2342-AA00-ML-201 - 0 - Hazards Analysis (HAZAN)

Project N° Unit Document Code Serial N° Rev.
Page
2342 AA00 ML 201 0 1/17
KARBALA REFINERY FEED PROJECT

SCOP – IRAQ (Contract n° 2171)
The present document or drawing is property of TECHNIP ITALY S.p.A. and shall not, under any circumstances, be totally or partially, directly or indirectly, transferred, reproduced, copied, disclosed or used, without its prior written consent, for any purpose and in any way other than that for
Hazards Analysis
(HAZAN)
which it is specifically furnished or outside the extent of the agreed upon right of use.
C. PAESANI – C. PASCALI / O.
0 15-09-2010 ISSUED FOR FEED D. BUCCOLIERO C. SCALA
LOIACONO
C. PAESANI – C. PASCALI / O.
A 30-05-2010 ISSUED FOR REVIEW D. BUCCOLIERO C. SCALA
LOIACONO
REV. DATE STATUS WRITTEN BY CHECKED BY APPROV./AUTHOR. BY
(name & visa) (name & visa) (name & visa)
DOCUMENT REVISIONS
TECHNIP ITALY S.p.A. - 00148 ROMA - Viale Castello della Magliana, 68

Project N° Unit Document Code Serial N° Rev. Page
2342 AA00 ML 201 0 2/17

INDEX
ATTACHMENT LIST 3
1. INTRODUCTION 4
1.1. Background 4
1.2. Study Objectives 4
1.3. Methodology 5
1.3.1. Data Collection and Review 5
1.3.2. Hazard Identification 5
1.3.3. Consequence Analysis 7
2. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 8
2.1. Overview 8
2.2. Material Property Review 8
2.3. Representatives Scenarios Selection 9
2.4. Equipment Lay-Out Hazard Identification 9
2.5. Potential Explosion Sites (PES) 10
3. CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT 11
3.1. Software 11
3.2. Meteorological Data 11
3.3. Leak Size 11
3.4. Release duration and release rates 11
3.5. Release Direction 12
3.6. Pool Extension 12
3.7. VCE modelling and assumptions 12
3.8. BLEVE modelling and assumptions 12
3.9. Threshold levels for hazard reporting 13
4. RESULTS 14
4.1. Source Term Results 14
4.2. Jet Fire Results 14
4.3. Pool Fire Results 14

4.4. Flash Fire Results 14
4.5. VCE Results 14
4.6. VCE effects on Refinery Buildings 15
4.7. Toxic Dispersion Results 16
5. HIGHLIGHTS 17

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Attachment list
Attachment 1. Representative Scenarios List

Attachment 2. Scenarios Distribution
Attachment 3. General Plot Plan
Attachment 4. Scenarios Release Details
Attachment 5. Potential Explosion Sites (PES)
Attachment 6. Radiation Effects
Attachment 7. Flash Fire Effect (LFL contour)
Attachment 8. Jet Fire Effect (radiation contour)
Attachment 9. VCE effect (overpressure)
Attachment 10. Toxic Effect
Attachment 11. Tank Pool Fire

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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background
Iraq's State Company for Oil Projects (SCOP) awarded Technip Italy (TPIT) the Front
End Engineering Design (FEED) for the new Karbala refinery to be located 110 km
southwest of Baghdad.
As part of the initial project activities, TPIT has performed an Hazards Analysis on
potential hazardous scenarios of loss of containment to determine the impacts of fire,
explosion and toxic effects on critical and vulnerable receptors. The study has been
carried out in support of:
 the development of the General Plot Plan,
 the development of the Fire Fighting and Fire&Gas Detection Philosophies,
 the identification of the requirements of protection against blast loads,
flammable and toxic dispersion for buildings
This document outlines the methodology and findings of the study.
1.2. Study Objectives
The objective of the study is to review the plot plan with regard to the location of the
process units, critical equipment and inter-distances between process unit and critical
buildings such that risk due to identified hazards from the process units is minimized.
The detailed objectives of the study include the following:

 Identify the hazards due to accidental scenarios associated with the operation
of the plant, such as fires, vapour cloud explosion or toxic dispersion, toward
the surrounding area.
 Evaluate the consequence distances for the identified hazardous scenarios.
 Assess the potential for impacting critical buildings due to vapour cloud
explosion, flammable dispersion or toxic dispersion.
 Suggest mitigation measures where the impact due to identified scenarios is
significant. These measures may include additional separation distance,
relocation, additional Fire & Gas detection and emergency isolation, additional
fire protection requirements including mounding, water curtain, deluge, etc,

blast design for buildings etc.

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1.3. Methodology
The study is based on a consequence analysis carried out by steps described below.
1.3.1. Data Collection and Review
A review of Process Flow Diagram (PFDs), plot plan and heat and material balance
was carried out to understand the process and to identify issues relevant to the study
objective.
1.3.2. Hazard Identification
Karbala Refinery was designed to process 2 different Crude and for each type of feed
it will be run in 2 modes depending on products request. Therefore the complex is
capable to operate in 4 run cases listed below:
o Crude: Mishrif, KERO production
o Crude: Mishrif, ATK production
o Crude: Basrah, KERO production
o Crude: Basrah, ATK production
This study was carried out considering Mishrif in KERO production configuration
because this run mode implies H2S streams concentrations greater than other cases
as shown on Refinery Block Flow Diagram (2342-AA00-PFD-0010-001-03_A).
The refinery complex includes follow process units:
Table 1-1 Karbala Refinery Project Process Units:

Unit Description
01 Crude and Vacuum Distillation Unit
02 Naphtha Hydrotreating Unit
03 Isomerization Unit
04 Catalytic Reforming Unit
05 Kerosene Hydrodesulfurization Unit
06 Diesel Hydrodesulfurization Unit
07 VGO Hydrotreating Unit
08 Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit
09 PolyNaphta Unit
10 Asphalt Blowing Unit
11 LPG Production Unit
13 Hydrogen Production Unit – Train 1
14 Hydrogen Production Unit – Train 2
15 Hydrogen Production Unit – Common Parts
16 Gas Sweetening and Amine Regeneration Unit
17 Sour Water Stripper Unit
18 Sulphur Recovery Unit – Train 1
19 Sulphur Recovery Unit – Train 2
20 Sulphur Recovery Unit – Common Parts and TGT

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In conjunction with process units the refinery complex includes many utilities such as
water treatment, flare, interconnecting, power station and steam generation that are
essential for plant operation but should be considered not particularly hazardous
compared to process units in terms of operational condition and handled material. For
these reasons only process and storage facilities units were selected as sources of
possible incidental scenarios.
For asphalt blowing unit (unit 10) no hazardous scenario was selected because the
handled materials are less dangerous, in terms of flammability, ignition energy and
vapour pressure with respect to materials handled into other units. Regarding to
sulphur recovery unit and TGT treatment (unit 18, 19, 20), the possible scenarios that
may involve these units are the same of unit 16 and 17.
To simplify the analysis and considering the early development phase of the project,
for each process unit were identified sections that handle hazardous substances, such
as flammable or toxic material. For these sections streams with most critical conditions
in terms of pressure and temperature was used to modelling release scenarios.
The plant handles flammable materials and the following hazardous scenarios can be
considered:
o Pool Fire: a flammable or combustible liquid released to atmosphere can form a

pool; flammable vapours above the pool can be ignited originating a pool fire.
Effects to humans depend on radiation levels;
o Jet Fire: a flammable gas released to atmosphere at high velocity can be

ignited at origin giving a jet fire. Effects to humans depend on radiation levels;
o Flash Fire: a flammable gas or a flashing liquid released to atmosphere, if not

immediate ignited, disperse to atmosphere originating a cloud. The area of the
cloud comprised between LFL (Lower Flammable Limit) and UFL (Upper
Flammable Limit) can develop into a Flash Fire if ignited. Effects on humans are
associated only to the extent of the flammable cloud.
o VCE: a flammable cloud (see previous point) can develop into a Vapour Cloud
Explosion (VCE), if the burning velocity of the cloud is increased due to
turbulence generated by obstacles present in the cloud. Effects on humans are

associated to levels of overpressure generated by pressure wave, and by the
effects of building and structure failure.
o BLEVE (Boiling-Liquid-Expanding-Vapour Explosion): a type of rapid phase

transition in which a liquid contained above its atmospheric boiling point is
rapidly depressurized, causing a nearly instantaneous transition from liquid to
vapour with a corresponding energy release. A BLEVE is often accompanied by
a large fireball if a flammable/combustible liquid is involved, since an external
fire impinging on the vapour space of a pressure vessel is a common BLEVE
initiating scenario.

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o Toxic Dispersion: toxic effects was assessed in terms of IDLH (Immediately

Dangerous to Life and Health) and LC1 (Lethal Concentration) for H2S, IDLH
concentration is considered to be the limit beyond which an individual will not be
capable of escaping death or permanent injury without help in less than 30
minutes. LC1 is the concentration of H2S in air which causes the death of 1% if
exposed for at least 30 minutes. Concentration limit was determined by Institut
National de l'Environnement Industriel et des Risques.
1.3.3. Consequence Analysis
For each section/stream, identified in the previous step, representative hole sizes of 1”,
2” and 4” were considered for estimating the hazard distances. The selection of hole
sizes was done based on past experience with quantitative risk assessment on similar
projects in order to identify hole sizes which are expected to give maximum risk
(frequency x consequence). Large leaks or ruptures may give a higher consequence
but are associated with very low frequency.
Consequences derived from BLEVE/Fireball scenarios were assessed but not reported
with other results. In this project equipment which could be affected by this scenario
are LPG storage tanks and in general vessels holding high quantity of pressurized
liquid. Regarding to LPG storage it was decided, in accordance with SCOP, (L-TPIT-
SCOP-0063) to store LPG in mounded bullets. This kind of storage protects the vessel
from fire engulfment and radiation from a fire in close proximity, as well as acts of
sabotage. Regarding to other equipment that could be affected by BLEVE/Fireball, the
analysis highlight that the effects, in terms of radiation and overpressure, are much
lower than those related to other scenarios.
Source term modelling was carried out to determine the release rates and associated
consequences in terms of scenarios that may be expected should a loss of
containment occur. Release rates for identified scenarios were estimated using the
DNV PHAST v6.53.1 software. A detailed list of selected scenarios is shown in
Attachment 1.

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2. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
2.1. Overview
This section of the report presents the details of hazard identification carried out in
order to identify loss of containment scenarios considered in the risk assessment.
A review of the refinery was conducted to identify the major hazards based on the
main hazardous fluid handled. The outcome of the review has been used as the basis
for developing a representative set of hazardous scenarios to be analyzed in detail.
2.2. Material Property Review
The potential major hazardous incidents arising from plant are mainly associated with
the loss of containment of:
 Combustible Gas/vapours with high Hydrogen Content;

 Flammable flashing liquids at high pressure and high temperature;
 LPG;
 Vapour/gas at high Hydrogen Sulphide content
Besides Hydrogen Sulphide, other toxic substances have been identified in the Karbala
refinery Complex:
 Carbon Monoxide in the Hydrogen Unit
 Ammonia in the Sour Water Stripping Unit
The risk associated with the accidental release of streams containing Carbon
Monoxide or Ammonia was considered low compared to the risk posed by an
accidental release of Hydrogen Sulphide due to the lower toxicity of Carbon Monoxide
and to the very low flow rate and inventory of Ammonia.
Early ignition of a flammable liquid or combustible gas would result respectively in a

pool fire or jet fire. Otherwise, a flammable cloud would be formed by the gaseous jet
release or flashing liquid release or from an evaporating liquid pool. For example,
material above its auto-ignition temperature will likely result in immediate ignition while
sub-cooled non-flashing material will be more likely to result in a delayed ignition on
leak. The resultant pool / jet fire from early ignition will usually be associated by a high
energy flame which if it impinges on adjoining equipment would result in escalation.

However, the risk of fire escalation can be greatly reduced if proper fire protection /
adequate separation distance of hydrocarbon inventory is in place.
Delayed ignition (once gas has dispersed) of a flammable cloud will generally lead to a
flash fire. However, if part of the flammable cloud envelop lies within a congested area,
this flash fire could develop into an explosion which may cause severe damage to
equipment and structure. The flame front from a flash fire/explosion may flash back to
the source and lead to a jet fire or a pool fire. Delayed ignition requires an ignition
source to initiate the event and many of these incidents can be prevented if
appropriate measures for control of ignition sources are in place.

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Dominant hazardous components handled in Karbala refinery Complex and their

typical properties are listed in Table 2.1.
Table 2-1 Main Hazardous Material handled in Karbala Refinery

Flammability Hazard
(typical)
Hazardous
Section Main Hazard
Substances Flash Autoignition
point Temperature
°C °C
H2/Light Hydrogen production Unit, Isomerization, CCR,

JF/FF/VCE - 500
Hydrocarbon KHT, DHT, VGO HDT, FCC, ARU
s H2 rich
Crude CDU/VDU, Tank Farm JF/FF/VCE/PF - -
Heavy HC CDU/VDU, FCC, VGO HDT, asphalt blowing PF >230 300~350
LPG CDU/VDU, LPG unit, Polynaphta, FCC, CCR JF/FF/VCE/FB/BL -73 460
CDU/VDU, Naphta HDT, Isomerization, VGO HDT,
Naphtha PF/JF/FF/VCE <0 200
Polynaphta, CCR
Diesel CDU/VDU, DHT PF/FF/VCE 50~120 250~290
Kerosene CDU/VDU, KHT PF/FF/VCE 38 210
CDU/VDU, NHT, KHT, DHT, VGO HDT, FCC, LPG

H2S TX GAS -
Unit, ARU, SWS, SRU
JF: Jet Fire, FF: Flash Fire, PF: Pool Fire, FB: FireBall, VCE: Vapour Cloud Explosion, BL: Bleve, TX: Toxic
2.3. Representatives Scenarios Selection
The selection of representative scenarios was aimed to represent the consequence

from a typical release within the unit/section.
The selection of scenarios has been mainly based on professional judgment and
TPIT’s experience. The following criteria were adopted:
o Equipment processing high risk hazardous material (as described in Section
2.2);
o Equipment with significant hazardous inventory;
o Equipment processing volatile hydrocarbon at high pressure and elevated
temperature.
The scenarios selected are shown in Attachment 1 and depicted in Attachment 2.
2.4. Equipment Lay-Out Hazard Identification
The Consequence Analysis has been based on the General Plot Plan of the Karbala
Refinery Project doc n° 2342-AA00-DW-0051-001 rev C pending which is shown in
Attachment 3. Refinery layout should be used to identify critical installations that can
be classified in:
 potential ignition sources;
 vulnerable receptors.

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In general, potential ignition sources within a typical process plant include:

 Open flame like in a furnace;
 Hot work;
 Hot surface and particles;
 Friction and impact;
 Hot, reactive, unstable and pyrophoric materials;
 Engines and Vehicles; and
 Lightning;
Vulnerable receptors identified in the complex are:

 Control rooms (main and peripheral)
 PIB/SS
 Flare KO drum
2.5. Potential Explosion Sites (PES)
A vapour cloud explosion (VCE) results from a release of flammable material in the
atmosphere, followed by its dispersion and after some delay, ignition upon contact with
an ignition source. In order to develop a blast load during burning of a vapour cloud, a
considerable acceleration of the flame propagation must occur. Flame acceleration is
expected in case of very congested areas or/and in case of high-momentum release
causing turbulence.
The congested areas with potential for flammable cloud accumulation and subsequent
explosion have been identified as Potential Explosion Site (PES). It shall be noted that
in case two or more congested areas are located very close to each other these shall
be consolidated into a single area for modelling purposes.
The PES have been selected considering different extension and different grade of
congestion and considering the location of the vulnerable receptors.
The PES selected are shown in Attachment 5.


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3. CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT
Consequence analysis has been carried out based on the following bases.
3.1. Software
Calculations has been carried out with software PHAST 6.53.1 developed by DNV.
PHAST is internationally recognized software for consequence assessment modelling

which includes a Gaussian dispersion model for toxic/flammable releases and
radiation/explosion consequence assessment models.
3.2. Meteorological Data
The following meteorological data, characteristic for the site, have been adopted:
 Ambient Temperature: 28°C

 Humidity: 70%
The following typical wind speed / stability classes have been adopted in present
study:
 5.0 m/s stability class D (Typical for day conditions)
 2.0 m/s stability class F (Typical for night conditions)
Prevailing wing direction used to report dispersion of flammable/toxic material is NW.
3.3. Leak Size
For each identified section/stream, the following representative hole sizes were
considered for estimating the hazard distances:
 1” small leak from process piping
 2” medium leak from process piping
 4” large leak from process piping
Although hole sizes up to 2” are considered more credible, hole size of 4” has also
been considered to represent a partial failure of a large diameter piping or equipment.
As a general approach hole size of 4” has been considered only for lines with flowrate
greater than 80000 kg/h because at this time of the project not all lines have been
sized.
3.4. Release duration and release rates
Leak on vessel/piping:
Leak duration has been considered an average of 15 minutes (based on the
assumption that the operator can close a manual valve and isolate the source of
leakage or route the vessel content to a safe place). For cases where the release rate
exceeds the normal process flowrate maximum continuous flowrate is set at 130% of

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normal process flow rate according to the capability of the system to supply a flowrate
grater than 100%.
3.5. Release Direction
All releases were modelled as continuous horizontal non-impinged release.
3.6. Pool Extension

2
For liquid releases with capability to form a pool, a maximum spreading area of 250 m
has been set (considering drainage system capacity). For pool fire scenarios given by
storage tanks rupture, the extension of pool is considered equal to dike area.
3.7. VCE modelling and assumptions
The VCE modelling was made using the TNO Multi-Energy model which is a
congestion based model. The Potential Explosion Sites (PES) were selected as shown
in Attachment 5. Due to the congestion degree of process areas TNO 7 overpressure
curve was used in the TNO model. PHAST was then used to evaluate the amount of
pure flammable material in each congested area based on stoichiometric conditions
and dispersion modelling results (flammable material between LFL and UFL) assuming
that the flammable cloud overlaps the PES. PHAST calculates the flammable mass
involved in an explosion as follows:
• The fuel density and stoichiometric concentration for each released hydrocarbon are
calculated based on the mixture properties and ambient conditions;
• Dispersion modelling is then used to calculate the total mass (MT) of fuel within the
flammability limits by integrating the concentration between the UFL and LFL contours;
• An effective volume of the flammable cloud (VT) is calculated from MT and assuming
stoichiometric concentration.
• VT = MT / (Fuel Density x Stoichiometric Concentration);
• If VT is larger than the confined volume VCONF, a stoichiometric concentration is
assumed to exist throughout the confined volume. The mass of fuel within the confined
volume MCONF is then simply calculated as
• M CONF= V CONF x Fuel Density x Stoichiometric Concentration
• If VT is smaller than the confined volume VCONF, then the entire flammable mass
MT is assumed to exist within the confined volume.
• MCONF = MT
• The energy involved in the explosion is then calculated based on the mixture heat of
combustion and the mass of fuel confined MCONF. As the model has been validated
with ground explosions, no modification factor is used in PHAST to evaluate ground
explosion effects.
• Subsequently, PHAST was used to predict the overpressures distances using the
TNO Multi-energy Method
3.8. BLEVE modelling and assumptions
The term BLEVE is used to describe a sudden release of a large mass of pressurized
superheated liquid to the atmosphere. The primary cause is usually an external flame

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impinging on the vessel. The sudden containment failure allows the superheated liquid
to flash leading to rapid increases in volume. This is sufficient to generate a pressure
wave and fragments. If the released fluid is flammable, a fireball may result.
The term fireball is used to describe a fire event associated with a catastrophic rupture
of pressurised vessel with high inventory which usually result in sphere shape fire
engulfed cloud rising from the failed vessel. This is modelled as an instantaneous
event. Fireball events are only considered to involve the vapour and the aerosol
released. The liquid rainout on the ground is considered not to be involved in the
fireball.
3.9. Threshold levels for hazard reporting
Assessment of hazards is quantified reporting the hazards obtained through modelling

(radiation, overpressure and toxic concentration) at thresholds values associated to
different hazard levels as shown in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 Effects Threshold Values

Hazardous Effect Threshold limit
Effect on humans/buildings
scenario typology value
2 Permanent Injury
3 kW/m
Jet fire/ Pool Stationary 2
5 kW/m Beginning of Lethal
fire radiation
2
12.5 kW/m Beginning of Domino Effect
Variable 200 s· (kW/m )

2
Permanent Injuries
BLEVE
thermal
Fireball 350 s·(kW/m )
2
Beginning of Lethal
radiation
Flammable
concentration in Beginning of Lethal
Short time air equal to LFL
Flash Fire thermal Flammable
radiation (It has been considered as threshold limit value in
concentration in
order to take into account potential not ideal
air equal to ½
homogeneous cloud composition)
LFL
0.03 bar g Permanent Injuries
VCE* Overpressure 0.14 bar g Beginning of Lethal
0.3 bar g Beginning of Effect
IDLH 100 ppm of

Permanent Injuries
Toxic H2S
Toxic Dose
Cloud** LC1 472 ppm of
First Lethal (1% death)
H2S
nd
* refer to “Loss prevention in the process industries” F.P. Lees 2 edition
** refer to INERIS “Seuils de Toxicité Aiguë Hydrogène Sulfuré (H2S) “
The distances to the above threshold levels are reported in the downwind direction
from the release source.

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4. RESULTS
4.1. Source Term Results

The results of the source term modelling showing the rates of hazardous liquid or gas
releases for the selected scenarios (Attachment 1 and Attachment 2) are given in
Attachment 4.
4.2. Jet Fire Results

Radiation effects of Jet Fire are shown in Attachment 6 and depicted in Attachment
8.
4.3. Pool Fire Results

Radiation effects of Pool Fire are shown in Attachment 6 and depicted in Attachment
11 (only for storage tank pool fire scenarios).
4.4. Flash Fire Results

Radiation effects of Flash Fire are shown in Attachment 6 and depicted in
Attachment 7.
4.5. VCE Results

Overpressure distances related to the VCE are shown in Table 4.1 and depicted in
Attachment 9.
Table 4.1 VCE Effect

Distance (m) to
PES Leak Flammable Cloud Overpressure
Release TNO
UNIT PES Area size Cloud Mass height levels
Scenario level
(m2) (inch) (kg) LFL (m) 0.03 0.14 0.3
bar g bar g bar g
1 1 3210 S2 4 5348 3.3 7 603 162 97
2 2 4662 S6 2 1550 4 7 706 190 114
3 3 4440 S8 2 308 3.8 7 418 112 67
4 4 7661 S9 2 65 2.7 7 241 65 39
5 5 2550 S12 2 260 3.7 7 395 106 64
S15 4 144 7.6 7 327 88 53
6 6 8400 S16 2 51.8 5.5 7 240 65 39
S18 4 160 14 7 333 90 54

S19 2 624 7 7 624 168 101
7 7 9900 S20 2 34.6 11.5 7 234 63 38
S22 2 284 2.5 7 405 109 65
8 8500 S24 2 561 2.8 7 508 137 82
8
9 5980 S27 2 214 4.5 7 373 100 60
9 10 7014 S33 2 169 4.3 7 344 93 55
11 11 2303 S29 2 52.6 3.7 7 234 63 38
13/14/15 12* * * * 21* * 7 * 64* 38*
In Pes1 flammable mass confined is 941 kg, in Pes2 flammable mass confined is 1489 kg.
* Scenario’s effect was extrapolated based on previous plants experience

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4.6. VCE effects on Refinery Buildings

If an explosion scenario occurs, building located in process area may be exposed to
blast wave. Blast strength impacting on building depends by flammable mass ignited,
explosion area congestion and distance from the explosion point. Overpressure levels
on buildings are listed below:
Table 4.2 VCE Overpressure impacting on Refinery Building

Distance from PEAK
ITEM BUILDING PES centre of PES OVERPRESSURE
(m) (bar g)
B3A-02 Laboratory bldg 1 223 0.10
B3A-01 Refinery Control bldg 1 235 0.09
B1A-01 PIB / SS 3 115 0.14
(2) 81 0.50
B1B-01 PIB / SS 3 121 0.13
4 102 0.08
(1) 71 0.49
2 270 0.09
B1C-01 PIB / SS
4 171 0.04
5 224 0.06
(5) 73 0.24
B1D-01 PIB / SS 1 235 0.09
6 127 0.09
(11) 180 0.04
B1E-01 PIB / SS
10 139 0.08
(8) 90 0.26
(9) 134 0.10
B1F-01 PIB / SS
10 93 0.14
7 252 0.09
(7) 125 0.21

B1G-01 PIB / SS 8 119 0.17
9 205 0.06
B1H-01 PIB / SS - >400 -
B1I-01 PIB / SS - >400 -
B4A-01 PIB / SS 12 * *
8 159 0.12
B4C-01 PIB / SS
10 198 0.06
(-) PES locate in the same unit area of considered building.
* PES-12 effect was extrapolated based on previous plants experience.

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Values related to B4A-01 are missing because blast effects coming from PES 12 are
indicatively only. In consideration of the early stage of the project, this analysis must be
considered as preliminary and calculated values will be confirmed during EPC stage by
EPC Contractor.
4.7. Toxic Dispersion Results
Toxic distances are shown in Table 4.3 and depicted in Attachment 10. Distances are
calculated considering two thresholds, 100ppm (IDLH) and 472ppm (LC1) of H2S.
Table 4.3 Toxic effect

Leak Toxic effect
Scenario material H2S (%w) size distance (m)
(inch) IDLH 100 ppm LC1 472 ppm
1 150 57
UNIT 01 S3 Wild Naphtha 4.4
2 150 57
1 - -
S4** C5- H2S 2.4 2 137 -
4 380 -
1 299 62
UNIT 02 S5 C5- H2S 8.0
2 361 77
1 92 16
S6 Wild Naphtha 0.3 2 167 33
4 167 33
1 159 23
S12 Kero, H2S 0.5 2 170 30
UNIT 05 4 170 30
1 53 27
S13 H2, light HC, H2S 20.1
2 53 27
1 84 24
S15 Diesel, H2S 2.3 2 132 56
UNIT 06 4 179 93
1 165 68
S16 Light HC, Diesel, H2S 6.1
2 256 127
1 78 43
UNIT 07 S20 H2, H2S, Methane 16.0
2 114 63
1 79 11
UNIT 08 S26 Light HC, H2S 2.1
2 193 24
1 259 46
UNIT 11 S28 SOUR LPG 2.0
2 259 46
1 410 86
S30 light HC, H2, H2S 15.1
2 853 233
UNIT 16
1 460 152
S31 H2S 91.8
2 698 324
1 107 65
UNIT 17 S32 H2S, H20, NH3 56.5
2 182 111
*All toxic concentration are measured at 1 m height
**Release point of S4 toxic scenario is located at 6m height
weather 5D has been considered
weather 2F has been considered

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5. Highlights
o Considering actual arrangement of building in general plot plan, it is suggested to

confirm the actual location of MCR by performing in EPC phase a cost-benefit analysis
of blast design load on Main Control Room (B3A-01) versus cable routing in order to
assign the optimal location of MCR between actual and alternative solutions depicted
below.
o During detailed design shall be evaluated the possibility to relocate, as shown in
picture below, Laboratory building (12 in the picture) in order to decrease the blast
design load on it.
Actual
Alternative suggested
location location
o Manned building that may be reached by toxic cloud with H2S concentration equal or
greater than IDLH (100 ppm), as shown in Attachment 10, shall be provided, during
EPC phase, by toxic gas detectors that close HVAC air intake system in order to avoid
building internal air contamination.
o Toxic dispersion model highlights wide impact zones due to high H2S content, in
particular from SWS/ARU.
 H2S released by SWS/ARU unit reach adjacent ones at concentration greater than
lethal (LC1)
 H2S at IDLH concentration may reach external people to some extent, however
lethal concentration remains within plant fence. In any case external emergency
plan shall be developed during EPC for H2S releases to minimize exposure of
external people.
During EPC phase, EPC contractor shall provide appropriate procedures and operator
training in order to ensure that remote actuated block valves, in SWS and SRU unit
(unit 17, 18, 19, 20) are closed from control room as fast as possible in case of toxic
gas detection. Closure of block valves, in case of loss of containment, reduce the
exposure time to toxic cloud for people present in the area, thus reducing the hazard
zone.
o Outcomes of the present analysis highlight that, in case of loss of containment in SWS
and SRU unit, toxic cloud at IDLH concentration may reach asphalt and sulphur
loading station located downwind prevailing wind direction. Lethal concentration (LC1)
do not affect the manned loading areas, anyway is suggested in EPC phase to provide
visible and audible alarms (flashing beam and horn) activated from toxic gas detectors
located in SWS and SRU unit that advert loading station operators for incipient hazard
to allow emergency/evacuation procedure activation.

2342-AA00-ML-201-ATT-11-1_0
Tank Pool Fire

Sheet 1 of 2
12.5 kW distance envelop for

most critical scenario of each unit.
(Refer to attachment 5 for more details)
5 kW distance envelop for most

critical scenario of each unit.
(Refer to attachment 5 for more details)
2342-AA00-ML-201-ATT-10-2_0
Toxic effect
Sheet 2 of 2
100 ppm H2S distance envelop for

(Refer to Table 4.3 for more details)

Toxic cloud shape

2342-AA00-ML-201-ATT-10-1_0
Toxic effect
Sheet 1 of 2


Toxic cloud shape

2342-AA00-ML-201-ATT-9_0
VCE effect (overpressure)
0.3 bar distance envelop for most

0.14 bar distance envelop for

2342-AA00-ML-201-ATT-8_A
Jet Fire (radiation effect)
12.5kW distance envelop for most

(Refer to att. 6 for more details)
5kW distance envelop for most

2342-AA00-ML-201-ATT-8_0
Jet Fire (radiation effect)
12.5kW distance envelop for most

5kW distance envelop for most

2342-AA00-ML-201-ATT-7_0
Flash Fire (LFL contour)
LFL distance envelop for most

2342-AA00-ML-201-ATT-6_0
Radiation Effects
Leak Flammable FF Consequence (m)** PF Consequences (m)** JF Consequences (m)**
Release
Scenario material size Cloud Mass
time ( s )
(inch) (kg) LFL 1/2 LFL 3 kW/m2 5 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 Flame 3 kW/m2 5 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2
1 900 31.0 86 90 54 46 32 26 69 60 48
S1 Crude 2 900 108.0 92 94 55 47 33 45 118 102 81
4 900 298.0 109 111 55 47 33 72 184 160 128
UNIT 01
1 900 219.0 67 110 60 52 31 31 73 64 52

S2 ATM reflux 2 900 1889.0 159 232 60 52 31 55 137 119 95
4 900 5348.0 257 369 60 52 31 78 199 173 138
1 900 11.0 19 45 - - - 16 38 32 26
S3 Wild Naphtha
2 900 11.0 19 45 - - - 16 38 32 26
1 900 - 11 27 - - - 17 26 23 20
S4 C5- H2S 2 900 3.9 28 70 - - - 30 53 47 39
4 900 45.0 70 165 - - - 52 103 90 72
UNIT 02
1 900 - 9 21 - - - 15 22 20 17
S5 C5- H2S
2 900 - 11 27 - - - 17 26 23 20
1 900 282.0 121 267 63 54 31 50 114 100 82
S6 Wild Naphtha 2 900 1550.0 218 498 64 55 32 78 185 161 131
4 900 1550.0 218 498 64 55 32 78 185 161 131
1 900 - 12 18 - - - 9 12 11 9
S7 H2
UNIT 03
2 900 - 12 18 - - - 9 12 11 9
1 900 137.0 98 246 - - - 46 85 74 59
S8 Naphtha + H2 2 900 308.0 129 321 - - - 56 105 91 72
4 900 308.0 129 321 - - - 56 105 91 72
1 900 58.0 58 84 57 49 31 50 112 98 80
S9 Aromatics 2 900 65.0 56 89 57 49 31 53 123 108 88
UNIT 04
4 900 65.0 56 89 57 49 31 53 123 108 88

1 900 - 6 12 - - - 7 10 9 8
H2, light HC,
S10 2 900 - 13 31 - - - 15 22 20 17
Aromatics
4 900 4.3 32 70 - - - 27 46 41 34
1 900 1.0 20 30 - - - 15 23 21 18
S11 H2, light HC
2 900 6.0 34 45 - - - 26 45 40 33
1 900 208.0 114 273 70 60 46 48 120 104 84
UNIT 05
S12 Kero, H2S 2 900 260.0 123 295 86 73 55 51 127 110 89

4 900 260.0 123 295 86 73 55 51 127 110 89
H2, light HC, 1 900 1.0 19 24 - - - 14 21 19 16
S13
H2S 2 900 1.0 19 24 - - - 14 21 19 16
1 900 2.1 22 46 - - - 26 44 39 33
S15 Diesel, H2S 2 900 26.7 51 80 - - - 47 90 79 64
4 900 144.0 83 111 - - - 71 146 126 100
UNIT 06
Light HC, 1 900 5.0 35 67 - - - 25 43 38 32

S16
Diesel, H2S 2 900 51.8 75 113 - - - 46 86 75 61
1 900 6.5 35 48 - - - 26 44 39 33
S17 H2, light HC
2 900 33.0 52 64 - - - 40 75 66 54
1 900 17.7 51 64 50 44 31 33 86 75 59
S18 Diesel 2 900 138.0 101 118 50 44 31 59 162 140 111
4 900 160.0 105 121 50 44 31 61 167 144 114
1 900 216.0 165 292 57 49 32 54 132 114 93
S19 VGO 2 900 624.0 249 359 57 49 32 71 173 150 122
4 900 624.0 249 359 57 49 32 71 173 150 122
UNIT 07
H2, H2S, 1 900 6.0 33 43 - - - 27 43 38 32

S20
Methane 2 900 34.6 50 63 - - - 43 83 72 57
1 900 6.7 32 41 - - - 28 48 43 35
S21 H2, Methane
2 900 33.6 46 59 - - - 46 93 80 63
1 900 109.0 78 139 59 51 31 38 90 79 64
S22 Naphtha
2 900 284.0 122 217 59 51 31 56 134 117 94
1 900 52.4 85 89 54 47 31 29 76 66 52
S23 Oil
2 900 52.4 85 89 54 47 31 29 76 66 52
1 900 269.0 105 191 61 53 32 44 102 89 72
S24 Gasoline 2 900 561.0 150 287 61 53 32 62 147 129 104
UNIT 08
4 900 561.0 150 287 61 53 32 62 147 129 104

1 900 - 10 23 - - - 15 23 21 18
S25 light HC
2 900 2.5 24 60 - - - 28 49 44 36
Light HC, 1 900 - 9 21 - - - 15 22 20 17
S26
H2S 2 900 1.8 21 54 - - - 27 46 41 35
1 900 31.0 60 140 - - - 41 87 77 64
S27 LPG 2 900 214.0 121 254 - - - 67 146 129 106
4 900 214.0 121 254 - - - 67 146 129 106
1 900 13.0 42 106 - - - 31 65 58 48
UNIT 11 UNIT 16 UNIT 17 UNIT 09
S28 SOUR LPG

2 900 13.0 42 106 - - - 31 65 58 48
1 900 24.0 55 128 - - - 42 85 76 63
S29 PROPANE
2 900 52.6 74 166 - - - 52 105 93 78
light HC, H2, 1 900 - 7 15 - - - 10 14 13 11
S30
H2S 2 900 - 16 42 - - - 19 29 26 22
1 900 - - - - - - - - - -
S31 H2S
2 900 - - - - - - - - - -
H2S, H20, 1 900 - - - - - - - - - -

S32
NH3
2 900 - - - - - - - - - -
1 900 79.7 87 188 - - - 52 112 99 82
S33 LPG 2 900 169.0 112 238 - - - 63 137 121 100
4 900 169.0 112 238 - - - 63 137 121 100
1 900 6.5 33 82 - - - 26 61 53 43
S34 Polymerate
2 900 6.5 33 82 - - - 26 61 53 43
TANKS
Crude - - - 107 75 6
Diesel - - - 67 49 6
Naphtha - - - 94 61 6
** All distances are measured at 1 m height
weather 5D has been considered

weather 2F has been considered
2342-AA00-ML-201-ATT-5_0
PES (Potential Explosion Sites)
PES
PES 9
PES 10
PES 7
PES 8
PES 11
PES 3
PES 6
PES 2
PES 5
PES 1
PES 4
2342-AA00-ML-201-ATT-4_0
Scenarios release details

Scenario
Process Release Rate (kg/s)

MW P T Liquid
unit
Material Flow Rate

g/gmol (kg/cm2) °C Frac.
(kg/s) 1" 2" 4" maxflow
S1 Crude 216 ~2 365 229.1 24.3 97.4 [297.8] 297.8 1

1 S2 ATM Reflux 124 ~3.5 129 48.2 6.7 27 [62.7] 62.7 0.85
S3 Wild Naphtha 91 7.5 38 1.3 [1.7] [1.7] * 1.7 0.75
S4 C5- H2S 49 15.2 76 29.6 2.0 8.0 32.1 38.4 0
2 S5 C5- H2S 34 14 38 1.7 1.6 [2.2] * 2.2 0
S6 Wild Naphtha 88 35 38 47.7 21.4 [62.0] [62.0] 62.0 1
S7 Makeup Gas (H2) 4.6 38.9 74 0.2 [0.3] [0.3] * 0.3 0
3
S8 Reactors Feed (Naphtha + H2) 72.7 35.9 127 24.7 20 [32.1] [32.1] 32.1 0
S9 Recontact liquid (Aromatics) 106 28.7 52 23.1 22.4 [30.1] [30.1] 30.1 1
4 Reactor effluent (H2, light

S10 21.5 4.2 111 33.9 0.4 1.6 6.3 44.0 1
HC, aromatics)
S11 Net Gas (H2, light HC) 6 28.8 118 3.1 1.1 [4.1] * 4.1 0
S12 Kerosene - H2S 73.3 68.7 108 26.0 29.8 [33.9] [33.9] 33.9 0.74
5
S13 H2 - H2S - Light HC 4.14 57.7 65 0.6 [0.8] [0.8] * 0.8 0
S15 Diesel - H2S 38.91 74.4 270 53.3 6.1 24.7 [69.4] 69.4 0
S16 Light HC - Diesel - H2S 14.62 71.8 45 19.2 5.1 20.5 * 24.9 0
6
S17 Light HC - H2 9.5 88.1 80 10.5 4.6 [13.7] * 13.7 0
S18 Diesel 236.24 10.3 222 40.2 12.2 49 [52.3] 52.3 1
S19 VGO 328 136.9 166 61.8 41.8 [80.4] [80.4] 80.4 1
S20 SOUR recyle GAS 4.9 93.9 65 15.3 3.5 14 * 19.9 0
7
S21 recycle GAS 3.8 122.7 107 14.1 3.9 15.7 * 18.3 0
S22 Naphtha 109.5 9.1 92 20.3 11 [26.4] * 26.4 1
S23 Cycle oil to strorage 201 10.6 202 7.6 [9.9] [9.9] * 9.9 1
S24 Ustab. Gasoline 99 16.5 38 26.3 15.1 [34.2] [34.2] 34.2 1
8 S25 Light HC 43 15.6 100 11.2 1.8 7.2 * 14.6 0
S26 Light Hc + H2S 31 14.7 38 6.5 1.6 6.5 * 8.4 0
S27 LPG 51 20.4 51 34.0 14.1 [44.2] [44.2] 44.2 0.58
S28 SOUR LPG 50.6 21.5 38 5.4 [7.0] [7.0] * 7.0 0.65
11
S29 PROPANE 44 21 38 17.3 14.1 [22.6] * 22.6 0.60
S30 SOUR GAS 21 7 42 3.6 0.65 2.6 * 4.7 0
16
S31 H2S 32 0.95 65 4.7 0.17 0.68 * 6.1 0
17 S32 H2S, H2O, NH3 24 0.95 90 0.3 0.14 [0.4] * 0.4 0
S33 LPG 51.9 62.6 45 29.8 25.1 [38.7] [38.7] 38.7 0.64
9
S34 Polymerate 122.9 12.6 233 6.7 [8.7] [8.7] * 8.7 0.2
[-] discharge flowrate =1.3 times process flowrate

* Rupture diameter not considered
PREVALENT WIND
GEOGRAPHIC DIRECTION
NORTH
CONVENTIONAL
NORTH
C
REFINERY BUILDINGS
1. MAIN GATEHOUSE
2. SECURITY BLDG.
3. PUBBLIC RELATION BLDG.
4. ADMINISTRATION BLDG.
5. CANTEEN
6. MOSQUE
7. LOCKER BLDG.
8. MEDICAL AND TRAINING BLDG.
9. FIRE-FIGHTING BLDG.
10. SAFETY AND INSPECTION BLDG.
11. REFINERY MAIN CONTROL BLDG.
12. LABORATORY BLDG.
13. MAINTENANCE BLDG.
14. CHEMICAL STORAGE BLDG.
15. HEAVY EQUIPMENT BLDG.
16. PUMP STATION
17. MAINTENANCE MECHANICAL WORKSHOP
18. MAINTENANCE ELECTR/INSTR WORKSHOP
19. MAINTENANCE ADMINISTRATION BLDG.
20. MAINTENANCE TOOLS STORE
21. PROCESS ADMINISTRATION BLDG.
22. UTILITY ADMINISTRATION BLDG.
23. CONSTRUCTION BLDG.
24. OPEN SHEDS
25. BADGE READER CONTROL SYSTEM BLDG.
26. MATERIAL STORAGE BLDG.
27. POLICE STATION (OUTSIDE FENCE)
28. SECONDARY GATEHOUSE
29. OPERATOR SHELTER
30. LOADING CONTROL ROOM
DEPOT BUILDINGS
1D. DEPOT GATEHOUSE
2D. BADGE READER CONTROL SYSTEM BLDG.
3D. SECURITY BLDG.
4D. FIRE-FIGHTING BLDG.
5D. PUMP STATION
6D. REGISTRATION BLDG
7D. LABOURERS BLDG.
8D. ADMINISTRATION BLDG.
9D. CANTEEN
10D. LABORATORY BLDG.
11D. OPERATOR SHELTER
12D. MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICALWORKSHOP
13D. STORAGE BLDG.
14D. OIL LUBRICANT STORAGE
15D. OPERATOR SHELTER
16D. SECONDARY GATEHOUSE
REFERENCE DRAWINGS
2342-AA00-ML-201-ATT-2-2_0
Scenarios Distribution
sheet 2 of 2
S17 S18
S16 S15
KEY PLAN
S30 S32
S01 Scenario
S31
S12
S13
2342-AA00-ML-201-ATT-2-1_0
Scenarios Distribution
sheet 1 of 2
S21
S03
S19 S22
S02 S20
S01
S26
S27
S09 S23
S24
S10 S25
S11
S04
KEY PLAN
S06
S05
S33
S01 Scenario
S34
S07
S08
S29
S28
2342-AA00-ML-201-ATT-1_0
Representative Scenarios List

Flowrate P P T H2S
unit Scenario Material # stream MW (kg/kmol) phase FF JF PF VCE TX
(kg/h) (kg/cm2) (bar) (°C) (%w)
S1 Crude 2 824644 216 36.5 35.8 125 - L x x

1
S2 ATM Reflux 16 173635 124 3.5 3.4 129 - L x x x x
S3 Wild Naphtha 34 4741 91 7.5 7.4 38 4.4 L x
S4 C5- H2S 308 106453 49 15.2 14.9 76 2.4 V x x x
S5 C5- H2S 517 6225 34 14 13.7 38 8 V x

2
S6 Wild Naphtha 221 171613 88 35.1 34.4 38 0.3 L x x x x
S7 Makeup Gas (H2) 105 748 4.6 38.9 38.1 74 - V x x x

3
Reactors Feed
S8 331 88470 72.7 35.9 35.2 127 - 97%w L x x x
(Naphtha + H2)
Recontact liquid
S9 1145 83305 106 28.7 28.1 52 - L x x x x
(Aromatics)
4 Reactor effluent(H2,
S10 166 121939 21.5 4.2 4.1 111 - 28%w L x x x
light HC, aromatics)
S11 Net Gas (H2, light HC) 1208 11267 6 28.8 28.2 118 - V x x x
S12 Kerosene - H2S 5 93749 73.3 68.7 67.4 108 <1 97.3%w L x x x x x
5
S13 H2 - H2S - Light HC 12 2304 4.14 57.7 56.6 65 20.09 V x
S15 Diesel - H2S 13 192057 38.91 74.4 73.0 270 2.30 68%w L x x x x
S16 Light HC - Diesel - H2S 18 68954 14.62 71.8 70.4 45 6.08 39.1%w L x x x x
6
S17 Light HC - H2 23 37959 9.50 88.1 86.4 80 - V x x x
S18 Diesel 52 144800 236.24 10.3 10.1 222 - L x x x x
S19 VGO 214 222522 328 136.9 134.3 166 - L x
S20 SOUR recyle GAS 336 55136 4.9 93.9 92.1 65 16 V x x x x
7
S21 recycle GAS 366 50725 3.8 122.7 120.3 107 - V x x x
S22 Naphtha 185 73117 109.5 9.1 8.9 92 - L x x x x
S23 Cycle oil to strorage 342 27368 201 10.6 10.4 202 - L x x
S24 Ustab. Gasoline 534 94753 99 16.5 16.2 38 - L x x x x
8 S25 Light HC 562 40348 43 15.6 15.3 100 - V x x x
S26 Light Hc + H2S 651 23392 31 14.7 14.4 38 2.1 V x x x x
S27 LPG 724+727 122538 51 20.4 20.0 51 - L x x x
S28 SOUR LPG 1 19285 50.6 21.5 21.1 38 2 L x x x x

11
S29 PROPANE 11+12 62451 44 21 20.6 38 - L x x x
S30 SOUR GAS 6 12879.7 21 7 6.9 42 15.1 V x
16
S31 H2S 13 + 23 16760.2 32 0.95 0.9 65 91.8 V x
17 S32 H2S, H2O, NH3 10+22 1196.7 24 0.95 0.932 90 56.5 V x
S33 unsaturated LPG 203 107255 51.9 62.6 61.39 45 - L x x x

9
S34 Polymerate 223 24228 122.9 12.6 12.36 233 L x x x
Crude Crude - - - - - - - L x
TANK Diesel Diesel - - - - - - - L x
Naphtha Naphtha - - - - - - - L x
2342-AA00-ML-201-ATT-11-2_0
Tank Pool Fire

Sheet 2 of 2
12.5 kW distance envelop for

most critical scenario of each
unit.
(Refer to attachment 5 for more
details)
5 kW distance envelop for

most critical scenario of each
unit.
(Refer to attachment 5 for more
details)

2342-AA00-ML-201 - 0 - Hazards Analysis (HAZAN)

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Project N° Unit Document Code Serial N° Rev.

KARBALA REFINERY FEED PROJECT

TECHNIP ITALY S.p.A. - 00148 ROMA - Viale Castello della Magliana, 68

KARBALA REFINERY FEED PROJECT

4.3. Pool Fire Results 14

TECHNIP ITALY S.p.A. - 00148 ROMA - Viale Castello della Magliana, 68

KARBALA REFINERY FEED PROJECT

Attachment 1. Representative Scenarios List

TECHNIP ITALY S.p.A. - 00148 ROMA - Viale Castello della Magliana, 68

KARBALA REFINERY FEED PROJECT

This document outlines the methodology and findings of the study.

1.2. Study Objectives

The detailed objectives of the study include the following:

fire protection requirements including mounding, water curtain, deluge, etc,

TECHNIP ITALY S.p.A. - 00148 ROMA - Viale Castello della Magliana, 68

KARBALA REFINERY FEED PROJECT

1.3.1. Data Collection and Review

1.3.2. Hazard Identification

The refinery complex includes follow process units:

Table 1-1 Karbala Refinery Project Process Units:

TECHNIP ITALY S.p.A. - 00148 ROMA - Viale Castello della Magliana, 68

KARBALA REFINERY FEED PROJECT

o Pool Fire: a flammable or combustible liquid released to atmosphere can form a

o Jet Fire: a flammable gas released to atmosphere at high velocity can be

o Flash Fire: a flammable gas or a flashing liquid released to atmosphere, if not

turbulence generated by obstacles present in the cloud. Effects on humans are

o BLEVE (Boiling-Liquid-Expanding-Vapour Explosion): a type of rapid phase

TECHNIP ITALY S.p.A. - 00148 ROMA - Viale Castello della Magliana, 68

KARBALA REFINERY FEED PROJECT

o Toxic Dispersion: toxic effects was assessed in terms of IDLH (Immediately

1.3.3. Consequence Analysis

TECHNIP ITALY S.p.A. - 00148 ROMA - Viale Castello della Magliana, 68

KARBALA REFINERY FEED PROJECT

2.2. Material Property Review

 Combustible Gas/vapours with high Hydrogen Content;

Early ignition of a flammable liquid or combustible gas would result respectively in a

energy flame which if it impinges on adjoining equipment would result in escalation.

TECHNIP ITALY S.p.A. - 00148 ROMA - Viale Castello della Magliana, 68

KARBALA REFINERY FEED PROJECT

Dominant hazardous components handled in Karbala refinery Complex and their

Table 2-1 Main Hazardous Material handled in Karbala Refinery

H2/Light Hydrogen production Unit, Isomerization, CCR,

Kerosene CDU/VDU, KHT PF/FF/VCE 38 210

CDU/VDU, NHT, KHT, DHT, VGO HDT, FCC, LPG

2.3. Representatives Scenarios Selection

The selection of representative scenarios was aimed to represent the consequence

The scenarios selected are shown in Attachment 1 and depicted in Attachment 2.

2.4. Equipment Lay-Out Hazard Identification

TECHNIP ITALY S.p.A. - 00148 ROMA - Viale Castello della Magliana, 68

KARBALA REFINERY FEED PROJECT

In general, potential ignition sources within a typical process plant include:

Vulnerable receptors identified in the complex are:

2.5. Potential Explosion Sites (PES)

The PES selected are shown in Attachment 5.

TECHNIP ITALY S.p.A. - 00148 ROMA - Viale Castello della Magliana, 68

KARBALA REFINERY FEED PROJECT

PHAST is internationally recognized software for consequence assessment modelling

3.2. Meteorological Data

 Ambient Temperature: 28°C

Prevailing wing direction used to report dispersion of flammable/toxic material is NW.

3.3. Leak Size

3.4. Release duration and release rates

TECHNIP ITALY S.p.A. - 00148 ROMA - Viale Castello della Magliana, 68