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Hiding in Plain Sight: Deceptive Tactics
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1st ed. 2020 Edition James F. Kenny
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Hiding in Plain Sight:
Deceptive Tactics and
the Criminal Victimization
Process
James F. Kenny
Hiding in Plain Sight
James F. Kenny
Hiding in Plain Sight

Deceptive Tactics and the Criminal
Victimization Process
James F. Kenny
Fairleigh Dickinson University
Teaneck, NJ, USA
ISBN 978-3-030-26866-4 ISBN 978-3-030-26867-1 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26867-1
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2020

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval,
electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now
known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the
publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to
the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The
publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and
institutional affiliations.
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
To my beloved children Jackie and Sean for all their support, and my wife
Cathy, who provided outstanding comments and editing assistance.
Who would have ever guessed that a wife would be so good
at correcting her husband!
Contents
1 Stronger Than We Think: More Capable Than We Know 1
2 The Art of Identifying Deception 15
3 Deception and the Process Toward Criminal

Victimization 33
4 Lurking in the Shadows: Stranger Danger and Target

Selection 45
5 “Getting to Know You”: Confirming Target Suitability 59
6 Choosing Familiar Targets: The Devils You Wish You Did

Not Know 71
7 Enticing the Target: Tactics That Fabricate Trust and

Reduce Suspicion 87
8 Developing a Smoke Screen: Tactics That Disguise

Criminal Advances 99
9 Preparing for the Attack: Tactics That Establish Control111
vii
viii CONTENTS
10 Removing the Blindfold: Recognizing Deceptive and

Dangerous Advances125
11 Stopping the Process from Beginning: Avoid Becoming a

Target141
12 Reestablishing the Balance of Power: Responding to

Deceptive and Aggressive Tactics157
13 Bystander Intervention: Helping Friends Recognize and

Address Deceptive Advances173
Index189
About the Author
James F. Kenny received his Ph.D. in Criminal Justice from Rutgers

University. He is a recipient of the Distinguished Faculty and Outstanding
Teaching Awards, has chaired the Threat Assessment Team, and serves as
Graduate and Internship Coordinator with the School of Criminal Justice,
Political Science, and International Studies at FDU. He is retired from the
U.S. Treasury Dept. with management experience as Chief of Advisory,
Chief of Review, Director’s Post of Duty Rep., District Quality Officer,
Training Group Manager, and Supervisory US Treasury Officer. He has
facilitated professional seminars in School/Workplace Violence, Bullying,
Anger Management, Threat Assessment, Stalking, and Partner Abuse for
Federal/State/Local Agencies, Universities/Schools (High/Middle/
Elementary), Victims Advocacy Groups, Mental Health Associations, and
private security companies. He was selected to serve on crime prevention
workgroups/panels for the Center for Peace and Violence Prevention, the
U.S. Justice Dept., National Victim Center, NJ Superior Court, and United
Educators Association.
ix
List of Figures
Fig. 1.1 The criminal event 2

Fig. 2.1 The art of identifying deception 16
Fig. 3.1 The process to criminal victimization 34
xi
List of Tables
Table 1.1 Taking Inventory of risk reduction capabilities 7

Table 9.1 NCVS stalking behaviors 114
Table 10.1 Behaviors to report to authorities and organizational officials 133
xiii
CHAPTER 1
Stronger Than We Think: More Capable

Than We Know
Introduction
Criminal victimization has been widely described by the actions and moti-
vations of the offender in committing the crime. This limited understand-
ing can lead to many viewing criminal victimization as random, senseless,
and unmanageable events where targets have very little input and control.
While the criminal is a key player in the criminal event, the targets, third
parties, the situation, and the physical setting play significant roles in influ-
encing the criminal’s decision to proceed with the attack. Criminals have
many advantages including the use of deception, but they are far from
invincible. Many targets possess considerable abilities and resources to
manage or prevent criminal victimization. In addition, many individuals
and professional guardians are willing to help them and are capable of
doing so (Fig. 1.1).
Reframing the Criminal Victimization Event

Many people have difficulty understanding criminal victimization when
they focus on how it was committed rather than how it developed. This
book will approach criminal victimization as the final event in a dynamic,
interactive, and progressively dangerous process. Recognizing and
responding proactively and effectively early in the process can discourage
further aggression. This is especially true if the offenders are not convinced
of their ability to be successful or is not fully committed to initiate acts of
© The Author(s) 2020 1

J. F. Kenny, Hiding in Plain Sight,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26867-1_1
2 J. F. KENNY
Offender Target
Crime
Victimization
Third Parties Location/Situation
Fig. 1.1 The criminal event
criminal victimization. At the minimum, early recognition of criminal

advances provides the target the time and opportunity to escape, secure
help, or set up a defense before inappropriate and strange behaviors esca-
late to dangerous ones. Targets, bystanders, guardians, and physical and
situational factors can influence the aggressors’ actions. While acts of
extreme violence are difficult to stop at the point of attack, the troubling
and deceitful behaviors that precede them are largely correctable and min-
imally volatile.
Criminals and aggressive individuals usually do not attack suddenly
without warning (ASIS International, 2005; Borum, Fein, Vossekuil, &
Berglund, 1999; National Threat Assessment Center, 2018). Criminal vic-
timization is often the culmination of a series of conflicts, disputes, and
problems. While it is the final event in the victimization process, there are
usually increasingly threatening actions that precede it. The target and the
offender would have usually had some prior association before the attack.
This interaction is largely responsible for setting the processes in motion.
Before criminals attack, they typically plan and prepare for it. This may
involve specific actions such as approaching the target, utilizing deception,
securing weapons, or visiting the intended place of attack. Targeted acts of
violence often evolve from less volatile actions such as insults, intimida-
tions, harassment, property destruction, minor assaults, or bullying.
Target selection rarely occurs due to chance, but rather involves specific
types of people. For example, a joint U.S. Secret Service, Department of
1 STRONGER THAN WE THINK: MORE CAPABLE THAN WE KNOW 3
Education, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) report on targeted

violence on college campuses found that in nearly three-quarters of the
incidents, the subjects targeted one or more specific individuals (Drysdale,
Modzeleski, & Simons, 2010). Some play an active and some a passive
role in contributing to the attack. They may initiate physical assaults,
insults, or harassment that can lead to violent responses. Others are
attacked because they are accessible, vulnerable, or provide perceived
rewards. Certain individuals are more likely to be selected because of life-
style choices that put them into contact with dangerous people. These
lifestyle choices place them in situations that compromise their ability to
protect themselves. They may fail to take steps to deter, limit access, or
become hardened targets.
Criminal victimization has often been discussed in terms of an event
occurring solely between the victim and the offender, but third parties can
serve to deter the actions of the offender. A U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistic
Report noted that third parties are involved in two-thirds of all violent
victimizations (Planty, 2002). This report demonstrated that third parties
are more likely to help the target by preventing injury, scaring the offender
off, or assisting in their escape. In forty-four percent of the situations, the
third party contacted the police. Sometimes the mere presence of the third
party as a witness to the event can cause the aggressor to withdraw.
Additionally, third parties can engage in certain actions that contribute
to an agitated person becoming violent. They may ignore, insult, or disre-
spect that person. At other times, they may not initiate the insult that
causes the person pain, but they may laugh at it. They may look the other
way rather than reporting strange and threatening behaviors. Luckenbill
(1977) in his study of homicide discussed the role of third parties in a
series of transactions between the parties leading up to the attack. Third
parties may encourage the offender to interpret a remark as offensive and
suggest an aggressive response. They may even supply the weapon used in
the homicide.
Crime victimization is usually a social event and not just the product of
personal interactions. Criminals will choose opportunistic locations and
situations that help to facilitate committing the crime. They will evaluate
a potential crime site for natural guardians, accessibility, rewards, detec-
tion, and escape routes. A National Institute of Justice report discussed
criminal preferences in terms of housing design, block layout, land use,
territorial features, and physical deterioration (Taylor & Harrell, 1996).
Criminals prefer locations with available targets, minimal barriers, and the
4 J. F. KENNY
lack of physical obstacles for committing crimes. They pay careful atten-
tion to observing walkways, paths, traffic patterns, and hours of operation
of public buildings and businesses. They look for blocks that lack vigilant
residents. Physical deterioration, vacancy, and vandalism of buildings and
public areas may signal vulnerability and lack of commitment to joint pro-
tective activities such as neighborhood watch groups.
Dismissing the Illusion of Criminal Invincibility

Criminals have many advantages during the victimization process. They
get to choose their targets, place, time, and method of attack. Aggressors
will survey the environment for those who are controllable, accessible, and
appear to possess social, physical, and mental disadvantages. They will
often take advantage of situations that enable them to observe, plan, and
prepare well before the attack. Many have experience with deceptive tech-
niques, the use of violence, and the weapons to assist them during the
attack. Despite all these advantages, criminals might make mistakes, “leak”
their intentions, and be deterred by actions and situational factors that
limit their advantages. Third parties may observe suspicious behaviors and
report them to authorities. Law enforcement will detect criminal activities
through surveillance, patrols, or investigations.
Some criminals are proficient in using deception to disguise, confuse,
distract, and control their targets. These strategies reduce the chance of
targeted individuals retreating, setting up defenses, or seeking help. In
addition, the use of deception can help keep the target paralyzed and
unaware that they are in a battle until they are well on their way to losing
it. Aggressors may accidently or purposely “leak” information concerning
their intentions (O’Toole & Bowman, 2012). They may inadvertently
reveal their true intentions through specific actions, facial expressions,
voice tone, or specific language. The FBI’s Critical Incident Response
Group (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2000) noted that school shooters
may “leak” clues through subtle threats, boasts, innuendos, predictions,
or ultimatums. These are conveyed in written documents and videos, or
communicated verbally to third parties. Initially, the leakage can be a cry
for help to resolve some inner conflict or problem.
Criminals need a number of things to go right to be successful, but
often make mistakes that cause them to be discovered, stopped, or cap-
tured. Theodore Kaczynski was so confident that he could evade capture
that he unwittingly provided the essential clue that led to his arrest.
Kaczynski was described as a twisted genius who built untraceable bombs

and delivered them to seemingly random targets (Federal Bureau of
Investigation, n.d.). He left false leads and was able to evade authorities
for over seventeen years. During that time, he mailed or hand-delivered a
series of sophisticated bombs that killed three American citizens and
injured twenty-four more. An FBI-led task force that included the Bureau
of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, and
over 150 full-time investigators was unable to solve the case because
Kaczynski left no forensic evidence, building his bombs from scrap materi-
als. Kaczynski provided authorities with the critical lead when he sent a
manifesto explaining his motives and views of the ills of modern society.
After the manifesto appeared in The Washington Post and the New York
Times, Kaczynski’s brother, David, identified him as the writer. David pro-
duced additional letters and documents and the FBI was able to confirm
that the author of those documents and the manifesto was the same person.
Mass shooting and acts of terrorism are stopped far more often than
they are successful. Bomb components can be found, informants may
come forward, and intelligence agencies can intercept messages between
terrorist cells. Intelligence agencies uncovered a plot to kill former
President George H. W. Bush during a planned visit to Kuwait after he
had left office. Kuwaiti authorities found a car bomb in a Toyota Land
Cruiser that was to transport Bush in the planned visit. CIA bomb techni-
cians compared the explosives to two known Iraqi explosive devices to
determine whether the Iraqi Intelligence Service was behind the attack
(US Department of Justice, 1997).
Assassins have limited opportunities to succeed, and they rarely have the
opportunity to practice. If they were to plant a bomb, they would have to
deliver it out of view of witnesses, video cameras, security personnel, and
the police. In their analysis of assassinations in the United States, Fein and
Vossekuil (1999) wrote “few attackers or near-lethal approachers possessed
the cunning or the bravado of assassins in popular movies or novels” (p. 333).
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (2018) has devel-
oped several proactive strategies to prevent and reduce vulnerability to
terrorist attacks. It conducts intelligence and information sharing to
ensure that critical infrastructure security partners can protect themselves.
The DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis conducts intelligence activ-
ities at the national and local levels. The National Infrastructure Protection
Plan brings together government and private stakeholders to facilitate the
sharing of intelligence, information, and best practices. Its National
6 J. F. KENNY
Operational Center shares up-to-date information on emerging incidents

with government officials, the private sector, and international partners.
The DHS’s Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative provides
a national network to gather, document, process, and analyze suspicious
activities. It has developed online information-sharing platforms such as
DHS.gov, Ready.gov, and TRIPwire that contain information on threat
preparedness.
Police patrols can get lucky and identify criminal activities when
responding to routine calls. Serial killer Michael Owen Perry killed five
people and threatened to kill Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor. Perry demonstrated skills with using weapons and successfully
stalked another target. He was arrested in Washington, DC, en route to
kill Justice O’Connor. Police were able to identify and capture Perry when
they responded to a simple noise complaint at a hotel (Savage, 1990).
Due to the increase in security measures, many of those attempting
school violence are not successful. The use of surveillance cameras, metal
detectors, and computer-coded identification badges has helped to detect
many potential attackers. Patrolling security guards or locked entryways
have been able to stop many outsiders from entering schools. The
Indicators of School Crime and Safety Report 2017 showed that the total
crime victimization rate at schools dropped from 155 per 1000 in 1993 to
29 per 1000 in 2016 (Musu-Gilletto et al., 2018).
Taking Inventory of Risk Reduction Capabilities

Criminals and aggressive individuals may choose their targets, but the tar-
gets can have the ability to decide whether they will become victims. Being
unaware and unprepared does not justify victimization; it makes it more
possible. Individuals must take inventory of their abilities and develop,
practice, and plan how to reduce the risk of crime victimization. Conversely,
they must also recognize and accept their limitations to deal with certain
people and situations and seek the assistance of those who can. Those who
anticipate, identify, and address strange and inappropriate advances may
promptly stop the escalation toward criminal victimization. Individuals
who decide to prepare and manage an attack may contain or minimize
potential victimization. Being prepared helps to reduce the fear, confusion,
and paralysis that limit effective responses to aggressive advances. Those
who choose to make themselves hardened targets increase the perceived
risks and are less likely to be selected for criminal victimization (Table 1.1).
Table 1.1 Taking Inventory of risk reduction capabilities
Recognize strange and concerning behaviors

Detect tactics of deception and manipulation
Trust intuitive messages
Interpret the meaning behind nonverbal communications
Anticipate and avoid dangerous situations and behaviors
Defuse escalating tensions
Minimize personal vulnerabilities
Learn self-protection techniques
Analyze the reasons behind aggression
Identify those who can provide assistance
Source: Compiled by the author
Instead of waiting to respond to a criminal attack, individuals can

choose to recognize and respond to strange and concerning behaviors
before they evolve into dangerous ones. These pre-incident indicators can
take the form of stalking, harassment, physically aggressive acts, or verbal
and written threats (Drysdale et al., 2010). Recognizing these behaviors
before an attack provides an opportunity for the target to defend them-
selves, leave, or secure help before the situation gets worse. Those who
choose to acknowledge and respond promptly and effectively to strange
and threatening behaviors may cause aggressors to withdraw or cease fur-
ther aggression. It is important to appreciate that various types of aggres-
sors travel the path leading to criminal victimization. These travelers
include strangers, hostile intimates, acquaintances, or clients. Aggressors
who are non-strangers often pose a greater danger as they often have
access to and personal knowledge of their targets.
Simon (1996) discusses the importance of individuals detecting and
acknowledging deceptive tactics. These behaviors tend to conceal aggres-
sive intentions, reduce resistance, and put their targets on the defensive.
Manipulative individuals may attempt to charm, seduce, and build rapport
to help them overcome resistance. They may disguise their aggressive
intentions with gestures of love or friendship to exercise power and con-
trol over their targets. Strangers, intimates, and acquaintances preparing
to attack may take steps to establish dominance by putting their targets on
the defensive and isolating them from potential help sources. It is not
necessary to attempt to understand the meaning of deceptive acts at the
time of the engagement. It is essential to take defensive actions and get
away from the aggressor. While it is unproductive to focus on traits and
8 J. F. KENNY
personal characteristics to identify risk, recognizing deceptive tactics can

alert the observer that some form of manipulation is taking place. Once
recognized, these behaviors should never be denied, dismissed, or ignored.
Individuals must learn to trust their intuitive abilities to identify dan-
gerous events in the environment. De Becker (2002) describes intuition as
“an astonishing defense system, brilliant beyond imagination” (p. 36). He
describes it as a complex cognitive process of knowing without knowing
why. Intuition is faster at accepting danger than logic, and it does not
waste time thinking about the way things ought to be or could be. Instead
of looking for answers from others, individuals should listen to their inter-
nal intuitive signals. Once notified of something worthy of their attention,
they should accept it and begin efforts to analyze the reasons behind it.
Dimitrius and Mazzarella (2008) contend that most people have the
ability to recognize and interpret the meaning behind nonverbal commu-
nications. Those who are successful have the determination to gather
appropriate information and take the necessary time to understand how to
recognize patterns in a person’s appearance, body language, voice, and
behaviors. Good gathering techniques involve using the eyes, ears, touch,
and the sense of smell. Wijn, van der Kleij, Kallen, Stekkinger, and de Vries
(2017) found that hostile intentions can be deduced by overt behaviors.
Their research findings suggest that the psychological mindsets of aggres-
sors differ from those of others. Hostile individuals become more anxious,
self-focused, suspicious, and exhibit rigid body movements. The pressure
to deceive others increases their cognitive workload, leading to more
errors in thought, speech, and action.
Individuals can choose to anticipate and avoid high-risk activities, situ-
ations, and places. They can avoid high-risk activities such as venturing out
alone at night, congregating with strangers at parks, or heavy alcohol con-
sumption (Mustaine & Tewksbery, 1998). Individuals can become famil-
iar with high-crime places, locations with little surveillance, or desolate
areas. Those who must travel to high-risk locations should go with a com-
panion, carry personal security devices, and hide their valuables.
Those who plan to limit their personal vulnerabilities reduce their risk
of being noticed or targeted for attack. Criminals are more likely to target
those who appear unprotected, careless, or unable to resist an attack
(Grayson & Stein, 2006; Karmen, 2013). Most individuals have vulnera-
bilities, but these disadvantages do not have to make them weak.
Individuals can acknowledge their vulnerabilities and decide to take steps
to protect themselves. Those with physical and mental disadvantages can

choose to secure assistance from those who can defend them.
Individuals can learn to protect themselves from aggressive people.
Those who are alert, assertive, and demonstrate a willingness to utilize
formal and informal help sources may deter those looking for easy targets
(Government Training Institute, 1998; Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, 2004). Those who receive uncomfortable and unwanted
personal attention should make it clear to the aggressor that it is unwanted.
If it continues, they should stop all contact, document the behaviors, and
report these behaviors to an authority figure. They can reduce the offend-
er’s interest in approaching them by developing strategies to limit access
and rewards, and increase the risk of detection.
Dealing with aggressive people is rarely easy and help may not be imme-
diately available. Individuals can defuse escalating tensions by utilizing
nonconfrontational communication and listening skills. The target can use
clear, assertive, and persuasive “I” statements that state how the person
feels about the aggressor’s behaviors (Center for Conflict Management,
1996). The individual should avoid hostile, challenging, or disrespectful
communications that can contribute to the escalation of tensions. Good
listening techniques involve physically showing an interest in what the
other person is saying and acknowledging their issues. When meeting with
agitated people, the individual can encourage them to discuss their con-
cerns and offer suggestions to fix the problem. The discussion should
always remain positive.
Many aggressive behaviors may seem senseless to the intimidated target
or the surprised observer, but they have meaning for the initiator. If the
behavior is more strange than dangerous, the parties can ask the person for
an explanation. Some aggressors may use anger to communicate frustra-
tion or as a means to secure attention, respect, and justice (Gilligan, 1997).
Desperate individuals may make threats to extort satisfaction of an unmet
need because they feel powerless to do so conventionally. While most of
those who make threats do not pose a threat, it is better to engage profes-
sionals to make this determination (Fein, Voddekuil, & Holden, 1995).
In certain situations, it is better for the person to identify and accept
their limitations and secure the help of professionals, trained advocates, or
capable third parties. When dealing with threatening and dangerous indi-
viduals at work, it is advisable to contact the company’s Risk Assessment
and Management (RAM) team or Employee Assistance Program (EAP).
The RAM team can help the employee evaluate and manage identified
10 J. F. KENNY
risks (Hinman & Cook, 2001). The EAP can help the employee with
mental health services. Criminal justice Victims’ Advocates can provide
emergency, counseling, legal protection, and education services (Office of
Victims of Crime, 2012). Domestic violence advocates can provide shel-
ter, medical services, financial assistance, and emotional support.
Enhancing Personal Capabilities to Reduce the Risk

of Criminal Victimization
The content in this book can help the reader enhance their capabilities to
reduce their risk of victimization. Criminals have many weapons and
deception is one the most powerful ones. Deception can disguise danger-
ous advances until the aggressor is ready to attack. Aggressors will use it to
keep their targets distracted, confused, and anxious. It can limit the tar-
get’s suspicion, alertness, and ability to set up defenses prior to the attack.
These tactics are less obvious forms of aggression, but they can be recog-
nized, predicted, and managed before an attack occurs.
Identifying and responding to aggressive advances has never been easy,
but modern social changes and technological advances have made it more
challenging. Modern technology makes it easier to communicate with
people from around the world, yet too many individuals know little about
their neighbors, coworkers, and classmates. Large urban centers, transi-
tional neighborhoods, and multicultural environments make it more dif-
ficult for individuals to know those physically close to them, and easier for
the wolves to blend in with the sheep. Increasing time spent with elec-
tronic communications can improve technical skills, yet expose user vul-
nerabilities. There is research that suggests that the increasing time spent
on electronic media may diminish the user’s ability to identify subtle
expressions, unspoken messages, and threatening behaviors during per-
sonal encounters (Dimitrius & Mazzarella, 2008; Goman, 2011). Those
who are preoccupied with their laptops, cell phones, or iPods may be too
distracted to notice dangerous and deceptive advances.
The information presented in this book will acknowledge and build on
existing research involving detection of deception, risk assessment, conflict
management, and crime prevention. It proposes that recognizing and
addressing deceptive advances early in the process is an important step in
reducing the risk of criminal victimization. This book incorporates lessons
learned from the author’s participation in post-incident analysis and RAM
teams. It utilizes information from the author’s experiences with program

development and violence prevention training to government, education,
business, and social service employees. Some of the material reflects feed-
back received during focus group analysis, training evaluation surveys, and
needs assessment interviews with security professionals, crime victims,
school administrators, students, employers, and workers.
There are six objectives to writing this book that will assist the reader in
identifying, managing, and preventing criminal victimization:
• To conduct a literature review of various theories and practices in

identifying deception (Chap. 2)
• To encourage the reader to view criminal victimization as a process
in which deceptive tactics help to facilitate increasingly dangerous
advances (Chap. 3)
• To assist the reader to identify factors in the victim selection stage
that attract and are exploited by aggressive individuals (Chaps.
4, 5, and 6)
• To help the reader anticipate, recognize, and label deceptive tactics
and aggressive advances in the victimization process (Chaps.
7, 8, and 9)
• To discuss the skills necessary to recognize deceptive tactics
(Chap. 10)
• To offer strategies to respond to acts of deception and reduce the risk
of being targeted for criminal victimization (Chaps. 11, 12, and 13)
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22, 378–399.
CHAPTER 2
The Art of Identifying Deception
Introduction
The art of identifying deception is not something new, and it has been
utilized in many contexts. Over the past fifty years, numerous researchers
have attempted to identify and interpret both verbal and nonverbal com-
munications to help individuals make better judgments regarding busi-
ness associates, clients, acquaintances, intimates, witnesses, and suspects
in criminal cases. Identifying deception is an art rather than a science
because research has only been able to find weak associations between
interpersonal communications and deception. Most researchers agree
that recognizing deception is difficult, but individual skills can be
improved with proper training and practice. Effective training seeks to
develop and improve a person’s abilities to observe, listen, and interpret
deception. Practicing these skills can improve one’s ability to notice sub-
tle expressions, gestures, and body movements that contradict verbal
statements (Fig. 2.1).
The Importance of Recognizing Deception

The ability to identify and interpret deception enhances the chances of
making effective personal and professional decisions. If everyone were
angels, the ability to identify deceit would be less important. Aggressive
individuals will often use deception as a tool to disguise their advances
until they are prepared to attack. It provides an opportunity for the wolves

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26867-1_2
16 J. F. KENNY
Fig. 2.1 The art of identifying deception
to blend in with the sheep. Those with evil intentions may employ words
to distract, confuse, or manipulate others. While words can serve as their
trusted messengers, their emotions are not so loyal and can often betray
them. They may even provide clues as to their true intentions.
Detecting criminal approaches has become more important in an age of
increasing violent events and greater predator access. Recent mass shoot-
ings with rising body counts have left many feeling helpless with fears that
future killings will exceed the horrors of past tragedies. Personal informa-
tion detailing lifestyles, schedules, and assets is commonly available on
social media. While those with criminal intent may be highly skilled at
disguising their advances, they often unwittingly reveal clues to their true
intentions. Potential targets who detect deception prior to the attack can
choose to build up their defenses, secure help, or remove themselves from
the situation.
The ability to identify deception can expose potentially dangerous
coworkers, acquaintances, friends, intimates, and strangers. This skill can
help employers make better hiring decisions, and employees make better
2 THE ART OF IDENTIFYING DECEPTION 17
choices when interacting with aggressive customers. Identifying deceptive

practices during social encounters can provide targets more time to disen-
gage before they are trapped by significant emotional investments, attach-
ments, and commitments. Recognizing manipulative or controlling
behaviors can serve as warning signs of potentially destructive and physi-
cally abusive relationships. Criminal Justice professionals who can properly
evaluate truthfulness during interrogations or investigations can secure
clues to solve cases more quickly. Inaccurate reads involving witnesses,
suspects, or informants can lead to misplaced confidence about the
strengths or weaknesses of cases. It can result in the loss of precious time
and the wasting of resources pursuing false leads.
Research Limitations on Detecting Deception

Detecting deception is an inexact science that often stumps the most expe-
rienced law enforcement, judicial, and forensic experts. Ex-FBI Agent Joe
Navarro (2012) noted that every study since 1986 has demonstrated that
normal people have no better than chance in detecting deception. He
contends that there are only a few people who are better than average, but
they are only correct around sixty percent of the time.
The search for universal messages contained in body language is often
exaggerated and misleading. Some contend that a person is acting decep-
tively when they avoid eye contact, touch their lips while speaking, or clear
their throats when being questioned. It is also possible that the person is
attempting to relieve stress. Many truthful individuals are often nervous
when facing the prospect of embarrassment, interrogation, or arrest.
Matsumoto, Hwang, Skinner, and Frank (2011) contend that the pres-
ence of only one of these clues means very little. These clues become more
significant based upon how they change over time from the person’s base-
line behaviors and how they combine with the subject’s words and behav-
iors under stress. It is not only inconsistencies in the person’s story, but
also how they tell it. Individuals should pay attention to the facial expres-
sions, gestures, voice tone, and verbal style when the story is conveyed.
Too often research on identifying deceptive patterns is secured from
experiments involving college students. While these experiments may have
been logically designed, the results are obtained in a controlled laboratory
setting and not in a real-life context. The circumstances involving law
enforcement interviews are very different. These interviews often take
place in dark, noisy, or outdoor places with many distractions. When
18 J. F. KENNY
researching deceptive behaviors, most college students have personalities

and motives different from criminal suspects. In criminal justice situations,
most statements from suspects need to be thoroughly reviewed. Many of
the suspects have issues with substance abuse, mental illness, or antisocial
tendencies. In addition, career criminals are habitual liars, and they have
learned to master lying in order to live and stay out of jail. Some lie so
often that they begin to believe their lies.
The use of polygraphs to detect some forms of lying is widespread.
Employers use these tests in pre-employment screening. Criminal justice
professionals use them on suspects, witnesses, and those seeking security
clearances. Generally, polygraph results are not admissible evidence at
trial. There is considerable disagreement among professionals concerning
the accuracy of the polygraph. Ekman (2009) contends that accuracy of
the polygraph depends upon the nature of the lie, the liar, and the lie
catcher. The examiner’s skill can depend on the particular questioning
technique and the scoring polygraph charts.
Enhancing Identification of Deception

Despite all the previously stated limitations, it is possible for individuals to
improve their chances of identifying and decoding nonverbal behaviors.
Research has demonstrated that emotions and cognitive thinking are
“leaked” through changes in the use of gestures, microfacial expressions,
and variations in blinking, pauses, and speech rates (Matsumoto, Skinner,
& Hwang, 2014). These behaviors normally go unnoticed in daily social
interactions because they happen in the blink of an eye. Despite attempts
by liars to hide their feelings and expressions, individuals can learn to rec-
ognize these involuntary signals. Matsumoto et al. (2011) contend that
trainees at the FBI National Academy typically recognize microexpres-
sions seventy to ninety percent of the time. Regular people can improve
their skills by learning to observe clusters of behaviors, establish baselines,
and understand the context in which they occur.
Detecting deception is more accurate when observing clusters of behav-
iors. Any solitary gesture in isolation of others could mean a number of
things. Dimitrius and Mazzarella (2008) noted that single traits or behav-
iors seldom hold the key to someone’s character or emotions. True under-
standing comes from identifying recurring themes. The more pieces of a
puzzle you possess, the better are your chances of putting them all together
and seeing the larger picture. Someone who engages in a weak handshake
may have negative feelings toward the other person. They could also have
arthritis in their hands and it may be painful to engage in a strong hand-
shake. Those whose occupations involve the use of their hands (surgeons,
musicians, artists) may use soft handshakes to protect their hands from
injury. One way to confirm suspicions is to gather and interpret informa-
tion from various sources. This includes noticing inconsistent and
contradictory body movements, verbal communications, appearance

characteristics, and behaviors toward others.
Navarro (2008) contends that it is important to establish a baseline of
normal behaviors before attempting to identify deceptive ones. Knowing
the normal response to situations provides a point of comparison with the
person being observed. It helps to differentiate their normal behaviors
from those in response to stressful stimuli. For example, it is important to
establish a baseline on the person’s normal sitting habits, hand move-
ments, and facial expressions. Sudden changes in these behaviors can help
reveal how a person is processing information or reacting to emotional
events. Changes in a person’s behavior can also demonstrate her or his
interest in conversations or social interactions.
It is the context of the situation that provides the content’s true mean-
ing. The circumstances, gestures, and relationship of the parties may be
more revealing than the person’s statements. The words “I am going to
kill you” can cause a great deal of anxiety when initiated by a stranger,
criminal, or terrorist. They may cause little fear when initiated by a six-
year-old or a friend who is smiling. Threats like promises are easy to make,
but harder to honor. The alarming words speak more to the person’s
desire to frighten. They often betray the speaker by revealing frustration
and desperation, not intention. The nonverbal signals carry much more
impact than the verbal content. Pease and Pease (2004) contend that if the
body-language signals do not match the words, the person is probably
lying. For example, if the person covers their mouth with their fingers after
making a statement, it is almost as if their brain instructed the hand to
cover the mouth to block the deceitful words.
Looking for Verbal and Nonverbal Clues

Communication involves much more than the spoken words. Criminals
tend to choose their words carefully as they have learned that they can be
used against them. A person’s true feelings or intentions are often
revealed not in what is said, but how the person says it. Research by
20 J. F. KENNY
Mehrabian (1971) concluded that only seven percent of the impact of a

presentation is produced by the content of the words. He found that
posture, gestures, eye contact, and voice tonality are much more impor-
tant. Because many people are not always aware of how they are com-
municating nonverbally, these messages are often more honest than their
verbal statements (Frank, 2016). It is possible for a person to choose the
words they want to convey, but it is much more difficult to suppress non-
verbal messages contained in a smile, laugh, or a shake of the hand. The
speaker may not even be aware that their body is revealing their true
emotions as these expressions may be brief. Because it is harder to man-
age nonverbal communications, these can provide greater insight into
what the person is thinking, or planning.
Individuals constantly send out involuntary messages. The way they
walk, sit, or stand often reveals inner emotions and reactions to what is
happening around them. These actions can reveal when a person is ner-
vous, fearful, frustrated, or being honest. By becoming more aware of
another’s body language and understanding its meaning, it can becomes
possible to understand how a person is feeling and to anticipate future
actions. This can lead to more effective and safer decision-making. These
silent messages are found in a person’s facial expressions, body move-
ments, voice patterns, personal appearance, and social interactions.
Facial Expressions
The face is used more than any other part of the body to cover up lies.
Liars can deliberately choose facial expressions such as smiles, nods, or
winks to hide their true feelings. These expressions help to fabricate con-
fidence, happiness, enthusiasm, and acceptance. Lieberman (2000) con-
tends that these types of facial expressions help to create favorable first
impressions so that the recipients are kinder in future evaluations of
that person.
Conversely, Ekman and Friesen (2003) suggest that the face can also
reveal a person’s true emotions. This happens spontaneously and emo-
tional expressions occur without the person even knowing it.
Matsumoto et al. (2011) contend that attempts to detect deception
should start with focusing on facial microexpressions because they are
involuntary. The expressions of concealed emotion happen in as fast as
one-fifteenth of a second as the individual will attempt to hide them
quickly. Facial expressions of emotion are the closest thing to a univer-
sal language. Matsumoto et al. (2011) suggest that people express cer-
tain emotions on their faces in exactly the same ways independent of
race, culture, nationality, or any demographic variable. Since they are
immediate and often unconscious reactions, messages sent from the
eyes and mouths are difficult to control.
The eyes are often called “the windows to the soul”. They can be
accurate indicators of true feelings because the muscles in the eyes
respond automatically to external dangers and internal thoughts and
emotions. The eyes can send messages through the dilation or constric-
tion of the pupils. Pupils will dilate or become larger when the person
becomes excited. Adelson (2004) suggests that when people lie the pupil
size increases due to increased tension and concentration. Once they
have a moment to process the information, the pupils constrict. When
people are angry, their eyes can constrict. This is often referred to as
“beady eyes”.
On the other hand, eye gaze is a learned behavior from one’s culture.
Looking directly at others could mean that the person likes them or is
curious about them. It could also mean that the initiator may be attempt-
ing to threaten them. One of the most common misconceptions is that
failing to look someone directly in their eyes is a sign of deceit. This is typi-
cally neither a sign of deception nor of disinterest, but one of comfort
(Vrij, 2003). A person may look away to enhance the clarity of thoughts.
In addition, certain cultures believe that looking down or away is a sign of
respect. Argyle and Ingham (1972) found that in Japan and some South
American cultures extended eye contact is viewed as aggressive and disre-
spectful. The Japanese tend to look away or below the face.
Navarro (2012) states that some predators and habitual liars will engage
in greater eye contact as a way to deceive their targets. They consciously
do this in order to create the impression of being truthful. Pease and Pease
(2004) conducted an experiment and found that only thirty percent of the
liars consistently looked away. The other seventy percent of the liars main-
tained strong eye contact. They were caught in their lies only twenty-five
percent of the time.
The research on the use of smiles in deception is mixed. Many believe
that criminals will use smiles to reassure or reduce their target’s appre-
hension. This makes sense as genuine smiles are universally considered as
a sign that a person is happy to see them. One of the benefits is that it can
secure positive reactions from others. Other research suggests that crimi-
nals and common liars believe that smiling can be associated with lying;
22 J. F. KENNY
hence, they will intentionally decrease their smiling (Ekman, 2009).

Pease and Pease (2004) in their work with Australian Customs in 1986
found that when individuals made false statements, they smiled less or
not at all.
Ekman and Friesen (2003) developed a Facial Action Coding System
(FACS) that detects when a person is giving a genuine versus a fake smile.
They conclude that in genuine smiles the mouth muscles move, the cheeks
rise, and the eyes crease up. As a result, the fleshy part of the eye between
the eyebrow and the eyelid moves downward and the ends of the eye-
brows dip slightly. Ekman (2009) contends that when liars do utilize the
smile, it comes more quickly than a genuine smile. In addition, they hold
it much longer. Pease and Pease (2004) state that the tight-lipped smile
suggests that the person is withholding information. In this type of smile,
the lips are stretched tight across the face to form a straight line and the
teeth are concealed. The aggressor seems to be signaling that I have a
secret, so try to guess what it is.
Body Movements
Many nonverbal clues are revealed in body movements because most peo-
ple cannot monitor or disguise them. Those who are lying or feeling guilty
must carry the knowledge of their deception. Many find it difficult to be
comfortable with this burden. Attempting to disguise their deception
places a very distressing cognitive load on them as they struggle to think
of answers to what would normally be very simple questions. Their dis-
comfort can be readily observed in body movements involving the legs,
feet, hands, torso, and gait.
Navarro (2008) contends that the feet and the legs are the most likely
body part to reveal a person’s true emotions. The farther away from the
brain a body part is positioned, the less awareness the person has of what
it is doing. He says that the face is the part of the body most often used to
conceal true sentiments. People have learned to lie with their faces since
childhood and, with practice, some can get good at it. Children are told
to put on their happy faces when relatives come to visit. While most people
know how to put on a happy face, few pay attention to the lower parts of
their body that reveal nervousness, anxiety, or happiness.
Navarro (2008) suggests that the movement of the feet and legs can
indicate discomfort and possibly deception. He says that discomfort is
demonstrated physiologically due to the arousal of the limbic brain. Some

people will attempt to block or distance themselves from uncomfortable
questions or situations by jiggling their feet or turning them away. By
doing this, the person is exhibiting a sign of disengagement from their
current position. When a person is attempting to become confrontational,
they will spread their feet and legs apart. This will provide greater balance,
but also signal a desire to claim greater territory. Vrij (2003) found that
people who are lying tend to interlock their feet in such a way as to restrict
movement. This behavior is indicative of self-restraint and caution in
someone who is troubled, nervous, or lying.
Hand gestures can provide powerful insights into a person’s emotional
state. Scientists have noted that there are more nerve connections between
the hands and the brain than any other parts of the body. Hand gestures
are often easy to see because the hands are in the front of the body. Pease
and Pease (2004) suggest that when people want to be open and honest,
they will often hold both palms out to the other person suggesting a sub-
missive or nonthreatening gesture. Conversely, moving the hand to cover
the mouth, touching the nose, tugging the ear, or rubbing the eye is the
brain subconsciously instructing it to suppress deception.
The way a person positions their torso can reveal their true feelings or
intentions. The torso covers the hips, abdomen, chest, and shoulders. The
torso contains many vital internal organs such as the heart and lungs. The
brain will unconsciously protect this area when threatened, stressed, or
challenged. People tend to expose the front part of their body toward the
person when they like them. When encountering conflict or aggression, it
is strategic to turn to the side. This helps to protect the most vulnerable
parts of the body from enemies.
Givens (2007) contends that when a person is about to strike another,
their chest will puff out. This is a way to try to establish dominance and
control. The person may lean into the opponent to project a certainty of
winning. Those who are aggressive will lean forward with noticeable ten-
sion in their upper body. They may even demonstrate clinched fists.
Prizefighters often do this during prefight events.
The shoulder shrug in American culture generally means “I don’t
know”, “I’m helpless”, or “what does it matter”. This deliberate gesture
is typically done to send a message. Ekman (2009) contends that a modi-
fied shrug reflects a person unsure of their responses or an attempt by that
person to conceal information. This occurs because the respondent is not
24 J. F. KENNY
fully committed to what was communicated. The person is expressing dis-

comfort or responding deceptively when only one shoulder comes up or
both rise to the point where the person’s head seems to disappear. Shrugs
may also exhibit feelings of helplessness reflected by a small rotation of the
hands while they are positioned on the leg.
Pease and Pease (2004) suggest that those in the process of deceiving
need to pull the collar away from their necks. This will permit cool air to
circulate as increased blood pressure on the neck causes sweat to form. In
addition, they may scratch their lower necks. This is often a signal of doubt
or uncertainty.
Criminals will often target individuals with certain walking styles, but
their own movements can alert that individual of a potential attack. Frank
(2016) contends that muggers will target individuals who walk with more
arm waving and shorter strides perceiving them to be more submissive.
Alert individuals who notice changes in suspicious strangers’ walking
styles can let this serve as important nonverbal clues that a problem might
be developing. Street predators can give themselves away when they sud-
denly change their walking speed as they prowl the area looking for good
targets. Unlike people who walk with a purpose and place to go to, mug-
gers and thieves may appear to be walking aimlessly until they spot a
good target. They will change their direction and pace as they prepare
to strike.
A person’s gait can reveal whether they are carrying a gun. Carrying the
weight of a weapon can alter the way a person normally walks. Robert
Gallagher, a former New York Police Officer, noted that a vast majority of
street criminals carry their guns in their waistbands (Eckholm, 1992).
When they walk, the leg on the gun side takes a slightly shorter stride and
the arm a shorter arm swing. When the person is getting out of the car or
going up or down stairs, the hand automatically reaches to the waistband
to adjust the gun. In rainy weather when a person runs for cover, they
hold their hand over the weapon.
Vocal Indicators
Liars tend to be careful about their choice of words because they receive
the greatest amount of attention from others. The problem is that they
often mislead or disguise the truth. Words are easy to falsify because they
can be written down and rehearsed in advance. The involuntary vocal
clues of communication may provide evidence of what the person is really

thinking. The tone, rhythms, and speech errors can reveal emotions that
the person may be reluctant to reveal.
Frank (2016) suggests that the voice tone reflected in pitch and loud-
ness can be indicative of various emotional states. He defines pitch as the
measurement of vocal frequency. Changes in pitch can occur when some-
one is experiencing joy, fear, excitement, or agitation. He suggests that
when people lie, their voice pitch tends to rise. Ekman (2009) cautions
that the raised pitch is not always a sign of deceit. A truthful person may
raise their pitch when they are worried about being believed. The best way
to determine whether the change in a person’s pitch is a sign of deception
is to become familiar with the person’s usual emotional behaviors.
Loudness reflects the intensity of the voice. People who are angry or
happy may get louder. A soft voice is often associated with someone who
is sad or lacks confidence or assertiveness. Dimitrius and Mazzarella
(2008) caution listeners not to be fooled by a low tone, suggesting that
the speaker could be doing it intentionally. The person could be lowering
their voice because they feel nervous or intimidated. They may be doing it
to hide a lie. The key is to determine whether the volume is indicative of
the speaker’s normal tone.
A person’s rhythms of speech can reflect their emotional state. This can
involve length of responses, hesitation, and rate of speech. Dimitrius and
Mazzarella (2008) suggest that when people are lying, they choose to
utter shorter sentences, respond slower, and hesitate before they answer
questions. Matsumoto et al. (2014) suggest that lies place more demands
on memory that result in fewer words, repeated details, and more omis-
sions of structured information. Slower than normal response usually
means that they are thinking more about what they are saying. Longer
than normal hesitations could mean that they are considering what they
said earlier and weighing their current response for plausibility.
Liars can reveal themselves with speech errors such as repeating words,
stuttering, grammar inaccuracies, and incoherent sounds (Ekman, 2009).
Some liars are betrayed by their words because of carelessness in prepara-
tion. Others are caught because they did not anticipate a particular ques-
tion. This may cause them to repeat their words or phrases as they work
through and evaluate the content of their story before stating it. Someone
may utter sounds such as “um” or “ah” between words as they stall for
time. Those trying to think of a believable response tend to have more
pauses in their speech.
26 J. F. KENNY
Appearance and Personal Space

Candid observations about another’s appearance and personal space can
often provide a great deal of information about that person’s values,
beliefs, tastes, hobbies, interests, or economic success. People select
clothes, makeup, accessories, and hairstyles to project how they want to be
seen by the outside world. They shape their personal space to fit their per-
sonalities, habits, and lifestyles.
Dimitrius and Mazzarella (2008) contend that an individual’s appear-
ance and personal space alone seldom provide definitive answers about
their character and personality. They can tell only part of the story without
examining the person’s body language. Body language is involuntary and
tends to provide insight into the person’s true emotions involving ner-
vousness, fear, and honesty. Personal appearance is a voluntary choice and
can reflect an individual’s true beliefs, or present an image they want oth-
ers to believe.
Any trait in a person’s appearance that dramatically deviates from a
social norm has some meaning. It can be indicative of poor common sense
or it could reflect someone who is insensitive, rebellious, or nonconform-
ist. Casual shorts would be appropriate for a date in warm weather, but
not for a job interview. Inappropriate clothing, hairstyles, or makeup can
reflect poor judgment, or that the individuals just do not care about what
other people think. Some of these individuals might prove to be antisocial,
difficult, argumentative, or hostile. Identifying strange appearances may
point out a need to focus attention on the person’s body language and
past social interactions.
Sometimes inappropriate attire can reveal something more dangerous
than poor fashion. A person wearing a coat on a hot day or a big sweater
that does not fit may seem to lack good judgment. However, these outfits
make perfect sense if the individual is choosing clothing that can best hide
weapons. Presidential assassin Leon Czolgosz wore an oversized jacket that
covered a handkerchief wrapped around his hand and wrist. This helped
conceal a handgun that killed President William McKinley. While other
award recipients were dressed in white, Carlito Dimaali wore a long black
suit that gave him the appearance of a priest. When it was his turn to
receive an award, he drew a large machete knife from his coat and attacked
Philippine First Lady Imelda Marcos (De Becker, Taylor, & Marquart, 2008).
In some cultures, it is most appropriate for women to wear loose-fitting
clothing, and terrorists have used this to their advantage. The terrorist
group Boko Haram has commonly used females as suicide bombers, espe-
cially in West Africa (Meservey & Vadyak, 2018). Females make good
suicide bombers because they draw less suspicion and normally wear loose-
fitting clothing that can hide bombs. In addition, cultural norms forbid
men from touching women in a way that is required to search for
explosives.
Fashion accessories are often worn to garner attention, but they should
be scrutinized when they appear to be excessive (De Becker et al., 2008).
Attacker Arthur Bremer was wearing numerous Wallace-for-President
buttons when he shot and paralyzed the candidate. The buttons gave him
the appearance of being an avid supporter, but the intention was to help
him get close to Wallace. In 1970, Benjamin Mendoza was able to
approach the Pope and stab him with a foot-long dagger. He minimized
suspicion by dressing in gray clerical clothing with a large crucifix attached.
Mendoza pulled the weapon out of the crucifix once he was within
arm’s reach.
A person’s appearance can reveal information about their affiliations,
travel, or cultural background. Tattoos or attachments to clothing can
reflect a relationship or identification with gangs, hate groups, or other
social organizations. Souvenir T-shirts can reflect places recently visited.
Clothing, jewelry, or other accessories can provide clues as to where indi-
viduals live, or lifestyles they prefer. If these articles are flamboyant, it
could suggest that the person is creative, independent, or possibly
nonconformist.
One’s office or living space can reveal clues about education, religion,
marital status, political beliefs, or interests. Being observant of these clues
can confirm or question what one has seen in their body language or
appearance. You do not have to open drawers, but rather, just notice what
is right in front of you.
A person’s workspace is typically limited and personal items that occupy
that space are usually very important to that employee. An office or cubi-
cle will contain business furniture, but photos, calendars, books, artwork,
and desktop items can be indicators of personal taste and lifestyle. A messy
and cluttered desk can suggest a disorganized life. The layout of the furni-
ture can reveal whether the space is arranged to make guests and cowork-
ers comfortable. A coworker of mine once set up the visitor’s chair in a
small crowded area and raised his chair higher. He explained that this
configuration helped establish dominance and control.
28 J. F. KENNY
Once you enter a person’s home, you can find out some very important
clues about their personalities, especially if they live alone. While they may
not have a total control over their workspace, the home is the private and
personal space a person has created for their own comfort and enjoyment.
When there is a great difference between a person’s public and private
persona, the home may offer a more reliable picture of the true person. A
visual examination can reveal photographs, CD collections, and other
items reflecting personal interests. They may openly display guns or dis-
turbing reading material. They may abruptly cover up things they do not
want seen. Smells can provide insights into their food or tobacco interests
or problems with hygiene. Sounds can reveal their taste in music, televi-
sion, or whether they have dogs or children. Certain TV shows, movies,
video games, social media sites, or music can demonstrate a preoccupation
with violence.
Interactions with Others

People are creatures of habit. Watching people interact with others over
time can give a true sense of the character of a person. It is not what the
person says they will do, but rather, what they consistently does that mat-
ters. Talk is cheap; choices reflect what a person truly believes. Former FBI
Behavioral Analyst Mary Ellen O’Toole contends that those who commit
serious acts of violence have previously exhibited behaviors of concern
(O’Toole & Bowman, 2012). If you want to get a sense of the person’s
true personality, watch how that person handles a crisis and daily activities
with coworkers, family members, and ordinary people.
Almost everyone can be happy, kind, and generous when things are
going well. It is more difficult to fake these emotions when people are ill,
stressed, broke, or experiencing personal loss. Some people in distress may
choose not to accept responsibility, but rather, blame others for their cur-
rent situations. Others sink into depression and cannot move forward in a
positive way. The U.S. Secret Service (2018) analysis of school shootings
noted that many of the attackers committed the acts of targeted violence
after being overwhelmed by negative events in their lives. Their analysis
noted that most students are resilient in the face of setbacks, losses, and
challenges, but some become overwhelmed and cannot cope with these
situations. The lack of friends and family members to help them overcome
these events may ultimately factor into their decision to carry out an attack.
The workplace offers a unique opportunity to watch how individuals

interact with different types of people in varied situations. As many people
spend a great deal of time in the office, their true personalities will eventually
surface. Some employees proclaim to be “team players” at meetings, but
afterward choose to be unsupportive and highly critical of the work of their
peers. Others may appear respectful to, and cooperative and friendly with
their bosses in the boardroom, but become angry with, and resentful and
critical of them when they return to their workstations. De Becker (1997)
points out that before an employee progresses to the stage of committing
acts of violence, their files contain numerous reports that show coworkers
felt uncomfortable, threatened, intimidated, and violated by their actions.
Watching how individuals interact with the disenfranchised, disadvan-
taged, and powerless people in social settings can give some insight into
their true personalities. Caring and thoughtful people should treat all peo-
ple consistently well, not just those with power and social status. A person
may treat judges, lawyers, and police officers with respect, but it is more
important to notice how they treat gas attendants, bank tellers, or waiters.
It can be very revealing to notice whether they are nasty or supportive to
these people when they make a mistake. In addition, when a person is
experiencing difficult times, do they take out their frustration and anger
on those paid to provide service? Kind and caring people may not be
overly polite and gentle during difficult times, but they should not be
confrontational, degrading, and physically aggressive. O’Toole and
Bowman (2012) noted that third parties often fail to recognize these
warning signs of potential violence because they do not want to believe
that friends and acquaintances are capable of it. In addition, relatively rare
aggressive behaviors are hard to distinguish when they are mixed in with
more common normal behaviors.
Observing how people treat family members in private settings should
be compared to how they treat others in public situations. For many, their
homes are their castles where their true personalities can go unfiltered
behind closed doors. Those who are emotionally abusive to loved ones
may eventually become abusive to others. Those who treat their spouses
like servants and make all the decisions in the relationship may be demon-
strating controlling tendencies that will eventually surface when social and
employment decisions are needed. Those who criticize, minimize, and
blame intimates may be revealing their deep-seated needs to exercise
power over others. Children who act inconsiderately or bully others may
be reflecting how their parents have treated them.
30 J. F. KENNY
Conclusions
Identifying deception is considered by many experts to be more of an art
than a science. Even professionals often miss reading people’s intentions.
Despite the difficulties, individual skills can be improved with training and
practice. It is important to try, as the modern world has presented increas-
ingly violent events and greater predator access. By possessing a greater
understanding of nonverbal behavior, individuals can achieve a more
meaningful view of the world around them. This knowledge can enrich
interpersonal relationships. In addition, this knowledge can improve the
person’s ability to identify deception. If identified promptly, the potential
aggressor may not continue on a path toward criminal victimization.
References
Adelson, R. (2004). Detecting deception. American Psychological Association,
35(7), 70.
Argyle, M., & Ingham, R. (1972). Gaze, mutual gaze, and proximity.
Semiotica, 6, 32–49.
De Becker, G. (1997). The gift of fear: Survival signals that protect us from violence.
Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company.
De Becker, G., Taylor, T., & Marquart, J. (2008). Just 2 seconds: Using time and
space to defeat assassins and other adversaries. Studio City, CA: The Gavin De
Becker Center for the Study and Reduction of violence.
Dimitrius, J., & Mazzarella, W. (2008). Reading people. New York: Ballantine Books.
Eckholm, E. (1992, May 26). Who’s got a gun? Clues are in the body. New York
Times. Retrieved January 10, 2017, from http://search.proquest.com.libac-
cess.fdu.edu/docview/428532017/fulltext/298C928C09F0
Ekman, P. (2009). Telling lies: Clues to deceit in the marketplace, politics, and
marriage. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. (2003). Unmasking the face: A guide to recognizing
emotions from facial expressions. Cambridge, MA: Malor Books.
Frank, M. (2016). Understanding nonverbal communication. Chantilly, VA: The
Teaching Company.
Givens, D. (2007). The nonverbal dictionary of gestures, signs, and body language
cues. Spokane, WA: Spokane Center for Nonverbal Studies.
Lieberman, D. (2000). Get anyone to do anything. New York: St. Martin’s Griffen.
Matsumoto, D., Hwang, H., Skinner, L., & Frank, M. (2011). Evaluating truth-
fulness and detecting deception. Retrieved on January 15, 2018 from https://
leb.fbi.gov/articles/featured-articles
Matsumoto, D., Skinner, L., & Hwang, H. (2014). Reading people: Behavioral
anomalies and investigating interviewing. Retrieved on April 5, 2017 from
https://leb.fbi.gov/2014/march/reading-people-behavior-anomalies-and-
investigative-interviewing
Mehrabian, A. (1971). Silent messages. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Meservey, J., & Vadyak, A. (2018). Boko Harem’s sick ploy to turn girls into suicide
bombers. Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation.
Navarro, J. (2008). What every body is saying: An ex-FBI agent’s guide to speed-
reading people. New York: Collins Publishers.
Navarro, J. (2012). The truth about lie detection. Retrieved on January 15, 2018
from http://www.psychologytoday.com
O’Toole, M., & Bowman, A. (2012). Dangerous instincts: Use an FBI profiler’s
tactics to avoid unsafe situations. New York: Plume.
Pease, A., & Pease, B. (2004). The definitive book of body language. New York:
Bantam Books.
U.S. Secret Service. (2018). Enhancing school safety using a threat assessment model:
An operational guide to preventing targeted school violence. Washington, DC:
National Threat Assessment Center.
Vrij, A. (2003). Detecting lies and deceit: The psychology of lying and the implications
for professional practice. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
CHAPTER 3
Deception and the Process Toward

Criminal Victimization
Introduction
The process approach utilized throughout this book views criminal victim-
ization as the final event in a series of purposeful, dynamic, and increas-
ingly dangerous interactions. Deception enables the process to progress
by disguising criminal advances, delaying effective responses, and mini-
mizing target resistance. Life stressors can ignite the process by causing a
person of concern to become tense, anxious, or angry. Workplace pres-
sures, an unhappy home environment, or financial problems can trigger an
act of aggression or fuel the process. Those who engage in targeted acts of
violence move along an identifiable pathway of progressively aggressive
behaviors. The progression may be rapid or slow and will not follow the
same course; it differs from person to person (Fig. 3.1).
Ignitors: Starting the Process

The process to violence often starts with some purpose or need the person
must satisfy. Understanding the motives of angry, troubled, or mentally ill
individuals is difficult, but they are always there. The FBI Behavior Analysis
Unit (2017) points out that while serious mental illness is present in many
cases of targeted violence, this does not mean that it is the driving force
behind the decision to offend. Many angry, troubled, or mentally ill per-
sons have a difficult time verbalizing their motives, and they may express
their thoughts in actions, not words. We must listen as they attempt to

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26867-1_3
34 J. F. KENNY
Criminal
Victimization
Pre-Attack
Behaviors
Threatening
Behaviors
Behaviors
Of
Concern
----------------------------------------------Contributors------------------------------------------------
Ignitors
Fig. 3.1 The process to criminal victimization
communicate their problems. We can reach out to those closest to the

person to tell us what they know about recent events affecting the subject.
We must observe threatening behaviors as they interact with others. These
encounters or events can further agitate the subjects and create a sense of
injustice, powerlessness, rejection, or present criminal opportunity.
One of the most common reasons for aggressive actions is the attempt
to achieve justice or correct some perceived wrong (de Becker, 1997;
Gilligan, 1997). This may involve some prior transgression against the
individual’s person, property, livelihood, or self-esteem. Those who see
themselves as victims of unfair treatment may turn to violence, especially
when they feel unable to achieve satisfaction through legal or institutional
means. Fox and DeLateur (2014) contend that revenge is the most com-
mon motive in mass killings. The killers will target those they hold respon-
sible for problems. The Secret Service (2000) analysis of school shootings
found that revenge was the motive in fifty percent of the shootings, and
two-thirds of the attackers felt bullied, persecuted, and injured by others
prior to the attack. In many cases of worker-on-worker violence, the
attackers sought revenge against those who insulted, harassed, or
abused them.
Individuals will seek various alternatives to rectify some material, rela-
tional, or work status loss when they feel powerless to do so in a legal or
conventional fashion. Initially they may utilize deceptive tactics such as
compliments, compromises, gifts, or reasons to achieve their objectives. If
they are unsuccessful, they may shift their tactics to insults, lawsuits, or
3 DECEPTION AND THE PROCESS TOWARD CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 35
some other nonphysical harm to the target. For those who still feel power-
less to achieve their goals, violence provides a way to be heard, respected,
or to ease personal pain (Dietz, 1986). De Becker (2002) contends that
many terrorists, assassins, and gang members may profess that social jus-
tice issues motivate their acts of violence. In reality, these people feel pow-
erless and believe that they have no other choice to achieve their objectives.
The use of violence can help them achieve attention for their causes, but it
can also provide notoriety for themselves. September 11 hijacker
Mohammed Atta and Columbine High School shooters Dylan Klebold
and Eric Harris did not achieve much success during their lives, but they
have been extensively studied and analyzed for the manner in which they
violently died. For those ignored or humiliated, the use of violence pro-
vides a way to be recognized or at least feared. It brings a measure of
importance to those feeling insignificant.
Few people like to be rejected, devalued, or disrespected. Most over-
come these feelings and move on. A few cannot cope and turn to violence
when overwhelmed with feelings of depression, hopelessness, desperation,
or entitlement. The Secret Service (2000) reported that many school
shooters had difficulty coping with changes in their lives, loss of significant
relationships, or devalued status prior to their attacks. Incidents of
employee violence are more likely to occur in organizations where employ-
ees feel pushed aside due to downsizing, restructuring, or layoffs (Arway,
2002; Braverman, 2002). Supervisors, personnel managers, or executives
who carry out these actions in an insensitive or degrading manner can trig-
ger an attack directed toward them.
Criminals predisposed to use aggression to achieve some financial, per-
sonal, or political gain may approach opportunistic and vulnerable pro-
spective targets. Thieves seek out those who possess money or property
that is easily valuable, accessible, and removable (Clarke & Hormel, 1997).
Numerous theories explaining motives for sexual assault contend that rap-
ists commit this crime because of the personal need for power, control, or
to express anger. Some are psychotic, sociopathic, or sadistic and view
their targets as sex objects whose role is to satisfy them. They care less
about the personal traits of their targets and more about whether they
appear to be unaware, unprotected, or easily accessible. Fein and Vossekuil’s
(1999) study on the assassination of public officials in the United States
found that the attackers’ expressed desire for political change often masked
their primary motives. Most were not active members of militant or radical
groups, but rather, marginal associates or socially isolated. These attackers
36 J. F. KENNY
often used violence as a way to achieve notoriety, fame, or a solution to

their problems. Being jailed or killed provided a way to be released from
their pain.
Once an individual’s motives are understood, the ability to predict
future actions and potential targets is enhanced. Their actions no longer
seem senseless, and their targets seem less random. Each violent event is
preceded by a series of interrelated actions that came before it. The exact
times, places, or targets of violence are difficult to predict, but prior behav-
iors can warn us to prepare for them.
Contributors: Fueling the Process

The process to criminal victimization is fueled by contributing events in
the concerned person’s life that cause tension, anger, or resentment. These
events could involve some negative change in the individual’s relation-
ships, health, or finances. They could result from some adversarial encoun-
ter, conflict, dispute, or problems between the potential attacker, the
target, or third parties at home, work, school, or in the community.
Generally, a person of concern will become increasingly volatile with the
accumulation of negative experiences, but each person is different. Some
have positive coping mechanisms and healthy support networks. A good
sense of humor, healthy activities, and realistic goals tend to help the per-
son deal with the present situation and look toward a positive future.
Positive family or social support can serve as stabilizing forces in the per-
son’s life preventing the person from thinking seriously about or acting on
an impulse to complete an act of targeted violence. Those individuals who
are allowed to progress to threatening and dangerous stages become more
difficult to defuse, stop, or contain.
Potential aggressors play a key role in the process, but their behaviors
are often affected by situations and circumstances in their lives. Individuals
with volatile tendencies are low risks until agitated or disturbed. Borum
et al. (1999) noted that these individuals are often destabilized by major
life changes, such as the death of a close family member, loss of status, or
ending of relationships. The loss of a relationship or some attack to the
person’s self-esteem can increase a sense of hopelessness or desperation.
Humiliation at work in the form of a negative performance review, denial
of grievance, position downgrade, or termination can push the employee
along the path of violence. Those lacking a strong network of support
3 DECEPTION AND THE PROCESS TOWARD CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 37
such as competent and compassionate family, friends, teachers, coworkers,

and mental health professionals are at higher risk of aggression.
The subjects’ immediate environment or setting can also influence their
decisions to commit acts of violence. They may be exposed to a pattern of
beliefs, customs, traditions, or values that may cause them to become
detached and angry. The FBI Critical Incident Response Group’s report
on school shooters (2000) noted that certain factors in the subject’s envi-
ronments could influence their decision to offend at school rather than
somewhere else. Some of these include tolerance for bullying, inequitable
discipline, and insensitivity to the needs of students. In addition, the prac-
tice of school officials and the student body treating certain groups as
more important and valuable to the school than others can alienate the
at-risk student.
Some crisis-prone companies characterized by poor corporate climates
and toxic work groups can push the at-risk employee on a fast track to
violence. Agitated employees faced with personnel actions, reduced pay
and benefits, and uncertainty about their futures can become increasingly
volatile when supervisors with poor communication skills and abrasive
management styles implement these (Northwestern National Life
Employee Benefits Division, 1993). Others may be victims of bullying
such as verbal abuse, threats, intimidation, and humiliation from bosses or
peers (Namie, 2014). Bullying can cause greater stress and lead to feelings
of betrayal. This can cause serious conflict and lead to physical confronta-
tion that may eventually become violent.
The targets can contribute actively or passively to the victimization pro-
cess. They can initiate the social interaction that can lead to an aggressive
response. These interactions can take the form of physical force, bullying,
or some type of provocation. Any type of belittling or insulting by the
target can threaten the aggressor’s emotional security. Challenging or
threatening the person can force the person to save face and retaliate. Any
type of pushing, touching, or intimidation with a weapon can escalate the
situation and draw a violent response. Active victim precipitation is more
common in domestic violence situations when women kill their husbands
rather than incidents in which men kill their wives. The National Coalition
Against Domestic Violence (n.d.) indicates that abused women tend to
use force or violence when they are resisting, reacting, or defending them-
selves. Many will stay in abusive relationships when repeatedly victimized
because of feelings of helplessness and fear. Eventually, they may feel that
using deadly force is the only way to escape.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
153
).
Ptosis, hysterical,
238
in tabes dorsalis,
830
Puberty, influence on causation of catalepsy,
318
of migraine,
407
411
influence on cerebral anæmia,

778
Puerperal insanity,
173
tetanus,
562
Pulmonary consumption, relation to mental diseases,
119
142
Pulsation of carotids, weakness of, in progressive unilateral facial

atrophy,
696
Pulse, state of, in acute alcoholism,
587
588
593
in acute simple meningitis,
717
718
in acute spinal meningitis,
750
in catalepsy,
321
in cerebral anæmia,
784
in cerebral hemorrhage and apoplexy,
938
in chorea,
449
in concussion of the brain,
909
in epilepsy,
480
in hæmatoma of the dura mater,
708
in hysteria,
252
in migraine,
409
411
412
in tetanus,
551
in the chloral habit,
662
in the opium habit,
654
657
659
in thermic fever,
391
in tubercular meningitis,
726-728
and respiration in delirium tremens,
629
Pupils, dilatation of, in migraine, cause of,
411
hysterical dilatation of,
248
in acute simple meningitis,
717
in cerebral anæmia,
775
in chronic hydrocephalus,
741
909
in diseases of the cervical sympathetic,
1264
in disseminated sclerosis,
879
in epileptic fit,
480
in general paralysis of the insane,
195
in tabes dorsalis,
829
830
727
729
loss of reflex of, in nervous diseases,
40
51
Pus, characters of, in abscess of the brain,
793
Pyramidal tract, derangements of, in amyotrophic lateral sclerosis,

867
Pyromania,
147
Q.
Quinia, use of, in acute simple meningitis,
721
in alcoholism,
642
643
645
646
in chronic lead-poisoning,
691
in intermittent neuralgia of supraorbital,
1233
in labio-glosso-laryngeal paralysis,
1175
in migraine,
414
in neuralgia,
1224
in paralysis agitans,
438
in sciatica,
1236
in spinal meningeal hemorrhage,
756
in thermic fever,
398
in vertigo,
427
R.
Race, influence on causation of chorea,
444
of hysteria,
217
of hystero-epilepsy,
291
of thermic fever,
389
Railway sickness,
426
Rectum, hysterical disorders of,
240
Reflex causes of epilepsy,
472
of neuralgia,
1220
irritability, changes in, in catalepsy,
321
irritation as a cause of catalepsy,
318
of chorea,
444
movements, abnormal, in nervous diseases,
50
of patellar tendon in nervous diseases,
52
paralyses in spinal anæmia,
806
paralysis in neuritis,
1193
Reflexes, active, in spinal hyperæmia,
802
exaggerated, in spinal syphilis,
1026
in acute spinal myelitis,
818
in amyotrophic lateral spinal sclerosis,
868
in chorea,
448
in combined forms of sclerosis,
870
in diffuse sclerosis,
888
in disseminated sclerosis,
875
,
877
in hemiplegia,
962
in spastic spinal paralysis,
862
in tabes dorsalis,
835
in tumors of the brain,
1041
of the spinal cord,
1092
1094
tendinous in epilepsy,
481
vaso-motor,
1248
Religious feeling, extreme, as a cause of ecstasy,
34
Remissions in general paralysis of the insane,
194
727
Respiration, artificial, in cerebral hemorrhage,
976
in acute spinal meningitis,
750
in anæmia of the brain,
777
in catalepsy,
321
in cerebral hemorrhage and apoplexy,
935
909
in labio-glosso-laryngeal paralysis,
1171
in the chloral habit,

662
in thermic fever,
390
391
395
728
in tumors of the brain,
1044
Rest, value of, in apoplexy,
975

911
in hyperæmia of the spine,
804
in melancholia,
160
in myelitis, acute,
823
in neuritis,
1194
in symmetrical gangrene,
1261
in writers' cramp,
533

Hiding in Plain Sight Deceptive Tactics and The Criminal Victimization Process 1St Ed 2020 Edition James F Kenny Full Chapter

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Hiding in Plain Sight: Deceptive Tactics

and the Criminal Victimization Process

Hiding in Plain Sight

ISBN 978-3-030-26866-4 ISBN 978-3-030-26867-1 (eBook)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2020

1 Stronger Than We Think: More Capable Than We Know 1

2 The Art of Identifying Deception 15

3 Deception and the Process Toward Criminal

4 Lurking in the Shadows: Stranger Danger and Target

5 “Getting to Know You”: Confirming Target Suitability 59

6 Choosing Familiar Targets: The Devils You Wish You Did

7 Enticing the Target: Tactics That Fabricate Trust and

8 Developing a Smoke Screen: Tactics That Disguise

9 Preparing for the Attack: Tactics That Establish Control111

10 Removing the Blindfold: Recognizing Deceptive and

11 Stopping the Process from Beginning: Avoid Becoming a

12 Reestablishing the Balance of Power: Responding to

13 Bystander Intervention: Helping Friends Recognize and

James F. Kenny received his Ph.D. in Criminal Justice from Rutgers

Fig. 1.1 The criminal event 2

Table 1.1 Taking Inventory of risk reduction capabilities 7

Stronger Than We Think: More Capable

Reframing the Criminal Victimization Event

© The Author(s) 2020 1

Third Parties Location/Situation

Fig. 1.1 The criminal event

criminal victimization. At the minimum, early recognition of criminal

Education, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) report on targeted

Dismissing the Illusion of Criminal Invincibility

Kaczynski was described as a twisted genius who built untraceable bombs

Operational Center shares up-to-date information on emerging incidents

Taking Inventory of Risk Reduction Capabilities

Table 1.1 Taking Inventory of risk reduction capabilities

Recognize strange and concerning behaviors

Source: Compiled by the author

Instead of waiting to respond to a criminal attack, individuals can

personal characteristics to identify risk, recognizing deceptive tactics can

to protect themselves. Those with physical and mental disadvantages can

Enhancing Personal Capabilities to Reduce the Risk

teams. It utilizes information from the author’s experiences with program

• To conduct a literature review of various theories and practices in

Simon, G. (1996). In sheep’s clothing: Understanding and dealing with manipula-

The Art of Identifying Deception

The Importance of Recognizing Deception

© The Author(s) 2020 15

Fig. 2.1 The art of identifying deception

choices when interacting with aggressive customers. Identifying deceptive

Research Limitations on Detecting Deception

researching deceptive behaviors, most college students have personalities

Enhancing Identification of Deception

Looking for Verbal and Nonverbal Clues

Mehrabian (1971) concluded that only seven percent of the impact of a

hence, they will intentionally decrease their smiling (Ekman, 2009).

demonstrated physiologically due to the arousal of the limbic brain. Some

fully committed to what was communicated. The person is expressing dis-

clues of communication may provide evidence of what the person is really

Appearance and Personal Space

Interactions with Others

The workplace offers a unique opportunity to watch how individuals

Deception and the Process Toward

Ignitors: Starting the Process

© The Author(s) 2020 33

Fig. 3.1 The process to criminal victimization

1 Stronger Than We Think: More Capable Than We Know 1

2 The Art of Identifying Deception 15

3 Deception and the Process Toward Criminal

4 Lurking in the Shadows: Stranger Danger and Target

5 “Getting to Know You”: Confirming Target Suitability 59

6 Choosing Familiar Targets: The Devils You Wish You Did

7 Enticing the Target: Tactics That Fabricate Trust and

8 Developing a Smoke Screen: Tactics That Disguise

9 Preparing for the Attack: Tactics That Establish Control111

10 Removing the Blindfold: Recognizing Deceptive and

11 Stopping the Process from Beginning: Avoid Becoming a

12 Reestablishing the Balance of Power: Responding to

13 Bystander Intervention: Helping Friends Recognize and

Fig. 1.1 The criminal event 2

Table 1.1 Taking Inventory of risk reduction capabilities 7