Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Series Editor
Thomas Risse
Otto Suhr Institute for Political Science
Freie Universität Berlin
Berlin, Germany
This ground-breaking monograph series showcases cutting edge research
on the transformation of governance in countries with weak state institu-
tions. Combing theoretically informed and empirically grounded scholar-
ship, it challenges the conventional governance discourse which is biased
towards modern developed nation states. Instead, the series focuses on
governance in Africa, Asia and Latin America including transnational and
trans-regional dimensions. Located at the intersection of global gover-
nance and international relations, on the one hand, and comparative pol-
itics, area studies, international law, history, and development studies, on
the other, this innovative series helps to challenge fundamental assump-
tions about governance in the social sciences.
Governance
and Societal
Adaptation in Fragile
States
Editors
John Idriss Lahai Helen Ware
University of New England Development Practice
Armidale, Australia University of New England
Armidale, Australia
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
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Contents
Introduction 1
Helen Ware and John Idriss Lahai
v
vi CONTENTS
Index 269
Notes on Contributors
vii
viii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
This book is concerned with governance in fragile states and how societies
adapt to the challenging conditions they face. A common feature of many
of the chapters is the extent to which they address familiar issues from
new viewpoints. A number of the authors have demonstrated courage in
addressing issues of abuse of power and corruption which are difficult
themes for those who want to go on living in the countries they write
about. Whilst Westerners may be constrained by libel laws, Africans and
other researchers in areas where the rule of law is at best selective may
face a range of acute disincentives from threats to their chances of future
promotion or employment to actual physical assaults by the supporters of
those who feel their privileges and illicit gains to be under attack.
Most writers—about governance in regions where systems do not, can-
not work; public services are only sporadically delivered; and the laws
are honoured more in the breach than in the observance—are looking
for more than academic renown. They want to see a change towards a
world where governments, politicians and public servants are fulfilling
their duties and delivering on their promises. They are only too familiar
with the barriers which stand in the way of achieving a more just and equi-
table system from the grassroots up to the international level. Yet some
optimism remains to back the belief that where there is knowledge and
understanding of what is happening now, there is hope for a better future.
One theme common to many of the chapters is the difficulty of finding
champions for positive changes in systems which survive precisely because
they reward negative behaviours by the greedy and unprincipled. Few
would question that more rewards for virtue are needed and that democ-
racy, even with relatively open information, does not necessarily result
in the election of more virtuous candidates. Several chapters explicitly
explore the worldviews and promises of the political parties and politi-
cians in power to see what the leaders perceive as the best offerings for
motivating a growing support base. Unless he (rarely she) has access to
a very effective secret police force, a president cannot stay in power for
decades without understanding how to garner and maintain a group of
loyal followers.
The authors of the individual chapters were not given fixed definitions
of the core terms to adhere to rather they were encouraged to focus on
the local views of how the people themselves see governance and fragility.
The aim was to get away from stereotypes and ask, using local evidence,
how far the reality backs up the theory. For both Zimbabwe and South
Africa there are contrasting but parallel chapters which deal with gover-
nance in the capital at the national level and out at a distance in a specific
rural area.
distinction between state property and his private property, and no divi-
sion between the welfare of his business cronies and the welfare of the
nation. The authors stress that awareness, down to the street level, of the
government going beyond daily corruption at all levels to state capture at
the top of the political pyramid had brought South Africa to the point of
state fragility. After a detailed account of the failings of the Zuma regime
and the links between his party’s fanatical desire to hold onto power and
its unwillingness to address state capture, the authors put forward their
recommendations for institutional changes with strong optimism.
For rural South Africa, Andrew Skuse presents a frank analysis of how
social welfare provision actually works on the ground and how corrup-
tion is faced by those at the grassroots who find themselves most hurt
by those immediately above them. Disadvantaged people need not only
to have access to the publicly available information about the system,
they also need to know all the unwritten rules about how to prove one’s
identity and work through the powerful local networks that determine
access. Based upon ethnographic studies in the rural areas of Eastern Cape
Province, the chapter examines the ‘everydayness’ of the state in contexts
where everyone may have a right to speak, but many cannot make their
voices heard where they might have some impact, and so are excluded.
The specific case here involves the corruption associated with access to
disability payments, where too often the poor and handicapped are not
able to get the money they are entitled to because of illiteracy and a lack of
knowledge of how bureaucracies work, whilst the able-bodied and better-
off literate villagers score through networks such as the village social wel-
fare committees. Ironically, paying a hefty fee for a private consultation
with the doctor who certifies disability will also secure a healthy person
the disability grant. Strikingly, this is a system that benefits women rather
than men, as they are the ones who maintain the networks (although the
main corrupt doctor is a man supported by the women who benefit from
his dishonest certification).
Almost all African social scientists are in a position to contribute to
the debates over good governance and state fragility. Yet, to date, there
have been few contributions by linguists. Finex Ndhlovu’s chapter on
‘Prospects for linguistic and cultural diversity to enhance African political
governance’ offers a new perspective. It asks two vital questions: ‘what
affordances do Africa’s cultural and linguistic resources provide for cre-
ativity and innovation in our quest for good and inclusive political gov-
ernance systems?’ and ‘What would Africa’s political governance system
INTRODUCTION 7
Conclusion
Each of the chapters of this book explores issues of governance within a
particular national or local context. It may be a cliché to repeat that there
is no ‘one size fits all model’ of governance even for sub-Saharan African
INTRODUCTION 9
countries, but it is nevertheless true. This is one reason why the donors’
passion for governance training along standardized lines is often so very
much misplaced. Actually, the government officials and politicians who
receive the training are often very happy because it is accompanied by
per diems and free meals and even accommodation (for Malawian public
servants, perks associated with training have been calculated to be equiva-
lent to one month’s salary per year). This is just one example of how even
attempts to combat bad governance and corruption may have the oppo-
site effect if not designed with an intelligent and cynical appreciation of
local conditions. More needs to be done: to ask the locals both whether
they see a need to improve governance and, if so, how they, who have
to live within the system, think that it can be done. Like architects plan-
ning a settlement, designers of governance systems need to know how
the inhabitants live, what their priorities are and how far people can be
led to change their ways for their own good. The extent to which global
religions have largely supplanted localized traditional religions, features of
which are adopted into the new faiths, demonstrates that people can be
very flexible in adopting changed behaviours, but only when they can see
the rewards in front of their eyes. People are won over less by rational
arguments than by the demonstration of results in a familiar context: as
the Chapters show, Zimbabwe is not Rwanda, is not Nigeria.
The Realities of Governance: Conflict
and Context Across Africa
Helen Ware
At that time Mazrui was concerned that one-party states rapidly became
tyrannical but that full democracy in multi-ethnic states sometimes led to
anarchy, but almost always led to economic decay through corruption and
economic privatization of the state by a dynasty or an ethnic group or a
general free for all, as in Nigeria under Shagari. Mazrui thus flirted with
H. Ware (B)
University of New England, Armidale, NSW, Australia
the idea of an engineered two-party system in which voters had the choice
between two nation-wide parties, one to the left and one to the right.
As with many social science concepts that have a history, governance
does not have a clinical or universally accepted definition (Makinda 2017).
From 1992 to 2007 the World Bank’s definition of governance moved
from: ‘governance is the manner in which power is exercised in the man-
agement of a country’s economic and social resources for development’
(World Bank 1992: 1) to: ‘the manner in which public officials and insti-
tutions acquire and exercise the authority to shape public policy and pro-
vide public goods and services’ (World Bank 2007: 1). The 1992 defi-
nition has the virtue of hinging on how power is exercised. The 2007
text benefits by making it plain that authority and implementation are
necessarily exercised by persons or institutions, thus ‘good governance’
requires good persons and good institutions and ‘bad governance’ occurs
when the bad guys are in charge and the institutions to control them are
badly designed or too weak.
It is the premise of this chapter that the discussion of governance relies
more upon a family resemblance between understandings of governance
than on any one exact definition, and that there is little point in dis-
cussing governance without a pragmatic focus on who exactly delivers
what to whom and under what circumstances. Governance should only
be measured by what it actually delivers (problems of measurement are
discussed further below). In any state where there is good governance
citizens, irrespective of race, religion, region, language, gender or income
can access basic services without experiencing discrimination in the avail-
ability or the quality of the service. They do not have to fear an emergency
dash to a remote clinic only to find no staff in attendance and no drugs
on the shelves. In face to face interactions with bureaucrats and applying
for government employment they know that their ethnic background and
political affiliations will not make a difference. In other words, there is a
clear understanding that public resources are indeed to be shared equi-
tably. For UNDP, somewhat idealistically, ‘Good governance is, among
other things, participatory, transparent and accountable. It is also effec-
tive and equitable. And it promotes the rule of law. Good governance
ensures that political, social and economic priorities are based on broad
consensus in society and that the voices of the poorest and the most vul-
nerable are heard in decision-making over the allocation of development
resources’ (UNDP in Gisselquist 2012: 6).
THE REALITIES OF GOVERNANCE … 13
While the direct link between corruption and GDP growth is difficult to
assess, corruption does have significant negative effects on a host of key
transmission channels, such as investment (including FDI), competition,
THE REALITIES OF GOVERNANCE … 15
conversation addresses how these languages are actually used in the con-
texts being discussed. For example, there are debates about the role of
the state, but no one asks whether in the local vernaculars it is actually
possible to distinguish between the government and the state. In many
cases, even the word for government will be a corruption of the French,
Portuguese or English term with inevitable colonial overtones. It would
be an interesting exercise to ask villagers about the local words used to
describe what a chief actually does and how far these same words would
apply to a politician or a government official. Issues of language, ethnic-
ity and conflict often overlap although it should be noted that Somali is
spoken across Somalia and Kinyarwanda by Hutu and Tutsi alike. In his
chapter, Finex Ndhlovu discusses the little-explored question of the prob-
able impacts of the greater use of African languages in African governance.
He is optimistic, others wonder how far language divides rather than uni-
fies and how far the use of African languages may cut people off from the
good ideas associated with globalism as well as the bad. Does an African
president who regularly prefers his native tongue in his public speeches
signal national pride, an ethnic bias or just a lack of Western education?
There are also questions of technology—how far have the very widespread
mobile phones changed patterns of language use? (During the fighting
in the Ivory Coast mobile phone data proved invaluable in tracking the
movements of internally displaced people and refugees as they fled.)
Remote from the countries themselves, the Quality of Government
Institute (QGI) based in the Department of Political Science at the
University of Gothenburg has created a remarkable body of work exam-
ining the nature of what constitutes ‘good government’ (The Quality
of Government Dataset http://www.qog.pol.gu.se). This group of aca-
demics regard ‘quality of government’ and ‘good governance’ and ‘state
capacity’ as close cousins which have become prominent in international
policy circles since the mid 1990s. Thus the IMF declared in 1996
‘promoting good governance in all its aspects, including by ensuring the
rule of law, improving the efficiency and accountability of the public
sector, and tackling corruption, as essential elements of a framework
within which economies can prosper’ (IMF 2005). Despite the fact that
poor governance is normally presented as a problem associated with poor
non-Western countries, Greece and Italy score lower than a number of
much poorer non-European countries including Botswana and Tanzania
(Rothstein and Holmberg 2014: 9). This is important evidence that
‘good governance’ is heavily dependent upon national culture. Avoiding
18 H. WARE
paying taxes is allegedly the Greek national sport and the consequence
is an unworkable system where the rule of law fails in the area of tax
collection.
For the members of the QGI neither democratization nor marketiza-
tion has delivered the economic benefits for the ordinary citizens which
were hoped for. Instead many elections remained ‘drenched in corrup-
tion, patronage, favouritism, and abuse of power’ (Diamond 2007). Mar-
ketization did not work because the countries affected did not have
enough of the formal and informal institutions taken for granted in neo-
classical economics. They lacked ‘a regulatory apparatus curbing the worst
forms of fraud, anti-competitive behaviour, and moral hazard, a moder-
ately cohesive society exhibiting trust and social co-operation. Social and
political institutions that mitigate risk and manage social conflicts, the
rule of law and clean government’ (Rodrik 2007: 97). The institutional
approach which QGI supports is based on the belief that the character of a
society’s political institutions determines its economic and social develop-
ment rather than the causal link operating in the opposite direction. For
QGI ‘neither the absence of corruption, nor representative democracy,
nor the size of government, nor the rule of law, nor administrative effec-
tiveness capture what should be counted as quality of government ’ (QGI
2011: 16). What they choose, instead, is the basic norm of impartiality
in the exercise of public power.
A. Sleeping and sitting-rooms. c. Little houses for holding grain. F. House of entrance.
B. Stables. D. Houses of the slaves. 4. Places for cooking.