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Beyond Chance and Credence
Beyond Chance and
Credence
A Theory of Hybrid Probabilities

WAY N E C . M Y RVO L D

1
 3
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 Contents

List of Figures and Table ix

Acknowledgments xi
Preface xiii
1. The Puzzle of Predictability 1
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 Determinism and the poverty of our knowledge 3
1.3 Statistical regularities and the law of large numbers 6
1.4 The importation of statistics into physics 8
1.5 Brownian motion and Langevin equations 12
1.6 Why are atoms so small? 14
1.7 The upshot 15
1.8 Credits 16
2. Two Senses of "Probability" 17
2.1 Chance and credence distinguished 17
2.2 Credence-functions and belief states 19
2.3 The Principal Principle and its justification 31
2.4 Learning about chances 36
2.5 Determinism, enemy of chance? 40
2.6 The displacement of chance by frequency 42
2.7 Could probability be only credence? 44
3. Two Non-senses of"Probability" 47
3.1 The insufficiency of indifference 47
3.2 Why you are not a frequentist 67
4. What Could a "Natural Measure" Be? 77
4.1 The grand temptation 77
4.2 The parabola gadget 78
4.3 Sensitive dependence as a source of predictability 85
4.4 Invertibility 86
4.5 Invariant distributions as surrogates 92
4.6 Introducing uniform distributions 93
4.7 Status of the input distributions 94
4.8 Partial equilibration 95
4.9 Conclusion 96
4.10 Appendix 97
vi CONTENTS

5. Epistemic Chances, or "Almost-Objective" Probabilities 106

5.1 Is chance incompatible with determinism? 106
5.2 The method of arbitrary functions 107
5.3 Epistemic chances 110
5.4 On the reasonable credence-set e,, and an analog of the
Principal Principle 112
5.5 Learning about epistemic chances 114
5.6 Soup from a stone: can the epistemic aspect be eliminated? 117
5.7 Conclusion 120
6. Thermodynamics: The Science of Heat and Work 122
6.1 About the term "thermodynamics" 122
6.2 The Laws of Thermodynamics 125
6.3 The Equilibration Principle 128
6.4 Enter entropy 130
6.5 Thermodynamics reconceived 134
6.6 Thermodynamics as a resource theory 145
7. Statistical Mechanics: The Basics 146
7.1 Introduction 146
7.2 Evolution of probability functions under classical dynamics 147
7.3 Gibbsian statistical mechanics 151
7.4 The neo-Boltzmannian approach 161
7.5 Criticisms of the Gibbsian approach 167
7.6 Statistical mechanics and the Principle oflndifference 169
7.7 Appendix 173
8. Probabilities in Statistical Mechanics 175
8.1 Puzzles about statistical mechanical probabilities 175
8.2 Preliminary considerations on convergence of
probability distributions 176
8.3 Equilibration as convergence of probability distributions 179
8.4 Statistical mechanical probabilities as epistemic chances 180
8.5 On the way to equilibrium: partial equilibration, and
the Markovian recipe 181
8.6 Explaining thermodynamics 191
8.7 A comment on the "Past Hypothesis" 200
9. Probabilities in Quantum Mechanics 205
9.1 Introduction 205
9.2 Quantum equilibration 207
9.3 The measurement problem 210
9.4 Probabilities in de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave theories 212
 CONTENTS Vii

9.5 Dynamical collapse theories: probabilities as objective

chances 218
9.6 Everettian interpretations: no probabilities, but a
working substitute (perhaps) 220
9.7 Can classical statistical mechanics stand on its own two feet? 224
9.8 Conclusion 225
9.9 Appendix: a brief introduction to the basics of
quantum theory 226
10. Epilogue 239
11. Appendix: Probability Basics 242
11.1 Axioms of probability 242
11.2 Random variables 246
11.3 Probability and measure 247
11.4 Laws of Large Numbers 252

References 261
Index 279
 List of Figures and Table

Figures

2.1 Likelihood functions 38

4.1 The parabola gadget 79
4.2 Evolution of the parabola gadget 79
4.3 Alice and Bob’s options 80
4.4 Density function for the invariant distribution μ 82
4.5 The effect of five iterations of the parabola gadget
on various input distributions 83
4.6 Five-step backwards evolute of a density function uniform over left
half of the diagonal 88
4.7 The difference between knowledge of the past and of the future 91
4.8 The function u(x) 93
4.9 Local equilibration 96
5.1 Poincaré’s illustration of a density function over final angle. From
Poincaré (1896: 128; 1912: 149) 108
5.2 Results of a simulated gadget experiment 116
5.3 Normalized likelihood functions for a simulated gadget experiment 117
11.1 Probabilities of possible values for Fn , for p = 2/3, with normal
approximations 258

Table
5.1 Results of simulated parabola gadget experiment 115
 Acknowledgments

Over the course of writing this book, I have given talks on some of the
contents at various places, and I am grateful to have received feedback on
those occasions. The book was also read in draft form in a reading group at
the University of Western Ontario. I express my thanks for their feedback
to members of that group, and to the graduate students in a course for
which it was used as a text. Among those who have provided valuable
comments on drafts of the book are Dimitrios Athanasiou, Michael Cuf-
faro, Thomas de Saegher, Lucas Dunlap, Sona Ghosh, Marie Gueguen, Bill
Harper, Marc Holman, Haiyu Jiang, Molly Kao, Adam Koberinski, Joshua
Luczak, Mackenzie Marcotte, Tim Maudlin, Vishnya Maudlin, John Norton,
Filippos Papagiannopoulos, Stathis Psillos, Brian Skyrms, Chris Smeenk,
and Martin Zelko. Particular thanks are due to David Wallace and Marshall
Abrams for their detailed comments. I thank Zili Dong for assistance with
copy-editing and the index.
Part of the writing of this book was done while the author was a visiting
scholar at the Pittsburgh Center for the Philosophy of Science. I thank the
Center for their hospitality, and for fostering a lively intellectual atmosphere.
Research for the book was sponsored, in part, by Graham and Gale Wright,
who generously fund the Graham and Gale Wright Distinguished Scholar
Award at the University of Western Ontario.
 Preface

This is a book about the use of probability in science, with an emphasis

on its use in physics, and, particularly, in statistical mechanics. Its impetus
stems from a puzzle. The application of probabilistic concepts in physics is
ubiquitous (more so than might at first appear, as I argue in the first chapter).
This raises the question of how to interpret the probabilities being used.
It has long been recognized (and is amply documented by Ian Hacking in
his book The Emergence of Probability) that the word “probability” has been
used in two distinct senses. One of these is an epistemic sense, having to
do with degrees of belief of agents, such as ourselves, with less than total
knowledge of the world. Following standard usage in philosophy, I will
call epistemic probabilities credences. In another sense, called by Hacking
the aleatory sense, probabilities are features of certain sorts of physical set-
ups: dice throws, roulette wheels, and the like. We routinely raise questions
about whether a coin toss is fair, or whether a roulette wheel is biased, and
treat these questions as questions about the objects, questions that can be
addressed by experimentation. Again, following standard usage, I will call
these probabilities chances, or objective chances.
It would be a mistake to think of these two senses in which the word
“probability” has been used as rival interpretations of probability, one of
which must be accepted to the exclusion of the other. They are simply distinct
(albeit intertwined) concepts, and each has a legitimate use. Indeed, much
confusion could have been prevented if the word “probability” had never
been used ambiguously, and “chance” and “credence” used instead.
However, there is a puzzle here. For much of the modern period, it was
taken for granted that the fundamental laws of physics are deterministic.
Even today, when it is accepted that the world is quantum, not classical, it
is far from noncontroversial that the lesson to be drawn from the empirical
success of quantum theory is indeterminism at the level of fundamental
physics. On the most straightforward conception of what an objective chance
would be, such chances are incompatible with determinism. It is this that led
writers on probability theory such as Bernoulli (1713), Laplace (1814), and
others, to declare that probability is wholly epistemic. And yet these same
xiv preface

writers fall, on occasion, into taking it as a matter of physical fact whether a

given game of chance is fair, and thus there is a tension in their writings.
One of the main theses of this book is that the familiar dichotomy of
chance and credence is inadequate, and that there is a need for a concept of
probability that makes sense in a deterministic context and which combines
epistemic and physical considerations. These hybrid probabilities, which are
neither wholly epistemic nor wholly physical, I call epistemic chances. I argue
that they fulfill the role required of probabilities in games of chance and in
statistical mechanics.
In order to do so, some ground-clearing is required, as I need to explain
why there aren’t ready-made serviceable notions that fill the role for objective
chance in a deterministic context. One of these, connected with classical
probability theory, is the idea that defining the probability of an event is a
simple matter: the probability of an event A is just the ratio of the number
of possibilities compatible with the event’s occurrence to the number of
all possibilities. The other is the idea that probability statements can be
cashed out as implicit references to relative frequencies in some actual
or hypothetical sequence of events. Neither of these attempts at defining
probabilities achieve their purpose. These approaches have been extensively
criticized, but I do not presume that all of my readers are familiar with these
criticisms, and, indeed, expect that some readers will begin their reading of
the book as proponents of one or the other of these views. For that reason,
I explain the reasons why I think that neither of these approaches provide
an adequate conception of probability in Chapter 3, and why my readers
should, too.
One of my motivations for writing the book is a dissatisfaction with the
way probabilities are treated in much of the philosophical literature. Too
much of the literature in the philosophy of probability is lacking in historical
perspective, and, as a consequence, debates that were carried out in the
nineteenth century are recapitulated in the twenty-first. Where historical
reference is made, it is often incorrect. A common narrative has it that
Laplace (1814) naïvely thought that probabilities could be straightforwardly
defined on the basis of a Principle of Indifference, and that Bertrand (1889)
shattered some sort of orthodoxy with his “paradox.” The truth is that the
examples invoked at the beginning of Bertrand’s Calcul des Probabilités were
meant to illustrate a by-then familiar point made already by Laplace, and
that Bertrand was, in fact, echoing Laplace. I hope to restore some historical
perspective to contemporary discussions.
 preface xv

The literature on the foundations of statistical mechanics has been heavily

influenced by the Ehrenfests’ encyclopedia article (1912). That article has
considerable merits, but historical accuracy is not one of them. The Ehren-
fests sought to secure the place of their late friend and mentor, Ludwig
Boltzmann, as the chief architect of statistical mechanics; and Boltzmann’s
predecessors, in particular James Clerk Maxwell, and Boltzmann’s successor,
J. Willard Gibbs, who built on and extended Boltzmann’s work, receive
short shrift. The narrative in the minds of many working in the philosophy
of statistical mechanics is that, at the time Boltzmann published his cele-
brated H-theorem (1872), those working in the field we now call statistical
mechanics presumed that a monotonic relaxation towards equilibrium could
be derived from the laws of mechanics alone, and that the reversibility
objection stemming from Loschmidt (1876) came as a bolt from the blue.
In fact, the argument from the reversibility of underlying mechanical laws
to the conclusion that irreversibility at the macroscopic level had to be a
matter of probability had been familiar to the British physicists, Maxwell,
Kelvin, Tait, and Rayleigh for almost a decade before Boltzmann came to
this realization. Another effect of the Ehrenfests’ influence is the notion that
there are two incompatible rival approaches to statistical mechanics: Boltz-
mannian and Gibbsian. What is now usually counted as Boltzmannian (or
neo-Boltzmannian) statistical mechanics consists of extracting one strand
from the many to be found in Boltzmann’s work. Gibbs saw himself, not as
offering a rival approach to Boltzmann’s, but as building upon another strand
of Boltzmann’s work. One of the seminal textbooks of statistical mechanics,
that of R. C. Tolman (1938), weaves together considerations drawn from
Boltzmann and Gibbs, as do many of its successors. In my presentation, the
reader is introduced to both a Gibbsian and neo-Boltzmannian approach; my
own view is that the supposed tensions between them have been exaggerated.
My chief motivation for writing the book is the fact that I frequently find,
in discussions with my own students and with students that I encounter at
conferences and workshops, that a great deal of material that I regard as
prerequisite for doing serious, professional-level work on the foundations
of probability and on the foundations of thermodynamics and statistical
mechanics, is not material that one can presume is familiar to those wishing
to embark on such work, and is not readily available. This is a book that I
wish had existed, when I was a graduate student and then a junior researcher,
beginning to delve into such matters.
The book is meant to be more or less self-contained, and can serve as
an introduction to the issues discussed for those not already familiar with
xvi preface

them. It can be used (as I have done with an earlier draft) as a text in a
graduate course on philosophical issues in probability, for students without
background in probability theory. For this reason, I have included, as an
Appendix, a brief introduction to probability theory, and include also chap-
ters introducing the basics of thermodynamics and statistical mechanics.
These contain material that I think everyone interested in the foundations of
these subjects should know, and which is not easy to glean from the existing
philosophical literature on thermodynamics and statistical mechanics.
I invite readers to think of this book as a choose-your-own-adventure
book. For those who wish to read through the work with a minimum of
mathematics, I have relegated most technical details to appendices. But
I hope that some readers will take these pages as an invitation to embark
on serious work in philosophy of probability. The training of a philosopher,
when it comes to relevant background knowledge, is often unsystematic, and
we often have to pick up what we need along the way. For graduate students
and others without much background in probability, I have included intro-
ductory material, and I hope that among my readers will be those who are
inclined to work through it.

Note on sources. In this book, I quote many works that were published
prior to the twentieth century. The dates and location of first publication
are important for historical reasons, and for this reason I have provided
references to the original publications. For many of the figures quoted,
such as Maxwell, Kelvin, and Boltzmann, there are volumes of collected
papers, which makes the works more readily accessible. For convenience,
I have provided reference to such collections, in addition to the original
publications. For any quotations contained in this book from works written
in languages other than English, I have, wherever possible, looked at the
original publication, and provide citation of the original for those who want
to look at it, as well as the translation from which I am quoting. In cases
where an adequate translation was not readily available, the translation is
my own, and I have provided the original text in a footnote. I am grateful to
Marie Gueguen for assistance with the French translations.
 1
The Puzzle of Predictability

1.1 Introduction

It is a familiar fact that some things can be predicted with a reasonable degree
of confidence; others, less so. The daily rising and setting of the sun, the
waxing and waning of the moon, and the motions of the major planets are
familiar examples of the predictable. In other domains, such as the stock
market, the motion of a leaf as it falls from a tree on a blustery day, or the
vagaries of the weather, prediction is harder to come by.
The question I want to ask is: How is prediction possible, in those domains
in which it is?
A venerable answer, and perhaps the first that might suggest itself to some
readers, is: because there are deterministic laws of physics that, together with
initial conditions, uniquely determine the future behaviour of things. This
might or might not be true. But it’s irrelevant to the question of what makes
prediction possible.
Even if the underlying laws of physics are deterministic, we are never in
possession of anything even remotely like the sort of specification of the state
of a system that, together with those laws, suffices to determine what we will
observe in the future. We never, in fact, take into account anything more than
a tiny fraction of the physical degrees of freedom of any macroscopic system.
Instead, we engage in radical dimensional reduction of our problems; we
seek relations between a small number of macroscopic variables, discarding
almost everything there is to be known about the system.
It is well known that there are systems that exhibit extremely sensitive
dependence on initial conditions, and there has been extensive literature on
the problems that this poses for prediction. Precise long-term prediction,
for such systems, requires absurdly precise specification of initial conditions.
But the situation we find ourselves in is much worse; we know virtually noth-
ing about the precise state of macroscopic systems to which we successfully
apply our predictive techniques.

Beyond Chance and Credence. Wayne C. Myrvold, Oxford University Press (2021).
© Wayne C. Myrvold.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198865094.003.0001
2 the puzzle of predictability

To get a sense of the magnitude of the problem, consider what might seem
to be the easiest case, that of planetary motion. Astrophysicists compute
tables of predicted planetary positions with an impressive degree of preci-
sion, millennia in advance. The calculation is an intricate one, because it’s
a gravitational many-body problem, which is tackled by deriving successive
approximations to the motion. It is complicated by the fact that, at the level of
precision reached by modern astronomy, Newton’s law of gravitation is not
sufficient, and the theory of general relativity must be taken into account.
But never mind all that; suppose you want to get a first approximation to the
motions of a single planet, say, Jupiter. The gravitational influence of the sun
on Jupiter is by far the strongest factor affecting its motion, and so, a good
first approximation can be obtained as a two-body problem.
Suppose then, that you are posed the following problem. You are given
the relevant laws of physics, the masses, current positions, and velocities of
the Sun and Jupiter, the values of any other macroscopically ascertainable
quantities that you might regard as relevant, and permission to ignore
everything in the universe other than Jupiter and the Sun, because you are
only being asked to provide a first approximation of the future behaviour
of the system. You are forbidden to invoke anything else. The only assump-
tion that you may make about the detailed microstate of the system is
that it is compatible with the values of the macrovariables that you have
been given.

Question: On this basis, what can you say about the future course of the
system?
Answer: Virtually nothing.

If you were posed a question like this, you would probably treat it as a grav-
itational two-body problem. This is exactly solvable, and an approximation
to initial conditions yields an approximation to later conditions.
But, if you are treating it as a two-body problem, you are assuming that
the Sun and Jupiter will remain, during the interval over which you are
interested, roughly spherical bodies small in size compared to the distance
between them, and you will treat the problem as one of finding the motion of
the centers of mass of these two spheres. You are assuming that they will not
fly into pieces. But this is, by the rules stipulated, an illicit assumption. The
macrostate of the system is compatible with a wide variety of states on the
scale of, say, individual molecules, and, within the scope of this set of states
are some that lead to a wide variety of subsequent behaviour. The problem is
that it is not a two-body problem; it’s at least an N-body problem, where
 beyond chance and credence 3

N is the total number of molecules that collectively make up Jupiter and

the sun.
What we actually know about any macroscopic system doesn’t even
remotely come close to being enough to tightly constrain the future
behaviour of the system. This is what I call the puzzle of predictability.
The key to solving the puzzle lies in the phenomenon of statistical regular-
ities. It has long been recognized that aggregates of events that are, individ-
ually, unpredictable, can give rise to reliable regularities. Thus, for example,
the total number of traffic accidents in a given year in Pittsburgh might
be more or less constant, from year to year, though exactly when and where
the next accident will occur is not predictable. Statistical regularities arise
when we aggregate a large number of variables that are effectively random
and effectively independent. Counterintuitive as it might seem, effective
prediction, even in cases of apparent determinism, always involves this sort
of statistical regularity. This is why the issue of whether the underlying laws
are deterministic is irrelevant to the question of how it is that we can make
effective predictions. Even if the laws are deterministic, what is required
from them is effectively random behaviour of most of the variables that are
potentially relevant to a prediction task.
An upshot of this is that considerations that stem from probability theory
are required for all—yes, all—of our applications of physical theory to
prediction, and not only in cases where their presence is apparent because
probabilities are explicitly invoked.
Now, a little more detail on these points.

1.2 Determinism and the poverty of our knowledge

In a paper presented to the Académie Royale des Sciences de Paris in February

1773, Laplace wrote,

The present state of the system of Nature is evidently a consequence of what

it was at the preceding moment, and if we conceive of an intelligence that,
for a given instant, embraced all the relations of the beings of this Universe,
it will be able to determine for any given time in the past or the future the
respective positions, movements, and generally the properties of all those
beings. (Laplace 1776: §XXV, in Oeuvres Complètes, vol. 8, p. 144)1

1 “L’état présent du system de la Nature est évidemment une suite de qu’il était au moment
précédent, et, si nous concevons une intelligence qui, pour un instant donné, embrasse tous les
rapports des êtres de cet Universe, elle pourra déterminer pour un temps quelconque pris dans
4 the puzzle of predictability

This was, of course, echoed 40 years later in an oft-quoted passage from his
Philosophical Essay on Probabilities (Laplace 1814: 4; 1902: 4).2
Some have attributed to Laplace a vision of the future progress of science
in which we humans approach ever closer to the condition of such a being.
Nothing could be further from Laplace’s intention. He is explaining to
his audience why, in spite of the presumed determinism of the laws of
nature (taken by Laplace to be an a priori truth, based on the principle of
sufficient reason), there is need for any such subject as probability theory.
The Perfect Predictor is introduced as a contrast to the workings of the
human mind. Though our predictive successes in astronomy furnish a “fee-
ble idea of this intelligence,” the human mind “will always remain infinitely
removed from it” (Laplace 1902: 4), and that is why we need probability
theory.
This is true for two reasons. The first is that the amount that we actually
know is always a minuscule fraction of the complete state of the world.
A complete specification of the state would require specification of the state
of every atom, every elementary particle. The second is that, even if (per
impossibile) we could be given this complete state, we could not process the
information, could not do the requisite computation. To make any headway,
we would have to select a few salient variables, and apply a probabilistic or
statistical treatment to the rest.
Our vast ignorance is, of course, only important if what we don’t know
about is potentially relevant to what we want to predict. One potential
solution to the puzzle of predictability that might suggest itself is that, in
order to make predictions about certain macrovariables, all we need as input
is the values of those macrovariables.
Take the case of planetary prediction. We don’t know the details of the
internal arrangements of the planets, but, it might be argued, we don’t have to.
All we need to know about Jupiter is that a certain mass is concentrated, in an
approximately spherically symmetric fashion, within a spherical region that

le passé ou dans l’avenir la position respective, les mouvements, et généralement les affectations
de tous ces êtres.”

2 Laplace is not, in this passage, formulating a novel thesis or saying anything that would have
been surprising or shocking to his readers; rather, he is reminding his readers of something that
he presumes they take for granted. Indeed, markedly similar passages can be found in earlier
writings by Boscovich, Condorcet, and d’Holbach; see Kožnjak (2015) for discussion.
 beyond chance and credence 5

is small compared to interplanetary distances, and that something similar

can be said about the Sun and other planets.
This is true; if we know that this holds at the present time, and can be
expected to remain true for the foreseeable future, then we have all we need
to treat the solar system as an n-body gravitational problem, where n is a
relatively small number of astronomical bodies.
However, as already mentioned, what we know about the current macro-
state of Jupiter is consistent with its flying apart in short order. To see this,
imagine two half-Jupiter sized blobs of gas colliding, and settling down into
something like the current state of Jupiter. The relevant physical laws are
invariant under velocity reversal, and so, if this is a past that could lead to
the observed macrostate of Jupiter, it is also a possible future of the observed
macrostate.
It might seem that some fundamental law of physics forbids Jupiter from
spontaneously dividing into two half-planets that fly apart from each other.
But what? Conservation of energy? Let the resulting half-planets be cooler
than Jupiter is now, so that the decrease in internal energy offsets the increase
in kinetic energy.
This would involve no violation of the conservation of energy, and need
not violate any other conservation law, but it would violate the Second Law
of Thermodynamics—at least, as originally conceived (see Chapter 6). This is
a key to solving the puzzle of predictability. Understanding the basis for the
laws of thermodynamics is requisite for understanding predictability, even in
domains where thermodynamics is not explicitly evoked. It was one of the
great insights of nineteenth-century physics to realize that the Second Law
of Thermodynamics rests on statistical regularities.
Statistical regularities are not the sort of thing that can be subjects of
certain knowledge. Unlike regularities underwritten by deterministic laws,
they are not exceptionless, and they are at best the sort of thing one can
regard as very likely to obtain. The pioneers of the science that came to
be called statistical mechanics came to the conclusion that phenomena that
would count as violating the Second Law, as originally conceived, should be
regarded, not as physically impossible, but only as highly improbable. Thus,
what we are seeking is not a criterion for ruling out of consideration the sorts
of microstates that would lead to Jupiter-splitting behaviour. What we are
seeking is more subtle: some way of regarding it as unlikely that a microstate
of that sort will be realized. And this means making sense of probabilistic
assertions, even in the context of deterministic physics.
6 the puzzle of predictability

1.3 Statistical regularities and the law of large numbers

Today, statistics is a branch of mathematics, closely connected with

probability theory. It was not always so. The original meaning of the word
had to do with collection and presentation in a systematic way of demo-
graphic data. Here’s how the subject was characterized in the inaugural issue
of the Journal of the Statistical Society of London, published in May of 1838.

It is within the last few years only that the Science of Statistics has been at all
actively pursued in this country; and it may not, even now, be unnecessary
to explain to general readers its objects, and to define its province. The word
Statistics is of German origin, and is derived from the word Staat, signifying
the same as our English word State, or a body of men existing in a social
union. Statistics, therefore, may be said, in the words of the Prospectus of
this Society, to be the ascertaining and bringing together of those “facts
which are calculated to illustrate the condition and prospects of society”
and the object of Statistical Science is to consider the results which they
produce, with the view to determine those principles upon which the well-
being of society depends.
The Science of Statistics differs from Political Economy, because,
although it has the same end in view, it does not discuss causes, nor reason
upon probable effects; it seeks only to collect, arrange, and compare, that
class of facts which alone can form the basis of correct conclusions with
respect to social and political government.
(Statistical Society of London 1838: 1)

Nearly 50 years later, in the volume celebrating the jubilee of the society, its
president, Rawson W. Rawson, characterized the science as

the science which treats of the structure of “human society,” i.e., of society
in all its constituents, however minute, and in all its relations, however
complex; embracing alike the highest phenomena of education, crime, and
commerce, and the so-called “statistics” of pin-making and London dust
bins. (Rawson 1885: 8)

By that time the mathematical methods that we now think of as the

province of the science of statistics had begun to make their way into the
profession, though they were not yet dominant. We see this in the Jubilee
volume, which contains a paper by F. Y. Edgeworth that introduces his
 beyond chance and credence 7

audience to such topics as the normal distribution and significance tests,3

to the perplexity of some members of the audience (Galton 1885: 266).
Systematic collection of statistics burgeoned in the first half of the
nineteenth century, giving rise to (in Hacking’s words) an “avalanche of
printed numbers” (Hacking 1990: 3) With this avalanche of numbers came
an increased awareness of statistical regularities, that is, stable frequencies,
in large populations, of the occurrence of individually unpredictable events.
These extended, not only to such things as births and deaths, but even to
matters such as the occurrences of violent crimes. As Quetelet dramatically
put it,⁴

It is a budget that we pay with frightening regularity, that which we pay

to the prisons, labor camps, and scaffolds…every year the numbers have
confirmed my predictions, to the point that, I could have said with more
exactitude: it is a tribute that man acquits with greater regularity than that
which he owes to nature or to the treasury of the State, that he pays to crime!
(Quetelet 1835: 9)

In England, one conduit of this sort of thinking was Thomas Henry Buckle,
described by Theodore Porter as “possibly the most enthusiastic and beyond
doubt the most influential popularizer of Quetelet’s ideas on statistical
regularity” (Porter 1986: 65).
Also in the nineteenth century came an increased awareness that, para-
doxical as it might seem, we can see these regularities as arising, not in spite
of chance, but because of chance. The basic idea is found already in Jacob
Bernoulli’s Ars conjectandi (1713), and has to do with what Poisson (1835;
1837) named the law of large numbers.

Things of any nature are subject to a universal law that can be called the law
of large numbers. It consists in the fact that, if we observe very considerable
numbers of events of the same nature, depending on constant causes and
causes that vary irregularly, sometimes in one direction and sometimes in
the other, without their variation being progressive in any given direction,

3 Yes, those existed before Fisher was born!

⁴ “Il est un budget qu’on paie avec une régularité effrayante, c’est celui des prisons, des bagnes
et des échafauds; …et, chaque année, les nombres sont venus confirmer mes prévisions, à tel
point, que j’aurais pu dire, peut-être avec plus d’exactitude: Il est un tribut que l’homme acquitte
avec plus de régularité que celui qu’il doit à la nature ou au trésor de l’État, c’est celui qu’il paie
au crime!”
8 the puzzle of predictability

we find ratios between these numbers that are very nearly constant. For
each kind of things, these ratios have a special value from which they will
deviate less and less, as the series of observed events increases further, and
which they would reach exactly if it were possible to extend the series to
infinity. (Poisson 1837: 7)⁵

We observe stable relative frequencies of events in a certain class, not

because there is a Providence watching over the sequence, ensuring that
things balance out, but because there isn’t. It is the result of aggregation of
independent chance events that leads to these stable frequencies.
The basic idea can be illustrated by a coin toss. Suppose a coin is tossed n
times, and that the probability of heads on any given toss is p (for a fair coin,
p = 1/2), and suppose that these tosses are probabilistically independent of
each other; the probability of Heads on any given toss is p, regardless of the
results of the other tosses.⁶ Now consider the relative frequency of Heads,
that is, the fraction, out of all the tosses, of those that land Heads. This
won’t, typically, be exactly equal to p. But for a large number of tosses, it
will probably be close to p, and the probability that the relative frequency
is more than a given distance from p gets smaller as the number n of tosses
increases. See Appendix for further discussion.

1.4 The importation of statistics into physics

This is the intellectual background against which serious work on the kinetic
theory of gases began, in the mid-nineteenth century. Statistical regularities
were a familiar phenomenon in the social sciences, and there was recognition
that the explanation for these regularities was to be based on probabilistic
considerations.

⁵ “Les choses de toute nature sont soumises à une loi universelle qu’on peut appeler la lois
des grands nombres. Elle consiste en ce que, si l’on observe des nombres très considérables
d’événements d’une même nature, dépendants de causes constantes et de causes qui varient
irrégulièrement, tantôt dans un sens, tantôt dans l’autre, c’est-à-dire sans que leur variation soit
progressive dans aucun sens déterminé, on trouvera, entre ces nombres, des rapports à très peu
près constants. Pour chaque nature de choses, ces rapports auront une valeur spéciale dont ils
s’écarteront de moins en moins, à mesure que la série des événements observés augmentera
davantage, et qu’ils atteindraient rigoureusement s’il était possible de prolonger cette série à
l’infini.”
This differs from the corresponding passage in Poisson (1835) only by the insertion of the
phrase “de causes constantes” in the second sentence.
⁶ A sequence of events of this sort is referred to a sequence of Bernoulli trials.
 beyond chance and credence 9

The kinetic theory of gases posits that a gas consists of a large number
of molecules moving in a haphazard fashion. This theory, pioneered by
Clausius (though there were important precursors, including Daniel
Bernoulli, Herapath, Waterston, Joule, and Krönig), was developed, at the
hands of Maxwell, Boltzmann, and Gibbs, into the science that we, following
Gibbs’ coinage, now call statistical mechanics, and whose scope has been
extended well beyond treatment of gases (see Brush 1976 for some of the
early history).
Poisson himself, who gave the law of large numbers its name, cites
molecular theory as an application. In a body composed of discrete
molecules separated by empty space, the intermolecular distances may
vary widely. Nonetheless, for sufficiently large volumes, equal volumes will
contain roughly equal numbers of molecules (Poisson 1835: 481; 1837: 10).
Krönig (1856) also argues for order from aggregated disorder, in accordance
with the law of large numbers.

In comparison with the gas-atoms even the smoothest wall is to be regarded

as very uneven, and the path of each gas-atom must therefore be one that is
so irregular as to escape calculation. According to the laws of the probability
calculus one may assume, however, in place of this complete irregularity, a
complete regularity. (Krönig 1856: 316)⁷

It was James Clerk Maxwell, however, who made the use of statistical meth-
ods a central part of kinetic theory. Recognizing that the effect of collisions
between molecules would render the details of their motions effectively
unpredictable, he adopted the strategy of asking, not for the detailed state
of the gas, but for a statistical summary of its properties comparable to the
tables compiled by the statisticians.

I carefully abstain from asking the molecules which enter where they last
started from. I only count them and register their mean velocities, avoiding
all personal enquiries which would only get me into trouble.
(Report on a paper by Osborne Reynolds on the flow
of rarified gases, March 28, 1879, in Harman 2002: 776,
and Garber et al. 1995: 422)

⁷ “Den Gasatomen gegenüber ist auch die ebenste Wand als sehr höckerig zu betrachten,
und die Bahn jedes Gasatoms muss deshalb eine so unregelmässige seyn, dass sie sich der
Berechnung entzicht. Nach den Gesetzen der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung wird man jedoch
statt dieser vollkommenen Unregelmässigkeit eine vollkommene Regelmässigkeit annehmen
dürfen.”
10 the puzzle of predictability

In particular, he asked himself what frequency distribution we should expect

for the velocities of molecules of an ideal gas, in conditions of equilibrium—
that is, a specification, for any given range of velocities, what proportion of
molecules would have their velocities within that range—and the answer he
came up with is what we now know as the Maxwell distribution.
In an address to the British Association for the Advancement of Science,
Maxwell was explicit that this method was imported into physics from the
social science of statistics.

As long as we have to deal with only two molecules, and have all the data
given us, we can calculate the result of their encounter, but when we have to
deal with millions of molecules, each of which has millions of encounters
in a second, the complexity of the problem seems to shut out all hope of a
legitimate solution.
The modern atomists have therefore adopted a method which is, I believe,
new in the department of mathematical physics, though it has long been in
use of the section of Statistics. When the working members of Section F [the
statistical section of the BAAS] get hold of a report of the Census, or any
other document containing the numerical data of Economic and Social
Science, they begin by distributing the whole population into groups,
according to age, income-tax, education, religious belief, or criminal
convictions. The number of individuals is far too great to allow of their
tracing the history of each separately, so that, in order to reduce their
labour within human limits, they concentrate their attention on a small
number of artificial groups. The varying number of individuals in each
group, and not the varying state of each individual, is the primary datum
from which they work. (Maxwell 1873b: 440; Niven 1890: 373–74)

This, indeed, is how Maxwell proceeded, when dealing with gases. It was
his insight to realize that the interesting question to ask, of a gas, is not its
detailed state, but a statistical distribution. When studying diffusion of one
gas into each other, one considers, not the detailed trajectories of all the
molecules, but matters such as the number of molecules that, on average, are
to be found in a given volume large enough to contain an enormous number
of molecules, and how this changes with time. Much of his work on the
kinetic theory of gases had to do with arguing that the Maxwell distribution
is a stable distribution, and, moreover, one that gases would tend to approach
if they started out with different velocity distributions.
 beyond chance and credence 11

On this view, the laws concerning the bulk behaviour of gases were to
be thought of as statistical regularities, having to do with the aggregate
behaviour of large numbers of molecules. The rationale for such a method
was the irregularity of the motions of individual molecules, due to the
randomizing effect of collisions.⁸ This included, for Maxwell, the Second Law
of Thermodynamics.

The truth of the second law is . . . a statistical, not a mathematical, truth, for
it depends on the fact that the bodies we deal with consist of millions of
molecules, and that we never can get hold of single molecule.
(Maxwell 1878: 279; Niven 1890: 670).

And Maxwell drew the inference that is at the center of this chapter.

But I think the most important effect of molecular science on our way of
thinking will be that it forces on our attention the distinction between two

⁸ This was of sufficient importance to Maxwell that it warranted being put into verse, to the
tune of “Comin’ Thro’ the Rye” (Campbell and Garnett 1882: 630; 1884: 408).
Rigid Body (sings)
Gin a body meet a body
Flyin’ through the air.
Gin a body hit a body,
Will it fly? And where?
Ilka impact has its measure,
Ne’er a ane hae I,
Yet a’ the lads they measure me,
Or, at least, they try!
Gin a body meet a body
Altogether free,
How they travel afterwards
We do not always see.
Ilka problem has its method
By analytics high;
For me, I ken na ane o’ them,
But what the waur am I?
Most of this is comprehensible without translation, but, as the last two lines are crucial to
Maxwell’s point, here they are:
Every problem has its method
By analytics high;
For me, I know not one of them,
But what the worse am I?
That is, there are exact solutions to the problem of finding the trajectories of the bodies, but
I am none the worse for not knowing them.
12 the puzzle of predictability

kinds of knowledge, which we may call for convenience the Dynamical and
the Statistical.
…
Now, if the molecular theory of the constitution of bodies is true, all of our
knowledge of matter is of the statistical kind. …The smallest portion of a
body which we can discern consists of a vast number of such molecules, and
all that we can learn about this group of molecules is statistical information.
We can determine the motion of the centre of gravity of the group, but
not that of any of its members for the time being, and these members
themselves are continually passing from one group to another in a manner
confessedly beyond our power of tracing them.
Hence those uniformities which we observe in our experiments with
quantities of matter containing millions of millions of molecules are uni-
formities of the same kind as those explained by Laplace and wondered at
by Buckle, arising from the slumping together of multitudes of cases, each
of which is by no means uniform with the others.
(Maxwell 1873a, in Campbell and Garnett 1882:
439–40; 1884: 361–2; Harman 1995: 819)

1.5 Brownian motion and Langevin equations

To get a sense of how the process of reducing an enormously complicated

and intractable problem into a tractable one involving a few key variables
and statistical averages over the rest, consider the case of Brownian motion.
A Brownian particle is moving in a fluid consisting of a huge, macroscopic
number of molecules. We can take the fluid to define a background state of
rest. Let V be the velocity of the particle with respect a reference frame with
respect to which the net momentum of the molecules of the fluid is zero.
The velocity of the particle will undergo changes due to collisions with the
molecules.
Now, if we had to keep track of the detailed motions of all of the molecules,
this would be a hopelessly intractable task. What we do, instead, is treat the
molecules probabilistically.
Assume that the probability distribution of position and velocities of the
fluid molecules is independent of where our particle is. Then, if the particle
is at rest with respect to the fluid, it will have no tendency to gain velocity in
any direction, as collisions from any direction are equally likely. If, however,
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1640 Vsus et a longo tempore iura parit;
Immoque nature si nos de iure loquamur,
Hoc in presbiteris splendet vbique magis:408
Et si sub forma tali sint iura creanda,
Legis quod vires longior vsus habet,
Tunc puto presbiteros ex vsu condere leges,
Oscula dum crebro dant in amore suo.
E c c l e s i e gremium notat ordo presbiterorum,
Quo debent animas rite fouere bonas;
Quomodo set proprias qui non curant, alienas
1650 Curabunt? non est hoc racionis opus.
Nescio quid meriti poterunt tales michi ferre,
Qui sibi nil proprie commoditatis habent:
Nam peccatores scitur quod non deus audit,
Est inhonesta deo laus set ab ore mali:
Indeuota deo qui verba precancia confert,
Iudicii proprii dampna futura petit.
Qui dampnum causat, hic dampna dedisse videtur,
Ledit qui patitur que reuocare potest:
Infligit mortem languenti, qui valet illam
1660 Nec vult auferre, set sinit esse malum:
Presul qui laicos, cum non sint ordine digni,
Ordinat ad sacra, scandala plura mouet.
Tales si quis emit lucro, frustrabitur inde,
Aut si perdet in hiis scit magis ipse deus.
Hoc scio, quod panem qui fregerit esurienti,
Cuius debilitas est sine fraude patens,
Qui nudos operit, infirmos visitat, illi
Debentur merita pro bonitate sua:
Set qui sunt fortes, vanaque sub ordinis vmbra
1670 Conspirant requiem quam sibi mundus habet,
Errat eos presul sacrans, et quosque locando
Tales de merito perdere dona puto.

Hic tractat causam, quare accidit quod laici,

quasi iuris amici, luxurie presbiterorum
 consuetudinem abhorrentes, eam multociens
castigantes grauiter affligunt.

Hoc dicit clerus, quod, quamuis crimine plenus

Capm. xxii.
Sit, non est laici ponere crimen ei;
Alter et alterius cleri peccata fauore
Excusat, quod in hiis stat sine lege reus.
Non accusari vult a laicis, tamen illos
Accusat, que sibi libera frena petit.
Libera sunt ideo peccata placencia clero,
1680 Sit nisi quod laici iura ferantur ibi.
Presbiter insipiens populum facit insipientem,
Et mala multa parit qui bona pauca sapit:
Clerus lege carens populum dat lege carentem,
Sic parat et causam presbiter ipse suam:
Nam quia lege caret laicus, sine lege
manentem
Ignorat clerum, quem videt esse reum.
Si foret et sapiens clerus, sapiencia plebis
Staret, vt in lege perstet vterque simul;
Set quia iam fatui patet insipiencia cleri,
1690 Despicitur vita desipientis ita.
Pluribus exemplis natura iuuat racionem,
Doccius vnde suum iudiciale regat.
Hinc est quod latitans bubo lucis iubar odit,
Escam vestigat nocte, veretur aues:
In quam forte greges auium si lumina figant,409
Conclamando volant et laniando secant.
Presbiteros notat iste reos, qui corpore fedi
Que sunt luxurie feda latenter agunt;
Hos laici quasi lucis aues restringere querunt,
1700 Zelo succensi legis, amore dei.
Preuaricatus enim Iudas non amplius inde
Seruorum Cristi dignus honore fuit.
Dum iuga luxurie supportat presbiter, ipsum
Si pungant laici, computet i n d e s i b i.
Iusto iudicio lex vult, quod iuris abusor
 Amittat vicio quod sibi iura dabant.
Ecclesie fratres in Cristo nos sumus omnes,
Semper et alterius indiget alter ope:
Lex tamen hoc dicit, frater quod si tuus erret,
1710 Corripe, sic et eum fac reuenire deo:
Si te non audit, dic ecclesie, set et illam
Si non audire vult, nec adheret ei,
Amplius ille tibi velut Ethnicus est reputandus,
Quo sibi de culpa parcere nullus habet.
Presbiter ergo suis assistens cotidianis
Peccatis nullo debet honore frui:
Non erit exemptus, nam qui neque iura veretur,
Non est iusticie quod quis honoret eum:
Qui contra legem vetitis presumpserit vti,
1720 Debet concessis lege carere bonis.
Omne quod occultum latet, vlteriore patebit
Fine, nec excusat ordo vel ille status.
Dic, sibi quid valuit tunc excusacio ficta,
Dum foliis fici se male texit Adam?
Quid valet aut, culpam carnis si presbiter vmbra
Contegat ipse sui fultus honore status?

Hic scribit contra hoc quod aliqui presbiteri

dicunt, qualiter ipsi in carnis luxuriam
committendo non grauius hominibus laicis
deum offendunt.

Dicunt presbiteri, non te peccant magis ipsi,

Capm xxiii.
Dum carnis vicio fit sua victa caro:
Sicut sunt alii fragili de carne creati,
1730 Dicit quod membra sic habet ipse sua.
‘Sum velut alter homo,’ dicit ‘cur tunc mulieres,
Sicut habent alii, non retinebo michi?’
Argumenta sui sic criminis ipse refingit,
Liber et est vicio, dicit, vt alter homo.
Hec tamen, vt credo, fingit contraria vero,
 Nam magis est sanctus omnibus ille status.
Ex improuiso sumi reliqus valet ordo,
Quo minor est culpa, si cadat inde rea;
Assumi subito set presbiteri sacer ordo
1740 Non valet, immo suas spectat habere vices.
Nam per quinque gradus scandit prius, estque
probatus,
Quolibet vnde suum preuidet ipse statum:
Omnis et inde gradus a presule sanctificatus
Est et non alio, sanccior vt sit eo.
Per caput atque manus est crismate presbiter
vnctus,
Vt sit ob hoc aliis dignus in orbe magis;
Accipiensque iugum votum vouet ammodo
castum,410
Quo faciat munda mundior acta sua:
Et quia preuisa sic vota facit, puto culpa,
1750 Dum facit econtra, fert grauiora mala:
Qui daret exemplum virtutis et est viciosus,
Errat plus ducto ductor in ore meo.
Hiis circumspectis michi sic per singula causis,
Estimo presbiteros te magis esse reos.
Se licet excuset fingens sibi verba sacerdos,
Nulla sue mentis interiora iuuat;
Inmemor immo sacri quem ceperat ordinis, vltro
Scandala sic facti querit in orbe sui.
Non puto presbitero sutorem quod status vnit,
1760 Culpa nec in simili lance coequat eos:411
Presbiter et laicus non sunt Bercarius vnum,
Nec scelus in simili condicione grauat.
Castum se vouit sibi cum fuit vncta corona,
Stringitur et voto quisq u e fidelis homo.
Non foret hic tanti mercede locatus honoris,
Sit nisi quod maius inde subiret onus:
Nam nequit hoc facere rex est qui maior in orbe,
Quod minor in Cristo presbiter ipse potest:
Sic, quia de iure reliquis prefertur honore,
 1770 Ledit eum grauius crimine iuris onus.
Heu! quod iniqua manus mulierum feda pudendis
Debet in altari tangere sacra dei!
Qui corpus domini tractabit, et est meretrici
Turpiter attractus, Cristus abhorret opus.
Qui fierent Cristi serui, sunt dumque ministri
Demonis, heu! nostram quis reparabit opem?

Hic describit qualiter omnia et singula que

sacerdocii concernunt officium magne virtutis
misteria designant: et primo dicet de vestibus
sacerdotalibus ex vtraque lege competenter
dispositis.

O bene si penset que sunt sibi iura sacerdos,

Capm. xxiiii.
Quid sit honor, quid onus, quid vel honoris opus,
Singula qui iuste sibi ponderat, instat et eque,
1780 Res est mira nimis, si male gestet onus.
Omne quod ille status sibi vendicat esse beatum
Cernitur, vt sancti sint magis inde viri.
Non est tam modicum quod misse spectat ad
vsum,
Lege sacerdotum quin decet esse sacrum.
Ornatus varii, quibus vtitur ipse sacerdos,
Virtutis varie mistica signa gerunt.
Poderis est vestis, aliter que dicitur alba,
Presbiteri corpus que tegit vsque pedes:
Vt foris est albus, fieret sic albior intus
1790 Presbiter, vt mores gestet in orbe bonos.
Cinctus ephot Samuel domini studet esse minister,
Cui paruam tunicam texuit Anna parens:
In tunica tenui fidei doctrina notatur,
Qua tenues animos gracia mater alit:
Ex lino factum per ephot signatur honestas
Carnis, quam mundam presbiter ipse geret.
Balteus est eciam, tunicam qui stringit honeste,
 Ne femur in luxu facta pudenda sciat:
Fert humerale decens, vt nostras presbiter egras
1800 Confortans animas ad meliora ferat:
Et ligat in summo sapiens capitale sacerdos,
Vt capitis sensus non sinat ire vagos.
Infula vestit eum circumdata, que nitet auro,
Quod virtute sua cuncta metalla regit;
Splendet et in simili forma virtute sacerdos,
Si bene conseruet ordinis ipse statum:
Aurum veste gerit sanctus, cum splendet in illo
Pre reliquis rutilans clara sophia dei.
Ne tunice leuiter possit ruptura minari,
1810 Nobilis in giro texilis ora micat:
Se nec et ipse bonus disrumpat in orbe sacerdos,
Ne pateat rima criminis vlla sui.
Hac se mundicia precinctus presbiter ornat,
Vt totus mundus munera munda sacret.
Aron et electis vestes texuntur, vt horum412
Quisque sacerdotis possit honore frui:
Sic modo presbiteri, seu summi siue minores,
Efficiunt Cristi corpus idemque sacrant.
Nam nos cum vinum panemque sacramus in ara,
1820 Hoc verus sanguis vna fit atque caro:
Qui Cristi carnem matris confecit in aluo,
Corpus in altari conficit ille sacrum.
Quadra fit altaris species, vt quatuor orbis
Partibus ecclesie sit solidata fides.
Vestibus ornatus qui sic et moribus extat
Dignus, non aliter, presbiterandus erit.
Quos tante vestes, quos gloria tanta perornat,
Sint magis vt sancti causa requirit eos:
Dedecus ecclesie presul qui talia prestat
1830 Presbiteris laicis, iure negante, parit.
Quos sinus ecclesie recipit, noscat sinus aptos
Esse deo, reliquos euomat ipsa foris.
 Hic loquitur qualiter sacrificia de veteri lege
altari debita fuerunt in figura ad exemplum nunc
noue legis presbiterorum: dicit vlterius qualiter
ex vtraque lege sacrificantes altari debent esse
sine macula.

Capm. xxv.Lex vetus instituit animalia, de quibus olim

Immolat altari plebs holocausta deo;
Semper et ex omni mactato sic animali
Debita presbitero porcio certa fuit.
Hoc tamen ad Cristi legem latitante figura
Presbiteris nostris mistica iura notat.
Illa sacerdoti que spectat pars holocausti,
1840 Curatis nostris est memoranda satis:
Heeque sacerdotis sunt partes, pectus et armus
Diuisus dexter, lege iubente sacra.
Pectus doctrine locus est, nam quisque sacerdos
Debet subiectos recta docere suos:
Forcior est armus dexter, signatque quod eius
Actus sit fortis, nulla sinistra gerens:
Armus diuisus docet vt viuendo sacerdos
Excedat populum, nil populare gerens.
Non est tam modicum quid in ordine
presbiterorum,
1850 Grande ministerii quin sibi pondus habet;
Nam lex iuncta vetus cum lege noua manifestant
Vndique presbiteros quod decet esse sacros.
Petrus in Aurora que scribam scripsit, et ille
Testis in hac causa verus et auctor erit.
Lex vetus ista iubet, noua que confirmat, vt
omnis
Sacrificans aris inmaculatus erit;
Absque sui macula sit corporis actus et eius,
Displicet vnde deo, feda nec vlla gerat:
Non habeat maculam, nec sit mixtura reatus,
1860 Ne purum maculet accio praua bonum.
Que tamen hee macule dicuntur in ordine dicam,
 Presbiter vt lector sit magis inde memor.
Dicitur hic cecus, qui mundi puluere plenus413
Ad lumen vite carpere nescit iter:
Est lippus, cuius mens ingenio micat intus,
Set carnale tamen eius opacat opus:
Albugo cecat oculos, et denotat illum
Qui tumet, ascribens candida facta sibi:
Est paruo naso qui nec discernere parua
1870 Sufficit, et quod agit perficit absque sale:
Est nimio naso, qui non intelligit illud
Quod legit, et doctum se tamen ipse facit:
Est torto naso, qui dulce fatetur amarum,
Et sanctos actus iudicat esse malos:
Est claudus, qui nouit iter, set currere tardus
Heret in hoc mundo, carne ligante pedem:
Fractus pes et fracta manus reputatur in illo,
Qui claudo peior tardat ad omne bonum:
Hic est gibbosus, quem mundi sarcina curuat,
1880 Lumina nec cordis summa videre sinit:
Corporis in scabie succensa libido notatur,
Que corrupta suo crimine plura facit.
Predictis viciis si quis se senciat egrum,
Lex iubet vt panem non sacret ille deo.
Oza manus tendens accessit vt erigat archam,
Set nimis audacem mors fuit vlta manum:
Hinc ideo dicunt meruisse necem, quia nocte
Transacta cohitu coniugis vsus erat.
Declaratur in hoc, quod qui pollutus ad aram
1890 Accedat, mortis vulnere dignus erit:414
Experimenta docent, quod ab hoc detergere
sordes
Feda manus nescit, dum tenet illa lutum.
Presbiter est dictus prebens aliis iter, et si
Erret, tunc errant ducere quosque putat.
Dans sacra siue docens, notat ista loquela,
sacerdos
Si malus est, alii sunt magis inde mali.
 Non sine stat cura quicumque professus in huius
Ordinis est opere, si bene seruet opus:
Ergo prius videas qui scandere vis, et in illum
1900 Si scandas, facias que iubet ordo tuus:
Non solum faciem, mores set confer et artes,
Proficias curis ex quibus ipse tuis.

Hic loquitur quod etas sufficiens, priusquam

gradum sacerdocii sibi assumat, in homine
requiritur: loquitur eciam de suorum rasura
pilorum, et dicit quod talia in signum mundicie
et sanctitatis specialiter presbiteris conueniunt:
dicit vlterius quod presbiteri a bonis non debent
esse operibus ociosi.415

Quam prius assumat, matura requiritur etas,

Capm. xxvi.
Presbiter officium, plenus vt ipse regat:
Nam flos etatis temptanti congruit hosti;
Carnis et etatis feruet vterque calor:
Iam quos vexat ad huc tenere lasciuia carnis416
Improba, pastores non decet esse gregis.
Vt regnare deo possint, sibi rasa corona
1910 Restat, et vt facta nobiliora gerant.
Radices non extirpat rasura pilorum,
Set rasi crescunt multiplicando magis:
Sic licet expellas omnes de pectore motus,
Non tamen hec penitus cuncta fugare potes:
Non ita rasus eris, quin semper habet caro
pugnam;417
Intus habes cum quo prelia semper agas.
Si quando mundum fugias, a puluere mundi
Perfecte purus non potes esse tamen:
Nam, licet eniteas summis virtutibus, omnes
1920 Ex animo culpas non resecare vales.
Fit tamen ex minimis hec quam retines tibi culpa,
Ne tua mens tumeat, dum bona multa geris:418
 Ex tali culpa tibi soluitur ergo tributum,
Vt tua mens paueat labe remorsa breui.
Sepe cadit iustus, fragilis quia vir manet omnis,
Ne nimis exaltet gloria vana virum:
Qui leuiter cecidit, vt surgat forcius, ille
Casum felicem suscipit ante deum.
Lux estis mundi, set non penitus sine fumo,
1930 Nam sine peccato viuere nullus habet:
Sepe boni fructus post temptamenta sequntur,
Mercedemque suam prelia carnis habent.
Vtile nempe foret seuas extinguere flammas,
Et sanum vicii pectus habere tuum:
Ne videant oculi per quod temptentur, et aures
Obtura, vicii ne sonus intret ibi.
Tucius est aptumque magis discedere pace,
Ponere quam bellum, vincere quale nequis:
Integer est melior nitidus gladiator in armis,
1940 Quam cum tela suo sanguine tincta madent:
Inque dei missis nitidus sine labe sacerdos
Victor in hoc placidum fert sibi lucra deum.
Quale sit hoc quod amas celeri circumspice
mente,
Et tua lesuro subtrahe colla iugo:
Debet homo sapiens nascentes pellere morbos,
Inueniet tardam ne sibi lentus opem:
Opprime, dum noua sunt, subiti mala semina
morbi,
Et tuus incipiens ire resistat equs;
Nam mora dat vires, teneras mora conficit vuas,
1950 Et validas segetes quod fuit herba facit.
Si Venus agreditur, tibi sit magis aspera vita,
Flamma recens modica sepe retardat aqua.
Vt corpus redimas, ferrum pacieris et ignem,
Quantum fert anime plus medicina tue.
Ocia si tollas, periere Cupidinis arcus,
Extincteque iacent et sine luce faces.
Vt non delinquas, debes imponere culpe
 Frena, vagos gressus, ocia queque fugans.
Presbiteros opere de re sibi que sit honesta,
1960 Aut se de precibus sollicitare decet:
Fecit enim sportas, vt frangeret ocia, Paulus,
Namque vagans aliquo noluit esse modo.
Ex requie cerpit pestis seuissima luxus,419
Armiger et fame prodigus hostis honor:
Ex requie sequitur infortunata voluptas,
Pauperies anime, criminis omne nephas.
Luxuriant animi varia sub ymagine moti,
Saltem virtutis dum caro nescit opus:
Vtile nempe dabit deus omne viris operosis,
1970 Debet mercedis pondera ferre labor.
Sollicitudo decet animam discreta, labores
Dum subit, vt vicia carne domare queat:
Sollicitudo iuuat corpus, perquirat vt illa
Victum, quo licitis viuat in orbe modis:
Ocia dumque caro petit et torpet labor exul,
In scelus ex solito more paratur iter.
Demon femineos et molles diligit actus,
Quando viri virtus omne virile negat;
Ocia quippe nocent in talibus absque labore,
1980 Quorum Cristicolis non valet esse salus.
Culpa quidem longe facit esse deo, prope virtus;
Displicet ista deo, placat et illa deum.

Hic loquitur de presbiterorum dignitate

spirituali, et qualiter hii, si bene agant sua
officia, plus aliis proficiunt: sinautem, de suis
malis exemplis delinquendi magis ministrant
occasiones.

Capm. xxvii. Presbiteri fit magnus honor maiorque potestas,

Si procul a viciis sit pius atque bonus.
Hii sacramenti manibus misteria summi
Tractant, quo verbo fit caro iuncta deo:
 Hiique scelus lauacro baptismi tollere sancto
Possunt, quo primus corruit ipse parens:
Hii quoque lege noua celebrant sponsalia nostra,
1990 Et si iura petunt cassaque nulla ferunt:
Hii quoque confessis veniam prestant residiuis,420
Errantique viro dant remeare deo:
Hii quoque celestem nobis dant sumere panem,
Post et in extremis vnccio spectat eis:
Hii quoque defunctis debent conferre sepultis,
Inque sua missa reddere vota pia.
Hii sunt sal terre, quo nos condimur in orbe,
Absque sapore suo vix salietur homo.
In sale, quod misit in aquas, Heliseus easdem421
2000 Sanat, nec remanet gustus amarus eis:
In sale signatur prudens discrecio iusti,
Vt discretus homo condiat inde suos.
Hii sunt lux mundi, quapropter si tenebrosi
Sint, tunc nos ceci stamus in orbe vagi.
Dans offendiculum ceco quo leditur vllum
Vt deus instituit, hic maledictus erit:
Ceco preponit obstacula, qui maledicta
Peccandi prebet per sua facta viam.
Hii sunt scala Iacob tangens celestia summa,422
2010 Plena satis gradibus, vnde patebit iter:
Hii sunt mons sanctus, per quos conscendere
debet
Virtutum culmen quisque fidelis homo:
Hii sunt consilium nostrum, via recta superne,
Legis doctores, et noua nostra salus:
Hii claudunt celum populo, reserant et apertum,
Possunt hiique boni subdere cuncta sibi.
‘Crescite,’ dicitur hiis, ‘et multum reddite fructum’;
Pertinet ad mores ista loquela bonos:
Dicitur hiis, ‘Terram replete’; nota tibi dictum:
2020 Plenus in ecclesia fructibus esto bonis.
Ante deum vacuus nemo veniet, quia nullus
Expers virtutis debet adesse deo.
 Sic placare deo iustosque reosque sacerdos
Debet, et ad celos fundere thura precum:
Oret ne iustus a iusticia cadat, oret
Vt prauus surgat et mala prima fleat.
O quam res vilis, dum presbiter est vt asellus,
Moribus indoctus, et sine lege rudis!
In numero sunt presbiteri celi quasi stelle,
2030 Vix tamen ex mille si duo luce micant:
Scripta legunt nec scripta sciunt, tonsi tamen ipsi
A vulgo distant, quod satis esse putant.
Sunt tales; et sunt alii quos ardua virtus
Ornat in ecclesia, qui bona multa ferunt.
Emittit coruum Noe, non redit ille; columbam
Emittit, reditum missa columba facit:
Sic et in ecclesia sunt corui suntque columbe,
Sunt cum felle mali, sunt sine felle boni.
Cras primam cantant, cum se conuertere tardant,
2040 Set tollit tales sepe suprema dies:
Tales sunt pigri, quos mundi vincula nectunt,
Nec promissa dei regna sitire volunt.
Ordinis ipse sui qui seruat iura sacerdos,
Rebus et exemplis dogmata sancta docens,
Non honor est tantus, quo non sit in ordine dignus,
Laus sibi nec populi sufficit, immo dei:
In clero fateor, quos approbat ardua virtus,
Illorum merito gracia maior erit.

Postquam dixit de errore illorum qui inter

seculares sacerdocii ministerium sibi
assumpserunt, intendit dicere secundum
tempus nunc de errore scolarium, qui ecclesie
plantule dicuntur.

Capm. Nomine sub cleri cognouimus esse scolares,

xxviii.Ecclesie plantas quos vocat ipse deus.
2050 Orti diuini bonus extat planta scolaris,
 Ecclesie fructus que facit esse bonos.
Qui studet in morum causis et non viciorum,
Qui sibi nec mundum computat, immo deum,
Clericus ipse dei super hoc reputatur, et eius
Principium fine clauditur inde bono.
Summi doctoris virtutum regula iusta
Discipulos dociles de racione fouet:
Qui studiis herent, cor ad alta leuant et in altis
2060 Figunt, hii vera sunt holocausta deo.
Nunc tamen inter eos puto multos esse vocatos,
Electos paucos condicione probos:
Moribus hii dudum studii virtute vacabant,
Nunc viciis studia dant vigilare sua.
Vix pro materia si nunc studet vnus habenda,
Solum set forme sufficit vmbra sue.
Clericus ire scolas animo paciente solebat,
Gloria nunc mundi statque magistra sibi,
Discurrensque vagus potator et accidiosus,
2070 Deditus et veneri, circuit hic et ibi.
Ex planta sterili non fiet fertilis arbor,
Nec faciet fructus arbor iniqua bonos:
Sepe senecta tenet, tenuit quodcumque iuuentus;
Si malus est iuuenis, vix bonus ipse vetus.
Est bona que radix bonitatis germina profert,
De radice mala germinat omne malum.
Quisque suos igitur pueros castiget, vt illa
Virgula non licite mentis agenda fugat:
Qui virtutis habet iuuenis cum flore magistrum,
2080 Discat et ipse pie que probitatis erunt,
Proficiet talis; set quem doctor viciosus
Instruit, hic raro fructificabit homo.

Hic querit causam que scolarium animos ad

ordinem presbiteratus suscipiendum inducit:
tres enim causas precipue allegat; tractat eciam
de quarta causa, que raro ad presens contingit.
 Sunt aliqui, studio modo qui perstant animoso,
Capm. xxix.
Nescio que causa sit tamen inde rea.
Quicquid agant homines, intencio iudicat omnes;
Corde quod interius est capit ipse deus:
Istis prepositis, verum michi pande, scolaris,
Dic que sit studii condita causa tui:
Muniri primo cum te facis ordine sacro,
2090 Cum te principiis presbiterare venis,
O que mente tua fuerit tunc mocio summa,
Hoc vel pro mundi sit vel amore dei?
Aut tu certa tue michi dic primordia cause,
Aut tibi que sapio dicere vera volo.
‘Sunt plures cause, per quas communis in
orbe423
Est sacer hic ordo carus vt ecce modo:
In prima causa fugio mundana flagella
Legis communis, que dat amara viris:
Vlterius video quod non sudore laboro,
2100 Ocia que quero sic et habere queo:
Te r c i a causa meum dat vestitum quoque victum;
Sicque meo placito persto quietus ego.
Ex hiis causata mea stat deuocio tota,
Qua poterit cerni rasa corona michi:
Hec est causa scole, ciuilia iura studere
Que facit, et logicam me docet arte suam.
Ipsa scoleque gradus michi dat conscendere
summos,
Sic et in ecclesiam scandere quero bonam:
Nam si fama viget, puto quod prebenda vigebit,
2110 Sicque vacare libris est labor ipse leuis.
Sic sacer ordo michi placet, et sic litera cleri
Confert, dum studio pinguia lucra gero.
Nunc causas dixi, constat quibus ordo scolari,
Sic propter mundum me reor esse reum;
Nam michi nil melius, dum sufficit ipsa facultas,
Estimo, quam mundi gaudia ferre michi.’
Est set adhuc causa melior tamen omnibus, illa
 Qua scola discipulum gaudet habere bonum.
Hec solet antiquis, non nostris stare diebus,
2120 Que de virtute concipit acta scole.
Nuper erant mundi qui contempsere beati
Pompas, et summum concupiere bonum;
Et quia scire scolas acuit mentes fore sanctas,
Scripture studiis se tribuere piis.
Non hos ambicio, non hos amor vrget habendi,
Set studio mores conuenienter eunt:
Hii contemplantes celum terrena negabant,
Causa voluptatis nulla remouit eos:
Hii neque serviciis optabant regis inesse,
2130 Nec foris in plebe nomen habere Rabi:
Hos neque precellens superabat comptus inanis
Nec vini luxus, nec mulieris amor:
Moribus experti dederant exempla futuris,
Que sibi discipulus debet habere scolis.
Nunc tamen in v i c i u m v i r t u s
c o n u e r t i t u r , e t que
Nuper erant mores turpia plura gerunt:
Que modo scripta dei dicunt se discere laudi,
In laudem mundi vertit auarus honor.
O res mira nimis! legit et studet ipse scolaris
2140 Mores, dum vicia sunt magis acta sua:
Sic quia stat cecus morum sine lumine clerus,
Erramus laici nos sine luce vagi.

FOOTNOTES:
340 Heading Hic incipit exquo L Incipit prologus libri tercii om. L
341 9 set et S (et in later hand)
342 13 vulgus] populus (ras.) C
343 16 Vt sit D Sit sic L
344 46 conciliumque H
345 58 malo C
346 69 poteruntque C
347 90 Quodque prius D Quod prius L
348 In place of Incipit &c., L has here the four lines ‘Ad mundum
mitto,’ with picture below: see p. 19.
349 4* exempla D humus] mundus DL
350 18* eum] ei D enim L
351 22* ille CD ipse HGEL
352 27* poterint D
353 1** regentes H₂
354 4** mundit T
355 24** ipse] ille H₂
356 58 periat HCGL
357 81 Marcenarius G mercennarius E
358 86 Glebas D
359 141 ipseque D
360 176 ouis CEHGDLH₂ onus ST
361 193 possint D
362 Heading Hic loquitur quomodo de legibus positiuis quasi
cotidie noua instituuntur nobis peccata, quibus tamen
priusquam fiant prelati propter lucrum dispensant, et ea fieri
libere propter aurum permittunt LTH₂ (Hic quomodo
diligentibus positiuis ... prius fiant &c. L liberi LT)
363 229 numquam L vnquam D
364 258 iugum] suum C
365 273 Dum S Cum CEHDL
366 300 gerarchiam SHT Ierarchiam CL ierarchiam ED
367 Heading 2 dicitur tamen nunc D dicitur tamen L
368 351 vinximus SDL vincimus CEHG
369 375 ff. marginal note om. ELTH₂L₂
370 375 margin hic om. S
371 margin in guerris S guerris CHGD
372 380 margin spoliantes S om. CHGD
373 379 neque C
374 401 reperare S reparare CED
375 454 cotinuatque H
376 462 saruat H
377 Heading deuincant EL deuincat SCHD
378 516 Solennes CEL Solemnes D
379 536 Hec DL
380 546 sit CE
381 561 No paragraph S
382 Cap. ix Heading 2 nec decet CEDL
383 579 sceptrum C
384 595 tetram CEH terram SGDL
385 617 No paragr. CE
386 633 sunt vmbra velud (velut) fugitiua CEG sunt fugitiua velut
vmbra L
387 641 piper vrtice om. D (blank)
388 685 Ne C
389 Heading 2 incontrarium S
390 840 lucri] dei EHT
391 934 ruet CH
392 989 sit] sic S
393 1124 Et CEGDL Est SHTH₂
394 1149 subectos S
395 1214 ad hec CEHGDTH₂ ad hoc L et hec S
396 1265 fallit S
397 1374 timuisse EHL
398 1376 vngat vt D vngat et SCEHGL
399 1454 plus sibi sensus hebes est SGDL fit sibi sensus hebes
CEHTH₂
400 1498 Nec CE
401 1518 circueuntis C
402 1533 Est et S Est sed (set) CEHGL Est set et D
403 1541 Durior CEHGDLT Durius S
404 1552 modicicum S
405 Heading 1 Qostquam S
406 2 iam om. S
407 1617 solennia CEDL
408 1642 Hoc S Hec CEHGDL
409 1695 si CEHGDLTH₂ sua S
410 1747 vouet CEHGT vouit SDLH₂
411 1760 nec in simili conditione grauat (om. ll. 1761 f.) C
412 1815 Aaron CED
413 1863 puluere CEH vulnere SGDL
414 1890 Accedat SL Accedit CEHGD
415 Heading 5 f. a bonis non debent operibus esse CE a bonis
operibus non debent esse L a bonis operibus non esse D
416 1907 ad huc SGT adhuc CEHDL
417 1915 pugnam CEHL pungnam SGT pinguam D
418 1922 Nec C timeat EDL
419 1963 serpit CE
420 1991 residiuis SET recidiuis CHDL
421 1999 Helizeus C Helyseus EL
422 2009 No paragr. S
423 2095 No paragr. S
 Exquo tractauit de errore cleri, ad quem
precipue nostrarum spectat regimen animarum,
iam intendit tractare de errore virorum
Religiosorum: et primo dicet de Monachis, et
aliis bonorum temporalium possessionem
optinentibus; ordinis vero illorum sanctitatem
commendans, illos precipue qui contraria
faciunt opera redarguit.

Incipit liber Quartus.

Capm. i. Sunt et Claustrales diuerse condicionis,

De quibus vt sapio scribere pauca volo.
Actus vt ipse probat, quosdam possessio signat,
Quosdam pauperies, set similata nimis.
Est bona religio de se, set religionem
Qui fallunt, tales dicimus esse malos:
Qui bene sub claustro viuunt fore credo beatos,
Quos mundanus amor nescit habere reos;
Quique manus aratro mittunt nec respicientes
10 Retro, viros sanctos ordo notabit eos.
Est deus in monachis, sunt et commercia celi
Hiis, sine qui mundo claustra subire volunt.
Cum quis amare duo pariter contraria sumit,
Alterius vires subtrahit alter amor:424
Sic qui presumunt facies laruare sub vmbra
Ordinis, et mundi crimina subtus agunt,
Talibus ipse mea fero scripta, nec alter ab ipsis
Leditur, immo suum quisque reportet onus.
Est nichil ex sensu proprio quod scribo, set ora
20 Que michi vox populi contulit, illa loquar.
Sunt etenim monachi, possessio quos titulauit,
Quidam, quos nullis moribus ordo ligat;
Nam possessores aliqui sic ocia querunt
Ordinis, vt nequeunt vlla nociua pati: