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INTERNATIONAL SERIES ON PUBLIC POLICY

Gun Control Policies

in Latin America

Diego Sanjurjo
International Series on Public Policy

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Department of Political Science
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA, USA

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 Diego Sanjurjo

Gun Control Policies

in Latin America
Diego Sanjurjo
Institute of Political Science
University of the Republic (UdelaR)
Montevideo, Uruguay

ISSN 2524-7301 ISSN 2524-731X (electronic)

International Series on Public Policy
ISBN 978-3-030-17916-8 ISBN 978-3-030-17917-5 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17917-5

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 Preface

For some time now, the debate over gun control is immediately asso-
ciated with the United States, with its strong gun culture and with the
mass shootings that make headlines every now and then. However, gun
control is a contentious and polarizing topic in many parts of the world.
Guns preoccupy citizens, public officials, and interest groups in most
societies, even in places where its social consequences go unnoticed. The
controversy eventually drew the attention of academics as well, who try
to provide clarity and scientific rationality to a debate that frequently
reaches a fever pitch.
Unfortunately, this is not the case in Latin America. Despite being
the region in which the dreadful consequences of gun violence are most
notorious, gun control is largely absent from public and political dis-
courses, as the issue is generally subsumed within the public security cri-
sis. Scholars and academics did not even address gun control until very
recently, when insecurity became one of the main public concerns in the
region. As a result, the literature and overall knowledge on guns, gun
violence, and gun control are very limited and usually focus on the par-
ticular situation of a given country.
Moreover, whether it is a report, an academic paper or a newspaper
article, security matters are often discussed in superficial terms in Latin
America and suffer from a strong normative bias. This is particularly true
for gun-related issues. Most analyses and evaluations relate to local pol-
icies or programs and are written by the same ones who promoted the
initiatives or were involved in their implementation. This is a significant

v
vi    Preface

problem for a policy area in which conclusive information is largely una-

vailable, because it leads to the author’s affiliations and personal interests
filling the gaps and biasing results.
I wanted to read a book on the subject that did not fall into these
errors. That was written with a sincere commitment to independence
and intellectual honesty. Since I could not find it, I eventually decided
to write it myself. In this vein, I personally do not own guns nor have a
particular preference for them. Further, I think guns are dangerous and
would prefer not to have them in my house, in particular, if there are
kids around or if there is a risk of them being stolen. However, I do not
consider guns to be inherently bad either and can understand those who
have strong feelings about the subject or feel the need to have a gun
around. Especially in Latin America, where criminality is rampant, and
states do not have the effective capacity to safeguard most citizens. If I
had a small convenience store in a complicated neighborhood, I proba-
bly would have a gun. Just in case.
Furthermore, for a while now I have been involved academically with
a public policy theory called the Multiple Streams Framework (MSF).
This is a fantastic tool for those interested in understanding why certain
topics become political issues in the first place. In other words, why some
public problems are given significant attention by policy-makers while
others never do. The MSF was developed more than thirty years ago by
John Kingdon and is now being advanced and improved by a great group
of researchers and academics from all over the world. Unfortunately, pol-
icy studies are also recent and limited in Latin America and the same is
true for the use of the MSF. This book is also an attempt to address this
deficit and contribute to the further development of the MSF and of the
policy research agenda in the developing world.
That having been said, this book could never have been written with-
out the help of so many relatives, friends, and fellow colleagues, whose
influence, motivation, and generous aid gave me the joy and strength to
carry on during the past five years and enjoy almost every minute of it. I
cannot possibly name them all here, but my deepest thanks and apprecia-
tion go to all of them.
A first special thank you must go to Carmen Navarro, whose exper-
tise, guidance, sense of humor, and overall friendship were constant
throughout my doctoral years. Thank you for taking me under your
wing and, most notably, for convincing me of pursuing this objective.
Special appreciation also goes to every colleague at the Dept. of Political
 Preface    vii

Science and International Relations at the Universidad Autónoma de

Madrid. I learned so much from all of you and I am sure that our paths
will cross again in the future. For that matter, I cannot fail to mention
my overall gratitude to the people of this university and of Spain, who
welcomed a foreigner and gave me the unbelievable opportunity of
devoting myself full time to this research, while asking so little in return.
I must also thank everyone working at the Small Arms Survey
research institute in Geneva, as well as at the Institute of International
Relations of the University of São Paulo. I spent three amazing months
as a Visiting Researcher in each institution, met wonderful people, and
learned more than I could hope for. Special thanks go out to Anna
Alvazzi del Frate and Janina Onuki, who were so kind as to comment
the first drafts and share their thoughts with me. Also, to all the scholars,
practitioners, activists, and politicians who were kind enough to lend me
their time for this investigation.
Equally, my deepest gratitude goes to Reimut Zohlnhöfer, who gave
me an invaluable review of the first draft, came all the way to Spain to
participate in the panel of my dissertation, and was actually the first
to suggest that a good book could come out of it. Also, to Nikolaos
Zahariadis, who invited me to join this small but great group of peo-
ple working on the MSF and has always been a major source of advice.
Thank you as well to Verna Smith, Kristin O’Donnel, and all the other
brilliant members of the group.
The last chapters of this endeavor were finished in what is now my
new home, the Institute of Political Science of the Universidad de la
República in Montevideo. My return would never have been possible
without the amazing help of Adolfo Garcé, whose support and deep
friendship have been a great gift in this new challenge. My appreciation
also goes to all my other talented colleagues and friends at the ICP.
Thank you as well to Jemima Warren and Oliver Foster, my editors at
Palgrave Macmillan. It is a great honor to publish my first book in such a
famous and renowned publisher, and I just hope the work will live up to
the trust that you placed in me.
Finally, but not less important, I want to thank those who always took
care of me and supported my endeavors along the way. Thank you to my
grandma, my mum, my dad, my brother, their partners, and kids. To my
girl Luizi, who always tells me to stop complaining and go back to work:
I love you. To all my aunts, uncles, and cousins. To my parents-in-law.
To Daniel Amoedo, Esteban Martínez, Pedro López, Salvador Serrano,
viii    Preface

Edgar Ruvalcaba, Héctor Domínguez, Pedro Moreira, Sandra Sanz, Isué

Vargas, Joao Pedro, Alex Steinhauf, Sebastian Soltau, and Lucía Silvera.
To all my friends and relatives in Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Peru,
Portugal, Spain, and Uruguay. Thank you.

Montevideo, Uruguay Diego Sanjurjo

 Contents

1 Introduction 1

2 Gun Violence, Gun Proliferation, and Security

Governance 21

3 Gun Securitization and Gun Control Policies 55

4 Multiple Streams and Multiple Couplings 97

5 The Brazilian Disarmament Statute 123

6 The Uruguayan Responsible Firearm Ownership Law 171

7 Gun Policy Processes and Interest Group Politics

in Latin America 221

8 Conclusions 259

Appendix 275

Index 279

ix
 Abbreviations

ACOLT Brazilian Association of Armories, Collectors and Shooters

ALUDEC Uruguayan Association to Fight for Civil Disarmament
ANIAM Brazilian National Association of Weapon and Ammunition
Industries
ANPCA Brazilian National Association of Firearm Owners and
Storekeepers
APA Uruguayan Arms Possession Permit
ATT UN Arms Trade Treaty
AUTRAF Uruguayan Association of Responsible Firearm Owners
CAN Community of Andean Nations
CASAC Central American Program on Small Arms Control
CBC Brazilian Ammunitions Company
CIAMU Uruguayan Chamber of Firearm and Ammunition Importers
CIFTA Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of
and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other
Related Materials
FA Uruguayan party coalition Broad Front (Frente Amplio)
FHC Brazilian former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso
GCM Garbage Can Model
HAC Humanitarian Arms Control
IANSA International Action Network on Small Arms
IBOPE Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion and Statistics
ICBL International Campaign to Ban Landmines
IDB Inter-American Development Bank
IELSUR Uruguayan Institute for Legal and Social Studies
IMBEL Brazilian War Material Industry

xi
xii    Abbreviations

IMF International Monetary Fund

ISER Brazilian Religion Studies Institute
ITI UN International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and
Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and
Light Weapons
Lula Brazilian former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva
MERCOSUR Southern Common Market
MSF Multiple Streams Framework
NE Uruguayan New Space party (Nuevo Espacio)
NEV-USP Centre for Violence Studies of the University of São Paulo
NFCO Uruguayan National Firearms Control Office
NGO Non-governmental organization
OAS Organization of American States
PC Uruguayan Colored Party (Partido Colorado, Colorados)
PI Uruguayan Independent Party (Partido Independiente)
PN Uruguayan National Party (Partido Nacional, Blancos)
PoA UN Program of Action
PSDB Brazilian Social Democracy Party (Partido de la Social
Democracia Brasileña)
PT Brazilian Worker’s Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores)
RENAR Argentinian National Weapons Registry
SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAM Small Arms Movement
SICA Central American Integration System
SIGMA Brazilian Military Weapons Management System
SMA Uruguayan Army’s Material and Weapons Service
THATA Uruguayan License for the Acquisition and Possession
of Firearms
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNRILEC United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament
and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean
US United States of America
VWCP Voluntary Weapons Collection Program
WHO World Health Organization
 List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 National homicide rates of selected countries (2000, 2016)

(Source Own elaboration using data from the UNODC
[n.d.] database on Intentional Homicide Victims) 24
Fig. 2.2 Countries with violent death rates of at least 20 per 100,000
population (2016) (Source Own elaboration using data from
the Small Arms Survey [n.d.] database on violent deaths) 26
Fig. 2.3 Gun distribution in Latin America (in millions; percentage)
(Source Own elaboration using estimations by Karp [2018a,
b, c]) 28
Fig. 2.4 National estimates of civilian guns (2017) and violent deaths
by guns (2016) (Source Own elaboration using estimations
and data by Karp [2018a] and Small Arms Survey [n.d.]
database on violent deaths) 30
Fig. 2.5 National violent death rates and percentages of violent deaths
committed with guns in selected countries (2016)
(Source Own elaboration using data from the Small Arms
Survey [n.d.] database on violent deaths) 31
Fig. 2.6 National violent death rates and percentages of violent deaths
committed with guns in selected countries (2016) (Source
Own elaboration using data from the Small Arms Survey
[n.d.] database on violent deaths) 32
Fig. 2.7 National homicide rates and percentage of homicides
committed with guns in Brazil (Source Own elaboration
using data from World Bank [n.d.], BRAZIL: MS/SVS/
CGIAE [n.d.], Waiselfisz [2015]) 33

xiii
xiv    List of Figures

Fig. 2.8 National homicide rates and percentage of homicides

committed with guns in Uruguay (Source Own elaboration
using data from UNODC [n.d.] and URUGUAY-MI [2014,
2016, 2017, 2018]) 33
Fig. 4.1 The extended Multiple Streams Framework (MSF)
(Source Own elaboration, based on Kingdon [1995],
Zahariadis [2007, 71], Knaggård [2015], and Zohlnhöfer
et al. [2016]) 105
Fig. 5.1 Gun deaths in Brazil, 1980–2014 (Source Own elaboration
using data from Waiselfisz [2015b]) 133
Fig. 5.2 Gun death rates and gun homicide rates in Brazil,
1979–2005 (Source Own elaboration using data from
World Bank [n.d.], BRAZIL: MS/SVS/CGIAE [n.d.],
Waiselfisz [2015b]) 137
Fig. 5.3 Timeline—The policy formation of the Disarmament Statute
(Source Own elaboration) 160
Fig. 6.1 Estimates of civilian gun rates in Latin America (2017)
(Source Own elaboration, using estimations by Karp [2018]) 172
Fig. 6.2 Violent death rates and percentage of the population that
considers insecurity its country’s main problem, 2014
(Source Own elaboration, using data from LAPOP [2014]
and UNODC [n.d.]) 177
Fig. 6.3 Homicide rates and percentage of homicides committed
with guns in Uruguay, 1990–2018 (Source Own elaboration
using data from UNODC [n.d.] and URUGUAY-MI
[2017, 2019a]) 185
Fig. 6.4 Timeline—The policy formation of the Responsible Firearm
Ownership Law (Source Own elaboration) 209
Fig. 7.1 Homicide rates and percentage of the population that
considers insecurity its country’s main problem in Brazil
and Uruguay, 2014 (Source Own elaboration, using data
from UNODC [n.d.] and LAPOP [2014]) 228
 List of Tables

Table 3.1 UN global instruments governing small arms control 67

Table 3.2 Most relevant regional instruments, initiatives
and programs governing small arms 68
Table 3.3 Regulations for defensive gun use in selected countries 70
Table 3.4 Notorious weapons collection and destruction programs 86
Table 5.1 Relevant gun legislation in Brazil 130
Table 6.1 Gun legislation in Uruguay 182
Table A.1 List of interviewees by case study, name, relevant
position, date, location and code 276

xv
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

In 2014, the Global Study on Homicide by the United Nations Office

on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) positioned Latin America first in the
regional classification of murders, both in absolute numbers as in relation
to its population. Today, the region hosts 43 of the 50 cities with the high-
est rates of homicide in the world. Brazilian cities make up half of all cities
in the ranking, partly due to the country’s large population (Muggah and
Aguirre 2018). Almost 64 thousand homicides are committed through-
out Brazil each year and over 80% of Brazilians believe that they are at
risk of being murdered. But Brazilians are not the only Latin Americans1
scared by lethal violence. In fact, Brazil’s national homicide rate only
supposes the sixth highest in the region. National homicide rates in El
Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica or Venezuela double, triple or quadruple
Brazilian national murder rates. Among cities, Caracas and San Salvador
are some of the most extreme examples. With 120 and 137 murders per
every 100 thousand inhabitants in 2017, their homicide rates are over 20
times higher than the global average (Igarapé Institute 2017; GDS 2015).
These numbers are the consequence of a dramatic rise in criminal vio-
lence since the turn of the century, translating into more than 2.5 m ­ illion
deaths since the year 2000. At present, there are roughly 400 murders
each day in Latin America, circa 140 thousand per year (Muggah and
Aguirre 2018). Moreover, the regional homicide rates are increasing at
a time when murders are declining virtually everywhere else. Such num-
bers are not a novelty, however. The region’s recent history is particularly

© The Author(s) 2020 1

D. Sanjurjo, Gun Control Policies in Latin America,
International Series on Public Policy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17917-5_1
2 D. SANJURJO

violent. Nonetheless, current manifestations are more pluriform and

spread out among the population, subjecting not just the poor to the
threat of violence, but all social groups and classes. Understandably, most
Latin Americans have become accustomed to a relentless perception of
fear, frequently manifested in a collective psychosis regarding public secu-
rity. Since it supposes the main public concern of its citizens, it is fair to
say that criminal violence is defining the region in the twenty-first century.
This book is about the role that guns play in this epidemic of violence
and about the policies that try to regulate their use in Latin America.
By guns I refer to portable weapons that shoot projectiles from a metal
tube, propelled at high speed by expanding gas that is generated by the
explosion of gunpowder in a confined space. Firearms or small arms2
are more precise terms for our purposes, so I will also use these terms
interchangeably throughout the book. In the regional context, the most
common are revolvers, pistols, rifles, and shotguns, but I will also use
these terms to refer to rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, and light
and heavy machine guns. These are used by private citizens as collectibles
or for self-defense, hunting or target shooting, but can also be acquired
and used for criminal purposes. Guns are also carried by police, private
security agents, and other armed security forces in their line of duty.
For the sake of clarity, let me be clear from the outset. I do not con-
sider guns to be inherently bad nor do I think guns should be pro-
hibited. I believe that with the proper training and under the right
conditions, guns can be an effective instrument for personal defense
against crime and even make the difference between life and death.
Especially when states do not have the effective capacity to safeguard
their citizens, as is the case in most parts of the region.
However, and beyond what anyone may think about the former, it is
undeniable that guns are a fundamental enabler of violence, as their pro-
liferation facilitates access to what are essentially highly lethal weapons.
As such, guns are the preferred weapon of choice to commit murders in
the region. In fact, their use as murder weapons is more frequent than
anywhere else. In many countries of the region, gun homicides corre-
spond to at least 80% of the total.3 Furthermore, Latin America suffers
33% of the world’s homicides despite hosting only 8% of its population
and just 7% of its gun arsenals (Muggah and Aguirre 2018; Karp 2018).
As a result, gun murders suppose the first cause of death for adolescent
males in many countries of the region, outpacing accidental injuries, can-
cer, suicide, and other diseases.
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

A few specific examples may better show the dimension of the problem:

• Whereas guns are used to commit 10 percent of homicides in

Oceania, 13 percent of homicides in Europe and 28 percent of
homicides in Asia and Africa, 66 percent of homicides are carried
out with guns in the Americas (UNODC 2014).
• Each day, more than 122 Brazilians lose their lives to guns, which is
more than the average number of passengers that a full Boeing 737
can carry (Ipea and FBSP 2018).
• On average, each person in Venezuela would live nearly 16 months
longer in the absence of gun violence (GDS 2015, 174).
• Most Latin American countries have homicide rates that are consid-
ered to be at epidemic levels by the World Health Organization.
• Faced in their home countries with extreme levels of homicide,
forced recruitment into criminal gangs and death threats, more than
294.000 asylum seekers and refugees from the North of Central
America were registered globally in 2017. This is sixteen times
more people than at the end of 2011 (UNHCR 2018).

Despite these risks, public efforts to control gun proliferation and acqui-
sition are not well known. This is partly because gun control is largely
absent of the public and political debates in the region. In most coun-
tries, the specific issue is normally subsumed within general concerns
over public security. In others, it gains public and political attention
intermittently, mostly after episodes of extreme violence or high-pro-
file murder cases. When it happens, gun violence turns into a matter of
polarized debate for a couple of weeks but can hardly adhere the public
and media attention for long. This is certainly not for lack of trying,
however. There are usually groups that publicly advocate for stricter gun
control. There are no strong gun cultures in the region either and nearly
all states have committed themselves to international treaties on the
matter. So, why is gun control not elevated to agenda status?
There are only very few exceptions in this regard. In Brazil, gun control has
been a prominent topic of discussion for almost two decades. In fact, it was at
the center of Jair Bolsonaro’s presidential campaign in 2018, because the new
President pledged to abolish existing gun laws and liberalize their acquisition
and use by civilians. At the time of this writing, it is still unclear what course
the new government will take on the matter, but given the country’s impor-
tance and that most guns in South America derive from Brazilian gun indus-
tries, it is undoubtedly a policy decision that will impact the entire region.
4 D. SANJURJO

Be that as it may, this is only the last chapter of a longstanding politi-

cal conflict in the country. Gun control first gained unusual attention in
Brazil during the second half of the 1990s, when state and federal gov-
ernments, legislators, advocacy groups, and the mass media engaged in
an intense and ongoing public debate in favor and against the posses-
sion of guns by civilians. Its inclusion in the political agenda led to the
approval of the Law nº 10.826 in 2003, which represented a paradigm
shift on the matter. The so-called ‘Disarmament Statute’ became the
most comprehensive gun control policy in national history and one of
the most far-reaching in the world. Among other measures, it prohibited
the carry of firearms and strongly discouraged their possession and use
among civilians. The Statute’s most controversial aspect was related to
the legislator’s desire to implement a comprehensive ban on gun sales to
civilians throughout the country.
Apart from its regional exceptionality, the Brazilian case is especially
interesting for various reasons. First, because such an ambitious and pro-
gressive policy was approved in one of the most violent countries in the
world, with a socially conservative society and a thriving weapons indus-
try. Second, because the comprehensive ban on gun sales to civilians was
decided on a national referendum, an instrument which had never been
used in Brazil since the transition to democracy in 1988. This means that
a specific security policy was put in the hands of the electorate, which in
addition was not accustomed to direct forms of democracy. And if this
was not enough, the result of the referendum contravened all expecta-
tions, which granted disarmament advocates an easy triumph. The ban
was not authorized, resulting in a resounding defeat for its promoters.
Beyond the continuity or abolishment of the Disarmament Statute
in the near future, the situation in Brazil contrasts sharply with that of
most countries in the region. Uruguay illustrates this divergence and is
more in line with the regional pattern. Despite an important increase in
homicides in recent years and probably being the most heavily armed
country in Latin America, gun proliferation never really caught the
attention of the public nor managed to be at the center of the polit-
ical debate. Nonetheless, its low profile in the agenda did not deter
gun control advocates from demanding stricter laws since the early
2000s. After almost a decade of indifference, their pressure for pol-
icy change was finally rewarded in 2014 with the approval of the Law
nº 19.247. Labeled the ‘Responsible Firearm Ownership Law’ (RFOL),
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

its legislative process went mostly unnoticed to the general public and
the legislator’s intentions could not be enforced until December 2016,
when the RFOL’s regulation was finally sanctioned.
The first goal of the RFOL is to assemble and harmonize all the pre-
vious laws, decrees, and memorandums that regulated gun control in
recent decades. It also incorporated important novelties, such as a new
institutional framework underlying firearm regulation, finally turning
gun traffic into a penal offence, and delivering a new turn on the screw
toward their stricter control. However, most changes were rather mod-
erate and remained in a similar directional logic as its legal predecessors.
Unlike the Disarmament Statute, which sought to discourage civilian
gun possession and use, the RFOL is focused on deterring the illegit-
imate use of guns by criminals while respecting their legitimate use by
law-abiding citizens. Due to these reasons, it is difficult to categorize the
Uruguayan policy change as disruptive.
The contrast between these two cases raises a series of questions.
If both countries experienced public security crises, why did gun con-
trol gain so much prominence in Brazil but went mostly unnoticed in
Uruguay? Which political elements were responsible for such dissimilar
developments and why were the outcomes so different? How did the ini-
tial conditions, political actors, or institutional constraints influence such
dissimilar results? Moreover, based on these cases, is it possible to draw
generalizations regarding the chances of gun control initiatives entering
public and political agendas? What sort of political configurations pro-
mote gun policy alterations and of what kind?
These and other similar questions motivated this book. As I said
before, I do not think that guns are inherently bad nor that their acquisi-
tion or use should be prohibited. Alterations in gun violence derive from
a complex combination of policies and social factors, and stricter gun
regulations cannot curve crime and violence indicators by themselves.
However, I do believe that the extreme levels of crime and violence in
Latin America cannot be contained without addressing gun proliferation
and control. It is a necessary but insufficient measure that many states
are not addressing properly. Besides, the problem cannot be described
as a political deadlock as in the United States. There are very few pow-
erful interest groups blocking reforms. Instead, it appears that the pub-
lic demand for stricter measures is simply not there sometimes or is not
picked up by policy-makers.
6 D. SANJURJO

Scholarly attention is a case in point. Gun control is namely a major

topic of discussion among scholars and academics in Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries, but it is quite a different story in Latin America. To begin with,
gun violence and proliferation was not addressed by academics until
recently, when insecurity became one of the main public concerns in the
region. In turn, political science has traditionally concentrated on armed
conflicts and post-conflict situations, leaving the study of crime and vio-
lence to sociologists. The literature on guns and armed violence is thus
recent and concentrates a limited number of multidisciplinary scholars
with mostly technical research agendas.4 Regarding gun control poli-
cies, a handful of authors have critically analyzed the configuration and
results of several gun regulations in the region (e.g. Dreyfus et al. 2003;
Godnick and Vázquez 2003a, b) in an attempt to improve the rationality
of policy decisions and define the best available instruments. I will dis-
cuss such instruments in-depth along the way, but this is not the main
objective of this book.
Instead, this book pursues three main research objectives. The first is
to analyze the relevance of the gun issue in Latin America and the role
that gun proliferation and gun policies play in the waves of violence
sweeping the region. How does gun violence erupt and what are its char-
acteristics? Do more guns necessarily lead to more crimes? What is the
relationship between gun proliferation and homicides? What other fac-
tors define this relationship and how can it be interpreted? Furthermore,
how do Latin American states respond to gun problems? What do gun
control policies look like in the region and how do they relate to gun
policies elsewhere? Are states worried about proliferation per se? Beyond
laws and regulations, do states possess the capacity to enforce control
over the situation? Finally, do armed citizens participate in the govern-
ance of security and in what way?
Building upon this analysis, the second research objective of this book
is to understand, explain, and compare the origins and trajectories of two
gun control policies in the region: the Brazilian Disarmament Statute
and the Uruguayan Responsible Firearm Ownership Law. The goal of
these analyses is to find out why these policies developed as they did
and identify the causal relations that explain such developments. It is an
endeavor that corresponds to the area of research known as policy studies
and implies looking at three different aspects of the policy process from a
comparative perspective: agenda-setting, the development of alternatives,
and policy decision-making.
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

Such an approach has several advantages. First, it provides explana-

tions for the strongly dissimilar prominence of the gun control issue in
the public and political agendas of Brazil and Uruguay, as well as for the
differences among both policy changes regarding goals, instruments,
time-scale, mode, scope, directional logic, etc. In turn, this yields infor-
mation on the contextual factors and political configurations that pro-
mote or hinder gun policy changes. Gun control measures perform in a
policy area that has never been thoroughly studied in the region. Hence,
such information is not only interesting from a scientific point of view
but also for gun rights and gun control advocates who want to assess
the likelihood of similar initiatives entering public and political agendas
in other countries. Finally, it not only deepens our knowledge of gun
control policies but also our overall understanding of policy formation
processes in Latin America.
To explain such phenomena, public policy researchers resort to theo-
ries of the policy process. This study is guided by John Kingdon’s (1984,
1995) Multiple Streams Framework (MSF), which is a theoretical lens
that conceives agenda and policy changes as the combination of problems,
solutions, and political processes, brought together by the decisive action
of policy entrepreneurs. Moreover, the MSF has endured thirty-five years
as an established policy theory and various scholars have proposed dif-
ferent theoretical modifications to further its applicability. Big and small,
some of these modifications are very convincing and I apply them in this
study as well (Zohlnhöfer et al. 2016; Knaggård 2016; Zahariadis 2003).
This is the origin of the third research objective, which is to contribute
to the further development of the MSF and of the policy research agenda
in Latin America. The study of agenda-setting and policy decision-making
has been largely developed in the United States’ and European contexts,
raising doubts on the degree to which these ideas may be applied to polit-
ical settings beyond the industrialized world (Baumgartner et al. 2006).
The MSF, on its part, works through a set of flexible elements that can
be selectively applied to virtually any policy-making setting. However, this
does not mean that it explains every policy process equally well in all con-
texts. The same applies to its modifications, which are cutting-edge and
have not been evaluated in developing countries before.
With regards to Latin America, policy studies are recent and limited,
and so is the use of the MSF.5 In fact, meta-reviews suggest that it is the
region in which the framework has been applied the least, even behind
Asia and Africa (Jones et al. 2016). Besides, when the MSF is applied
8 D. SANJURJO

it is almost exclusively in heuristic terms, as a structured description of

case studies and policy processes. With notable exceptions (e.g. Brasil
and Capella 2017), its theoretical development in the region is almost
non-existent.
For all these reasons, the improvement of the explanatory capacity
of the MSF in Latin America and in the developing world is particularly
important. In this sense, Brazil and Uruguay suppose a dissimilar chal-
lenge, as both countries present distinct levels of development and vary
significantly in size, complexity, and power. Their comparative analysis
will lead to conclusions on conditions under which the selected theoret-
ical framework and its extensions perform best. An information that, in
turn, will shed light upon potential adjustments to further its theoretical
development and applicability.
So, let us recap.

The Research Objectives

This book pursues three specific research objectives. The first is to ana-
lyze the role that guns play in the Latin American security crisis and
how states try to regulate their use in the region. To that end, I ana-
lyze if there is a relationship between gun proliferation and violence in
the region, how armed civilians behave and in which ways they contrib-
ute to the governance of security. At last, I examine how Latin American
governments try to control gun acquisition and use in contexts of weak
statehood and in societies that do not adhere to the rule of law to the
same extent as they do in advanced democracies.
The second research objective is to understand, explain, and compare
the origins and trajectories of two public policies, which implies analyz-
ing three distinct policy phenomena related to agenda-setting, the devel-
opment of alternatives, and policy decision-making: (1) The prominence
of gun control in the agendas of Brazil and Uruguay; (2) The policy
decisions regarding the approval of the Disarmament Statute in Brazil
and the Responsible Firearm Ownership Law in Uruguay; (3) Finally, to
explain how and why these policies vary across countries.
The third research objective is to evaluate the capacity of the Multiple
Streams Framework to explain agenda-setting and policy formation in
Latin America. Its empirical verification will be enriched by the incor-
poration of several theoretical modifications and by the differences and
 1 INTRODUCTION 9

similarities between policy processes in Western countries and in Latin

America, as well as between those in a large federative country like Brazil
and a small and centralized country like Uruguay.

The Method
Following the research objectives, the aim of this book is to contribute
to public policy studies, both empirically and theoretically. To do so, I
select the multiple case study as the design of inquiry and analyze empiri-
cal evidence from different qualitative explanatory sources. These include
the study of legislative documents, academic literature, and media
reports, as well as the conduct of in situ interviews with protagonists of
the specific policy processes.
Among the considered explanatory factors for agenda-setting and leg-
islative reform are crime and armed violence indicators, gun proliferation
and use in crime, gun culture and tradition, related socioeconomic indi-
cators, institutional dynamics and constraints, the political environment,
the presence of policy experts and interest groups in favor or against
policy change, as well as their influence in policy decision-making. The
MSF will work as a roadmap in this regard, suggesting which variables or
explanatory factors to look for and observe.

What Follows
Beyond the specific research objectives, the general goal of this book is
to analyze the gun problematic and the policies that are being imple-
mented as solutions. In this vein, the book is arranged as follows.
After this introduction, Chapter 2 analyzes the Latin American secu-
rity crisis and the role that guns and their owners play in these dynam-
ics. Crime and violence have increased sharply in recent decades and
turned into the main problems in the region. Guns are the preferred
weapon of choice to commit murders and their use as murder weapons
is more frequent than anywhere else. This chapter finds that the relation-
ship between gun proliferation and gun murders is not linear, but that
there are important correlations that suggest that gun violence is driving
high murder rates in most countries. Moreover, it is not the sheer num-
ber of guns in circulation but the social context in which gun owners
are embedded that has an impact on the rates of murder. The analysis
10 D. SANJURJO

concludes that Latin American states face a combination of risk factors

and institutional limitations that hinder their capacities to regulate armed
citizens and guide their behavior. As a result, gun owners play different
roles within the governance of security and are better conceptualized as
nodes in a nodal governance model, which supposes an autonomous par-
ticipation in the provision of security.
Chapter 3 addresses the securitization of guns and the efforts that are
made to regulate their transfer, possession, and use in Latin America. It
is argued that gun policies are part and consequence of a securitization
strategy carried out by the small arms movement since the second half of
the 1990s. From this premise, this chapter analyzes how states control
gun-related activities at the international level as well as gun possession
and use at the national and local levels. In order to find an equilibrium
between the legitimate legal use of guns and the prevention of social
harms, most Latin American countries draw from the basic premise that
citizens should not be allowed to own guns unless there is a good reason
to allow it. From there, gun regulations and programs vary widely, and
their main differences and characteristics are discussed in-depth along the
chapter next to what is known about the impact and efficacy of such pol-
icies and programs.
Chapter 4 introduces the reader to the conceptual framework that
guides the main research of the book and which is applied in the follow-
ing chapters: John Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework (MSF). The
first section introduces the reader to the area of study known as policy
studies and its main research themes: agenda-setting and policy forma-
tion. Their study requires the use of conceptual tools that incorporate
their relation in the analysis and relate to the broader study of the pol-
icy process. In consequence, the second section addresses why the MSF
is the most convenient theoretical framework for this research and then
thoroughly analyzes its assumptions, core elements, and functioning. Also
discussed are a series of recently developed theoretical modifications that
may enhance the explanatory capacity of the framework and which are
also applied and evaluated in following chapters. The chapter ends with a
discussion on the framework’s limitations and theoretical contributions.
Chapter 5 supposes the first case study of the book and applies the
MSF to explain the agenda-setting and policy formation processes that
led to the approval of the 2003 Brazilian Disarmament Statute. The
analysis demonstrates that the Statute was the consequence of a radical
policy change as a result of various attempts by policy entrepreneurs to
alter the gun control policies in place. It was specifically the result of full
 1 INTRODUCTION 11

agenda couplings in 1999 and 2003, followed by a full decision coupling

in 2003. Among other findings, the analysis underscores the significance
of gun homicide indicators, economic shocks, and turnovers in govern-
ment. The process also had a strong bottom-up dimension because of
the prominent role that researchers and civil society actors had in framing
the issue and pushing it into the political agenda. Their prominence in
the larger process suggests an inconsistency regarding Kingdon’s theory,
since he does not include interest groups among the ‘visible participants’
that largely influence agenda-setting.
Chapter 6 is the second case study and the MSF is used to explain the
agenda-setting and policy formation processes that led to the approval of
the 2014 Uruguayan Responsible Firearm Ownership Law (RFOL). The
analysis argues that the incremental change in policy was the consequence
of a full agenda coupling in 2012 and a successful decision coupling in
2014. The analysis of the agenda-setting process underscores the impor-
tance of focusing events in low-crime contexts, of increases in gun homi-
cides, and of the proper framing of gun violence. The RFOL developed in
a highly fragmented policy community and its formation was the result of
an exclusively top-down endeavor with little involvement of non-partisan
actors. This is not exceptional, however, as Uruguayan researchers and aca-
demics are not usually involved in policy-making and political parties exert
a near-monopolistic role as mediators of political interests and demands.
Chapter 7 analyzes the agenda-setting and policy formation processes of
the Brazilian Disarmament Statute and the RFOL from a comparative per-
spective. The use of the comparative method provides an explanation on
which specific elements of each case study account for the dissimilar out-
comes. This, in turn, allows drawing generalizations that can inform other
gun policy processes in Latin America. The findings are not just relevant
for policy scholars analyzing gun policies but also for policy advocates and
policy-makers working on gun violence and control. At last, the compara-
tive study is used to evaluate the suitability of the MSF and its theoretical
modifications to explain agenda and policy changes in the region. Based
on this evaluation, the chapter ends with a discussion over the possibility
that interest groups play an enhanced role in Latin American politics and
over the implications that this might have for policy studies in the region.
Chapter 8 ends the book and summarizes its main findings and con-
clusions. The chapter relates to the three research objectives presented
in this chapter. In accordance, it evaluates the role that guns play in the
Latin American security crisis and how states try to regulate their use in
the region. It also reviews the findings on the origins and trajectories
12 D. SANJURJO

of the Brazilian Disarmament Statute and the Uruguayan Responsible

Firearm Ownership Law. At last, it assesses the capacity of the Multiple
Streams Framework to explain both case studies and the insights that
arose from their singular and comparative analyses. The chapter ends
with concluding remarks about the nature of the gun debate and over
what gun policies are really about in Latin America.

Notes
1. For the purposes of this book, Latin America will refer to the following
geographical regions: South America, Central America, the Caribbean, and
Mexico.
2. There is no universally accepted definition of a ‘small arm’ nor of a ‘light
weapon’. The Glossary of terms, definitions, and abbreviations of the
United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms defines ‘small arms’
as ‘any man-portable lethal weapon designed for individual use that
expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily con-
verted to expel or launch a shot, bullet, or projectile by the action of an
explosive’ (UN CASA 2012). According to the United Nations Panel of
Governmental Experts on Small Arms, ‘small arms’ are designed for per-
sonal use and may be carried by one person, whereas ‘light weapons’ are
used by several persons or a crew and may be transported by two or more
people, a pack animal, or a light vehicle (UNGA 1997). Small arms and
light weapons (SALW) usually cover both military-style small arms and
light weapons, as well as commercial firearms (handguns and long guns).
The term ‘small arms’ is often used to refer to both types of weapons.
For the purposes of this book, I use the terms ‘small arms’, ‘firearms’,
and ‘guns’ interchangeably and refer to the following items: revolvers and
self-loading pistols; rifles and carbines; shotguns; sub-machine guns; and
light and heavy machine guns.
3. Even though Latin America is the region with the highest proportion of
gun homicides, the information on homicidal mechanisms in places such as
Africa, Southern Asia or Southeast Asia is very scarce, which may result in
under-reporting.
4. As a response to a major difficulty shared by all countries in the region,
a first body of literature confronts the challenge of creating and improv-
ing the existing data and statistics on gun possession and use (Dreyfus
and de Sousa Nascimento 2010; Jütersonke et al. 2007; Karp 2011,
2012; Sáenz Breckenridge 2007; DerGhougassian et al. 2007). Other
authors go a step further and analyze the problem in relation to armed
 1 INTRODUCTION 13

violence (Godnick et al. 2003; César Fernandes and de Sousa Nascimento

2007; Mujica 2012; IELSUR 2016; Fleitas 2006; Phebo 2005; Rangel
Bandeira 2012; Sánchez et al. 2014), homicides (Gilgen 2012; Sanjurjo
2016, 2019; Waiselfisz 2015), and femicides (DerGhougassian et al.
2016). Furthermore, its entrance in the public and political agendas of
several countries has brought an increasing interest in the development
of gun policies (Álvarez Velasco 2016; DerGhougassian 2011; Sanjurjo
2018, 2019) and in their results. Some authors discuss or evaluate spe-
cific national gun control regulations (Dreyfus et al. 2003; Godnick and
Vázquez 2003a, b; Mack 2011; Pekny et al. 2015; Kopel 2014), while oth-
ers evaluate the results of awareness campaigns and voluntary weapon col-
lection programs (Fleitas 2010; Godnick 2010; Otamendi 2011; Dreyfus
et al. 2008; Ronconi et al. 2011). Finally, various authors address regional
gun traffic (Dreyfus and Marsh 2006; Dreyfus and Rangel Bandeira 2006;
Godnick and Bustamante 2013; Aguirre 2011; de León Escribano 2011;
Fundación Arias para la Paz y el Progreso Humano 2009; García Pinzón
2012), the origin and type of guns used to commit crimes (Dreyfus 2007;
Schroeder 2013; SUCAMEC 2014), gun industries (Dreyfus et al. 2010),
and gun cultures (Sanjurjo 2017; Goldstein 2007; Agozino et al. 2009).
5. 
Policy studies have experienced a relatively strong expansion in Latin
America in the last few decades but are still incipient in comparison to
developed nations. These conditions also apply to our case studies, partly
due to the late development of the sub-discipline. While in the United
States public policy as a field of research dates back to the 1950s, its con-
solidation in Brazil occurred in the 1990s and the study of agenda-setting
and policy formation did not start until the mid-2000s (Capella and Brasil
2016). The public policy research agenda followed a similar pattern in
Uruguay, only even more delayed. In fact, Uruguayan political science was
just taking off in the 1990s (Garcé and Rocha 2015; Buquet 2012) and
the institutionalization of public policy as a sub discipline would not occur
until 2009. It is no surprise that its consolidation is yet to be completed
(Bentancur and Mancebo 2013; Rocha 2017). Since then, academic works
in both countries have experienced a rapid expansion of writings and case
studies, but the existing literature reviews suggest that the study of policy
processes is still fairly limited. Moreover, the public policy literature usu-
ally faces a series of challenges that also apply to the study of policy pro-
cesses and to the specific use of the MSF; among others, the low utilization
of recent foreign literature, low methodological rigor, a strong normative
bias, disregard for previous research efforts, and thematic dispersion (Farah
2013; Capella et al. 2014; Capella and Brasil 2015, 2016).
14 D. SANJURJO

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Rocha, Cecilia Carpuic. 2017. “La Ciencia Política En Uruguay: Profesión,
Enseñanza e Investigación.” In La Ciencia Política Sobre América Latina:
Docencia e Investigación En Perspectiva Comparada, edited by Flavia
Freidenberg, 247–74. Santo Domingo: Fundación Global Democracia y
Desarrollo-FUNGLODE.
Ronconi, Lucas, David Lenis, and Ernesto Schargrodsky. 2011. “Evaluación
Del Programa de Entrega Voluntaria de Armas de Fuego En Argentina.”
Perspectivas Sobre El Desarrollo 9 (1): 14–34.
Sáenz Breckenridge, Stella, ed. 2007. Armas Pequeñas y Livianas: Una Amenaza
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Trabajo 1/2016. Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano.
———. 2017. “The Role of Defensive Firearm Use in the Governance of
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———. 2018. “Corrientes y Acoplamientos Múltiples En Uruguay: La
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———. 2019. “Gun Violence and Defensive Firearm Use in the Governance of
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 1 INTRODUCTION 19

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 CHAPTER 2

Gun Violence, Gun Proliferation,

and Security Governance

Public policies do not appear from nowhere. Instead, policies are usually
presented as solutions to perceived social problems. Gun control is not
an exception. Traditionally, gun laws were enacted in Latin America to
secure the common defense and protect individuals from accidentally
harming each other. However, in a context of unprecedented violence
and crime, new rationales come into play.
In this respect, most Latin American countries, states, and cities face
a profound public security crisis. Many countries present homicide1
rates that are much higher than the global average and which are even
considered to be at epidemic levels by the World Health Organization.
Unsurprisingly, guns are fundamental in this rising trend. They are not
only the preferred weapon of choice to commit murders, but their use
as murder weapons is more frequent than anywhere else in the world.
Moreover, their proliferation and use among civilians is changing the
nature of violence itself in the region. Whereas the traditional forms of
violence revolved around defending or challenging the power of the
state or regime, the current violence is perpetrated among citizens. And
more precisely, among citizens with guns. Whether used in domestic and
gender violence, common street or organized crime, civilian guns are
favoring manifestations of violence that are more spread out among the
different population groups than ever before.
And yet, the vast majority of those who acquire guns in Latin America
do so for defensive purposes. In a context of rising violence and states

© The Author(s) 2020 21

D. Sanjurjo, Gun Control Policies in Latin America,
International Series on Public Policy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17917-5_2
22 D. SANJURJO

that do not have the effective capacity to safeguard most of their citi-
zens, Latin Americans look desperately at a way out of what is a con-
stant and relentless perception of fear. As with fences, alarms, cameras,
private security guards and gated communities, each day more citizens
acquire guns for protection. As a way to feel somewhat less vulnerable
from attackers and intruders. By doing so, they become one of the main
target groups of gun policies and are among the most affected by their
regulations. At the same time, those who acquire guns for self-defense
are arguably taking part in the fight against crime.
The problem with this rising trend is that gun proliferation has turned
itself into a major cause of violence in the region. Hundreds of new
firearms enter circulation each day and ultimately promote a culture of
violence, cause more fear, trigger a higher demand for guns and cause
additional violence. An arms race and vicious circle that has not gone
unnoticed to researchers, civil society and policy-makers. Therefore, the
strengthening of gun regulations in Brazil (2003) and Uruguay (2014)
is part of a larger trend taking place around the world. What is more, it is
a consequence of associating gun proliferation with high levels of armed
violence, a process that will be analyzed in-depth in Chapter 3. But let us
start at the beginning.

Latin America’s Homicide Epidemic

Between 2007 and 2012, only 14% of all violent deaths worldwide
occurred because of armed conflict or terrorism, while an additional 4%
happened in relation to legal interventions. The remaining 82% were
a consequence of intentional and non-intentional homicides in con-
texts that would traditionally be characterized as non-conflict settings2
(GDS 2015). Indeed—and contrary to conventional wisdom—the over-
whelming majority of deaths derived from armed violence are not a con-
sequence of armed conflicts and occur in contexts of little relevance to
western media, which is usually more attracted by the scale of concen-
trated violence of civil and interstate wars. This often comes as a surprise
at first but makes sense once we look at the numbers. For instance, over
3200 people died in Yemen in 2016 as a direct consequence of the civil
war that is ravaging the country (Small Arms Survey, n.d.). Nevertheless,
the death toll is pretty low when compared to the more than 24,000
homicides that took place in Mexico during the same year, or to the
more than 32,000 that occurred in 2017 (MEXICO-INEGI, n.d.).
 2 GUN VIOLENCE, GUN PROLIFERATION, AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE 23

As the most violent and crime-ridden region in the world, Latin

America has been the fiercest illustration of this phenomenon in recent
decades. The region has accomplished significant economic expansion-
ism, the development of civil societies and the strengthening of democra-
cies and constitutionalism. However, insecurity, crime and urban violence
have strongly increased and become the most pressing public concern in
the region. This is a paradox that challenges traditional criminological the-
ories that suggest that an improvement in socioeconomic indicators should
bring a reduction in rates of crime and violence (Agnew 1992; Merton
1938; Cloward and Ohlin 1960). For this reason, Latin American schol-
ars are producing alternative theories to explain these developments. For
instance, Soares and Naritomi (2010) recognize the improvements in soci-
oeconomic indicators but consider high crime rates to be consistent with
current inequality levels, low police presence and—relatively—low incar-
ceration rates. Marcelo Bergman (2018), on his part, makes a consistent
argument on how criminality has increased because growing illegal markets
turned crime into a lucrative enterprise for many citizens, entrepreneurs,
and public officials. Thereby, criminals acquired expertise and established a
growing enterprise in the face of states and criminal justice systems that do
not have the practical and legal capacities to contain them. According to
this insightful theory, prosperity unintentionally fueled criminality.
It is not my purpose to enter this discussion. Beyond this paradox of
socioeconomic improvement and rising crime rates, the matter is that
the vast majority of Latin American countries share a similar trend of
rising crime and violence. Most forms of violent crime have intensified,
with property crime being the most notorious and giving way to large
and thriving criminal markets (Bergman 2018). Nonetheless, homicides
are easier to account for. Murders experienced an 11% increase in the
region between 2000 and 2010, resulting in more than 2.5 million kill-
ings since the turn of the century (UNDP 2013; Muggah and Aguirre
Tobón 2018). Furthermore, homicides have arguably turned into a Latin
American singularity, because it is the only region in the world in which
murder rates increased during the first decades of the twenty-first cen-
tury (Fig. 2.1). According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime (UNODC 2014), the region surpassed Africa for the first time
and positioned itself first in the regional classification of murders, both in
absolute numbers as in relation to its population.
This upward trend does not apply to every country. Murder rates in
Paraguay and Colombia decreased during the past decade, for example;
24 D. SANJURJO

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EĂƟŽŶĂůŚŽŵŝĐŝĚĞƐƉĞƌϭϬϬ͕ϬϬϬƉŽƉƵůĂƟŽŶ

Fig. 2.1 National homicide rates of selected countries (2000, 2016) (Source
Own elaboration using data from the UNODC [n.d.] database on Intentional
Homicide Victims. *Argentina [2014, 2016], Barbados [2000, 2015], Bolivia
[2005, 2016], Chile [2003, 2016], Paraguay [2000, 2015], Peru [2011, 2016],
and Trinidad and Tobago [2000, 2015])

but rates in El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, and Venezuela doubled or tri-

pled, often exceeding rates of countries at war. And while regional statistics
are highly sensitive to such prominent increases, important rises were also
experienced in countries with traditionally low levels of violence, such as
Costa Rica, Panama, and Uruguay. Undoubtedly, the most severe cases at
 2 GUN VIOLENCE, GUN PROLIFERATION, AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE 25

present are Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico,

and Venezuela. Combined, they generate one in four murders around
the world each year. In fact, in proportion to their populations, crime
claimed as many victims in these countries as some high-intensity conflicts
(Fig. 2.2). Therefore, if present trends continue, Latin America’s average
homicide rate is expected to increase from 21.7 murders per 100,000 pop-
ulation in 2012 to 39.6 by 2030 (Muggah and Aguirre Tobón 2018).
Furthermore, the escalation of violence has restated a traditional per-
ception of Latin America as a particularly violent region of the world.
This is an important element that is often neglected. Crime and violence
have reached unprecedented levels in many countries, but violence has
been an endemic and permanent feature of nation-building in the area
(Koonings and Kruijt 1999). What is more, Latin America already pre-
sented similar violent death rates in the mid-1990s (see CAF 2014, 22).
At that time however, terrorism, civil wars, and interstate conflicts pre-
dominated in the region and favored a context of widespread political
and social violence. More contemporary forms of violence are in some
ways a consequence of the political turmoil of those times, but it is an
entirely different situation altogether. Since the turn of the century, the
only traditional armed conflict in the region was the Colombian conflict.
And with the signing of the revised and still very fragile peace deal in
2016, Latin America—and the Western Hemisphere—became entirely
free of active armed conflicts for the first time in centuries.
Instead, the ‘new violence’ (Koonings and Kruijt 2004) in Latin
America is more diverse and democratic. It is mostly perpetrated among
citizens, subjecting not just the poor or political adversaries to the threat
of violence, but all social groups and classes. Understandably, most Latin
Americans have become accustomed to a relentless perception of fear,
frequently manifested in a collective psychosis regarding public security
(Kessler 2009). Violence results from gangs, drug trafficking and organ-
ized criminal groups. From conflicts based on land and property rights,
to domestic violence, urban crime and interpersonal violence, in general.3
Patterns of violence are highly heterogeneous, varying from one country
to the next and even at the local level. Hence, major cities usually con-
centrate criminality and violence, both in the form of street and organized
crime. Most homicides are also concentrated geographically and demo-
graphically, occurring disproportionately in certain neighborhoods and
between young men, who are the overwhelming majority of victims and
perpetrators.
26 D. SANJURJO

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Ϭ ϮϬ ϰϬ ϲϬ ϴϬ ϭϬϬ ϭϮϬ ϭϰϬ ϭϲϬ ϭϴϬ

sŝŽůĞŶƚĚĞĂƚŚƐƉĞƌϭϬϬ͕ϬϬϬƉŽƉƵůĂƟŽŶ

Fig. 2.2 Countries with violent death rates of at least 20 per 100,000 popu-
lation (2016) (Source Own elaboration using data from the Small Arms Survey
[n.d.] database on violent deaths)

And although gun assaults and injuries are somewhat concentrated in

certain locations and groups, other non-tangible costs are more fairly dis-
tributed and suppose a great burden to our present and future societies.
 2 GUN VIOLENCE, GUN PROLIFERATION, AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE 27

Beyond the massive loss of human lives, the growing crime rates in the
region carry devastating consequences for the legitimacy of public insti-
tutions, for social cohesion, and democratic culture. The demands for
security exceed by far the capacities of states to provide it, leading to
a profound lack of faith in public authorities and to the massive pres-
ence of private and non-state actors governing security in every country.
In Colombia, for instance, the ratio of private security agents to public
police agents is estimated to be 7:1 (Arias 2009). Moreover, violence
ceases and even reverts social development, as it reduces general life
expectancy, destroys productive capital, and puts macroeconomic stabil-
ity at risk. In this sense, studies on the socioeconomic impact of crime
are highly divergent and not particularly reliable but agree on the fact
that it supposes a terrible burden that amounts to billions of US dollars
every year. Hence, one of the most recent and robust studies estimates
the total costs in crime expenses in 170.4 billion US dollars, an amount
equivalent to 3.55% of the region’s GDP (Jaitman and Torre 2017).
Ultimately, the costs of gun violence go far beyond measurable and
tangible costs (Cook and Ludwig 2000). It devastates families and
neighborhoods and causes people to be fearful for their safety and for
their loved ones. Fear determines where we live, where we work, where
we go to school, where we shop, where we gather, and where we walk
through. Today, crime and violence suppose the main political and social
challenge for Latin American states and citizens alike.

Gun Proliferation and Violence

Since guns are remarkably effective killing instruments when compared
to other possibilities, such as knifes or human strength, it is not surpris-
ing that their use is fundamental in homicidal violence. Nonetheless, the
use of guns supposes a particularity of the Latin American homicide epi-
demic. Between 2010 and 2015, guns were namely used to commit 50%
of all homicides worldwide (Widmer and Pavesi 2016). And for each
person killed, at least three more survived gunshot injuries (Alvazzi del
Frate and de Martino 2015). However, this average is strongly raised by
their particular impact in Latin America, where the percentage of homi-
cides committed with guns is usually much higher. In Brazil, Colombia,
Mexico and Venezuela, for instance, gun homicides correspond to at
least 80% of the total (GDS 2015; Muggah and Aguirre Tobón 2018).
28 D. SANJURJO

Their use in non-lethal forms of violence has drastically increased

as well in recent decades, as local studies show that rising insecurity
and mistrust in state authorities favored a higher disposition to acquire
guns for self-defense. In this way, self-protection and criminal predatory
behavior fuel a rising demand for guns in a region that already possesses
important surpluses dating back to the civil wars and military dictator-
ships of the twentieth century (Karp 2011).
As a result, the Small Arms Survey research institute estimates that
there could be approximately 71 million small arms in Latin America
(Karp 2018a, b, c). Among these, 14% would belong to state security
forces and the remaining 86% would belong to civilians (Fig. 2.3).
Such a distribution might seem odd but is not exceptional. For instance,
the same study estimates the worldwide existence of over one billion
small arms as of 2017, the vast majority of which would be in civilian
hands (857 million; 85%). And this distribution is perhaps most pro-
nounced in the United States, where estimates suggest that civilian guns
suppose 98.6% of the close to 400 million guns in circulation.
If we relate these findings with the former rates of homicide, it fol-
lows that such a distribution is coherent with the direct impact that state
security forces and civilians produce in terms of violence. Undoubtedly,

ϲ͘ϵ͕ϭϬй

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>ĂǁĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚ
DŝůŝƚĂƌLJ

ϲϮ͕ϴϲй

Fig. 2.3 Gun distribution in Latin America (in millions; percentage) (Source
Own elaboration using estimations by Karp [2018a, b, c])
 2 GUN VIOLENCE, GUN PROLIFERATION, AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE 29

military and law enforcement actors are themselves a critical source of

violence in the region. Examples abound. Honduras police officers have
been implicated for years in corruption, kidnappings, and murders. So
much indeed, that over 4000 of the more than 9000 police officers eval-
uated in 2017 by an independent commission were removed from the
force on corruption charges. The Brazilian police is another prominent
example. Infamously known as the most brutal police force in the world,
its civilian and military police forces killed 4224 people in 2016 alone.
Some of these killings were due to legitimate use of force, but others
were extrajudicial and illegal (Human Rights Watch 2018). Similar
examples can be found in most Latin American countries. But despite
these deficits, and in the absence of traditional armed conflicts the
region, the vast majority of violent deaths occur at the hands of civilians.
The estimated civilian arsenal in Latin America equals an average dis-
tribution of 9.87 civil guns per every 100 residents, which is a very low
rate by international standards. The numbers vary considerably when
it comes to national estimations, though. Among independent coun-
tries and territories, estimations range between 2 firearms per every 100
inhabitants in Bolivia and Peru, to 34.7 in Uruguay (Fig. 2.4). That
these countries can be found on opposite ends is particularly interesting,
as precisely Bolivia, Peru and Uruguay are countries that present low or
medium-low levels of violent crime. It is a strong indication that the rela-
tionship between civilian gun ownership and armed violence is not linear,
and that the correlation between gun proliferation and crime is usually
low. This is not a distinctive feature of the region either. The United
States is estimated to have the highest civilian gun ownership rate in
the world, with 120.5 guns per every 100 inhabitants. That is 12 times
higher than Latin America’s average. However, its firearm homicide rate
is seven times lower. Likewise, Finland and Switzerland are estimated to
have 32.4 and 27.6 guns per every 100 inhabitants but are two of the
most peaceful countries in the world.
The influence of gun proliferation on crime and violence is namely
more complex and difficult to predict than the regional literature fre-
quently suggests. The Anglo-Saxon criminology field holds an intense
academic debate on the risks and benefits of civilians’ gun ownership and
carry (e.g. Cook and Ludwig 2000; Lott 1998; Hemenway 2004), but
its results are largely inconclusive (RAND 2018). In-depth studies of this
nature have not been carried out in the region, but local studies would
probably encounter the same methodological limitations that hinder
30 D. SANJURJO

ƐƟŵĂƚĞŽĨĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶŐƵŶƐ;ϮϬϭϳͿ sŝŽůĞŶƚĚĞĂƚŚƐďLJŐƵŶƐ;ϮϬϭϲͿ

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Fig. 2.4 National estimates of civilian guns (2017) and violent deaths by guns
(2016) (Source Own elaboration using estimations and data by Karp [2018a] and
Small Arms Survey [n.d.] database on violent deaths)

foreign scholars from reaching definite conclusions. Ultimately, a gun

can be an effective instrument for personal defense against crime, as well
as a lethal instrument to generate violence, commit crimes and confront
state security policies.
That being said, the influence of guns presents distinctive particu-
larities in Latin America. Guns do not suppose a problem in the region
because of their sheer quantity, but due to their prominent incidence
in crime and violence at an aggregate level. Elisabeth Gilgen (2012)
was the first to notice a particular phenomenon that takes place in the
region. She looked at the incidence of different homicide mechanisms
and noticed that the percentage of gun homicides is not only dispropor-
tionally high, but also that national homicide rates present a positive cor-
relation with the percentage of homicides committed with firearms. In
other words, high homicide rates tend to coexist with high percentages
of homicides committed with guns (cf. Sanjurjo 2016). Figures 2.5 and
2.6 portray this phenomenon comparing current violent death rates with
the percentage of violent deaths committed with guns.
What this correlation suggests is that regional gun violence often acts
as an effective enhancer of violence at an aggregate level. This happens
in much the same way as guns are usually said to intensify violence in
particular micro-situations, such as in a heated discussion among neigh-
bors or in cases of domestic violence (Cook and Ludwig 2000). Brazil
 2 GUN VIOLENCE, GUN PROLIFERATION, AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE 31

Violent deaths (2016) Percentage of violent deaths committed with guns (2016)

120 90%

Violent deaths committed with guns (%)

Violent deaths per 100.000 population

80%
100
70%
80 60%
50%
60
40%
40 30%
20%
20
10%
0 0%

Trinidad and Tobago

Dominican Republic
Colombia
Argentina

Paraguay
Uruguay
Nicaragua

El Salvador
Jamaica
Honduras
Suriname

Guatemala

Venezuela
Cuba

Puerto Rico
Panama

Bolivia

Bahamas
Ecuador

Costa Rica
Chile

Mexico

Belize
Haiti

Brazil
Peru

Fig. 2.5 National violent death rates and percentages of violent deaths com-
mitted with guns in selected countries (2016) (Source Own elaboration using
data from the Small Arms Survey [n.d.] database on violent deaths)

and Uruguay are good examples (Figs. 2.7 and 2.8). There were 13,000
homicides committed in Brazil in 1980, 44% of which were perpe-
trated with guns. Since then, homicides increased by 485% and the per-
centage of homicides committed with guns almost doubled. In 2016,
almost 59,000 Brazilians were murdered and nearly 72% of those kill-
ings were gun-related (Waiselfisz 2015). Uruguay is experiencing a
similar dynamic, only much more nuanced. Its national homicide rate
remained relatively stable during the last few decades, varying along 5.5
and 7.5 homicides per every 100,000 inhabitants. But this changed in
2011 when homicide numbers began to rise as a result of an impor-
tant increase in gun homicides. These went from representing 49% of
all homicides in 2011 to 60% in 2017 (URUGUAY-MI 2014, 2017;
UNODC, n.d.).
In some countries of the region, important rises in gun violence are
frequently associated with the greater presence of drug trafficking and
organized criminal groups. This is certainly a major explanative factor, as
guns are increasingly the weapon of choice of gangs and groups engaged
in organized crime and their members are much more violent than reg-
ular armed citizens. Some comparative studies even suggest that murder
rates among gang member can be as much as 100 times greater than
Another random document with
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barruntado su propósito, por ser
aquella parte visitada muchas
veces de las Ninfas; á lo cual dixo
Siralvo desta suerte: Yendo por el
cerrado valle de los fresnos hacia
las fuentes del Obrego como dos
millas de allí, acabado el valle
entre dos antiguos allozares,
mana una fuente abundantíssima,
y á poco trecho se deja bajar por
la aspereza de unos riscos de
caída extraña, donde por
tortuosas sendas fácilmente
puede irse tras el agua, la cual en
el camino va cogiendo otras
cuarenta fuentes perenales que
juntas con extraño ruido van por
entre aquellas peñas
quebrantándose, y llegando á
topar el otro risco soberbias le
pretenden contrastar; mas
viéndose detenidas, llenas de
blanca espuma, tuercen por
aquella hondura cavernosa como
á buscar el centro de la tierra; á
pocos pasos en lo más estrecho
está una puente natural por
donde las aguas passando, casi
corridas de verse assí oprimir,
hacen doblado estruendo, y al fin
de la puente hay una angosta
senda que, dando vuelta á la
parte del risco, en aquella soledad
descubre al Mediodía un verde
pradecillo de muchas fuentes
pero de pocas plantas, y entre
ellas de viva piedra cavada está
la cueva del Mago Erión, albergue
ancho y obrado con suma
curiosidad. Este es el solo lugar
que os conviene, porque el
secreto dél es grande y el
apartamiento no es mucho. ¿Qué
podréis allá pedir que no halléis?
Todo está lleno de caza y de
frescura, y aunque es visitado
continuamente de las bellas
Ninfas, no es lugar común á todos
como el bosque del Pino, pues la
compañía de Erión seros ha muy
agradable. Éste sabe en los cielos
desde la más mínima estrella
hasta el mayor planeta su
movimiento y virtud; en los aires
sus calidades y en las aves dél y
alimañas de la tierra lo mismo; en
la mar tiene fuerza de enfrenar
sus olas y levantar tempestades
hasta poner sobre las aguas las
arenas: la división de las almas
irracionales y la virtud de la
inmortal con profundíssimo saber.
Pues llegando á los abismos las
tres Furias á su canto, Alecto
tiembla, Tesifón gime y Megera se
humilla; Plutón le obedece y los
dañados salen á la menor de sus
voces. Pues de las penas de
amor, sin hierba ni piedra, con
sólo su canto hace que ame el
amado ó aborrezca el aborrecido;
y si le viene la gana vuelto en
lobo se va á los montes, y hecho
águila á los aires, tornado pez
entra por las aguas, y convertido
en árbol se aparece en los
desiertos; no tiene Dios desde las
aguas del cielo á las ínfimas del
olvido cosa que no conozca por
nombre y naturaleza; no es de
condición áspera ni de trato
oculto; allí recibe á quien le busca
y remedia á quien le halla. Aquí
podemos irnos que en probarlo se
pierde poco, y yo sé que el ser
bien recebidos está cierto.
Cardenio, como de la ribera había
estado tanto tiempo ausente,
quedó admirado del gran saber
del nuevo Erión; pero Mendino,
que dél y de su estancia tenía
mucha noticia, aunque pudiera
desde el Mago Sincero estar
escarmentado, fácilmente dando
crédito á sus loores, determinó
que le buscassen el siguiente día
por poner aquél en cobro lo que
les importaba dexar, que fué
fácilmente hecho, y recogiéndose
á las cabañas de Mendino,
pusieron orden en la cena, que
fué de mucho gusto, y al fin della
no faltó quien se le acrecentasse,
porque vinieron Batto y Silvano,
pastores conocidíssimos, ambos
mozos y ambos de grande
habilidad, á buscar juez á ciertas
dudas que Batto sentía de versos
de Silvano; y el juicio de Siralvo
fué que si todos los poetas
fuessen calumniados, pocos
escaparían de algún objeto; y
colérico Silvano, en un momento
puso mil á Batto, y de razón en
razón se desafiaron á cantar en
presencia de aquellos pastores,
pero pareciéndoles la noche
blanda y el aire suave, se salieron
juntos á tomarle y oirlos á la
fresca fuente: donde sentados
sacaron la lira y el rabel, á cuyo
son assí cantó Silvano y assí fué
Batto respondiendo:

SILVANO
Dime que Dios te dé para un
pellico,
¿por qué traes tan mal
vestido, Batto,
presumiendo tu padre de tan
rico?

BATTO
Porque el pastor de mi
nobleza y trato
no ha menester buscarlo en el
apero,
que una cosa es el hombre y
otra el hato.
Mas dime, esse capote
dominguero
¿quién te le dió? ¿Quizá
porque cantasses
en tanto que comía el
compañero?
 SILVANO
Si á quien yo le canté tú le
bailasses,
yo sé, por más que de rico te
alabes,
si te diesse otro á ti, que le
tomasses.
Mas ¿por qué culpas tales y
tan graves
de Lisio traes sus rimas
desmandadas,
de lengua en lengua que
ninguna sabes?

BATTO
Calla y sabrás: ¿no ves
cuán aprobadas
del mundo son las mías y la
alteza
de mis líricas odas imitadas?
Tú tienes por tesoro tu
pobreza,
y si lo es, está tan escondido
que para descubrirle no hay
destreza.

SILVANO
Pastor liviano, ¿qué libro
has leído
que de ti pueda nadie hacer
caso,
si no estuviesse fuera de
sentido?
El franco Apolo fué contigo
escaso,
y por hacerte de sus
paniaguados,
no te echarán á palos del
Parnasso.

BATTO
Desso darán mis versos
levantados
el testimonio y de mi poesía
sin ser como los tuyos
acabados.
En diciendo fineza y
hidalguía,
regalo, gusto y
entretenimiento,
diosa, bizarro trato y gallardía.

SILVANO
¡Oh, qué donoso
desvanecimiento!
Dessos vocablos uso, Batto
mío,
porque son tiernos y me dan
contento,
Pero las partes por do yo los
guío,
son tan diversas todas y tan
buenas,
que ellas lo dicen, que yo no
porfío.

BATTO
 ¿Sabes lo que nos dicen?
Que van llenas
de muy bajas razones su
camino,
y si algunas se escapan son
ajenas,
Y no hurtáis, Silvano, del
latino,
del griego ó del francés ó del
romano,
sino de mí y del otro su
vecino.

SILVANO
Si tu trompa tomassen en la
mano,
que la de Lisio apenas lo
hiciste,
¿qué son harías, cabrerizo
hermano?
Para vaciarla el sueño no
perdiste,
para cambiarla sí, que no
hallaste
otro tanto metal como fundiste.

BATTO
¡Basta! que tú en la tuya
granjeaste
de crédito y honor ancho
tesoro;
mas dime si en mis Rimas
encontraste
La copla ajena entera sin
decoro,
ó espuelas barnizadas de
gineta,
con jaez carmesí y estribos de
oro.

SILVANO
Descubriréte á la primera
treta
tu lengua sin artículos, defeto
digno de castigar por nueva
seta.
Tu nombre es Piedra
toque y en efeto,
usando descubrir otros
metales,
el miserable tuyo te es
secreto.

BATTO
¡Oh tú, que con irónicas
señales,
cansas los sabios, frunces los
misérrimos,
viviendo por pensión de los
mortales!

SIRALVO
Pastores, dos poetas
celebérrimos
no han de tratarse assí, que
es caso ilícito
motejarse en lenguajes tan
acérrimos.
Ni á vosotros, amigos, os es
lícito,
ni á mi sufrirlo, y es razón
legítima,
que ande el juez en esto más
solícito.
La honra al bueno es cordial
epítima,
y los nobles conócense en la
plática,
dándose el uno por el otro en
vítima.
Aquí, donde la hierba es
aromática,
con el sonido de la fuente
harmónica,
al claro rayo de la luz
scenática,
Suene Silvano, nuestra lira
jónica,
Batto rosponda el rabelejo
dórico
y duerma el Jovio con su dota
Crónica.
Cada cual es poeta y es
histórico,
y cada cual es cómico y es
trágico,
y aun cada cual gramático y
retórico.
Pero dexado, en un cantar
selvático,
si aquí resuena Lúcida y
Tirrena,
más mueve un tierno son que
un canto mágico.
 SILVANO
En hora buena, pero con tal
pato
si pierde Batto, que esté llano
y cierto,
que por concierto deste
desafío,
ha de ser mío su rabel de
pino;
y si benino Apolo se le allana,
y en él se humana para que
me gane,
que yo me allane y sin desdén
ó ira
le dé mi lira de ciprés y
sándalos.

BATTO
No hagas más escándalos,
satírico,
ni presumas de lírico y
bucólico;
con algún melancólico lunático
te precias tú de plático en
poética;
que esté su lira ética y él ético,
que mi rabel poético odorífero
no entrará en tan pestífero
catálogo
ni en tal falso diálogo ni
cántico.

SIRALVO
 Si estilo nigromántico
bastasse
á poder sossegar vuestra
contienda,
tened por cierto que lo
procurasse,
O callad ambos ó tened la
rienda,
ó poned premios ó cantad sin
ellos,
pero ninguno en su cantar se
ofenda.

SILVANO
Dos chivos tengo, y huelgo
de ponellos,
para abreviar en el presente
caso,
contento de ganallos ó
perdellos.

BATTO
Pues yo tengo, Siralvo, un
rico vaso
que á mi opinión es de
ponerse dino
con las riquezas del soberbio
Crasso.
El pie de haya, el tapador de
pino,
de cedro el cuerpo y de
manera el arte,
que excede el precio del metal
más fino.
Dédalo le labró parte por
parte,
tallando en él del uno al otro
polo,
cuanto el cielo y el sol mira y
reparte.
Y cuando en tanta
hermosura violo,
fuese por Delfos, y passando
á Anfriso,
dióle al santo pastor el rubio
Apolo.
Y cuando al carro
trasponerse quiso
el retor de la luz, dejó el
ganado
y aqueste vaso con mayor
aviso,
Á las Ninfas del Tajo
encomendado;
y ellas después le dieron á
Silvana,
de quien mi padre fué pastor
preciado.
Ella á él y él á mí; mas si me
gana
Silvano, ahora quiero que le
lleve.

SIRALVO
Y yo juzgaros con entera
gana.
Batto á pagar y á no reñir
se atreve,
y tú, Silvano mío, bien te
acuerdas
que has prometido lo que aquí
se debe.
Pues fregad la resina por las
cerdas,
muestren las claras voces su
dulzura
al dulce son de las templadas
cuerdas.
Sentémonos ahora en la
verdura;
cantad ahora que se va
colmando
de flor el prado, el soto de
frescura.
Ahora están los árboles
mostrando,
como de nuevo, un año
fertilíssimo,
los ganados y gentes
alegrando.
Ahora viene el ancho río
puríssimo,
no le turban las nieves, que el
lozano
salce se ve en su seno
profundíssimo.
Descubrid vuestro ingenio
mano á mano,
cada cual cante con estilo
nuevo,
comience Batto, seguirá
Silvano,
diréis á veces, gozaráse Febo.

BATTO
¡Oh, rico cielo, cuya eterna
orden
es claro ejemplo del poder
divino,
haz que mis versos y tu honor
concorden!

SILVANO
Para que deste premio sea
yo dino
en mis enamorados
pensamientos,
muéstrame, Amor, la luz de tu
camino.

BATTO
Lleven los frescos y suaves
vientos
mis dulces versos á la cuarta
esfera,
pues ama el mismo Apolo mis
acentos.

SILVANO
Dichoso yo si Lúcida
estuviera
tras estos verdes ramos
escuchando,
y oyéndose nombrar me
respondiera.

BATTO
Pues no me canso de vivir
penando,
la que me está matando,
debría templar un poco de mi
pena.
Ablándate, dulcíssima
Tirrena,
que siendo en todo buena,
no es justo que te falte el ser
piadosa.

SILVANO
Pues cuando te me
muestras amorosa,
Lúcida mía hermosa,
muy humilde te soy, seime
benina.
Regala, diosa, esta ánima
mezquina,
que mi fineza es dina
de que tu gallardía me
entretenga.

BATTO
Si quiere Amor que mi vivir
sostenga,
de Tirrena me venga
el remedio, que es malo de
otra parte.
Mira que de mi pecho no se
parte,
Tirrena, por amarte,
un Etna fiero, un Mongibelo
ardiente.

SILVANO
 Si yo dijesse la que mi alma
siente,
cuando me hallo ausente,
de tu grande beldad, Lúcida
mía,
Etnas y Mongibelos helaría,
porque su llama es fría,
con la que abrasa el pecho de
Silvano.

BATTO
Cuando en mi corazón
metió la mano,
sin dejarme entendello,
robóme Amor la libertad con
ella,
dejando en lugar della
el duro yugo que me oprime el
cuello.

SILVANO
El duro yugo que me oprime
el cuello,
por blando le he tenido
llevado del dulzor de mi
deseo,
por quien de Amor me veo
menos pagado y más
agradecido.

BATTO
Menos pagado y más
agradecido,
Amor quiere que muera,
quiéralo él, que yo también lo
quiero,
y veráse, si muero,
cuánto mi fe, pastora, es
verdadera.

SILVANO
Cuánto mi fe, pastora, es
verdadera
es falsa mi esperanza,
porque mejor entrambas me
deshagan,
y aunque ellas no la hagan,
nunca mi corazón hará
mudanza.

BATTO
Tirrena mía, más blanca que
azucena,
más colorada que purpúrea
rosa,
más dura y más helada
que blanca y colorada;
si no te precias de aliviar mi
pena,
hazlo al menos de ser tan
poderosa,
que queriendo tus ojos
acabarme,
con ellos mismos puedas
remediarme.

SILVANO
 Lúcida mía, en cuya
hermosura
están juntas la vida con la
muerte,
el miedo y la esperanza,
tempestad y bonanza,
sin duda á aquél que de tu
Amor no cura
darás vida, esperanza y buena
suerte,
pues por amarte, Lúcida, me
han dado
la muerte el miedo y el
adverso hado.

BATTO
¿Di, quién, recién nacido
de un animal doméstico
preciado,
del todo está crecido,
de padre sensitivo fué
engendrado,
mas nació sin sentido
y en esto su natura ha
confirmado;
después, materna cura,
muda su sér, su nombre y su
figura?

SILVANO
Di tu, ¿quién en dulzura
nace, y en siendo della
dividida,
la llega su ventura
á otra cosa, que teniendo vida
muere ella y si procura
vivir, queda la otra apetecida,
haciendo su concierto,
del muerto vivo y del vivo
muerto?

BATTO
El canto se ha passado
querellándonos,
de aquellas inhumanas que,
ofendiéndonos,
quedan sin culpa con el mal
pagándonos.

SILVANO
Al principio pensé que,
defendiéndonos,
tan solos nuestros premios
procuráramos,
menos desseo y más passión
venciéndonos.

SIRALVO
Pastores, mucho más os
escucháramos,
aunque en razones no sabré
mostrároslo,
porque de oiros nunca nos
cansáramos.
Ponerme yo en mis Rimas á
loároslo,
por más que lo procure
desvelándome,
no será más possible que
premiároslo.

BATTO
Pues yo, Siralvo, pienso,
que premiándome,
saldrás de aquessa deuda
conociéndote,
y en tu saber y mi razón
fiándome.

SILVANO
Yo no pienso cansarte
persuadiéndote
á lo que tú, Siralvo mío,
obligástete,
y la justicia clara está
pidiéndote.

SIRALVO
Batto, de tal manera
señalástete,
de suerte tus cantares
compusístelos,
que de tu mano con tu loor
premiástete.
Y tú, Silvano, tanto
enriquecístelos
tus conceptos de amor, que
deste premio
como de cosa humilde
desviástelos.
Por esto sin gastar largo
proemio,