EAP Angat Dam & Dyke-Revised 013113

EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN (EAP)
ANGAT DAM AND DYKE

NORZAGARAY BULACAN PROVINCE
(Latitude 14º 49’ to 15º 13’ N, Longitude 121º 08’ to 121º 20’ E)
Region 3
ANGAT DAM
AND DIKE
Consulting Services for the Study of Angat Dam
and Dyke Safety 6th DRAFT EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN
Verification by Owner & Operator
The first draft issue of this document has been prepared by EDCOP/T&T Phils. for the
benefit of NPC. The undersigned have reviewed this Emergency Action Plan and state
that he/she has read and understand the contents herein and acknowledge that
information is true and correct to the best of his/her knowledge and belief.
Noted By:
_____________________
PSALM Representative
RODOLFO E. GERMAN
Plant Manager, Angat HEP
ROMUALDO T. BELTRAN
OIC, Dams Management Department - NPC
i
Engineering and Development
Corporation of the Philippines T & T Philippines
AMENDMENT RECORD SHEET
Amendment Effective Subject Pages Signed

Number Date
1 12.02.2012 Revision 1st Draft
2 30.04.2012 Revision 2nd Draft
3 13.09.2012 Revision 3rd Draft
4 19.09.2012 Revision 4th Draft
5 Revision 5
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ABBREVIATIONS
CPF - Common Purpose Facilities
DPWH - Department of Public Works and Highways
DMD - Dam Management Division
DSWD - Department of Social Welfare and Development
EAP - Emergency Action Plan
EDCOP - Engineering Development Corporation of the Philippines
FFWSDO - Flood Forecasting Warning System for Dam Operation – Angat Dam
LGU - Local Government Unit
MWCI - Manila Water Company Inc.
MWSI - Maynilad Water Services Inc .
MWSS - Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
NGCP - National Grid Corporation of the Philippines
NIA - National Irrigation Administration
NPC - National Power Corporation
NZSOLD - New Zealand Society on Large Dams
OCD - Office of Civil Defense
PAGASA - Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services

Administration
PDRRMO - Provincial Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office
PHIVOLCS - Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology
PSALM - Power Sector Assets & Liabilities Management Corporation
T&T Phils. - Tonkin & Taylor International Limited (Phils.)
NLEX - North Luzon Expressway
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EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN

FOR
ANGAT DAM AND DYKE
CONTROLLED COPY DISTRIBUTION LIST
Revision No.: _____
Date: _______
COMPANY/AGENCY PERSONNEL DATE SIGNATURE

NAME ISSUED
1. National Power Corporation (NPC)
2. Power Sector Assets & Liabilities Management

Corporation (PSALM)
3. National Irrigation Administration (NIA)
4. Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System

(MWSS)
5. Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and

Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA)
6. Common Purpose Facilities (CPF)
7. Maynilad Water Services Inc (MWSI)
8. Manila Water Company Inc (MWCI)
9. Flood Forecasting Warning System for Dam

Operation (FFWSDO) – Angat Dam
10. Department of Public Works and Highways

(DPWH)
11. Office of Civil Defense (OCD)
12. Philippine Institute of Volcanology and

Seismology (PHIVOLCS)
13. Provincial Government of Bulacan - PDRRMO
14. Engineering Development Corporation of the

Philippines (EDCOP)
15. Tonkin & Taylor International Limited (Phils.)

(T&T Phils.)
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.0 NOTIFICATION 1
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 Notification Flowchart 1
2.0 INTRODUCTION 8
2.1 Purpose of Emergency Action Plan 8
2.2 EAP Outline 8
2.3 Dam Ownership & Management 8
3.0 RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE EAP 10
3.1 General Responsibilities 10
3.1.1 National Power Corporation 10
3.1.2 National Government 11
3.1.3 Local Government 11
3.1.4 Barangay Community Leaders 12
3.2 Responsibility For Notification 13
3.2.1 National Power Corporation 13
3.2.2 Government Agencies (e.g. NDRRMC, OCD, PAGASA, PHIVOLCS,
DENR, DPWH, DSWD, LGUs) 13
3.3 Responsibility For Evacuation 13
3.3.1 Outside and Downstream of the Angat Dam 13
3.3.2 Within the Facility 13
3.4 Responsibility for Duration, Security, Termination and Post Review 14
3.4.1 Duration of Emergency 14
3.4.2 Security 14
3.4.3 Termination of Emergency 14
3.4.4 Post Review of Emergency 14
3.5 EAP Coordinator Responsibility 15
3.5.1 EAP Revisions and Updates 15
3.5.2 EAP Training & Frequency 15
3.5.3 EAP Exercises 16
3.6 Damage Assessment 16
3.6.1 Damage Assessment Checklist 16
4.0 EMERGENCY IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION 17
4.1 Notification of Potential Emergency Situations 17
4.2 Definitions of Emergency Situations 18
4.3 Definitions of Unusual Occurrences 18
4.4 Emergency Evaluation & Classification 18
4.4.1 YELLOW Site Emergency: Unusual Events 19
4.4.2 ORANGE Site Emergency: Potential Failure Situation is Developing19
4.4.3 RED Site Emergency: Failure is Imminent or has occurred 20
5.0 PREPAREDNESS 20
5.1 Preventive and Warning Systems 20
5.2 Emergency Preparedness 21
5.3 Site Access 21
5.4 Response During Power Supply Failure 21
5.5 Response During Periods of Adverse Weather 22
5.6 Response During Weekends and Holidays 22
5.7 Communication Systems 22
5.8 Emergency Supplies and Information 23
5.8.1 Special Equipment 23
5.8.2 Supplies and Materials 23
5.8.3 Emergency Power Supply 23
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6.0 INUNDATION MAPS 25

6.1 Introduction 25
6.2 Flood Hazard Classification 25
6.3 Use of Inundation Maps 25
6.3.1 Disclaimer 28
7.0 SUPPORTING INFORMATION 29
7.1 Dam Details 29
7.1.1 Downstream Dams 30
7.1.2 Operation Standards 30
7.2 Major Risks - General 31
7.3 Heavy Rainfall Monitoring & Flood Forecasting 31
7.4 Earthquake Risk 31
8.0 GLOSSARY OF TERMS 33
9.0 Forms 37
Appendix A: Flood Inundation Maps

Appendix B: Training, Updating, Reporting and Posting
Appendix C: Dam Break Study Summary
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1.0 NOTIFICATION
1.1 Introduction
In the event of an emergency, as classified by Section 4.4 of this document, all
possible measures outlined in this document must be taken to protect the integrity
of the dam, life and property downstream. All parties must be aware of their
individual role in ensuring that the correct mitigation and communication measures
are taken.
1.2 Notification Flowchart

The notification flow chart in Figure 1.2-1 is an effective tool to be used for timely
notification applicable to all emergency classification levels considered in Section
4.4 and clearly summarizes:
 Who is responsible for notifying the Angat Dam, Ipo Dam, and Bustos dam
representative(s) and emergency management official(s) or the Provincial
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office (PDRRMO).
 Who is to be notified, and by whom.
 What is the order of notification priority is.
The Plant Manager is designated as the Emergency Action Plan (EAP)

Coordinator. Upon detection of an emergency, the EAP Coordinator will
immediately follow the Notification Flowchart presented in this section to initiate the
emergency response procedures.
In line with the notification flowchart shown in Figure 1.2-1, the contact details for
all involved are provided in Table 1.
The Notification Form included in this section is to be completed during an

emergency.
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Table 1. Contact Number
ORGANIZATION LOCATION NAME OFFICE PHONE OFFICE FAX MOBILE
Angat HEP San Lorenzo, Rodolfo E. German 02 921 2189 02 921 2189 0908 181 8217
Norzagaray, Bulacan 02 924 5458
Roque de Guzman
DMD, NPC Head Office Diliman, Quezon City Romualdo T. Beltran 02 924 5236 02 924 5236 0908 181 2570
Wilfredo S. Senadrin 0908 181 9297
FFWSDO Angat Dam, Alexander A. Palada 02 921 3328 02 921 3328 0908 181 8470
Norzagaray, Bul.
Russel A. Rigor 0908 181 9165
Ipo Dam (CPF- MWSS) Norzagaray, Bulacan Hermie Medrano 02 939 7477 none 0929 399 8608
Ricardo Alano 02 939 7477 0917 506 4088
Common Purposed Facility (CPF) Mar Rodriguez 02 928 5762 0917 516 3957
Salvador Leyble 0928 500 9892
Bustos Dam (NIA) San Rafael, Bulacan Felix Y. Robles 044 766 3888 044 766 3888 0918 340 9497
044 766 3524
PAGASA Diliman, QC Dr. Susan Espinueva 02 929 4065 02 920 4052 0939 511 3916
PHIVOLCS
National Grid Corp. of the Phil. Diliman, QC Sr. Superintendent on 02 920 0073 02 922 0487 n/a
Duty
2
PSALM Makati City VP Conrad S. Tolentino 02 840 3896 02 840 3896 0908 860 6049
Office of Civil Defense
Office of Civil Defense – Region 3 San Fernando, (Civil Defence Officer) 045 455 0564
Pampanga
North Luzon Expressway (NLEX)
BULACAN PROVINCE
Office of the Bulacan Governor Malolos, Bulacan Gov. Wilhelmino M. Sy-
Alvarado
Bulacan - PDRRMO Malolos, Bulacan Liz Mungcal 044 796 2651 044 791 1861 0917 804 0206
Norzagaray -MDRRMO Norzagaray, Bulacan Edilberto Castillo 044 694 1715 044 694 0626 0917 345 0076
Angat - MDRRMO Angat, Bulacan Dr. Alex Saligao 044 671 7950 * 0921 471 9352 **
Bustos -MDRRMO Bustos, Bulacan Insp. Arnel Cañosa 044 617 1035 044 617 7996 0906 805 9544
044 617 7996
3
Baliuag - MDRRMO Baliuag, Bulacan Josephine L. Labasbas 044 892 0745 044 766 3246 0932 516 5808
044 766 2538
San Rafael -MDRRMO San Rafael, Bulacan Luisito Rodriguez 044 761 5561 044 761 5556 0905 416 2744
Plaridel - MDRRMO Plaridel, Bulacan Reynaldo dela Cruz 044 670 2673 044 795 0366 0920 945 2641
Pulilan -MDRRMO Pulilan, Bulacan Cymbeline C. Maño 044 795 0128 044 795 0128 0922 816 2967
044 676 1234
Calumpit - MDRRMO Calumpit, Bulacan Engr. Abel Cabrera 044 675 1271 * 0917 826 0856 **
Hagunoy -MDRRMO Hagunoy, Bulacan Rodolfo J. Santos 044 793 5811 044 793 2619 0939 922 6391
Paombong - MDRRMO Paombong, Bulacan Emerito Sacdalan 044 760 5044 044 760 5044 0918 925 1293
044 760 7783
PAMPANGA PROVINCE
METRO MANILA
4
Note : * - No-one is answering ** - Not available.
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AN EMERGENCY CONDITION EXIST

NIA
Angat Dam
MWSS
PSALM
Plant Manager PAGASA
FFWSDO PSALM PHIVOLCS
(EAP Coordinator)
IPO DAM
BUSTOS DAM
NPC DILIMAN
m
e Primary Contact: Primary Contact:
NLEX
st
sy ................... PDRRMO, NDRRMC
ng Governor of Bulacan Secondary Contact:
ni
ar Secondary Contact: Civil Defense Officer Downstream
w
........................
h Municipalities
other than
ug
ro Media
Bulacan
Th
Community
Office of Mayor
Barangay Capt.
GENERAL PUBLIC
The EAP Coordinator is responsible for implementing the emergency notification in the order of priority indicated below. If the Primary contact is not available the EAP Coordinator shall immediately contact the Secondary
Contact. Order of Notification Priority for the EAP Coordinator is noted in top right corner of each box. In the absence of the Plant Manager, the Operation Superintendent shall be the automatic EAP Coordinator.
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Figure1.2-1. Emergency Notification Flowchart

STEP 1 EMERGENCY CONDITION

Event Detection EXISTS
Assess Situation
Determine Emergency
Level
STEP 2 YELLOW ORANGE RED

Emergency Level
Unusual Event: Potential Dam Urgent:
Determination
Slowly Failure Situation
Dam Failure
Developing Rapidly
appears to be
Developing
Imminent or is in
Progress
NOTIFY NOTIFY NOTIFY

STEP 3
Notification and Notification Notification Flow Notification Flow
Communication Flow Chart Chart Chart
MONITOR SAVE DAM SAVE PEOPLE

STEP 4 PROTECTIVE EVACUATE
Expected Actions ACTIONS /
Possible
Evacuation
STEP 5
Termination TERMINATION AND FOLLOW-UP
Figure 1.2-2. EAP Overview
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
1.3 Purpose of Emergency Action Plan
This Emergency Action Plan defines the responsibilities of all organizations
associated with identifying and assessing potential emergency situations or
unusual events which may endanger Angat Dam and Dyke and downstream
residents. Through early identification of an emergency situation, preventive
actions can be taken and the appropriate emergency management officials can be
notified of possible, impending, or actual failure of the dam.
The Angat Dam and Dyke Emergency Action Plan (EAP) provide the Operator
(NPC) with a straight forward procedure to notify:
 The Government agencies of the Republic of the Philippines (RP) involved in
responding to “dam related” emergencies; and
 The downstream municipalities of the Dam that will be affected by such an
emergency.
1.4 EAP Outline

This Emergency Action Plan includes a set of procedures for:
 Defining and identifying Emergency Situations and/or Unusual Events which
may threaten the integrity of the Dam;
 Ensuring effective and early actions are taken to prevent dam failure;
 Avoiding loss of life and minimizing property damage in the event of a failure by
implementing early and effective warnings to all involved; and
 Providing timely warning to appropriate government agencies and downstream
LGUs for their implementation of protective measures for downstream
communities.
This document remains in force throughout the operational life of the dam. It will be
updated annually with formal written notification of any amendments and distributed
to those who have a copy.
The dam is considered to be in operation while the structure is being used to

control flow from the Angat River.
1.5 Dam Ownership & Management

PSALM owns the Angat HEP Facility, as per Electric Power Industry Reform Act
(EPIRA), which includes the Dam and Dykes and its instrumentations. NPC
operates and maintains the Angat HEP Facility as per Operation and Maintenance
Agreement executed with PSALM.
8
NPC as operator, through its Dam Management Division (DMD) shall administer,
operate, rehabilitate, preserve and maintain the dam and dykes and shall utilize the
reservoir water to provide the requirements for drinking water, irrigation and power
generation of MWSS, NIA and NPC, respectively.
The Flood Forecasting and Warning System for Dam Operations Division
(FFWSDO) of DMD, as per Flood Forecasting Manual, are responsible for the
continuous flood monitoring and warning systems. During normal conditions, when
there is no weather disturbance and/or the reservoir elevation is below the Normal
High Water Level, the operator is solely responsible for water release activities.
During Extraordinary Conditions, identified through coordination with PAGASA, the
FFWSDO shall govern for advising the Angat HEP Operator on water release
activities, issuance of notices on flood operation of the dam to related agencies,
general public and local officials implementing disaster preparedness plan and
conducting post flood analysis after occurrence of extreme floods. For emergency
situations, this document will take precedence over anything else.
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3.0 RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE EAP

1.6 General Responsibilities
1.6.1 National Power Corporation
The National Power Corporation (NPC) is the operator of the Angat Dam and Dyke.
NPC is responsible for maintaining the FFWSDO office and for executing flood
releases through the spillway under extraordinary conditions. PAGASA assists
NPC FFWSDO office by providing rainfall and weather alert information. NPC,
through the FFWSDO office is responsible for initiating and controlling the opening
and closing of the Angat Dam spillway gates.
The FFWSDO office is responsible for notifying the Ipo and Bustos dam Operators
of any potential hazard or scheduled releases at Angat Dam. The FFWSDO office
is responsible for the notification of flood warnings to the downstream Local
Government Units (LGUs), and residents in coordination with government agencies
(e.g. DPWH, OCD, PAGASA, DSWD).
NPC is responsible for the operations and maintenance of the Angat Dam and
Dyke to ensure their integrity and safety. It has the responsibility to operate the
dam in a manner that would, under all circumstances, meet sound engineering and
professional standards, and all guidelines associated with procedures in the Dam
Safety Program and Flood Forecasting Manuals. The procedures herein are based
on the New Zealand Society on Large Dams (NZSOLD).
Specifically, NPC’s overall responsibilities include:

 Development, testing, maintaining and implementing this plan.
 Complying with the detail of this emergency plans.
 Ensuring all staff involved in the operation of the Angat Dam and Dyke are
familiar with this plan, and the obligations it has.
 Retaining suitably trained staff and ensuring authorised staff are available to
competently assess potential emergency situations.
 Having facilities and procedures in place to give warnings to Provincial
Governor, the Chairperson of the Provincial Disaster Risk Reduction and
Management Office (PDRRMO), the National Disaster Risk Reduction and
Management Council (NDRRMC), and government agencies (such as
PAGASA) in the event of an emergency situation at the dam site.
 Monitoring the condition of the Dam, continuing with operation, maintenance
and corrective action as guided by the NPC Dam Safety Program Manual.
 Evaluating the significance of abnormal or dam related events and determining
if emergency conditions exist.
 Practicing caution while operating during abnormal and emergency conditions.
 Developing information sessions for downstream communities on how to
effectively follow the EAP without creating a fear of hazards.
 Creating working relationships with all involved with the emergency response.
10
 Responsible for designating an EAP coordinator who will implement all

activities related to an emergency.
 Establish relationships with local communities and government officials,
ensuring they are properly informed about Dam safety measures.
 Periodic updating of the EAP.
1.6.2 National Government
The National Government has the overall responsibility for organizing and
maintaining an adequate level of disaster preparedness for emergencies
throughout the Philippines. During the development phase of any major Philippines
project, the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) reviews the environmental impacts
and establishes the initial requirements for the preparation of emergency action
plans. The principal agency involved in disaster coordination is the National
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC). The NDRRMC
sets the guidelines for emergency preparedness and disaster operations that
involve rescue, relief, and rehabilitation. The NDRRMC provides the following:
 Guidelines to encourage and support local governments and industry and

initiation of coordinated emergency action plans at the local level in industrial
and developed areas;
 Dissemination of information about emergency preparedness and disaster
operations;
 Promotion and sponsorship of workshops, training seminars, and courses on
emergency preparedness;
 Provision of resources for the local community to respond effectively and
expeditiously to any emergency at the local level.
The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC)

coordinate all disaster management programs on a regional level. As such the
NDRRMC has field officers designated to each province and in the event of any
disaster; the NDRRMC coordinates with the National Government for rescue and
relief operations.
PAGASA maintains a flood forecasting and warning system during the wet season
and issues weather advisories and bulletins on a regular basis to local radio and
television stations and the internet.
The National Government establishes a working atmosphere conducive to

emergency action plans by providing the resources to ensure their successful
implementation.
1.6.3 Local Government
The Provincial Government of affected province and its LGU, in coordination with
other government agencies (such as NDRRMC, OCD, DPWH, DSWD, PHIVOLCS,
PAGASA and DENR), is responsible for safety, public health, and environmental
11
protection within the area responsibilities. The LGUs with the support of the
concerned agencies is responsible for notifying and evacuating those people who
live in areas that would be inundated by failure of dam or flood releases. Functions
relating to emergency preparedness and disaster operations are assigned
specifically to the Regional Disaster and Risk Reduction Management Council
(RDRRMC), the Provincial Disaster and Risk Reduction Management Office
(PDRRMO) and the Municipal Disaster and Risk Reduction Management Council
(MDRRMC) at their respective regional, provincial and municipal levels.
The Chairman of the RDRRMC is the Regional Director of the Office of Civil
Defence (OCD). The Regional Director coordinates the disaster operations in the
region and implements the guidelines set by the NDRRMC.
The Chairman of the PDRRMO and MDRRMC are the Governor and Mayor,
respectively. They are counterparts of the RDRRMC Chairman in the province and
municipality.
The PDRRMO Chairman is responsible for initiating appropriate actions based on

Emergency Notifications received from the Angat Dam. This responsibility includes
determining if and when an evacuation is required (see Section 4.4), and time
frame for the emergency termination.
Within each Government Agencies, several committees exist to handle the various
tasks. The additional responsibilities of Government Agencies are:
 Public awareness and mobilization of public support to emergency action
programs as part of the overall disaster preparedness programs of the
Province/Municipality/Barangay
 Training of personnel in emergency response
 Acquisition and mobilization of needed resources
 Implementing off-site activities of this EAP.
1.6.4 Barangay Community Leaders
Community leaders and non-government organizations, groups and associations,

including religious, community service, health, academic and business. These
representative leaders are responsible for:
 Addressing concerns related to their constituency to the local authorities,

including plans and programs to protect their habitat and health
 Providing leadership to train people on this EAP
 Assisting local support and participating in this EAP
 Assisting in evacuation efforts under the direction of the EAP authorities.
1.7 Responsibility For Notification
1.7.1 National Power Corporation
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As specified in the Notification Flowchart, Figure 1.2-1, the Plant Manager (Angat
Hydro-Electric Power Plant, AHEPP) assumes the role of the EAP Coordinator and
as soon the emergency event is observed or reported, immediately determine the
emergency classifications (see Section 4.4), and will initiate notification if an
emergency is declared. Similar to the Flood Warning Rule, notification shall be via
the land line telephones, mobile phone, fax and hand held radios. The major
responsibility of the EAP Coordinator is to contact and update of the situation to the
emergency response agencies with information concerning the emergency.
Upon declaration of an emergency, NPC will mobilize dam emergency organization

and if necessary, convene a panel of experts.
1.7.2 Government Agencies (e.g. NDRRMC, OCD, PAGASA, PHIVOLCS,

DENR, DPWH, DSWD, LGUs)
The representatives of the government agencies shall maintain the coordination

with the EAP Coordinator, local government, and communication with media
people regarding the emergency event reported. They will also be responsible to
participate in an annual review and update of EAP.
1.8 Responsibility For Evacuation
1.8.1 Outside and Downstream of the Angat Dam
The EAP coordinator shall contact the Chairman of PDRRMO and concerned
agencies to inform them the current condition of Angat Dam and an emergency
situation may require evaluation.
The Chairman of the PDRRMO serves as the primary contact person responsible
for initiating the timely and accurate decisions regarding warning and safe
evacuation of residents from the inundation-prone areas. The PDRRMO in
coordination with the MDRRMCs will implement an evacuation.
1.8.2 Within the Facility
The EAP Coordinator shall initiate a safe and timely evacuation of all the Angat
Dam personnel and site visitors.
In the event of an evacuation, all personnel, security, and visitors on site will
proceed to the emergency meeting point where the Plant Manager will account for
all Dam personnel and visitors on site at the time of evacuation. The emergency
evacuation point will be at the Administration Building Area.
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1.9 Responsibility for Duration, Security, Termination and Post

Review
1.9.1 Duration of Emergency
Over the duration of an emergency situation, the EAP Coordinator shall provide
emergency update reports to all concerned agencies as presented in the
notification flow chart.
1.9.2 Security
Security on site at Angat Dam shall be notified of the emergency situation and extra
precautions should be taken to protect the public and allow effective performance
of emergency response actions.
1.9.3 Termination of Emergency
There are two conditions requiring a termination of the emergency. One has to do
with emergency conditions at the dam and the other is related to the evacuation
and disaster response. The EAP coordinator, through coordination with the
government agencies (such as PHIVOLCS, PAGASA and LGU) and the FFWS
office, is responsible for making the decision that an emergency condition no longer
exists at the dam. The PDRRMO/MDRRMC Chairmen and the local Mayors’
offices are responsible for termination of the evacuation or disaster response
activities.
The National Power Corporation, Heads of Regional, Provincial and Municipal

DRRMCs and the concerned local government officials and agencies are
responsible and shall agree for termination of the emergency condition. It is the
responsibility of plant manager and government officials to notify the media that the
event has been terminated. Such news releases are expected to be a supplement
to other methods of notifying the public that the emergency has been terminated.
1.9.4 Post Review of Emergency
Following an emergency, NPC technical organization and panel of experts will

inspect the dam and conduct an evaluation and review that includes official
representatives from all concerned agencies as presented in Notification Flowchart
(Figure 1.2-1). The following should be discussed and evaluated in the after-action
review:
 Events before, during, and following the emergency
 Significant actions taken by each participant, and improvements practicable for
future emergencies
 All strengths and deficiencies found in procedures, materials, equipment,
staffing levels, and leadership
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The results of the after-action review should be documented in an evaluation report

chaired by the dam owner and used as a basis for revising the EAP.
1.10 EAP Coordinator Responsibility

The EAP Coordinator is the primary contact between the Dam and the emergency
response agencies. EAP Coordinator provide leadership to assure the EAP is
reviewed and updated annually, and is responsible for records, initial Notification,
updates and relaying information to both Dam personnel and emergency agencies.
The EAP Coordinator and representative are responsible for the follow-up and
provide dam emergency situation report to document the emergency event and
actions that were taken after the emergency has been terminated.
The EAP Coordinator may also initiate communications with external technical
experts for further assessment.
1.10.1 EAP Revisions and Updates
The EAP should be reviewed regularly by a committee from NPC, composed of

representatives from Angat HEPP, Dam Management Division (DMD),
Environmental Management Department (EMD), and Government Agencies
(NGOs, LGUs and community representatives). The Committee will conduct yearly
reviews and exercise of the EAP and its functionality, making updates as required
and upon emergency.
When an amendment or update is made, the Committee shall issue notices of

changes to all EAP recipients, including a full hard copy of the revised edition.
When a revision is made, the revision table at the beginning of this document must
reflect exactly what changes were made. In addition to including the date, page
number of edits, the footer shall be changed to reflect the “Version No. X and
revised dd/mm/yy”. This ensures all parties involved are clear about which version
is most current.
1.10.2 EAP Training & Frequency
The Plant Manager (EAP Coordinator) is in charge of and responsible for training
all Operator’s employees with the government agencies and local government
officials and representatives. The training will vary for different groups of
employees, depended on their role.
The training should occur quarterly, or when there are changes to the roles of staff.
Appropriate training is to be provided by their immediate supervisor on their new
roles and responsibilities during an emergency. Before the training begins,
representatives will visit the dam and familiarize with the dam site.
During the EAP training sessions, a focus should be placed on:

 Employee roles and responsibilities
15
 Plans and procedures

 Evacuation procedures on site and downstream
 Response to particular scenarios and emergency levels.
1.10.3 EAP Exercises
The EAP shall be simulated regularly in part or whole to test the efficiency of the
process, from Operator’s employees to the emergency agencies. Regular drills will
improve knowledge, awareness, and emergency preparedness skills. The Plant
Manager (EAP Coordinator) determines the frequency of these exercises, often at
unexpected times to simulate a real situation.
Areas to be monitored which are of specific concern during a drill are:

 Proper working of alarms, satellite phones, portable radios, fax
 Adherence to EAP procedures
 Emergency agencies, their availability and their response time
 Timeliness of evacuation and accountability of personnel on site at time of drill.
The exercises shall be documented, taking note of efficiency and areas of concern.
The Plant Manager shall relay this information on to the Committee to determine
whether recommendations shall be incorporated in the manual.
1.11 Damage Assessment

Damage assessment is an onsite evaluation of damage or loss caused by an
accident or natural event before filling a disaster declaration. It records the extent
of damage, what can be replaced, restored, or salvage, and time required for their
execution.
Procedures in conducting the damage assessment:
 Document the impact of the incident including emergency protective measures

and damage to dam structures, property and businesses and public
infrastructure.
 Document the initial assessment on appropriate Damage Assessment Forms.
 NPC Dam organizations and panel of experts shall provide recommendations to
the Plant Manager (EAP Coordinator) and owner.
 EAP Coordinator will notify concerned agencies and make a recommendation.
1.11.1 Damage Assessment Checklist
a.) Location of Damage Site

b.) Category – yellow, orange or red
c.) Name - damage assessment team
d.) Description of damage – accurate data on damage
e.) Latitude and Longitude – GPS data for damage site
f.) Impact – what are the consequences from the damages at the site
16
g.) List of Environmental issues, if applicable, at the damage site

h.) Documentation of photographs
i.) Estimated cost of damage
 List of total number of damage sites, the types of damage and
category;
 Potential funds for recovery
17
4.0 EMERGENCY IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION

1.12 Notification of Potential Emergency Situations
During the operation of the Angat Plant, NPC staff, specifically DMD staff, are
required to maintain surveillance and monitoring of the dam and dyke, including
reservoir level, as per the Dam Safety Program Manual. Upon recognition of a
potential problem with the dam, said staff shall, without delay, investigate the
cause, and proceed with the necessary actions and provide preliminary warning to
the Angat Plant Manager. It is the responsibility of the Plant Manager to declare
whether the situation is likely to lead to an Emergency Situation or not. Emergency
Situations and Unusual Occurrences are defined in Section 1.13 and 1.14
respectively.
1.13 Definitions of Emergency Situations

An Emergency Situation is an unexpected and sudden event that may endanger
the integrity of the dam or downstream property and/or life, and requires immediate
action. Emergency situations can include, but are not limited to:
 Failure by breaching or impending failure of the dam is the most serious
emergency requiring immediate action;
 Overtopping of the dam;
 Excessive seepage, or highly coloured seepage from any part of the dam and
it’s appurtenant structures;
 Failure or impending failure of the dam spillway;
 Earthquake; and
 Sabotage.
1.14 Definitions of Unusual Occurrences

An Unusual Occurrence is an event which takes place, or a condition that
develops, that is not normally encountered during routine operation of the Dam and
Dyke, and may endanger the structure. These include, but are not limited to:
 High inflows to the reservoir, or heavy rain in the catchments area.
 Reservoir level rising above RL.219 m
 Slumping, cracking or erosion of the dam or its abutments.
 New springs, boggy areas, or increased seepage.
 An increase in murky appearance of seepage flows from the dam or dyke.
 Damage to the upstream face due to unusually high winds and wave action.
 Inability to open the spillway gates.
 Blockage of the spillway.
18
 Total loss of power at the Angat Hydroelectric Facility.

 Incident associated with the dam or dyke operation likely to impact the
downstream environment.
1.15 Emergency Evaluation & Classification

Notification of emergency situations requires that a representative from DMD or
Angat HEP through closed coordination with DMD head office technical staff
initiates the remedial action and decide if and when an emergency should be
declared and the EAP executed. As an emergency situation develops, if no actions
are taken to prevent or mitigate the problem, the situation will likely intensify. For
this reason, it is important for the Operation Superintendent to classify and declare
the emergency level based on the classifications below.
For the purposes of these EAP guidelines, site emergencies are separated into
three levels, depending on the severity of the event that has occurred, or is
predicted to occur. The level of site emergency may change as more information
becomes available. The level of site emergency, including a dam failure
emergency classification and non-failure emergency classifications are provided:
1.15.1 YELLOW Site Emergency: Unusual Events
Yellow Site Emergency is not normal but has not yet threatened the operation or
structural integrity of the dam, but possibly could if it continues to develop (such as
Earthquakes). After this event occurs, NPC emergency organization and panel of
experts should conduct a dam inspection and investigate as per Dam Safety
Program Manual Inspection after Unusual Events’ criteria, and recommend actions
to take. Plant Manager (EAP Coordinator) should follow the Emergency
Notification Flowchart (Figure 1.2-1) if it is determined that the conditions may
require emergency actions).
1.15.2 ORANGE Site Emergency: Potential Failure Situation is Developing
An Orange Site Emergency will be declared when a situation develops where a

dam and/or dyke failure may eventually occur, but corrective actions taken during
certain events (such as major floods, earthquakes, evidence of seepage through
dam core) may mitigate the problem. The following are emergency situation under
this level:
a. Seepage or solid deposits are observed at the seepage exit points and
unusual increase in volume of downstream seepage. Transverse cracks
extending through the dam, abutments, or foundation;
b. Embankment Movement and Cracking – significant increase in length,
width of cracks in the crest, slope, abutments, and foundation of the dam
that may eventually result in breaching of the dam.
19
This situation can also be used when there is no danger for dam and/or dyke
failure, but extreme flooding possible occurs on downstream areas and
communities near the river bank, and initiate possible evacuations or road closures.
 Emergency Response teams at various levels from government agencies as

presented in the Emergency Notification Flowchart (Figure 1.2-1) and
downstream residents must be placed on alert; situation will be carefully
monitored by DMD together with Angat HEPP technical personnel and all
efforts will be made to mitigate the situation.
If time permits, the EAP Coordinator with the NPC Emergency Organization and
experts should evaluate the situation immediately and recommend remedial actions
to prevent failure of the dam. The EAP Coordinator must notify the downstream
LGUs and government agencies if the dam failure worsen and must change the
emergency level to evacuate the people at risk downstream.
1.15.3 RED Site Emergency: Failure is Imminent or has occurred
A Red Site Emergency will be declared when a situation where a dam and/or dyke
failure has either occurred, is occurring, or is just about to occur and cannot be
prevented, such as Embankment Overtopping. This level of emergency is for
situations when there is no time for dam owner to attempt corrective measures or
when mitigating measures implemented do not address the problem, the “failure is
imminent or has occurred”.
 Emergency Response Teams at various levels from government agencies as

presented in the Notification Flowchart initiate evacuation. Rapid response
is required. Communication through a transition from Level ORANGE
emergency to a Level RED emergency shall be smooth and efficient.
20
5.0 PREPAREDNESS
1.16 Preventive and Warning Systems
Preventing an emergency situation is the number one priority. Early mitigation of a
potential problem can save loss of life and property. Using best practices following
the Dam Safety Program and the Flood Forecasting Manuals could allow for early
detection and mitigation of a problem and avoid life loss and property damage.
In accordance with the Dam Safety Program Manual, the Plant Manager or the
Maintenance Manager shall ensure periodical inspection and maintenance of the
following:
a) Spillway gates
b) Hoisting equipment and control equipment necessary for spillway gates
Operation
c) Auxiliary diesel generator for spillway gates operation
d) Lighting system of the spillway gate operation and staff gauge reading
e) Portable radio telephone sets
f) Other equipment and facilities required for effective emergency operations
FFWSDO office at the Angat Dam is constantly monitoring rainfall upstream of

Angat Dam, at the Dam and also the changes in the reservoir water level. Upon
prediction of extreme weather by either PAGASA or FFWSDO and reservoir level
reaches the maximum normal high water level; alarms will sound and action will be
taken based on the Flood Operation Rule Manual.
1.17 Emergency Preparedness

The measures are in place for early detection, evaluation, classification and
notification of an emergency situation under this EAP. Staff planning and training
provide pivotal knowledge and confidence during an emergency situation, ensuring
all plant employees and emergency agencies know their role as well as the role of
another in case of absence.
Preparedness includes all actions from the observation and recording of dam
conditions, monitoring the development of an emergency situation, and taking
actions to mitigate or control the further development of the situation through
identifying the cause and/or repairing the damage.
In order to limit the impacts and damage resulting from an emergency situation, the
key documents used for Emergency planning and prevention are:
- Flood Forecasting and Warning Documents
 Flood Operation Rule
 Flood Warning Manual
21
 Dam Discharge Warning Manual

- Dam Discharge Protocol (Reservoir Operation Rule)
- Dam Safety Program Manual.
1.18 Site Access

The main access is from the Provincial Road passing Barangay Bigti in
Norzagaray, going up to the Angat HEP Administration Building, Barangay San
Lorenzo within the municipality of Norzagaray also. Access to the spillway or dam
crest can be from the main access road from the Administration Building going
down to the main dam right abutment which also gives access to the dyke crests.
1.19 Response During Power Supply Failure

Actions are to be taken to illuminate the spillway operating platform, access to the
emergency generators, the dam crest and any other potentially stressed area of the
dam. The Angat Hydro Facility should be equipped with emergency lighting and
back-up generators for key components of the dam operations.
NPC will ensure that there is adequate emergency lighting at the dam site to
undertake the listed emergency actions in this plan during dam break.
In the event of a power failure, the emergency radio should be used to contact the
Flood Forecasting Center, and also local government units and agencies as stated
in Section 1.2 Contact Numbers.
Wherever possible, two people should attend to an Emergency Situation or

Unusual Occurrence at the site during dam break. For employee safety and dam
safety, contact must be maintained at a minimum hourly interval using handheld
radio providing situation updates. Flash lights are basic issue for such situations.
1.20 Response During Periods of Adverse Weather

The relative remoteness of the Angat Dam could make outside emergency access
difficult during adverse weather conditions such as heavy rains or high winds.
Although operating staff are positioned very close to the dam, caution must be
exercised and suitable vehicles utilized when moving on site or when notifying
downstream residents of an emergency or possible emergency situation.
Wherever possible, two people should attend to an Emergency Situation or

Unusual Occurrence at the site during periods of adverse weather. For employee
safety and dam safety, contact must be maintained at a minimum hourly interval
using handheld radio providing situation updates.
22
Communication from the site could be significantly more difficult during periods of
adverse weather, therefore it is important that all systems are regularly checked
throughout any emergency situation or unusual occurrence and that care is taken
to ensure messages are correctly received.
1.21 Response During Weekends and Holidays

In the event of an emergency during the weekend or a holiday, the responsibilities
of the Angat Dam staff and Notification procedures remain the same. The available
staff on site will initiate preventive or mitigation actions, with the Operation
Superintendent taking on the role of the EAP Coordinator. As soon as possible
after identification of a potential emergency situation or abnormal condition, all on
call personnel and the Plant Manager will be notified along with responses
consistent with the notification chart and this report.
1.22 Communication Systems

The following communication systems are available to be utilized throughout any
Emergency Situation or Unusual Occurrence:
 A fixed land line with a fax and phone at the site office, downstream LGUs and
agency officials/representatives, otherwise via mobile phone and two-way radio
as a back-up.
 Open channel radio telephone network which will be available for use during an
Emergency Situation or Unusual Occurrence.
NPC will ensure these communication systems are maintained and remain
operational as far as reasonably possible.
The relevant voice and fax communication telephone numbers are detailed in
Section 1.2.
In case of failure of the primary systems of communications, the following

alternative systems of communications may be referred to:
1. VHF / UHF radio;
1.23 Emergency Supplies and Information
1.23.1 Special Equipment
Special Equipment in the form of earth moving machinery may be required under
certain Emergency Situations or Unusual Occurrences. This equipment is large
and will take time to mobilize; therefore an allowance must be made for the time it
23
will take to reach the site. Equipment located in the vicinity of the dam should be
utilized wherever possible.
Further equipment that may be required in the event of emergency:
a. Bulldozers
b. Excavators
c. Front-end Loaders
d. Backhoes
e. Graders
f. Dump Trucks
1.23.2 Supplies and Materials
Rock Riprap, sandbags and other construction materials should be prepared and in
proper location in case of emergency occur.
1.23.3 Emergency Power Supply
Power is supplied to the dam operating plant through the Angat Plant switchyard.
The switchyard lies downstream and on the right side of the dam. It is possible that
during some of the Emergency Situations and Unusual Occurrences envisaged,
power connections to the site will be lost.
In the event of a power failure, NPC will restore power supply to the site as quickly
as possible, however during certain emergency conditions this may result in a
considerable amount of time with no power. In this situation, NPC connect the
onsite generator or arrange for the rental and connection of a portable generator of
sufficient capacity to maintain the essential plant and monitoring equipment.
24
6.0 INUNDATION MAPS

1.24 Introduction
Inundation maps have been created as part of the Dam Break analysis completed
by EDCOP and Tonkin & Taylor International (Phils.), Inc. These maps identify
areas downstream of the Angat Dam and Dyke that are subject to flooding in the
event of a rapid dam failure. The dam break analysis report is a document
separate to this which was developed to simulate actual flooding downstream of
the facility.
Topographical information for the Angat River from the sea to Angat is limited to
the following:
 1:50,000 topography maps with 20m contours
 Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM). The SRTM data sets are a subset
of those recorded by NASA, NIMA and the German and Italian space agencies
whose aim is to generate a near-global DEM of the Earth using radar
interferometry. The SRTM data has a grid resolution of approximately 90m by
90m in the area of interest.
The vertical and horizontal accuracy of the SRTM topographical data is largely
unknown since validation data is not available. The 1:50,000 topographical map
should have vertical accuracy better than ± 20 m.
The flood inundation maps are shown in Appendix A.
1.25 Flood Hazard Classification

The potentially inundated area from a dam break, as shown in the flood inundation
maps in Appendix A, constitutes the flood hazard zone. All of flood hazard zone is
classified as high hazard floodway.
It must be noted that, as a result of the limited accuracy of the base topographical
data and mapping, there may be additional areas in the river valley not indicated on
the maps which are in the flood hazard zone. These are areas with ground
elevation below the peak flow depths (above the normal river level) indicated in
Section 1.26.
1.26 Use of Inundation Maps

The flood inundation maps attached in Appendix A show the area of inundation
developed for disaster preparedness for the Angat Dam. Table 3 shows the travel
time of the flood wave and Table 2 shows the maximum water depths, both for
Dam and Dyke scenarios.
25
Table 2 shows the modelled peak water level rise whilst Table 3 shows travel time
in the Angat River from Angat dam and Dyke scenarios to the sea in the event of a
dry weather failure of Angat dam or dyke. Note that the travel time is the time
taken for a flow increase at Angat dam or dyke to be noticed at a given
downstream location. Typically, the total available warning time will be significantly
longer.
Table 2. Angat Dam breach results- peak water level rise
Maximum water level rise

above normal river level (m)
Chainage
Section Location Angat Dam Angat Dyke
(km)
Sunny Day Failure Sunny Day Failure
(Scenario 1) (Scenario 1)
0 Angat Dam 48 17
0
12.1 Bitbit Bridge 43 19

1
36.0 Angat DRT Bridge 21.3 11.2

2
48.0 Bustos Dam 21.1 5.8

3
Gen. Alejo Santos

51.0 14.8 11.7
4 Bridge
60.6 New Plaridel Bridge 10.6 9.1

5
69 NLEX Bridge 5.3 5.1

6
74 Labangan Bridge 2.3 1.8

7
78.2 Bridge to Iba-Ibayo 3.2 2.6

8
Paombong-Hagonoy
81.2 2.4 2.9
9 Bridge
26
Table 3. Angat Dam breach results-travel times
Sunny day failure of Sunny day failure of

Angat Dam Angat Dyke
Chainage Elapsed time Elapsed Elapsed time Elapsed

Section Location for flood for flood
(km) time for time for
wave to first flood peak wave to first flood peak
arrive to occur arrive to occur Tp
Ts (hr) Tp (hr) Ts (hr) (hr)
0 0 Angat Dam 0 2.3 0 1.0

1 12.1 Bitbit Bridge 0.7 2.4 1.0 1.7
2 36.0 Angat DRT Bridge 1.8 3.0 1.9 2.8
3 48.0 Bustos Dam 2.4 3.5 2.5 3.7
Gen. Alejo Santos Br.
4 51.0 (Bustos-Baliwag) 2.6 4.0 3.2 4.8
Bridge
New Plaridel Bridge 5.4
5 60.6 2.7 4.2 7.0
(Sto.Cristo, Pulilan) (95%)*
5.8
6 69 Tibag (NLEX) Bridge 3.9 5.8 7.2
(95%)*
Labangan Bridge- 6.5
7 74 5.2 7.0 8.2
Bagbag Bridge (80%)*
8 78.2 Bridge to Iba-Ibayo 12.5 14 (80%)* 14.7 16.8 (80%)
Paombong-Hagonoy 17.7
9 81.2 15 15 16.3 (80%)
Bridge (80%)*
Due to uncertainty regarding elevations in the topographical data, it is considered

that the water depth (from cross section invert level to peak water level) may be a
more pragmatic and accurate parameter for emergency planning than the water
surface elevation. To be safe, the maximum water level should be estimated by
adding the peak water depth into the river level in a normal of low flow condition.
The associated Dam break Analysis report should be read in conjunction with this
map. Upon further developments, more accurate/detailed topographical data and
aerial photographs, changes in catchments conditions and/or land development,
the inundation maps may need to be reassessed.
Any use, application or extension of this information should be done in coordination

with PSALM.
27
1.26.1 Disclaimer
As the flood wave from a dam breach scenario approaches the downstream
reservoir, the peak water depth is largely controlled by the operation of the
reservoir. The dam breach assessment has been based on conservative
assumptions of reservoir operation and therefore quoted water depths near the
downstream reservoirs would be less if the spillways are operational and/or the
water level in the reservoir is dropped before the flood wave arrives.
The travel times indicated in the results are the time from the start of the dam
breach to the time that water levels start to increase at downstream locations.
Please note that this is not a determination of warning time since warning time is
determined from the time at which the alarm can first be raised, which is likely to be
later than the start time of the dam breach.
There is uncertainty regarding the vertical and horizontal accuracy of the

topographical data and it is therefore recommended that water depth may be a
more important parameter for emergency planning. A more reliable indication of
water elevation would be possible if the Angat River model was updated with
detailed topographical information obtained from survey of the Angat River and its
floodplain.
The flood levels and water depths indicated in the Table 2 and 3 are indicative of a
dry weather dam break scenario of Angat dam and are not necessarily
representative of the peak flood levels that could theoretically occur.
28
7.0 SUPPORTING INFORMATION

1.27 Dam Details
Angat Hydroelectric scheme forms an impoundment on the Angat River and its
tributaries in the Bulacan Province, Republic of the Philippines. The nearest city,
Manila, is approximately 60 km or 1.5hrs drive away.
The main embankment is a central core rockfill dam and reaches a maximum
height of some 131 m above the bed of the Angat River and is 368 m in length. A
gated ogee spillway is located at the left abutment ridge; with a steep chute and it
bend discharging into the Angat River. The PMF reservoir routing is shown in
Figure 7.1-1. The existing power station intake is located to the left of the
embankment and is connected via the power tunnel to a valve chamber and
surface power house. Further along the left abutment ridge are two dykes, also
central core rockfill with maximum height 52 m.
The Angat reservoir has a design live storage capacity of 850 MCM when full, but
due to siltation over the years, the 2008 live storage capacity has been reduced to
approximately 840 MCM (Watershed Erosion and Reservoir Sedimentation Study
of Angat Hydroelectric Power Plant, EDCOP). The Height vs. Storage relationship
is shown in Figure 7.1-2. For the purposes of emergency planning it is important
for emergency services to know the volume that is retained by the dam at each
level of the reservoir.
Angat Spillway - PMF Routing

14000 232
12000 Inflow 228

Main S/W
Level
10000 Dam Crest 224
Flow (cumecs)
Level (Rl m)
8000 220
6000 216
4000 212
2000 208
0 204
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
Time (hours)
Figure 7.1-1. Angat PMF Reservoir Routing
29
Figure7.1-2. Angat Reservoir Height vs Storage Curve
1.27.1 Downstream Dams
Including the Angat Dam and Dyke, there are currently 3 dams cascading the
Angat River. The Ipo Dam is located approximately 7.5 km downstream of Angat
Dam, in Bulucan province. Ipo Dam has a reservoir capacity of 5.9 MCM which is
used to divert water to treatment plants.
The Bustos dam for irrigation and owned by NIA and is approximately 45km
downstream of Angat.
1.27.2 Operation Standards
Angat HEP operates based from the Approved Reservoir Operation Rule of the
National Water Resources Board (NWRB). It is NWRB’s responsibility, in
coordination with the TWG composed of representatives from NPC, NIA, MWSS,
MWCI and MWSI, to allocate water releases for domestic water supply, irrigation
and power generation. During water shortage, domestic water supply has the
highest priority over irrigation and power generation.
NPC can generate power only based from the water requirement and irrigation
diversion requirement of MWSS and NIA, respectively. NWRB approves the water
allocation for MWSS and NIA on a timothy, bimonthly and monthly period and if
necessary on a semi-monthly or weekly period.
Additional power can be generated only by NPC, if a prior approval has been
issued by NWRB, this is when the reservoir level reaches above the Higher Rule
Curve and the occurrence of more heavy rainfalls are expected to come in the
coming weeks or months.
30
1.28 Major Risks - General

Flooding constitutes a serious natural hazard in the Luzon. Heavy tropical rains
and typhoons can cause very high flows in the rivers leading into the Angat.
There are active faults in the area, including but not limited to the Valley Fault
System, the Lubang Fault Zone, Manila Trench and the Philippine Fault Zone.
Three of the most active faults around the Philippines are the Philippine Fault Zone,
the Manila Trench, and the Philippine Trench, of which the Philippine Fault Zone
lies very close to the dam as shown in Figure 7.4-1.
1.29 Heavy Rainfall Monitoring & Flood Forecasting

The northern Luzon region is known for heavy rainfall, typhoons, flooding and land
slides associated with heavy rain. Due to its steep sloped catchments, retention
time is very low. The dry season for this area extends from November to late June
and a wet season the remainder of the year.
The region around Angat is capable of and has experienced 76 mm/hr intensity
rainfall events. This intensity has the ability to cause flooding upstream and
downstream of Angat as well as potential landslides blocking access roads to the
site.
1.30 Earthquake Risk

The Philippines is located in an area of active seismicity with significant earthquake
generating faults throughout the country. These areas are of significant risk as
they have produced repeated movements in the past.
Figure 7.4-1 shows the locations of major active faults in the region of the Angat
dam complex.
This region around Angat Dam is capable and has experienced earthquakes with a
magnitude of 7.8 on the Richter Scale. This was demonstrated by the 1990
earthquake near Baguio which recorded 7.8 on the Richter Scale and caused no
damages to the dam structure. This magnitude has the ability to cause serious
damage to the Angat Dam and Dyke.
31
Figure 7.4-1. Location of major active faults in the region of Angat Dam
(source - Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology,

http://www.phivolcs.dost.gov.ph).
32
8.0 GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Abutment - That part of the valley side against which the dam is
constructed. The left and right abutments of dams are defined
with the observer looking downstream from the dam.
Appendices - contain information that supports and supplements the
material used in the development and maintenance of the EAP.
Breach - An opening through the dam that allows draining of the
reservoir. A controlled breach is an intentionally constructed
opening. An uncontrolled breach is an unintended failure of the
dam.
Cross section - A slice through the dam showing elevation vertically and
direction of natural water flow horizontally from left to right. Also,
a slice through a spillway showing elevation vertically and left
and right sides of the spillway looking downstream.
Dam - An artificial barrier generally constructed across a watercourse
for the purpose of impounding or diverting water.
Dam failure - The uncontrolled release of a dam’s impounded water.
Dam Height - A dam’s height is the vertical distance between the lowest
point on the dam crest and the lowest point in the original
streambed measured at the toe of the dam
Dam Operator - The person(s) or unit(s) of government with responsibility for
the operation and maintenance of dam.
Department of Social - is the agency responsible for the distributing social services to
Welfare and Development the Filipino people. Provides government relief operations
(DSWD) during incidents of calamities.
Drain, toe or foundation - A water collection system of sand and gravel and typically
pipes along the downstream portion of the dam to collect
seepage and convey it to a safe outlet.
Emergency - A condition that develops unexpectedly, endangers the
structural integrity of the dam and/or downstream human life
and property, and requires immediate action.
Emergency Action Plan - is a formal document that identifies potential emergency
(EAP) conditions at a dam and specifies pre-planned actions to be
followed to minimize property damage and loss of life. It
contains procedures and information to assist the license in
issuing early warning and notification messages to responsible
downstream emergency management authorities of the
emergency situation. It also contains inundation maps to show
the emergency management authorities the critical areas that
33
require action in case of emergency.

Emergency Detection, - Early detection and evaluation of the situation(s) or triggering
Evaluation, and event(s) that initiates or requires an emergency action is
Classification crucial. The establishment of procedures for reliable and timely
classification of an emergency situation is imperative to ensure
that appropriate course of action is taken based on the urgency
of the situation. It is better to activate the EAP while confirming
the extent of the emergency, than waiting for the emergency to
fully develop.
Emergency of dam - is defined as an impending or actual sudden failure of the dam
operation or other water retaining structures, release of water caused by
heavy rains upstream, or the result of an impending flood
condition.
Gate, slide or sluice - An operable, watertight valve to manage the discharge of
water from the dam.
Hazard classification - A system that categorizes dams (high, significant, or low)
according to the degree of their potential to create adverse
incremental consequences such as loss of life, property
damage, or environmental impacts of a failure or disoperation
of a dam.
Height, dam - The vertical distance between the lowest point along the top of
the dam and the lowest point at the downstream toe, which
usually occurs in the bed of the outlet channel.
Hydrograph - Inflow or a graphical representation of either the flow rate or
flow depth at a specific outflow, or breach point above or
below the dam over time for a specific flood occurrence.
Instrumentation - An arrangement of devices installed into or near dams that
provide measurements to evaluate the structural behaviour and
other performance parameters of the dam and appurtenant
structures.
Inundation area or map - The geographic area downstream of the dam that would be
flooded by a breach of the dam or other large discharge.
Notification - To immediately inform appropriate individuals, organizations,
or agencies about a potentially emergency situation so they can
initiate appropriate actions.
Notification Flowchart - A notification flowchart shows whose is to be notified, by
whom, and in what order. The information in the notification
flowchart is required for timely notification of those responsible
for taking emergency actions.
National Disaster Risk - was established to pursue disaster prevention and risk
Reduction Management reduction. It reports updates on the effects and preparedness
Council (NDRRMC) measures of disaster situation such as typhoons, earthquakes,
34
etc.
Philippine Atmospheric - is an agency under the Department of Science and
Geophysical Astronomical Technology (DOST) that provides real-time updates about
Services Administration weather and typhoon alerts.
(PAGASA)
Philippine Institute of - is a services institute of the DOST. The agency is tasked to
Volcanology and mitigate disasters that may arise from earthquake and other
Seismology (PHIVOLCS) related geotectonic phenomena.
Probable Maximum Flood - The theoretically greatest precipitation or resulting flood that is
meteorologically feasible for a given duration over a specific
drainage area at a particular geographical location.
Reservoir - The body of water impounded or potentially impounded by the
dam.
Responsibility - A determination of responsibility for EAP - related tasks
should be made during the development of the plan. EAP
Coordinators, LGUs and concerned agencies are responsible
for developing, maintaining, and implementing the EAP. This
includes notifying appropriate emergency management officials
when a dam failure is imminent, a potentially hazardous
situation is developing, or large releases are expected. State
and local emergency management officials having statutory
obligation are responsible for warning and evacuation within
affected areas. The EAP must be site-specific, since conditions
at and downstream of all dams are different.
Riprap - A layer of large rock, precast blocks, bags of cement, or other
suitable material, generally placed on an embankment or along
a watercourse as protection against wave action, erosion, or
scour.
Risk - A measure of the likelihood and severity of an adverse
consequence.
Seepage - The natural movement of water through the embankment,
foundation, or abutments of the dam.
Slide - The movement of a mass of earth down a slope on the
embankment or abutment of the dam.
Spillway - The appurtenant structure that provides the controlled
conveyance of excess water through, over, or around the dam.
Spillway capacity - The maximum discharge the spillway can safely convey with
the reservoir at the maximum design elevation.
Spillway crest - The lowest level at which reservoir water can flow into the
spillway.
Toe of dam - The junction of the upstream or downstream face of an
35
embankment with the ground surface.

Top of dam (crest of dam) - The elevation of the uppermost surface of an embankment
which can safely impound water behind the dam.
36
9.0 FORMS
37
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION
EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM

Angat Hydroelectric Power Plant
Date : _____________
Time : _____________
To Whom It May Concern:
Since one of the Emergency Conditions, checked below, exists, we are requesting for
your immediate action.
o YELLOW – to be declared after or during unusual events (e.g. Earthquakes). After

one of these events occurs, a Dam Inspection shall take place as per NPC Dam
Safety Program Manual Criteria.
o ORANGE – to be declared when a situation develops where a failure may

eventually occur, but corrective actions taken during certain events i.e., Major Floods,
Earthquakes, Evidence of Seepage through dam core may mitigate the problem.
Emergency Response Teams at various levels to be placed on ALERT.
o RED – to be declared when a situation where a failure has either occurred, is

occurring or is just about to occur. Emergency Response Teams at various levels
INITIATE EVACUATION.
Reservoir Level : _______________ Previous Hour Res. Level : ___________
Remarks : _______________________________________________ ____

_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________.
_______________________________
EAP COORDINATOR
Sign over Printed Name
38
Consulting Services for the Study of Angat Dam EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN
and Dyke Safety Appendices
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION
TERMINATION OF EMERGENCY
Angat Dam and Dyke
Ref. No. : ___________

Date : ______________
Time : ______________
To Whom It May Concern:
We are Terminating our previously declared Emergency Condition/s, checked

below, after our thorough assessment/evaluation, coordination with other concerned
agencies and/or consultation with dam experts:
o YELLOW
o ORANGE
o RED
Remarks, if
any :_______________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
____.
_______________________________
EAP COORDINATOR
Sign over Printed Name
39
Corporation of the Philippines
T & T Philippines
Appendix A:
Flood Inundation
Figure 1 - Simulated maximum inundation depth during a hypothetical sunny day

failure of Angat Dam
Figure 2 - Simulated maximum inundation depth during a hypothetical sunny day

failure of Angat Dyke
Figure 3 - Maximum Velocities of Angat Dam Break
Figure 4 - Maximum Velocities of Angat Dyke Break
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T & T Philippines
Figure1. Simulated maximum inundation depth during a hypothetical sunny day failure of Angat Dam
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T & T Philippines
Figure2. Simulated maximum inundation depth during a hypothetical sunny day failure of Angat Dyke
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T & T Philippines
Figure3. Maximum Velocities of Angat Dam Break
2
T & T Philippines
Figure4. Maximum Velocities of Angat Dyke Break
3
T & T Philippines
Appendix B:
TRAINING, UPDATING, REPORTING

AND POSTING EAP
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T & T Philippines
1. Training
Training of people involved in implementation of the EAP should be conducted to

ensure that they are thoroughly familiar with all elements of the plan, the availability
of equipment, and their responsibilities and duties under the plan.
Technically qualified personnel should be trained in problem detection and

evaluation and appropriate remedial (emergency and non-emergency) measures.
This training is essential for proper evaluation of developing situations at all levels
of responsibility which, initially, is usually based on on-site observations. A
sufficient number of people should be trained to ensure adequate coverage at all
times.
A training plan could be included in the Appendix B to the EAP. Exercises

simulating emergency conditions are excellent mechanisms for ensuring readiness.
Cross-training in more than one responsible position for each individual is
advisable to provide alternates. A careful record by roster should be kept of training
completed and refresher training conducted.
2. Updating
The EAP should be updated promptly after each change in involved personnel or
their telephone numbers, or after completion of a scheduled exercise.
A review of the adequacy of the EAP should be conducted at intervals not to
exceed 1 year. During the review, an evaluation of any changes in flood inundation
areas, downstream developments, or in the reservoir should be made to determine
whether any revisions to the current EAP (including inundation maps) are
necessary.
Reviews should be conducted on or about the same date each year. If no revision
is necessary, a statement that the review was made and no revision to the EAP
was necessary should be provided to each recipient of the original EAP.
Copies of any revisions that do result from updating the EAP or from periodic
exercises of the EAP should be furnished to all individuals to whom the original
EAP was distributed, as shown at the beginning of this document. Confirmation
should be provided by all parties involved that they have received the updated
EAP.
3. Posting of the Notification Flowchart.
An up-to-date copy of the notification flowchart should be posted in prominent

locations at the dam site and local emergency operations center (essential for
unattended dams), as appropriate.
The flowchart should be posted at each phone and radio transmitter at the dam,
powerhouse and at all other desirable locations.
2
T & T Philippines
A copy of the complete, up-to-date EAP should also be available to personnel at

the dam and to local officials. All personnel shall be made aware of the location of
each copy of the EAP onsite. Key personnel should obtain a copy of this EAP for
their residence.
4. Report on EAP Exercises.
The following is a suggested format for reporting on EAP exercises:
A. Purpose of Exercise
B. Initiated By:
C. Design of Exercise:
 Brief description of process, set-up and actions followed.
D. Exercise Efficiency:
 Summary of effectiveness. Debrief with staff.

 Incorporate personnel comments on efficiency.
 Comment on timeliness during exercise, overall team capability to notify the
appropriate agencies and follow the procedures.
E. Results and Lessons Learnt
F. Follow-Up Actions
G. Summary and Recommendations
Appendices
 List of participants
 Narrative record of events
 Written critiques from personnel
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Appendix C:
DAM BREAK STUDY SUMMARY
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T & T Philippines
Tonkin & Taylor International (Phils), Inc (T&TI) in association with Engineering
Development Corporation of the Philippines (EDCOP) were commissioned in 2011 by Power
Sector Assets and Liability Management (PSALM) Corporation to complete a dam break
study and prepare maps of the resulting inundation for the Angat Dam and Dyke. The report
which resulted presents the dam break analysis and associated inundation mapping for the
Angat Dam and Angat Dyke. This summary is included in the EAP for information.
It is important to note that the dam break analysis is hypothetical and entirely divorced from
the chances of a dam failure ever occurring. The analysis was undertaken primarily to
assess the downstream hazard potential and for emergency response planning in case of
significant risk of dam break. It also provides a planning tool to allow the dam owners to
understand the nature of the hazard posed by the dams to downstream communities.
The main findings and key conclusions are summarised as follows:
 A fully developed breach at the tallest section of the Angat Dam embankment, which is
over the original river bed, can generate a peak flow of about 220,000 m3/s in a sunny
day failure.
 A separate dam break analysis has been carried out for the Angat Dyke. The likelihood
of its failure is considered to be greater than of Angat Dam because the Dyke lies over a
fault splay of the West Valley Fault. A peak breach outflow of 32,000 m3/s has been
estimated for a fully developed breach at Angat Dyke in a sunny day failure.
 A Mike11 one-dimensional (1D) hydrodynamic model was developed for modelling the
flood wave from Angat Dam up to reservoir of the Bustos Dam. Downstream of Bustos
Dam, a Mike21 two-dimensional (2D) hydrodynamic model was developed for
simulating the flood wave movement and lateral spread across the very wide and flat
floodplain all the way to Manila Bay.
 It is reasonable to assume that the Bustos Dam will not survive a dam break of the
Angat Dam, thus a cascade failure of both the Angat and Bustos dams has been
modelled. A similar assumption has been made in the case of the Angat Dyke dam
break even though it is possible that the concrete dam portion of the Bustos Dam may
remain in place. Ipo Dam is also unlikely to survive in the flood wave from an Angat
Dam failure, particularly the superstructure above the level of the concrete dam
spillcrest. It has therefore been modelled as a weir in the failure analysis of both the
Angat Dam and Angat Dyke.
 In terms of the sensitivity of the peak dambreak flow and downstream flood severity to
the assumed breach parameters, it was found that:
o the peak outflow from Angat Dam is moderately sensitive to the potential range of
breach parameters, with estimates ranging between 140,000 m3/s and 220,000
m3/s
o at the Angat Dyke, the peak outflow is not sensitive to the assumed breach
development time; the modelled peak outflows lie in a narrow range between
30,000 m3/s and 33,000 m3/s
o the precise shape and “peakiness” of the breach outflow hydrograph from the
Angat Dam or Angat Dyke is not critical because of the rapid attenuation
(flattening) of the flood peak as the flood wave propagates downstream; for
example, the peak inflow to Bustos Dam from a sunny day failure of the Angat
Dam is between 88,000 m3/s and 103,000 m3/s compared with peak dambreak
flows of 140,000 m3/s to 220,000 m3/s respectively at the toe of the dam.
2
T & T Philippines
 The modelling shows a general trend of reducing flow and hydraulic effects from dam
break with increasing distance downstream from the dams through in-channel and
floodplain storage attenuation. For example, the peak water level rise from a sunny day
failure of the Angat Dam at the New Plaridel Bridge is about 10 m compared with a peak
water level rise at the dam of about 48 m.
 The elapsed time for the dam break flood wave to first arrive and for the peak flow/depth
to occur at specific downstream locations has been estimated. For example, the flood
wave from a sunny day failure of Angat Dam is predicted to take about 5.2 hours from
breach initiation to first arrive at the Labangan Bridge near Calumpit and a further 1.3
hours to reach its peak. This information provides an indication of the available warning
times, which should be included in the Emergency Action Plan for the Angat Dam.
 Maps of the maximum inundation depth for the Angat Dam and Angat Dyke sunny day
failures, which include the full extent of the flood path to the sea, have been produced
using the 1:250,000 map series by NAMRIA as a base map.
The modelling indicates that the dam break flood wave will not only affect the areas near the
Angat River, but spread and occupy vast areas well beyond the Angat River channel, and
extend both upstream and downstream into the floodplain of the Pampanga River. In a
sunny day failure of Angat Dam, the northernmost extent of the inundated area in the
Pampanga River floodplain is predicted to extend up to about 27 km north of Bustos Dam.
Inundation from a sunny day failure of Angat Dyke covers a significantly smaller area but
would still extend up to about 13 km north of Bustos Dam within the Pampanga River
floodplain.
3
T & T Philippines

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EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN (EAP)

ANGAT DAM AND DYKE

Verification by Owner & Operator

Plant Manager, Angat HEP

OIC, Dams Management Department - NPC

AMENDMENT RECORD SHEET

Amendment Effective Subject Pages Signed

1 12.02.2012 Revision 1st Draft

2 30.04.2012 Revision 2nd Draft

3 13.09.2012 Revision 3rd Draft

4 19.09.2012 Revision 4th Draft

CPF - Common Purpose Facilities

DPWH - Department of Public Works and Highways

DMD - Dam Management Division

DSWD - Department of Social Welfare and Development

EAP - Emergency Action Plan

EDCOP - Engineering Development Corporation of the Philippines

LGU - Local Government Unit

MWCI - Manila Water Company Inc.

MWSI - Maynilad Water Services Inc .

MWSS - Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System

NGCP - National Grid Corporation of the Philippines

NIA - National Irrigation Administration

NPC - National Power Corporation

NZSOLD - New Zealand Society on Large Dams

OCD - Office of Civil Defense

PAGASA - Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services

PDRRMO - Provincial Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office

PHIVOLCS - Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology

PSALM - Power Sector Assets & Liabilities Management Corporation

T&T Phils. - Tonkin & Taylor International Limited (Phils.)

NLEX - North Luzon Expressway

EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN

Revision No.: _____

COMPANY/AGENCY PERSONNEL DATE SIGNATURE

1. National Power Corporation (NPC)

2. Power Sector Assets & Liabilities Management

3. National Irrigation Administration (NIA)

4. Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System

5. Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and

6. Common Purpose Facilities (CPF)

7. Maynilad Water Services Inc (MWSI)

8. Manila Water Company Inc (MWCI)

9. Flood Forecasting Warning System for Dam

10. Department of Public Works and Highways

11. Office of Civil Defense (OCD)

12. Philippine Institute of Volcanology and

13. Provincial Government of Bulacan - PDRRMO

14. Engineering Development Corporation of the

15. Tonkin & Taylor International Limited (Phils.)

6.0 INUNDATION MAPS 25

Appendix A: Flood Inundation Maps

1.2 Notification Flowchart

The Plant Manager is designated as the Emergency Action Plan (EAP)

The Notification Form included in this section is to be completed during an

Table 1. Contact Number

ORGANIZATION LOCATION NAME OFFICE PHONE OFFICE FAX MOBILE

ORGANIZATION LOCATION NAME OFFICE PHONE OFFICE FAX MOBILE

Office of Civil Defense

North Luzon Expressway (NLEX)

ORGANIZATION LOCATION NAME OFFICE PHONE OFFICE FAX MOBILE

ORGANIZATION LOCATION NAME OFFICE PHONE OFFICE FAX MOBILE

Note : * - No-one is answering ** - Not available.