Small Baltic States and The Euro Atlantic Security Community 1St Ed Edition Sandis Sraders All Chapter

Small Baltic States and the
Euro-Atlantic Security Community 1st

ed. Edition Sandis Sraders
Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://ebookmass.com/product/small-baltic-states-and-the-euro-atlantic-security-com
munity-1st-ed-edition-sandis-sraders/
Small Baltic
States and the
Euro-Atlantic
Security Community
s a n di s sr a de r s
Small Baltic States and the Euro-Atlantic
Security Community
Sandis Sraders
Small Baltic States

and the Euro-Atlantic
Security Community
Sandis Sraders
Baltic Defence College
Tartu, Estonia
ISBN 978-3-030-53762-3 ISBN 978-3-030-53763-0 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53763-0
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2021
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such
names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for
general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informa-
tion in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither
the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with
respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been
made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
To My Wife, Madara
Contents
Introduction 1
Small Baltic States: Sensitivities and Vulnerabilities 7

Military 14
Economy 35
Social Capital 49
The Surge of the Euro-Atlantic Community: 1956, 1968,

1981 71
A Road to Hungary, 1956 80
Prague Spring, 1968 100
Solidarity in Poland, 1981 114
American Foreign Policy and the Baltic States 129

Malign: Between the Wars 130
Benign: The Cold War 137
Redemption: NATO Refined 151
The Baltic Predicament: Russia’s Shadows 167

Ideas Defining Russia Today 171
Yeltsin’s Democratic Experiments 183
Putin Curbs Democracy 197
vii
viii CONTENTS
The Baltic States in Europe 221

Germany: Reluctance 223
France: Ambivalence 232
The United Kingdom: Reforms 238
New and Auxiliary Actors 244
Conclusion 257
Index 267
List of Figures
Small Baltic States: Sensitivities and Vulnerabilities

Fig. 1 UN Member states: 1945–2011 (Source UN) 10
Fig. 2 Military Spending, % of GDP (Source SIPRI) 22
Fig. 3 Baltic Embassies: Number and Location, 2019 (Source Web
pages of Baltic Foreign Ministries [Accessed on January 05,
2020]) 50
Fig. 4 Latvian Emabassies, 1994 and 2004 (Source Yearbook of
the ministry of foreign affairs of the republic of Latvia
2004 [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia:
McAbols, 2005], 113–128) 53
Fig. 5 The comparison of GDPpc in 2018 (Nominal, USD) (Source
World Bank) 55
Fig. 6 Constitutional amendments in Latvia and Russian speakers in
Estonia, 2012 (Source Central Election Committee of Latvia
and Statistics Estonia) 63
The Baltic Predicament: Russia’s Shadows

Fig. 1 The frontline 178
Fig. 2 Oil price, 1999–2016 (Source Europe Brent Spot Price FOB) 202
Fig. 3 Russian military activities, 2008–2016 (Sources The
European Leadership Network Report [2015], The McCain
Institute Report [2016], Report of the Information Agency
under the auspices of the Ministry of Defense of the
Republic of Latvia “Tevijas Sargs” [2015]) 210
ix
List of Tables
Small Baltic States: Sensitivities and Vulnerabilities

Table 1 Baltic trade, 1995 and 2018 (Source World Bank [World
Integrated Trade Solutions, WITS]) 38
Table 2 Diplomatic list in 1994 and 2004 (Source Ministry of
foreign affairs of the Republic of Latvia [2016]) 52
The Baltic Predicament: Russia’s Shadows

Table 1 Top 3 the most hostile by Russians, 2005–2018 (Source
Russian Public Opinion by Levada Center [2019]) 181
xi
Introduction
Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians are known as people who love to

live in peace, indulge their hard-working traditions, and enjoy their bond
with their land and nature. Quite frequently and for significant periods the
Baltic lust for peace was obstructed by Swedish kings, Polish emperors,
German noblemen, Russian tsars and communists. Moreover, Lithuania
had ascended as a type of empire in its own commonwealth with Poland.
Nevertheless, the recent five-decade occupation period under the Soviet
Union almost led to Baltic nations becoming a piddling drop on the Baltic
littoral, but they survived. For centuries have the destinies of each of the
Baltic States heavily depend on foreign policies of major powers in the
region to which they belong.
This experience has aggregated to the recognizable fact that the small
Baltic States cannot withstand large power superiority. All Baltic States
appeared as independent out of the collapse of the Russian empire by
1918—the result of the Russian revolution. The Soviet Union took the
independence back by 1940, but the collapse of the Communist empire
made independence possible in 1990s.
Subsequently, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as well as the other small
European states desperately looked for protection and a geopolitical
asylum. In the 1990s, few choices existed to avoid the repetition of their
historic predicament. Thankfully, since the beginning of the Cold War
other European states had shared similar objectives at a time when the
United States was ready to embrace Europe to avoid future conflicts.
© The Author(s) 2021 1

S. Sraders, Small Baltic States and the Euro-Atlantic Security Community,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53763-0_1
2 S. SRADERS
Broadly shared in the West, Franklin Delano Roosevelt explicitly noted

that “more than an end to war, we all want an end to the beginnings of
all wars.” The shared objective was expressed by a person who had seen
myriad atrocities even before the dawn of the Cold War descended over
Europe. The West was exhausted from the European history frequently
going mad with few choices, all bad.
Since the willingness existed to deter conflicts and institutionalize
cooperation, the West corrected what was wrong with the past. European
integration aimed at creating an affluent and stable partner for the United
States, but NATO was built for the defense of a Euro-Atlantic partner-
ship. Sadly, not all European countries could join the Euro-Atlantic club
at the outset. As a warning for the rest, Stalin prevented Czechoslovakia
from joining the West early in 1948.
Since 1945, the Cold War pitted the West against the East for five
decades, but the ideological clash is yet enduring. The West primarily
focused on the containment and the eventual defeat of the communist
regime then, but now the focus is on deterring the resurgent Russia along
the borders of the Euro-Atlantic alliance and its partners. The objective of
rebuilding the European continent whole and free was never abandoned
in the past and remains the same today.
When the Soviet Union approached its imminent final destination, the
European Union (EU) and NATO were still enduring, and the next steps
for the future of Europe and Euro-Atlantic cooperation, were debated.
At this moment the Baltic States never hid their willingness to join the
Euro-Atlantic community. In relations with NATO, the former Estonian
President Lennart Meri colorfully described the security cooperation the
Baltic States were desperately seeking with NATO, since for them “secu-
rity was seen like a virginity: you’re either a virgin or you’re not. You
either have security or you don’t.”1 While no country could account for
absolute safety, the pronouncements of the Baltic leaders indicated the
utter sense of insecurity and discomfort with Russia in the region.
When the Baltic States were invited to start accession talks with NATO,
it was also concluding the EU accession negotiations. On that occasion,
in 2002, Latvian President Vaira Vı̄ķe-Freiberga remarked that “it was
not just a year which could be symmetrically read from both sides. It
was a moment when states, small and large, from East and West, deleted
1 Lennart Meri, “Meriisms,” City Paper’s Baltics Worldwide (1994), accessed on March
17, 2016, http://www.balticsworldwide.com/quotes/merisms.htm.
INTRODUCTION 3
the last remnants from World War II on the Europe’s map based on
the legality and equality of all.”2 From the Baltic perspective, the failure
to join NATO was seen as imminently resulting in re-imposition of the
Russian domain, while a possibility to join the EU was seen as an end to
the soviet economic deprivation and social injustices. Yet, in order to gain
access to these communities, the Baltic States had to undertake significant
transformation and enjoy the welcoming approaches by major powers for
their membership in the Euro-Atlantic community.
To outline these aspects this book will first focus on intrinsic weak-
nesses of the Baltic States. Chapter “Small Baltic States: Sensitivities and
Vulnerabilities” will outline some important instances as indicators for
military, economic and social vulnerabilities and sensitivities in the post-
Cold War until the EU and NATO enlargement and thereafter. This
unique outline of intrinsic sensitivities and vulnerabilities for the Baltic
States will dwell on paradigms and experiences of other small states in
international affairs. This chapter will also deliver some answers if the
Euro-Atlantic integration became a remedy for all inherent weaknesses
for the Baltic States.
Chapter “The Surge of the Euro-Atlantic Community: 1956, 1968,
1981” of this book will emphasize foreign and security policies of the
United States and the Soviet Union until the end of the Cold War.
Despite this book focuses on the Baltic integration into NATO and the
EU in the post-Cold War, this chapter will explain the patterns and ideas
behind the policies of major powers (their ways and temptation to use
force against small states in their neighborhood). The Cold War shared
experiences of former Soviet states became the intrinsic reasons for early
fragmentation of the Soviet bloc and dwindling of Kremlin’s power. Until
the enlargement of NATO and the EU in 2004, the Baltic States were
mentioning experiences of Hungary from 1956, Czechoslovakia from
1968 and Poland from 1980s. These historical lessons explain the over-
arching inability by Moscow to construct benevolent relations with its
constituents and its neighbors. Thus, the possible voluntary reintegration
of the Baltic States into the Russian polity or political order was popularly
2 Vaira Vı̄ķe-Freiberga, “The Speech of the President of the Republic of Latvia,”

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia (November 18, 2002), accessed on
March 19, 2019, http://www.mfa.gov.lv/aktualitates/zinas/runas-raksti-intervijas-prese/
16951-valsts-prezidentes-vairas-vikes-freibergas-runa-valsts-svetkos-pie-brivibas-pieminekla-
2002-gada-18-novembri.
4 S. SRADERS
denied at the outset due to inherent incompatibility. During the occupa-

tion years, the Baltic States shared similar experiences with the Visegrad
countries resulting in the adamant foreign policy orientation to join all
Western structures to escape Moscow’s dominance.
Chapter “American Foreign Policy and the Baltic States” will focus
on American foreign policy toward Europe and the Baltic States. This
policy and the actor was indispensable to balance and deter Russia against
military temptation to take the Baltic States back by force or abuse its
economic superiority. The United States was the only militarily, econom-
ically, and socially apt power to ensure security and stability in Europe
in the post-Cold War. Periods of American approaches to Europe in
a comparative perspective will outline malign, benign, and beneficial
American foreign policy doctrines for Europe, and the Baltic States.
Chapter “The Baltic Predicament: Russia’s Shadows” will focus on
Russia. Baltic security, economy and social affairs strongly depend on ways
Kremlin approaches its neighbors. Despite the Baltic States would like
to enjoy cooperative relations with Russia, its ideological background,
unsuccessful democratic experiments, and resurgent neo-imperial and
neo-communist traditions make co-existence complicated at least. The
faith of the Baltic States strongly depends on Russia while there is little
any or all Baltic States together could do to inflict any change inside
Russia or when it comes to its foreign and security policies. This chapter
will provide insights to ideological torrents in Russia that are shaping and
limiting its attempts to build democratic-benevolent polity.
Chapter “The Baltic States in Europe” of this book will describe how
European powers, sandwiched between the United States and Russia,
were approaching the Baltic States in their shared and unilateral attempts
to join NATO, the EU, and the democratic West. Security, economic,
and social interests of major European powers as well as regional ones
were determining European approaches toward the Baltic States. Since
democracy became the criteria for Baltic entry into NATO, the policies
of major European powers as well as regional and institutional influ-
ences played important roles. This chapter will outline European interests
toward Russia that were tearing some major powers apart in their osten-
sible effort to rebuild the common home Europe—whole and free from
atrocious ideologies, oppression, deprivation, and wars.
INTRODUCTION 5
This book will eventually provide the answer to what extent if at

all foreign and security policies of major powers allow small states to
mitigate their sensitivities and vulnerabilities. The Baltic States and their
experiences will serve as an example.
Small Baltic States: Sensitivities
and Vulnerabilities
As is the case with many other small states, there are few studies about
the Baltic States. Small states might simply not be as interesting as major
powers, institutions, multinational organizations, interests groups or any
other influential actor in international affairs. Additionally, it may be
assumed that there is little rationale for studying small states with minis-
cule global impact. So, why should we study small states in general or any
one in particular?
International relations have been a state-centered discipline. Since the
peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the emergence of nation states as the
primary actors in international affairs, the focus of analysis has been on
a comparison of diverse states––large and small, or weak and powerful.
Most experts have been interested in major and powerful actors. Thus,
the debate about small states emerged as a residual category with the
tendency to surge as the number of small states grew.
Before World War I, the debate was solely about major powers, and,
for many of them, their empires. Such world order was apparent between
the unification of Germany until the run up to World War I when major
powers had incorporated inside their polities most small states.1 Some
authors mention that in the run up to the war, there were six major
powers (Germany, Great Britain, France, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and
1 Carsten Holbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics (St. Martin’s Press, 1984).
© The Author(s) 2021 7

S. Sraders, Small Baltic States and the Euro-Atlantic Security Community,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53763-0_2
8 S. SRADERS
Italy). The rest could be viewed as “small” powers with Denmark, Turkey,
and Sweden the most notable exceptions as middle powers.2 Therefore,
a small state was defined by what it was not, assuming it even existed, or
as an impediment to large and middle powers.3
A few new states emerged during the interwar period. That includes
the Baltic States. But their viability was immediately put to test when the
world order was based on hard to enforce idealistic principles suggesting
the preservation of small states only legally.4 As a result, the interwar
order offered novel foreign policy possibilities for small states, but small
and microstates had to rely on their own capabilities to withstand external
pressure.5 The dawn of the Second World War proved to be the viability
test for small states where most failed.
Around 1945, the post-war world offered different principles. The
order was determined mainly by two superior powers and the balance
of power principles.6 The post-war period divided the world into two
ideologically different poles.7 The structure was rigid, especially at first.
Nevertheless, some powers managed eventually to rise as middle powers.
2 Francis Harry Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the
History of Relations Between States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 245–
255.
3 Ivar B. Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöhl, “Lilliputian’s in Gulliver’s World?” ed. Chritine
Ingebritsen, Ivar Neumann, Sieglinde Gstöhl, and Jessica Beyer, Small States in Interna-
tional Relations (Seattle: University of Washington Press and Reykjavik: University of
Iceland Press, 2006), 6.
4 David Vital, The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Rela-
tions (Greenwood Publisher Group, 1967); Elmer Plischke, Microstates in World Affairs:
Policy Problems and Options (Studies in Foreign Policy: AEI Press, 1977); Sheila Harden,
Small is Dangerous: Micro States in a Macro World (Frances Pinter Publishers Ltd, 1985).
5 William E. Rappard, Problems of Peace: Pacifism is Not Enough (Geneva Institute of
International Relations, 1934).
6 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and the War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1959); John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power
Politics (W. W. Norton & Company, 2001); Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after
the Cold War,” International Security, Volume 25, No. 1 (Summer, 2000).
7 Raymond Aron, The Century of Total War (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1954);
Judt and Snyder, Thinking the Twentieth Century; Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe
Since 1945 (England: Penguin Books, 2005).
SMALL BALTIC STATES: SENSITIVITIES AND VULNERABILITIES 9
For example, in the 1960s France rose as a European nuclear power or

a power that could keep a finger on the nuclear trigger of major powers.8
The Fifth Republic shaped French-British and French-German relations
with consequences on the rise of a united Europe as a salient power.
During the Cold War, small and weak states grouped around two major
power blocs. Thus, their fate depended on the policies of major powers.
At the pinnacle of the Cold War, a great power was able to assert its
will against a small state, while a small state was not able to do the same
against a great power.9 In the same way as major powers were ascending
and descending powers, the distribution and emergence of small states
have been a historic process. Major powers called all the shots interna-
tionally. Middle powers were invited to participate and contribute to the
bargaining process of major powers, but small states were not involved in
great power games.
However, one profound trend happened after World War II and during
the Cold War. There was a significant increase in the number of small
states. The UN membership enhanced the legitimacy of even the smallest
international members. Owing to de-colonization trends and the disinte-
gration of the Soviet Union, there were more than 40 additional states at
the UN in the 1950s and 50 in 1960s while almost 30 additional states
joined the UN from 1990 to 1995, the Baltic States were among them
(See Fig. 1). Therefore, small states together could attempt to defend
their common interests.
As the debate of this book is about the post-Cold War, the focus is on
the end of the bipolar world order when new discussions about small and
large states and their powers ensued. The definition of size and power
had been a point for endless debates. From the normative point of view,
all states are equal before the law. From the political perspective, they
are far from equal. In fact, all states are unique. Thus, sovereign equality
between states has hardly existed before. Moreover, small and weak states
have been viewed as an unimportant category in international relations or
one that is an impediment to, or unnecessary reason for, struggles among
great powers. Some American foreign policy pundits had overtly criticized
8 Simon Serfaty, France, De Gaulle and Europe: The Policy of the Fourth and Fifth
Republic toward the Continent (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1968), 89–117,
143–149.
9 Hans Joachim Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace
(New York: Knopf, 1960), 129–130.
10 S. SRADERS
Fig. 1 UN Member states: 1945–2011 (Source UN)
the United States approach to small states like the Baltic States in inter-
national affairs as impediment to better relations with major powers, like
the Russian Federation.10
Many authors have argued that the right to self-determination
promoted by the UN Charter was precisely the reason for the surge of
numerous small states, as well as causes for significant governance prob-
lems for major and middle powers.11 However, no group or no small
power alone hindered the designs of major UN powers. Discussions were,
instead, about aspects related to the extent to which small states depended
on major powers.12
It was broadly conceived that small states could escape the pressure of
major powers by entering into alliances with major powers or convincing
them that the neutrality of a small state could be beneficial.13 The roles
of small states depended on changes in international trade, transport,
10 Michael Mandelbaum, Mission Failure: America in the World in the Post-Cold War
Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 68–70.
11 Patricia Wohlgemuth Blair, The Ministate Dilemma (Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace, 1968); Stanley A. De Smith, Microstates and Micronesia: The Problems of
America’s Pacific Islands and Other Minute Territories (New York University Press, 1970);
Richard L. Harris, Death of a Revolutionary: Che Guevara’s Last Mission (New York: W.
W. Norton, 1970).
12 Otmar Holl, Small states in Europe and Dependence (Austrian Institute for Interna-
tional Affairs, 1983).
13 Nicholas J. Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics: the United States and the
Balance of Power (Transaction Publishers, 2008); Annette Baker Fox, The Power of Small
States: Diplomacy in World War II (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1959).
security, foreign policy or culture and ideology, for example. By utilizing

intensified communication channels, small states could convince larger
countries that the use of force against them could favor their adversaries
or while their neutrality could be beneficial.
Scandinavian countries in general, and Switzerland in particular, have
often been described as the neutrals in Europe. Remaining neutral was
admired by those that were forced to take sides or, more frequently,
simply comply. The ability to remain a neutral state was explored by
Hans Mouritzen who analyzed the ability of small Nordic countries to
stay neutral. The process was called the Finlandization - the politics of a
weak country whose regime feels compelled to make some concessions
to a powerful neighbor in order to preserve more important elements
of its independence.14 This strategy of non-commitment or neutrality is
more effective if supported by a credible level of strength and military
preparedness.15
Some debates about small states were aimed at questioning the quality
of their power. Such states as Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland and
Iceland could keep their pride not because they were large and capable
major powers but because they could be the most just, organized or
moral.16 Thus, multiple small states were depicted as essential actors in
specific issue areas like the financial sector (Switzerland and Luxembourg),
the oil sector (OPEC countries), or moral and normative issues (Scandi-
navian countries). Smallness and greatness, therefore, were not criteria to
be applied to size or systemic level only, but to distinct areas where even
small states could challenge the clout of major powers.17
Despite the fact that small states might look like a doomed category in
international affairs, always exposed to the goodwill or pressure of major
powers, Peter Katzenstein’s pivotal work on Small States in World Markets
showed that small states, owing to the efficiently acquirable democratic
consensus, could not only survive but also even thrive.
14 A. E. Campbell, “Review: Finlandization: Towards a General Theory of Adaptive

Politics,” International Affairs: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Volume 65, No.
2 (1989): 315.
15 Hans Mouritzen, Theory and Reality of International Politics (Brookfield: Ashgate
Publishing, Ltd., 1998), 44–45.
16 Emile Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals (Routledge, 1992), 75.
17 Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Longman,
2012).
12 S. SRADERS
They could turn some of their domestic properties into niche power
capabilities to better serve their domestic interests. The work was
significant because it was not about systemic vulnerabilities and sensi-
tivities resulting from large states decisions. The narrative was about
small Western European countries––the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden,
Switzerland and Austria––that managed to offset negative external condi-
tions by adapting domestic institutions and interest groups to respond
to changes in international markets. This work about world market and
democratic consensus implicitly implies that there is little small states can
do in the face of military threats.
Until the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, there had been
no other significant research that would challenge Professor Katzenstein’s
general conclusions. The first literature that questioned the new roles
of small states was devoted to Scandinavia, which had been previously
neutral against the Soviet Union. If still neutral, then against whom?
That policy dilemma absorbed Sweden or Finland, for example. Since the
end of the Cold War, the enhancement of small state domestic interests
were broadly sought within international organizations. Liberal coopera-
tion was widespread and the military realm had gone out of fashion for a
while.
It was argued that the decisions taken by small countries depended on
domestic structural interests.18 Moreover, there has been some research
devoted to explaining how easy it was for small and large countries to
satisfy their combined interests even when their societies were heteroge-
neous.19 The work argues that man-made political boundaries of states
should dovetail with the economic interests and market possibilities of a
group.
Thus, the emergence of new small states or the federalization of larger
ones could be a result of market forces. Such arguments were rooted in
a quantitative analysis by computing the optimal size of a state in theory,
and explaining the phenomenon of a country size in reality. Here, again,
the debate fails to explain the impact of military power while more focus
is on markets.
18 Christine Ingebritsen, The Nordic States and the European Unity (Cornell University
Press, 1998).
19 Alberto Alesina and Enrico Spolaore, The Size of Nations (Boston: MIT Press, 2003).
International trade, political affairs, social affairs, and diplomatic inter-

action were all becoming more dynamic. As a result, the need for a
strategy for small states gained prominence.20 One side argued that, by
having a strategy, small states could better guide their domestic societies.
The other side held that a strategy from the past might be outdated for
challenges of the present. Consequences of modernity were that it became
harder to discern security from danger and risk from trust in a highly
dynamic environment.21 Therefore, there was a risk that domestic soci-
eties might be misguided by charting a rigid national path in terms of
strategy or foreign policy of a small state.
Despite the fact that the future of small states does not look promising
in a more complex and modern environment, institutional frameworks,
markets or alliances designed to best pursue international opportunities
were viable options.22 Small states could be more mobile and versa-
tile. Therefore, they may be better able to adapt to current challenges
than larger countries. Small states could act like dynamic speedboats
while large states will always resemble huge, clumsy, resource-endowed
tankers. In theory, it should be easier for small states to adapt to
changing international environment if in practice domestic structures can
be resiliently adapted. The literature suggests that even the Baltic States
have applied different methods to reorient their domestic structures and
pursue interests.23
However, from the perspective of security, little has changed. On the
outskirts of Europe, neutrality at the outset of the first independence
proved to be delusional for the Baltic States. The experience of the Scan-
dinavian and Swiss “neutrality ghetto” only underlines such a stance. The
complete neutrality had proved as something negative, even menacing.24
20 Alyson J. K. Bailes, “Does a Small State Need a Strategy,” University of Iceland:

Centre for Small State Studies Publication Series, Occasional Paper No. 2 (2009).
21 Anthony Giddens, Consequences of Modernity (Stanford University Press, 1991).
22 Harald Balderstein and Michael Keating ed., Small in the Modern World: Vulner-
abilities and Opportunities (Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, USA: Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2015); Dorothee Bohle and Béla Greskovits, Capitalist Diversity on Europe’s
Periphery (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2012).
23 Dorothee Bohle and Béla Greskovits, Capitalist Diversity on Europe’s Periphery
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2012), 96–131.
24 Timo Hellenberg, “Foreword,” ed. Atis Lejiņš and Žaneta Ozoliņa, Baltic Security
Prospects at the Turn of the 21st Century (Helsinki: Kikimora Publications, 1999), 6.
14 S. SRADERS
Thus, this experience has a significant effect on the domestic debates

about the future. The frequent incorporation of the Baltic States made
the search for foreign policy or the creation of grand strategy profound.25
To outline the challenges for the enduring grand strategy and foreign
policy, the author will focus on three distinct areas. First, the Baltic States
face the overarching question: how to avoid becoming occupied again.
The Russian Empire and the Soviet Union had looted their independence
twice. The potential for military capabilities, alliances and prospects for
security therefore must receive the necessary attention.
Second, markets and economy render small states interdependent and
therefore sensitive or vulnerable to external market adjustments (and
political pressure by larger countries). As a result, a part of this research
will focus on some distinct areas that are exposing the Baltic States to
intentional market adjustments. Particular focus will be on such areas as
energy, finance and transit (in relations with the Russian Federation).
The third part will focus on what social instances make the Baltic
States exposed in the big power games. The particular focus will be on
Baltic diplomatic networks, leaders and humanitarian capital as well as
domestic cultural and social (ethno-political) challenges to the demo-
cratic consensus (pan-Baltic and each of the Baltic States). The author
will investigate some of the most challenging known areas and trends for
the coherence of the Baltic States.
Military
The strategic significance of small powers emanate from various polit-
ical, geographical, economic and military factors that are not always easy
to identify or disentangle.26 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
constellation of power in the proximity of the Baltic States was reshaped,
but the attention from Russia never shifted. Thus, military capacities still
25 Anders Wivel, “The Grand Strategies of Small European States,” Paper Presented
at the 50th Annual ISA Meeting (February 15, 2009), Accessed on November 25,
2016, http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/3/1/1/7/4/
pages311749/p311749-1.php.
26 Tim Sweijs, “The Role of Small Powers in the Outbreak of Great Power War,” Centre
for Small State Studies Publishing Series: University of Iceland, Occasional Paper (2010),
5.
played an important role even when the application of power seemed to

be out of fashion.
One reason for small states to be concerned with great power clashes
has to do with the essential assets they might hold in great power
games.27 For example, a forceful takeover of a part or the whole terri-
tory of a NATO member state by the Russian Federation would mean
the collapse of NATO and waning of the United States power in Europe.
Same thinkers of American foreign policy that formerly blamed the
United States for spoiling relations with large players like Russia are now
reversing their position. They say the United States must defend the tiny
Baltic States on Russia’s border; “by defending them, the United States
could encounter same difficulties it did defending West Berlin,” from
1948 until 1949.28 Nevertheless, this would become the decisive test for
NATO’s credibility or the United States presence and power in Europe
and internationally.
On the other hand, small states themselves might need their own inter-
national strategy to mobilize domestic resources or explicitly adhere to
security interests of larger countries.29 Here, all measures to offset Russia
militarily and forge closer ties with the US-led NATO must be the strategy
for the Baltic States to balance Russia. The historical relations and ideo-
logical importance of history for Russia to retake the lost territories is
sufficiently bold argument for any of the Baltic States to embrace such
strategy. Thus, defense and security matters must top national security
concerns for the Baltic States.
Small countries are primarily concerned with their viability, but their
access to sufficient military capabilities depends on their economic poten-
tial. In the military domain, trends have changed. In 1914, there was
no need for large-scale investments to equip an army. The war required
an infantry to be equipped with almost universal and fundamentally
simple equipment used by all armies. More importance was attached to
numbers, natural obstacles and the territory of a state. However, with new
technological advances the military requirements rapidly changed.
27 Nicholas J. Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the
Balance of Power (Transaction Publishers, 2008), 19.
28 Michael Mandelbaum, “The New Containment: Handling Russia, China, and Iran,”
Foreign Affairs (March/April, 2019).
29 Alyson JK Bailes, “Does a Small State Need a Strategy?” Center for Small State
Studies Publication Series: University of Iceland, Occasional Paper (2009), 40–41.
16 S. SRADERS
Therefore, modernizing military became a possibility for smaller states,

like Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. In their military modernization
efforts, small states will be always more constrained due to their limited
availability of resources for national defense. For example, Estonia could
afford buying five F35 fighter jets, but there would be no money for
gas or personnel left. Latvia could afford six such fighter planes, but no
finance would be left to pay salaries to military command or national
guards. Lithuania could afford one Mistral aircraft carrier and approx-
imately the same number of F35s as Estonia or Latvia separately, but
when it comes to financing maintenance or operation, also Lithuania
would end up with the same financial constraints as the two smaller Baltic
countries.30
When it comes to national defense, smaller actors will also have to be
more vigilant and resilient. A single major defeat for a small state can
mean the loss of the most valuable parts of the country-if not all of it-
and the loss of any prospect of a victory with the nation’s own resources.
Greater powers have larger territories and populations, which puts them
in a strategically advantageous position. They can push the perimeter of
conflict from its vital population, economy, supplies or decision-making
centers. Conversely, at the outset of a military intervention smaller coun-
tries can lose a fight for strategically important assets and, as a result, a
war. Even the smallest losses can lead to the inability to retaliate, rehabil-
itate, or push back enemies’ forces. Thus, a smaller country must await
the enemy at the gates, at the outer limits of its vital centers, invariably
so when it is alone. All pre-emptive means for security must be mobi-
lized and applied instantly. It makes defense highly demanding from a
socio-economic perspective.
Considering the myriad difficulties in ensuring sufficient contingency
measures, small states tend to employ the best military deterrent possible.
30 See Trading Economics data for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, https://tradingec
onomics.com/lithuania/latvia/estonia/gdp (2019: GDP for Estonia was 31 bnUSD and
2% or 620 mUSD for defense, for Latvia 36 bnUSD and 2% or 720 mUSD for defense,
and Lithuania 54 bnUSD and 108 mUSD for defense). One F35 fighter jet costs approx-
imately 120 mUSD, see article “How much does the F-35 Cost? Producing, Operating
and supporting a 5th Generation Fighter,” accessed April 30, 2020, https://www.f35.
com/about/cost. One Mistral ship vacillates between 600–700 mUSD, see article by
Sebastien Roblin, “How France Almost Sold Russia Two Powerful Aircraft Carriers,” The
National Interest (September 1, 2019), accessed on April 30, 2020, https://nationalinte
rest.org/blog/buzz/how-france-almost-sold-russia-two-powerful-aircraft-carriers-77241.
A small, non-aligned power, at least in so far as it is involved in, or

anticipates, conflict, has the most profound reasons for attempting to
offset limited numbers, limited supplies and limited maneuverability by
acquiring weapons of the highest fire-power, mobility, destruction and
operational efficiency.
Then in search of such superior military capabilities, small states can
attract the attention of the greatest powers even if small states will be
economically fit to acquire and sustain such defense capabilities that are
primarily oriented toward preventing war. For example in a nuclear-armed
system, a philosophy of live-and-let-live among powers becomes the
only practical alternative to the high risk of annihilation.31 After all, the
stronger the capacity to resist militarily and the greater the damage a state
can inflict on its enemies in the event of attack, the more restricted the
greater powers are in their own political and military movements against
smaller and weaker entities.32 Nevertheless, there are several downsides
that small states must consider when contemplating the development and
application of nuclear military capability.
First, the actual application of such might as nuclear weapons might
be a delusional security guarantee: insistence on the pursuit of what
appears to be the national interest may lead to defeat, and even to self-
destruction. Small states, because of their limited territory and human
resources, can inflict significant damages on their own territory and popu-
lation by attempting to stop conventional attack with weapons of mass
destruction. As a result, the alliance and protection of a greater power
should be sought if political and geographic circumstances warrant it.33
Military strategies for small states will depend on the security environ-
ment to which they belong. In addition, geography for small states plays
a dominant, if not the dominant, role in international affairs. States will
not be able to choose their neighbors in the same manner as humans
cannot choose their parents.34 Thus, military strategies and investment
31 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: The National Security Problems in International
Relations (University of North Carolina Press, 1983), 171.
32 Vital, 159–160.
33 Ibid., 58–68.
34 Brendan Halligan, Strategies for a Small State in a Large Union (Dublin: The
Institute of International and European Affairs, 2013), 8.
18 S. SRADERS
policies will depend on inherent security perceptions.35 The lessons of

history teaches some important things to the Baltic States and the present
foreign and security policy trends assertiveness compounded the surge or
neo-imperial and neo-communist ideas makes the security in Baltic Sea
Region worrisome. Small states should not embrace appeasement, but
remain non-provoking. Most importantly, they must maintain significant
military notwithstanding costs to raise the price of seizing them high
enough.
Before and during the Second World War, Denmark’s policy of
pre-emptive appeasement only encouraged the German invasion. When
Denmark could no longer accept surging demands from Nazi Germany,
it reversed most of the concessions, and Denmark was soon overrun
because of being in the path of the Reich without a sufficient military
deterrent. Soon thereafter, Hitler turned against Norway, which, facing
overwhelming military force, surrendered. Since Norway discovered oil
resources only after World War II, its economic significance was not suffi-
cient for potential allies to support it militarily, or for Hitler to regard
it as an economic asset. It was neither sufficiently militarily strong nor
strategically important to avoid its annihilation by the major power.
In the case of the Soviet invasion in Finland, the narrative is different.
When Hitler and Stalin designed the secret Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact,
Finland was not a part of the Soviet plan. In the same way as Lithuania
was given to Stalin unexpectedly late, Finland was added to the Soviet
playground belatedly. As a result, Moscow had poor intelligence and weak
military plans and preparedness to occupy Finland during the Winter
War.36 In addition, Finland’s topography and willingness to fight played
a crucial role. Severely cold conditions were as familiar to the Russians
as they were to the Finns, but the severe Soviet military losses salvaged
Finland’s neutrality during the Cold War years.
Finland’s neighbor, Sweden, was located between Norway and
Denmark, with the Soviet Union close to the north. As a result, Sweden
had developed four scenarios. Three were directed against a potential
Soviet invasion, and one, possible rather than probable, was aimed at the
German Reich.
35 Vital, 89.
36 Viktor Suvorov, Inside Soviet Military Intelligence (New York: MacMillan Publishing
Company, 1984), 24.
When one of the first three scenarios materialized and the Soviet
Union indeed attacked Finland during the Winter War of 1939, Sweden
politically downplayed its military involvement by describing itself as a
non-combatant, rather than as neutral to fight together with Finland
against the Soviet Union.37 Furthermore, since Finland reached peace
accords with Russia, and subsequent neutrality by 1944, Sweden could
further discard the first three strategies and opt for defense against
Germany.
Learning from Norwegian-German and Danish-German lessons,
Sweden quickly mobilized its domestic production resources with firms
like Husqvarna, Ericsson, and Volvo. Apart from quick and sound
improvements in naval capabilities, Sweden rapidly developed its own
domestic aircraft design and production company, SAAB (Svenska Aero-
plan Aktienbolaget ). It made Swedish defense strategy more efficient
and the country could stay militarily non-committed since it did not
procure military equipment from abroad.38 Apart from building its own
military-industrial complex, in early 1942 Sweden launched large-scale
mobilization by recruiting 300,000 men; there is evidence that this move
might have deterred Germany from “liquidating” Sweden.39
What allowed Sweden to incrementally adapt to changing external
conditions were not just its geographic location and the wartime expe-
rience of its neighbors or military mobilization. Wartime Germany relied
on Sweden for about 40% of its supplies of iron ore––one of the most
contentious issues in the war. As a result, Sweden’s foreign relations could
be succinctly explained as maneuvering on the margins since there was
a strong opposition from the United Kingdom and the United States
regarding the Swedish trade.
Sweden’s trading policies were closely tied to its foreign policies. It
was the “double-negotiation”––a delicate balancing, sometimes blackmail
and brinkmanship, aimed at taking care of both wartime parties without
upsetting any of them.40 Sweden proved itself compliant as it efficiently
switched its support to the winning party notwithstanding the moral
37 John Gilmour, Sweden, Swastika and Stalin (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
2010), 211–212.
38 Gilmour, 216–217.
39 Ibid., 219.
40 Ibid., 113.
20 S. SRADERS
ambiguities. During the German invasion of Denmark and Norway, it

faced a number of hard decisions as to when to give in, and by how much,
to German demands and expectations. Only after a series of German
defeats in 1942 and 1943 did Sweden withdraw most of previous conces-
sions.41 By then the Swedes were already making more concessions to the
likely victors. As a sign of reciprocal courtesy, in 1946 Sweden did not
hesitate to extradite Baltic and German refugees to the Soviet Union.42
Around the Swiss borders before the start of World War II, conditions
were changing more rapidly. Thus, mobilization efforts in Switzerland
were effective and swift. Civilian institutions elected General Guisan the
army chief on August 30, 1939, to maintain the security, independence,
and neutrality of Switzerland, for defending the economic interests of the
country, and for insuring its economic survival.43 That openly signified
that the days as usual were over. Switzerland quickly mobilized around a
435,000-man fighting force out of a population of 4.2 million. It was a
significant accomplishment even if the Swiss army was not highly mech-
anized. The military strategy was based on sound anti-tank infantry and
mass resistance organized around natural obstacles inside the country.
The result was that the Swiss neutrality and national interests depended
on how “the new might of Germany would express itself.”44 Even before
World War II, Swiss compliance toward German wishes was evident.
Switzerland conceded to such financial pro-German concessions as the
extradition of the Czech gold reserves to the German Reichsbank by the
Governor of the Bank of England.45 During the war, Swiss authorities
maintained friendly relations and permitted Germany to run substantial
41 Håkan Wiberg, “Coping with a Greedy Neighbor,” Journal of Peace Research, Volume
26, No. 3 (1989): 319–325, 321.
42 See “Zviedrija izdod baltiešu un vācu bēgļus PSRS” Nekropole, accessed on
January 25, 2017, https://nekropole.info/lv/events/Zveidrija-izdod-baltiesu-un-vacu-beg
lus-PSRS; See “The Baltic Tragedy - Nazi and Soviet occupation in Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania,” a documentary, accessed on January 25, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=x440cUS4uTU.
43 Urs Schwarz, The Eye of the Hurricane: Switzerland in World War Two (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), 2–9.
44 John Kimche, Spying for Peace: General Guisan and Swiss Neutrality (New York: Roy
Publishers Inc., 1961), 58.
45 Christopher Kopper, “Hitler, the West, and Switzerland, 1936–1945,” German
Studies Review, Volume 26, No. 1 (2003): 198–199, 199.
trade deficits. By not withdrawing from financial cooperation, Switzer-

land was no less a participant of the appeasement than Paris or London
during the Munich Agreement.
Switzerland could also prove itself beneficial for the German Reich
more broadly. A focal point for political and financial transactions, it was
important for the Reich’s military, political, and economic edifice. There
is evidence that corporate headquarters even in the United States and
the branch plants in Germany stayed in contact with each other, either
indirectly via subsidiaries in neutral Switzerland, or directly by means of
modern worldwide systems of communications.46
Furthermore, between 1940 and 1944, the Swiss military industrial
complex provided arms and ammunition valued at 633 million Francs
to the Axis countries such as Germany, Italy, Romania and Japan, and
similar goods (later) to the Allied countries including France, the United
Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway for a value of 57.5
million Francs.47 Switzerland exported arms to such neutral countries as
Sweden and Finland, too, but the value of the Reich’s military imports
highlights the intensity of the cooperation.
The cases of Sweden and Switzerland prove that neutrality for a small
state depends on several crucial conditions. One, however, is especially
salient. Even if a small state can prove itself an economic asset, without
a strong and modern military attuned to local topography and natural
obstacles there can be no non-alignment or neutrality. The Baltic States
were tantamount to Norway before Hitler’s invasion and some of them
have resembled the Denmark’s elements of appeasement against Stalin.
None of these strategies had worked to maintain Norwegian indepen-
dence, Danish security or Baltic sovereignty. Furthermore, none of the
Baltic States can boast about financial institutions or natural resources
indispensable to countries like Russia. Conversely, Kremlin holds pride
with self-sufficiency of resources and an overwhelming military might. It
is Russia’s modern army much stronger than the financial figures would
46 Jacques R. Pauwels, “Hitler, the West and Switzerland, 1936–1945,” Labour-Le

Travail, Issue 51 (2003): 223–249, 236.
47 Independent Commission of Experts: Switzerland––Second World War, Switzerland,
National Socialism and the Second World War (Zurich: Pendo Verlag GmbH, 2002), 200.
22 S. SRADERS
Fig. 2 Military Spending, % of GDP (Source SIPRI)
suggest when comparing with the strongest in Europe, such as France or

the United Kingdom.48
In comparison, Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania hold tepid if considered
the most modern military capabilities to deter Russia’s military pressure
on their own or all three together. The application of such military force
has been evident. No European power has ever deterred or disciplined
Russia (the heir of the Soviet Union) against military invasion – against
Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, against the military curfew
in Poland in 1980s, against Georgia in 2008 or Ukraine since 2014.
In the post-Cold War, Georgia and Ukraine have been militarily more
responsible as their share for military suggests than the Baltic States (See
Fig. 2).
Nevertheless, nothing has restrained Kremlin from military campaigns
against those near abroad states. Only NATO security guarantees have
deterred Russia from taking back what was ostensibly lost to the collapses
of the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union (like the Baltic States). Only
the US led-NATO has proved to be the only guarantee to deter Russia.
48 Michael Kofman and Richard Connolly, “Why Russian Military Expendi-

ture is Much Higher Than Commonly Understood (as is China’s),” Texas
National Security Review––War on the Rocks (December 16, 2019), accessed on
April 20, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/why-russian-military-expenditure-
is-much-higher-than-commonly-understood-as-is-chinas/.
In the event of attack, the United States would come to defend any of the
NATO’s members like the Baltic States. In exchange, any member-state
must uphold NATO military spending principles and follow the United
States leadership to ensure the stability and security of the alliance.49 As
the result, the Baltic States can enjoy similar security guarantees provided
by the United States to Israel.
Notwithstanding the aggregate Baltic military spending, all three Baltic
States together, or each of them separately, are miniscule military powers.
Since the Russian invasion in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014,
the three Baltic States have the fastest growing military budgets. Latvia,
Lithuania and Estonia increased spending on new defense equipment to
$390 million in 2016, from $210 million in 2014.50 In comparison, the
United States in 2016 has granted Israel a military aid package worth
$38 billion for the next 10 years, equating to $3.8 billion a year, or
$10 million a day.51 It means that Israel in a little bit more than one
month spends the same amount on its military as the Baltic States on
equipment per year. Nevertheless, the United States security guarantees
through NATO places the Baltic States as similar to Israel. Thus, the
future of NATO was and is of paramount security interests to the Baltic
States.
NATO is the result of shared American and European interests. The
prosperity of Europe keeps America affluent, the stability of a democratic
Europe helps strengthen American values, and the security of war-weary
European states helps protect America from the risks of another global
war in Europe.52 Today as the result of the Marshall Plan cooperation,
the United States and Europe are one another’s closest trading partner.53
49 Richard Holbrooke, “America, a European Power,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 74, No.
2 (1995): 38–51, 46.
50 Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Lending Support to Baltic States Fearing Russia,” The New York
Times (January 1, 2017).
51 See “Obama Grants Israel Largest Military Aid Package in U.S. History,” Inter-
national Middle East Media Center News (September 16, 2016), accessed on January
03, 2017, http://imemc.org/article/obama-grants-israel-largest-military-aid-package-in-
u-s-history/.
52 Simon Serfaty, Stay the Course: European Unity and Atlantic Solidarity (Westport,
Connecticut, and London: Praeger, 1997), 3–4.
53 Daniel S. Hamilton and Joseph P. Quinlan, The Transatlantic Economy 2016: Annual
Survey of Jobs, Trade and Investment Between the United States and Europe (Washington:
24 S. SRADERS
All these preconditions, shared on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean

indicated the continued relevance of the complementary institutions built
during the Cold War-NATO and the EU. The transatlantic alliance was
the best insurance for security. The EU was the best way to ensure
stability and cooperation. The endurance of the Euro-Atlantic commu-
nity nevertheless depended on the United States’ interest in staying in
Europe.
When the sole unifier of the Euro-Atlantic community––the Soviet
Union––was gone, retrenchment, isolationism, or self-containment of the
United States was not an option. Or so it seemed. The past lessons were
not as distant as it might have seemed. The United States had won World
War I, but it lost the peace; Allies won World War II and were immediately
engaged in protracted conflict. When the Cold War was over, the preser-
vation of peace required for the United States to stay for peace in Europe
also meant peace in the United States. To maintain its global power status
and security, the United States could not afford retrenchment.54
The over-arching post-Cold War question was how to keep the Euro-
Atlantic alliance together and prepared for new tasks. Some argued that
with the bipolar international structure gone, NATO had lost its purpose
and, thus, its future.55 On the other hand, others argued that the future
of NATO was a matter of transformation and adaptation to new security
challenges. Each side was partially right and the evolution of NATO as
well as the security architecture was the subject of much discussion.
In the immediate post-Cold War years, skeptics argued that the Soviet
Union was the essential glue that had held NATO together. In the same
way as the Warsaw Pact was disbanded, so should NATO. It was broadly
argued that the West had lost its military unifier. Thus, the only solution
was to create a new political structure––an artificial institution or a power
Trans-Atlantic Business Council, 2016), accessed on October 01, 2016, http://www.tra

nsatlanticbusiness.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/160301-TAE-FULL-BOOK.pdf.
54 Nicholas J. Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and
the Balance of Power (New York: Transaction Publishers, 2008), 457; A. T. Mahan, The
Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (Dover Publications, 1987), 163.
55 Celeste A. Wallander, “Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold
War,” International Organization, Volume 54, Issue 4 (October, 2000): 705–735.
merely on paper.56 The alliance had to forego the test of viability, lost
original purposes, and adaptation to new potential risks.57 The search for
solidarity and applicability would test whether NATO’s best days were in
the past.58
NATO skeptics might have been partially right. Apart from the Article
V, there was little NATO could seemingly offer in the immediate after-
math of the Cold War. Russia was still a nuclear power, but it was
severely weakened and circumscribed. China was on the rise, but it did
not project any immediate military threats to the Euro-Atlantic alliance.
In the meantime, inter-ethnic and multi-cultural conflicts were far from
gone in Europe.
The foremost critics failed to grasp the role of NATO as a peace-
maker and peacekeeper between its allies in Europe. Some experts viewed
the United States as a peace subsidy for the alliance members.59 Within
the alliance, there is no principle or article that would exclude conflicts
between the members from erupting. Nevertheless, such countries as
Turkey, Greece, France and Germany had been living in peace despite
regional and historical grievances. Apart from its military function, NATO
had evolved into a cooperation platform where institutional framework
contributed to the political dialogue, mutual respect and peace. The
alliance, in the same manner as the EU, contributed to the liberal
peace and the emergence of the democratic community.60 NATO was
56 John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,”
International Security, Volume 15, No. 1 (1990); Owen Harries, “The Collapse of the
West,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 72, No. 4 (September/October, 1994).
57 George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 16.
58 John L. Harper, “Anatomy of a Habit: America’s Unnecessary Wars,” Survival,
Volume 42, No. 2 (2005): 57–86; Robert A. Levine, “NATO is Irrelevant: A Bureau-
cracy Whose Time Has Passed,” International Herald Tribune (2003); Charles Kupchan,
“The Last Days of the Atlantic Alliance,” Financial Times (November 18, 2002); Bret
Stephens, “The Retreat Doctrine,” Wall Street Journal (May, 2013); Richard E. Rupp,
NATO After 9/11: An Alliance in Continuing Decline (New York: Palgrave MacMillan,
2006); Simon Serfaty, “Bad War Gone Worse,” The Washington Quarterly, Volume 31,
No. 2 (2008): 165–179.
59 Josef Joffe, “Europe’s American Pacifier,” Survival, Volume 26, Issue 4 (July, 1984):
174–181, 180.
60 Thomas Risse-Krappen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case
of NATO,” ed. Peter Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1996); Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,”
26 S. SRADERS
strongly embedded in European-like affairs, institutions, and organiza-

tions while it had to undergo transformation to adapt to emerging
security challenges.61
When President George H. W. Bush heralded the new mission for
NATO to create Europe whole and free in 1989, the incorporation
of both parts of Germany into NATO took place. In the meantime,
reshaping NATO as an organization from military to more political
entity was a way to soften the geopolitical shock in the Soviet Union
of Germany’s impending unification and entry into NATO.62
In his memoirs, James Baker, former U.S. Secretary of State, recalls
informing Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze about NATO’s
awareness of the political constraints Russians faced and the alliance’s task
to adapt to a new, radically different world.63 Significant political efforts
were devoted to comforting the changing adversary when Germany’s
unification took place. Therefore, Americans shared significant concern
about Mikhail Gorbachev’s vision of a “common European home”––
a home where there was no place for the United States.64 There was
a genuine willingness, recalls Robert Zoelick, an aide to Secretary of
State Baker at the time, to “play off Eastern Europe against Moscow,
if Gorbachev will try to split the alliance.”65
Without the American presence, the Western institutions alone were ill
prepared to enlarge or sustain the zone of stability built during the Cold
War years.66 But without these institutions, America could not ensure its
presence in Europe. The EU and NATO could not be sustained without
Philosophy and Public Affairs, Volume 12, No. 2 (1994); Rob de Wijk, “Towards a New
Political Strategy for NATO,” NATO Review, Volume 2 (1998).
61 Robert B. McCalla, “NATO’s Persistence after the Cold War,” International
Organizations, Volume 50, Issue 3 (1996): 445–476, 470.
62 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf, 1998),
217.
63 James A. Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy; Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989––
1992 (Putnam Adult, 1995), 250–262.
64 Rebecca R. Moore, NATO’s New Mission (London: Praeger Security International,
2007), 16–17.
65 Baker III, 89.
66 Robert L. Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider’s
Account of US Diplomacy in Europe, 1989–1992 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1998), 144.
the United States, Russia could not be balanced without NATO, but
Germany could not be balanced without the EU.67
With the unofficial NATO enlargement “germanwards,” no imme-
diate further enlargement could take place. It was a sobering message
to aspiring members. Even before the Warsaw Pact was disbanded, some
Czech, Polish, and Hungarian leaders, like Václav Havel, from his prison
cell, Adam Michnik as an opposition member, and György Konrád had
been writing about the role of a political dissident, giving political advice
to opposition movements, or promoting a new Central European iden-
tity.68 The urge to join the Euro-Atlantic was evident. The attempted
August coup of 1991 in Russia only elevated the fears of instability and
resurgent imperialism. Therefore, less than a year later, on May 6 of
1992, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland officially declared their
desire for quick NATO membership. 69 The United States adapted an all-
inclusive approach to accommodate Russia but was urging the Visegrad
Group to not to bang on the NATO’s door” too early, staunchly, and
swiftly.70
The debate about the open door policy was in the air. It was argued
that there was a need for a firm stance on the condition of enlarge-
ment, and how NATO could protect new democracies in the East.71
The policies of the new NATO could affect the institutional capacities
to achieve transparency, integration, and negotiation among NATO’s
members-assets that could be mobilized to deal with new security
missions.72
Owing to geographic proximity to the Visegrad countries, as well
as post-Cold War euphoria slowly transcending into hysteria, German
Defense Minister Volker Rühe started investigating NATO enlargement
as a means for extending stability eastwards. Moreover, the Germans did
not see stability in the East as their only objective. It was argued that the
67 Serfaty, “NATO at Sixty,” 23.

68 Timothy Garton Ash, The Uses of Adversity: Essays on the Fate of Central Europe
(New York: Random House, 1989), 180–185.
69 Ronald D. Asmus and George Robertson, Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance
Remade Itself for a New Era (Columbia University Press, 2012), 17.
70 Moore, 22.
71 Hans Binnendijk, “NATO Can’t be Vague About Commitments to Eastern Europe,”
International Herald Tribune (November 8, 1991).
72 Wallander, 712.
28 S. SRADERS
extension of the EU and NATO was the final step to complete the unifica-
tion of Germany.73 United States Senator Richard Lugar was one of the
early proponents for NATO enlargement. In his words, NATO needed
to go “out of area or out of business”.74 There was the evident need
to deal with the erupting conflicts in former Yugoslavia. Even the new
pro-Western regime in Russia went as far as to state on August 26, 1993,
that the Eastern European countries could join any alliance they deemed
necessary.75 It was argued that the expansion of the transatlantic alliance
would stabilize democracy, uphold economic reforms, revert authoritarian
backsliding, and curb nationalism from surging.76
At the Brussels NATO Summit in 1994, President Bill Clinton
announced that the alliance can do for Europe’s East the same as it did for
Europe’s West: prevent a return to local rivalries, strengthen democracies
against future threats and create conditions for prosperity to flourish.77
The All-Inclusive Partnership for Peace (PfP) was announced at the time
as a milestone for NATO, and a marker for eventual membership.
The initial evolution of NATO enlargement caused discomfort in
Moscow. Nevertheless, the announcement of PfP was seen as a foreign
policy victory as a means to postpone NATO enlargement, aimed at
admitting some states and excluding others. Moreover, the initial concept
for the new NATO, proposed by RAND experts Ronald D. Asmus,
Richard L. Kugler and F. Stephen Larrabee, was seen implicitly or even
explicitly as playing the Baltic countries and Ukraine off Moscow by
considering them for NATO membership sometime after the Visegrad
Group.78 It was broadly conceived inside Russia that the West should
not risk fabricating an enemy out of Russia just to have a post-Cold War
rejuvenation for NATO.
73 Ronald D. Asmus, “NATO’s Double Enlargement: New Tasks, New Members”, ed.
Clay Clemens, NATO and the Quest for Post-Cold War Security (London: MacMillan
Press, 1997), 71.
74 Moore, 23–24.
75 Alexei K. Pushkov, “A View from Russia,” ed. Jeffrey Simon, NATO Enlargement:
Opinion and Options (Washington: National Defence University Press, 1995), 123–126.
76 Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, “Building a New
NATO,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 72, No. 4 (September/October, 1993): 28–40, 40.
77 Moore, 25–26.
78 Alexei Pushkov and Miroslav Polreich, “Building a New NATO at Russia’s Expense,”
Foreign Affairs, Volume 73, No. 1 (January/February, 1994): 173–175, 174.
While Russia was still generally indifferent to NATO enlargement,

radical nationalist players, like Vladimir Zhirinovsky, emerged. In 1993,
Zhirinovsky’s ultra-nationalist political party scored 24% support in
national elections. He overtly declared that NATO enlargement would
help him be elected President of the Russian Federation. Thus, NATO’s
potential enlargement was positioned as a way to awaken nationalist-
communist-imperialist forces inside Russia, strengthen opposition against
the West, and cut Russia off from further cooperation with the Euro-
Atlantic community.
Nevertheless, PfP initially was seen in Russia as an alternatives to
NATO enlargement. The first stressed that PfP was a foreign policy
achievement, for it allowed Russia to be involved in constructing common
security space with NATO while the enlargement was postponed. The
second group viewed PfP as a policy imposed on Russia by NATO. As
a result, Russia’s status was marginalized, which suggested that Russia
should opt-out from PfP and forge stronger ties with China. The third
group stressed the necessity of equal partnership with NATO. PfP was
seen as too ambiguous without any advantage over decision-making, an
inability to contribute to NATO’s decisions, and a downgrade in status.
The fourth group welcomed PfP, viewed as the first step toward a more
salient status.79
In the meantime, there was little Russia could do to contain NATO’s
enlargement. Russia was economically weak. It depended on Western
financial aid and access to global markets. It was a nuclear power, but,
without an immediate external adversary, the role of its military was
marginalized. Moreover, politically, Russia desired to join the G-7. If
the enlargement took place, Russia wanted strategic guarantees to avoid
the deployment of additional military in Central and Eastern Europe.
Finally, only if there was a genuine, strategic NATO-Russia partnership,
the opposition against NATO, it was assumed, could decrease.80
The security environment was perceived differently in the post-Cold
War Europe. To maintain a buffer zone against the US-led NATO, what
Russia was initially seeking in its neighborhood was probably highlighted
in Ukraine. The initial foreign policy was embedded in the Declara-
tion of the State Sovereignty of Ukraine, adopted in July of 1990. The
79 Pushkov, 129–130.
80 Ibid., 139.
30 S. SRADERS
Warsaw Pact was disbanded and the Soviet Union was gone. There-
fore, Ukraine upheld an all-inclusive, all-European security architecture.
Owing to the post-Cold War disorder and “security vacuum,” Ukraine
supported a dialogue between the Western security structures as well as
the post-Soviet structures and welcomed PfP as a platform for cooper-
ation and dialogue where Ukraine participated along the same lines as
formerly neutral Austria, Sweden or Finland. It endorsed the dialogue
with NATO as well as Russia’s cooperation with NATO within PfP, or
any other format. Ukraine viewed the inability for Russia and NATO to
find a common ground as a genuine security challenge. In the meantime,
Ukraine pointed to Russia’s subtle task to maintain respectful relations
with its post-Soviet neighbors. It had to act in a manner to avoid new
geopolitical division. Policies of taking sides or choosing alliances were in
conflict with how Ukraine saw its security within the all-European security
cooperation context.81
Furthermore, Belarus was participating in the signing of the dissolution
of the Soviet Union treaty with Ukraine and Russia. After the disband-
ment of the Soviet Union, it had an opportunity to define its foreign and
security policy. Like Ukraine, it acknowledged the need for cooperation
and emergence of a security structure that would be genuinely unifying.
Nevertheless, Belarus emphasized the importance for the United States
to avoid overstepping the Cold War geopolitical borders by coming as
close to Russia as the Baltic states. Because of the geographic proximity
and economic and security dependence, a separate or neutral alliance with
Russia was seen as possible.82
Through Polish eyes, the possibility of joining multi-lateral organiza-
tions with small and medium-sized European states was a matter of secure
existence and national development. Despite no longer being bipolar, the
world was divided between rich and poor, secure and insecure, stable and
volatile areas.83 The pivotal point of 1989 marked the return of Poland,
and the other Central and Eastern European states, into a “grey area,”
81 Ihor Kharachenko, “A View from Ukraine,” ed. Jeffrey Simon, NATO Enlargement:
Opinion and Options (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1995), 143–154.
82 Anatol Maisenia, “A View from Belarus,” ed. Jeffrey Simon, NATO Enlargement:
83 Andrzej Karkoszka, “A View from Poland,” ed. Jeffrey Simon, NATO Enlargement:
located between the affluent, secure, and seen as selfish West and the
unstable and unpredictable East.
To avoid Poland’s pre-1939 predicament when it was left at the mercy
of two revisionist powers, Poland was anxious to overcome the nega-
tive fragility of its post-Cold War status by joining NATO and all other
Western organizations at whatever cost. Military integration, however, did
not constitute Poland’s primary motivation to reintegrate with the West.
The main reason was the absence of immediate, tangible threats from
its neighbors. With Germany, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, relations
were warm, while with others they were at least normal. For these reasons,
Poland could examine four security options.
First, it could overcome its historic ghosts by signing bilateral secu-
rity guarantees with Russia on equal grounds. The validity of this option,
however, must not be based on historic memory or political declarations.
It was argued that Russia’s internal reforms and stability, which Poland,
or any other country, could not influence, should be relied upon. On
the contrary, Russia’s military campaign in Chechnya, its willingness to
recreate military ties with the Commonwealth of Independent States,
its insistence on a military presence in Caucasus, its involvement in all
conflicts in the nearest proximity around its borders, a new and quite
revealing defense doctrine, as well as a growing influence of the military-
industrial complex, were derailing such cooperation options by default.
Therefore, neutrality and self-defense, a regional defense system-NATO-
bis comprised mainly of the states in the “grey zone” (former Soviet
Union states in Central and Eastern Europe) were not options. The
integration in the Euro-Atlantic community would include NATO, the
Western European Union, the European Union, and other institutions.
This objective entailed Poland’s synergic convergence with the affluent,
secure, and stable West. Poland managed more rapid integration within
the collective defense system, with the United States, Germany, France,
Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Denmark all adamant supporters in
bringing Warsaw into NATO.84 When inside NATO, Poland’s stability
would contribute to the cooperation with Russia.85
84 Karkoszka, 80–81.
85 Asmus, 70.
32 S. SRADERS
While some countries saw PfP as an upgrade in status, some viewed

the agreement as a downgrade. In a meantime, Romania saw it as appro-
priate as it could be. Romania acknowledged that a transformation path
was needed to catch up with the Visegrad Group, seen as more apt
for NATO’s membership. The PfP agreement, was, therefore, seen as a
step toward NATO membership, as well as a precondition for modern-
ization of Romania’s armed forces and adaptation for peacekeeping
operations. Apart from enhancing regional stability, Euro-Atlantic coop-
eration allowed Romania to improve its relations with neighbors like
Hungary.86
In comparison to Romania, the view from Lithuania looked distinc-
tively different. It was broadly acknowledged that the historic experience,
cultural, social, and economic trajectory discern Balts from Russians.
Lithuania’s international aspirations took a similarly distinctive character.
It was acknowledged that the Baltic States could not escape Russian
problems without becoming members of the Euro-Atlantic community.
Therefore, escaping dependence on Russia required adopting the oppo-
site strategy as what was conceived in Belarus. Thus, memberships first in
NATO, then in all other structures where Russia would not be a member,
were adamantly sought. There was the fear that the Baltic States, after
admitting Central European countries, might be isolated and left at the
mercy of Russia’s neo-imperial or neo-communist domestic political inter-
ests. Owing to a vast domestic political and social support, all possible
cooperation models with the West were embraced.
The 1994 Brussels NATO Summit, when PfP was announced, was
seen as a way to keep “Russia happy, but Eastern Europe hoping” in
Lithuania.87 The Baltic leaders saw NATO as the solution to all Baltic
security concerns. For example, former Estonian President Lennart Meri
compared PfP with “a bottle of used Chanel perfume: nice to look at,
but empty.”88 In 1996, the three Baltic presidents promised to make any
86 Ioan Mircea Pascu, “A View from Romania,” ed. Jeffrey Simon, NATO Enlargement:
87 Eitvydas Bajarunas, “A View from Lithuania,” ed. Jeffrey Simon, NATO Enlargement:
88 See “Meriisms,” Citi Paper: The Baltic States, accessed on 28, September, 2016,
http://www.balticsworldwide.com/quotes/merisms.htm.
sacrifice to achieve membership in NATO.89 Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius

separately, and the Baltic States all together, could not provide for their
own military security. On the part of the Baltic States, the historic hostility
and future unpredictability of Russia were seen as impediments to any
bilateral security agreement with Russia.
In comparison to debates about NATO enlargement in Central and
Eastern Europe, EU enlargement was less debated as it was seen as less
menacing outside and inside of Europe. The reasons were the benign
character of the EU and Europe relative to Russia. Nevertheless, the
journey to the EU was not simple for countries that wanted to join it.
Even if EU expansion was less debated, European integration showed a
significant reciprocity with the debate about NATO enlargement.
It was strongly argued that whichever expansion took place, the EU
or NATO must follow each other’s footsteps.90 This was especially true
for the Baltic States. As Russia did not oppose the Baltic entry into the
EU, the region’s convergence with EU’s acquis communitaire and institu-
tions was seen as a way to bring the most unsafe, most anxious and most
unstable regions first into the EU, then, owing to possible softening of
Russia’s opposition, into NATO as well. In some western countries, EU
membership was seen as a compensation for no-NATO membership. In
the Baltic States it was “all or nothing – the EU could not become an
alternative to NATO.”91
The first enlargement could not include the Baltic States because
they “did not have votes” among NATO’s members while, for example,
Poland could muster sufficient support. NATO enlargement was a polit-
ical decision based on consensus and Baltic membership within NATO
was simply unpopular.92 NATO does not have a multi-step program or
89 Aivars Stranga, “The Baltic States in the European Security Architecture,” ed. Atis
Lejiņš and Žaneta Ozoliņa, Small States in a Turbulent Environment: The Baltic Perspective
(Riga: Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 1997), 29.
90 Asmus, 61–83; Simon Serfaty, Stay the Course: European Unity and Atlantic
Solidarity, 85–95.
91 Daina Bleiere, “Integration of the Baltic States in the European Union: The Latvian
Perspective,” ed. Atis Lejiņš and Žaneta Ozoliņa, Small States in a Turbulent Environment:
The Baltic Perspective (Rı̄ga: Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 1997), 37.
92 Ronald D. Asmus and Robert C. Nurick, “NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States,”
ed. Philip H. Gordon, NATO’s Transformation (New York: Rowman and Littlefield
Publishers, 1997), 156–174.
34 S. SRADERS
a comprehensive, normative, set of institutional criteria for EU member-

ship. In fact, NATO’s normative package is rather shallow. Nevertheless,
the new democratic NATO membership principles are of vital importance
for EU membership. Thus, the Baltic prospects for joining the EU were
seen as the democratic criteria for NATO membership.
From the arguments above, there are several important conclusions
that are rendering Baltic States potentially sensitive or vulnerable. First is
the profound need for modern and sound even if comparatively small
military. Even if the military balance between the small Baltic States
together or separately will be rather lopsided when comparing to Russia’s.
The readiness and capabilities to stand against larger powers raise the
cost of takeover high. As the result, rational arguments for larger enti-
ties would suggest abstaining from military conflicts even with smaller
powers. Second is the need for small states to avoid appeasement, but
they should not project themselves as overtly provoking. Both arguments
are well substantiated with the experiences during the Second World War
by small Scandinavian states and Switzerland.
Third argument suggests for small states to always seek a strategic
partner or a protective alliance. The only power in Europe with suffi-
cient military capabilities to balance against the Russian Federation is
the United States. The most appropriate cooperation platform for the
Baltic States with the United States is NATO. Thus, the future of this
alliance before the 2004 enlargement and thereafter becomes the ques-
tion of national security for the Baltic States. The alternative are the
lessons by larger and with more substantia share for military capabilities
experiences of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine since 2014. As the result,
national security interests suggest to embrace all conditions imposed on
the Baltic States by NATO. By embracing the spending rules and devel-
oping modern niche capabilities, the small Baltic States with much lower
military expenditure can enjoy the same security guarantees by the United
States as Israel.
For smaller states, the requirement to sustain pre-emptive military
capabilities and maintain necessary vigilance and resilience suggests a
significant socio-economic strain. Only if the idea about the viability of
a state as well as the necessity of common security goods are considered
important enough, will the necessity to rally around bold defense posture
be utmost.
Thus, the Baltic States were willing to quickly adapt to NATO at any
cost. Here, the first criteria defined de facto adaptability to membership
and was acknowledged by all NATO member states––the two percent

spending rule and politically stable state.93 The Baltic States had promised
early to increase their defense spending early or by 2003 at latest.94 The
European security and defense identity had to mean something in terms
of not just what Europeans said, but also what they did.95 Only since the
2014 Russia’s enduring invasion in Ukraine have all three Baltic States
committed to the no less than two percent spending rule for their military,
in 2018. Their individual security depends on the security of all three as
invasion scenarios for Russia in the Baltic States suggest first taking the
smallest Estonia, or the largest Lithuania, then Latvia.96 The order can
change, but the Russian attack would not stop with an invasion of a single
Baltic State.
Economy
The second most common feature for small, unaligned states to consider
is their economic sensitivity and vulnerability. In all situations, short of
outright military conflict, this is the weakest spot in the small state’s
armor.97 Here, power and security struggles cannot be distinguished so
reliably. Small states will always have to maintain a sense of adaptability to
the changing external environment. Economic pressures against a small
state can be translated ultimately into security terms. Certain resources,
such as minerals, but especially fuels, are no less essential to industry and
agriculture than to armed forces.98
93 Stephen S. Rosenfeld, “NATO Expansion: The View from Washington,” ed. Atis
Lejiņš, EU and NATO Enlargement in the Baltic Sea Region (Riga: Stockholm School of
Economics, 2002), 8–13.
94 See “The Chronology of Co-operation between Latvia and NATO, 1999–2004,”
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, accessed on October 03,
2013, http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/security-policy/co-operation-with-nato-member-states-
and-candidate-countries/chronology-of-co-operation-between-latvia-and-nato-1999.
95 Alyson J. K. Bailes, “Presentation,” ed. Atis Lejiņš and Pauls Apinis, After Madrid
and Amsterdam: Prospects for the Consolidation of Baltic Security (Konrad Adenauer
Stiftung and Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 1998), 40–48.
96 R. D. Hooker, Jr., “How to Defend the Baltic States,” The Jamestown Foundation
(2009), accessed on April 30, 2020, https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/
10/How-to-Defend-the-Baltic-States-full-web4.pdf, 2–10.
97 Vital, 40, 55.
98 Ibid., 105.
36 S. SRADERS
If exercising military pressure against the Baltic States can be raised

high enough, then other, less costly means of achieving the major objec-
tive are preferred, such as economic interdependence. Small states must
therefore be ready to address external pressure by mobilizing domestic
resources. In order to meet the challenges of an insecure international
environment and globalized markets, a certain level of national solidarity
and harmony on basic policy issues has to be in place.99
For all small states, domestic coherence is the best answer to changing
external conditions. However, not in all instances can a solitary society
offset external pressures. Thus, it is worth assessing the domestic
economic conditions that make the Baltic States sensitive and vulner-
able. It is impossible to outline all aspects, but several instances that are
known make the Baltic States interdependent and as a result sensitive and
vulnerable. Retaliation against stronger powers in such circumstances is
ineffective and ruled out due to discrepancies in trade volumes.
An indicator of a small state is the size of their economy. The aggre-
gate GDP for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania equals Belarus. Poland to the
South, Finland to the North, and Sweden to the North-West compare to
each other, but the aggregate size of the complete Baltic economy is just a
fraction of any of the mentioned economies, but is in the slight dispropor-
tion with the Russian Federation. Even though the GDP of the Russian
Federation is only the same size as that of South Korea (and declining),
the aggregate Baltic GDP yearly output does not reach even the 10% of
that of Russia’s.100
The second most common feature for small, unaligned states to
consider is their trade relations. There is little any small state can employ
against external economic pressures. The market size for small countries
will always be less attractive. They will not be able to use open access
to their domestic markets as a bargaining chip. On the contrary, larger
states can use the access to their economically rewarding markets as an
advantage in addition to other options such as withdrawing preferential
99 Anton Steen, “Small States and National Elites in Neoliberal Era,” ed. Harald
Balderstein and Michael Keating, Small States in the Modern World: Vulnerabilities and
Opportunities (Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing,
2015), 183.
100 The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2019: South Korea––1690 bnUSD, Russia–
–1750 bnUSD, Estonia––31 bnUSD, Latvia––35 bnUSD, Lithuania––54 bnUSD (See
Data for GDP in 2019 from TradingEconomics.com).
trade agreements, economic pressure on officials, and unilateral removal

of negotiators from influential positions and obstruction of economic
dialogue. Small developed and developing states are very dependent on
world markets, and protectionism is therefore not a viable option.101
The inescapability of economic change suggests that small states
must apply reactive and flexible policies, ensure corporatist compromises,
uphold domestic political stability and promote resource mobilization to
overcome severe change. The freedom of action has been circumscribed
by economic forces over which states have even less control as interna-
tional economic activity surges.102 In these trade relations, the Baltic
States significantly depend on imports from and exports to Russia. More-
over, their reciprocal trade and the possibility of economic descent or
collapse of any of the Baltic States suggests economic freefall for all three
Baltic States (with repercussions for broader Baltic Sea Region). Thus,
trade relations especially with major partners bear opportunities, but also
substantial risks (See Table 1).
Lithuania is the biggest economy among the Baltic States, but its top
trading partner from 1995 until 2018 has been Russia (both, imports and
exports). For Latvia, the top trading partner from 1995 until 2018 has
been Lithuania (both, imports and exports), but Russia has always been
amongst the most important trading partners (losing the salience from
approximately one fifth of the two way trade by 1995 to less than one
tenth by 2018). Furthermore, Lithuania, Latvia, and the Russian Feder-
ation have been among the top trading partners for Estonia. Despite
the salience of the Russian Federation as the result of reorientation to
more affluent EU market is decreasing, the economic interdependence
of Lithuania on Russia, Latvia on Lithuania and Russia, and Estonia on
the all suggest domino effects. If any of the Baltic States were failing
economically, the remaining two would inevitably follow. The stability
and robustness of each of the Baltic States transcends in the absence of
economic fragility for all Baltic States. Moreover, the Russian Federation
can always use some of the major Baltic trading partners as factors for
political gains with any of the Baltic States. For example, Finland has
been a close partner for Estonia for decades. As Finland is a close coop-
eration partner with Russia (economically, for example, as salient partners
101 Katzenstein, 24.

102 Keating, 6.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
[256]Ib., p. 165.
[257]“Modern Abyssinia,” p. 224.
[258]Compare, e.g., his remark on p. 223, “They have any
amount of pluck,” with Parkyns’s comments quoted on p. 24 of
this book.
[259]E.g. p. 222.
[260]Ib., p. 216.
[261]Eyre and Spottiswoode.
[262]Cf. p. 308.
[263]Mr. Wylde describes the Ras as “by far the cleverest and
most enlightened man that the country possesses.” He is a
possible successor to the Abyssinian throne.
[264]Colonel Rochfort’s Report.
APPENDIX
Abyssinia is a deeply interesting country from the point of view of

geographical distribution, and it is much to be regretted that Dr. A. J.
Hayes did not have the opportunity of collecting insects on a large
scale. The animals of the southern half of Arabia are Ethiopian in
character; but in the Abyssinian mountains we may expect to find,
and we do find, a certain amount of Oriental affinity.
The valuable little collection of insects made by Dr. Hayes has
been presented by him to the Hope Department of the Oxford
University Museum, where the specimens can be seen and studied
by every naturalist interested in the great problems of distribution.
The attention of the donor was directed to the Oxford Museum by Mr.
W. L. S. Loat, who has himself contributed a large amount of
valuable material. Dr. Hayes’ collection was made, in February 1903,
in the vicinity of Lake Tsana, at a height of about 6500 feet. A
complete list is furnished below. Dr. Dixey has kindly determined and
made remarks upon the Pierinae.
LEPIDOPTERA.
NYMPHALIDAE.
Danainae: Limnas chrysippus (Linn.) ♀. The ground
colour of the pale tint characteristic of
1
Oriental specimens and usually replaced by
a much darker shade in African.
Danainae: L. chrysippus (Linn.) var. alcippus (Cram.) ♂♂.
2
Typical.
Nymphalinae: 1 Neptis agatha (Cram.).
1 Precis cebrene (Trim.).
PAPILIONIDAE.
Pierinae: 1 Catopsilia florella (Fabr.) ♂.
2 Colias electra (Linn.) ♂ ♀.
Terias brigitta (Cram.) ♂ ♂ ♀.
3
Dry season forms; not extreme.
3 Eronia leda (Boisd.) ♂ ♀ ♀.
One of these females has an orange apical
patch on the forewing, almost as distinct as
that of the male.
1 Pinacopteryx sp. ?
A female, rather worn; simulating Mylothris
agathina ♀.
Probably a new species, but being in poor
condition and a single specimen it would not
be advisable to describe it.
1 Belenois severina (Cram.) ♀. Dry season form.
1 Phrissura sp. ♂.
A male, of the P. sylvia group. This form of
Phrissura has not previously been recorded
from any part of East Africa.
Papilioninae: 8 Papilio demodocus (Esp.).
HYMENOPTERA.
1 Dorylus fimbriatus (Shuck.) ♂.
COLEOPTERA.
LAMELLICORNIA.
Scarabaeidae: Oniticellus inaequalis (Reiche).
1
Only known from Abyssinia.
Cetoniidae: 1 Pachnoda abyssinica (Blanch.).
1 Pachnoda stehelini (Schaum).
Both Abyssinian species.
PHYTOPHAGA.
Cassididae: 1 Aspidomorpha punctata (Fab.).
HETEROMERA.
Cantharidae: 2 Mylabris, probably a new species.
NEUROPTERA.
1 Nemoptera, probably a new species.
ORTHOPTERA.
Acridiidae: 1 Cyrtacanthacris
sp.
1 Phymateus brunneri? (Bolivar).
1 Phymateus leprosus (Fab.).
1 Petasia anchoreta (Bolivar).
Mantidae: 1 Sphodromantis bioculata (Burm.).
1 Chiropus aestuans? (Sauss.).
In addition to the above, Dr. Hayes presented three insects
captured by him at Gedaref in the Soudan, including a pair of a
magnificent new species of Buprestid beetle of the genus
Sternocera, taken in coitu. This species has recently been described,
from Dr. Hayes’ specimen and two others in the British Museum, by
Mr. C. O. Waterhouse, who has given it the name Sternocera druryi
(“Ann. Mag. Nat. Hist.” Oct., 1904, p. 247). The third insect is an
example of a Cantharid beetle, which does great damage to the
crops at Gadarif. Its determination as Mylabris hybrida (Bohem.) is
therefore a matter of some importance.
THE END
PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED, LONDON AND BECCLES.

THE
ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SUDAN
By permission of the Egyptian London: Smith, Elder Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt.,

Government. & Co. London.
(Large-size)
LAKE TSANA
By permission of the London: Stanford’s

Egyptian Smith, Elder Geogl. Estabt.,
Government. & Co. London.
(Large-size)
Transcriber's note:
pg 70 (footnote 41) Changed: Abyssinnia and its people to: Abyssinia

pg 91-92 (footnote 61) Changed: equitidœ to: equitidæ
pg 91-92 (footnote 61) Changed: nectariniœ to: nectariniæ
pg 96 Changed: plently of fish to: plenty
pg 271 Changed: been complied by to: compiled
pg 293 Changed: general langour to: languor
pg 311 (footnote 262) Changed: Cp. to: Cf.
Minor punctuation changes have been done silently.
Spelling inconsistencies have been left unchanged.
*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE SOURCE
OF THE BLUE NILE ***
Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions

will be renamed.
Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S.

copyright law means that no one owns a United States copyright
in these works, so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and
distribute it in the United States without permission and without
paying copyright royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General
Terms of Use part of this license, apply to copying and
distributing Project Gutenberg™ electronic works to protect the
PROJECT GUTENBERG™ concept and trademark. Project
Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if
you charge for an eBook, except by following the terms of the
trademark license, including paying royalties for use of the
Project Gutenberg trademark. If you do not charge anything for
copies of this eBook, complying with the trademark license is
very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose such
as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and
research. Project Gutenberg eBooks may be modified and
printed and given away—you may do practically ANYTHING in
the United States with eBooks not protected by U.S. copyright
law. Redistribution is subject to the trademark license, especially
commercial redistribution.
START: FULL LICENSE

THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE
PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK
To protect the Project Gutenberg™ mission of promoting the

free distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this
work (or any other work associated in any way with the phrase
“Project Gutenberg”), you agree to comply with all the terms of
the Full Project Gutenberg™ License available with this file or
online at www.gutenberg.org/license.
Section 1. General Terms of Use and

Redistributing Project Gutenberg™
electronic works
1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg™
electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand,
agree to and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual
property (trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to
abide by all the terms of this agreement, you must cease using
and return or destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg™
electronic works in your possession. If you paid a fee for
obtaining a copy of or access to a Project Gutenberg™
electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the terms
of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or
entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8.
1.B. “Project Gutenberg” is a registered trademark. It may only

be used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by
people who agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement.
There are a few things that you can do with most Project
Gutenberg™ electronic works even without complying with the
full terms of this agreement. See paragraph 1.C below. There
are a lot of things you can do with Project Gutenberg™
electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement and
help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg™
electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below.
1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation (“the
Foundation” or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the
collection of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works. Nearly all the
individual works in the collection are in the public domain in the
United States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright
law in the United States and you are located in the United
States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from copying,
distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative works
based on the work as long as all references to Project
Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope that you will
support the Project Gutenberg™ mission of promoting free
access to electronic works by freely sharing Project
Gutenberg™ works in compliance with the terms of this
agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg™ name
associated with the work. You can easily comply with the terms
of this agreement by keeping this work in the same format with
its attached full Project Gutenberg™ License when you share it
without charge with others.
1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also
govern what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most
countries are in a constant state of change. If you are outside
the United States, check the laws of your country in addition to
the terms of this agreement before downloading, copying,
displaying, performing, distributing or creating derivative works
based on this work or any other Project Gutenberg™ work. The
Foundation makes no representations concerning the copyright
status of any work in any country other than the United States.
1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project

Gutenberg:
1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other

immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg™ License must
appear prominently whenever any copy of a Project
Gutenberg™ work (any work on which the phrase “Project
Gutenberg” appears, or with which the phrase “Project
Gutenberg” is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed,
viewed, copied or distributed:
This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United

States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with
almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it
away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg
License included with this eBook or online at
www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United
States, you will have to check the laws of the country where
you are located before using this eBook.
1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg™ electronic work is

derived from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not
contain a notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the
copyright holder), the work can be copied and distributed to
anyone in the United States without paying any fees or charges.
If you are redistributing or providing access to a work with the
phrase “Project Gutenberg” associated with or appearing on the
work, you must comply either with the requirements of
paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use
of the work and the Project Gutenberg™ trademark as set forth
in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.
1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg™ electronic work is

posted with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and
distribution must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through
1.E.7 and any additional terms imposed by the copyright holder.
Additional terms will be linked to the Project Gutenberg™
License for all works posted with the permission of the copyright
holder found at the beginning of this work.
1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project

Gutenberg™ License terms from this work, or any files
containing a part of this work or any other work associated with
Project Gutenberg™.
1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute
this electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without
prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1
with active links or immediate access to the full terms of the
Project Gutenberg™ License.
1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary,
compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form,
including any word processing or hypertext form. However, if
you provide access to or distribute copies of a Project
Gutenberg™ work in a format other than “Plain Vanilla ASCII” or
other format used in the official version posted on the official
Project Gutenberg™ website (www.gutenberg.org), you must, at
no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a copy, a
means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon
request, of the work in its original “Plain Vanilla ASCII” or other
form. Any alternate format must include the full Project
Gutenberg™ License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1.
1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying,

performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg™
works unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.
1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or

providing access to or distributing Project Gutenberg™
electronic works provided that:
• You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from
the use of Project Gutenberg™ works calculated using the
method you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The
fee is owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg™ trademark,
but he has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to
the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty
payments must be paid within 60 days following each date on
which you prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your
periodic tax returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked
as such and sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation at the address specified in Section 4, “Information
about donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation.”
• You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who

notifies you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that
s/he does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg™
License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all
copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and
discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of Project
Gutenberg™ works.
• You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of

any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in
the electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90
days of receipt of the work.
• You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free
distribution of Project Gutenberg™ works.
1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project

Gutenberg™ electronic work or group of works on different
terms than are set forth in this agreement, you must obtain
permission in writing from the Project Gutenberg Literary
Archive Foundation, the manager of the Project Gutenberg™
trademark. Contact the Foundation as set forth in Section 3
below.
1.F.
1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend

considerable effort to identify, do copyright research on,
transcribe and proofread works not protected by U.S. copyright
law in creating the Project Gutenberg™ collection. Despite
these efforts, Project Gutenberg™ electronic works, and the
medium on which they may be stored, may contain “Defects,”
such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or corrupt
data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual
property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other
medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or
cannot be read by your equipment.
1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES -

Except for the “Right of Replacement or Refund” described in
paragraph 1.F.3, the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation, the owner of the Project Gutenberg™ trademark,
and any other party distributing a Project Gutenberg™ electronic
work under this agreement, disclaim all liability to you for
damages, costs and expenses, including legal fees. YOU
AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE,
STRICT LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH
OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH
1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE
TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER
THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR
ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE
OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF
THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If

you discover a defect in this electronic work within 90 days of
receiving it, you can receive a refund of the money (if any) you
paid for it by sending a written explanation to the person you
received the work from. If you received the work on a physical
medium, you must return the medium with your written
explanation. The person or entity that provided you with the
defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu
of a refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or
entity providing it to you may choose to give you a second
opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund.
If the second copy is also defective, you may demand a refund
in writing without further opportunities to fix the problem.
1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set

forth in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you ‘AS-IS’,
WITH NO OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR
ANY PURPOSE.
1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied

warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of
damages. If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this
agreement violates the law of the state applicable to this
agreement, the agreement shall be interpreted to make the
maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by the applicable
state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any provision of
this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions.
1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the

Foundation, the trademark owner, any agent or employee of the
Foundation, anyone providing copies of Project Gutenberg™
electronic works in accordance with this agreement, and any
volunteers associated with the production, promotion and
distribution of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works, harmless
from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, that
arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do
or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project
Gutenberg™ work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or
deletions to any Project Gutenberg™ work, and (c) any Defect
you cause.
Section 2. Information about the Mission of

Project Gutenberg™
Project Gutenberg™ is synonymous with the free distribution of
electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of
computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new
computers. It exists because of the efforts of hundreds of
volunteers and donations from people in all walks of life.
Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the

assistance they need are critical to reaching Project
Gutenberg™’s goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg™
collection will remain freely available for generations to come. In
2001, the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was
created to provide a secure and permanent future for Project
Gutenberg™ and future generations. To learn more about the
Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and how your
efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 and the
Foundation information page at www.gutenberg.org.
Section 3. Information about the Project

Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation
The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non-
profit 501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the
laws of the state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by
the Internal Revenue Service. The Foundation’s EIN or federal
tax identification number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the
Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation are tax
deductible to the full extent permitted by U.S. federal laws and
your state’s laws.
The Foundation’s business office is located at 809 North 1500

West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email contact
links and up to date contact information can be found at the
Foundation’s website and official page at
www.gutenberg.org/contact
Section 4. Information about Donations to

the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation
Project Gutenberg™ depends upon and cannot survive without
widespread public support and donations to carry out its mission
of increasing the number of public domain and licensed works
that can be freely distributed in machine-readable form
accessible by the widest array of equipment including outdated
equipment. Many small donations ($1 to $5,000) are particularly
important to maintaining tax exempt status with the IRS.
The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws

regulating charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of
the United States. Compliance requirements are not uniform
and it takes a considerable effort, much paperwork and many
fees to meet and keep up with these requirements. We do not
solicit donations in locations where we have not received written
confirmation of compliance. To SEND DONATIONS or
determine the status of compliance for any particular state visit
www.gutenberg.org/donate.
While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states

where we have not met the solicitation requirements, we know
of no prohibition against accepting unsolicited donations from
donors in such states who approach us with offers to donate.
International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot

make any statements concerning tax treatment of donations
received from outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp
our small staff.
Please check the Project Gutenberg web pages for current

donation methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a
number of other ways including checks, online payments and
credit card donations. To donate, please visit:
www.gutenberg.org/donate.
Section 5. General Information About Project

Gutenberg™ electronic works
Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project
Gutenberg™ concept of a library of electronic works that could
be freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and
distributed Project Gutenberg™ eBooks with only a loose
network of volunteer support.
Project Gutenberg™ eBooks are often created from several

printed editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by
copyright in the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus,
we do not necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any
particular paper edition.
Most people start at our website which has the main PG search
facility: www.gutenberg.org.
This website includes information about Project Gutenberg™,

including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg
Literary Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new
eBooks, and how to subscribe to our email newsletter to hear
about new eBooks.
back
back

Small Baltic States and The Euro Atlantic Security Community 1St Ed Edition Sandis Sraders All Chapter

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Small Baltic States and The Euro Atlantic Security Community 1St Ed Edition Sandis Sraders All Chapter

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Small Baltic States and the

Euro-Atlantic Security Community 1st

Small Baltic States

ISBN 978-3-030-53762-3 ISBN 978-3-030-53763-0 (eBook)

Small Baltic States: Sensitivities and Vulnerabilities 7

The Surge of the Euro-Atlantic Community: 1956, 1968,

American Foreign Policy and the Baltic States 129

The Baltic Predicament: Russia’s Shadows 167

The Baltic States in Europe 221

Small Baltic States: Sensitivities and Vulnerabilities

The Baltic Predicament: Russia’s Shadows

Small Baltic States: Sensitivities and Vulnerabilities

The Baltic Predicament: Russia’s Shadows

Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians are known as people who love to

© The Author(s) 2021 1

Broadly shared in the West, Franklin Delano Roosevelt explicitly noted

2 Vaira Vı̄ķe-Freiberga, “The Speech of the President of the Republic of Latvia,”

denied at the outset due to inherent incompatibility. During the occupa-

This book will eventually provide the answer to what extent if at

© The Author(s) 2021 7

For example, in the 1960s France rose as a European nuclear power or

Fig. 1 UN Member states: 1945–2011 (Source UN)

security, foreign policy or culture and ideology, for example. By utilizing

14 A. E. Campbell, “Review: Finlandization: Towards a General Theory of Adaptive

International trade, political affairs, social affairs, and diplomatic inter-

20 Alyson J. K. Bailes, “Does a Small State Need a Strategy,” University of Iceland:

Thus, this experience has a significant effect on the domestic debates

played an important role even when the application of power seemed to

Therefore, modernizing military became a possibility for smaller states,

A small, non-aligned power, at least in so far as it is involved in, or

policies will depend on inherent security perceptions.35 The lessons of

ambiguities. During the German invasion of Denmark and Norway, it

trade deficits. By not withdrawing from financial cooperation, Switzer-

46 Jacques R. Pauwels, “Hitler, the West and Switzerland, 1936–1945,” Labour-Le

Fig. 2 Military Spending, % of GDP (Source SIPRI)

suggest when comparing with the strongest in Europe, such as France or

48 Michael Kofman and Richard Connolly, “Why Russian Military Expendi-

All these preconditions, shared on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean

Trans-Atlantic Business Council, 2016), accessed on October 01, 2016, http://www.tra

strongly embedded in European-like affairs, institutions, and organiza-

67 Serfaty, “NATO at Sixty,” 23.

While Russia was still generally indifferent to NATO enlargement,

While some countries saw PfP as an upgrade in status, some viewed

sacrifice to achieve membership in NATO.89 Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius

a comprehensive, normative, set of institutional criteria for EU member-

and was acknowledged by all NATO member states––the two percent

If exercising military pressure against the Baltic States can be raised

trade agreements, economic pressure on officials, and unilateral removal

101 Katzenstein, 24.

Abyssinia is a deeply interesting country from the point of view of

PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED, LONDON AND BECCLES.

By permission of the Egyptian London: Smith, Elder Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt.,

By permission of the London: Stanford’s

pg 70 (footnote 41) Changed: Abyssinnia and its people to: Abyssinia

Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions

Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S.

START: FULL LICENSE

To protect the Project Gutenberg™ mission of promoting the

Section 1. General Terms of Use and

1.B. “Project Gutenberg” is a registered trademark. It may only

1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project

1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other

This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United