Perceiving Things Divine Towards A Constructive Account of Spiritual Perception Frederick D Aquino Editor All Chapter

Perceiving Things Divine: Towards a
Constructive Account of Spiritual

Perception Frederick D. Aquino (Editor)
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Perceiving Things Divine

Perceiving
Things Divine
Towards a Constructive Account of
Spiritual Perception
Edited by
F R E D E R IC K D. AQU I N O
and
PAU L L . G AV R I LY U K
1
1
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In memoriam William J. Abraham (1947–2021): Requiem aeternam

dona ei, Domine, et lux perpetua luceat ei. Requiescat in pace.
Foreword
Mark Wynn
This volume is a successor to Paul Gavrilyuk and Sarah Coakley’s 2012 collection
The Spiritual Senses: Perceiving God in Western Christianity. That text introduced
various traditions of thought, and the present volume draws out, most excitingly,
some of the implications of those traditions for contemporary debate—showing
how close attention to the idea of spiritual perception can deepen and, in some
cases indeed, transform our approach to an array of otherwise apparently quite
disparate theological themes, including: liturgy, the reading of scripture, eschat
ology, spiritual formation, divine hiddenness, and the spiritual import of, for
instance, the experience of nature and of beauty. It is to be hoped that the intel
lectual project that has been initiated in these pages will be taken up more
widely—and in that case, we may expect theological enquiry to become newly
alert to the deep-seated connections between religious understanding and our
capacity to orient ourselves in the everyday world, through our apprehension of
values that are presented to us in sensory and more than sensory form.
The central themes of this collection are very fully and acutely described in
Frederick Aquino and Paul Gavrilyuk’s Introduction, so rather than present a fur
ther survey of the volume’s contents, in the following brief remarks, I shall try to
draw out the significance of its concerns by showing how they intersect with three
further contexts of enquiry, each of which is of obvious practical and theological
interest. I shall introduce these contexts in turn, by touching on: the nature of
knowledge of place; the emotions as sources of evaluative insight; and the role of
salience in the perceptual field in disclosing the import of the sensory world.
We all of us negotiate our physical environment not only by reference to its
structure—as when I duck to avoid a low-lying beam—but also with a view to
acknowledging the existential significance of particular spaces: when I comport
myself differently in a football ground as compared with, say, a lecture theatre or
graveyard, that is not only because of the different physical dimensions of these
spaces. And when we orient ourselves appropriately in a particular place in bodily
terms, in ways that give due recognition to the existential significance of the place,
we do not normally rely on some process of reflection—as if I were to rehearse
first the thought that this place is a graveyard, and then the thought that the dead
are to be treated with respect, and then the thought that I had therefore better not
kick a ball or raise my voice while here. Rather, in standard cases, it is in the
responses of the body, rather than mediately, by means of some process of
viii Foreword
reflection, that we apprehend the significance of the space, and adapt our
demeanour to fit the space.
Of course, the existential import of a place is commonly defined by the stories
with which it is associated: in such cases, it is the history of the space that defines
its meaning for us in the present and calls for appropriate practical acknowledge
ment in the present. And when we are attuned to the storied significance of a
place in bodily terms, rather than by way of some discursive assessment of its
import, we seem to navigate our way through the world by means of something
like a spiritual perception—that is, by means of a non-inferential apprehension of
the space that tracks not only its sensory but also its existential import. And there
is some reason to think that spiritual perception that is theological in content
works similarly. This is most straightforwardly true of spaces whose religious
meaning is fixed by reference to their history, as with, say, sites of pilgrimage. But
it is also true, potentially, on a wider scale, in so far as theological traditions offer
us a storied account of the significance of particular items in the world, human
beings among them, and indeed of the world itself, considered as the object of
divine creation and care: these distinctively theological storied meanings can also
be acknowledged, we may suppose, immediately in our bodily responses. A num
ber of the essays in this volume carry very fruitful implications for how we might
elaborate on an account of the nature of spiritual perception of broadly this form,
that is, one that understands spiritual perception by reference to our bodily
attunement to place-relative, story-mediated existential meanings.
Moving to a second context of enquiry, it is a commonplace of recent philo
sophical work on the emotions that emotional feelings can themselves be
thoughts, rather than simply stimuli for thought, or the by-products of thought.
Here is one example of how this proposal might be developed, presented by
Peter Goldie:
imagine you are in a zoo, looking at a gorilla grimly loping from left to right in
its cage. You are thinking of the gorilla as dangerous, but you do not feel fear, as
it seems to be safely behind bars. Then you see that the door to the cage has been
left wide open. Just for a moment, though, you fail to put the two thoughts – the
gorilla is dangerous, the cage is open – together. Then, suddenly, you do put
them together: now your way of thinking of the gorilla as dangerous is new; now
it is dangerous in an emotionally relevant way for you. The earlier thought, nat
urally expressed as ‘That gorilla is dangerous’, differs in content from the new
thought, although this new thought, thought with emotional feeling, might also
be naturally expressed in the same words. Now, in feeling fear towards the gorilla
you are emotionally engaged with the world, and, typically, you are poised for
action in a new way – poised for action out of the emotion.1
1 Peter Goldie, The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000), 61.
Foreword ix
Although he is concerned with a somewhat unusual state of affairs, Goldie’s

remarks point very readily to a number of insights into the nature of emotional
feelings, and their importance for everyday life. First, it seems a clear implication
of this sort of example that emotional feelings are themselves forms of thought:
here, the feeling of fear (of feeling towards, as Goldie puts the point) involves
some reckoning with the character of the world. Moreover, this reckoning runs
beyond what can be captured verbally in the statement ‘That gorilla is dangerous’.
So as with our apprehension of the storied import of a place, so here, we seem to
be dealing with an insight that is not standardly realized in a discursive, verbally
articulated train of thought, but in the responses of the body. In this case, the new
insight is presented in a response of feeling, rather than in the body’s disposition
to orient itself in space—though as Goldie notes, the understanding that is vouch
safed in the feeling of fear is also of its nature action-guiding.
We can draw out the sense of this example a little further by noting that it
would be possible in principle to apprehend both that the gorilla is dangerous and
that the cage is open without seeing what follows for our wellbeing from the fact
that these truths hold in combination—that is, without grasping what needs to be
done in these circumstances. By contrast, the understanding afforded in the feel
ing of fear brings together these two truths—the gorilla is dangerous and the cage
door is open—in such a way as to disclose their combined import for the person’s
safety. In such cases, we can think of emotional feelings as involving an integra
tive kind of understanding: one that reveals the overall sense of various features
of a situation, thereby orienting the person in practical terms. This account offers,
potentially, another way of representing the nature of spiritual perception—in
this case, because religious understanding is commonly thought to be concerned
not so much with individual entities, nor even with God considered as an indi
vidual entity, as with the connectedness of things, or with questions about how
the world, as it were, hangs together, so as to add up to a meaningful context, one
that calls for practical acknowledgement in the lives of human beings. This
account also invites the thought that spiritual perception is integrative in the fur
ther sense of involving a unitary state of mind, in which the affective, cognitive,
and volitional strands of the person’s engagement with the world are fused. Again,
a number of the essays in this collection speak very directly to this question, by
showing how the subject of spiritual perception is the person considered in their
affective-intellectual-moral integrity, and by exploring the ways in which spiritual
practices can contribute to the formation of this unified state of mind.
Lastly, and very briefly, let us note one further way of thinking of spiritual
perception—again, one that intersects with various themes in this collection. In
ordinary experience, the perceptual field is of course structured—so that certain
items are thrown into relief, while others are consigned to the periphery of our
awareness. Accordingly, in our perception of the world, objects are not presented
to us neutrally, rather, certain features of our environment are salient in the per
ceptual field, and are thereby picked out as more deserving of attention than other
x Foreword
features. Accordingly, the ordering of the perceptual field can track, for example,
the relative moral significance of the items that fall within our purview—so that
we are focally aware of, say, the facial expressions of human beings, rather than of
the inanimate objects that are also presented to us on a given occasion of percep
tion. And by extension, it seems reasonable to suppose, the contouring of the per
ceptual field can also count as more or less appropriate in theological terms—and
will count as theologically fitting to the extent that an object’s salience in the per
ceptual field is directly proportional to its importance relative to some religious or
spiritual narrative. When there is such a correspondence, between the salience of
objects and their theological significance, then the world as it appears in our
experience will mirror the divine vantage point on the world—since the patterns
of salience that are inscribed in the perceptual field will now track a divinely
ordered scale of values. We might even say that, in such a case, the world as it
appears will offer a window onto the mind of God—by giving us a sensory image
that matches the divine assessment of the relative importance of the contents of
the perceptual field.
Here, then, are three ways of thinking about the nature of spiritual perception,
namely, by reference to: the body’s spontaneous sensitivity to the storied signifi
cance of particular places; the integrative, action-guiding understanding that is
afforded by emotional feelings; and our ability to track the relative importance of
objects via the structuring of the perceptual field. When understood in these
ways, spiritual perception turns out to be rooted in capacities that are continuous
with our capacity to apprehend the normative significance of the world in other
respects. These accounts allow us to see, therefore, how it is possible for human
beings to register the full range of values in their practical engagement with the
sensory world—that is, not just, say, prudential and moral values, but in addition
spiritual values. The essays in this volume lead us more deeply into these same
issues—and thereby they show us both what we need to understand if our lives
are to be well-ordered in theological terms, and what it would take for a creature
of our capacities and mode of embodiment to display that sort of understanding
in their relationship to other human beings and the everyday world.
Acknowledgements
We owe a debt of gratitude to many scholars and organizations. The first impetus
for this book project was given by the Analytic Theology Seminar at Southern
Methodist University in August 2012, organized by William Abraham, at which
we agreed to assemble a team of researchers in order to advance the work of The
Spiritual Senses volume (2012) in a constructive direction. As a result, we organ
ized three symposia to discuss individual chapters and form a coherent vision of
the volume. The first symposium was held in Atlanta, Georgia, in November 2015
with the participation of William Abraham, James Arcadi, Kenny Boyce, Sarah
Coakley, Boyd Taylor Coolman, Brandon Gallaher, Amber Griffioen, Stephen
Grimm, Douglas Hedley, John Kern (as an assistant), Dominika Kurek-Chomycz,
John Martens, Mark McInroy, Timothy O’Brien, Marcus Plested, Michael Rea,
Ann Taves, Allan Torrance, Sameer Yadav, and Ray Yeo. The second symposium
was held in San Antonio, Texas, in November 2016 and additionally included
Chance Juliano (as an assistant), David Luy, Michael McClymond, Kevin Nordby,
Nicole Reibe, and Mark Spencer. The third symposium was held at the University
of St Thomas, St Paul, Minnesota, in July 2017 and included William Abraham,
Hans Boersma, Sarah Coakley, Boyd Taylor Coolman, Richard Cross, Erika Kidd,
John Martens, Mark McInroy, Faith Pawl, Darren Sarisky, and Erika Zabinski (as
an assistant).
In the fall 2017, Paul Gavrilyuk and Mark Spencer organized a faculty seminar
on spiritual perception at the University of St Thomas co-funded by the Dean’s
office and the Templeton Foundation through the Philosophy of Religion Center
at the University of Notre Dame. The seminar participants were John Froula,
William Junker, Stephen Laumakis, Mathew Lu, John Martens, Mark McInroy,
Stephen McMichael, Faith Pawl, Barbara Sain, and Deborah Savage. The guest
speakers who presented their work at the seminar and offered public lectures
were Aquino, Greco, and Taves. In June 2017 Gavrilyuk’s graduate seminar
‘Perceiving God: The Spiritual Senses in History and Theology’ at the St Paul
School of Divinity, University of St Thomas, was enriched by the contributions
of the following guest speakers: Aquino, Coolman, Greco, McInroy, Spencer,
and Yadav.
In addition, the following events were held at different venues: a panel on
spiritual perception at the annual meeting of the International Society of

Neoplatonism Studies in Seattle, Washington, in June 2016 organized by Frederick
Aquino with contributions from Paul Gavrilyuk (in absentia) and Mark McInroy;
‘Retrieving Premodern Understandings of Spiritual Perception for Contemporary
xii Acknowledgements
Theology’ panel at the annual Patristic, Medieval, and Renaissance Conference at

Villanova University in October 2016 and organized by Boyd Coolman with the
participation of Frederick Aquino and Paul Gavrilyuk; a graduate seminar on
spiritual perception at Abilene Christian University (ACU), Abilene, Texas,
organized by Frederick Aquino with presentations by John Cottingham and Paul
Gavrilyuk in March 2018; ‘Spiritual Perception in Eastern Christianity’ session at
the Inaugural Conference of the International Orthodox Theological Association
and organized by Paul Gavrilyuk with the participation of Frederick Aquino and
Marcus Plested in January 2019.
Over the course of editing this book and writing his chapter, Frederick Aquino
has benefited from conversations with William Abraham, Sarah Coakley, John
Cottingham, Paul Gavrilyuk, John Greco, Jeffery Kinlaw, Chance Juliano, Michael
Van Huis, and Taylor Bonner. The following institutions also provided opportun
ities to share material on spiritual perception and related ideas: a graduate sem
inar on religious epistemology at Saint Louis University (March 2013), the Annual
Aquinas Colloquium, Oxford University (March 2017), and the CSART Keynote
lecture at ACU (March 2018).
Paul Gavrilyuk wishes to thank different scholarly audiences who responded to
earlier versions of the volume’s introduction presented at the following venues: a
‘Divine Hiddenness’ Panel of the Philosophy of Religion Group chaired by Amber
Griffioen at the annual meeting of the American Academy of Religion (AAR) in
San Diego in November 2014; a session ‘Understandings of Spiritual Perception’
at the Logos Workshop organized by Michael Rea and the Center for Philosophy
of Religion at the University of Notre Dame in May 2015 (with a commentary by
Allison Thornton); a keynote address at McMurry University, Abilene, Texas at
the invitation of Jeffery Kinlaw and Frederick Aquino in March 2018.
We also wish to acknowledge the help of our editorial assistants Erika Zabinski,
John Kern, Chance Juliano, and Taylor Bonner. Over the years, we have grown to
rely on the spotless professionalism of Tom Perridge and his team at Oxford
University Press.
Table of Contents
List of figures xv
List of contributors xvii
Introduction xix
PA RT I . FAC E T S
1. The Possibility of Spiritual Perception: Objections and Replies 3

John Greco
2. Developing Spiritual Perception: Lessons from Claude Monet
and Wassily Kandinsky 20
Paul L. Gavrilyuk
3. Training Spiritual Perception: A Constructive Look at
John Cassian37
Frederick D. Aquino
4. Value Perception and Spiritual Perception in Max Scheler 51
Mark K. Spencer
5. Radical Evil and Spiritual Perception 67
William J. Abraham
6. Spiritual and Sensuous: Spiritual Perception, Eschatologically
Considered81
Boyd Taylor Coolman
PA RT I I . I N T E R SE C T IO N S
7. Scripture as Signpost: A Perceptual Paradigm of Biblical

Interpretation101
Sameer Yadav
8. Spiritual Perception and Liturgy 117
Catherine Pickstock
9. Sensus Christi: A Liturgico-Sacramental Therapy for a
Pornographic Sensibility138
Boyd Taylor Coolman
xiv Acknowledgements
10. Spiritual Perception and the Racist Gaze: Can Contemplation

Shift Racism?153
Sarah Coakley
11. Divine Hiddenness, Agapē Conviction, and Spiritual Discernment 177
Paul K. Moser
12. Healed and Whole Forever: Spiritual Perception in Nature 193
Douglas E. Christie
13. Spiritual Perception and Beauty: On Looking and Letting Appear 212
Mark McInroy
Afterword: The Spiritual Senses and Human Embodiment 229

John Cottingham
Index 233
List of figures
2.1 The Water Lily Pond. Claude Monet’s Estate in Giverny, France.
Photo: P. Gavrilyuk, 1 August 2015, 11.22 a.m. 23
2.2 Claude Monet, Water Lilies (1906). The Art Institute of Chicago,
Chicago, Illinois. Photo: P. Gavrilyuk, November 2019. 24
2.3 Claude Monet, Grainstack, Sun in the Mist (1891), Minneapolis Institute
of Art, Minneapolis, Minnesota. Photo: P. Gavrilyuk, May 2016. 27
13.1 Lewis Bowman, Transfiguration (2005). 222
Rembrandt Van Rijn, “The Good Samaritan” (etching). 230
List of contributors
William J. Abraham (1947–2021) was Emeritus Outler Professor of Wesley Studies at

Perkins School of Theology, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas and Director of
the Wesley House of Studies at Truett Theological Seminary, Baylor University, Waco,
Texas. His recent publications include Canon and Criterion in Christian Theology (Oxford,
1998), Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation (Eerdmans, 2006), The Oxford Handbook
of Methodist Studies (Oxford, 2009), co-edited with James E. Kirby; The Oxford Handbook
of the Epistemology of Theology (Oxford, 2017), co-edited with Frederick D. Aquino; and
Divine Agency and Divine Action, vols. 1–4 (Oxford, 2017–2021).
Frederick D. Aquino is Professor of Theology and Philosophy at the Graduate School of

Theology, Abilene Christian University. His recent publications include Communities
of Informed Judgment (CUA, 2004); An Integrative Habit of Mind (NIU, 2012); Receptions of
Newman (Oxford, 2015), co-edited with Benjamin J. King; The Oxford Handbook of the
Epistemology of Theology (Oxford, 2017), co-edited with William J. Abraham; and The
Oxford Handbook of John Henry Newman (Oxford, 2018), co-edited with Benjamin J. King.
Douglas E. Christie is Professor of Theological Studies at Loyola Marymount University in

Los Angeles. He is the author of The Word in the Desert: Scripture and the Quest for Holiness
in Early Christian Monasticism (Oxford, 1993), The Blue Sapphire of the Mind: Notes for a
Contemplative Ecology (Oxford, 2013), and is the founding editor of Spiritus: A Journal of
Christian Spirituality (Johns Hopkins, 2001–).
Sarah Coakley FBA is the Norris-Hulse Professor Emerita, University of Cambridge,

Professorial Research Fellow at the Australian Catholic University, and Honorary Professor
at the Logos Institute, University of St Andrews. Her recent publications include The
Spiritual Senses: Perceiving God in Western Christianity (Cambridge, 2012), co-edited with
Paul Gavrilyuk; God, Sexuality and the Self: An Essay ‘On the Trinity’ (Cambridge, 2013);
and The New Asceticism: Sexuality, Gender and the Quest for God (Bloomsbury, 2015).
Boyd Taylor Coolman is Professor of Theology at Boston College. He has authored:

Knowledge, Love and Ecstasy in the Theology of Thomas Gallus (Oxford, 2017), The Theology
of Hugh of St. Victor (Cambridge, 2010), and Knowing God by Experience: The Spiritual
Senses in the Theology of William of Auxerre (CUAP, 2004). His interests lie in high medieval
theology, the Victorine and Franciscan traditions, early scholasticism, and mysticism. He
founded the ‘Boston Colloquy in Historical Theology’.
John Cottingham is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of Reading, and an

Honorary Fellow of St John’s College, Oxford University. His books include The Spiritual
Dimension (Cambridge, 2005), Philosophy of Religion: Towards a More Humane Approach
(Cambridge, 2014), and In Search of the Soul (Princeton, 2020).
xviii List of contributors
Paul L. Gavrilyuk is the Aquinas Chair in Theology and Philosophy at the University of
St Thomas and the Founding President of the International Orthodox Theological
Association. His books include The Suffering of the Impassible God (Oxford, 2004), Georges
Florovsky and the Russian Religious Renaissance (Oxford, 2013), and The Spiritual Senses:
Perceiving God in Western Christianity (Cambridge, 2012), co-edited with Sarah Coakley.
John Greco is the Robert L. McDevitt, K.S.G., K.C.H.S. and Catherine H. McDevitt L.C.H.S
Chair in Philosophy at Georgetown University. He is the author of Putting Skeptics in
Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry
(Cambridge, 2000); Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity
(Cambridge, 2010); and The Transmission of Knowledge (Cambridge, 2020).
Mark McInroy is Associate Professor of Theology at the University of St Thomas. He is the

author of Balthasar on the Spiritual Senses: Perceiving Splendour (Oxford, 2014), for which
he received the Manfred Lautenschlaeger Award for Theological Promise in 2015. He is
co-editor of The Christian Theological Tradition (Routledge, 2019), with Michael J. Hollerich,
and Image as Theology: The Power of Art in Shaping Christian Thought, Devotion, and
Imagination (Brepols, forthcoming), with C. A. Strine and Alexis Torrance.
Paul K. Moser is Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University Chicago. He is the author of

The Divine Goodness of Jesus (2021); Understanding Religious Experience (2020); The God
Relationship (2017); The Severity of God (2013); The Evidence for God (2010); The Elusive
God (2008); Philosophy after Objectivity (1993); and Knowledge and Evidence (1989); editor
of Jesus and Philosophy (2010); co-editor of The Cambridge Companion to Religious
Experience (2020) and of the book series Cambridge Studies in Religion, Philosophy, and
Society and Cambridge Elements: Religion and Monotheism.
Catherine Pickstock is Norris-Hulse Professor of Divinity at the University of Cambridge.

Her books include After Writing (1998), Thomas d’Aquin et la Quête Eucharistique (2001),
Repetition and Identity (2013), Aspects of Truth (2020), and Truth in Aquinas (2001) co-
authored with John Milbank. She is a co-founder (with John Milbank and Graham Ward)
of the critical international theological movement, Radical Orthodoxy.
Mark K. Spencer is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of St Thomas in

St Paul, Minnesota. He is the author of the forthcoming book The Irreducibility of the
Human Person: A Catholic Synthesis (The Catholic University of America Press), and of
more than forty articles on metaphysics, phenomenology, and aesthetics.
Mark Wynn is Nolloth Professor of the Philosophy of the Christian Religion at the
University of Oxford. He is the author of Spiritual Traditions and the Virtues: Living
Between Heaven and Earth (Oxford, 2020) and Renewing the Senses: A Study of the
Philosophy and Theology of the Spiritual Life (Oxford, 2013).
Sameer Yadav is a systematic and philosophical theologian and Associate Professor of

Religious Studies at Westmont College. He is author of The Problem of Perception and the
Experience of God (Fortress Press, 2015) and a number of articles in edited volumes and
journals on topics including Christian mysticism, religious epistemology, liberation the
ology, and the intersection of race and religion.
Introduction
Frederick D. Aquino and Paul L. Gavrilyuk
Perceiving Things Divine seeks to make philosophical and theological sense of

spiritual perception. The objects of spiritual perception are God and all reality
inasmuch as it can communicate divine presence. The possibility and mechanism
of spiritual perception, as well as religious claims based on it, remain essentially
contested. While pre-modern Christian theology offers ample theoretical resources
and a considerable historical record of ‘perceiving things divine’, no theory of
spiritual perception was ever formally adopted as authoritative and the topic
remained exploratory, rather than settled. In modernity, the possibility of spiritual
perception was often questioned on epistemological grounds, as a matter of general
scepticism vis-à-vis any religious claims, including the claims based on religious
experience. While modernist epistemologies had precious little space for ‘perceiv-
ing things divine’, the concept of the spiritual senses continued to play a role in the
theories and practices of spiritual direction.1 Taking into account such theories
and practices, this volume aims at restoring spiritual perception to its rightful
place in philosophy and theology.
The constructive vision of the present volume builds on the historical ground-
work provided in an earlier collection of essays on the spiritual senses.2 Representing
the first phase of the Spiritual Perception Project,3 this collection surveyed the
theme of spiritual perception throughout Christian history, beginning with Origen
of Alexandria and ending with twentieth-century theologians, such as Karl Rahner,
Hans Urs von Balthasar, and William Alston. Diachronically arranged, the study
was largely descriptive and highly selective and thus focused primarily on Christian
authors who gave a theoretical articulation of the notion of spiritual perception.
While our historical research continues, in Perceiving Things Divine we expand the
topic of the ‘spiritual senses’ by correlating spiritual perception with other types of
perception, including physical, moral, aesthetic, and value perception.
1 For a classical treatment of this issue in Jesuit spirituality, see Augustin Poulain, Des grâces
d’oraison; traité de théologie mystique (Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1901).
2 Paul L. Gavrilyuk and Sarah Coakley, eds, The Spiritual Senses: Perceiving God in Western
Christianity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
3 Online at spiritualperceptionproject.wordpress.com with videos on The Spiritual Perception
Project Channel on YouTube at http://www.youtube.com/channel/UCzQwXDBp6xIw_f4_z7eodeQ.
Frederick D. Aquino and Paul L. Gavrilyuk, Introduction In: Perceiving Things Divine: Towards a Constructive Account of
Spiritual Perception. Edited by: Frederick D. Aquino and Paul L. Gavrilyuk, Oxford University Press.
© Oxford University Press 2022. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198802594.001.0001
xx Introduction
Reflecting the results of the second phase of the Spiritual Perception Project,
this volume argues for the possibility of spiritual perception. More exactly, it seeks
to make progress towards a constructive account of the different aspects of spirit-
ual perception while exploring its intersection with various theological and philo-
sophical issues, such as biblical interpretation, aesthetics, liturgy, race, ecology,
eschatology, and the hiddenness of God. Spiritual perception can be explained in
two ways, on the analogy with the (five) physical senses, and, without such an
analogy, as a perceptual capacity sui generis. When the analogy of the five senses
is in play, it is often appropriate to use the tradition-sanctioned expression ‘spiritual
senses’, especially when the emphasis is on the nature of the spiritual sensorium.
Spiritual perception may also be construed as a perceptual power sui generis, akin
to but not reducible to intuition, moral discernment, conscience, or aesthetic
taste, and thus not to be correlated exclusively with the fivefold sensorium.4 For
this reason, our general preference in this volume is for the broader expression,
‘spiritual perception’, which includes all phenomena associated with the operation
of the spiritual senses without necessarily implying an analogy with the physical
senses. In what follows, we discuss the general features of perception, introduce a
new interdisciplinary field of spiritual perception, and sketch out future research
trajectories in this field.
Varieties of Perception
Along with reason, memory, and testimony, perception is indispensable for

acquiring beliefs about objects in the world. In its basic form, perception entails
an awareness of a given object. In terms of its structure, perception generally
includes the basic elements of (1) a perceiver, (2) an object, (3) an experience, and
(4) a relation between (1) and (2). Perceptual modes of presentation include see-
ing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching, though this list is not intended to be
exhaustive.5 Moreover, perceptual experiences can vary in quality and accuracy.
Traditionally, perception is taken to be the ability to acquire beliefs about
objects in the world on the basis of experience and not as a result of a chain of
reasoning. In this respect, what makes perception a distinctive source is that it is
constrained by its object.6 The content of the perceptual experience is formed by
the relevant properties that are phenomenally represented in it. In this sense,
4 Other examples of unique perceptual powers, usually classified as ‘extrasensory perception’

(ESP), include telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition, distance vision, introspection, and the like. The
discussion of these powers is outside the scope of this volume.
5 Since Aristotle’s De anima, it has been common in Western psychology to describe the physical
sensorium as fivefold. Cultural anthropology brought to light other ways of differentiating sensory
modes, different from the Aristotelian five. See David Howes, The Varieties of Sensory Experience: A
Sourcebook in the Anthropology of the Senses (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991).
6 On this point, see Tim Crane, ‘The Problem of Perception’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-problem/).
Frederick D. Aquino and Paul L. Gavrilyuk xxi
erceptual experience is distinguishable from conception. As William Alston

p
explains in his groundbreaking work, Perceiving God, ‘what makes this a matter of
perceiving the house, rather than just thinking about it or remembering it, is the
fact of presentation, givenness, the fact that something is presented to conscious-
ness, is something of which I am directly aware’. As a result, the givenness or
presentation of the object to the perceiver is distinguishable from any concep-
tualization, however seldom the ‘former may be found without the latter in
adult experience’.7 He argues that perception is ‘essentially independent of any
conceptualization, belief, judgment, or any other application of general con-
cepts to the object, though it typically exists in close connection with the latter’.8
So, a fundamental distinction remains between a blue object appearing to a
person and a person taking it to be blue. Thus, as Sameer Yadav makes clear in
Chapter 7, it is possible to distinguish between perceptual awareness and per-
ceptual recognition.
Scholarly debate has arisen concerning whether perception is shot through
with background beliefs, dispositions, and practices, and could be altered or
improved by training. For example, in The Evidential Force of Religious Experience,
Caroline Franks Davis anticipates this new stage of studies in perception and
captures well the extent to which our perceptual experiences incorporate
interpretation:
Psychological studies paint a very different picture of perception . . . Interpretation,

far from being an extraneous element imposed from without, is absolutely
essential to there occurring a perceptual experience at all. Perception of any type
is never a purely physical activity; it involves the whole person. We are not p assive
recipients of ready-made representations of our environment; rather, stimuli
from that environment must be processed by various interpretive mechanisms
before they can have any significance for us and constitute a perceptual experience
(as opposed to mere sensation).9
So, the movement from ‘mere sensation’ to ‘representation’ in Davis’s terms

involves activity on the part of the perceiver.10 This kind of interpretative activity
may reinforce one’s beliefs, desires, and wishes, or result in a kind of perceptual
distortion (see chapters 5, 6, and 10). As we hope this volume will show, however,
7 William Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1991), 27; emphasis in the original.
8 Alston, Perceiving God, 37.
9 Caroline Franks Davis, The Evidential Force of Religious Experience (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1989), 148–9.
10 Some argue that there is a form of perception (e.g. simple perception) that does not require the
possession of concepts (although this claim has been challenged). On the non-conceptual aspect of
perception, see Robert Audi, Moral Perception (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013); for a
good overview of the relevant issues, see Daniel O’Brien, ‘The Epistemology of Perception’, https://
www.iep.utm.edu/epis-per/.
xxii Introduction
background beliefs, dispositions, and practices may also restore, purify, and
enhance spiritual perception, for example, in how we read scripture (Yadav),
interact with the environment (Christie), and engage in liturgical acts (Pickstock).
We emphasize that training enables one to make fine-grained perceptual judge-
ments (Aquino, Gavrilyuk). Of equal importance to this volume is the expansion
of the scope of perception.
Some forms of perception in everyday experience appear to go beyond phys
ical perception. These forms include moral and aesthetic perception. In Moral
Perception, for example, Robert Audi seeks to show how perception factors in the
acquisition of moral knowledge. In this regard, he makes a distinction between
two kinds of properties: the perceptual and the perceptible. The former are sensory
properties such as colours and shapes, while the latter are ‘not all sensory and
include certain moral properties’ such as ‘being wrong, being unjust, and being
obligatory, among others’.11 So, the phenomenal aspect of moral perception is a
non-sensory perception of injustice but not in ‘pictorial’ terms, say in how we see
the Mesquite tree in our backyard. In this respect, Audi thinks that we should not
expect moral perception to be reducible to physical properties. Consequently, this
kind of research opens the door for exploring a phenomenon like spiritual per-
ception. For example, in Chapter 1, John Greco explores the parity between moral
and spiritual perception. In Chapter 11, Paul Moser locates spiritual perception in
conscience thereby aligning it even more closely with moral perception.
Similarly, the perception of beauty or aesthetic perception may include the
apprehension of non-sensory properties such as harmony, unity, complexity, and
proportion, which are also plausible candidates for being perceptible in Audi’s
sense of the term. Even if the apprehension of these properties is typically more
cognitively loaded than the apprehension of physical properties, such as shapes
and colours, as we saw above, the influence of cognitive factors on sensory aspects
of perception does not warrant excluding a given property from the range of
perception. Along these lines, the parallels between aesthetic and spiritual per-
ception are explored in this volume by Gavrilyuk (Chapter 2) and McInroy
(Chapter 13). Mark Spencer’s discussion of value perception in Chapter 4, which
draws on the phenomenology of Max Scheler, also provides an important bridge
between moral, aesthetic, and spiritual perception.
Spiritual Perception: A New Interdisciplinary Field
The study of spiritual perception is a new interdisciplinary field of research, which

requires a solid methodological basis. In this volume, we examine spiritual percep-
tion from different fields of inquiry, especially those that focus on metaphysical,
11 Audi, Moral Perception, 35.

Frederick D. Aquino and Paul L. Gavrilyuk xxiii
epistemological, phenomenological, moral, aesthetic, and theological issues relevant

to spiritual perception. The metaphysics of spiritual perception includes such issues
as the nature of the spiritual senses and their relationship to other aspects of the
self. Regarding the nature of the spiritual sensorium, the metaphysically weakest
accounts construe the spiritual senses as no more than distinct acts, whereas the
metaphysically strongest accounts construe the spiritual senses as powers, capaci-
ties, or even faculties.
An equally significant metaphysical problem is the number of the spiritual
senses. Some accounts construe the spiritual sensorium as unitary, other accounts
insist that it is manifold, and still other accounts leave the number of the modes
of spiritual perception unspecified. As we mentioned earlier, spiritual perception
could be understood on the analogy of the five physical senses and without such
an analogy. The ‘analogy of the five senses’ has a very respectable pedigree in the
history of Christian theology. Within this analogy, at least three distinct models
can be identified. The disjunctive model postulates that the spiritual senses oper-
ate when the physical senses are non-operational and vice versa. The model
emphasizes the independence of the spiritual senses from the physical senses
and in its metaphysically strongest version presupposes the existence of a non-
material soul as a locus of the spiritual sensorium. The conjunctive model postu-
lates that the spiritual senses are distinct from the physical senses, but that both
operate in tandem: the spiritual senses are always engaged simultaneously with
the physical senses. The third model holds that the spiritual senses are the physical
senses operating in an unusual way. In other words, that the spiritual senses repre-
sent a transformed state of the physical senses. In the twentieth century this
model was retrieved by Hans Urs von Balthasar and, in this volume, it is devel-
oped by Mark McInroy in Chapter 13. It is not uncommon for the conjunctive
and the third model to ‘bleed’ into each other, since both emphasize the unity of
the physical and spiritual sensorium, as well as the distinctive character of spirit-
ual perceiving.
These three models could also be unpacked in terms of the integration of the
self and the relationship between the spiritual sensorium and other aspects of the
self, including heart, mind, conscience, will, desire, body, and affectivity. For
example, in Chapter 11 Paul Moser proposes a unitary conception of spiritual
perception, locating it in conscience and connecting its proper operation with
human volitional and loving response to God and neighbour. In Chapter 8, on
liturgy, Catherine Pickstock discusses how bodily disciplines and ritual practices
influence the functioning of the spiritual senses. In Chapter 6, on the eschato
logical body, Boyd Taylor Coolman develops an account of how an initially mani-
fold and partially functioning physical and spiritual sensorium could become
unified in the ‘spiritual body’ characteristic of the resurrection state.
Additionally, the metaphysics of spiritual perception deals with the nature of
the objects of spiritual perception, and the causal mechanisms that bring about
xxiv Introduction
perceiving spiritually. In Christian practice, the objects of spiritual perception

include God, Christ, Holy Spirit, divine essence, divine attributes, divine energies,
divine presence in creation, sacraments, saints, holy objects and places, scripture,
moral properties, aesthetic properties, and other spiritual realities. We refer to
these objects cumulatively as ‘divine things’ in the title of the volume.
As emphasized by Paul Moser, God chooses to make himself available to spir-
itual perception in a manner different from that in which the physical objects
present themselves to ordinary perception. Two paradigms of divine action could
be distinguished: the first paradigm focuses on God’s reasons for voluntarily
manifesting or hiding ‘divine things’ from human perceivers; the second para-
digm assumes that divine presence is in principle available to all, focusing on the
reasons for human failures to perceive God. One might call the first paradigm
‘voluntarist’, since it accentuates the sovereign divine decision to remain tran
scendent to human experience and to reveal Godself whenever God wills; the
second paradigm might be called ‘receptionist’, since it focuses on the human
reception of divine communications. The second paradigm treats divine presence
as always in some sense available and as a function of human receptivity.
The epistemology of spiritual perception focuses on the conditions under which
perceiving the divine is possible. Some epistemological issues include clarifying
the relationship between the conceptual and the perceptual, determining whether
spiritual perception provides grounds for beliefs about God in a comparable man-
ner to how sensory experience grounds beliefs about material objects, explaining
how spiritual perception is both conceptually loaded and non-inferential, and
unpacking the epistemically beneficial and harmful aspects of spiritual perception.
Accordingly, in Chapter 1, John Greco addresses the major objections to the pos-
sibility of spiritual perception by arguing, among other things, that the objections
apply also to the causes of physical perception. In particular, he takes up the ques-
tion of whether spiritual perception is consistent with what we know about the
nature and functioning of perception in general. Building on this argument, in
Chapter 3 Frederick Aquino investigates how practices and virtues, such as purity
of heart, provide favourable conditions for the development of spiritual percep-
tion. In addition, he draws attention to some of the inter-subjective safeguards that
aid in critically examining relevant perceptual claims. Similarly, Paul Gavrilyuk
and Catherine Pickstock discuss how such practices as scripture reading and litur-
gical participation could be conducive to the activation, development, cultivation,
expansion, and sharpening of spiritual perception.
The epistemology of spiritual perception also considers how this form of per-
ception can become epistemically harmful or distorted. In Chapter 9 Boyd Taylor
Coolman notes that the apprehension of the beauty of the human body could be
distorted by viewing pornographic images and potentially healed by viewing the
presentations of the human body in religious art. In Chapter 10 Sarah Coakley
clarifies how racism is a perceptual problem and how perceptual blindness can be
explained in philosophical and theological terms. William Abraham explores the
Frederick D. Aquino and Paul L. Gavrilyuk xxv
influence of demonic deception on different aspects of human self, including

imagination, will, cognition, and perception in Chapter 4. In Chapter 12 Douglas
Christie takes up the question of how the cultivation of spiritual perception
through contemplative practices can purge the gates of perception, while educat-
ing human desire and influencing human attitudes towards the environment.
As the volume also shows, epistemological issues intersect with the moral and
aesthetic domains of inquiry. For example, John Greco draws on the schema the-
ory in empirical psychology in order to develop an account of moral perception
that takes into account the extent to which various stages of perceptual process can
be shot through with cognitive elements. Greco proposes that we come to recog-
nize moral and personal properties based on certain cues, scripts, and schemas.
Similarly, in spiritual perception, the recognition of God and divine things depends
on the schemas derived from religious education, ascetic formation, and so on.
Along these lines, in Chapter 3 Frederick Aquino focuses on the connection
between ascetic formation and spiritual perception. An important aspect of the
training of spiritual perception here involves focusing on the complex and inex-
tricable relationship between the cultivation of a stable and properly disposed
habit of mind and the different levels of spiritual perception. As a result, a reliably
formed and trained spiritual perception is able to distinguish between salient and
peripheral pieces of information and make the relevant progress towards the
vision of God.
In Chapter 2 Paul Gavrilyuk draws parallels between aesthetic perception
(apprehension of beauty in nature and art) and spiritual perception. Human
apprehension of the beautiful depends partly on emotional attunement and partly
on the ability of perceiving the object as fraught with aesthetic and spiritual pos-
sibilities not otherwise captured by our background beliefs, concepts, and sche-
mas. The aesthetic perception could be developed and sharpened depending
upon the measure of the person’s immersion in the world of art; similarly, spiritual
perception could be trained and habituated depending upon the measure of the
person’s involvement in the life of God.
The phenomenology of spiritual perception focuses on the structure of the
experience of spiritual perception in itself. The phenomenological approach
largely brackets metaphysical questions concerning the causal mechanism of spir-
itual perception and epistemological questions regarding the conditions for justi-
fying claims made on the basis of spiritual perceptual experience. This is not to
say that those who consider spiritual perception from a phenomenological angle
ignore metaphysics or epistemology completely. Indeed, phenomenologists who
consider spiritual perception are interested in metaphysical questions like that of
how the experience of spiritual perception fits together with other experiences,
and with the structure of the human person as a whole, and in epistemological
questions like that of how knowledge arises from spiritual perceptual experiences.
But these questions are considered from the point of view of the experiencing
subject, rather than in the more ‘objective’ terms used in traditional metaphysics
xxvi Introduction
and epistemology. A phenomenology of spiritual perception can stand on its own

as an account of spiritual perception, but it can also serve as providing experien-
tial data for supporting or opposing some metaphysics or epistemology of spirit-
ual perception.
Phenomenologists often try to build an account of the whole of human experi
ence by using some experience as foundational for all others. This allows for
many insights into the interconnections among the many kinds of experience, but
it also often conceals other experiences and interconnections among experiences.
Individual phenomenologies considered as a whole, and considered with respect
to spiritual perception in particular, should be used as models for particular kinds
of experience but are less helpful if they are taken to be an exhaustive account of
human experience. In Chapter 4, on value perception and spiritual perception,
Mark Spencer provides one model for a phenomenology of spiritual perception,
by building on the work of German phenomenologist Max Scheler. On Scheler’s
view, at the root of all other experiences is affective experience of values, that is, of
various ways in which things have importance. The values that we feel in persons,
situations, and things guide our attention to other aspects of those objects.
Spiritual perception occurs when we are guided by the value of holiness, the high-
est value, and we experience the world along with God; only saints are fully
guided by this value, and so only saints see the world as it truly is, as God sees it.
Scheler’s model allows for clear descriptions of forms of spiritual perception
just as the experience of seeing and loving the world along with God, seeing God
sacramentally present in the world, and seeing oneself as God sees one, in experi
ences like that of conscience. But other models might help us describe other
forms of spiritual perception. Emmanuel Levinas, for example, describes the
experience of seeing the face of another in which one experiences oneself not as
seeing God present in or revealing Himself through that face, but sees there God’s
command to serve that other. Jean-Luc Marion, drawing in part on the work of
Hans Urs von Balthasar, describes experiences of what he calls ‘saturated phe-
nomena’, in which content that one receives from the world exceeds or ‘saturates’
the meanings that one expects to find in the world.12 The most profound example
of such an experience is divine revelation. Finally, philosophers from outside the
phenomenological tradition, including some from the analytic tradition, can be
seen as providing phenomenological models for the careful description of experi
ence. For example, William Alston’s account of spiritual perception includes
many phenomenological elements.
While the metaphysical, epistemological, and phenomenological approaches
to spiritual perception have their merits, they could also benefit from distinctly
religious insights that theologically focused accounts of spiritual perception can
12 Jean-Luc Marion, In Excess: Studies of Saturated Phenomena, trans. Robyn Horner and Vincent
Berraud (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002).
Frederick D. Aquino and Paul L. Gavrilyuk xxvii
offer. Within the Christian tradition, such accounts may draw on all loci of
systematic theology, including the doctrines of God, Christ, Holy Spirit, creation,
human nature, fall, sin, incarnation, redemption, church, sacraments, and last
things. As a creator of the world, God remains transcendent and as such not
available to ordinary perception in the manner characterizing his creation. And
yet, in the incarnation, God has appeared in the world, and as a result God can
now be perceived in the person of Christ. Furthermore, the ongoing presence of
Christ can be perceived in the sacraments, which suggest that all five senses are
involved in the perception of the divine.
Christian theological anthropology postulates that humans are created ‘in the
image and likeness of God’, and some accounts of spiritual perception assume
that pre-lapsarian human beings were capable of perceiving God. The fallen con-
dition alters this state of affairs without, however, severing the communicative
link altogether. The purpose of divine action in the incarnation and redemption is
the restoration of the divine–human communication, including the perception of
God. This communication is impossible without the work of the Holy Spirit.
A question emerges, whether the operation of spiritual perception is a matter of
grace or is it a function of human effort and practice? In our judgement, divine
grace and human effort are not in causal competition; while the operation of spir-
itual perception is inconceivable without the sustaining and illuminating power
of divine grace, its activation, cultivation, and habituation also involve a measure
of human cooperation with God. While graced perception may be a divine gift,
the main emphasis of this volume is on a developed perceptual power that
becomes a vital aspect of the transformed human self. As such, the restoration of
spiritual perception is a vital, if unjustly neglected, aspect of the process of sancti-
fication and deification.
A related question is whether spiritual perception is for everybody, or whether
it is reserved exclusively for a few unique individuals with high-level perceptual
training, such as mystics. In Chapter 13, on theological aesthetics, Mark McInroy
defends a strong version of the everyday spiritual perception and argues that spir-
itual perception is a constitutive feature of physical perception. Such an account
would not rule out mystical spiritual perception, but would treat it as the culmin
ation and ultimate fulfilment of the everyday spiritual perception. We propose
that spiritual perception is a capacity that is latent in all humans, although not all
exercise it in an equal measure. The account of spiritual perception put forth in
this volume presupposes that perceiving spiritually is to some extent a feature of
everyday human experience, even if it is not always recognized as such. Just as it
is possible to speak of weaker and stronger functioning of other human powers,
such as, for example, physical strength or memory, it is equally reasonable to
speak of spiritual perception as more or less attuned to the apprehension of God.
While it is notoriously difficult to chart the precise stages of mystical ascent, it is
nevertheless possible to speak of the experiences of God that are more mundane
xxviii Introduction
and those that point to the possibilities of the resurrection state, when God will
be ‘all in all’.
The restoration of the whole person in the resurrection state will feature the
‘spiritual body’ (1 Cor. 15:44), in which all human perception will be at once fully
embodied and fully spiritual. Thus, a complete account of spiritual perception is
inescapably theological and must present ‘perceiving things divine’ in relation to
a grace-filled human striving after a full communion with God. In the eschaton,
this communion is so complete that it is Christ, who as the head of his mystical
Body, the Church, does the sensing in the believers, who have acquired the ‘mind
of Christ’ (1 Cor. 2:16, Phil. 2:5). This trope of medieval Western theology, con-
sidered in Chapter 6 by Boyd Taylor Coolman on eschatological fulfilment of
human knowledge of God, is significant for understanding spiritual perception as
the Christological transformation of the natural powers of the human self. For
spiritual perception is not a secret sense that is a prerogative of the mystics; on the
contrary, spiritual perception is how we are all meant to perceive God, the world,
and each other.
Future Work on Spiritual Perception
This volume does not seek to provide a comprehensive account of spiritual

perception. As we have already noted, much in our constructive proposal remains
exploratory. There is a need for work on spiritual perception in comparative
religion, cultural studies, anthropology, cognitive science, neuroscience, and

psychology. We believe that our work has just begun and we welcome future studies
that will take the emerging interdisciplinary field to new heights.
Our study has important implications for the theory and practice of education
in the West, where due attention to the spiritual dimension of learning is often
lacking. It follows from our account that education is not merely about acquiring
various pieces of information, but it is also about helping students to become bet-
ter perceivers of the spiritual dimension of reality. Furthermore, if humans are
capable of ‘perceiving things divine’, then the prevailing reductionist theories of
human nature require critical evaluation and revision. The next stages of the pro-
ject could involve a rigorous engagement of cognitive science in order to both
draw on its insights and challenge its physicalist assumptions. Equally valuable
work remains to be done in the fields of cultural anthropology and comparative
religion. The aspiration of the Spiritual Perception Project in general and of this
volume in particular, is to make progress towards understanding the powers of
the human self, especially in terms of its openness to and preparation for ‘perceiv-
ing things divine’.
PART I
FAC ET S
1
The Possibility of Spiritual Perception
Objections and Replies
John Greco
Throughout history and in different cultures, many persons have taken themselves
to have a perception of God on some analogy to the perception of physical objects.1
There are numerous variations on the theme, but the central idea is that the ana
logy is apt on at least two important dimensions. First, the idea is that there is
some analogous kind of cognitive contact—that the mind–object relation in the
two sorts of case are somehow importantly alike. Second, the idea is that there is
some analogous epistemic relation—that the experience of God serves to ground
beliefs about God in a way importantly similar to how sensory experience grounds
beliefs about material objects. Again, variations on both themes abound, including
variations that eschew talk of analogy. That is, some have thought that we can quite
literally experience God in our lives, and that this quite literally counts as a kind of
perception. No analogy needed.2
Others, of course, have thought that a perception of God would be impossible.
Here we need not get into verbal disputes about the ordinary language meaning
of ‘perception’. The real issues concern the ideas above about cognitive contact
and epistemic grounding. Those who deny that a perception of God is possible, or
who deny that the analogy is apt, are really denying that an experience of God
could put us in a similar cognitive relation as we have with physical objects of
perception. Likewise, they deny that an experience of God could provide epi
stemically good grounds for beliefs about God, in a way similar to how sensory
experience provides epistemically good grounds for beliefs about physical objects.
And again, variations on the theme abound. That is, the specific reasons regard
ing why such a relation would be impossible, or why such grounding would be
possible, are various. Nevertheless, I think we can identify three broad lines of
1 For numerous examples, see Paul Gavrilyuk and Sarah Coakley (eds), The Spiritual Senses:
Perceiving God in Western Christianity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). See also
William P. Alston, Perceiving God (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), especially chapter 1; and
William James The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: Longmans, Green, 1916; originally
published in 1902).
2 For example, in Perceiving God, Alston offers a general analysis of perception on which perceiving
God counts as an instance.
John Greco, The Possibility of Spiritual Perception: Objections and Replies In: Perceiving Things Divine: Towards a
Constructive Account of Spiritual Perception. Edited by: Frederick D. Aquino and Paul L. Gavrilyuk, Oxford University Press.
© Oxford University Press 2022. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198802594.003.0001
4 The Possibility of Spiritual Perception
reasoning put forward by the naysayers. As it turns out, the details will not matter
for our purposes.
The first broad line of objection to the possibility of spiritual perception is that
there is no good inference from religious experience to divine reality. Put differ
ently, there is no rationally sound route from (a) experience of a religious charac
ter to (b) the conclusion that such experience is caused by or accurately represents
a divine reality. Let us call this the ‘no good inference’ objection. Like other objec
tions to spiritual perception, this line of reasoning does not assume that God does
not exist. That is, the idea is not that we cannot perceive God because there is no
God to perceive. Rather, the idea is that, even if God does exist, it would be impos
sible to perceive God, either literally or in an importantly analogous sense. More
specifically, even if God does exist, there is no good inference from religious
experience to divine reality.
The second broad line of objection to the possibility of spiritual perception is
that all religious experience is theoretically loaded, and therefore cannot provide
the kind of immediate relation to God that perception is supposed to provide to
the object of perception. Put differently, experience of a religious character is
always ‘thick’ with the concepts, assumptions, and expectations of the religious
believer. This sort of mediation is sometimes thought to be inconsistent with the
kind of cognitive contact (the kind of mind–object relation) that perception is
supposed to provide. Alternatively, this sort of mediation is thought to be incon
sistent with the kind of epistemic grounding that perception is supposed to pro
vide. Either way, the idea is that experience which is thus theoretically loaded
cannot play a role similar to that which sensory experience plays in the percep
tion of physical objects. Let us call this the ‘loaded experience’ objection.
Finally, a third line of objection claims that neither God nor God’s properties
can be a proper object of perception. The idea behind this objection is that per
ception and perceptual experience are necessarily narrow in scope. For example,
the properties that are presented in perception are restricted to relatively ‘low-
level’ properties, such as colour, sound, motion, and shape. Higher-level proper
ties, involving causation and agency, for example, always fall outside the scope of
what is presented by perception proper. Beliefs that are about such properties
therefore require some kind of inference or interpretation, in that their contents
are not delivered by perception itself. If this is right, then it turns out that God’s
properties and activities, and thus God Himself, must fall outside the scope of
perception. Call this the ‘no proper object’ objection.
We have identified three broad lines of objection to the possibility of spiritual
perception. I said above that variations of these abound but that further details will
not matter for our purposes. That is because, I will argue, all three lines of objec
tion are clearly misguided from the point of view of the contemporary cognitive
science of perception. That is, they are clearly misguided even at this very general
level of presentation. Accordingly, adding further details cannot save them.
John Greco 5
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The first part considers
three issues in the cognitive science of perception that speak directly to our three
lines of objection: (a) in what sense does perception involve inference or reason
ing?; (b) to what degree is perception ‘cognitively penetrated’ by higher-level
mental states of the perceiver?; and (c) what is the proper object of perception?
We will see that all three issues do involve substantive disagreements in the sci
ence of perception, but none in such a way that leave our three lines of objection
standing. That is, consensus positions about the nature and functioning of percep
tion are enough to show that all three lines of objection are without force. The
next part puts forward a model of moral and spiritual perception that shows how
(a) these can be both conceptually and theoretically loaded and yet (b) non-
inferential. The model also shows how moral and spiritual perception can be
understood as kinds of expert perception, that is, perception that is enabled and
improved by accumulated knowledge and training. The model is also psycho
logically realistic, in the sense that it is consistent with what we know about the
nature and functioning of perception in general.
What We Know about Perception in General
The science of perception is rife with interesting and difficult issues. Nevertheless,
these issues are debated within a broad consensus about the nature of perception
and perceptual functioning, and that consensus is enough to put aside the famil
iar lines of objection considered above. These were framed as objections to the
possibility of spiritual perception, but it is interesting to note that they might be
framed as objections to moral perception as well. That is, the very same consid
erations that were reviewed above could be directed against the possibility of
moral perception with little or no adjustment. Thus, one might argue that there
is no good inference from moral experience to moral reality—that there is no
rationally sound route from (a) experience of a moral character to (b) the conclu
sion that such experience is caused by or accurately represents the moral facts.
Likewise, one might insist that all moral experience is conceptually and theoretic
ally loaded and therefore cannot provide the kind of immediate relation to moral
reality that perception is supposed to provide. Finally, one might think that moral
properties cannot be the proper object of perception, precisely because they are
the sort of higher-level properties that go beyond the low-level properties that are
made available by perception proper.
Accordingly, our three broad considerations against the possibility of spiritual
perception count just as well against the possibility of moral perception. But
again, we shall see that all three lines of objection are misguided, and that this is
made clear by consensus positions in the cognitive science of perception.
Accordingly, let us turn to three relevant issues in that domain.
Does Perception Involve Inference or Reasoning?
The first issue I want to consider is whether, or in what sense, perception involves
inference or reasoning. This is important because our first line of objection claims
that there is no good inference from religious experience to religious reality. Put
differently, the idea is that religious experience does not ‘support’ religious belief.
This line of objection is premised on the idea that perception in general, for
example the perception of physical objections via sensory experience, does involve
a good inference from experience to reality. The central thought of the objection
is that spiritual perception falls short in a way that physical object perception does
not. Put differently, the central thought is that religious experience fails to sup
port religious belief in a way that sensory experience successfully supports percep
tual beliefs about physical objects.
The problem with this line of objection is that no one now thinks that physical
object perception involves good inference from sensory experience to physical
reality. More carefully, no cognitive scientist thinks that physical object percep
tion involves inference or reasoning in the way that the objection requires. Clearly
enough, and without controversy, physical object perception involves inference in
some sense. And in fact, texts on perception frequently speak about ‘inferences’
in perception. But cognitive scientists use the word ‘inference’ in a very broad
way. In effect, what they mean by ‘inference’ is any kind of information processing.
Let us make a distinction between (a) information processing in general and
(b) reasoning proper in particular. Information processing in general takes repre
sentations as inputs, operates on those according to some relevant set of process
ing rules, and then outputs further representations on that basis. In this very
broad sense, physical object perception involves lots of information processing, as
when the visual system represents distance from a variety of binocular and
monocular cues. Much of this processing is subpersonal, in terms of both the rep
resentations that are operated on and the processing rules that are used.3
Now let us consider the kind of information processing involved in reasoning
proper. Reasoning takes prior beliefs as inputs, operates on these according to
some relevant set of inference rules, and then outputs further beliefs on that basis.
Moreover, the relevant processing operates on person–level representations (i.e.
beliefs) according to person–level inference rules. ‘Good reasoning’ is reasoning
that takes us from input beliefs (premises in the reasoning) to output beliefs (con
clusion of the reasoning) in an appropriate way.
3 Subpersonal processes, in the sense intended here, are computational processes operating on
r epresentations that are sub-doxastic and hence not available to the subject, in this case the perceiver.
For an informative discussion of the personal/subpersonal distinction as it is typically used in
cognitive science and the philosophy of mind, see Zoe Drayson, ‘The uses and abuses of the personal/
subpersonal distinction’, Philosophical Perspectives 26/1 (2012): 1–18.
John Greco 7
And now here is the point: physical object perception involves lots of information
processing, but that processing is not relevantly like reasoning from premises to a
conclusion, as the present line of objection requires. In short, the present line of
objection misapplies the norms of good reasoning to perception. That is, when
the objection claims that ‘there is no good inference’ from experience to belief in
some candidate episode of perception, it is using the norms of reasoning to evalu
ate perception. But perception is not a kind of reasoning, and is therefore not
subject to the norms of reasoning.
The moral of the story is that not even physical object perception involves a
good inference from experience to reality. That is the wrong way to think about
perception in general. Accordingly, it can be no objection to spiritual perception
that there is no good inference from religious experience to religious belief. As
noted above, the same point applies to moral perception.
Is Perception Cognitively Penetrated?
There is a hotly debated issue in the contemporary literature regarding whether

perception is ‘cognitively penetrated’. The question here is whether, or to what
extent, perceptual experience is influenced by higher-order mental states such as
beliefs, background theories, expectations, desires, etc. Another way to frame the
issue is in terms of the modularity of perception. On traditional models of the
mind, perception is understood as ‘modular’, in the sense that perceptual process
ing is thought to be independent from higher-order modes of cognition, such as
reasoning, supposing, desiring, etc. Friends of cognitive penetration deny such
independence, offering evidence that what we perceive can be influenced by what
we believe, expect, desire, etc.
As Firestone and Scholl understand the issue, it is essentially about how the
mind is organized.
What do we mean when we say that cognition does not affect perception, such
that there are no top-down effects on what we see? The primary reason these
issues have received so much historical and contemporary attention is that a
proper understanding of mental organization depends on whether there is a
salient “joint” between perception and cognition . . . whether visual perception is
modular, encapsulated from the rest of cognition, and “cognitively (im)pene
trable.” . . .We single out this meaning of top-down not only because it may be the
most prominent usage of the term, but also because the questions it raises are
especially foundational for our understanding of the organization of the mind.4
4 Chaz Firestone and Brian J. Scholl, ‘Cognition does not affect perception: Evaluating the evidence
for “top-down” Effects’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 39 (2016): 3.
One might think that the controversy here has implications for the possibility of
spiritual perception. For it seems that the best candidates for spiritual perception
are clearly influenced by higher-order mental states of the believer. For example,
religious experience by Christians will typically have a Christian content, as
opposed to a Hindu or Buddhist content. Likewise, the influence of desire,
expectation, and other aspects of will on religious experience are readily acknow
ledged in various religious traditions.5 But if perception proper is supposed to be
isolated from the influence of higher-order cognition, then these candidates for
perception can be ruled out as proper instances.
In fact, however, the relevant debates about cognitive penetration in percep
tion have no such implications. We can see this by making a four-way distinction
between (a) the perceptual processing that takes place before or ‘upstream’ from
the construction of a conscious sensory experience; (b) the qualitative features of
conscious sensory experience, such as phenomenal colour, phenomenal pitch,
etc.; (c) the conscious experience of low-level perceptual features of objects in the
environment, such as shape, texture, motion, distance, etc.; and (d) the perceptual
beliefs or judgements that are provoked by sensory experience. And now the
point is this: the controversies over cognitive penetration concern only categories
(a)–(c). They concern: (a) whether higher-level cognition affects perceptual pro
cessing upstream from conscious experience; (b) whether higher-level cognition
affects the phenomenal quality of sensory experience; and (c) whether higher-
level cognition affects the experience of perceived features such as shape and dis
tance. Moreover, the reason that issues over cognitive penetration concern only
categories (a)–(c) is that it is uncontroversial that top-down effects occur at (d),
the level of perceptual belief or judgement. That is, all parties to the dispute agree
that perceptual belief is affected by prior beliefs, desires, expectations, and the
like.6 Accordingly, it can be no objection to spiritual perception that beliefs based
on religious experience are affected by higher-level cognitive resources. That is
completely in keeping with the nature and workings of perceptual belief in
general.
To see this point more clearly, let us take a closer look at what is and is not a
matter of substantive disagreement here. First, let us take a closer look at what is
controversial. In each of the cases below, a number of researchers have presented
experiments that purport to demonstrate the relevant effect, and others have in
one way or another disputed their findings.7
5 See Caroline Franks Davis, The Evidential Force of Religious Experience (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1989); as well as some of the chapters in this volume, especially the Introduction and Chapter 3.
6 For example, see the discussions in Jack Lyons, ‘Circularity, Reliability, and the Cognitive
Penetrability of Perception’, Philosophical Issues 21/1 (2011): 289–311; William F. Brewer, ‘Perception
is Theory Laden: The Naturalized Evidence and Philosophical Implications’, Journal for General
Philosophy of Science 46 (2015): 121–38; and Firestone and Scholl, ‘Cognition does not affect percep
tion’, 1–77.
7 See Firestone and Scholl, ‘Cognition does not affect perception’.
John Greco 9
Consider the perceptual processing that takes place en route to but before the
production of a conscious sensory experience. In the case of visual processing,
this would include the subpersonal processing that begins when light hits the
retina, and continues as the perceptual system builds up initial representations
that will eventually be recruited to produce a three-dimensional representation of
the perceived environment. This is sometimes called ‘early vision’. Some contro
versies in perception science are in regard to whether early vision and analogous
early processing in other perceptual modalities is subject to cognitive penetration
by higher-order cognition.
A second kind of controversy regards whether the qualitative character of con
scious sensory experience can be affected by higher-order cognition. For example,
there is controversy over whether knowledge of an object’s typical colour (bananas
are typically yellow, for example) can affect experienced colour. Similarly, some
researchers claim to have shown that knowledge of race affects the experience of
skin tone.
There is also controversy regarding cognitive penetration at the level of per
ceived low-level properties, such as shape, size, and distance. For example, there
is controversy over whether the anticipation of a physical task, such as climbing a
hill, can affect perception of slope. Likewise, there are controversies over whether
knowledge of an object’s desirability or perceived value can affect perceptions of
distance.
Now let us take a look at what is not controversial. For one, it is not controver
sial that higher-order cognition can affect the quality of sensory experience by
means of attentional direction. For example, suppose that one is particularly fear
ful of spiders and is therefore, due to some prompt or other, hypersensitive to the
possibility of spiders in one’s environment. It is uncontroversial that in such a
situation, one is more likely to perceive spiders if they are there to be perceived.
Similarly, suppose that you are a bird lover and that you are highly knowledgeable
about and interested in local birds. It is uncontroversial that in such a situation,
one is more likely to perceive birds in one’s environment—more likely than some
one who is uninterested in birds and so not thus attentionally attuned. This is in
fact commonplace, and no one working on perception denies it.
It is easy to see why these kinds of attentional phenomena do not touch on
the controversies over cognitive penetration reviewed above. Namely, one’s atten
tional direction, at least in the examples we considered, affects what is input into
early processing, as opposed to the processing itself.8 Thus, someone who is look
ing for birds, even subconsciously, scans her environment differently from some
one who is not looking for birds. For example, someone who is eager and
interested to see birds will change their gaze in response to subtle movement on
8 There are real controversies over other kinds of attentional phenomena.

the periphery of the visual field, or in response to a chirp from above. But again,
this kind of attentional direction can be understood as affecting input to early
processing, as opposed to the early processing itself. Nor does it affect the qualita
tive features of one’s sensory experience, nor how low-level features of the percep
tual environment are presented, once the input is given.9
Another thing that is not controversial is that higher-order cognition can affect
one’s perceptual recognition abilities. Again, if one is a trained bird watcher, one
is more likely to perceptually recognize an ambiguous figure as a bird. Likewise,
one is more likely to perceptually recognize a bird if one is primed to do so, either
by testimony, story-telling, promise of a reward, or some other priming mechan
ism. Again, this is commonplace, and no one working on perception would
deny it.
Also again, we can see why this kind of phenomenon does not touch on actual
controversies over top-down processing. Namely, the kind of differential recogni
tion presented in our examples can be explained by different reactions to the
presentation of low-level perceptual properties. For example, someone who is
expert at identifying birds, or who is simply primed to see birds, will be more
sensitive to bird-relevant perceptual cues, such as shape and size, and thus more
likely to recognize a bird as a bird. But this sort of phenomenon is consistent with
enjoying the very same ‘thin’ qualitative experience as someone not disposed to
see birds.10 It is also consistent with being perceptually presented with the very
same low-level features of the environment. In the examples we considered, it is
the reaction to perceptual cues, rather than the cues themselves, that are subject
to top-down effects.
In sum, it is uncontroversial that higher-order cognition can affect perceptual
judgement and perceptual belief. This is because it is uncontroversial that higher-
order cognition can affect one’s perceptual experience by means of attentional
direction, and that it can affect one’s ability to recognize perceived objects. There
are other uncontroversial top-down effects on perceptual belief as well.11 Thus
it can be no objection to spiritual perception that beliefs based on religious
experience are subject to the same top-down effects. Again, that would be entirely
consistent with our best understanding of perception in general.
What is controversial within perception science is whether there are top-down
effects on (a) ‘early’ perceptual processing, that is, processing before conscious
sensory experience; (b) the qualitative character of sensory experience, such as
phenomenal colour; and (c) the presentation of low-level features such as size and
distance. But the defender of spiritual perception need not take a stand on these
9 For discussions of attentional direction in religious experience, see chapters 2 and 3 in

this volume.
10 For more on the distinction between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ experience, see text below.
11 Most obviously, background beliefs can affect whether one trusts one’s perceptual experience, or
takes it at face value.
John Greco 11
controversial issues. At least not until there is some reason to think that religious
experience involves some such phenomena in a way that perception proper
does not.
At this point, a sceptic about spiritual perception might think that we have
missed the relevant issue. For the point of the ‘loaded experience’ objection is
about religious experience, not religious belief. The problem with spiritual percep
tion, the objection goes, is that religious experience itself is shaped by higher-level
resources, and this is the crucial disanalogy with physical object perception.
To answer this charge, we may invoke a distinction that is more familiar in
philosophy than in cognitive science—that between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ experience.12
According to this distinction, thin experience is supposed to have a purely quali
tative nature, exhausted by purely phenomenal properties. Thick experience, on
the other hand, is supposed to involve representational content—it presents
experienced objects as having properties. In different terms, thin experience is
understood as uninterpreted qualia, whereas thick experience is understood as
carrying an interpretation, presenting some object as having some property. At
least typically, thick experience is understood to fall short of judgement. Thus,
I can experience a stick in water as being bent or broken, while judging that it is
straight. Nevertheless, my (thick) perceptual experience is thought to represent,
in some sense, the stick as broken. And whatever sense this is, it goes beyond a
merely phenomenal presentation. Thus, a perceiver who lacks the concepts of
stick and of being broken could not enjoy the same thick experience, although she
could enjoy the same thin experience, that is, the same purely phenomenal
presentation.
With this distinction in hand, we may now see that the present objection dis
solves. For either the charge is (a) that religious experience considered as purely
phenomenal, thin experience is cognitively penetrated, or (b) that religious experi
ence considered as interpreted, thick experience is cognitively penetrated. The first
version of the objection is clearly without force. On the one hand, it is controver
sial whether any perceptual experience considered as thin is subject to top-down
effects, and so it is not clear that there is a difference here between religious
experience and sensory experience in physical object perception, even if religious
experience is subject to top-down effects. On the other hand, it is not clear
whether religious experience considered as thin really is subject to top-down
effects. That is, it is not clear that the purely qualitative or phenomenal character
of religious experience is so affected. Indeed, this would be a hard thing to
12 The language of ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ perceptual experience probably originates with philosophers
influenced by Immanuel Kant’s distinction between ‘intuition’ and ‘concepts’ in his Critique of Pure
Reason. For example, see C. I. Lewis, Mind and The World Order: An Outline of a Theory of Knowledge
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1929, reprinted in paperback by Dover Publications, Inc., New
York, 1956).
establish, for reasons similar to why the same issue remains controversial in the
case of physical object perception.
The second version of the objection is also without force. This is now the charge
that religious experience considered as thick is subject to cognitive penetration.
But as we have already seen, perceptual experience in physical object perception
is clearly subject to cognitive penetration when considered as thick. Remember,
thick experience is experience carrying representational content, as when one
perceives a bird as a bird. In other words, thick experience involves the same
kinds of high-level representational capacities as does perceptual belief. But we
have already seen that this kind of representation is penetrated by higher-level
cognition, and uncontroversially so.
What is the Proper Object of Perception?
A third issue in the philosophy and science of perception concerns the proper
objects of perception. The issue here can be framed partly in terms of a distinc
tion that we have already seen—that between (a) the low-level properties of per
ceptual objects, such as size, shape, and motion, and (b) higher-level properties
involving causation, agency, dispositions, etc. As Siegel points out, the issue is
over which properties are represented in perceptual experience.
Positions on which properties are represented in experience can be located on a

rough continuum, with low-level properties (where these include color, shape,
illumination, and depth) at one end, and high-level properties (where these
include kind properties, agential or other emotional properties, and semantic
properties) at the other. The issue is which of these properties can be perceived
as being instantiated: e.g., whether one can have a visual experience that repre
sents that someone is trying to do something.13
13 Susanna Siegel, ‘The Contents of Perception’, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy (Winter 2016), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/perception-
contents/>, 39–40. Siegel notes that defenders of the view that only low-level properties are repre
sented in experience include Michael Tye, Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of
the Phenomenal Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995); Fred Dretske, Naturalizing the Mind
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995); Austen Clark, A Theory of Sentience (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000); Richard Price, ‘Aspect- switching and Visual Phenomenal Character’, Philosophical
Quarterly 59/236 (2009): 508–18; Berit Brogaard, ‘Do we Perceive Natural Kind Properties?’,
Philosophical Studies 162/1 (2013): 35–42; defenders of the view that high-level properties are repre
sented in experience include Christopher Peacocke, A Study of Concepts (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1992); Charles Siewert, The Significance of Consciousness (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1998); Susanna Siegel, ‘Which Properties are Represented in Perception?’, in T. Gendler Szabo and
J. Hawthorne (eds), Perceptual Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 481–503; Susanna
Siegel, The Rationality of Perception (Oxford University Press, 2017); T. Bayne, ‘Perception and the
reach of phenomenal content’, Philosophical Quarterly 59/236 (2009): 385–404; Farid Masrour, ‘Is
Perceptual Phenomenology Thin?’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83/2 (2011): 366–97;
John Greco 13
Siegel is here concerned with which properties are represented in perceptual

experience, but we can also ask which objects are so represented. Does perceptual
experience present us with chairs, trucks, and waiters, etc., or merely with three-
dimensional objects that must be judged to be chairs, trucks, and waiters?
According to theories on which visual experience represents only very low-level

properties, such as color, the shapes of facing surfaces, their illumination prop
erties and nothing more, visual experience does not carry information about
whether any of the facing surfaces belong to the same ordinary object, and does
not carry information about whether there are any ordinary objects in the
immediate environment at all. Instead, visual experience represents that low-
level properties are instantiated at certain locations, without taking a stand on
whether ordinary objects are instantiating them. A version of this view . . . argues
that experience represents colors (and perhaps other low- level properties)
instantiated in regions of space-time around the perceiver, and nothing else.14
Once again, however, it is essential to note that the current controversy is over
which properties and objects are represented in perceptual experience. There is no
analogous controversy over the proper objects of perceptual belief or judgement.
That is, all parties agree that perceptual beliefs (judgements) are about ordinary
objects in the environment, including people, furniture, and the like. For example,
my perceptual beliefs include the beliefs that there is a waiter walking toward the
table, that there is a firetruck parked on the street, and that my dog is lying down
quietly. The only controversy in the area is how such perceptual beliefs are related
to perceptual experience—whether they reflect the same or similar content, or
whether they go beyond the content of experience in significant ways. It can be
no objection to spiritual perception, then, that religious beliefs have higher-level
objects and properties as their content. This is entirely consistent with perceptual
beliefs about physical objects, which also can have higher-level objects and prop
erties as their content.
A Model for Moral and Spiritual Perception
So far we have seen that perception should not be understood as involving an

inference from perceptual experience, not if by ‘inference’ we mean the sort of
movement from premise to conclusion that is manifested in reasoning, and that is
Bence Nanay, ‘Do we see apples as edible?’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92/3 (2011): 305–22; Ned
Block, ‘Seeing-As in the Light of Vision Science’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89/1
(2014): 560–72.
14 Siegel, ‘The Contents of Perception’, 47–8, cites Clark, A Theory of Sentience, ch. 5 as a defender
of this kind of view.
subject to the norms of good reasoning. Nevertheless, we have also seen that
perceptual belief is influenced by various higher-level mental states and resources,
including presumed theories, prior beliefs and background knowledge. We have
also seen that the objects of perceptual belief can be, and in fact usually are,
ordinary objects with high-level properties. How are these various features of per
ception consistent with each other? How is it that perception can be both non-
inferential but conceptually and theoretically loaded? A very general answer is
that background knowledge can influence perception in ways other than by act
ing as premises in an inference. Put differently, higher-level mental states can
‘shape’ perceptual dispositions in various ways, by shaping expectations, influen
cing attention, distributing salience, and the like.
In this part of the chapter, I present a psychologically realistic model for how
this might work. My claim is not that perception does work this way. Neither is
the claim that this is the only way that perception can incorporate top-down pro
cessing. Rather, the point is to describe one model for explaining how perception
can be both non-inferential and yet subject to various top-down effects of higher-
order cognition. The same model also demonstrates the possibility of moral and
spiritual perception. That is, it shows how there could be, quite literally, a percep
tion or moral and spiritual reality.
A central idea of the proposed model is that perception operates by employing
various kinds of cognitive heuristics. In general, a heuristic is a ‘mental short-cut’
employed in cognitive processing. Heuristics are ‘short-cuts’ in the sense that they
forgo more costly information processing for the sake of efficiency and speed.
Thus, Shah and Oppenheimer write that ‘heuristics primarily serve the purpose
of reducing the effort associated with a task’,15 and do so by (1) examining fewer
cues, (2) reducing the difficulty associated with retrieving and storing cue values,
(3) simplifying the weighting principles for cues, (4) integrating less information,
and/or (5) examining fewer alternatives.16
Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier adopt the following general definition: ‘A heuristic
is a strategy that ignores part of the information, with the goal of making deci
sions more quickly, frugally, and/or accurately than more complex methods’.17
Early work on heuristics typically claimed that heuristics trade speed and effi
ciency for accuracy.18 But as their definition suggests, Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier
dispute this, arguing that cost-saving heuristics can sometimes increase accuracy.
15 A. K. Shah and D. M. Oppenheimer, ‘Heuristics Made Easy: An Effort-reduction Framework’,

Psychological Bulletin 134/2 (2008): 207.
16 Shah and Oppenheimer, ‘Heuristics Made Easy’, 209.
17 Gerd Gigerenzer and Wolfgang Gaissmaier, ‘Heuristic Decision Making’, Annual Review of
Psychology 62 (2011): 454.
18 For example, see A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, ‘Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and
biases’, Science 185 (1974): 1124–30.
John Greco 15
If we think of heuristics very broadly, and in terms of ‘reducing the effort

a ssociated with a task’ by ‘examining fewer cues, integrating less information, and
examining fewer alternatives’, then it is fair to say that heuristics are used in the
early stages of perceptual processing, including the subpersonal processing of
early vision and other perceptual modalities. In fact, these are ‘hard-wired’ into
perceptual systems. They take advantage of stable structures of the perceptual
environment, such as typical lighting patterns, and are responsible for many well-
known perceptual hallucinations. In what follows below, however, I am interested
in the role of higher-level heuristics in perceptual judgement. In particular, I want
to look at the role of perceptual ‘schemas’.
The central idea of schema theory in empirical psychology is that cognition in
general often involves heuristics known as ‘scripts’ and ‘personae’. In the following
passages, Nisbett and Ross describe how scripts and personae are supposed
to work.
To understand the social world, the layperson makes heavy use of a variety of
knowledge structures normally not expressed in propositional terms and pos
sibly not stored in a form even analogous to propositional statements.19
They distinguish between two kinds of schema: event-schemas, or ‘scripts’, and

person-schemas, or ‘personae’.
A script is a type of schema in which the related elements are social objects and
events involving the individual as actor and observer . . . A script can be com
pared to a cartoon strip with two or more captioned ‘scenes’, each of which sum
marizes some basic actions that can be executed in a range of possible manners
and contexts (for instance, the ‘restaurant script’ with its ‘entering’, ‘ordering’,
‘eating’, and ‘exiting’ scenes).20
Social judgements and expectations often are mediated by a class of schemas
which we shall term ‘personae’, that is, cognitive structures representing the per
sonal characteristics and typical behaviors of particular ‘stock characters’. Some
personae are the unique products of one’s own personal experience (good old
Aunt Mary, Coach Whiplash). Others are shared within the culture or sub-culture
(the sexpot, the earth-mother, the girl-next-door, the redneck, the schlemiel, the
rebel-without-a-cause) . . . Once the principal features or behaviors of a given indi
vidual suggest a particular persona, subsequent expectations of and responses to
that individual are apt to be dictated in part by the characteristics of the persona.21
19 Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross, ‘Judgmental Heuristics and Knowledge Structures’, in Hilary
Kornblith (ed.), Naturalizing Epistemology, 2nd edn (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), 278.
20 Nisbett and Ross, ‘Judgmental Heuristics and Knowledge Structures’, 280.
21 Nisbett and Ross, ‘Judgmental Heuristics and Knowledge Structures’, 281–2.
The application to perception is straightforward. When we are seated at the

restaurant table and a man approaches, we perceive that the waiter is coming.
According to schema theory, this perception is not based on an inference from
other things we believe. For example, we do not reason that ‘waiters typically
dress in such and such a manner, there appears to be a man dressed this way, and
therefore this must be the waiter’. Rather, we are operating with a script that dis
poses us to expect a waiter in the present time and place, and that provokes an
interpretation of present perceptual cues. Suppose that we are working with the
persona of the surly waiter. We will be apt to interpret a tone of voice as impa
tient, or a facial expression as sarcastic. On the present proposal, such perceptions
are not grounded in anything like a reasoning process. As was explained in the
passages quoted above, scripts and personae are not thought of as beliefs or
assumptions, as premises for inferences would have to be. Nevertheless, percep
tion is theoretically loaded on this view. As was also explained above, scripts and
personae can be part of our cultural inheritance, the result of special training, or
gleaned from previous life experience.
The present account of physical-object perception opens up possibilities for
moral perception and spiritual perception. For example, the present account
explains how we might see (quite literally) that an action is wrong, that a child is
innocent, or that a man is dishonest. The basic idea is that we are equipped with
moral scripts and moral personae. If perception in general involves schema-
governed interpretation, then moral perception involving this kind of informa
tion processing would be just another kind of perception. In effect, the moral
perception that some man is dishonest would not be essentially different from the
empirical perception that some man is a waiter.
Again, the main idea is that, as perceivers, we employ moral scripts and perso
nae. Put differently, we employ scripts and personae that have moral content. In
our cast of characters there is the shifty lawyer, the cop on the take, the school
yard bully, the vicious drug dealer, the petty neighbour, and the greedy doctor.
There is also the selfless mother, the devoted teacher, the kind doctor, the cour
ageous cop, and the crusading lawyer. The list goes on and on. There are also
countless moral scripts. As with personae, many of these are highly specific to
time, place and culture. Others are more universal, perhaps showing up in the
great literature of several distinct cultures.
According to schema theory, then, perceptual processing can involve scripts
and personae. Some feature of a situation activates a relevant schema, and as a
result we are disposed to see or hear things a particular way. The present sugges
tion is that these might be moral ways as well as empirical ways. For example,
moral schemas might influence one to see a movement as aggressive, to hear a
voice as threatening, or to feel a touch as reassuring. Of course, some schemas
amount to no more than stereotypes and myths. In such cases their influence
would undermine the reliability of our moral judgements, thereby having a
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„Reichlich.“
Fürst Reichenberg, unnachahmlich vornehm und elegant, mit
seiner müden, vornübergebeugten, hageren Gestalt, tauchte die
Fingerspitzen in die silberne Wasserschale.
„Eine furchtbare norddeutsche Gewohnheit, dieses ewige Auf-
die-Uhr-schauen“, meinte er. „Habt ihr den Rhythmus der Zeit nicht
im Blut — aus der Westentasche seine Tagesbefehle holen ...
nehmt’s mir nicht übel, aber das find’ ich schrecklich! Das könnt’ mir
das Leben verleiden. Oder brauchens auch immer den Metronom,
gnä’ Frau?“
Er küßte Karla die Hand — ein bißchen lässig, wie er alles tat,
aber mit einem in seiner Weichheit fast zärtlichen Blick in den
gleichsam ausgewaschenen, hellen, länglichen Augen.
Karla lachte.
„Ich komme immer zu spät — trotz all meiner Uhren, denn ich
sehe nie hin.“
Gaudlitz faßte ihre beiden Hände, umschloß sie mit den seinen.
„Ich seh’ schon — jetzt muß ich dir eine Uhr schenken. Die wirst
du doch ansehen ... oder etwa nicht?“
Er sagte es flüsternd, daß nur sie allein das „Du“ hören konnte.
Aber sie wurde doch rot. Zu rasch war alles gekommen. Noch war
ihr diese äußere Nähe zu ungewohnt. Keine Werbung war
vorangegangen, kaum eine Frage.
Während sie mit Reichenbergs am Morgen nach ihrem letzten
Auftreten in Bayreuth im Hotelgarten frühstückte, war er plötzlich die
kurze Allee heruntergekommen, hatte seinen Strohhut geschwenkt,
war an den Tisch getreten.
„So. Nun habe ich lange genug gewartet!“
Schob mit lachendem Gesicht einen Stuhl zwischen seine
Schwester und Karla, reichte dem Schwager über den Tisch die
Hand.
„Jetzt wollen wir wenigstens Vorverlobung feiern — bei einem
Glase Milch und Butter, mit Honig. Das soll das Symbol unserer Ehe
werden, Karla.“
Sogar Alice Reichenbergs Gesicht wurde flammend rot.
„Du bist unmöglich, Hans Jochen. Ein Wilder.“
Aber Reichenberg meinte:
„Warum denn, Alice? Ich find’ das sehr fesch. Grüß dich Gott,
Hansel! Schad’, daß du die gnä’ Frau gestern nit g’hört hast! ... Also
weißt, wenn Wagner noch lebte ... Heut’ sind wir zum Tee in
Wahnfried. Wenn du willst, führ’ ich dich ein ...“
Gaudlitz schüttelte lachend den Kopf.
„Danke verbindlichst. Das könnt’ uns passen, heute ... Karla,
wie? Sagen Sie selbst?“
Sie widersprach eifrig.
„Doch, Graf Gaudlitz ... ich muß hingehen.“
Gaudlitz gab ihr einen Klaps auf die Hand.
„Erstens: nicht Graf Gaudlitz, sondern Hans Jochen. Nur nicht
Hansel! Mein Schwager hält mich scheint’s für einen Kanarienvogel.
Ich möchte mir’s verbeten haben. So. Und zweitens m ü s s e n Sie
nichts anderes tun, als was Sie w o l l e n . Von heute ab ist es so.
Verstanden? Und was Sie wollen, das muß genau dasselbe sein,
was ich will.“
Karla faßte lachend und nicht ohne Verlegenheit die Hand der
Fürstin.
„Alice, schützen Sie mich — vor diesem Manne.“
Es nahm Karla den Atem. Sie war wirklich nicht vorbereitet auf
diesen Zwiespalt, nicht vorbereitet auf das Kommen von Gaudlitz.
Sie hatte an einen Telegrammwechsel gedacht; an lange Briefe, an
ein sich langsames Gewöhnen — nun war er da. Lachte sie mit
seinen blauen Augen an, als wäre es das Selbstverständlichste von
der Welt, daß er da war, sie „Karla“ nannte vor seiner Schwester,
von der Ehe mit ihr sprach, ihr seinen Willen aufzwang ...
Und wenn das Herz ihr auch vor Seligkeit schlug — da war doch
noch anderes. Viel anderes ... ihr Leben bisher, ihr Erfolg hier ...
Ehren, die ihr — ganz allein galten ... Verpflichtungen, die sie allein
erfüllen mußte, als selbständiger, freier Mensch — als Künstlerin ...
Aber nein — sie mußte richtig absagen in der Villa Wahnfried.
Mußte Alice Reichenberg bitten, sie mit Migräne zu entschuldigen.
Durfte keine Zeitung ansehen, die doch alle Depeschen gebracht
hatten, alle ihren Ruhm verkündeten! Mußte einen Boten zu dem
berühmten Maler schicken, der sie gebeten hatte, ihm zu einer
Skizze eine halbstündige Sitzung zu gewähren; konnte kaum die
Karten durchsehen, die für sie während des Vormittags abgegeben
worden waren, die Briefe und Depeschen lesen, die sich auf dem
Schreibtisch ihres kleinen Hotelsalons stapelten, — ja, es blieb ihr
schließlich nichts anderes übrig, als in einem weiten Staubmantel,
einen dicken Schleier vor dem Gesicht, in ein Auto zu steigen und
sich von Gaudlitz ganz weit weg von allen abgeklapperten
Ausflugsorten entführen zu lassen, nur damit er seinen Willen hatte
und sie ganz für sich behielt an diesem ersten Tage.
Als sie dann am späten Nachmittag heimkehrte, da wußte ihr
Mädchen nicht recht, was mit ihrer „gnä’ Frau“ geschehen war. So
glückstrahlend und geistesabwesend hatte sie sie nie gesehen.
Am selben Abend noch wurde gepackt. Und auch die Rückreise
mit Reichenbergs nach Wien war wie eine Entführung.
Aber Gaudlitz erklärte, er müsse gleich wieder zurück aufs Gut.
Das könnte ihn jetzt nicht entbehren. Die neuen Maschinen wären
gerade eingetroffen, von denen der alte Verwalter nichts hatte
wissen wollen. Da gälte es, seinen Willen durchzusetzen. Die
Maschinen müßten in seiner Gegenwart zusammengesetzt und
aufgestellt werden ... Aber vorher wollte er mit Karla am Tisch und im
Hause seiner Schwester ein Glas Sekt trinken.
Das sollte die Weihe sein.
Fürst Reichenberg lächelte sein müdes, ein bißchen ironisches
Lächeln. „Sozusagen — die zweite Vorverlobung. Sag’s lieber gleich,
Hansel, wie oft du dich noch mit der gnä’ Frau zu verloben
gedenkst ...“
Gaudlitz lachte. „So oft ich wiederkomme: im Herbst und im
Winter und nächstes Frühjahr ... und so weiter — bis es ans
Heiraten geht! Und darauf, daß es bald ist, wollen wir zusammen
anstoßen. Denn viel Zeit zu verlieren haben wir nicht mehr. Jeder
Augenblick muß ausgenutzt werden!“
Im Wintergarten des Reichenbergschen Palais sagte er ihr noch
einmal:
„Keine Minute dürfen wir versäumen. Darum sollst du die Uhr von
mir haben. Mir darfst du nicht zu spät kommen — hörst du, mir
nicht!“
Es flackerte plötzlich wie eine Unruhe, wie eine Angst in seinen
lachenden, blauen Augen auf.
Jetzt, da Karla vor ihm stand, im Hause seiner Schwester, im
einfachen Sommerkleid, war sie ihm so nahe, so vertraut. Als hätte
er nicht bloß in Sehnsucht an sie gedacht diese endlos lange Zeit,
sondern als hätte sie bereits sein Leben geteilt, als wäre sie bereits
wirklich durch die großen hellen Räume des großen weißen Hauses
geschritten, des Grafenhauses, wie die auf Pinnow sagten. Als hätte
nicht nur in seinen wachen Träumen ihre wundervolle Stimme die
Halle durchbraust, in der noch ein alter, verstimmter, langer
Klapperkasten stand.
Aus dem Holze wollte Gaudlitz eine Wiege zimmern lassen ...
Das gab es her. Und an dieser Wiege würde Karla sitzen; ihre
Stimme würde über sie fluten, aus dem Schnitzwerk würde es
widerklingen. So sollte jedes seiner Kinder von Vergangenheit und
Gegenwart träumen in seinem ersten Schlaf, Vergangenheit und
Gegenwart einen, durch das Singen der Mutter, das Singen der
Wiege ...
Auch ein langer Tisch sollte in der Halle des Grafenhauses
stehen ... so ein Tisch, von dem Karla manchmal geträumt hatte ...
Ein hastiger, herzlicher Abschied. Ein Winken vom Fenster, ein
Winken zurück aus dem Auto. Ein kurzes Ankurbeln, Fauchen und
Rattern, und in stolzem Bogen glitt der dunkelgrüne Wagen mit den
zwei Schwägern die Auffahrt hinab. Wie betäubt blieb Karla noch
eine Weile stehen, dann warf sie sich Alice Reichenberg an die
Brust.
— — — Es war heiß in Wien. Es war unerträglich. Und trotz der
Hitze erhob sich von Zeit zu Zeit ein kurzer heftiger Windstoß, jagte
den Straßengängern den Kalkstaub in die Augen.
Reichenbergs waren wieder abgereist, auf ihre Besitzung. Karla
sollte sie besuchen, wenn „das“ überstanden war.
„Das“ ... Die Aussprache mit Altmann.
Karla wollte nicht sprechen. Wollte schreiben. Aber sie hatte
schon zwanzig Briefe begonnen und wieder zerrissen. Es gab ja zu
viel zu sagen! Ihre Feder kam ihren Empfindungen nicht nach.
Auch mit Gaudlitz war es mehr ein Depeschenwechsel. Es war
keine Seltenheit, daß sie drei, vier Telegramme täglich von ihm
bekam. War es nur eines, zitterte sie vor Unruhe. Er ritt Gäule ein,
stellte sich selbst an die Dreschmaschine, um sie auszuprobieren ...
kam ein anderes Mal wieder den ganzen Tag nicht aus dem Sattel
und warf sich dann zur Abkühlung in den kleinen See, wo er eine
Stunde lang herumschwamm. Sie lernte die Angst kennen um einen
geliebten Menschen, hatte die plötzlichen Besorgnisse einer allzu
ängstlichen Mutter. Telegraphierte: „Beschwöre, vorsichtig zu sein.
Andern Gaul reiten“ oder „Kaltes Baden nach Reiten Wahnsinn. Bin
außer mir“. Depeschen kamen zurück, aus denen sein Lachen ihr
entgegenschallte: „Liege in Watte gepackt auf Ruhebett, beginne
ungefährliche Stickerei“ oder „gleich um Verzeihung bitten wegen
Feigheit. Pfui.“
Sie lachte, sie weinte, sie stampfte ärgerlich mit dem Fuße auf
und drückte sein Bild an die Lippen.
Sie liebte, wie sie mit zwanzig Jahren nicht zu lieben gewußt
hätte — auch wenn sie ihm begegnet wäre.
Er schickte ihr Blumen: „aus unserm Garten“, Perlen, die „seiner
Mutter gehört hatten“, Bücher, die „er gelesen hatte“.
Die Blumen kamen welk an, und sie legte sie in ihren
Wäscheschrank. Vor den Perlen der Gräfin Gaudlitz hatte sie eine
heilige Scheu und hätte sie nicht eher angelegt, als bis sie den
gleichen Namen führte. Die Bücher legte sie auf ihren Nachttisch, las
abends und morgens darin und wußte doch nichts von ihrem Inhalt,
weil ihre Gedanken nach allen Richtungen hin flatterten.
Ihr Bayreuther Erfolg hatte ihr eine vertrauliche „ganz private“
Anfrage von einer der Berliner Generalintendanz nahestehenden
Seite gebracht, ob sie nicht ....
Russel hatte in einem hundert Worte langen Telegramm sein
Angebot erneuert, die Hofmarschälle zweier regierenden Fürsten
luden sie zu einem Hofkonzert ein. Fast jede Post brachte
Gastspielanträge aus allen großen Städten Deutschlands und
Österreichs.
Auch Liebesbriefe liefen ein, schamlos kalte, mit
Versprechungen, die sich in fünfstelligen Zahlen äußerten,
überschwänglich leidenschaftliche, von Narren und Spekulanten;
schüchterne von kaum dem Kindesalter entwachsenen Jünglingen;
flammende von hysterischen, unverstandenen Frauen, denen sie
den Weg weisen sollte „aus ihrem großen, alles verstehenden
Künstlertum heraus“. Bettelbriefe kamen: mit Kronen in der linken
Ecke und andere mit Fettflecken am Rand; anonyme Anträge und
Schmähungen, Rechnungen über Gegenstände, die sie nie gekauft,
und Schmuck mit beigelegter Quittung.
Sie dachte an die Zeit, da Altmann ihr alles so klug und bedacht
ferngehalten, was ihr nicht nähertreten durfte, da sie ihn beratend,
oft bestimmend an ihrer Seite gehabt hatte, keinen Finger zu rühren
brauchte, da alles ihr aus dem Wege geräumt war, sie vor keiner
Besudelung, keinem Irrtum Angst zu haben brauchte, da ihr Haus
wie eine Festung gewesen war, unter deren Schutz sie ihrer Kunst
gelebt hatte ...
Und wieder würde solch eine Festung sie umschließen,
schirmender, schützender als die erste. Würde auch ihre Kunst mit
einschließen — —
Manchmal durchfuhr es sie dann wie ein leiser Schrecken — mit
eigentümlichem Prickeln in der Haut und dem Aussetzen eines
Herzschlages.
Und sie telegraphierte: „Ich liebe Dich und sehne mich nach Dir.“
Sie brauchte die Gegenwärtigkeit. Brauchte seine blauen Augen,
seine eigensinnige blonde Stirn, seinen lachenden Willen, seine
heiße Liebe, den Ton seiner Stimme ... Alles das brauchte sie, um
das andere lösen zu können .... das viele, unsagbar viele „andere“,
das ihr Leben war!
Und mit schauerndem Erbeben ließ sie noch einmal die Welle
der Begeisterung über sich zusammenschlagen, badete sich in allem
Köstlichen und allem Schlamm, womit diese Welle sie überschüttete,
faltete die Hände wie ein frommes, unschuldiges Kind und betete
leidenschaftlich:
„Lieber Gott, ich danke Dir, daß ich ihm so viel opfern darf ... so
viel! ...“
Dieses Opfer sollte die Heiligung ihrer Liebe sein.
Die Einladung nach Baden zu einer Dame der ersten
Gesellschaft gab ihr bald wieder ihre alte Zuversicht zurück.
Der Kreis hochgebildeter und abgeklärter Menschen, die ihre
Bewunderung für Karla mit einem zarten Hauch erlesener Geistigkeit
umkleideten, wirkte wie eine Erlösung auf sie nach all dem
Schwülen, Traumhaften, Überreizten, kaum Faßbaren der letzten
Wochen.
Vielleicht waren es die glücklichsten Stunden ihres ganzen
Lebens, die in diesen zwei Badener Tagen sich zusammendrängten,
Stunden, in denen sich gleichsam alle Höhepunkte ihres Daseins in
ihrer feinsten Wesenheit zu einer leuchtenden Kette
zusammenschlossen.
Ruhig, stolz und strahlend kehrte sie nach Wien zurück. Das
Mädchen nahm ihr die Sachen ab, berichtete, was sich ereignet
hatte in den zwei Tagen.
Ein Herr von einer Zeitung wäre dagewesen. Der Schneider hätte
das Lodenkostüm zum Aufbügeln g’holt. Der Hauswirt hatte eine
Kollekte herunterg’schickt für blinde Kinder. Noch eine Masse Leit’
— und dann wär’ heute mittag noch ein Herr dag’wesen, ein ganz
fremder — keiner von Wien ... ein älterer Herr ...
Sie holte die Karte vom Schreibtisch — er tät wiederkommen,
hätt’ er g’sagt.
Karla stand vor dem Spiegel und bauschte ihr vom Hut
zusammengedrücktes Haar auf, stand da in einem knappen weißen
Rock, mit duftiger weißer Batistbluse, einen schmalen goldenen
Gürtel um die Mitte, mit ihren, wie es immer hieß, „statuenhaft
schönen“ Armen, die rosig unter dem durchsichtigen Gewebe
hervorschimmerten.
Dabei hatte sie ganz vergessen, daß sie noch immer die
Visitenkarte zwischen den Fingern hielt. Ja .... richtig ... wer war
denn das gewesen? Sie las den Namen und hörte gleichzeitig
Läuten von draußen hereinschallen.
Alwin! ...
„Alwin ... mein guter, lieber Alwin ...“
Alwin Maurer blinzelte sie aus seinen tiefliegenden Augen
verwirrt und sprachlos an.
„Du, Karla ... du ...“
„Ja, wer denn, Alwin ... bin ich so alt geworden, daß du mich
nicht erkennst? ...“
‚So schön ...‘ hätte er beinahe geantwortet. Aber er schwieg noch
immer, starrte sie nur an und merkte es kaum, wie sie ihn hereinzog.
„So zieh’ dich doch aus, Alwin ... Nein, wie bist du nur auf den
herrlichen Gedanken gekommen .... Wie ... wo kommst du her ...
geradeswegs aus Berlin? ....“
„Ja ... das heißt, nein ... aus Karlsbad ... vielmehr aus Bayreuth
.... aber du warst schon fort, und da ....“
Jetzt stand er in ihrem Zimmer, in dem weichen warmen Licht der
ockerfarbigen Seidenschirme, im betäubenden Duft der Rosen.
„So wohnst du ... so ...?“
An den Wänden hingen Bilder, von schmalen Goldleisten
gerahmt, zwei hohe, schlank gebaute Schränke zeigten ihren
reichen Inhalt an Noten und Büchern in einfachen Lederbänden.
Über dem Schreibtisch mit einem großen Bild von Schmerzchen in
silbernem Rahmen hing die Radierung des Beethovenkopfes. Auf
dem Flügel, der aus der Ecke des großen Zimmers schräg
hereinragte, standen zwischen zwei großen, blumengefüllten
Schalen Bilder in Rahmen, die eine geschlossene Krone zierte, und
mit kurzen, verschnörkelten Unterschriften.
Keine Kränze. Keine Schleifen. Nur einzelne kostbare
Gegenstände.
Er sah sie an, in ihrer voll erblühten Frauenschönheit, mit ihrem
alten Kinderlächeln um die roten Lippen. Und er vergaß alles, was er
hatte sagen, alles, womit er zerrissene Fäden wieder hatte
zusammenknüpfen wollen.
Eine große Traurigkeit befiel ihn, ein trostloses Fremdgefühl. Als
wäre sein Körper zu grob und schwer für diesen Raum.
„Stör’ ich dich auch nicht, Karla — nein? Sag’s mir ruhig ... ich
kann gut morgen wiederkommen, zu einer gelegeneren Zeit ...“
Hundetreu blickten seine Augen sie an, bereit, sofort sich zu
entfernen, wenn sie ihn fortschickte, und doch voll Bangen, sie
könnte es tun.
„Was fällt dir denn ein, Alwin ...? Ich bin ja froh, daß du da bist ...
so froh ...“
Und während sie seine Hand drückte, ihm ins Gesicht sah, das
grau war und abgemagert, da mischte sich in ihre Freude tiefe
Bekümmernis.
Gleichzeitig aber, so seltsam es sein mochte, auch die Hoffnung,
daß ihr in ihm, der ihr so treu ergeben war, der Helfer gekommen
war für ihr Vorhaben, das allein zu vollbringen ihr bis jetzt die Kraft
gefehlt hatte. Ihr lachendes Gesicht wurde plötzlich und ohne daß es
ihr bewußt war, ernst.
„Erzähle mir, wie es dir gegangen ist, Karla .... Denke — all die
Zeit ohne dich ... und so wenig, woran man sich halten kann.
Zeitungsnachrichten zumeist ...“
Sie fühlte in diesem Augenblick, daß auch das, was er zu hören
begehrte, bereits der Vergangenheit angehörte, daß sie selbst kaum
mehr darüber zu sagen vermochte, als was die Öffentlichkeit
berichtet hatte.
Das Mädchen kam herein und fragte, ob sie ein zweites Gedeck
auflegen sollte.
Alwin Maurer erhob sich. Er wollte nicht stören: „Nein.
Keinesfalls.“
Sie mußte Gewalt anwenden. Sie hielt seinen Hut hinter ihrem
Rücken versteckt. „Ich bin böse, wenn du gehst ....“ Und sie sah ihm
an, daß es ihm eine Erleichterung war, bleiben zu dürfen. Er nahm
ihre Hand.
„Du darfst nicht böse sein ... mußt immer daran denken, daß
unsereins dich anders sieht. Was kennt meine Philisterweisheit vom
Leben einer Künstlerin? Es mag gewiß anders in Wirklichkeit
aussehen, als die Phantasie es uns vorspiegelt.“
Und Karla dachte mit Wehmut daran, wie fremd sie ihm wohl
geworden war, daß er sich so gar keinen Begriff mehr von der
Wirklichkeit machte.
Sie nahm seinen Arm, ging mit ihm in ihr kleines Speisezimmer
und sagte:
„Die Abende, an denen ich hier ganz allein vor meinen Tellern
sitze, sind häufiger als die anderen. Viel häufiger! Und wenn mir’s
dann zu einsam wird, stelle ich oft Schmerzchens Bild vor mir auf
oder ...“
Sie brach ab.
„Hier, Alwin ... mir gegenüber. Es tut wohl, ein lebendiges, liebes
Gesicht an seinem Tisch zu sehen ...“
Karla ließ Wein aufstellen. Nach dem zweiten Glase fragte sie:
„Und wie geht es deinen ... wie geht es in Berlin?“
Er antwortete:
„Durch deinen ... Durch Ernst wirst du wohl das meiste
wissen — —“
Sagte es, obwohl er wußte, daß die Briefe selten waren, die hin
und her gingen. Sie nickte, spielte mit dem Messerbänkchen.
„Ja ... es scheint dort alles beim alten zu sein ...“
„So weit. Man wird nicht jünger.“
Nein — das hatte er nicht sagen wollen. Das war ganz verkehrt.
Aber je länger er Karla ansah, desto mehr fühlte er die Last der
freudlosen Jahre auf seinem Rücken. Dem Schwager konnte es
nicht gut anders gehen. Wie durfte er nur hoffen ... was mochte er
denn erwarten ...? Er nahm sich zusammen.
„Die Kinder ... bleiben die größte Freude.“
Und ein zweites Mal biß er sich auf die Lippe.
„Ja ...“, murmelte Karla und legte auf.
Angst packte sie — es könnte zu schnell das Wichtige gesagt, zu
schnell der letzte Schleier reißen. Sie lenkte ab und fragte nach
Vicki.
„Ein gutes Kind, gewiß — ein Juwel für ihren Mann. Aber ihr
Leben führt andere Wege.“ Da gab’s nur selten ein Treffen. Wenn
auch der Wille nicht fehlte, so doch die Möglichkeit ... Der Mann vor
allen — das mußte ja auch so sein! Nun, er durfte sich nicht
beklagen — da war ja noch Fritz, der Stolz seines Alters, ein
Prachtjunge! Seine ganze Freude war der Bengel!
„Da sitzen wir so in irgendeinem verräucherten Winkel, eine
Flasche Mosel zwischen uns oder zwei — und dann geht’s ans
Erzählen. Was ich hatte werden wollen und was ich wurde, sage ich
dann ... und von der Zeit, da Du zuerst ins Haus kamst, erzähle ich
... dann vertraut er mir an, daß er in dich verschossen war — und wir
sprechen von deiner Stimme, von deinen Erfolgen. Über diese
Stunden mit dem Jungen geht mir eben nichts. Auf die freue ich
mich lange Wochen vorher, die entschädigen mich für so manches
... so manches recht schwer entbehrte ...“
Karla beugte den Kopf tiefer auf das Tischtuch herab. „Sage mal,
Alwin ... kommt er denn auch aus mit dem, was ihm Ernst gibt? ...
Ernst ist so starr in seinen Ansichten, er versteht vielleicht nicht ...“
Ein fahles Rot huschte über Alwin Maurers Wangen, und er
machte eine heftig abwehrende Bewegung.
„Er hat genug ... mehr als genug ... überreichlich.“
Das fehlte gerade noch, daß sie ihm Geld anbot für Fritz ... das
wäre was!
„Bitte ... laß das ... ein für allemal ... laß das ... Ich wollte dich
sogar bitten ... Ernst kein Geld mehr für Fritz zu schicken ... ja! Ich
verdiene genügend — mehr, viel mehr, als wir verbrauchen können.
Die Zulage wird er fortab von mir bekommen. Ich bitte dich, Karla, ...
nicht mehr darauf zurückkommen ... keinesfalls. Du hast so viel
getan ... immerfort getan ... für alle gesorgt ... für alle anderen zuerst
... jetzt laß es genug sein! Jetzt denk’ an dich ... nur an dich! ...“
Er stand auf, ergriff ihre beiden Hände.
„Denk’ an dich, Karla ...“
Ein kurzer, schriller Klingelzug — gleich darauf trat das Mädchen
ein.
„Ein Telegramm, gnä’ Frau.“
Heiß stieg Karla das Blut zu Kopf.
„Doch nichts Böses?“
Alwin Maurer konnte sich schwer andere Depeschen vorstellen.
„Nein, Alwin ... nichts Böses ... nur Gutes, nur Glückliches.“
Ihre Augen strahlten, ihre Finger rissen hastig das Siegel auf. Sie
stutzte — das Blut lief ihr aus den Wangen. Sie las einmal, zweimal.
„Also doch Böses, Karla?“ ...
Ängstlich blickten seine Augen sie an. Sie faßte sich, faltete das
Blatt zusammen, schob es unter ihren Teller.
„Nein ... nichts von Bedeutung.“
Die Worte fielen trocken und kurz von ihren Lippen, aber sie
reichte ihm die Kristallschüssel mit roten Johannisbeeren, den
Streuzucker, lächelte mühsam, schien etwas zu überlegen.
„Du sagtest vorhin, Alwin, ich sollte an mich denken?“
„Ja, Karla, ... das sollst du.“
„Und willst du mir einen Dienst leisten, Alwin? Einen großen
Freundschaftsdienst?“
Alwin Maurer schob den Teller zurück, beugte sich über den
Tisch.
Sie atmete schwer und reichte ihm die Hand über den Tisch.
„Du weißt, Karla, daß du in allem über mich verfügen darfst — in
allem und jedem.“
„Ich danke dir, Alwin. Und wenn es so ist — dann fahre morgen
... morgen früh zurück nach Berlin und sage Ernst ... sage ihm, daß
ich nicht mehr zurückkomme.“
Die Erregung hatte ihr den Mut gegeben. Alwin mußte fort, mußte
abreisen. Und da es heute zu spät war — morgen mit dem Frühzug.
Er durfte den Sohn nicht treffen — seinen Fritz, der von Mutter und
Schwester geschickt wurde zu ihr — damit sie ihn aus „einer
verzweifelten Lage errette“. Sie wollte ihm sein einziges Glück
erhalten — seine einzige Freude ... Das war sie ihm schuldig ...
Schuldig auch, daß er es nie erfuhr, daß ihn nicht eine neue Last, ein
drückendes Schamgefühl noch tiefer beugte, als es das Leben
schon ohnehin getan.
Alwin Maurer aber wiederholte:
„Du kommst nicht mehr zurück ... nie mehr?“
Und obwohl er es längst geahnt, obwohl er es nicht einmal
anders für sie gewünscht, so legte sich doch fahle Blässe auf seine
Wangen.
„Ja ... Karla ... ja, gewiß ... ich kann’s verstehn ... und bedacht
wirst du es haben ...“
Er sprang vom Stuhl auf, suchte nach seinem großen weißen
Taschentuch in der Hintertasche seines Rockes.
„Nicht, Alwin ... nicht!“
Karla legte ihren Arm um Alwin Maurers Schulter. Auch sie war
blaß, und ihre Lippen zuckten.
„Mach mir’s nicht schwer ... nicht schwerer als nötig. ... Gewiß
hab’ ich’s bedacht ... nicht seit heute und nicht seit gestern ... zwei
volle Jahre habe ich gewartet, und nur der Mut hat mir gefehlt ... der
Mut, es zu sagen ...“
Alwin Maurer legte seine Hände um Karlas Wangen. Wie ein
Vater, der seinem Mädel eine Beichte abnimmt.
„Ich kenne dich, Karla .... Du bist keine, die allein durchs Leben
geht, die einsam bleiben kann — ohne Mann, ohne Kind ...“
Sie sah ihn an, offen, vertrauend.
„Ich bleibe nicht allein“, sagte sie leise.
Er strich ihr über die Wange, behutsam, scheu und zärtlich.
„Gaudlitz?“ fragte er leise.
„Ja.“ ...
Sie hob bittend die Hände.
„Sag’s ihm nicht — nicht gleich .... Dir mag’s ja eine Beruhigung
sein — ihm ...“
„Ihm auch“, sagte Alwin Maurer ernst. „Er liebt dich doch mehr,
als du glaubst.“
Da fiel ihr Kopf auf seine Schulter, und ihre Tränen tropften heiß
und schwer auf seinen schwarzen Rock.
„Und was wird dann aus deiner Kunst, Karla?“
Sie hob den Kopf, und ein Lächeln flog über ihr tränenfeuchtes
Gesicht.
„Die wiege ich in den Schlaf Alwin — wie die Kinder, die mir Gott
bescheren wird.“
Und Alwin Maurer fühlte es deutlich, daß, so lieb sie auch ihr
Schmerzchen hatte, so tief ihre Sehnsucht war, die Allmacht der
Natur einen Trost für sie bereit hielt, der den Verlust des einen
Kindes aufzuwiegen vermochte.
„Du kannst auf mich zählen, Karla .... Gleich nach meiner Ankunft
spreche ich mit Ernst.“
Er drückte ihre Hand. Ihre Augen sagten ihm Dank.
„Was immer geschieht, Alwin — wir bleiben die alten ... willst
du?“
Da drückte er in einer letzten, starken Bewegung ihre Hand an
seine Lippen. „Leb’ wohl, Karla ...“
Sie lächelte ihm noch zu über die Rampe der Treppe. „Vergiß
nicht, Alwin — daß du mir immer über Schmerzchen Nachricht
geben mußt!“
Er nickte noch einmal zu ihr herauf und dachte, wie wunderlich
die Frauen doch waren. Schlugen ein Leben entzwei und konnten
lächelnd mit den Scherben spielen! Wie weit war Karla doch schon
entfernt von ihnen allen ... ja selbst von ihrem — ersten Kind! — —
— — — — Ganz zeitig wachte Karla am nächsten Morgen auf.
Ihr war, als hätte sie schon alles getan, was von ihr abhing, als hätte
sie sich ihr Glück schon verdient durch die Aussprache mit Alwin
Maurer. Als wäre eine große, schwere Last ihr vom Herzen
genommen worden. Es waren ein paar Briefe zu durchfliegen,
während Resi den Tee auf das Tischchen am Fenster stellte und die
Semmeln mit Butter bestrich. Eine Einladung nach Reichenau — ein
paar Zeitungsausschnitte, die Bitte eines Photographen um eine
Sitzung — und dann ... der dickste von allen Briefen, schwer wie ein
Stein .... Die Schrift kannte sie doch, ... die hatte sie doch oft
gesehen ... wo denn nur? ... In ... in Kiel, ja ... und in Amerika ....
Altmann hatte Briefe erhalten, die diese Schrift trugen .... Adele! ...
Richtig! Das betraf Fritz! Karla las:
„Liebe Karla! So peinlich es mir ist, aber ich muß Dich
herzlich bitten, mir in einer Angelegenheit zu helfen, da Dein
Mann sich leider so zu Fritz gestellt hat, daß es ihm
unmöglich ist, sich an ihn zu wenden. Aber da ja schließlich
Du es warst, die ihm zu seiner Laufbahn verhalf, so bist auch
Du die Nächste. Mir zittern noch die Glieder, wenn ich an das
Entsetzliche denke, das ich erlebte. Du mußt wissen, liebe
Karla, daß es einem jungen Offizier, der in der Nähe Berlins
steht, einfach unmöglich ist, mit der kleinen Zulage
auszukommen, die Dein Mann für Fritz ausgeworfen hat. Ich
brauche Dir wohl nicht zu sagen, daß wir unser Möglichstes
getan haben, Fritz zu unterstützen. Aber leider hat der arme,
dumme Junge immer nur einen Teil seiner Schulden
gebeichtet und ist so immer tiefer ins Verderben geraten. Vor
drei Tagen kam er in heller Verzweiflung zu Völkels, um sich
von Bodo Hilfe zu holen. Aber Bodo war verreist und, wie
Vicki ihm sagte, augenblicklich selbst nicht bei Kasse. Er
sagte, das machte nichts, und ging fort. Aber Vicki war sein
verstörtes Gesicht aufgefallen. Und sie setzte sich noch an
demselben Nachmittag auf und fuhr nach Küstrin. Er wohnt
dort in der Kaserne, und Vicki suchte ihn auf seinem Zimmer.
Aber sie traf ihn nicht an. Der Bursche sagte, er wäre seit
frühem Morgen auf Urlaub und wollte erst abends
wiederkommen. Vicki schlug die Mappe auf Fritzens
Schreibtisch auf, um ihm ein paar Zeilen zu hinterlassen. Da
findet sie einen Brief von ihm, der an mich adressiert war. Sie
öffnete den Brief und erfährt aus ihm alles.
Fritz ist in Wuchererhände geraten. Um seine erst kleinen
Schulden zu decken, hat er geborgt, wieder geborgt, Wechsel
unterschrieben — an fünftausend Mark werden es sein! Wenn
er keine Deckung findet, müsse er sich das Leben nehmen!
Ich hatte das so oft in Romanen gelesen. Ich hatte immer
dabei gedacht: Soll sich der Lump nur erschießen — er
verdient keine Träne. Aber jetzt ... da es mich trifft — meinen
Jungen ... Alwins Stolz und Freude ... da ... Liebe Karla, Du
kannst Dir denken, was da in mir vorging!
Nur so viel noch: Vicki spazierte zwei Stunden vor dem
Tor der Kaserne auf und ab, bis die Füße sie kaum noch
tragen konnten. Endlich kam er. Ganz blaß und entstellt —
gewiß schon zum Letzten, zum Äußersten entschlossen. Sie
sagte ihm: ‚Ich habe deinen Brief an Mutter gelesen. Du bist
ein schlechter Kerl. Aber das Leben brauchst du dir nicht zu
nehmen. Die Deckung ist da.‘ Da soll er losgeweint haben wie
ein kleiner Junge, soll ihr die Hände geküßt haben. Er hat sie
dann zur Bahn gebracht, und gestern früh traf er mit Vicki bei
mir zusammen. Die arme Vicki war ganz fassungslos.
Deckung — woher? Sie hatte nur Zeit gewinnen wollen.
Diesmal weinte Fritz nicht. Er ließ mich reden und Vicki reden
und machte ein Gesicht dazu, daß wir genau wußten — er
ließ nicht ab von dem, was er beschlossen hatte zu tun. Vicki
klingelte Deinen Mann an. Ein glattes Nein! Er hätte nichts.
Was auf Isoldens Namen eingezahlt sei, könnte er nicht
abheben. Wenn der Junge geschaßt würde, dann geschähe
es ihm recht ... Oh, er fand so harte Worte ... so schrecklich
harte Worte ... Luise kam angelaufen, mit Isolde, die sie von
der Schule abgeholt hatte. Und in der Aufregung wurde alles
vor dem Kinde wieder durchgesprochen.
Und wie ich schließlich fast zusammenbrach und
aufschrie: Ja, wo nehme ich denn nur das Geld her ... wer
gibt es mir nur? da kam Isoldchen auf mich zu und sagte mit
ihrem feinen Stimmchen: ‚Schreibe doch nach Wien an die
Mama. Mama schickt immer Geld.‘ — — So war es, wie ich
es Dir hier schreibe! Und Luise und ich, wir dachten, daß ein
Engel durch das Kind zu uns gesprochen hätte, und da
sagten wir Fritz, daß eigentlich Du es gewesen bist, die für
ihn bis jetzt gesorgt hat. Und daß Du ihn nicht zugrunde
gehen lassen würdest, wenn er zu Dir käme und Dich bäte ...
Wir sagten das alles! Verzeih, liebe Karla, wenn ich mein
Versprechen nicht gehalten habe, das ich Deinem Mann
gegeben ... aber Dein Mann weiß eben nicht, wie eine Mutter
leiden kann um ihr Kind. Luise aber sagte mir, daß Du so viel
Geld verdienst ... so schrecklich viel Geld ... und wir wissen,
daß Du gut bist und uns nicht im Stiche läßt. Es sind im
ganzen — mit den fünftausend Mark auf den Wechsel —
vielleicht siebentausend. Nicht ein Pfennig mehr! Fritz hat
sein Ehrenwort gegeben. Er hat auch noch etwas anderes
gesagt, aber das will ich nicht glauben. Darüber würde er zu
unglücklich sein — an dieses Wort dürfen wir ihn nicht binden
... Er wird nun um Urlaub bitten und um Erlaubnis, nach Wien
zu fahren auf vierundzwanzig Stunden. O könnte er doch gute
Nachricht bringen, daß nur mein armer, guter Mann nichts
davon erfährt! Es wäre ein so furchtbarer Schlag für ihn ... er
darf es nicht erfahren. Nie! Hab’ Dank für alles, was Du Gutes
getan und jetzt noch tun wirst. Luise und meine liebe Vicki
bitten mit mir.
Deine alte unglückliche Adele.
Nachschrift: Wenn es Dir schwer fallen sollte, ihm zu
helfen — denk an Dein Schmerzchen, die uns den Gedanken
an Dich gab und der nichts unmöglich scheint bei Dir.
A. M.“
Es war ein bittres Lächeln, das Karlas Lippen herunterzog, als sie
den Brief aus der Hand legte. Solche Briefe mochte Adele an ihren
Bruder geschrieben haben, so mochte sie ihn eingekreist haben mit
allem, was das Arsenal weiblicher Schlauheit und weiblichen
Gemütes hergab.
Siebentausend Mark .... Es war eine Summe auch für sie. Der
vierte Teil von dem, was sie sich erspart hatte. Ihr Taschengeld
wenigstens wollte sie in die neue Ehe einbringen, wenn sie alles
abzog, was sie noch anzuschaffen, nach Berlin abzuführen hatte ....
Dieser abscheuliche, nichtsnutzige Bengel!
Es war mittlerweile elf Uhr geworden, und sie hatte kaum Zeit
gefunden, die ersten Tonleitern zu singen, als es läutete, und das
Mädchen Herrn Leutnant Maurer meldete.
„Bitte ...“
Aber er stand schon da — mit einem großen Rosenstrauß in der
Hand, der Strolch — —
„Die Blumen hättest du dir schenken können unter den
Umständen“, sagte sie als Begrüßung.
Er stotterte.
„Verzeihung ... aber ... Donnerwetter ja ...“
Bildhübsch sah er aus in seinem dunklen, flott geschnittenen
Zivilanzug.
Fatale Situation war das ... Eine Tante anpumpen — machten
alle. Waren dazu da, die Erbtanten. Aber — das war ja keine „Tante“
... das war eine entzückende, junge, berauschende Person, eine ...
Nein, wie hatten ihn nur die Weiber zu Hause rumgekriegt.
Hundertmal lieber ein Kugel, als vor dem Weib dastehn wie ’n
dummer Junge, sich seine Schulden von ihr bezahlen lassen und
nicht mal ’n paar Rosen bringen dürfen ....!
Er streckte sich. Immer wieder flackerte ein junges, helles Rot auf
seiner Stirn auf.

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Perceiving Things Divine Towards A Constructive Account of Spiritual Perception Frederick D Aquino Editor All Chapter

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Perceiving Things Divine: Towards a

Constructive Account of Spiritual

Perceiving Things Divine

In memoriam William J. Abraham (1947–2021): Requiem aeternam

Although he is concerned with a somewhat unusual state of affairs, Goldie’s

Theology’ panel at the annual Patristic, Medieval, and Renaissance Conference at

1. The Possibility of Spiritual Perception: Objections and Replies 3

7. Scripture as Signpost: A Perceptual Paradigm of Biblical

10. Spiritual Perception and the Racist Gaze: Can Contemplation

Afterword: The Spiritual Senses and Human Embodiment 229

William J. Abraham (1947–2021) was Emeritus Outler Professor of Wesley Studies at

Frederick D. Aquino is Professor of Theology and Philosophy at the Graduate School of

Douglas E. Christie is Professor of Theological Studies at Loyola Marymount University in

Sarah Coakley FBA is the Norris-­Hulse Professor Emerita, University of Cambridge,

Boyd Taylor Coolman is Professor of Theology at Boston College. He has authored:

John Cottingham is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of Reading, and an

Mark McInroy is Associate Professor of Theology at the University of St Thomas. He is the

Paul K. Moser is Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University Chicago. He is the author of

Catherine Pickstock is Norris-­Hulse Professor of Divinity at the University of Cambridge.

Mark K. Spencer is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of St Thomas in

Sameer Yadav is a systematic and philosophical theologian and Associate Professor of

Perceiving Things Divine seeks to make philosophical and theological sense of

Along with reason, memory, and testimony, perception is indispensable for

4 Other examples of unique perceptual powers, usually classified as ‘extrasensory perception’

Frederick D. Aquino and Paul L. Gavrilyuk xxi

­ erceptual experience is distinguishable from conception. As William Alston

Psychological studies paint a very different picture of perception . . . Interpretation,

So, the movement from ‘mere sensation’ to ‘representation’ in Davis’s terms

Spiritual Perception: A New Interdisciplinary Field

The study of spiritual perception is a new interdisciplinary field of research, which

11 Audi, Moral Perception, 35.

Frederick D. Aquino and Paul L. Gavrilyuk xxiii

epistemological, phenomenological, moral, aesthetic, and theological issues ­relevant

perceiving spiritually. In Christian practice, the objects of spiritual perception

Frederick D. Aquino and Paul L. Gavrilyuk xxv

influence of demonic deception on different aspects of human self, including

and epistemology. A phenomenology of spiritual perception can stand on its own

Frederick D. Aquino and Paul L. Gavrilyuk xxvii

Future Work on Spiritual Perception

This volume does not seek to provide a comprehensive account of spiritual

4 The Possibility of Spiritual Perception

What We Know about Perception in General

6 The Possibility of Spiritual Perception

Does Perception Involve Inference or Reasoning?

Is Perception Cognitively Penetrated?

There is a hotly debated issue in the contemporary literature regarding whether

8 The Possibility of Spiritual Perception

8 There are real controversies over other kinds of attentional phenomena.

10 The Possibility of Spiritual Perception

9 For discussions of attentional direction in religious experience, see chapters 2 and 3 in

12 The Possibility of Spiritual Perception

What is the Proper Object of Perception?

Positions on which properties are represented in experience can be located on a

Siegel is here concerned with which properties are represented in perceptual

According to theories on which visual experience represents only very low-­level

A Model for Moral and Spiritual Perception

So far we have seen that perception should not be understood as involving an

14 The Possibility of Spiritual Perception

15 A. K. Shah and D. M. Oppenheimer, ‘Heuristics Made Easy: An Effort-­reduction Framework’,

If we think of heuristics very broadly, and in terms of ‘reducing the effort

They distinguish between two kinds of schema: event-­schemas, or ‘scripts’, and

16 The Possibility of Spiritual Perception

The application to perception is straightforward. When we are seated at the

1. The Possibility of Spiritual Perception: Objections and Replies 3

Afterword: The Spiritual Senses and Human Embodiment 229

Sarah Coakley FBA is the Norris-Hulse Professor Emerita, University of Cambridge,

Catherine Pickstock is Norris-Hulse Professor of Divinity at the University of Cambridge.

erceptual experience is distinguishable from conception. As William Alston

epistemological, phenomenological, moral, aesthetic, and theological issues relevant

According to theories on which visual experience represents only very low-level

15 A. K. Shah and D. M. Oppenheimer, ‘Heuristics Made Easy: An Effort-reduction Framework’,

They distinguish between two kinds of schema: event-schemas, or ‘scripts’, and