker of his wicked vice.

51.

Then all such newes as made for our auayle,

Was brought to me, but such as sounded ill,
Was none so bould to speake or yet bewayle:
Euerich was so wedded vnto[1827] his will,
That foorth they cryed with bowes, sword,[1828] and byll:
And what the rufler spake the lout tooke for a verdite,
For there the best was worst, [the] worst [was] best
regarded.

52.

For when men goe a madding, there[1829] still the viler

part[1830]
Conspyre together, and will haue all the sway:
And bee it well or yll, they must haue all the porte,[1831]
As they will do, the rest must nedes obay:
They prattle and prate as doth the popingaye:
They crye and commaund the rest[1832] to kepe
th’array,
Whiles they may raunge and rob for spoyle and pray.

53.
And when wee had prepared euery thing,
Wee went to Tawnton with all our prouision,
And there we slewe the prouost of Penryn,
For that on the subsedy hee sate in commission:[1833]
Hee was not wise, nor yet of great discretion,
That durst approche his enmies in their rage,
When wit nor reason coulde their yre asswage.

54.

From thence wee went to Wels, where wee were[1834]

receiued
Of this lorde Awdeley as [of] our chiefe captayne,
And so had[1835] the name, but yet hee was deceiued,
For I indeede did rule the clubbish trayne,
My cartly knights true honour did disdayne:
For like doth loue his like, it will[1836] bee none other,
A chorle will loue a chorle, before hee will his brother.

55.

[Then] from Wels to Winchester, [and so] to Blackheath

field,
And there [wee] enchamped looking for more ayde,
But when none came, wee thought our selues begild:
Such Cornishmen as knew they were betrayde,
From their fellowes by night away they strayde:[1837]
There might wee learne how vayne it is to trust
Our fayned frends, in quarels so vniust.

56.

But wee [the sturdy captaynes] that thought our power

was strong,
Were bent to try [our fortune] what euer should betyde:
Wee were the bolder, for [that] the king so long
Deferred battayle: which so increast our pryde,
That sure wee thought the king himselfe did hyde
Within the cyty, therfore with[1838] courage hault,
Wee did determine the[1839] cyty to assault.

57.

But hee [working] contrary to our expectation,

Was fully mynded to[1840] let vs run our race,
Till wee were from our domesticall habitation,[1841]
Where that of ayde or succour was no place,
And then [to] bee plaged as it should please his grace:
[But] all doubtfull playnts, how euer they did sound,
To our best vayle wee alway did expound.

58.

When that the king sawe time, with courage bolde

Hee sent a powre to circumuent vs all:
Where wee enclosde as simple sheepe in folde,
Were slaine and murdred as[1842] beasts in butcher’s
stall:
The king himselfe, what euer [chaunce] might fall,
Was strongly encamped[1843] within Saynt George’s
fielde,
And there abode tyll that hee hearde vs yeelde.

59.

Then downe wee kneelde, and cryde to saue our life,

It was to late our folly to bewayle:
There were wee spoyide of armour, coate, and knife:
And wee, which thought [with pride] the citye to assaile,
Were led in[1844] prisoners, naked as my nayle:
[But] of vs two thousand they had slayne before,
And wee of them three hundred and no more.

60.
[This] my lorde and wee the captaynes of the west,
Tooke [our] inne at Newgate, fast in fetters tide,
Where after tryall[1845] wee had but litle rest:
My lorde through London was drawne on a slide,
To Tower hill, where with an[1846] axe hee dyde,
Clad in his [coate] armour painted all in paper,
Torne[1847] and reuersed[1848] in spite of his behauer.
[1849]

61.

And I with Thomas Flamoke, and[1850] other of our bent,

As traytours at Tiburne our iudgment did obay:
The people looked[1851] I should my fault lament,
To whom I [boldly] spake, that for my fond assaye
I was sure of fame,[1852] that neuer should decaye:
Wherby ye may perceiue vayne glory doth enflame
As well the meaner sort, as men of greater name.[1853]

62.

But as the fickle patient, sometyme hath desyre

To tast the things that phisicke hath denide,
And hath both payne and sorrowe for his hyre:
The same to mee right well may bee applide,
Which while I raught for fame on shame did slide:
And seeking fame, brought forth my bitter bane,
As hee that fyred the temple of Diane.

63.

I tell thee, Baldwine, I muse [right] oft, to see

How euery man for wealth and honour gapeth,
How euery man would climbe aboue the skye,
How euery man th’assured meane so hateth,
How froward fortune oft their purpose mateth:
 And if they hap theire purpose to obtayne,
Their wealth is woe, their honour care and payne.

64.

Wee see the seruant more happy[1854] then his lord,

Wee see him lyue when that his lorde is dead,
Hee slepeth sounde, is mery at his boorde,
No sorrowe in his harte doth vexe his head:
Happy [then] is he that pouerty can wed:
What gayne the mighty conquerours[1855] when they
be dead,
By all the spoyle, and bloud that they haue shed?

65.

The terrible towre[1856] where honour hath his seate,

Is hye on rockes more slipper then the yse,
Where still the whorleing wynde doth roare and beate,
Where sodayne qualmes and periles still aryse,
And is beset with many sundry vice,
So straunge to men when first they come thereat,
They bee amased, and do they wot not what.

66.

Hee that preuailes, and to the towre can clyme,

With trouble[1857] and care must needes abridge his
dayes:
And hee that slydes may curse the howre and tyme,
Hee did attempt to geue so fond assayes,
And all his lyfe to sorrowe[1858] and shame obayes:
Thus slyde he downe, or to the top ascend,
Assure himselfe repentaunce is the end.

67.
Wherefore, good Baldwine, do[1859] thou record my
name,
To bee ensample to[1860] such as credit lyes,
Or thrist to sucke the sugred cup of fame,
Or doe attempt agaynst their prince to ryse:
And charge them all to keepe within their syse:
Who doth assay to wrest beyond his strength,
Let him be sure hee shall repent at length.

68.

[And] at my request admonishe thou all men,

To spend well the talent[1861] which God [to them] hath
lent,
[And] hee that hath [but] one, let him not toile for ten,
For one is[1862] too much, vnlesse it bee well spent:
I haue had the proofe, therefore I now repent,
And happy are those men, and blist and blist is hee,
As can bee well content to serue in his degree.[1863]

Maister Cauyll.[1864]
 [“It is pity,” quoth[1865] one, “that the meeter is no better, seeing
the matter is so good: you may do very well to helpe it, and a lytle
filing would make it formal.” “The author him selfe,” quoth[1866] I,
“could haue done that, but hee would not, and hath desired me that it
may passe in such rude sort as you haue heard it: for hee obserueth
therein a double decorum both of the Smith, and of himselfe: for hee
thinketh it not meete for the Smith to speake, nor for himselfe to write
in any exact kinde of meeter.” “Well,” sayd another, “the matter is
notable to teach al people, as well officers as subiects, to consider
their estates, and to liue in loue and obedience to the highest
powers, whatsoeuer they bee, whome God either by birth, law,
succession, or vniuersall election, doth or shall aucthorise in his
owne roume to execute his lawes and iustice among any people or
nation. For by all these meanes God placeth his deputies. And in my
iudgement there is no meane so good eyther for the common quiet
of the people, or for God’s free choise, as the naturall order of
enheritaunce by lineall discent: for so it is left in God’s handes, to
creat in the wombe what prince hee thinketh meetest for his
purposes: the people also knowe their princes, and therefore the
more gladly and willingly receiue and obay them. And although some
realmes, more carefull then wise, haue entailed theire crowne to the
heire male, thinking it not meete for the feminine sexe to beare the
royall office: yet if they consider all circumstaunces, and the chiefest
vses of a prince in a realme, they shall see how they are deceiued.
For princes are God’s lieutenauntes or deputies, to see God’s lawes
executed among theire subiects, not to rule according to their owne
lustes or deuises, but by the prescript of God’s lawes: so that the
chiefest poynt of a prince’s office consisteth in obedience to God and
to his ordinaunces, and what shoulde let but that a woman may bee
as obedient vnto God, as a man? The second poynt of a prince’s
office is to prouide for the impotent, nedy, and helples, as widowes,
orphanes, lame, and decrepite persons: and seing women are by
nature tender harted, milde and pitifull, who may better then they
discharge this duty? Yea but a woman lacketh courage, boldnesse,
and stomacke, to withstand the aduersarie, and so are her subiects
an open spoyle to their enemies. Debora, Iaell, Iudith, Thomeris, and
other doe proue the contrary. But graunt it were so: what harme were
that, seing victory consisteth not in witte or force, but in God’s
pleasure.[1867] I am sure that whatsoeuer prince doth his duty in
obaying God, and causing iustice to bee ministred according to
God’s lawes, shall not only lacke warre (bee hee man, woman, or
childe) but also bee a terroure to all other princes. And if God suffer
any at any time to be assayled, it is for the destruction of the
assayler, whether he bee rebell or forayne foe, and to the honour
and profit of the vertuous prince, in whose behalfe, rather then hee
shall miscary, God himselfe will fight with enfections and
earthquakes from the lande and waters, and with stormes and
lightenings from the ayre and skies. Moe warres haue bene sought
through the wilfull and hauty courages of kings, and greater
destructions happened to realmes therby, then by any other meanes.
And as for wisdome and pollicy, seing it consisteth in following the
counsayle of many godly, learned, and long experienced heades, it
were better to haue a woman, who considering her owne weaknes
and inability, should be ruled thereby, then a man which presuming
vpon his owne fond brayne, will heare no aduise saue his owne. You
muse peraduenture wherefore I say this. The franticke heades which
disable our queene, because shee is a woman, and our king
because hee is a straunger, to bee our princes and cheife
gouernours, hath caused mee to say thus mutch. For whatsoeuer
man, woman, or childe, is by the consent of the whole realme
established in the royall seate, so it haue not bene iniuriously
procured by rygour of sworde and open force, but quietly by tytle,
either of enheritaunce, succession, lawfull bequest, common consent
or election, is vndoubtedly chosen by God to bee his deputye: and
whosoeuer resisteth any suche, resisteth agaynste God himselfe,
and is a ranke traytour and rebell, and shalbe sure to prosper as well
as the blacke Smith and other suche haue done. All resist that
wilfully breake any lawe, not being agaynst God’s lawe, made by
common consent for the wealthe of the realme, and commaunded to
be kept by the authority of the prince: or that deny to pay such
duties, as by consent of the high court of parliament, are appointed
to the prince, for the defence and preseruation of the realme.” “You
haue saide very truly herein,” quoth[1868] I, “and I trust this terrible
example of the blacke Smith, will put all men in minde of their duties,
and teach them to bee obedient to all good lawes, and lawfull
contributions. The scriptures do forbyd vs to rebell, or forcibly to
withstand princes, though they commaund vniust things: yet in any
case wee may not doe them: but receiue quietly at the prince’s hand
whatsoeuer punishment God shall suffer to bee layd vpon vs for our
refusall. God will suffer none of his to bee tempted aboue their
strength.”[1869] This talke thus being ended: “I was willed my
maisters,” quoth I, “by maister Holinshed, to bring sir Nicholas Burdet
vnto you.” “Were you?” quoth they: “on his word we will heare what
he sayes.” “Read it, I pray you,” quod one. “You must thinke then,”
quoth I, “that you see him all wounded as he was slaine at Pontoise,
to say as foloweth.”]
How the Valiant Knight Sir Nicholas
Burdet, Chiefe Butler of Normandy,
was slayne at Pontoise, Anno 1441.
1.

“Yf erst at prince’ affayres[1870] wee counted were of

truste,
To fight in waeged warres, as captayne gainst the foes,
And might therefore aliue receiue the guerdon iuste,
Which ay his maiesty employde on those:
Why should wee so keepe silence now, and not disclose
Our noble acts to those remayne aliue,
T’encourage them the like exployts t’achiue?

2.

For if when as wee werde,[1871] for prince and publique

weale,
We might to ech for both haue time and place to speake,
Then why not now, yf wee to both appeale?
Sith both well knowe our dealeings were not weake:
Wee clayme as ryghte, in trueth our myndes to breake,
The rather eke wee thinke to speake wee franchizde
ar,
Because wee serude for peace and dyde in prince his
war.[1872]

3.

Which graunted so, and held deserued due,

I may full well on stage supply the place a while,
Till I haue playnly layde before your vew
That I haue cause, as these, to playne of fortune’s guyle,
Which smirking though at first, she seeme to smoothe
and smyle,
(If fortune bee) who deemde themselues in skyes to
dwell,
She thirleth downe to dreade the gulfes of ghastly hell.

4.

But here I let a while the lady fortune stay,

To tell what time I liu’d, and what our warres were then,
The great exployts wee did, and where our armies laye,
Eke of the prayse of some right honourable men,
Which things with eyes I saw, calde now to minde agen:
What I performed present in the fight,
I will in order and my fall resite.

5.

In youth I seru’d that royall Henry fifte the king,

Whose prayse for martiall feats eternall fame retaynes,
When hee the Normanes stout did in subiection bring,
My selfe was vnder then his ensignes taking paynes:
With loyall hart I faught, pursude my prince his gaines,
There dealt I so that time my fame to rayse,
French wryters yet my name and manhoode prayse.

6.

And erste as Burdet’s diuers warlike wights,

(In Warwickeshire theyr lands in Arrow ar)[1873]
Were, for good seruice done, made worthy knights,
Whose noble acts be yet recounted far:
Euen so my selfe, well framde to peace or war,
Of these the heyre by due discent I came,
Sir Nicholas Burdet knight, which had to name.
 7.

That time the noble Iohn of Bedford duke bare sway,

And feared was in Fraunce for courage stout and fell,
Hee lou’de mee for my fight and person, (though I say)
And with revenues mee rewarded yearely well:
I playde the faythfull subiect’s parte, the truth to tell,
And was accounted loyall, constant still
Of stomake, worship great, and warlike scill.

8.

But then, O greefe to tell, ere long this pearelesse king,

When hee restored had his right vnto the crowne
The duchye all of Normandy, eke subiect bring
The Frenchemen all, and set lieutenants in eache towne,
High regent made of Fraunce, then fortune gan to
frowne,
Hee then departed life, too soone alas:
Som men suppose his grace empoysonde was.

9.

Thou fortune slye, what meanste thou thus, these

prancks to play
False fortune blereyde blinde, vnsteady startling still,
What meanste thou turning thus thy flattering face away,
Inconstant where thou bearest most good will?
Is it thy nature then? or iste thy wonted scill?
It cost thee naught, they say it commes by kinde,
As thou art bisme, so are thine actions blinde.

10.

I nothing doubte then thou thy selfe shalt fall:

I trust to see the time when thou shalt bee forgot:
For why thy pride, and pompe and powre must vanish all,
Thy name shall dye for aye, and perish quite I wot: