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SELF-TRACKING
Empirical and
Philosophical
Investigations

Edited by
Btihaj Ajana
Self-Tracking
 Btihaj Ajana
Editor

Self-Tracking
Empirical and Philosophical Investigations
Editor
Btihaj Ajana
Digital Humanities
King’s College London
London, UK
and
Aarhus Institute of Advanced Studies
Aarhus University
Aarhus, Denmark

ISBN 978-3-319-65378-5 ISBN 978-3-319-65379-2 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-65379-2

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017948697

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction
on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and
information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication.
Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied,
with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have
been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published
maps and institutional affiliations.

Cover illustration: © Stephen Bonk/Fotolia.co.uk

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature

The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
 Acknowledgements

This edited collection grew out of the workshop ‘The Quantified Self
and the Rise of Self-Tracking Culture’, organised by Btihaj Ajana in June
2016 at the Aarhus Institute of Advanced Studies. The workshop was
part of Ajana’s Marie Curie Fellowship project, supported the European
Union’s Seventh Framework Programme under Grant Agreement No.
609033. We wish to thank Aarhus Institute of Advanced Studies and
the European Union for their generous support with the workshop and
this ensuing publication project. We also wish to thank all the workshop
attendees for their useful feedback and comments on our presentations
and panel discussions.
Many thanks also to the research participants and the many self-trackers
who generously shared their experiences and thoughts with us in the course
of conducting our respective research projects and writings.
Finally, we would like to thank the editors at Palgrave Macmillan for
their support with the publication of this book.

v
 Contents

1 Introduction 1
Btihaj Ajana

2 Engagement and the Quantified Self: Uneventful

Relationships with Ghostly Companions 11
Paolo Ruffino

3 Apps as Companions: How Quantified Self Apps Become

Our Audience and Our Companions 27
Jill Walker Rettberg

4 Human/Technology Associations in Self-Tracking

Practices 43
Dorthe Brogård Kristensen and Carolin Prigge

5 Social Media and Self-Tracking: Representing the ‘Health

Self’ 61
Rachael Kent

6 Self-Tracking as the Mobilisation of the Social

for Capital Accumulation 77
Chris Till

vii
viii Contents

7 The Quantified Workplace: A Study in Self-Tracking,

Agility and Change Management 93
Phoebe Moore, Lukasz Piwek and Ian Roper

8 Data Privacy: Users’ Thoughts on Quantified Self

Personal Data 111
Keith Spiller, Kirstie Ball, Arosha Bandara,
Maureen Meadows, Ciaran McCormick, Bashar Nuseibeh
and Blaine A. Price

9 Communal Self-Tracking: Data Philanthropy, Solidarity

and Privacy 125
Btihaj Ajana

Author Index 143

Subject Index 149

 Editor and Contributors

About the Editor

Btihaj Ajana is Senior Lecturer at the Department of Digital Humanities,

King’s College London. She is also associated to Aarhus Institute of
Advanced Studies where she undertook a Marie Curie Fellowship in
2015–2017. Her academic work is interdisciplinary in nature, spanning
areas of digital culture, media praxis, and biopolitics. She is the author of
Governing through Biometrics: The Biopolitics of Identity (Palgrave 2013).

Contributors

Kirstie Ball is Professor of Management at St. Andrews University. Her

research interests focus on surveillance; in particular, she is interested in
subjectivity and the experience of surveillance, employee surveillance,
consumer surveillance, and the blurring of public and private boundaries
in government surveillance regimes.
Arosha Bandara is Senior Lecturer in Computing at the Open
University. His research focuses on addressing the practical problems
associated with building and maintaining self-managing systems. Most
recently, he has been investigating ways in which machine-learning tech-
niques can improve the privacy management capabilities for users.

ix
x Editor and Contributors

Rachael Kent is a Ph.D. candidate at King’s College London. She

is currently researching the use of social media and digital health tech-
nologies as part of the European Research Council funded project, Ego
Media. Kent is also a Graduate Teaching Assistant at the Department of
Digital Humanities, King’s College London.
Dorthe Brogård Kristensen is Associate Professor in Consumption
Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. She holds a Ph.D. from
the University of Copenhagen (2008) and an M.Sc. in medical anthro-
pology from University College London (1998). Her current interests
include digital health, food, social marketing, and medical pluralism.
Ciaran McCormick is Technical Project Officer in Computing at the
Open University. He is a KDB+/Q Developer, Functional Programmer,
and Big Data Devotee.
Maureen Meadows is Professor of Strategic Management at Coventry
University. Her research explores the use of data, particularly customer/
consumer data, by organisations of all kinds; the analysis of ‘big data’
to support decision-making and enhance strategic conversations; and
the impact of data sharing and privacy on customer behaviours and new
business models.
Phoebe Moore is an internationally renowned researcher on labour,
technology, and global governance. Moore’s recent publications in this
area include ‘The Quantified Self: What counts in the neoliberal work-
place’ (New Media and Society 2016) and Humans and Machines
at Work: Monitoring, Surveillance and Automation in Contemporary
Capitalism (Palgrave October 2017).
Bashar Nuseibeh is Professor of Computing at the Open University.
His research interests are broadly in software engineering, requirements
engineering and design, with a special interest in applications in security,
privacy, and digital forensics. His work aims to improve the development
of both cyber-physical systems and socio-technical ones.
Lukasz Piwek is Assistant Professor in Data Science at the School of
Management, University of Bath. His research work focuses on using
Big Data obtained from mobile devices, smart wearables, apps, and
social networks in security, work, health profiling, behaviour change, and
developing new research methodologies.
 Editor and Contributors xi

Blaine A. Price is Senior Lecturer of Computing at the Open

University. His research interests are in privacy in mobile and ubiquitous
computing and in lifelogging technologies in particular, including both
personal lifelogging and logging energy and resource usage.
Carolin Prigge finished her Master's Degree in Brand Management
and Marketing Communication in 2016 at the University of Southern
Denmark. Originally from Germany, she has been studying abroad in
Denmark, Spain, and the USA. Her work investigates the consumption
of fitness self-tracking technologies from a postphenomenological per-
spective.
Jill Walker Rettberg is Professor of Digital Culture at the University of
Bergen. She is the author of Seeing Ourselves Through Technology: How
We Uses Selfies, Blogs and Wearable Devices to See and Shape Ourselves
(Palgrave 2014) and Blogging (Polity Press 2014).
Ian Roper works at Middlesex University where he teaches employ-
ment relations and contemporary human resources management. He has
research interests in the nature of professionalism, employment relations,
ethics, and employment regulation. He has written a number of journal
articles and book chapters and edited books on these topics.
Paolo Ruffino is Lecturer in Media Studies at the University of
Lincoln. He has been researching and teaching on video game culture,
gamification, the Quantified Self, and media arts. He is one of the four
founding members of the art collective IOCOSE.
Keith Spiller is Lecturer in Criminology at Birmingham City University.
His research examines the social consequences of surveillance and its
impacts on organisations and individuals. His work has considered
CCTV, security regulation, counter-terror measures, and the impacts of
surveillance technologies within the UK’s travel and financial sectors.
Chris Till is a Senior Lecturer in Sociology at Leeds Beckett University.
His research interests are in social theory, health, technologies, and bod-
ies. Currently, he is conducting research into the use of self-tracking
technologies in corporate wellness programs to explore the role they play
in digital capitalism.
 List of Figures

Fig. 3.1 Chatman’s model of the narrative communication

situation (redrawn from Chatman 1978, 151) 31
Fig. 3.2 Google Books Ngram Viewer chart showing the occurrence
of the phrase ‘dear diary’ (with different capitalisation)
in books published between 1800 and 2000 that have
been digitised by Google. Chart generated 01.06.2016 33
Fig. 3.3 From left to right: iPhone Health app, Reporter, Withings 35
Fig. 4.1 The idea of the figure is to map the life cycle
of the self-tracking practice. In a way, there is always
this kind of negotiation in terms of the impact of technology
and practice on one’s life. The figure shows that it is not
possible to move backward, only forward. It is possible
to jump from hermeneutics to alterity or integration 57
Fig. 7.1 Timeline of QWS project with the list of all data that was
collected during the year-long study. Numbers in brackets
indicate the number of participants (n) who gave permission
to access their data or participated in the interviews
and/or surveys 99
Fig. 7.2 Frequency of (a) using Fitbits, and (b) completing
self-reports for the period between March 2015
and February 2016 shown for each participant separately
(each row for separate participant). Bars indicate
the use/completion in a specific time period, while gaps
indicate the lack of use/completion 102

xiii
xiv List of Figures

Fig. 7.3 Fitbit step counts and self-reports rating for well-being,
productivity and stress, scaled and averaged monthly across
all participants for the period of one year with fitted smoothed
conditional mean line and standard errors (grey bands) 103
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Btihaj Ajana

Abstract Practices of self-tracking and quantification through d ­ igital

technologies have become commonplace in recent years. With the rapid
spread of apps and devices enabling the data capturing and monitor-
ing of the individual’s everyday activities, behaviours and habits, an
increasing number of people around the world are embracing this cul-
ture of quantification and self-tracking in the spirit of improving their
health and charting their fitness progress. Encouraged by movements
such as the Quantified Self, whose motto is ‘self-knowledge through
numbers’, practices of self-tracking and fitness monitoring have now
become routine aspects of everyday life. In this introductory chapter,
I begin by introducing the topic of the book, providing a contextu-
alisation of its content and an overview of the different chapters in this
edited collection.

Keywords Self-tracking · Quantified self · Quantification

Lifelogging · Apps · Health

B. Ajana (*)
Digital Humanities, King’s College London, London, UK;
Aarhus Institute of Advanced Studies, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark
e-mail: btihaj.ajana@kcl.ac.uk

© The Author(s) 2018 1

B. Ajana (ed.), Self-Tracking, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-65379-2_1
2 B. Ajana

Practices of self-tracking and quantification through digital technolo-

gies have become commonplace in recent years. With the rapid spread
of apps and devices enabling the data capturing, monitoring and analy-
sis of one’s daily activities, behaviours and habits, an increasing number
of people around the world are embracing this growing culture of self-
measurement and tracking in the spirit of improving their health, well-
being, productivity and other aspects of everyday life. There are now
over 160,000 self-tracking apps on the markets (Lupton 2016a, 1) and
a broad collection of wearable devices such as Fitbit, Jawbone UP, Nike+
Fuel and Apple Watch. Intended to motivate users by encouraging a
healthy lifestyle through daily monitoring, such devices and apps record
a wide range of biometric data, health indicators and vital signs, includ-
ing calories consumed, distances walked and hours slept. In fact, there
are now apps and devices that can even scan our mood and emotions,
our levels of stress and anxiety as well as our very intimate ‘sexual perfor-
mance’. Self-tracking is also not limited to health monitoring but extends
to cover other aspects, including location tracking and the measurement
of productivity and performance at the workplace.
Back in 2007, Gary Wolf and Kevin Kelly from Wired Magazine
established a group under the name, the Quantified Self, a term that cap-
tures precisely these growing practices of digital self-tracking, promot-
ing a new type of wisdom: ‘self-knowledge through numbers’. Since its
inception, the Quantified Self community has grown to include over 200
regular meet-up groups across more than 100 cities around the world.
The term itself is now used to describe almost any form of self-tracking.1
When the trend began, its followers were, as noted in the Economist
(2012), ‘an eclectic mix of early adopters, fitness freaks, technology
evangelists, personal-development junkies, hackers and patients suffer-
ing from a wide variety of health problems’. Now, and with the conver-
gence of health apps and mobile devices, anyone with a smartphone, for
instance, is likely to be engaged in one form of self-tracking or another,
and oftentimes in a rather automatic and passive way (as is the case with
of location tracking or Apple’s Health app that automatically tracks
user’s steps). Speaking of the notion of ‘lifelogging’, another term for
self-tracking, Selke (2016, 3) suggests that ‘the real lifelogging innova-
tion is the automatic data collection that usually goes unnoticed in daily
life […] the logger no longer has to make decisions because the system
and its sensors constantly collect different data’.
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

To be sure, the idea of monitoring the body and its activities is not
completely new, nor is the use of metrics to chart progress and goal
attainment. As Carmichael (2010) reminds us, ‘[p]eople have been
recording their lives in analog format ever since they started drawing on
cave walls’. However, developments in digital technologies and sensors
have made it easier than ever to automate the process of self-tracking and
quantification, embedding this practice into everyday products such as
mobile phones and watches. For the first time, Topol (2013) argues, we
can digitise humans ‘in highest definition, in granular detail, and in ways
that most people thought would not be possible’.
And in economic terms, measuring the body is becoming a very prof-
itable industry. According to a report by BCC Research (2015), the
global market for wearable self-tracking technologies reached US$3.2
billion in 2014. They expect this number to grow to US$18.8 billion in
2019.2 The rapidly increasing market value of wearable tracking devices
and apps is, itself, indicative of the growing interest in such technologies
and the notable shift towards self-quantification and performance moni-
toring in general.
The impact of this growing phenomenon of self-tracking has been
receiving much attention recently, as evidenced in the mass media cover-
age of these trends and in the rapidly developing body of literature from
medical researchers, cognitive and behavioural psychologists, and social
scientists. Much of this literature tends to celebrate digital self-tracking
practices as emancipatory and empowering for both individuals and insti-
tutions (Swan 2012; Townsend 2013; Wei 2013; Topol 2013). For the
individual, it is often reported that the practice of tracking one’s physical
activity and health indicators can have a positive impact on well-being
(Fox and Duggan 2013) in the way it allows the user to set daily goals,
monitor health habits and identify actions that are conducive to the bet-
terment of fitness levels, health and life overall. Researchers in persuasive
computing (for instance, Purpura et al. 2011 and Thieme et al. 2012)
have also explored the motivational aspects and the ‘nurselike applica-
tion’ (Singer 2015) of self-tracking devices and apps, given how these
technologies are increasingly designed to playfully ‘prod’ the user to take
action rather than just collect data.
For the wider health community, it is often postulated that self-track-
ing practices can play an important role in the advancement of medicine
and health research in the sense that they can enable the capturing of
4 B. Ajana

quantifiable health data which can feed into decision-making vis-à-vis

one’s lifestyle, diet options, exercise activities, performance and habits,
while comparing these to the wider population. According to Rhodes
(2014), ‘the immediate benefit of self-tracking data is that it can pro-
vide better measures of everyday behavior and lifestyle, filling the gaps in
more traditional clinical data collection and presenting a more complete
picture of health’. What this offers at the broader level of public health-
care is the promise to enhance risk management and analysis regarding
health and illness and to stimulate a shift from an exclusive dependence
on health professionals towards participatory and preventative models of
health management (Swan 2012).
The speculative benefits of self-tracking technologies and practices
have also been coupled with growing concerns, ranging from privacy,
surveillance and data ownership issues to concerns about the excessive
­self-involvement and the pressure of self-improvement that often under-
score the practices and ethos of self-tracking culture (Lupton 2016b; Till
2014; Moore and Robinson 2015). Other concerns have been expressed
with regard to the possibilities of categorisation, discrimination and exclu-
sion that self-tracking culture might exacerbate. Lupton (2016a), for
instance, argues that while self-tracking can promote health and well-being,
it can also contribute to socio-economic disadvantage and marginalisation:
‘People who do not take up suggestions to self-track their health and fit-
ness by their employers or insurers, for example, may suffer adverse con-
sequences such as being considered as an inadequate employee or paying
higher premiums’ (Lupton 2016a, 4). As this phenomenon of self-track-
ing continues to spread in almost every sphere of daily life, it becomes all
the more important to attend to its myriad effects and assess the kinds of
futures that are being designed as a result of the rapid infiltration of digital
tracking technologies in everyday settings and activities.
Recent academic work from fields such as sociology, philosophy and
digital culture has begun to highlight the complex sociocultural, politi-
cal and ethical dynamics and implications of self-tracking practices, add-
ing a critical dimension to the debate (Whitson 2013; Ruckenstein 2014;
Till 2014; Lupton 2016b; Neff and Nafus 2016; Nafus 2016; Selke
2016; Moore and Robinson 2015). Yet there remains a need for further
theoretical and empirical investigations to enhance our understanding
of the different manifestations and nuanced aspects of self-tracking cul-
ture, and challenge some of the assumptions and discourses relating to
the Quantified Self movement and its ethos. The aim of this book is to
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

contribute to this process through a critical exploration of various sites

and examples of self-tracking and by engaging with a number of perti-
nent political, philosophical, ethical and cultural questions.
This edited collection brings together scholars who are working at
the forefront of the critical study of self-tracking culture and actively
engaged in developing empirically based and conceptually sophisticated
analyses of the challenging issues raised by developments in self-tracking
technologies and practices. They each provide a different lens through
which one can examine this rising trend, while grounding the discussions
in relevant empirical examples. From (post-)phenomenology to discourse
analysis, from questions of identity, privacy and agency to issues of sur-
veillance and tracking at the workplace, this edited collection takes on
a wide, and yet focused, approach to the timely topic of self-tracking,
in terms of both the methodological approaches adopted and the issues
addressed throughout. What these chapters have primarily in common
is their preoccupation with the human/technology relationship; how it
is experienced, performed and redefined through self-tracking practices.
The first contribution, by Paolo Ruffino, proposes an alternative
reading of the interconnection between the user and the self-tracking
artefact. Focusing on his own personal use of the Nike Fuel wristband,
Ruffino explores the impact that the technology and his own actions had
on each other throughout the duration of his 2-year self-tracking expe-
rience. By playfully deploying the metaphor of romantic relationship to
deconstruct and narrate the dynamics of his own intimate connection
with the Nike Fuel device, Ruffino provides thoughtful reflections on
Quantified Self practices and ideologies as well as useful signposts as to
how one can relate differently to self-tracking technologies. He particu-
larly takes issue with the concepts of ‘engagement’ and ‘movement’ that
are at the heart of the marketing campaigns of the wearables industry.
He argues that the Quantified Self movement, as it has been understood
and applied so far, aims at a particular kind of engagement with the user
that keeps both user and technology at a distance, static and never fully
affecting each other. Ultimately, this makes it impossible to reach a trans-
formative engagement that can truly bring about significant changes for
the user. Inspired by the work of Donna Haraway, Ruffino concludes by
advocating a form of disruptive engagement that can interrupt the repet-
itive, uneventful and never-ending cycle of self-tracking in order to give
way to more meaningful, playful and hermeneutic experiences and prac-
tices of self-exploration.
6 B. Ajana

The following chapter by Jill Walker Rettberg also examines the rela-
tionship between technology (Quantified Self apps in this case) and
users. Adopting a narratological approach, the chapter explores the
diary-like aspect of self-tracking and the way in which apps, such as Lark
and Capsule.fm, act as conversational companions, through Artificial
Intelligence and chat bot programming rather than simply being a mere
tool or an object that a human subject uses. In this sense, Rettberg
argues that with self-tracking devices and apps, technology acquires
agency and subjectivity of its own and develops a form of kinship with
the user. The author provides a number of examples in which the anthro-
pomorphism of self-tracking technologies is manifested in everyday
practices and whereby apps and devices can be seen as conversational
agents and personal coaches. In conclusion, Rettberg questions how the
humanisation of our self-tracking tools might be easing us into a new
kind of relationship with technology, one in which we might not be fully
in control after all.
Another exploration of human/technology relationship is provided in
Kristensen’s and Prigge’s chapter which is based on two studies: a longi-
tudinal ethnographic study undertaken from 2012 to 2016 among mem-
bers of the Danish Quantified Self community and a study in a German
context of more mainstream users of fitness tracking apps and devices.
Drawing on post-phenomenological methods, Kristensen and Prigge
examine how users perceive and experience self-tracking technologies
and the data generated through their practices. Taking cue from the
work of Ihde and Verbeek, the authors attempt to establish a typology
of the self/technology constellation that is informed by both empiri-
cal analysis and philosophical considerations. This typology is explained
along four temporal dimensions: first, hermeneutics of the self which refers
to the act of interpretation and sense-making that users bring into their
experience of self-tracking as well as the way in which technology itself
mediates and transforms the experience of one’s self. Second, embodi-
ment of the self to examine how technology becomes part of the bodily
self, broadening the sensory apparatus of the body. Third, entanglement
through which the user becomes aware of how technology amplifies,
reduces or even contradicts the subjective experience of the self. And
finally, integration which accounts for the ways in which users integrate
self-tracking technology into everyday practices as a kind of background.
Kristensen and Prigge conclude by calling for a more critical stance
towards the role played by self-tracking technologies in shaping and
defining what counts as healthy and active.
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

Rachael Kent’s chapter picks up on this issue and considers the role of
self-tracking technologies and social media platforms in shaping and medi-
ating self-representation and, with it, ‘personal health identity’. Drawing
on a set of in-depth interviews with regular users of self-tracking devices
and apps, Kent explores how the sharing of self-tracking data on platforms
such as Facebook and Instagram helps users construct not only an online
identity but also a ‘health self’. Kent questions the extent to which sur-
veillance by self and others (through the convergence of self-tracking data
and the sharing culture of social media) influences self-representations
and the ways in which users experience and view their body and health.
The author argues that for many self-trackers, personal gratification and
sense of achievement are reinforced through the gaze of the commu-
nity (whether on social media or the dedicated online health platforms).
Ultimately, the question arises as to whether the acquisition and sharing
of self-tracking data mean better health outcomes or health optimisation.
Kent provides a nuanced answer to this question cautioning against the
oversimplified understandings of body and health that often transpire
from the data-driven practices of self-tracking.
Chapter 6 by Chris Till moves the discussion to the context of the
workplace and particularly with regard to the corporate wellness schemes
that have been adopted by an increasing number of companies in recent
years. Using critical discourse analysis to examine the promotional lit-
erature belonging to Virgin Pulse and Global Corporate Challenge, the
chapter considers emergent initiatives revolving around the provision of
activity trackers to employees and the institution of team competition
among self-tracking workers. Such initiatives are intended to promote
good health and high productivity. Till links these developments to ‘con-
nexionist’ philosophy, which is prominent in management discourse and
considered as an important catalyst for subjective investment in capital
accumulation. This helps the author unravel what constitutes the ‘ideal
worker’ and the ‘good manager’ in the context of corporate wellness,
and the kind of strategies that are mobilised for the purpose of actualis-
ing such ideal. Self-tracking practices are seen here as a means of encour-
aging connexionism through the stimulation of interactions between
workers and providing the ethical justification for managerial interven-
tion into employee’s health and physical activity.
Remaining with the context of the workplace, Moore’s, Piwek’s
and Roper’s chapter examines issues of quantification and tracking in
work settings with a specific focus on so-called agile and lean modes of
8 B. Ajana

production. They draw on an empirical case study involving the use of

Fitbit devices, RescueTime and daily lifelogs to track employees’ physi-
cal activity, hours of productivity and subjective sense of well-being and
stress. Through a mixed-method observational approach comprised of
electronic surveys and in-depth interviews, the authors explored partici-
pants’ experience of the self-tracking wellness scheme and their views on
its effectiveness and impact. The findings of this research revealed a level
of dissatisfaction among employees vis-à-vis the self-tracking devices and
techniques they used as well as a desire for further assistance and coach-
ing to achieve better results. Concerns about data security and privacy
were also expressed by some of the participants, especially with regard
to the potential of the data collected to be used for performance mon-
itoring and appraisals. The chapter concludes by recommending better
communication between employers and employees about the intentions
and objectives of wellness schemes and calling for more in-depth discus-
sions about the possible role of self-tracking and agile methods in future
workplaces as well as a thorough engagement with the ethical issues that
might arise out of these corporate wellness initiatives.
The issue of data privacy is the topic of discussion in Spiller et al.’s
chapter. Based on a series of interviews with members of the Quantified
Self London Meetup group, the authors question how these users view
and value the data they collect and share with others, and how they eval-
uate issues of privacy in the context of self-tracking. The findings suggest
that there is a sense of ambiguity as to how personal data are managed
and used, and a lack of interest in privacy among users. The authors
explain that while there is some level of awareness of privacy issues, users
are, nevertheless, content to provide data to manufacturers and third
parties. This openness towards data sharing is underlined by the belief
that there is little to be compromised in sharing the data, as the mantra
of ‘I have nothing to hide, nothing to fear’ persists. This also has to do
with the value ascribed to self-tracking data in terms of its function as
a memory tool for accessing useful content with ease and its supposed
benefit for the ‘greater good’. These views are of course questionable,
especially given the way they uncritically equate data with knowledge and
absence of privacy with access and public good.
The last chapter in this collection delves further into the issue of pri-
vacy, linking it to debates on data philanthropy and solidarity. By explor-
ing the social and communal dimension of self-tracking through specific
examples, the chapter elucidates the tension between philanthropic
 1 INTRODUCTION 9

discourses of data sharing and issues of privacy, data ownership and secu-
rity. The chapter also questions the extent to which data sharing can
be seen as a ‘solidaristic’ act that has the potential to contribute to the
wider health community. One important issue raised in this chapter is to
do with the changing attitudes towards the concept of privacy itself. It
argues that privacy is increasingly perceived as being too individualistic,
too narrow and in opposition to the notion of public good. In response,
the chapter cautions against such simplistic and binary attitudes and calls
for a more heightened awareness of the stakes of the data sharing culture
and a critical stance towards the increasing normalisation of self-tracking
practices.
Finally, and as the editor of this book, I can only hope that this edited
collection contributes to stimulating such awareness and paving the way
for further engagement and critical enquiry into the phenomenon of
self-tracking.

Notes
1. I should point out at the outset that throughout this book, we use terms
of self-tracking and Quantified Self interchangeably. Here, we do not
restrict the term Quantified Self to the community it represents, but see it
as an umbrella term that covers both the self-tracking community and the
‘practice’ itself. I have given the authors, contributing to this edited collec-
tion, the freedom to use the term they prefer.
2. Although, as noted in Ruffino’s chapter in this book, there has been a
period of crisis for the self-tracking industry.

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 CHAPTER 2

Engagement and the Quantified Self:

Uneventful Relationships with Ghostly
Companions

Paolo Ruffino

Abstract This chapter looks at the notion of engagement and its inter-
pretation in the development and marketing of self-tracking wearable
devices and in the literature on the Quantified Self and gamification. It
concludes that the vision provided so far in these contexts imagines a
scenario where events are impossible, and the quantification of the self
is reduced to a collection of facts about the individual. It is precisely
by investigating the polysemy of the term ‘engagement’ that alterna-
tive relationships with our quantified selves could be imagined. This is a
necessary practice, in an age when engagement is no longer voluntarily
but imposed on the user by invisible forms of tracking. The argument
is supported by drawing on a personal, emotional, and ‘catastrophic’
experience with Nike+ FuelBand.

Keywords Self-tracking · Engagement · Quantified Self · Nike+

Gamification

P. Ruffino (*)
University of Lincoln, Lincoln, UK
e-mail: p.ruffino@gmail.com

© The Author(s) 2018 11

B. Ajana (ed.), Self-Tracking, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-65379-2_2
12 P. Ruffino

Introduction
In this chapter, I question how the notion of engagement has been
interpreted in the development and marketing of self-tracking wearable
devices and in the literature on the Quantified Self and gamification. I
conclude that the vision provided so far imagines a scenario that excludes
the possibility for any event to happen, thus reducing the quantification
of the self to a series of facts about the individual. To support my argu-
ment, I will draw on my personal, emotional, and ‘catastrophic’ experi-
ence with Nike+ FuelBand.
In 2012, I bought the Nike+ FuelBand, a self-tracking wearable
device developed by Nike. The wristband has an accelerometer that
detects the movement of the wrist and converts it into a number, which
constitutes the personal score of the user (also known as NikeFuel). The
score resets every night at midnight, and it is visible by pressing a but-
ton on the wristband or via the smartphone app. Nike+ FuelBand is part
of the Nike+ series, a combination of products for self-tracking. The
Nike+ series is oriented towards sports practitioners and amateurs who
want to keep a healthy lifestyle by monitoring their personal activity. Self-
monitoring is supposed to motivate the user to practice sports or simply
to move more.
I have been wearing the Nike+ FuelBand for about two years. Every
day, the gadget and myself were in contact with each other. I used to
touch it, to see my daily score, and it would provide me with informa-
tion about my movement. Retrospectively, the initial period has been rel-
atively useful for my fitness. The score gave me a good reason to pursue
physical activity. It worked, at least for a while. After two years, I decided
to stop wearing it. The reason for this break-up has always been hard
to articulate, and my speculations on the Quantified Self originate from
the difficulty of explaining to myself the failure of this story. Two years
is a long period, and I had almost stopped considering the use of the
wristband as a deliberate choice. Nike+ FuelBand was on my wrist all day
long, every day, and I would check my NikeFuel score as frequently and
naturally as one could check the time. Checking the score was more than
a habit. It was a tic. As a couple in a long-lasting relationship, we became
used to each other. Although moments of occasional excitement could
still occur (e.g. breaking my personal record or achieving a reward for
running on my birthday), most of the time the presence of the Nike+
FuelBand on my wrist was invisible to my eyes.
 2 ENGAGEMENT AND THE QUANTIFIED SELF … 13

A few months after my decision, Nike announced that NikeFuel

would be discontinued. The wristband would no longer be supported or
sold, and Nike would only work on the Nike+ API to build an improved
smartphone app, focussing only on the software (Newton 2014). The
production of similar gadgets was stopped in the following months.
Jawbone announced that they would no longer produce their fitness
trackers in May 2016 (Ingraham 2016). The leader in the market, Fitbit,
reported significant losses in profit and announced that they might soon
be working on the software only (Pressman 2017). In a white paper pub-
lished by the consulting company Endeavour Partners in January 2014,
it is revealed that self-tracking wearables, while initially successful in
terms of sales, have failed to persuade most of its users to keep using
the devices a few months after their purchase. Most of these devices, the
paper reveals, ‘fail to drive long-term sustained engagement for a major-
ity of users’ (Ledger and McCaffrey 2014, 4). The drop in sales and con-
sumption of fitness gadgets became known around 2014, and it started
having effects on the production of these tools. An article in Fortune
magazine reporting the fall in stock prices for Fitbit, also comments
that ‘in Fitbit’s view, the sales slump is a sign that the market for track-
ers among early adopters has been saturated, but more mainstream buy-
ers, the so-called late adopters, haven’t gotten on board yet’ (Pressman
2017). The paper by Endeavour Partner defines the disappointing result
of self-tracking gadgets as the ‘dirty little secret of wearables’ (Ledger
and McCaffrey 2014, 4).
However, the poor results of wearables influence only one dimension
of self-tracking practices and should not be mistaken for a general failure
of the techniques for collection and archival of private data. As Deborah
Lupton argues, ‘self-tracking can no longer be viewed as an individual
enterprise […]. Self-tracking has been taken up in various social domains,
for objectives that go well beyond the individual’s quest for self-knowl-
edge and self-improvement’ (2016, 142–143). Lupton notes that there
are at least five different modes for tracking the self. Nike+ FuelBand
and other wearables could be defined as forms of private self-tracking,
confined to consensual and personal objectives. There are also examples
of pushed tracking, where the initiative comes from an external agent;
communal tracking where data are shared among a community of users;
tracking can also be imposed by an external agent and finally exploited or
used by other agents for commercial or management purposes (Lupton
2016, 143). Gina Neff and Dawn Nafus (2016) similarly claim that
14 P. Ruffino

self-tracking is now becoming less visible but more present, as uses of

digital technologies increasingly imply the collection of personal data by
external agents, and for purposes that remain largely unknown or not
explicit.
Self-tracking might be disappearing as a deliberate choice from the
side of the user. It is also disappearing from users’ wrists, as the most
recent trend from the leading companies is to transform wearables,
which are usually ‘bulky’ and ‘geeky’, into ‘chic’ accessories or incor-
porated into watches and other gadgets, thus ultimately making them
invisible (Goode 2016; Chrara 2016). The tracking of body move-
ments is far from dissipating and is being remediated by other less vis-
ible technologies. For instance, after quitting Nike+ FuelBand, I realised
that, while my daily steps might no longer be counted by Nike’s prod-
ucts, the iPhone Health app is fulfilling the same purpose, functioning
on the background of my smartphone and without my explicit consent.
Self-tracking in the post-Snowden era does not need to be consensual
(Karanasiou and Kang 2016).

The Crisis of Engagement

The crisis of self-tracking wearables seems to concern the interest and
curiosity of the general public to intentionally quantify their own lives.
In the literature on the Quantified Self movement, the complex feeling
of desire and commitment to self-tracking has been defined as engage-
ment, a single word that summarises, in marketing talk, the vexed prob-
lem of acquiring and retaining customers. The white paper by Endeavour
Partners refers to ‘engagement’ when outlining their solution to the
marketing crisis of self-tracking wearables. The goal is ‘sustained engage-
ment’, there defined as a ‘long-term impact on […] users’ health and
happiness’ (Ledger and McCaffrey 2014, 6). The term engagement also
appears in the literature on gamification, a movement grounded in the
same context of the Quantified Self. Popularised through TED Talks and
in Wired magazine, gamification promises to transform serious activi-
ties (such as keeping a healthy lifestyle, working, learning, and teach-
ing) into game-like experiences, via the introduction of game design
elements such as badges, rewards, and rankings (Deterding et al. 2011;
Fuchs et al. 2014). Gamification is often sold to companies who intend
to motivate their employees or customers, and manuals that explain
these techniques have been published abundantly since 2010, when the
 2 ENGAGEMENT AND THE QUANTIFIED SELF … 15

movement became popular among digital businesses. An oft-cited text-

book, ‘Gamification by Design’ (Zichermann and Cunningham 2011),
begins precisely with a definition of engagement:

The term ‘engagement’, in a business sense, indicates the connection

between a consumer and a product or service. Unsurprisingly, the term
is also used to name the period in a romantic couple’s relationship dur-
ing which they are preparing and planning to spend the rest of their lives
together. Engagement is the period of time at which we have a great
deal of connection with a person, place, thing or idea. (Zichermann and
Cunningham 2011, xvi)

Zichermann and Cunningham rapidly dismiss the polysemy of the term

and propose a metric that could quantify engagement and make it under-
standable and improvable. The challenge of defining engagement is
acknowledged by the two gamification gurus. Engagement is a nebulous
concept, one that captures the transformation of a series of deliberate
actions in habits, choices repeated in time.
The metaphor of the romantic relationship introduced, and dismissed,
by Zichermann and Cunningham can be used to broaden and re-inter-
pret the meaning of engagement. The ‘great deal of connection’ that I
experienced with Nike+ FuelBand failed to last in the long term, but it
was based on a physical proximity and mutual influence. We had been
living together, almost like a couple. My argument is that the notion of
engagement is vital not only to understand the logic of quantification of
the self, but also to imagine possible interventions within the practices
of quantification of our lives. Thus, the polysemy of the term should be
investigated. Especially in a period when the Quantified Self is increas-
ingly orientated towards imposed and exploited forms of tracking, to
borrow Lupton’s categories (2016), there is a need to re-assess the nebu-
lous connection between the self and its quantified-other. I argue that
it is not a coincidence that engagement is, at the same time, one of the
most used words in the literature on the Quantified Self and gamifica-
tion, and one of the most ambiguous and poorly defined. The connec-
tion between human and tool, while being imagined in the development
and advertisement of technologies for self-tracking as being instanta-
neous and transparent, is instead ambiguous and inconclusive, as often
experienced by two partners during a long relationship.
16 P. Ruffino

Self-tracking might soon become an invisible practice, part of our dig-

ital lives and technological environment. Yet, it is precisely the role of
media theory to imagine counter-environments, ‘to prevent us becoming
adjusted to our environments’ and ‘provide new vision and new powers
of adjusting to and relating to new situations’ (McLuhan 2003, 223).
David Beer has outlined the three main areas where to challenge and
renegotiate the seemingly effortless escalation of the Quantified Self in
all areas of our lives: the measurement of data and the history of assess-
ing social entities quantitatively; the circulation of data among private
and public institutions, or the social life of data; and finally, the possi-
bilities that data open and restrict in regard to maintaining power and
inequalities (Beer 2016). According to Beer, measurement, circulation,
and possibility are the key areas to address when trying to understand
practices of life tracking, and imagine what else these could be. I argue
that all three areas can be understood through a study of practices of
engagement. The connection between user and product, human and
technology, the self and its quantified-other must be re-evaluated and
re-thought if we are to imagine forms of negotiation and resistance in
regard to the measurement and circulation of data on our private lives.
At stake is the evaluation of a current trend in digital culture, but also
the possibility of organising a political action in regard to the forced col-
lection of data about ourselves.

An Uneventful Relationship
During the two years of engagement with Nike+ FuelBand, I expe-
rienced a technical fault of the device. While travelling across different
time zones, the daily NikeFuel score changed in an unpredictable man-
ner, multiplying my points and making them incomparable with previ-
ous and future recordings. I wrote to Nike on Twitter and received
assistance on my issue. Eventually, I solved the problem by switching off
the synchronisation with my smartphone while travelling. In this way, the
wristband would keep its internal clock set at the time of the point of
departure (in my case, it was the Greenwich Mean Time). Initially, the
problem did not raise any particular concern. Only many months later I
realised that it was probably that technical fault that made me reconsider
my decision of wearing Nike+ FuelBand. The fault became a significant
moment of disruption in an otherwise smooth process of engagement.
The technical problem was not just a consequence of a miscalculation
 2 ENGAGEMENT AND THE QUANTIFIED SELF … 17

from the side of Nike’s developers but, more generally, of the concep-
tion of time and movement that underlies technologies for self-tracking.
Indeed, it is paradoxical that a device for the measurement of movement
fails in its primary purpose when the user moves ‘too much’ across dif-
ferent time zones. However, there is also another paradox, much more
deep-rooted and disconcerting, involved with the technical fault, one
that has troubled Western philosophy in the last 2000 years.
It is comprehensible why the NikeFuel score cannot possibly work
by crossing time zones. Dawn Nafus (2016) reminds us that data are by
definition ‘dated’ (Boellstorff 2013). Data ‘always have a date – they are
that which is stamped by time, recorded as having taken place’ (Nafus
2016, xviii). Time stamps allow data to be compared and correlated.
This process is vital for biosensor technologies used in medicine, where
alterations between two variables are correlated to produce meaning-
ful data about the patient, for instance, by noticing that an increase in
heart rate happens at the same time of a physical activity. Time needs to
be recorded on both acquisitions if the correlation between sets of data
is required. However, the necessity of associating the recording of the
accelerometer on my Nike+ FuelBand wristband with the internal clock
reveals a limitation of Nike’s gadget, as well as life-tracking and biosensor
technologies. These devices succeed in their purpose only as long as the
conditions for the measurement of time remain the same.
The other, more troublesome, paradox that the stability of time meas-
urement brings with it is that time, and movement, should be thought
of as being homogenous, spatialised, and ultimately static. This is the
conclusion reached in the seminal paradox by Zeno of Elea, formulated
by the pre-Socratic philosopher in the fifth-century BC. Zeno presented
his theory on movement by imagining paradoxical scenarios that revealed
apparently irresolvable conditions. In one of his most famous paradoxes,
Zeno imagines that Achilles, a mythological character celebrated for his
athletic abilities, would compete in a race with a tortoise. The tortoise is
given a certain margin of advantage over Achilles. When the race begins,
each contestant runs at constant speed. Common sense suggests that
Achilles surpasses the tortoise in a few steps and wins the race. However,
Zeno argues that before Achilles could reach the tortoise, the animal
moves forward, although by a minimal distance. By the time, Achilles
covers that extra distance, the tortoise again moves slightly further. For
each step that Achilles performs, the tortoise will always keep the lead of
the race, as the distances between the two contestants can be infinitely
18 P. Ruffino

divided. Thus, Zeno concludes, the race between Achilles and the tor-
toise reveals that movement is impossible. The space occupied while
moving can be divided infinitely, and the movement itself is inconceiv-
able. The paradox of Zeno should apply not just to the two contestants
of the imaginary race, but to anyone, anywhere, and at any time zone.
Henri Bergson has been one of the many to challenge the paradox
of Zeno in the centuries that followed its original formulation. Bergson
(2001) explains how, and why, movement is in fact possible, as it appears
to our common sense. Bergson observes that in the imaginary race
Achilles would certainly and easily win. The problem posed by Zeno is
unsolvable if it is presented through the terms used by the pre-Socratic
philosopher. In Zeno’s narrative, Bergson argues, the movement is spa-
tialised, or thought of as if it amounts to the space occupied while mov-
ing. Zeno imagines a line that begins at the starting point of the race and
ends at the finishing line. In this view, the line can be infinitely divided
into smaller fragments, thus moving along this imaginary line will take
an infinite amount of time. However, intuition tells us that Achilles
runs faster than the tortoise. Bergson argues that Achilles’ victory is to
be attributed to the duration of his movement, compared to that of the
tortoise. The duration of movement is what Zeno does not take into
account. Movements have a duration, and duration cannot be reduced to
space. While the space surrounding the two contestants is homogenous
and can be infinitely divided into smaller fragments, the movements of
Achilles and the tortoise are not similarly homogenous and happen in
time as much as in space. As Bergson concludes, movements are indivis-
ible and different in kind with respect to the space occupied by Achilles
and the tortoise:

Why does Achilles outstrip the tortoise? Because each of Achilles’ steps and
each of the tortoise’s steps are indivisible acts in so far as they are move-
ments, and are different magnitudes in so far as they are space […]. This
is what Zeno leaves out of account when he reconstructs the movement of
Achilles […], forgetting that space alone can be divided and put together
again in any way we like, and thus confusing space with motion. (Bergson
2001, 113–114)

Bergson solves the paradox through what he names intuition, a faculty

of the mind that allows human beings to ‘[state] a problem and [solve]
it in terms of time rather than of space’ (Deleuze 1991, 31). Zeno’s
 2 ENGAGEMENT AND THE QUANTIFIED SELF … 19

vision of movement would instead be defined by Bergson as making use

of intellect: the faculty of the mind that divides and recomposes things
to give us knowledge of the world. Intellect provides the analytical fac-
ulty of the mind, while intuition allows us to reconnect with the constant
movement and becoming of life (Bergson 2007).
Self-tracking technologies, by dividing and recomposing motion,
replicate the same understanding of the movement that Zeno offered
through his paradoxes. The movement of the user must be recorded
through an accelerometer, or biosensor, and transformed in a score
which can increase in quantity, but where every unit is qualitatively the
same as any other unit. For instance, the movement needed to move
from zero to one NikeFuel points is supposed of the same intensity and
quality as that which is required to increase the score from one to two.
Thus, through the quantification in a NikeFuel score, the movement is
spatialised, as it is represented as a continuum of homogenous units. If
Achilles and the tortoise were given a Nike+ FuelBand, Zeno could have
divided their scores into infinitely smaller portions to demonstrate his
counter-intuitive argument.
NikeFuel and self-tracking technologies understand movement as
homogenous. Moreover, the recording of data concerns the activities of
one’s life, understood as homogenous and deprived of the possibility of
their culmination. Life-tracking and biosensor technologies are not con-
cerned with the recording of events, actions, processes, or performances
that presume a finishing point, as these imply the duration of movement
and the possibility of its end. It could be concluded that self-tracking is
orientated towards the facts about the user: what is recorded is the fact
that the user has moved, rather than the event that the user is moving.
When checking the NikeFuel score, for instance, I could see that ‘I have
moved’, but not if ‘I am moving’ at the time of looking at the wristband
or app: the indexical property of the score points towards facts, as these
have been recorded by the device, but does not and cannot record move-
ment as an event, as a temporal entity (Vendler 1967; Davidson 1980).
Self-tracking technologies, focusing on the facts about the users, imply
the impossibility of reaching and recording a finishing point, or cata-
strophic point of modification, in the engagement between oneself and
his or her quantified-other. Facts about oneself are continuously updated
and updatable. Instead, events happen at one time and place and reach
their culmination when the performing actor modifies his or her condi-
tion and becomes other. In other words, if the movement is intended
20 P. Ruffino

as deprived of its duration, it is impossible to conceive a moment when

Achilles surpasses the tortoise. Likewise, it becomes impossible to con-
ceive a moment when the use of Nike+ FuelBand, or similar self-tracking
wearables, reaches its completion, when the user could be said to have
become a different person, one that cannot be compared by orders of
magnitude with the person he or she was before. In the terminology
of Bergson, self-tracking technologies cannot record differences in kind,
or of quality, but only of magnitude and quantity.
It becomes reasonable to understand why my engagement with Nike+
FuelBand failed. Relationships might end when unexpected events occur
and alter the implicit or explicit agreement between the two partners.
While this could be an unfortunate and undesirable condition, it is still
more favourable than a relationship where nothing ever happens, or
where the very possibility of any event occurring is eliminated. On those
occasions, it might be harder to decide which is the decisive moment
when the relationship should come to an end, as it was difficult for me
to understand when and why I would quit Nike+ FuelBand. It is difficult
to decide how to terminate an engagement where nothing ever happens.

The Moment of Looking

Engagement is understood within the Quantified Self movement as
a rather uneventful process. This might be a consequence of how the
agency is valued within the development of computational technologies,
where it is often seen as being contained within singular entities, whether
human or non-human, and in turn reinforcing the separation between
the two. As Lucy Suchman (2007) argues, autonomy is seen in the
development of computational tools as a mark of intelligence, and relat-
edness between human and artefact is instead kept in the background.
Dawn Nafus effectively notes that the ‘tie between body and number’
is made possible by ‘the moment of looking’ (2016, xx). The emphasis
on the ‘moment of’, in the words of Nafus, reminds us that the event,
understood in its duration, of the act of looking or moving is repeatedly
erased from the understanding of engagement within the development
of Quantified Self technologies, as the ‘tie’ between body and number is
obfuscated.
The relation between self and Quantified Self is often interpreted
through a rationalist perspective, one where ‘the concatenation of causes
and consequences […] does not trigger any dramatic effect, because,
 2 ENGAGEMENT AND THE QUANTIFIED SELF … 21

precisely […] the consequences are already there in the cause: no sus-
pense to expect, no sudden transformation, no metamorphosis, no ambi-
guity. Time flows from past to present’ (Latour 2014, 11). In what
Latour names the ‘scientific world view’, ‘nothing happens any more
since the agent is supposed to be “simply caused” by its predecessor’
(14). This lack of events amounts to the abstraction and separation of
human and artefact, each seen as acting on the other through imaginary
vectors of cause and effect, and where the temporality of the action is
homogenous, spatialised, quantifiable, and quantified. Nike+ FuelBand,
for instance, is designed to receive and record already predicted signals; it
rewards precise facts that are already expected by the simulation, through
the logic of pre-emptive regulation of cybernetic systems (Crogan 2011).
The user of Nike+ FuelBand is encouraged to comply with a set of rules
that works as a regulatory frame, where only specific movements are
expected, saved, calculated, evaluated, and transformed into facts about
the user. Through this practice of compliance, the user of Nike’s wear-
able is normalised and regulates him or herself to maintain and progress
in a process of constant self-normalisation and discipline (Foucault 1977;
Whitson 2015).
For the engagement to be felicitous and bring, for instance, the user
of a self-tracking product to keep and maintain a healthy lifestyle, the
influence between the self and its quantified-other should occur because
of the physical proximity between the user with the wearable gadget,
almost by osmosis. The time and space in between, where and when
engagement is supposed to happen, is divided infinitely up to a point
where movement itself becomes impossible. Unsurprisingly, as much as
Achilles would probably get annoyed by running a race that sees him
eternally behind a tortoise, many users of self-tracking devices quit their
products and break the engagement with their quantified selves.

Conclusion: Playing with Our (Quantified) Selves

Just when I thought I could get rid of my quantified self by breaking the
promise of engagement, I realised that both of us were in fact already
brought together by an arranged marriage, forced to live under the same
roof for an undefined period of time. Self-tracking is now invisible and
ubiquitous, it is everywhere, ‘everyware’ and ‘everywear’ (Kember 2016,
46–64). Just like marriage, it is also morally binding and inescapable, as
‘privacy is becoming cast more and more as the opposite of collective
22 P. Ruffino

good’ (Ajana 2017, 14) and moments of unquantified anonymity

become harder to achieve and treacherous to demand. Thus, it becomes
necessary to invent alternative solutions for surviving an otherwise une-
ventful, strangling co-living.
Fortunately, as Donna Haraway reminds us, ‘self-certainty and death-
less communions are god-tricks’, as ‘partial connections’, ‘incongru-
ent translations’, and situated knowledges can always be looked for in
the attempt of ‘getting on together’ (2003, 25). The rise and fall of the
gamification movement had offered a temporary glimpse into the pos-
sibility that we could have fun with our Quantified Self. Sadly, the move-
ment revealed to be mostly a marketing strategy for selling consultancy
programmes to digital businesses and public institutions, by offering
quick-fix design solutions based on Skinner-box models and rushes of
dopamine. Gamification revealed to be little more than ‘bullshit’ (Bogost
2015), but at least posed the question of what could be made of Big
Data and the quantification of the self. Alas, and as it could have been
expected, both the Quantified Self and gamification entertain no body:
they produce ‘unlocatable, and so irresponsible, knowledge claims’,
offering visions of the self ‘from everywhere and nowhere equally and
fully’ (Haraway 1988, 583–584).
Through Haraway, I propose in the conclusions that we need to find
alternative ways to reconnect meanings and bodies: imagining situated
knowledges through which we could write other rules of cohabitation
with our all-seeing but invisible, ghostly, quantified-other. Knowledge of
the self can be unstable, uncertain, and unsettling, and cybernetic organ-
isms might be inhabited in a spirit of ironic appropriation (Haraway
1991). As argued by Nora Young, it is ironic that digital culture pro-
motes both disembodiment and, in the same gesture, an obsession for
self-tracking and the quantification of the individual as a documented
and persistent entity, which is in itself an illusion (Young 2012, 80).
I argue that writing, and fabulation, could be methods for playing
with our quantified selves, in ways that are possibly more destabilising
and eventful than what we have experienced so far. The main promoter
of the Quantified Self movement, Gary Wolf, in an article in the New
York Times published in 2010, explains how ‘trackers’, early experi-
menters with self-tracking methods, could not settle for the standardised
prescriptions given to them by health practitioners and were obsessed
instead with discovering truths about themselves, recording data that
could tell them how they were different and unique. Wolf argues that
 2 ENGAGEMENT AND THE QUANTIFIED SELF … 23

numbers make problems ‘more tractable intellectually’, and trackers

preferred to quantify their bodies rather than negotiate with language
and words, ‘talking and writing’ (Wolf 2010). However, as argued by
Danter, Reichardt, and Schober, fictional texts offer concrete episte-
mological counter models to the quantified self and alternative knowl-
edge ‘by emphasising the qualitative, hermeneutic dimension of human
experience as well as the struggles and coping mechanisms of human
existence’ (2016, 57). The concern of the early trackers for inventing
different differences should not be dismissed, but their perspective should
be displaced.
What should we write about, then? About the ‘moment of looking’,
the timing of the relation between human and artefact. As companions,
the self and its quantified-other do not pre-exist their co-constitutive
relationship, ‘and the relating is never done once and for all’ (Haraway
2003, 12). But while the relating might be always unfinished and in pro-
gress, similarly to the race between Achilles and the tortoise imagined
by Zeno, writing about contingent relations can reintroduce events in
our quantified lives, as writing is by itself an action, process, and event, a
moment of rupture. As Haraway writes, fiction might be etymologically
close to ‘fact’, as both refer to action, but fiction ‘is about the act of fash-
ioning, forming, inventing, as well as feigning or feinting’ (my empha-
sis), rather than being something ‘done, over, fixed, shown, performed,
accomplished’ (2003, 19). Fictions, writings, and fabulations could be
forms of playing with our Quantified Self, reintroduce events, rather than
facts, in our relationships and make something finally happen.

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 CHAPTER 3

Apps as Companions: How Quantified

Self Apps Become Our Audience and Our
Companions

Jill Walker Rettberg

Abstract Self-tracking apps gather intimate information about our daily

lives. Sometimes, they take the role of a confidante, an anthropomor-
phised companion we can trust. Humans have long confided in non-
human companions, such as diaries. The relationship between user and
app is structurally similar to the relationship narratologists and literary
theorists have identified between diarist and diary. Our agency is always
shared with the technologies we use, whether they are simply pen and
paper or a complex AI. By comparing apps to diaries, I demonstrate how
these technologies act not simply as objects but also as narrators and
narratees. While diaries are mostly silent listeners, self-tracking apps speak
back to us in a feedback loop and thus enter a role as our companions
rather than simply as our audiences.

Keywords Self-tracking · Quantified Self · Apps · Diary · AI

Narratology

J.W. Rettberg (*)

University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway
e-mail: Jill.Walker.Rettberg@uib.no

© The Author(s) 2018 27

B. Ajana (ed.), Self-Tracking, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-65379-2_3
28 J.W. Rettberg

Introduction
Self-tracking requires technology. Not necessarily digital technology, but
always, technology. Tally marks pressed into clay or scratched into stone;
paper charts with pens for making check marks and perhaps calculations;
smartphone apps that track everything a smartphone can measure: all
these are ways in which humans have used technology to create an exter-
nal, quantified representation of an aspect of our lives.
As long as the technology we use is simple, like a pen and paper, we
tend not to think of the technology as adding much to the process. But
we could not possibly remember the events we record in anything like as
exact a manner without recording them, even if the only technology we
are using is paper. If we think about it, we also know that the organisa-
tion of the charts we draw affects what we measure and how we think
about it.
When we use simple technologies, though, we tend to still feel as
though we are using the paper. We are in no doubt as to who is the sub-
ject here: the human feels fully in charge, at least in cases of voluntary
self-tracking, where the person doing the tracking is free to stop at any
time or to change the chart she is using. The human is the subject with
agency to act upon objects, that is, upon the pen and paper and the data
that the human collects.
This chapter is an examination of self-tracking apps that emphasise
the agency of the app through a conversational interface, where the app
uses simple scripts or more complex artificial intelligence (AI) to speak
to the user. Until recently, self-tracking apps have displayed user data in
lists or graphs, but as conversational agents like Siri on the iPhone or
Amazon’s Alexa have become popular, self-tracking apps are also begin-
ning to use the technology. Examples range from text-based chatbots
like Lark, Instant and Pepper, which send encouraging messages and
ask simple questions of the user, to speaking workout assistants like Vi
(pronounced vee), which is what Andrea L. Guzman calls a Vocal Social
Agent (Guzman 2017).
Telling our secrets to a simulated confidante like Vi is structurally sim-
ilar to confiding in a diary. Diarists often anthropomorphise their diaries,
addressing them as ‘Dear Diary’ and confiding in them as though to a
human friend. In this chapter, I outline a history of humans confiding
in non-human companions, from diaries to apps, in order to show how
our agency is always shared with the technologies we use, whether they
 3 APPS AS COMPANIONS: HOW QUANTIFIED … 29

are simply pen and paper or a complex AI. By comparing apps to diaries,
I show how these technologies, or media, act not simply as objects but
also as narratees or audiences to our human narratives. While diaries are
mostly silent listeners, self-tracking apps speak back to us and thus enter
a role as our companions rather than simply our audiences. We don’t see
this to the same extent in social media, where we share content intended
for a human audience, using technology as a medium between humans
rather than as a companion or a tool for organising our data. This also
occurs, to a lesser extent, in other digital media—but it is more obvious
in self-tracking apps because they are designed to work without necessar-
ily having any other human audience than the user themselves.

Trusting Our Apps

Digital devices are far less transparent to us than pens and paper or most
other pre-digital technology. Most of us don’t really understand how our
self-tracking apps work, and we’re not always entirely sure what they’re
measuring. Interestingly enough, this often means we trust them more
than we trust ourselves. José van Dijck calls this dataism: a ‘widespread
belief in the objective quantification and potential tracking of all kinds
of human behaviour and sociality through online media technologies’
(Dijck 2014). We may even trust our devices more than our own experi-
ences or memories. Studying people wearing heart rate variability moni-
tors, Minna Ruckenstein found that her informants changed their stories
about their day after being shown the data:

Significantly, data visualizations were interpreted by research participants as

more ‘factual’ or ‘credible’ insights into their daily lives than their subjec-
tive experiences. This intertwines with the deeply-rooted cultural notion
that ‘seeing’ makes knowledge reliable and trustworthy. (Ruckenstein
2014)

This surrendering of subjectivity or agency to our machines tends to

worry people. We trust the machine’s representation of our life more
than our own memories. Do we really want our machines to be writing
the stories of our lives?
Perhaps, though, we have never written the stories of our own lives.
At least not completely alone. We write with the tools we have at hand:
pen and paper, Snapchat or a typewriter. These tools also determine
30 J.W. Rettberg

how we write, how we are able to see our own lives. Literary theorist
Paul de Man wrote of this in the late seventies, arguing that perhaps,
rather than a lived life leading to an autobiography, it is the other way
around:

We assume that life produces the autobiography as an act produces its

consequences, but can we not suggest, with equal justice, that the auto-
biographical project may itself produce and determine the life and that
whatever the writer does is in fact governed by the technical demands of
self-portraiture and thus determined, in all its aspects, by the resources of
his medium? (Man 1979, 920)

We usually think of a diary, an autobiography or a self-tracking app as an

inanimate object that may structure and mediate the way we are able to
tell our stories, but that has no stories of its own. And yet there are many
examples of people adjusting their actions so as to make them more suit-
able for mediation. For instance, a runner may postpone a run because
their phone’s battery is flat and needs charging and thus cannot track
their run. A Snapchatter may decide to go to a certain event because
they want to show themselves at that event in their next Snapchat story.
And once we see the data that our devices have collected, we may, as
Ruckenstein found, slightly alter our retelling of our day to better fit the
data that is displayed.
James Bridle, an artist and designer, has argued that the data a phone
collects are actually the phone’s diary, not the diary of the person carrying
the phone. When he learned that his iPhone had saved the coordinates of
every location he (or it) had been at, he downloaded the data and used
it to create an artistic project: a book of maps showing his whereabouts
as recorded by the phone (Bridle 2011). The title of the book, fittingly
enough, is Where the F**k Was I? because Bridle claims to have no rec-
ollection of having been at all the places the phone had registered that
he was at. Bridle’s phone, seen in this way, is hardly an inanimate object
that is only acted upon and has no agency of its own. It tells its own sto-
ries, as an independent subject. What does that mean for our relationship
with our machines?
 3 APPS AS COMPANIONS: HOW QUANTIFIED … 31

Dear Diary: Diaries and Apps as Narratees

Marshall McLuhan saw media as extensions of our bodies (1964).
Perhaps he would say that our ‘dear diary’ and our step counters and
lifelogging apps are such extensions. I argue that these personal media
(Lüders 2008) are something more. They are our audiences. These are
media that we do not simply listen to or read or watch: we speak to them
(Walker 2004). We are the narrators, and they are the narratees, the
audience for our words or our data. These media (machines) may be the
only ‘readers’ of our stories and our data, or we may share the stories and
data we record in a diary or an app with others, for instance, by passing
around a paper diary or by choosing to share data with our friends or
posting it to Facebook.
In narratology, the actual, flesh-and-blood author and reader are
seen as separate from the text. But we can usually identify an implied
author and an implied reader in the text. The implied reader (or listener)
of one of Trump’s speeches is, for instance, clearly not a European who
appreciates universal healthcare, or a refugee from a war-torn country,
but such people may well be among the actual flesh-and-blood readers
or listeners. Some texts also have a narrator and a narratee, that is, an
explicit speaker in the text, somebody who speaks in the first person and
an explicit listener or an explicit addressee. The term implied reader was
coined by Wolfgang Iser (1978), but when we use these terms to think
about the way apps address their users, it’s most useful to think about
the role of the implied reader as part of a larger system, as shown in
Fig. 3.1, which shows Seymour Chatman’s model of narrative communi-
cation as it works in a novel, or even a diary (1978, 151).
In his theories of the diary, Phillippe Lejeune writes that a diary is
always written for a reader, even if that reader may simply be the writer,
at some future date (Lejeune 2008, 324). It is impossible to imagine
writing for nobody. I would argue that we think of our self-tracking apps
in the same way. We are collecting our data for our future selves, and

The text
Real Implied Implicit Real
→ author → (Narrator) → (Narratee) → → reader
author Reader

Fig. 3.1 Chatman’s model of the narrative communication situation (redrawn

from Chatman 1978, 151)
32 J.W. Rettberg

perhaps for others as well: to share our accomplishments with a group or

peers, perhaps. We are also usually sending our data to a corporation that
combines our data with others to generate comparisons, and that data
may be used for quite different purposes than we imagined when we slid
the Fitbit onto our wrists or installed the app on our phones. For cor-
porations, data about our exercise patterns or other daily activities have
monetary value, which Chris Till argues, transform our leisure activities
into a form of labour that can be commodified and exploited (Till 2014).
One way of making that less visible to users (or labourers, in this model)
might be to make the apps seem to be more like individual people or
even a friend, rather than presenting them as technical data collectors.
Such a devious plan is probably not necessary to make users anthropo-
morphise their devices and think of them as intimate companions rather
than the agents of corporations that surveil us. Individual users rarely
see the full scale of data collection. For a user, the relationship is mostly
experienced as being between the user and the device.
This is not simply about the intimacy of a wearable device or a smart-
phone. Diary-writers have also long anthropomorphised their diaries,
imagining a ‘you’, a reader that the writer is writing for. One may well
argue that this ‘you’ is a requirement of language itself. Speech is founded
upon conversation or at least upon an audience. In diary-writing, we
often address our words to a ‘dear diary’, imagining the diary itself to be
a safe, silent listener.
Here is an example of how ‘dear diary’ is used in a serial magazine
story written in 1866. Note that this is from a fictional diary, so the use
of ‘dear diary’ may be slightly parodic, or at least intended to capture a
certain type of personality in the fictional diary-writer:

March 2nd.–Now, my diary, let me tell you all about today. You are the
only bosom-friend I have, dear diary, and you keep all my secrets, that is,
you would keep them if I had any to confide in you. (Worboise 1866, 16).

Do we still imagine a ‘dear diary’ when we open our self-tracking apps

on our phones? Do we imagine our machines as audiences? Or as sub-
jects in their own rights?
‘Dear diary’ is a direct address of a narratee, giving the diary itself
a human subjectivity. Based on a search of Google Books’ corpus of
digitised, published books,1 we can see that the expression ‘dear diary’
began to be used in print in the mid-eighteenth century, but became
 3 APPS AS COMPANIONS: HOW QUANTIFIED … 33

Fig. 3.2 Google Books Ngram Viewer chart showing the occurrence of the
phrase ‘dear diary’ (with different capitalisation) in books published between
1800 and 2000 that have been digitised by Google. Chart generated 01.06.2016

really popular in the last decades of the twentieth century. Interestingly,

both the phrase ‘dear diary’ and the word ‘diary’ were used markedly less
in print after the turn of the twenty-first century, which seems very likely
to be connected to Internet use (see Fig. 3.2).
Perhaps we don’t need to anthropomorphise our diaries anymore now
that we have the Internet, with real people as potential readers of our
blog posts and Facebook updates. Although there are clearly many sim-
ilarities between traditional diaries and the way people share stories of
their daily lives in social media (Rettberg 2014a), there has been a transi-
tion from sites like OpenDiary.com, that very explicitly used diary con-
ventions to structure the users’ writings, to platforms like Snapchat and
Tumblr that don’t reference traditional diary conventions at all (Martinviita
2016; Rettberg 2017, forthcoming). For the purpose of this chapter,
though, what I am interested in is the way that diarists have anthropomor-
phised their diaries, for instance, by writing to their ‘Dear Diary’.

Confessing Secrets to a Diary or App

Both diaries and self-tracking balance between the private and the public.
Today, the privacy of a personal diary is often seen as its defining fea-
ture. Diaries are sold with padlocks and keys and used as confessional
34 J.W. Rettberg

spaces where it is safe to pour out all one’s secrets. Historically in

Western culture, the diary was sometimes quite explicitly seen as a way
to confess sins directly to God (Heehs 2013, 49), but also as a tool for
spiritual self-improvement. Sixteenth century Jesuits had explicit guide-
lines for writing spiritual narratives about themselves (Molina 2008),
and other sixteenth- and seventeenth-century guides exist that empha-
sise both self-abasement before God and recording mercies, grace and
deliverances (Rettberg 2014b, 5–7). Some of the spiritual work in this
self-narration took place when diary-writers shared and discussed their
diaries with friends or with the congregation. So, although there is a
strong history of private diaries, where the author would be horrified if
others read her diary, there is also a strong parallel tradition of diaries
that were expected to be shared with others and that were specifically
intended as self-improvement tools (Humphreys et al. 2013). This latter
kind of diary obviously has something in common with the Quantified
Self (QS) movement’s drive towards self-improvement. There are many
examples of self-improvement projects that combine self-representation
with more quantifiable kinds of self-tracking. For instance, the app You
(you-app.com) gives users daily tasks to complete and asks them to doc-
ument each task by taking photographs and writing short comments,
which can be shared with friends or kept private. Taken together, these
photographs and comments become a kind of diary. Gratitude projects
such as #gratitude365 are another example. Here, participants aim to
share daily photographs of something they are grateful for, with a shared
hashtag that creates a flexible sense of community as well as allowing
individual users to organise their own contributions. Keeping a record
of what you are grateful for is an old technique for self-improvement,
recommended, for instance, in John Beadles’ A Journal or Diary of a
Thankful Christian (Beadle 1656; Rettberg 2014b, 5–6).
Interestingly, QS has a similar tension between the private and the
public as diaries do. The Show and Tell meetings that are common at QS
events and on the QS blog are very explicitly about sharing, and as with
many shared diaries, the purpose is self-improvement. Yet there is also a
strong sense that people find over-sharing to be rude. Complaints about
Facebook friends who post every map of their run or every song they
hear on Spotify to their Facebook timeline are common. We also need to
recognise that some of the drive to share one’s personal data is driven not
by the individual users, but by the corporations that develop the services
(Ajana 2017; Till 2014).
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
kultaesineitä, mutta jätti kymmenen kertaa kallisarvoisemmat
pikkuesineet ottamatta. Hän otti myös yhtä ja toista itselleen
muistoksi, mutta siitä enemmän edempänä. Tehtyään tämän
kauhean teon hän poistui samaa tietä kuin oli tullutkin. Ei
seuraavana päivänä, jolloin asiasta nousi hälinä, eikä koskaan
myöhemmin koko hänen elämänsä aikana kenenkään päähänkään
pälkähtänyt kohdistaa epäluuloja todelliseen tihutyön tekijään! Eikä
kukaan tietänyt hänen rakkaudestaankaan vainajaan, sillä hän oli
aina ollut luonteeltaan harvapuheinen ja juro, eikä hänellä ollut
ketään ystävää, jolle olisi avannut sydämensä. Häntä pidettiin
yksinkertaisesti murhatun tuttuna eikä aivan läheisenäkään, sillä
viimeisten kahden viikon aikana hän ei ollut käynyt tämän luona.
Ruvettiin heti epäilemään vainajan palvelijana olevaa maaorjaa
Pjotria, ja kaikki asianhaarat vahvistivat tätä epäluuloa, sillä tämä
palvelija tiesi, eikä vainajakaan ollut sitä salannut, että emäntä aikoi
antaa hänet sotamieheksi, koska hänen oli talonpojistaan annettava
rekryyttejä ja koska Pjotr oli yksinäinen mies ja sitäpaitsi
huonokäytöksinen. Oli kuultu Pjotrin äkäpäissään juopuneena
kapakassa uhanneen tappaa emäntänsä. Kaksi päivää ennen
emäntänsä kuolemaa oli Pjotr karannut talosta ja elänyt kaupungilla
tietymättömissä. Murhan jälkeisenä päivänä hänet löydettiin
maantieltä aivan kaupungin luota sikahumalassa, taskussaan veitsi
ja oikea kämmen jostakin syystä veren tahrimana. Hän väitti veren
tulleen nenästään, mutta häntä ei uskottu. Sisäköt myönsivät
tehneensä itsensä syypäiksi siihen, että olivat olleet keinuissa ja että
ulko-ovi kuistissa oli ollut lukitsematta siihen asti, kunnes he
palasivat kotiin. Ilmeni vielä monta muutakin tämänkaltaista seikkaa,
ja niiden nojalla otettiin viaton palvelija kiinni. Hänet vangittiin, ja
oikeudenkäynti alkoi, mutta viikon kuluttua vanki sairastui
kuumeeseen ja kuoli sairaalassa tajuihinsa tulematta. Siihen asia
päättyi, kaikki jäi Jumalan huostaan, ja kaikki, niin tuomarit ja
esivalta kuin yhteiskuntakin, jäivät vakuutetuiksi siitä, että rikosta ei
ollut tehnyt kukaan muu kuin kuollut palvelija. Mutta tämän jälkeen
alkoi rangaistus.

Salaperäinen vieras, joka nyt oli ystäväni, kertoi minulle, että

alussa hänellä ei juuri ollenkaan ollut omantunnon vaivoja. Hänen oli
pitkän aikaa paha olla, mutta ainoastaan sen tähden, että oli
tappanut rakkaan naisen, että tätä ei enää ollut olemassa, että
tappaessaan hänet oli tappanut lempensäkin, intohimon jäädessä
edelleen palamaan hänen veressään. Mutta että hän oli vuodattanut
viatonta verta ja että hän oli tappanut ihmisen, sitä hän ei silloin juuri
ollenkaan ajatellut. Ajatus, että hänen uhristaan olisi tullut toisen
puoliso, tuntui hänestä mahdottomalta, ja sentähden hän oli pitkät
ajat tunnossaan vakuutettu siitä, ettei ollut voinut menetellä toisin.
Häntä vaivasi alussa jonkin verran palvelijan vangitseminen, mutta
vangin pikainen sairastuminen ja kuolema rauhoittivat häntä, sillä
aivan ilmeisesti tämä (niin hän ajatteli silloin) ei ollut kuollut
vangitsemisen johdosta eikä pelästyksestä, vaan vilustuksesta
johtuneeseen tautiin, jonka hän oli saanut karkumatkoillaan
maatessaan koko yön sikahumalassa kostealla maalla. Varastetut
esineet ja rahat eivät häntä paljoa vaivanneet, sillä (niin hän ajatteli
edelleen) varkaus ei ollut tapahtunut voitonhimosta, vaan sen
tarkoituksena oli ollut johtaa epäluulot toisaalle. Varastettu
rahamäärä oli taas vähäinen, ja tämän määrän sekä vielä paljon
enemmän hän lahjoitti kaupunkiimme perustettavaa vaivaistaloa
varten. Hän teki sen vartavasten rauhoittaakseen omaatuntoaan
varkauden johdosta, ja omituista kyllä, hän sai todellakin mielelleen
rauhan joksikin, vieläpä melkoisen pitkäksi aikaa, — hän kertoi itse
minulle siitä. Sitten hän antautui uutterasti virkatoimiin, pyrki itse
huolia tuottavaan ja vaikeaan tehtävään, joka vei häneltä parin
vuoden ajan, ja lujaluontoinen kun oli, melkein unohti mitä oli
tapahtunut; kun se muistui hänen mieleensä, niin hän koetti olla sitä
kokonaan ajattelematta. Hän alkoi harjoittaa hyväntekeväisyyttä, teki
paljon aloitteita ja uhrasi paljon varoja meidän kaupungissamme, tuli
tunnetuksi pääkaupungeissakin, valittiin Moskovassa ja Pietarissa
sikäläisten hyväntekeväisyysyhdistysten jäseneksi. Mutta yhä
enemmän alkoi hänen ajatuksiaan askarruttaa tuska, joka oli hänelle
ylivoimainen. Hän mieltyi erääseen kauniiseen ja järkevään tyttöön ja
meni pian naimisiin tämän kanssa toivoen saavansa naimisellaan
karkoitetuksi yksinäisyytensä surumielisyyden sekä astumalla
uudelle tielle ja täyttämällä hartaasti velvollisuutensa vaimoaan ja
lapsiaan kohtaan irtautuvansa kokonaan vanhoista muistoista. Mutta
kävikin aivan päinvastoin kuin hän oli odottanut. Jo avioliiton
ensimmäisenä kuukautena alkoi häntä lakkaamatta kiusata ajatus:
»Vaimoni rakastaa minua, mutta entä jos hän saisi tietää?» Kun
vaimo tuli ensimmäisen kerran raskaaksi ja ilmoitti hänelle tämän,
niin hän äkkiä huolestui: »Annan hengen, mutta olen itse riistänyt
toiselta hengen.» Tuli lapsia: »Kuinka minä uskallan rakastaa,
opettaa ja kasvattaa heitä, kuinka voin puhua heille hyveestä: minä
olen vuodattanut verta.» Lapset kasvavat suloisina, tekee mieli
hyväillä heitä: »Minä en voi katsoa heidän viattomia, kirkkaita
kasvojaan; en ole sen arvoinen.» Viimein alkoi hänen eteensä
uhkaavana ja katkerana astua hänen murhaamansa uhrin veri, sen
nuori, tuhottu elämä, veri, joka huusi kostoa. Hän alkoi nähdä
kamalia unia. Mutta hänellä oli luja sydän, ja hän kesti tuskan kauan:
»Sovitan kaikki tällä salaisella kärsimykselläni.» Mutta turha oli
tämäkin toivo: mitä pitemmälle aika kului, sitä kovemmaksi tuli
kärsimys. Yhteiskunnassa alettiin häntä kunnioittaa hänen
hyväntekeväisyytensä tähden, vaikka kaikki pelkäsivätkin hänen
ankaraa ja synkkää luonnettaan, mutta kuta enemmän häntä
kunnioitettiin, sitä sietämättömämmäksi kävi hänen olonsa. Hän
tunnusti minulle aikoneensa tappaa itsensä. Mutta sen asemesta
alkoi hänen mieleensä kangastella toinen unelma, — unelma, jota
hän alussa piti mahdottomana ja järjettömänä, mutta joka lopulta niin
imeytyi hänen sydämeensä, että hän ei voinut sitä reväistä irti. Hän
unelmoi tämmöistä: hän nousee, astuu kansan eteen ja ilmoittaa
kaikille tappaneensa ihmisen. Kolmisen vuotta hän oli hautonut tätä
haavetta, se väikkyi hänen mielessään alati eri muodoissa. Viimein
hän alkoi koko sydämestään uskoa, että ilmoittamalla rikoksensa
hän ehdottomasti lääkitsee sielunsa ja saa rauhan lopullisesti. Mutta
tultuaan tästä vakuutetuksi hän tunsi sydämensä kauhistuvan, sillä
miten hän panisi sen toimeen? Silloin sattui tuo tapaus minun
kaksintaistelussani. »Teitä katsellessani olen nyt tehnyt päätökseni.»
Katson häneen.

»Saattoiko todellakin», huudahdin hänelle käsiäni yhteen lyöden,

»niin pieni tapahtuma synnyttää teissä tuommoisen
päättäväisyyden?»

»Päätökseni on ollut syntymässä kolme vuotta», vastaa hän

minulle, »ja teidän tapauksenne antoi sille vain sysäyksen. Teitä
katsellessani minä soimasin itseäni ja aloin kadehtia teitä.» Hän
lausui tämän minulle melkein tylysti.

»Mutta eihän teitä uskota», huomautin. »Siitä on kulunut

neljätoista vuotta.»

»Minulla on todistuksia, sangen hyviä. Esitän ne.»

Minä aloin silloin itkeä ja suutelin häntä.

 »Ratkaiskaa minulle yksi asia, yksi asia», sanoi hän minulle (aivan
kuin kaikki nyt olisi riippunut minusta), »vaimo, lapset! Vaimoni
kenties kuolee surusta, ja lapset, vaikka eivät menetäkään
aatelisarvoa eivätkä omaisuuttaan, — ovat kuitenkin pakkotyövangin
lapsia kaiken ikänsä. Ja millaisen muiston, millaisen muiston
jätänkään heidän sydämiinsä itsestäni!»

Olen vaiti.

»Erota heistä, jättää iäksi? Sehän on iäksi, iäksi.»

Istun ääneti ja luen itsekseni rukousta. Nousin viimein, minua oli

alkanut peloittaa.

»No mitä?» hän katsoo minuun.

»Menkää», — sanon, — »ilmoittakaa ihmisille. Kaikki menee

ohitse, totuus yksin jää. Lapset ymmärtävät suuriksi kasvettuaan,
kuinka paljon jaloutta oli suuressa päättäväisyydessänne.»

Hän lähti silloin luotani niinkuin todellakin olisi tehnyt päätöksensä.

Mutta kuitenkin hän kävi sen jälkeen luonani yli kahden viikon aikana
aivan joka ilta, valmistautui yhä eikä päässyt päätökseen. Hän kidutti
sydämeni pahanpäiväiseksi. Saapuu joskus lujana ja sanoo
liikutettuna:

»Tiedän, että paratiisi alkaa minulle, alkaa heti, kun teen

ilmoitukseni. Neljätoista vuotta olen ollut helvetissä. Tahdon kärsiä.
Otan kärsimyksen ja alan elää. Vääryydellä voi mennä maailman
läpi, mutta ei palata takaisin… Nyt en uskalla rakastaa lähimmäistäni
enkä edes lapsianikaan. Herra Jumala, ymmärtäväthän lapseni
kenties, mitä kärsimykseni ovat minulle maksaneet, eivätkä tuomitse
minua! Jumala ei ole voimassa, vaan totuudessa.»

»Kaikki ymmärtävät teidän sankaritekonne», sanon hänelle, »jos

eivät ymmärrä nyt, niin ymmärtävät myöhemmin, sillä te olette
palvellut korkeinta totuutta, maallisen yläpuolella olevaa…»

Ja hän lähtee luotani ikäänkuin lohdutettuna, mutta seuraavana

päivänä hän tulee taas äkkiä ilkeänä, kalpeana, puhuu pilkallisesti:

»Joka kerta kun tulen teille, te katsotte niin uteliaana: Vieläkäänkö,

muka, ei ole ilmoittanut? Odottakaa, älkää kovin halveksiko. Ei sitä
ole niin helppoa tehdä kuin teistä näyttää. Kenties en ollenkaan
teekään sitä. Ettehän te silloin mene ilmiantamaan minua, vai mitä?»

Mutta minä en suinkaan uskaltanut katsoa häntä

ymmärtämättömän uteliaasti, vaan pelkäsinpä katsahtaakin häneen.
Olin niin kiusaantunut, että olin sairas, ja sieluni oli kyynelien
vallassa. En saanut enää unta öisin.

»Tulen», jatkaa hän, »vaimoni luota. Ymmärrättekö, mitä vaimo

on? Kun läksin, huusivat lapset minulle: 'Hyvästi, isä, tulkaa pian
takaisin lukemaan kanssamme Lukemisia Lapsille.' Ei, te ette
ymmärrä tätä! Toisen hätä ei lisää älyä.»

Hänen silmänsä alkoivat säkenöidä, huulet vavahtelivat. Äkkiä hän

löi nyrkkinsä pöytään, niin että sillä olevat esineet hypähtelivät, —
hän oli niin lempeä mies, ensikertaa hänelle sattui tämmöistä.

»Ja onko tarpeellista?» hän huudahti. »Onko se tarpeellista?

Eihän ketään tuomittu, ei ketään lähetetty minun sijastani
pakkotyöhön, palvelija kuoli tautiin. Vuodattamastani verestä ovat
rangaistuksena minulle olleet kärsimykseni. Eikä minua uskotakaan,
ei mitään todistuskappaleitani uskota. Onko tarpeellista ilmoittaa,
onko tarpeellista? Vuodattamani veren tähden olen valmis
kärsimään tuskia vielä koko elämäni ajan, kunhan vain en vie
vaimoni ja lasteni onnea. Onko oikein tuhota heidät itseni mukana?
Emmeköhän me erehdy? Missä tässä on totuus? Ja ymmärtävätkö
ihmiset tämän totuuden, antavatko he sille arvoa, kunnioittavatko he
sitä?»

»Hyvä Jumala!» ajattelen itsekseni, »hän ajattelee ihmisten

kunnioitusta tämmöisenä hetkenä!» Ja niin sääli tuli minun silloin
häntä, että olisin ollut valmis jakamaan hänen kohtalonsa vain
tehdäkseni hänen olonsa helpommaksi. Huomaan hänen olevan
aivan kuin poissa suunniltaan. Minä kauhistuin, sillä minä ymmärsin
en vain järjelläni, vaan elävällä sielullani, mitä tuommoinen
päättäväisyys maksaa.

»Ratkaiskaa toki kohtaloni!» huudahti hän taas.

»Menkää ja ilmoittakaa», kuiskasin minä hänelle. En jaksanut

lausua sitä ääneen, mutta kuiskaukseni oli luja. Otin pöydältä
evankeliumin venäläisen käännöksen ja näytin hänelle Johanneksen
evankeliumin 12:nnen luvun 24:ttä värssyä:

»Totisesti, totisesti sanon minä teille: ellei maahan pudonnut nisun

jyvä kuole, niin se jää yksinänsä; mutta jos se kuolee, niin se tuo
paljon hedelmätä.» Olin juuri ennen hänen tuloaan lukenut tämän
paikan.

Hän luki. »Totta on», sanoo, mutta hymyilee katkerasti. »Niin,

näissä kirjoissa», sanoo vähän vaiti oltuaan, »on ihmeellisiä asioita.
On helppo työntää ne nenän alle. Ja kuka onkaan ne kirjoittanut,
ihmisetkö tosiaankin?»

»Pyhä Henki on kirjoittanut», sanon.

»Teidän on helppo laverrella», hymähti hän vielä, mutta nyt jo

miltei vihamielisesti. Otin taas kirjan, avasin siitä toisen paikan ja
näytin hänelle Hebrealaisepistolan 10:nnen luvun 31:ttä värssyä.
Hän luki: »Hirmuista on langeta elävän Jumalan käsiin.»

Hän luki sen ja viskasi samassa kirjan pois. Koko hänen ruumiinsa
alkoi vavista.

»Hirmuisen värssyn», sanoo, »valitsittekin, muuta ei voi sanoa.»

Hän nousi tuoliltaan. »No», sanoo, »hyvästi, kenties en tule enää…
paratiisissa tapaamme. Siitä on siis neljätoista vuotta, kun 'lankesin
elävän Jumalan käsiin', — niin siis näitä neljäätoista vuotta
nimitetään. Huomenna pyydän noita käsiä päästämään minut irti…»

Tahdoin syleillä ja suudella häntä, mutta en uskaltanut, — hänen

kasvonsa olivat niin vääristyneet, että oli vaikeata niitä katsoakin.
Hän lähti ulos. Herra Jumala, ajattelin minä, mihin on ihminen
lähtenyt! Laskeuduin polvilleni jumalankuvan eteen ja vuodatin
hänen puolestaan kyyneliä Pyhälle Neitsyelle, ainaiselle puoltajalle
ja auttajalle. Oli kulunut noin puoli tuntia siitä, kun olin kyynelsilmin
rukoillut, ja oli jo myöhäinen yön hetki, noin kello kahdentoista
tienoissa. Äkkiä näen oven avautuvan, ja hän astuu taas sisälle.
Minä hämmästyn.

»Missä olette ollut?» kysyn häneltä.

 »Minä», hän sanoo, »minä luullakseni unohdin jotakin… kaiketi
nenäliinan… No, vaikka en olekaan mitään unohtanut, niin
antakaahan istahtaa.»

Hän istuutui tuolille. Seison hänen edessään. »Istuutukaa», hän

sanoo, »tekin». Minä istuuduin. Istuimme noin kaksi minuuttia, hän
katsoi minuun kiinteästi ja hymähti äkkiä, muistan sen, sitten nousi,
syleili minua voimakkaasti ja suuteli…

»Muista», hän sanoo, »miten tulin sinun luoksesi toistamiseen.

Kuuletko, muista se!»

Ensimmäisen kerran hän sinutteli minua. Sitten hän poistui.

»Huomenna», ajattelin.

Niin tapahtuikin. En tietänyt sinä iltana, että seuraava päivä sattui

olemaan hänen syntymäpäivänsä. Minä en ollut voinut sitä
keneltäkään kuulla. Sinä päivänä hänellä joka vuosi oli paljon
vieraita, sinne saapui koko kaupunki. Saapuivat nytkin. Ja silloin
päivällisen jälkeen hän astuu huoneen keskelle kädessä paperi —
asianmukainen ilmoitus viranomaisille. Ja koska hänen esimiehensä
olivat siellä saapuvilla, niin hän luki ääneen paperin kaikille
kokoontuneille, ja siinä oli koko rikos kuvattu yksityiskohtaisesti.
»Julmurina erotan itseni ihmisten yhteydestä, Jumala on lähestynyt
minua», hän lopetti kirjoituksensa, »tahdon kärsiä!» Samassa hän toi
esille ja pani pöydälle kaikki, millä aikoi todistaa rikoksensa ja mitä
oli säilyttänyt neljätoista vuotta: murhatun kultaesineet, jotka hän oli
anastanut johtaakseen epäluulot pois itsestään, nimittäin murhatun
kaulasta otetun medaljongin ja ristin, — medaljongissa vainajan
sulhasen kuva, murhatun muistikirjan ja lopuksi kaksi kirjettä:
sulhasen kirjeen murhatulle, jossa hän ilmoittaa pian palaavansa, ja
vainajan vastauksen tähän kirjeeseen, jonka hän oli aloittanut ja
jättänyt keskeneräisenä pöydälle lähettääkseen sen seuraavana
päivänä. Molemmat kirjeet oli murhaaja ottanut mukaansa, — miksi?
Miksi hän oli säilyttänyt niitä neljätoista vuotta, sen sijaan että olisi
hävittänyt ne langettavina todistuskappaleina? Ja kävi näin: kaikki
hämmästyivät ja kauhistuivat, eikä kukaan tahtonut uskoa, vaikka
kaikki olivat kuunnelleet tavattomalla mielenkiinnolla, mutta pitäen
kaikkea sairaan puheena; ja muutaman päivän kuluttua oli yleisenä
mielipiteenä kaikissa taloissa, että miesparka oli menettänyt
järkensä. Viranomaisten ja tuomarien oli pakko ryhtyä asiaan, mutta
se pysähtyi heidänkin käsissään alkuunsa: vaikka todisteiksi tuodut
esineet ja kirjeet panivatkin ajattelemaan, niin tultiin tässäkin siihen
johtopäätökseen, että jos nämä todistuskappaleet osoittautuisivatkin
oikeiksi, niin yksistään niiden perusteella ei kuitenkaan voisi nostaa
lopullista syytettä. Olihan mahdollista, että hän oli saanut kaikki
nämä esineet vainajalta itseltään tämän tuttuna ja hyvässä
luottamuksessa. Sain muuten kuulla, että monet surmatun tutut ja
sukulaiset myöhemmin totesivat esineet oikeiksi ja että tässä
suhteessa ei ollut mitään epäilemistä. Mutta tämän jutun ei oltu
sallittu nytkään päästä oikealle tolalle. Viiden päivän kuluttua tuli
kaikkien tietoon, että tuo niin paljon kärsinyt mies oli sairastunut ja
että hänen henkensä oli vaarassa. Mihin tautiin hän oli sairastunut,
sitä en voi selittää: puhuttiin sydämen toiminnan häiriintymisestä,
mutta saatiin tietää, että paikalle kutsutut lääkärit potilaan vaimon
pyynnöstä olivat tarkastaneet myös hänen sielullisen tilansa ja tulleet
siihen päätökseen, että alkava mielenhäiriö oli todettavissa. Minä en
ilmaissut mitään, vaikka kimppuuni käytiinkin kyselyin, mutta kun
tahdoin mennä häntä katsomaan, niin monet minua kovasti moittivat,
varsinkin hänen vaimonsa: »Tehän», sanoi hän minulle, »saatoitte
hänet pois tasapainosta, hän oli jo aikaisemminkin synkkä, ja viime
vuonna kaikki huomasivat hänessä tavatonta kiihtymystä ja hän
käyttäytyi omituisesti, ja juuri silloin te syöksitte hänet turmioon: te
olette hänen kanssaan lukemalla pannut hänen päänsä pyörälle, hän
istui luonanne kokonaisen kuukauden.» Eikä vain hänen vaimonsa,
vaan kaikki kaupunkilaiset kävivät kimppuuni ja syyttivät minua: »Te
olette syynä kaikkeen», sanovat. Minä olen vaiti, mutta iloitsen myös
sielussani, sillä näin Jumalan epäämättömän armon kohdanneen
miestä, joka oli noussut itseänsä vastaan ja itseään rangaissut. Enkä
voinut uskoa, että hän oli menettänyt järkensä. Viimein päästettiin
minutkin hänen luokseen, hän oli itse sitä hartaasti halunnut
sanoakseen minulle jäähyväiset. Astuin sisälle ja näin heti, että ei
vain hänen päivänsä, vaan tunnitkin olivat luetut. Hän oli heikko,
keltainen, kädet vapisevat, hän läähättää, mutta on lempeän ja
iloisen näköinen.

»Se on täytetty!» lausui hän minulle. »Jo kauan olen halunnut

nähdä sinua, miksi et ole tullut?»

En ilmoittanut hänelle, että minua ei ollut päästetty hänen

luokseen.

»Jumala on säälinyt minua ja kutsuu luokseen. Tiedän nyt

kuolevani, mutta tunnen riemua ja rauhaa ensimmäisen kerran niin
monen vuoden jälkeen. Heti tunsin sielussani paratiisin, kun täytin
sen, mitä piti. Nyt uskallan rakastaa lapsiani ja suudella heitä. Minua
ei uskota eikä kukaan ole uskonut, ei vaimoni eivätkä tuomarini;
eivät lapsenikaan koskaan usko. Näen siinä Jumalan armon lapsiani
kohtaan. Kuolen, ja nimeni jää heille tahrattomaksi. Mutta nyt
aavistan jo Jumalan, sydän riemuitsee kuin paratiisissa… olen
täyttänyt velvollisuuteni…»

Hän ei voi puhua, hengitys tukahtuu, hän puristaa lämpimästi

kättäni, katsoo minua palavin silmin. Mutta emme keskustelleet
kauan, hänen vaimonsa pistäytyi tavan takaa meitä katsomassa.
Hän ennätti kuitenkin kuiskata minulle:

»Muistatko, miten minä silloin toistamiseen tulin luoksesi

sydänyöllä? Käskin sinua vielä panemaan sen mieleesi. Tiedätkö,
miksi silloin tulin? Tulin tappaakseni sinut!»

Minä hätkähdin.

»Minä läksin silloin luotasi pimeään, kuljeskelin kaduilla ja

kamppailin itseni kanssa. Ja äkkiä tunsin sinua kohtaan niin suurta
vihaa, että sydämeni tuskin jaksoi sitä kestää. 'Nyt', ajattelen, 'hän
yksin on sitonut minut ja on minun tuomarini, en voi enää vapautua
huomisesta rangaistuksestani, sillä hän tietää kaikki.' Ei se ollut sitä,
että olisin pelännyt sinun ilmiantavan minut (ei ollut ajatustakaan
sinnepäin), vaan ajattelin: kuinka voin katsoa häneen, jos en
ilmianna itseäni? Ja vaikka sinä olisit ollut maailman ääressä, mutta
elossa, niin se ei olisi muuttanut asiaa; se ajatus oli sietämätön, että
sinä olit elossa ja tiedät kaikki sekä tuomitset minut. Vihasin sinua,
niinkuin sinä olisit ollut kaiken alkuna ja kaikkeen syypää. Palasin
silloin luoksesi, muistan, että pöydälläsi oli tikari. Istuuduin ja pyysin
sinua istuutumaan ja ajattelin kokonaisen minuutin. Jos olisin
tappanut sinut, niin olisin joka tapauksessa ollut turmion oma tämän
murhan tähden, vaikka en olisikaan ilmaissut entistä rikostani. Mutta
sitä minä en ollenkaan ajatellut enkä tahtonut ajatella sillä hetkellä.
Minä vain vihasin sinua ja tahdoin kostaa sinulle kaikin voimin
kaikesta. Mutta Jumalani voitti perkeleen sydämessäni. Tiedä
kuitenkin, että sinä et koskaan ole ollut lähempänä kuolemaa.»

Viikon kuluttua hän kuoli. Hänen ruumisarkkuaan saattoi hautaan

koko kaupunki. Esipappi puhui liikuttavia sanoja. Murehdittiin
kaameata sairautta, joka oli päättänyt hänen päivänsä. Mutta koko
kaupunki nousi minua vastaan, kun hänet oli haudattu, eikä minua
enää tahdottu nähdä taloissa vieraana. Tosin jotkut, alussa
harvalukuiset, mutta sitten yhä useammat, alkoivat uskoa tosiksi
hänen selityksiään ja rupesivat yhä enemmän käymään luonani ja
kyselemään suurella uteliaisuudella ja halulla: sillä ihminen näkee
mielellään vanhurskaan lankeemuksen ja hänen häpeänsä. Mutta
minä olin vaiti ja poistuin kohta koko kaupungista, ja viiden
kuukauden kuluttua Herra Jumala soi minun astua varmalle ja
oikealle tielle, ja minä siunaan näkymätöntä kättä, joka minut niin
selvästi tälle tielle ohjasi. Mutta paljon kärsinyttä Jumalan palvelijaa
Mikaelia olen muistanut rukouksissani joka päivä hamaan tähän
päivään saakka.

3.

Luostarinvanhin Zosiman keskusteluja ja opetuksia

e) Venäläisestä munkista ja hänen mahdollisesta merkityksestään

— Isät ja opettajat, mitä on munkki? Sivistyneessä maailmassa

tämän sanan lausuvat meidän päivinämme toiset ivallisesti ja jotkut
haukkumasananakin. Ja sitä enemmän, kuta pitemmälle aika kuluu.
Totta on, ah, totta, että paljon on munkkien joukossa laiskoittelijoita,
hekumoitsijoita, nautiskelijoita ja julkeita kulkureita. Näitä osoittavat
sivistyneet maallikot: »Te olette laiskureita ja hyödyttömiä
yhteiskunnan jäseniä, elätte toisten työstä, olette häpeämättömiä
kerjäläisiä.» Ja miten paljon kuitenkin onkaan munkkien joukossa
nöyriä ja lempeitä, semmoisia, jotka hartaasti haluavat yksinäisyyttä
ja palavaa rukousta hiljaisuudessa. Näitä mainitaan vähemmän,
vieläpä heistä kokonaan vaietaankin, ja kuinka
hämmästyttäisiinkään, jos sanon, että nämä lempeät ja
yksinäisyydessä rukousta haluavat kenties kerran vielä tuottavat
pelastuksen Venäjän maalle! Sillä totisesti he ovat hiljaisuudessa
valmistuneet »päivään ja hetkeen, kuukauteen ja vuoteen».
Kristuksen kuvan he säilyttävät siihen saakka yksinäisyydessään
loistossansa ja väärentämättömänä, Jumalan totuuden puhtaudessa,
semmoisena kuin sen ovat jättäneet ikivanhoista ajoista isät,
apostolit ja marttyyrit, ja tarpeen tullen he tuovat sen esille maailman
horjuvalle totuudelle. Tämä on suuri ajatus. Idästä tämä tähti
nousee.

Tämmöinen on ajatukseni munkista, ja onko se väärä, onko se

pöyhkeilevä? Katsokaa maallisia ja koko Jumalan kansan yläpuolelle
asettunutta maailmaa, eikö siinä ole Jumalan kuva ja Hänen
totuutensa väärentynyt? Heillä on tiede, mutta tieteessä vain se,
mikä riippuu tunteista. Mutta hengen maailma, ihmisolennon
korkeampi puoli, on kokonaan kielletty, karkoitettu jonkinmoisella
voitonriemulla, vieläpä vihamielisyydellä. Maailma on julistanut
vapauden, varsinkin viime aikoina, ja mitä me näemme tässä heidän
vapaudessaan: ainoastaan orjuutta ja itsemurhaa! Sillä maailma
sanoo: »Sinulla on haluja ja sentähden tyydytä niitä, sillä sinulla on
samat oikeudet kuin kaikkein ylhäisimmillä ja rikkaimmilla ihmisillä.
Älä pelkää tyydyttää niitä, vaan lisääkin niiden lukumäärää», — siinä
on maailman nykyinen oppi. Siinä he näkevät vapauden. Ja mikä on
seurauksena tästä oikeudesta lisätä halujaan? Rikkailla
eristäytyneisyys ja henkinen itsemurha, köyhillä — kateus ja murha,
sillä oikeudet on annettu, mutta keinoja halujen tyydyttämiseen ei
vielä ole osoitettu. Vakuutetaan maailman ajan kuluessa yhä
enemmän yhtyvän ja liittyvän veljelliseksi kokonaisuudeksi sen
johdosta, että se lyhentää välimatkat, siirtää ilman halki ajatuksia;
voi, älkää uskoko tuommoiseen ihmisten yhtymiseen. Käsittäessään
vapauden halujen lisäämiseksi ja nopeaksi tyydyttämiseksi he
väärentävät luontonsa, sillä he synnyttävät itsessään paljon
järjettömiä ja typeriä pyyteitä, tottumuksia ja mielettömiä
päähänpistoja. He elävät vain kadehtiakseen toisiaan,
hekumoidakseen ja pöyhkeilläkseen. Päivällisten, huviretkien,
vaunujen, virka-arvojen ja orjamaisten mielistelijäin merkitys on heille
niin suuri, että he pitävät semmoista välttämättömyytenä, jonka takia
uhraavat henkensä, kunnian ja ihmisrakkauden saadakseen tämän
välttämättömyyden tyydytetyksi, vieläpä tappavat itsensä, jos eivät
voi sitä tyydyttää. Niillä, jotka eivät ole rikkaita, näemme samaa, kun
taas köyhät tukahduttavat halujensa tyydyttämättömyyden ja
kateutensa juoppouteen. Mutta pian he viinan asemesta juovat verta,
siihen heitä johdetaan. Minä kysyn teiltä: onko tämmöinen ihminen
vapaa? Olen tuntenut erään »aatteen soturin», joka itse kertoi
minulle, että kun hänelle vankilassa ei annettu tupakkaa, niin sen
riistäminen kiusasi häntä niin, että hän oli vähällä mennä ja hylätä
»aatteensa», kunhan vain saisi tupakkaa. Mutta tämmöinen sanoo:
»Menen taisteluun ihmisyyden puolesta.» No, mihin tuollainen
menee ja mihin hän kelpaa? Ehkä tekemään jonkin nopeasti
suoritettavan teon, mutta kauan hän ei jaksa kestää. Eikä ole ihme,
että he vapauden asemesta ovat joutuneet orjuuteen, ja sen sijaan,
että palvelisivat veljesrakkautta ja ihmisten yhdistymistä, päinvastoin
ovat joutuneet erottautuneisuuteen ja eristäytyneisyyteen, niinkuin
nuoruudessani minulle puhui salaperäinen vieraani ja opettajani. Ja
sentähden maailmassa yhä enemmän ja enemmän sammuu ajatus
ihmiskunnan palvelemisesta, ihmisten veljeydestä ja
yhteenkuuluvaisuudesta, ja totisesti tätä ajatusta ivataankin, sillä
kuinka voi luopua tottumuksistaan, minne menee tuo vanki, jos hän
on siinä määrin tottunut tyydyttämään lukemattomia halujaan, jotka
hän itse on keksinyt? Hän on eristäytynyt, eikä hänellä ole mitään
tekemistä kokonaisuuden kanssa. Ja niin on jouduttu siihen, että
tavaraa on kertynyt enemmän, mutta iloa on alkanut olla vähemmän.

Toista on munkin ura. Kuuliaisuudelle, paastolle ja rukoukselle

nauretaan, mutta niissä kuitenkin on tie oikeaan, todelliseen
vapauteen: minä leikkaan itsestäni pois liiat ja tarpeettomat halut,
taltutan ja alistan kuuliaisuuden alle itserakkaan ja ylpeän tahtoni, ja
saavutan sillä tavoin Jumalan avulla, hengen vapauden ja sen
mukana myös hengen ilon! Kumpi heistä on soveliaampi
kohottamaan suuren ajatuksen ja lähtemään sen palvelukseen, —
eristäytynyt rikas mies vaiko tämä esineitten ja tottumusten
tyrannivallasta vapautunut henkilö? Munkkia moititaan hänen
eristäytymisestään: »Sinä olet eristäytynyt pelastaaksesi itsesi
luostarin seinien sisällä ja olet unhottanut veljellisen ihmiskunnan
palvelemisen.» Mutta katsokaamme vielä, kumpi enemmän edistää
veljesrakkautta. Sillä emme me ole eristäytyneitä, vaan he, vaikka he
eivät näe sitä. Mutta meidän joukostamme on jo vanhastaan lähtenyt
kansan toimenmiehiä, miksi siis niitä ei voisi olla nytkin? Samat
nöyrät ja lempeät paastoojat ja vaikenijat nousevat ja lähtevät
suorittamaan suurta työtä. Kansa on Venäjän pelastus. Venäläinen
luostari taas on ikivanhoista ajoista pitänyt yhtä kansan kanssa. Jos
kansa on eristäytynyt, niin silloin mekin olemme eristäytyneitä.
Kansa uskoo meidän tavallamme, mutta henkilö, joka ei usko, ei
meillä Venäjällä saa mitään toimeen, vaikka hän olisi vilpitön
sydämeltään ja nerokas älyltään. Muistakaa tämä. Kansa nousee
ateistia vastaan ja voittaa hänet, ja syntyy yksi oikeauskoinen
Venäjä. Mutta vaalikaa kansaa ja varjelkaa sen sydäntä.
Hiljaisuudessa kasvattakaa sitä. Se on teidän munkki-urotyönne,
sillä tämä kansa on jumalinen.

f) Yhä ja toista herroista ja palvelijoista ja siitä, voivatko herrat ja

palvelijat tulla keskenään henkisesti veljiksi

— Herra Jumala, kuka väittääkään, ettei kansassakin olisi syntiä.

Turmeluksen palo leviää aivan silminnähtävästi, joka hetki, se tulee
ylhäältäpäin. Kansassakin saa valtaa eristäytyneisyys: alkaa olla
pomoja ja kansan nylkyreitä; kauppias haluaa jo yhä enemmän ja
enemmän kunnianosoituksia, pyrkii käymään sivistyneestä, vaikka
hänellä ei ole hituistakaan sivistystä, ja tämän vuoksi hän iljettävästi
hylkii ikivanhoja tapoja, jopa häpeilee isiensä uskoa. Hän käy
ruhtinaitten vieraana, eikä hän kuitenkaan ole muuta kuin
turmeltunut talonpoika. Juoppous on tehnyt kansasta mädän, eikä
kansa enää voi siitä luopua. Entä miten paljon julmuutta perhettä
kohtaan, vaimoa ja lapsiakin kohtaan, — kaikki juoppouden ansiota.
Olen nähnyt tehtaissa jopa kymmenvuotiaita lapsia: heikkoja,
kuihtuneita, kumaraisia, ja jo siveellisesti turmeltuneita.
Tukahduttava sali, jymisevä kone, koko Jumalan päivän työtä,
irstaita sanoja ja viinaa, viinaa, — sitäkö tarvitsee vielä noin pienen
lapsen sielu? Hän tarvitsee aurinkoa, lasten leikkejä ja kaikkialla
valoisan esimerkin sekä edes hivenen rakkautta kohtaansa. Mutta
eihän sitä saa olla, munkit, eihän saa olla lasten kidutusta, nouskaa
ja saarnatkaa siitä pian, pian. Jumala pelastaa Venäjän, sillä vaikka
rahvaanmies onkin paheellinen eikä enää voi irtautua häpeällisestä
synnistä, niin hän kuitenkin tietää, että hänen häpeällinen syntinsä
on Jumalan kiroama ja että hän tekee huonosti silloin, kun tekee
syntiä. Niin että väsymättä kansamme vielä uskoo totuuteen,
tunnustaa Jumalan, itkee liikutettuna. Toisin on ylempien laita. Nämä
tieteen mukaisesti tahtovat saada olonsa oikeudenmukaiseksi
pelkällä järjellänsä, mutta ilman Kristusta, kuten oli ennen, ja he ovat
julistaneet, että ei ole olemassa rikosta, ei ole enää syntiä. Ja onhan
se oikein heidän kannaltaan: sillä jos sinulla ei ole Jumalaa, niin mitä
rikosta silloin voisi olla? Euroopassa kansa nousee jo väkivoimin
rikkaita vastaan ja kansan johtajat johtavat sen kaikkialla vereen ja
opettavat, että sen viha on oikea. Mutta »kirottu on heidän vihansa,
sillä se on julma». Mutta Venäjän pelastaa Jumala niinkuin on
pelastanut jo monta kertaa. Pelastus lähtee kansasta, sen uskosta ja
nöyryydestä. Isät ja opettajat, varjelkaa kansan uskoa, eikä tämä ole
vain haave: koko elämäni ajan minua on hämmästyttänyt suuressa
kansassamme sen suurenmoinen ja todellinen oivallisuus, itse olen
sen nähnyt, itse voin sen todistaa, olen nähnyt ja ihmetellyt, nähnyt
huolimatta syntien saastastakin ja kansamme köyhästä asusta.
Kansamme ei ole orjamainen, vaikka on ollut kaksi vuosisataa
orjana. Vapaa se on muodoltaan ja käytökseltään eikä ole mitään
menettänyt. Eikä se ole kostonhimoinen eikä kateellinen. »Sinä olet
ylhäinen, sinä olet rikas, sinä olet viisas ja lahjakas, — ole vain sitä,
Jumala sinua siunatkoon. Minä kunnioitan sinua, mutta tiedän, että
minäkin olen ihminen. Sillä, että kunnioitan sinua tuntematta
kateutta, sillä minä juuri osoitankin sinun edessäsi ihmisarvoni.»
Totisesti, jos he eivät puhu näin (sillä he eivät vielä osaa sanoa tätä),
niin he menettelevät tällä tavoin, olen sen itse nähnyt, itse kokenut,
ja uskotteko: kuta köyhempi ja alhaisempi meidän venäläinen
miehemme on, sitä enemmän hänessä huomataan tätä
suurenmoista totuutta, sillä rikkaat pomot ja nylkyrit heidän
joukossaan ovat jo suurin määrin turmeltuneita, ja paljon, paljon
tähän on vaikuttanut meidän huolimattomuutemme ja velttoutemme!
Mutta Jumala pelastaa omansa, sillä Venäjä on suuri
nöyryydessään. Haluan hartaasti nähdä ja ikäänkuin näenkin jo
selvästi tulevaisuutemme; sillä tulee niin olemaan, että
turmeltuneinkin pohatta meillä lopuksi alkaa hävetä rikkauttaan
köyhän edessä, mutta köyhä nähdessään tämän nöyryyden
ymmärtää ja myöntää hänelle kaiken, vastaa ilolla ja
ystävällisyydellä hänen jaloon häveliäisyyteensä. Uskokaa, että tämä
tulee lopputulokseksi: siihen se on menossa. Vain henkisessä
ihmisarvossa on tasavertaisuus, ja se ymmärretään ainoastaan
meillä. Jos vain olisi veljiä, niin tulisi myös veljeys, mutta sitä ennen
ei koskaan jaeta omaisuutta. Me säilytämme Kristuksen kuvan, ja se
on loistava kuin kallis timantti koko maailmalle… Niin tapahtuu,
tapahtuu!

Isät ja opettajat, minulle sattui kerran liikuttava tapaus.

Vaellusmatkoillani tapasin kerran K:n kaupungissa entisen
sotilaspalvelijani Afanasin; erostamme oli silloin kulunut kahdeksan
vuotta. Hän näki minut sattumalta toripaikalla, tunsi, juoksi luokseni
ja, hyvä Jumala, miten hän ilostui, suorastaan syöksähti luokseni:
»Isäkulta, herrani, tekö siinä olette? Näenkö todellakin teidät?» Hän
vei minut kotiinsa. Hän oli jo eronnut sotapalveluksesta, mennyt
naimisiin, saanut jo kaksi pienokaista. Hän eli puolisoineen
harjoittamalla pientä kauppaa torilla kantelemalla tavaroita
kanninlaudalla. Hänen huoneensa oli köyhästi sisustettu, mutta se oli
puhdas ja iloinen. Hän pani minut istumaan, viritti tulen
teekeittimeen, lähetti noutamaan vaimoaan, aivan kuin minun tuloni
olisi ollut hänelle juhla. Hän toi lapsensa luokseni: »Siunatkaa,
isäkulta.» — »Minustako olisi siunaajaksi», vastaan hänelle, »minä
olen yksinkertainen ja nöyrä munkki, rukoilen Jumalaa heidän
puolestaan, ja sinun puolestasi, Afanasi Pavlovitš, rukoilen aina, joka
päivä Jumalaa, olen sen tehnyt tuosta päivästä asti, sillä sinusta,
sanon, sai kaikki alkunsa.» Ja minä selitin hänelle sen niinkuin
osasin. Mutta mitäs mies: katsoo minua eikä mitenkään voi käsittää,
että minä, hänen entinen herransa, upseeri, olen hänen edessään
sen näköinen ja semmoisessa puvussa; hän ihan rupesi itkemään.
»Mitä sinä itket», sanon hänelle, »sinä olet unohtumaton mies,
riemuitse mieluummin puolestani hengessä, ystäväni, sillä tieni on
riemukas ja valoisa». Paljoa hän ei puhunut, huokaili vain ja pudisteli
minulle lempeästi päätään. »Entä missä», kysyy, »on teidän
rikkautenne?» Vastaan hänelle: »Annoin luostariin, me elämme
yhteiselämää.» Teetä juotuani aloin hyvästellä heitä, mutta hän toi
minulle äkkiä puoli ruplaa lahjaksi luostarille ja toisen puoliruplasen,
huomaan, hän tunkee minulle kouraan puhuen kiireesti: »Tämä taas
on teille, sanoo, kulkijalle, vaeltajalle, ehkäpä se voi olla teille
hyödyksi, isäkulta.» Otin vastaan hänen puoliruplasensa, kumarsin
hänelle ja hänen vaimolleen ja poistuin ilostuneena ajatellen
kulkiessani: »Kas nyt me molemmat, hän kotonaan ja minä
kulkiessani, huokailemme ja naurahtelemme iloisesti, riemuitsevin
sydämin, sekä nyökäytämme päätämme ja muistelemme, kuinka
Jumala johti meidät kohtaamaan toisemme.» Enkä minä sen
koommin enää nähnyt häntä. Minä olin ollut hänen herransa ja hän
minun palvelijani, mutta nyt, kun me suutelimme toisiamme rakkaasti
ja hengessä liikutettuina, syntyi meidän välillämme suuri inhimillinen
yhteenkuuluvaisuus. Olen paljon ajatellut tätä, ja nyt ajattelen näin:
onko todellakin järjelle niin käsittämätöntä, että tämä suuri ja vilpitön
yhdistyminen voisi kaikkialla tapahtua meidän venäläisten kesken?
Uskon, että se tapahtuu, ja aika on lähellä.

Palvelijoista lisään seuraavaa: muinoin nuorena minä olin usein

vihainen palvelijoille: keittäjätär tarjosi ruoan liian kuumana,
sotilaspalvelija ei puhdistanut pukua. Mutta minua valaisi silloin
yhtäkkiä rakkaan veljeni ajatus, jonka lapsuudessani kuulin hänen
lausuvan: »Olenko minä ensinkään sen arvoinen, että toinen minua