Russia, the Former Soviet Republics,

and Europe Since 1989: Transformation

and Tragedy Katherine Graney
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Russia, the Former Soviet Republics,
and Europe since 1989
Russia, the Former Soviet
Republics, and Europe
since 1989
Transformation and Tragedy

K AT H E R I N E G R A N E Y

1
 1
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Library of Congress Cataloging-​in-​Publication Data

Names: Graney, Katherine, 1970– author.
Title: Russia, the former Soviet republics, and Europe since 1989 :
transformation and tragedy / Katherine Graney.
Description: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2019. |
Includes bibliographical references.
Identifiers: LCCN 2018061177 | ISBN 9780190055080 (hardback) |
ISBN 9780190055097 (paperback)
Subjects: LCSH: Russia (Federation)—Politics and government—1991– |
Former Soviet republics—Politics and government. | Europe—Politics and
government—1989– | Russia (Federation)—Foreign relations—Europe. |
Europe—Foreign relations—Russia (Federation) | Former Soviet
republics—Foreign relations—Europe. | Europe—Foreign relations—Former
Soviet republics. | BISAC: POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General.
Classification: LCC DK510.763 .G7357 2019 | DDC 303.48/24704—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018061177

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For Sean, Ronan, and Maeve, with love and gratitude
 CONTENTS

List of Figures  ix
List of Tables  xiii
List of Boxes  xv
List of Maps  xvii
Preface  xix
Acknowledgments  xxi
List of Abbreviations Used in Text  xxiii
List of News Sources Cited in Text  xxvii

PART ONE THEORIES AND HISTORIES OF EUROPE ANIZ ATION

AND THE POST-​C OMMUNIST WORLD SINCE 1989

1. From Europhilia to Europhobia?: Trajectories and Theories of

Europeanization in the Post-​Communist World since 1989  3
2. Europe as a Cultural-​Civilizational Construct  36
3. Political Europeanization since 1989  62
4. Security Europeanization since 1989  88
5. Cultural-​Civilizational Europeanization since 1989  113

PART T WO CA SE STUDIES

6. Russia: Eternal and Incomplete Europeanization  141

7. The Baltic States: Successful “Return to Europe”  171
viii Contents

8. Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova: Almost European?  210

9. The Caucasus States: The Endpoint of Europe or Europe’s New
Eastern Boundary?  264
10. The Central Asian States: Not European by Mutual
Agreement?  317
11. Conclusion: The Continuing Influence of the Eurocentric-​
Orientalist Cultural Gradient on European, Russian, and Post-​
Soviet Politics  375

Notes  381
Bibliography  393
Index  419
 FIGURES

1.1 Phase One of Europeanization: Europhoria (1989–​1999) 15

1.2 Phase Two of Europeanization: Europhilia (2000–​2008) 17
1.3 Phase Three of Europeanization: Europhobia (2009–​) 18
1.4 Europeanization in Political Institutions 28
1.5 Europeanization in Security Institutions 29
1.6 Europeanization in Cultural-​Civilizational Institutions 34
2.1 Factors of Intrinsic Europeanness 60
6.1 Factors of Intrinsic Europeanness in Russia 144
6.2 Cultural-​Civilizational Europeanization in Russia 147
6.3 Political Europeanization in Russia 159
6.4 Security Europeanization in Russia 167
7.1 Linguistic, Religious, and Historical Attributes of the Baltic States 172
7.2 Factors of Intrinsic Europeanness in Estonia 174
7.3 Factors of Intrinsic Europeanness in Latvia 175
7.4 Factors of Intrinsic Europeanness in Lithuania 176
7.5 Cultural-​Civilizational Europeanization in Estonia 192
7.6 Political Europeanization in Estonia 195
7.7 Security Europeanization in Estonia 196
7.8 Cultural-​Civilizational Europeanization in Latvia 197
7.9 Political Europeanization in Latvia 200
7.10 Security Europeanization in Latvia 202
7.11 Cultural-​Civilizational Europeanization in Lithuania 203
7.12 Political Europeanization in Lithuania 206
7.13 Security Europeanization in Lithuania 208
8.1 Linguistic, Religious, and Historical Attributes of Belarus, Ukraine, and
Moldova 211
8.2 Factors of Intrinsic Europeanness in Belarus 214
8.3 Cultural-​Civilizational Europeanization in Belarus 216

ix
x Figures

8.4 Political Europeanization in Belarus 222

8.5 Security Europeanization in Belarus 226
8.6 Factors of Intrinsic Europeanness in Ukraine 229
8.7 Cultural-​Civilizational Europeanization in Ukraine 233
8.8 Political Europeanization in Ukraine 240
8.9 Security Europeanization in Ukraine 244
8.10 Factors of Intrinsic Europeanness in Moldova 247
8.11 Cultural-​Civilizational Europeanization in Moldova 249
8.12 Political Europeanization in Moldova 255
8.13 Security Europeanization in Moldova 260
9.1 Linguistic, Historical, and Cultural Comparison of Georgia, Armenia,
and Azerbaijan 265
9.2 Factors of Intrinsic Europeanness in Georgia 270
9.3 Cultural-​Civilizational Europeanization in Georgia 272
9.4 Political Europeanization in Georgia 278
9.5 Security Europeanization in Georgia 284
9.6 Factors of Intrinsic Europeanness in Armenia 288
9.7 Cultural-​Civilizational Europeanization in Armenia 290
9.8 Political Europeanization in Armenia 295
9.9 Security Europeanization in Armenia 299
9.10 Factors of Intrinsic Europeanness in Azerbaijan 302
9.11 Cultural-​Civilizational Europeanization in Azerbaijan 304
9.12 Political Europeanization in Azerbaijan 308
9.13 Security Europeanization in Azerbaijan 314
10.1 Linguistic, Religious, and Historical Comparison of the Central Asian
States 318
10.2 Factors of Intrinsic Europeanness in Kazakhstan 341
10.3 Cultural-​Civilizational Europeanization in Kazakhstan 342
10.4 Political Europeanization in Kazakhstan 345
10.5 Security Europeanization in Kazakhstan 347
10.6 Factors of Intrinsic Europeanness in Kyrgyzstan 349
10.7 Cultural-​Civilizational Europeanization in Kyrgyzstan 350
10.8 Political Europeanization in Kyrgyzstan 352
10.9 Security Europeanization in Kyrgyzstan 353
10.10 Factors of Intrinsic Europeanness in Uzbekistan 355
10.11 Cultural-​Civilizational Europeanization in Uzbekistan 357
10.12 Political Europeanization in Uzbekistan 359
10.13 Security Europeanization in Uzbekistan 360
10.14 Factors of Intrinsic Europeanness in Tajikistan 363
10.15 Cultural-​Civilizational Europeanization in Tajikistan 364
10.16 Political Europeanization in Tajikistan 366
 Figures xi

10.17 Security Europeanization in Tajikistan 367

10.18 Factors of Intrinsic Europeanness in Turkmenistan 369
10.19 Cultural-​Civilizational Europeanization in Turkmenistan 370
10.20 Political Europeanization in Turkmenistan 372
10.21 Security Europeanization in Turkmenistan 373
11.1 Strength of Europeanization Projects in the Former Soviet Union 377
 TA B L E S

1.1 Post-​Communist and Post-​Soviet Countries 5

1.2 Strength of Europeanization Projects in the Post-​Soviet States 11
2.1 Post-​Soviet States: Levels of Intrinsic Europeanness 61
4.1 Levels of Integration of Post-​Communist States with NATO 97
7.1 Demographics of the Baltic States, 1989 and 2014 172
7.2 Major Trading Partners of the Baltic States, 2014 173
8.1 Demographics of Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova, 1989 and 2014 211
8.2 Major Trading Partners of Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova, 2014 212
9.1 Demographics of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, 1989 and
2014 268
9.2 Trading Partners of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, 2014 269
10.1 Demographics of the Central Asian States, 1989 and 2014 319
10.2 Trading Partners of the Central Asian States, 2014 319
10.3 Economic Impact of Petroleum Resources in the Central Asian States,
2014 320
11.1 Factors Influencing Strength of Europeanization Efforts in Eastern
Partner States 378
11.2 Factors Influencing Future of Strong Europeanization Efforts in Eastern
Partner States 379

xiii
 B OX E S

1.1 The Ukraine Crisis (2013–​) 8

1.2 Three Sets of Actors in Europeanization 12
1.3 Three Animating Forces Characterizing Europeanization since
1989 13
1.4 Three Chronological Phases of Europeanization since 1989 14

xv
 MAPS

1.1 Europe and the Former Soviet Union 6

2.1 The Different “Europes” 40
3.1 Europe According to the European Union: Current and Candidate
Members 63
3.2 The Eastern Partnership States (EAP) 75
4.1 Europe According to NATO 90
5.1 Europe According to Eurovision 118
5.2 Europe According to UEFA Membership 130

xvii
 P R E FA C E

This is a big book about a big topic. I wrote this book in part to solve a problem
that I encountered every time I taught my Politics of Russia and the former
Soviet Union class at Skidmore College. There are many books about Russian
politics, and an increasing number of books about each of the other fourteen ex-​
Soviet republics. But I was never able to find a book that provided a historically
rich, theoretically sophisticated, and relatively undated introduction to both
Russia and the other states that used to make up the Soviet Union. I decided to
write such a book myself.
A second reason for this book dates back to the fieldwork I did for my disserta-
tion in Tatarstan, Russia, in 1996–​1997. During the interviews I conducted with
ethnic Tatar political and cultural leaders, I was quite surprised by the number
of times these actors would bring up the question of the “civility” of the Tatars.
They wanted to be sure that I understood that Tatars were “civilized, like you in
Europe and the West,” and that “Tatars do not eat raw meat—​we are not savages”
(a reference to steak tartare). Relatedly, I was also struck by the prominence of
Europe in the strategy of Tatarstan’s leaders during the quest for political sover-
eignty in the 1990s and 2000s—​their sincere belief that “European” norms of
democracy, human rights, and the respect for ethnic diversity should serve as
the basis for a renewed form of ethno-​federalism in Russia in the post-​Soviet
period. While space prevents me from discussing this specific aspect of the
Europeanization process here, I am happy that the genesis of the present project
can be found in my earlier work on Tatarstan, Of Khans and Kremlins: Tatarstan
and the Future of Ethno-​Federalism in Russia.
As I began to think about ways to approach a one-​volume treatment of Russia
and the post-​Soviet states that would be more than just an encyclopedic recita-
tion of facts and important political developments in these countries, it was be-
coming more and more clear that the early promise of “a Europe whole and free”
arising out of the fall of the Berlin Wall and collapse of the Soviet Union was

xix
xx Preface

in serious eclipse. Indeed, it became apparent that “European expansion,” once

seen by many in the former communist world as a concept bearing the promise
of progress and plenty, was more and more viewed as a nefarious plot emanating
from Brussels and Washington aimed, at best, at the exploitation of the ex-​Soviet
states and, at worst, at the total destruction of their “way of life.” (Russia has be-
come the foremost proponent of this discourse, but variants of it can be heard in
Hungary, Poland, and other places as well.)
I came to see that the deeply felt concerns that my Tatar friends voiced in the
1990s about their status in a world where “Europeanness” was still the standard of
civility and worthiness, and their hopes for a future organized along “European”
political and economic principles, were closely related to the tensions that began
to arise both within Europe and between Europe and Russia in the 2000s (and
have come to a boil in the 2010s, as the continuing Ukraine Crisis that began
in 2013–​2014 demonstrates). As they have been historically—​since Peter the
Great decided to “hack a window to Europe” in the late seventeenth and early
eighteenth centuries—​cultural-​civilizational understandings about “Europe”
and “Europeanness” and the political and security arrangements based on those
understandings are a singularly important factor in understanding patterns of
political development in the former Soviet Union since 1989.
I have tried to produce a volume that can serve as the basis for an intro-
ductory course in post-​Soviet politics but that is also appropriate for courses
on contemporary European politics. (As the history of Russia is inextricably
intertwined with that of Europe, and as the practical overlap between these
two regions has increased dramatically since 1989, it hardly seems possible to
do otherwise.) And while appropriate for students with little to no background
in Russia and post-​Soviet politics, I believe this analysis has much to benefit
even long-​time students of Russia and the former Soviet Union. As this project
roamed far from my own small area of expertise, I have relied on the research
and analyses of the leading scholars in our field of Russian and post-​Soviet poli-
tics and on Europeanization, and I am grateful for the opportunity to share with
my colleagues and students these scholars’ insights into the concepts of Europe,
Europeanness, and Europeanization and how these concepts animate political
developments in Russia and the former Soviet Union.
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am very grateful to the Skidmore College Collaborative Research program for

funds to support work on ­chapter 5 and the creation of the maps and graphs
in this book, and to Emma Kurs, Katie Morton, Jennifer Cholnoky, and Reilly
Grant for their skillful work on the same. I am also grateful to Skidmore College
for the sabbatical leave that helped make this book possible.
I want to thank the many other students who helped me greatly at various
stages of this project, including: Michael Bruschi, Elizabeth Collins, Britt Lynzee
Dorfman, Misha Lanin, Matt Marani, Katie Morton, Jesse Ritner, and Megan
Schachter. I am also grateful to my friend Barbara McDonough for helping with
logistical aspects of this work’s production.
Special thanks to Jennifer Delton for helpful and intellectually stimulating
conversations as well as necessary respites to ski. I am also grateful to the anony-
mous reviewers from Oxford University Press, whose insights helped shape the
final draft in important and helpful ways.
Most of all, I want to thank my family for bearing with me during this long
journey. Ronan and Maeve—​it’s finally done! And you have your dogs, too.
See, it all worked out. Sean, thank you, as always, for everything. The only thing
I love in the world more than reading and writing and teaching about Europe
and Russia is you guys.

xxi
 A B B R E V I AT I O N S U S E D I N T E X T

AA association agreement
ADR Azerbaijan Democratic Republic
AIOC Azerbaijan International Operating Company
APF Azerbaijani Popular Front
BALTOPS Exercise Baltic Operations
BSS Black Sea Synergy
CAS Central Asian Strategy
CFE Conventional Forces in Europe
CIA Central Intelligence Agency (US)
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CIS FTA Commonwealth of Independent States Free Trade Area
COE Council of Europe
CPC Conflict Prevention Center
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CRRF Collective Rapid Reaction Force
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization
DCFTA Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Acts
DCI development cooperation instrument
EAP Eastern Partnership
EAPC Euro-​Atlantic Partnership Council
EAPP Eastern Partnership Plus
EBU European Broadcasting Union
EC European Community
ECHR European Court of Human Rights
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community
ECSR European Council on Social Research
ECU Eurasian Customs Union

xxiii
xxiv Abbreviations

EEAB East European Assistance Bureau

EEC European Energy Community
EEU Eurasian Economic Union
ENP European Neighborhood Policy
EOC European Olympic Committee
EP European Parliament
ESC European Song Contest (Eurovision)
EST European Security Treaty
EU European Union
EURO European Football Championships
FARE Football against Racism in Europe
FFP Fair Play Program
FRG Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)
FSU former Soviet Union
FYU former Yugoslavia
GDR German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
GOC Georgian Orthodox Church
GUAM Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova
HDI Human Development Index
IPAP Individual Partnership Action Plan
IS Islamic State
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
ITU International Telecommunications Union
K2 Karshi-​Khanabad Airbase
KFOR Kosovo Force
KHL Kontinental Hockey League
KUMU Art Museum of Estonia
LGBTQ lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (or
questioning)
MAP Membership Action Plan
MFA Minister of Foreign Affairs (Russian Federation)
MOC Moldovan Orthodox Church
NACC North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGC NATO-​Georgia Commission
NGO non-​governmental organization
NRC NATO-​Russia Council
NUC NATO-​Ukraine Council
OIRT International Radio and Television Organization
OSCE Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe
PACE Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
 Abbreviations xxv

PCA Partnership Cooperation Agreement

PCRM Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova
PFP Partnership for Peace
PHARE Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring Their
Economies
PJC Permanent Joint Council
REACT Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams
RFU Russian Football Union
ROC Russian Orthodox Church
RPL Russian Premier League
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SOCAR State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic
TACIS Transition Assistance to the Commonwealth of
Independent States
TCP Trans-​Caspian Pipeline
TURKSOI International Organization of Turkish Culture
UPA Ukrainian Insurgent Army
US CENTCOM United States Central Command
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO World Trade Organization
 NEWS SOURCES CITED IN TEXT

Online News Agencies and Journals

Armenia News
ArmeniaNow
Baltic Course
CAD (Caucasus Analytical Digest)
CACI Analyst (Central Asia and Caucasus Analyst)
Civil Georgia
Defense News
DW (Deutsche Welle)
EDM (Eurasia Daily Monitor of the Jamestown Foundation)
EUObserver
EURACTIV.com
EurasiaNet
EurasiaNet Weekly Digest Euronews
Inside Europe
Lithuania Tribune
LragirAM (Armenian Open Society Foundation)
NATO News
NEE (New Eastern Europe)
NewEuropeOnline
openDemocracy
RAD (Russian Analytical Digest)
RFE/​RL (Radio Free Europe/​R adio Liberty)
TOL (Transitions OnLine)
TOL Weekly (Transitions OnLine Weekly)

xxvii
xxviii News Sources

ValdaiClub
Window on Eurasia

International and National News Sources

AFP (Agence France-​Presse)
AIS Moldpres (Agentia Informationala de Stat “Moldpres”)—​Moldova
Al Jazeera
AP (Associated Press)
APR (Armenia Public Radio)
BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation)
Bloomberg Business
Der Spiegel—​Bulgaria
FOCUS Information Agency
Interfax—​Ukraine
Izvestiya—​Russia
Kommersant—​Russia
Lithuania Tribune
Moscow Times
Newsweek
NYTimes—​New York Times
Respublika Tatarstan—​Tatarstan, Russia
Reuters
Reuters Canada
Sovetskaya Tatariya—​Tatarstan, Russia
Telegraph—​UK
Vatanym Tatarstan—​Tatarstan, Russia
Voice of Russia
Vremya i Dengi—​Tatarstan, Russia
Russia, the Former Soviet Republics,
and Europe since 1989
 PA RT O N E

THEORIES AND HISTORIES

Europeanization and the Post-​Communist World
since 1989
 1

From Europhilia to Europhobia?

Trajectories and Theories of Europeanization
in the Post-​Communist World since 1989

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 is one of the only purely joyful and univer-
sally celebrated moments of the twentieth century. Families and countries were
reunited; the traumas of repression, poverty, and division that marked life under
communism were over; and the expansion of the European dream of freedom
and prosperity to the formerly “occupied” states could begin. Three decades
later, we are now a long way from triumphant renditions of the Ode to Joy at
the Brandenburg Gate. Europe faces multiple serious challenges, including the
Eurozone and attendant austerity and unemployment crises in southern Europe,
the refugee crisis that has exacerbated the already problematic rise of illiberal
populist movements and non-​democratic governments across the continent,
military conflict following Russian annexations in Europe’s eastern fringe, and
perhaps most shocking of all, Brexit. Books proclaim that we are witnessing “the
End of Europe” and are busy envisioning a world “After Europe” (Kirchick 2017;
Krastev 2017). The European postwar experiment that was characterized after
1945 by intentionally increased economic and political unity among European
states and the promotion of a peaceful, multilateral foreign policy, and since
1989 by the expansion of these new European norms and institutions into
the post-​communist world, now seems to be in grave peril. It might seem then
that this is an inopportune moment for a book examining Europeanization at
Europe’s eastern edges: Russia and the other fourteen former Soviet republics.
Surely Europeanization, which I define as the desire for, seeking of, and acquisition
of the institutional and ideational forms of “Europeanness,” is a process that seems
to be, particularly in the territories of the former Soviet Union, at best perpetu-
ally stalled, and at worst a finished and failed experiment.
This book argues that examining the process of Europeanization that has
occurred over the past three decades in the post-​communist world in general,

3
4 Russia, the Former Soviet Republics, and Europe

and in Russia and the other fourteen former Soviet republics in particular, reveals
that the roots of many aspects of contemporary Europe’s profound malaise may
be found in those encounters.1 As Kristen Ghodsee has put it, the “legacies of
the fall of communism infuse current European political realities” (2017, xv; em-
phasis mine). The lingering influence of the Soviet experience is ambiguous and
multivalent, with some aspects clearly exacerbating Europe’s centrifugal present,
but with others suggesting that if Europe is to rediscover its faith in the postwar
norms and practices that have brought historic levels of peace and prosperity, it
may, unexpectedly, find both inspiration and help in the way that some places in
the former Soviet Union understand, value, and seek to achieve “Europeanness.”
Scholars have noted that the post–​Cold War relationship between Europe and
Russia is essentially a competition over meaningful understandings of the world,
where the loyal and allegiance of the post-​communist states are the objects of the
game. Since 1989, Europe and Russia have been engaged in a “normative rivalry”
involving the “mutual readjustment of two identities in the making” (Kazharski
and Makarychev 2015), in a “war of words and stories” that is essentially dis-
cursive in nature (Bechev 2015), in a battle of “cultural statecraft” fought with
the weapons of persuasion and attraction (Forsberg and Smith 2016), and in a
“competition not for physical objects that can be consumed . . . but for psycho-
logical states that are generated in the mind” (Snyder 2018). Inspired by these
arguments, I employ the concept of Europeanization here broadly, as the way that
both the institutional, practical and normative, discursive meanings of “Europe”
and “Europeanness” have been negotiated and shaped through the interactions
of European actors such as the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA),
and the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) on the one hand, and actors in the
post-​communist (generally) and post-​Soviet (specifically) worlds on the other.
(See Table 1.1 and Map 1.1.)
This book deepens our understanding of Europe’s contemporary crises
using the lens of the “battle of stories” that has characterized relations among
Europe, Russia, and the former communist states since 1989. These relations
are mediated by two related and long-​standing dynamics. The first is the pro-
found and abiding east/​west divide in Europe, which is generated and sustained
by historical and contemporary “mental maps” that associate particular charac-
teristics and behaviors with either geographic pole, and which clearly privilege
those on the western side of the divide. The contemporary iteration of the east/​
west divide, in which east is associated with “post-​communist/​unfree/​inferior”
and west with “never communist/​free/​superior,” is only the latest stratum in the
much older formation of cultural understandings of Occident and Orient and ci-
vility and barbarism, where the former is associated with the west and the latter
with the east. Following Martin Malia, I refer to this throughout the book as
 From Europhilia to Europhob ia? 5

Table 1.1 Post-​Communist and Post-​Soviet Countries

Post-​Communist Countries Post-​Soviet Countries* (all)

Albania* Russia•
Bosnia-​Herzegovina+ Estonia•
Bulgaria* Latvia•
Croatia+ Lithuania•
Czech Republic* Belarus•
Hungary* Ukraine•
Kosovo+ Moldova•
Montenegro+ Georgia•
Republic of North Macedonia (FYROM)+ Armenia•
Poland* Azerbaijan•
Romania* Kazakhstan•
Serbia+ Uzbekistan•
Slovakia* Kyrgyzstan•
Slovenia+ Tajikistan•
Turkmenistan•
(Other: German Democratic Republic/​
GDR)*
* Denotes member of the Warsaw Pact (May 1955–​February 1991). Albania member until 1968.
GDR member until 1990.
+
Denotes member of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1945–​1991/​2). Kosovo had
status of autonomous province in Serbian republic.
•
Denotes constituent republic (Soviet Socialist Republic, or SSR) of the Soviet Union (USSR).

the “Eurocentric-​Orientalist Cultural Gradient” (EOCG) (Evtuhov and Kotkin

2003; Malia 2006).
The second, related fault line emanating from the post-​communist world
fueling contemporary challenges to the postwar European experiment is more
explicitly political and centers on the geopolitical fact of Russia as Europe’s
largest and most powerful neighbor. The history between Europe and Russia
is a complicated one in which Russia is sometimes seen as a close ally of, an
integral part of, or even the “savior” of Europe (as after the defeat of Napoleon
in 1812 and the defeat of the Nazis in 1945), but at other times as the closest
and most immediate, and thus most dangerous and insidious, military and po-
litical threat to a free and united Europe (as during the Cold War and, in some
ways, today).
 EU Member States
EU Candidate Countries
Categorized by the European Union as “Other European Countries”
Former Soviet Union

Map 1.1 Europe and the Former Soviet Union

 From Europhilia to Europhob ia? 7

Over the past three decades, the pendulum of Russia’s relations with Europe
has swung from one end to the other of the arc that it has historically traveled
repeatedly, moving from the promise of building “a Europe whole and free”
together with the west of Europe in the early 1990s to the present moment,
wherein Russia positions itself as the avatar and leader of a movement based
on an alternative vision of Europeanness. Since the later 2000s, Russia has
promoted a form of Europeanness that it claims is both alt (alternative and op-
positional) and alte (older and more authentically European) in relation to the
liberal, multilateral vision that has dominated Europe since 1945. Russia’s alt/​
alte vision of Europeanness champions populism, nationalism, and xenophobia
in domestic politics, and realpolitik, state sovereignty, and the rejection of mul-
tilateralism in international relations (Forsberg and Smith 2016; Kazharski and
Makarychev 2018; Snyder 2018; Tsygankov 2016). Across the European conti-
nent, Russia’s alt/​alte vision of Europe shows increasing potential to challenge
the liberal institutions and norms that have defined Europe since 1945.
How and why did this happen? Will the centrifugal tendencies stressing Europe
internally and the bellicose relations between Europe, Russia, and the former
Soviet Union worsen, or are they mere growing pains on the way to Gorbachev’s
hopeful mid-​1980s vision of a Europe “whole and free,” encompassing the ter-
ritory from the Atlantic Coast to Vladivostok? These are the larger questions
that this book’s examination of three decades of Europeanization in the former
Soviet Union seeks to answer. Along the way, this inquiry also brings into stark
relief the high moral stakes of Europe’s current political turmoil.
The stories told here demonstrate the great political, economic, security, and
moral value of the postwar European experiment and of the extension of that
experiment into the former Soviet Union. It also shows that in some of the re-
publics of the former Soviet Union, the “European dream” remains a compel-
ling and aspirational vision. Understanding how Europe’s achievements are seen
from these eastern neighbors and appreciating the sacrifices some of them are
willing to make in the name of “becoming European” might help remind “estab-
lished” European states of the value of what they have achieved, and make them
more willing to work to protect it. In the most prominent example, Ukraine’s
Maidan Square in late 2013 and early 2014 was “the first place that anyone died
under” the EU’s blue and yellow flag (Kirchick 2017, 222–​23). The bravery of
Ukrainians in those days provided Europeans with “reminders of an older more
vigorous Europe beneath the malaise of a Euro crisis and decaying public poli-
tics” (Wilson 2014, 1). (See Box 1.1.) If the encounter with the former Soviet
world has helped to shape many of the problems Europe currently faces, it might
also be that one of the most effective ways Europe can revive its flagging belief
in the liberal norms and institutions that have served it so well since 1945 is to
continue to promote those norms in the post-​Soviet world, where a “more direct
 Box 1.1 The Ukraine Crisis (2013–​)
THE UKR A INE CR ISIS

November–​December 2013: On November 21, 2013, Ukrainian

president Viktor Yanukovich announced that Ukraine would not sign
an Association Agreement with the European Union, but instead would
pursue closer ties with Russia. Throughout November and December,
crowds of up to 800,000 people come to Maidan Square in Kiev to protest
Yanukovich’s turn to Russia. These well-​organized protests become known
as the EuroMaidan, for their main demand that Ukraine continue on a
course toward eventual EU membership.
January–​February 2014: In January, Yanukovich’s government passes
a tough anti-​protest law, but the EuroMaidan activists refuse to leave the
square. The Ukrainian government, in a response dubbed the AntiMaidan,
uses snipers and other force to try to clear the square. Over 100 people
are killed. In late February, Yanukovich flees the capital, and the Ukrainian
parliament names a pro-​EuroMaidan interim prime minister and president.
New presidential elections are scheduled for May 2014.
March 2014: Pro-​Russian forces move to take control of Simferopol,
the capital of the Crimean region of Ukraine. Russia’s parliament votes to
authorize the use of force to “protect Russian interests” in Ukraine. “Little
Green Men,” Russian forces in unmarked green uniforms, help consolidate
the takeover of Crimea and appear in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of
Ukraine. On March 16, Crimea votes to secede from Ukraine. On March
18, Putin signs a law making Crimea a part of the Russian Federation.
Summer 2014: Low-​level war between Ukrainian loyalists and pro-​
Russian forces (complemented by Russian forces) continues in Donetsk
and Luhansk regions. On June 27, Ukraine signs its Association Agreement
with the EU. On July 18, a Malaysian Airlines flight from Amsterdam is
shot down in Ukraine by pro-​Russian forces. Nearly 300 people are killed.
October 2014: A new pro-​European parliament and president (Petro
Poroshenko) are elected in Kiev.
2015–​present Fighting continues in Ukraine’s eastern regions. 10,000
estimated casualties since 2013.
 From Europhilia to Europhob ia? 9

knowledge” of living under illiberal regimes means that people there “possess
a greater appreciation” for Europe’s postwar experiment (Kirchick 2017, 229).

Europeanization in the Former Communist World

since 1989: From Europhoria and Europhilia
to Europhobia in Three Short Decades
The descent of the Iron Curtain after World War II prompted an agonized de-
bate about the nature of the new European divide, with prominent voices on
both sides eventually emerging to promote the reunification of the continent.
In the 1970s the policy of détente and the Helsinki process represented an in-
itial attempt at mending Europe’s Cold War breach through the creation of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the CSCE, predecessor
to today’s Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE),
which brought the Warsaw Pact states and the western states into a novel, pan-​
European web of security and normative agreements (significantly, the United
States and Canada were also signatories). In the mid-​1980s, the Soviet Union’s
young new leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, surprised everyone and elevated the
prospects for some type of European reunification with his “New Thinking” in
foreign policy, which included the boldly and precisely stated aim of “reuniting
our Soviet motherland with her European destiny” and reclaiming the Soviet
Union’s “rightful place” in the “common European homeland” (English 2000,
140; Petrov 2013; Wolff 1994, 372).
The rapidity of communism’s collapse first in the Soviet satellite states of
Eastern and Central Europe and then in the Soviet Union itself surprised actors
in both halves of Europe. The end of communism was also almost exactly coin-
cident with the then–​European Community’s (EC) efforts to transform itself
into the more institutional robust and politically and economically meaningful
European Union. This synchrony presented both a huge potential complication
and a huge potential opportunity for the EC. The difficult challenge of persuading
western European states to risk transferring some of their political and eco-
nomic sovereignty to a new and untried “European Union” was made even
harder by the sudden re-​emergence of many more potentially viable members
of said union from behind the Iron Curtain. The Europe of the fledgling EU was
suddenly potentially much larger, its ultimate geographic limits less clear. Did
the claims about European unity underlying the Helsinki process of the 1970s
and Gorbachev’s assertions in the 1980s about “our common European home”
mean that in the 1990s the nascent EU would eventually extend to the farthest
boundaries of the former Soviet Union?
10 Russia, the Former Soviet Republics, and Europe

Of course, the answer has turned out to be no. Instead, what we have seen over
the past three decades is a complex and conflictual process that has transformed
and multiplied the institutional practices and normative understandings of what
it means to be European. There is a clear gap between those ex-​Soviet states that
already have become “fully European” by joining the EU and NATO (namely,
the three Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia), and those that remain
“outside” of Europe, namely, Russia and the rest of the Soviet successor states.
The latter are largely mired in cycles of authoritarianism and corruption. Russia
itself is increasingly actively hostile not just to the further expansion of but also
to the very existence of the EU and NATO (Hale 2005; King 2010; Krastev
2011; Levitsky and Way 2010; Snyder 2018; Toal 2017; Vachudova 2008, 2010;
Way 2005, 2008).
Despite this generally grim situation, it would be empirically, strategi-
cally, and morally wrong to assume that Europeanization is dead in the former
Soviet Union. The desire for and progress of Europeanization is quite vari-
able throughout the fifteen former Soviet states. The Baltic states of Latvia,
Lithuania, and Estonia have already achieved full Europeanization in the form
of EU and NATO membership, and are among the most enthusiastic defenders
and supporters of those institutions during the current crisis of European
morale. Several of their post-​Soviet brethren have voiced the desire to follow
the Baltic states down this “strong” or maximal path of Europeanization—​
specifically, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. Other ex-​Soviet republics have
pursued a moderate, hybrid sort of “complementary” or “balancing” approach
to Europeanization that mines both European and post-​Soviet opportunities
for political, economic, and security development. In this middle category are
Armenia and Azerbaijan, whose Europeanizing efforts have been stronger, and
also Belarus and Kazakhstan, whose efforts are decidedly weaker. Other post-​
Soviet states exhibit a near total lack of desire for any form of “Europeanization,”
namely Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. (See Table 1.2.)
The case studies presented in Part II of this book explore each state’s unique
Europeanization effort in some detail.
Russia’s relationship to the idea of Europeanization is certainly the most
complex of all the states under consideration here. Under the Yeltsin adminis-
tration, Russia was content to “borrow and benefit” from Europe’s institutional
and normative models (Tsygankov 2016, 146), as long as Europe agreed that
it must treat Russia as an equal partner, not a supplicant (Snyder 2018, 79). As
the process of Europeanization evolved, and more post-​communist and even
post-​Soviet states grew closer to Europe both institutionally and normatively,
Russia’s stance changed into a more openly hostile one. This more antagonistic
era has been characterized by two main trends. The first is the attempt to entice
post-​Soviet states to reject Europeanization by offering its own ersatz versions
 From Europhilia to Europhob ia? 11

Table 1.2 Strength of Europeanization Projects in the

Post-​Soviet States
Strong Moderate/​+ Moderate/​− Weak

Estonia Armenia Belarus Kyrgyzstan

Latvia Azerbaijan Kazakhstan Tajikistan
Lithuania Russia* Turkmenistan
Georgia Uzbekistan
Moldova
Ukraine

of the EU and NATO in the form of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU—​the
current name of an organization explicitly modeled after the EU that is meant
to evolve into a true “Eurasian Union”)2 and the CSTO (the Collective Security
Treaty Organization). The second trend involves concentrated efforts to weaken
Europe’s institutional and normative consensus by promoting an alt/​alte vi-
sion of European civilization, disseminated through information war, electoral
influencing, and other forms of “cultural statecraft” (Brattberg and Mauer 2018;
Cizik 2017; Forsberg and Smith 2016).
Russia’s current animosity toward the institutions and norms of postwar
Europe should not obscure the fact that the idea of and practices associated with
“Europeanness” remain a matter of almost obsessive concern for Russia, as has
been the case throughout its history. Nor should it mask the reality that Russia
actually has adopted a fair number of those same “European” institutions and
norms since 1989, albeit grudgingly and imperfectly. For this reason, I char-
acterize Russia’s attitude toward Europeanization as “medium/​weak,” while
recognizing that this hardly does justice to the complexity of Russia’s relation-
ship with “Europe” and “Europeanness” since 1989. Chapter 6 examines the in-
triguing paradoxes underlying Russia’s Europeanization efforts with more of the
close scrutiny they demand.
In order to properly contextualize the case studies of Europeanization in
Russia and each of the other former Soviet republics that are presented in Part
II of this book, we must first examine in some depth the more general pro-
cess of Europeanization that has taken place across the Iron Curtain since its
collapse in 1989. I present a brief overview of this process here, then discuss
specific aspects of it in more detail in the remainder of Part I. In my concep-
tualization, Europeanization involves three main sets of actors, is animated
by three main forces, and has evolved through three overlapping but clearly
distinct chronological phases. In order to both concretize and narrow the
12 Russia, the Former Soviet Republics, and Europe

application of this complex general schema of Europeanization to Russia and

the fourteen other former Soviet states, I segment the study of that process into
three sectors—​political (focusing chiefly on the EU), security (NATO), and
cultural-​civilizational (the EBU and UEFA). These sectoral discussions are also
previewed briefly at the end of this chapter and presented in more depth in the
rest of Part I—­​­chapters 3, 4, and 5, respectively.

Three Sets of Actors in Europeanization

The three sets of actors involved in the broad process of Europeanization in
the post-​communist world are as follows. (See Box 1.2.) First are the European
gatekeepers, the elites who populate the most important political, security, and
cultural-​civilizational institutions of Europe—​the EU, NATO, and UEFA/​EBU,
respectively. The second set of actors comprises the non-​Russian states of the
former communist world—​a set that includes but is not restricted to the four-
teen republics of the former Soviet Union. The third actor is Russia itself. While
they differ greatly from one another in terms of history, landmass, resource en-
dowment, and leadership, all the non-​Russian post-​communist states are situated
both literally and metaphorically between two larger hegemons, and as such,
must navigate their futures in a challenging, tightly constrained environment.
Russia’s historical status as an empire in its own right (both in its Tsarist and
Soviet guises), and the fact that it continues to occupy a liminal state between its
imperial past and its present as a “nation-​state” (albeit the world’s largest), means
that Russia’s participation in and influence on the Europeanization processes of
the past thirty years is equal (and increasingly, opposite) to that of European
actors. It is the dubious fate of the smaller states of the post-​communist world
to be caught in the (evolving and changeable) dynamic between these two
larger blocs.

Three Animating Forces of Europeanization

Three animating forces characterize the process of Europeanization that
has evolved over the past three decades. (See Box 1.3.) The first is the

Box 1.2 Three Sets of Actors in Europeanization

European Gatekeepers
Post-​Communist States
Russia
 From Europhilia to Europhob ia? 13

Box 1.3 Three Animating Forces Characterizing

Europeanization since 1989
Eurocentric-​Orientalist Cultural Gradient (EOCG)
Values-​based identity commitments embedded in postwar European institutions
Instrumental concerns of post-​communist and post-​Soviet states

European-​Orientalist cultural gradient, which sets the broad contours of rela-

tions between the western and eastern halves of Europe, and which I present
in more detail in c­ hapter 2. The assumptions of the EOCG shape the way that
Europeanization was initially framed and offered to the post-​communist states,
namely as a “tutelary” and “one-​way” process whereby “superior” western
European states and institutions dictated to “inferior” former communist states
the terms and conditions upon which they would be “allowed” to enter Europe.
The number and type of conditions required for Europeanization is conso-
nant with a given state’s position on the EOCG, and Europeanization becomes
harder and less likely for those positioned further from the European “norm.”
Significantly, as they gained membership in Europe’s most important institutions
(the EU and NATO), “new” European states from the post-​communist world
sought to recast the terms of the EOCG to include some of their post-​communist
brethren and exclude others (namely Russia).
The second and related dynamic at play in Europeanization since 1989
concerns the way that institutional, “official” Europe understands itself. Since
1945, European institutions such as the EU and NATO have been organized
on the premise that they are “special” communities of states based chiefly on
shared liberal values and norms, and not merely communities of self-​interested
actors each pursuing sovereignty according to the dictates of realpolitik. States
in the former communist world would skillfully use Europe’s value-​based self-​
understanding to “rhetorically entrap” European gatekeepers into pursuing
enlargement to the post-​communist east (Schimmelfennig 2003). That very
process of enlargement itself would, ironically and unexpectedly, later bring
about wrenching transformations in Europe’s understanding of itself as a set
of value-​based communities (Agh 2016; Appel and Orenstein 2018; Ghodsee
2017; Krastev 2017; Malova and Dolny 2016; Person 2016).
The final dynamic animating the broad contours of Europeanization in
the former communist world since 1989 is about self-​interest rather than
self-​identification. Identity and interest are intertwined in complex ways, and
throughout this analysis I remain attentive to the moments when the two are in
conflict, or when one clearly prevails over the other. Because the post-​communist
14 Russia, the Former Soviet Republics, and Europe

states exist in a profound form of the security dilemma, trying to preserve their
sovereignty in the midst of two increasingly hostile blocs, the influence of self-​
interest is at times more visible in the choices they make regarding whether or
not, or to what degree to pursue Europeanization in a particular sector (political,
security, or cultural-​civilizational).

Three Chronological Phases of Europeanization

It is helpful to break the general process of Europeanization in the post-​
communist world since 1989 into three roughly decade-​long phases. (See
Box 1.4.)
Phase One, which I call “Europhoria,” took place from 1989 to 1999. Phase
Two, “Europhilia,” encompasses the years 2000–​2008. The third stage, which
I label “Europhobia,” dates roughly from 2009 to the present.
Phase One of Europeanization: Europhoria (1989–​1999). Some of the states
that emerged newly freed from communism’s wreckage in 1989, especially the
Visegrad states of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, were intimately, if decreas-
ingly, familiar to the powers of western Europe. Towering figures from these
states, particularly Czech dissident Václav Havel, made morally and politically
forceful arguments—​ultimately successful—​that they belonged in the European
Union and NATO. Havel and others challenged those building the new EU and
leading NATO to pursue an understanding of Europeanness that was based
on what we might call Europe’s “best moral self.” They pushed gatekeepers in
western Europe to embrace confidently the salutary vision of Europe as it had
been preserved and cherished behind the Iron Curtain—​Europe as a values-​
based community that stood for political democracy, human rights, a commit-
ment to a multilateral approach to international relations, and a free but just
form of social-​welfare capitalism. (See Figure 1.1.)
Bolstered by the quick and seemingly successful reunification of Germany
in 1990, and also “rhetorically entrapped” by the skillful use of their own
claims to high moral-​mindedness against them by “pastoral authorities” like
Havel (Schimmelfennig 2003; Kuus 2007), European gatekeepers in the EU
and NATO had, by the end of the 1990s, made the decision to proceed with a

Box 1.4 Three Chronological Phases of Europeanization since 1989

Europhoria (1989–​1999)
Europhilia (2000–​2008)
Europhobia (2009–​)
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