2342-Aa00-Jsm-202 - 0 - Detailed Hazopsil Review Procedure For Epc Phase

Project N° Unit Document Code Serial N° Rev.
Page
2342 AA00 JSM 202 0 1/19
KARBALA REFINERY FEED PROJECT

SCOP – IRAQ (Contract n° 2171)
The present document or drawing is property of TECHNIP ITALY S.p.A. and shall not, under any circumstances, be totally or partially, directly or indirectly, transferred, reproduced, copied, disclosed or used, without its prior written consent, for any purpose and in any way other than that for
DETAILED HAZOP/SIL REVIEW

PROCEDURE
FOR EPC PHASE
which it is specifically furnished or outside the extent of the agreed upon right of use.
0 10-10-2010 ISSUE FOR FEED C. SCALA C. PASCALI C. PAESANI / O. LOIACONO
A 20-09-2010 ISSUE FOR REVIEW C. SCALA C. PASCALI C. PAESANI / O. LOIACONO
REV. DATE STATUS WRITTEN BY CHECKED BY APPROV./AUTHOR. BY

(name & visa) (name & visa) (name & visa)
DOCUMENT REVISIONS
TECHNIP ITALY S.p.A. - 00148 ROMA - Viale Castello della Magliana, 68

Project N° Unit Document Code Serial N° Rev. Page
2342 AA00 JSM 202 0 2/19

INDEX
1. INTRODUCTION, OBJECTIVE and SCOPE ...........................................................................3

1.1. Implementation of FEED HAZOP Review Recommendations.....................................3
1.2. EPC Detailed HAZOP/SIL Review...................................................................................4
1.2.1. Management of Changes.........................................................................................4
2. Study Objectives ....................................................................................................................5
2.1. Reference Data and Documents ....................................................................................6
2.2. Acronyms.........................................................................................................................6
2.3. Definitions .......................................................................................................................6
3. TEAM ORGANIZATION ...........................................................................................................8
4. HAZOP AND SIL REVIEW METHODOLOGY..........................................................................9
4.1. Guidelines for HAZOP and SIL Methodology ................................................................9
4.1.1. Consequences ...........................................................................................................9
4.1.2. Safeguards ................................................................................................................9
4.1.3. HAZOP Recommendations ........................................................................................9
4.1.4. SIF Identification ......................................................................................................10
4.1.5. SIL Classification......................................................................................................10

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1. INTRODUCTION, OBJECTIVE and SCOPE
This document covers the procedure for the combined Hazard and Operability study
and the Safety Integrity Level (SIL) determination for the Safety Instrumented
Functions (SIFs) that shall be undertaken by the EPC Contractor (here after referred
as “Contractor”) during the Engineering Procurement Construction (EPC) phase for the
Karbala Refinery Project.
1.1. Implementation of FEED HAZOP Review Recommendations

During the FEED Phase of the Project a HAZOP Review has been developed.
The HAZOP Reports for all the Units analyzed are provided for each unit in the
relevant part of EPC Bid Package.
The HAZOP Analysis, developed during the FEED phase, identified a number of
recommendations aimed to increase the safety and operability of the systems. Two
levels of recommendations were considered:
 First level: Recommendations closed during the FEED phase of the Project and
relevant actions implemented in the Project FEED Documentation.
 Second level: Recommendations to be closed during the EPC phase. It is
responsibility of the Contractor to ensure proper follow-up and closure of all
these Recommendations.
The list of Recommendations assigned to Contractor is given for each unit in the
relevant part of ITB Package. Refer to “FEED HAZOP Review Report” - (Doc. 2234-
unit/section code-ML-210), and “FEED HAZOP Review Recommendation Close Out
Report (Doc. 2234-unit/section code-ML-220).
As part of the Flare Study developed during the FEED Stage of Karbala Project a
number of additional requirements were identified aimed to reduce the relief loads to
the flare. These shall be considered during the Detailed HAZOP / SIL Review during
the EPC phase.
The preliminary design of the Karbala Refinery flare system, as described in the Flare
Study Report from the FEED phase will be reviewed, optimized and modified as
needed by Contractor. As a result of this, Contractor:
- will have to confirm the need for all Safety Instrumented Functions which have
been already foreseen during the FEED phase as preliminary flare mitigation
measures.
- will add new Safety Instrumented Function as required to reduce flare loads further
more, if needed for flare design optimisation.
- will give the appropriate SIL level requirement to each Safety Instrumented
Function.

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1.2. EPC Detailed HAZOP/SIL Review

During the development of EPC, a full Detailed HAZOP/SIL Review shall be developed
for the all systems and units including both those units already analyzed during FEED
(process units) and those which were not analyzed in the previous phase:
- Utilities and Offsite

- Packages
- Machineries
- Interconnecting
The Review shall be developed when information on Major Packages and Machineries,
Chemical Injection Systems, Operating/Start-up Procedures are available, but early
enough to be properly implemented during detailed engineering.
1.2.1. Management of Changes

Contractor shall implement a system to monitor changes on P&IDs in order to identify
Major Process Changes on which additional HAZOP and SIL Session shall be
undertaken.
The Management of Changes shall cover all P&IDs issues after the Detailed HAZOP
and SIL Review.

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2. Study Objectives
The objective of the HAZOP study is to identify hazards and operability problems that
may be encountered during the operation of the facility such that suitable mitigation
measures can be incorporated in the design and/or in the operating procedures.
During the HAZOP review sessions, issues of concern will be defined and party
responsible for resolution will be identified, but no solution will be proposed.
Resolutions for identified issues will be solved after the completion of the HAZOP
review by the responsible parties and reported in a separate document (HAZOP
Follow-up Report).
HAZOP Review cannot be intended as a review of project design bases and operating
philosophies, since these must be defined before the HAZOP Review is carried out.
The objective of the SIL study is to determine the Safety Instrumented System (SIS)
required to prevent and to mitigate hazardous events and the Safety Integrity Level
(SIL) that the SIS has to be designed, to prevent the occurrence of hazardous event or
in some scenarios, to mitigate the consequences from such hazardous event.
The SIL indicates the minimum level of reliability in terms of Probability of Failure on
Demand (PFD) required for a SIF. Such failure probabilities are:
SIL PFD
 10 to  10
-2 -1
1
 10 to  10
-3 -2
2
 10 to  10
-4 -3
3
 10 to  10
-5 -4
4
The request of a SIL 4 has to be considered as extremely rare in the process industry.
If a classification leads to SIL 4, further study should be performed, aimed at
rearrangement of the section or installation under analysis (development of process
alternatives to eliminate the need for a SIL 4). Each SIF comprises of an initiating
element (process sensor), a logic solver (PLC/DCS), a final element (shutdown valve,
machinery).
Safety Instrumented Function shall be implemented according to the SIL level

architecture according to project specifications that will be developed.

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2.1. Reference Data and Documents
The following documentation shall be available during the Detail HAZOP/SIL Review:
 Piping & Instrument Diagrams (P&IDs)

 Process and Utility Flow Diagrams (PFDs and UFDs)
 Heat & Material Balance
 Material Selection Diagrams
 Cause and Effect Diagrams
 Interlock Process Description
 Equipment Data Sheets
 Relief Valve applicable Emergency Scenarios
 Project Basic Design Data
 Unit Basis of Design
 Plot Plan
2.2. Acronyms
HAZOP Hazard and Operability

FEED Front End Engineering Design
SIL Safety Integrity Level
SIF Safety Instrumented Function
SIS Safety Instrumented System
IPL Independent Protection Layer
PFD Probability of Failure on Demand
PLC Program Logic Solver
DCS Distributed Control System
2.3. Definitions
SIF
Safety function with a specified safety integrity level which is necessary to achieve
functional safety and which can be either safety instrumented protection function.
SIL
Discrete level (one out of four) for specifying the safety integrity requirements of the
safety instrumented functions to be allocated in safety instrumented systems. Safety
integrity level 4 has the highest level of safety integrity; safety integrity level 1 has the
lowest.
SIS
Instrumented system used to implement one or more safety instrumented functions.
IPL
Independent protection layer is applied to a safeguard which is capable of preventing a
scenario from proceeding to its undesired consequence independent of the initiating
event or the action of any other layer of protection associated with the scenario. There
is a slight distinction however, in IEC 61511, between the terms ‘protection layer’ and

2342 AA00 JSM 202 0 7/19

‘independent protection layer’. Although both need to meet the criteria mentioned
above, a safeguard may qualify as a ‘Protection layer’, if at least a factor of 10 risk
reduction can be achieved while to qualify as an ‘independent protection layer’, a
higher degree of reliability is required (i.e. reduces the identified risk by a minimum of
100 fold). While this study report has used the term ‘IPL’ for all protection layers, a
100-fold risk reduction is applied only to those protection layers such as PSVs which
meet the criteria of IPL as defined in IEC 61511.

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3. TEAM ORGANIZATION
The HAZOP and SIL Review shall be lead by a Third Party independent from the
Project.
The HAZOP and SIL Review Team shall include as a minimum:

 HAZOP Team Leader
 HAZOP Scribe
 Contractor Process representative
 Licensor Representative for Licensed Units
 COMPANY Process representatives
 COMPANY Operation representatives
 Contractor Specialists (Start-Up, Machinery and Packages, Instrument …) when
required

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4. HAZOP AND SIL REVIEW METHODOLOGY
The HAZOP and SIL Review shall cover all the P&IDs. The Team Leader shall ensure
that the technique is systematically applied to all parts of a system such that safety and
operability problems on the complete system are identified.
Contractor shall, on the basis of the below guidelines:
- Develop a detailed procedure for the HAZOP and SIL Review

- Identify the systems for which a conventional HAZOP methodology is not really
appropriate and develop a specific safety analysis methodology to review these
systems during the EPC phase
- Produce the HAZOP and SIL Report with the minimum contents shown in
Appendix C
4.1. Guidelines for HAZOP and SIL Methodology
The HAZOP technique applies a combination of a Parameter and Guide Word to

generate a Deviation from design intent. The Causes and Consequences of each
deviation are identified. Safeguards that can prevent or mitigate the hazard, and which
are already provided in the design, are listed.
A detailed list of guide words to be used for the various HAZOP reviews of the EPC
phase is attached in Appendix B.
4.1.1. Consequences
The potential consequences of each deviation will be discussed and assessed within
the limits of the information available and the expertise of the team. The potential
consequence threats will be assessed without considering operator or instrument
intervention or any mitigation or safeguards. Consequences will focus on possible
major effects in terms of personal safety, environment and production/equipment loss.
4.1.2. Safeguards
The team will identify safeguards that are effective in preventing or controlling the
hazards. The safeguards can be classified as Independent Protection Layers (IPLs)
and non-IPLs. An IPL is a device, system or action that is capable of preventing a
scenario from proceeding to its undesired consequence independent of the initiating
event or the action of any other layer of protection associated with the scenario. An IPL
may also include a Safety Instrumented System (SIS). Appendix A shows the rule
sets for IPLs.
4.1.3. HAZOP Recommendations
The team will provide recommendations if the existing protective measures are found
to be inadequate. Actions will be recommended to eliminate or mitigate any residual
hazard that is considered significant.

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The recommendation may take the form of design changes (e.g. addition of an alarm
or increase the design temperature) or request for further clarification on design basis.
4.1.4. SIF Identification
A SIF consists of one or more initiators, the logic solver and the final elements. The
initiators are the sensors that detect one or more initiating events or the hazardous
situation. The final elements are all the actuators that are required to bring the process
to a safe state to avert the hazardous event.
The final element(s) of the SIF will be chosen as those which directly meet their design
intent. Thus, only one or two final elements will be usually defined for any function, and
where more than one is selected, a success criterion will be defined for these final
elements. The other elements acted upon by the initiators will be left unclassified (they
will however, be retained for implementation in the ESD system).
4.1.5. SIL Classification
SIL Classification will assign a discrete level (SIL 1, SIL 2, etc.) to every SIF identified.
According to guidelines provided in IEC-61511, both semi-qualitative (risk graphs) or

quantitative methods (LOPA analysis) may be applied for SIL determination.
The following aspects shall be investigated for SIL assignment:
 SAFETY: personnel injury;

 ECONOMY: equipment damage and loss of production;
 ENVIRONMENT: environmental damage.
All consequences shall be classified and the most stringent SIL shall be selected for
that function. If the demand has different causes, the consequences of failure on
demand will usually be different as well, requiring a classification for all causes and
consequences.
For each aspect, the following will be considered for the analysis:
 Severity Levels
 Frequency of Demand
 Safeguards
Severity Levels
Severity Levels will be selected in accordance to the consequence identified in the review
and categorised in personal safety (S), environmental (E) and production/equipment loss
(P). An example of severity categorization is shown in Table 3.1.

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Table 4.1 Hazard severity level in terms of personal safety, environment and
production/equipment loss
Hazard Severity Levels
Level Severity
4 - Catastrophic S4: Several deaths or very many seriously injured.
E4: Large scale destruction of the soil, groundwater, water

system, flora or fauna outside the plant area. Permanent
effects.
P4: Catastrophic damage to equipment or very long interruption

of production. Negative international or domestic media
event.
3 - Major S3: Death of one person or several seriously injured.
Permanent disability to work. Permanent serious defect.
Significant exposure to toxicant or carcinogen.
E3: Large scale pollution of the soil, groundwater, water

system, flora or fauna at the plant area. Serious but
amendable or recoverable damage outside the plant
area.
P3: Very serious damage to expensive equipment or long term

shut down. Negative publicity in local media.
2 - Serious S2: Long sick leave. Temporary disability for work. Serious
injury that may heal up. Exposure leading to symptoms.
E2: Local or minor pollution of the soil, groundwater or water

system. Emission to the water system exceeding the
terms of license.
P2: Serious operational upset or damage to equipment

1 - Minor S1: Short sick leave. Non permanent injury.
E1: Temporary emissions to air
P1: Minor operational upset or minor damage to equipment

0 – No Damage No consequences for Safety, Environment or Production
Severity for safety impacts will be determined based on the nature of fluid handled,
e.g., sweet gas, sour gas, flashing liquids, liquids handled above boiling point, hot
liquids, liquids near auto ignition temperature etc. The size of release and inventory
may also be considered. This may be further expanded during the course of the study
to ensure consistency in assigning severity levels.
Also the presence of personnel and escape possibility may be considered for safety
severity levels determination according to guidelines of IEC-61511.
Production loss estimates will be determined based on expected downtime and impact
on production. Approximate monetary impacts due to production loss will be provided
by COMPANY for each unit and for the plant as a whole. Impact on production will then
be determined by the team based on cascading effect on other units, availability of
standby equipment/ trains, availability of storage capacity etc.

2342 AA00 JSM 202 0 12/19

For equipment damage costs, equipment costs will be assumed based on the team’s
experience on approximate costs for similar size equipment. Where standby
equipment is provided, no production loss may apply but damage costs will be
considered.
In any case the main severity criteria to be considered are relative to safety or/and
environment. Production losses or cost criteria should only be used as complementary
information only.
Frequency of Demand
A demand on a SIF may be caused by instrument malfunction, operator error, etc.

After recording the consequences, the first question to be answered by the classification
team is: How often is the SIF activated?
The IEC 61511 describes the frequency of demand in both qualitative terms where a
discrete classification is made (low, moderate, high demand, see Table 1.1 in Appendix
A) or quantitative ones, depending on the methodology adopted.
Typical values for initiating events frequency is given in Appendix A.
Safeguards
During the frequency of demand analysis, the provision of other safeguards for the
specific scenario will be reviewed. For each safeguard identified (IPL), a risk reduction
factor will be determined. Guidelines for IPL determination are given in Appendix A.
Severity / frequencies classification and SIL assignment methodology shall be agreed

before the start of the SIL review to ensure consistency between the SIL levels and the
target risk levels to be achieved.

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APPENDIX A
RULE SETS FOR SIL CLASSIFICATION

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Frequency of Initiating Events
Table 1.1 Frequency of initiating events
Frequency of Initiating Description

Events
W5 Very high (may occur about 3 times per
year)
W4 High (may occur about 1 time per year)
W3 Moderate (may occur about 1 time per 3

years)
W2 Low (may occur about 1 time per 10 years)
W1 Very low (may occur about 1 time per 30

years or over the plant life)
Table 1.2 Rule Set for Independent Protection Layers (IPLs)
Independent Protection Layer Risk Reduction

SIS - SIL 1 10
SIS - SIL 2 100
SIS - SIL 3 1000
BPCS, when independent of initiating event 10
Internal mechanical safety trips that are 10 to 100
(1)
independent of the SIS or BPCS
Operator response under high stress, 0
average training
Operator response to Alarms with 10
procedures, low stress, recognized event and
at least 5 minutes to respond.
(2)
Check Valves 0 or 10
Dikes when capable of mitigating the 100
initiating event. This is an IPL only for
environmental events.
Notes:
(1) This may be relevant to vendor packages. Risk reduction will depend on the
integrity of the system
(2) Credit for check valve will depend on pressure differential and impact of
contamination

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Table 1.3 Rule Set for Initiating Events
Scenario Initiating Event Frequency of

Frequency Demand (W)
(per year)
Instrumentation
Control loop failure >1.E-01 W4
Controller failure 1E-01 W4
Shutdown valve spurious closure (Mean value 3.45E-2 W5
from Exida and Sintef). No values provided in
Total Charad Data Base
Rotating Equipment
Pump Failure Loss of Flow (OREDA, 7.9E-01 W2/ W3
conservatively W2). This value is also in
agreement with Total Charad Data Base
Positive Displacement Pump Trip (OREDA) 1.1E-00 W2/W1
Centrifugal Compressor Trip (OREDA) 2.1.E-00 W2/W1
Single Mechanical Pump Seal Leak 1.E-01 W4
Double Mechanical Pump Seal Leak with 1.E-02 W5/W4
announcement
Canned/Magnetic Drive Pump Leak 1.E-02 W5/W4
Heat Exch. tube leak 1.E-02 W5/W4
Human Errors
Operator Failure (if considered in the analysis)
-Under stress, emergency, action performed W1
more than once a quarter.
- Unstressed, action performed more than W3/W4
once a quarter.
- Under stress, emergency, action performed W3/W4
once/Qtr. or less
- Unstressed, action performed once/Qtr. or W2
less
For control failure involving a control valve whose failure position is opposite to that
which leads to a hazard, the likelihood may be assigned lower than suggested above,
based on the study team’s experience.

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APPENDIX B
TYPICAL HAZOP GUIDEWORDS/PARAMETERS
AND RELATED DEVIATIONS FOR CONTINUOS PROCESS

2342 AA00 JSM 202 0 17/19

PARAMETERS GUIDEWORDS DEVIATIONS

More high flow
Less low flow
FLOW
None no flow
Reverse reverse flow
More high pressure
PRESSURE Less low pressure
None vacuum
More high temperature
TEMPERATURE Less low temperature
As well as cryogenic
More high level
LEVEL Less low level
None no level
More additional phase
Less loss of phase
Reverse change of state
STATE/ COMPOSITION
Part of off-spec composition
As well as contaminants
Other than corrosive concentration
More runway reaction
REACTION As well as side reaction
Other than explosion
UTILITY: power, air, steam,

Other than loss of …
nitrogen, cooling water
UNSTEADY OPERATION: startup,
As well as difficult …
shutdown, maintenance, sampling,
Other than hazardous …
drainage
CONTAINMENT Other than loss of containment

Part of incomplete documentation
DOCUMENTATION As well as unclear documentation
Other than incorrect documentation

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APPENDIX C
HAZOP AND SIL REVIEW REPORT CONTENTS

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The HAZOP and SIL Study Report shall include:
1) Main body of report

 Introduction and Scope of Work
 Executive Summary
 Study Approach
 Study Results
 Conclusions
2) Attachments
 DRAWING LIST
 NODE LIST
 ATTENDANCE LIST
 HAZOP/SIL WORKSHEETS
 HAZOP/SIL RECOMMENDATION CLOSE OUT FORM
 SIL CLASSIFICATION LIST
 HAZOP MASTER P&IDS

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Project N° Unit Document Code Serial N° Rev.

KARBALA REFINERY FEED PROJECT

DETAILED HAZOP/SIL REVIEW

0 10-10-2010 ISSUE FOR FEED C. SCALA C. PASCALI C. PAESANI / O. LOIACONO

A 20-09-2010 ISSUE FOR REVIEW C. SCALA C. PASCALI C. PAESANI / O. LOIACONO

REV. DATE STATUS WRITTEN BY CHECKED BY APPROV./AUTHOR. BY

TECHNIP ITALY S.p.A. - 00148 ROMA - Viale Castello della Magliana, 68

KARBALA REFINERY FEED PROJECT

1. INTRODUCTION, OBJECTIVE and SCOPE ...........................................................................3

TECHNIP ITALY S.p.A. - 00148 ROMA - Viale Castello della Magliana, 68

KARBALA REFINERY FEED PROJECT

1. INTRODUCTION, OBJECTIVE and SCOPE

1.1. Implementation of FEED HAZOP Review Recommendations

TECHNIP ITALY S.p.A. - 00148 ROMA - Viale Castello della Magliana, 68

KARBALA REFINERY FEED PROJECT

1.2. EPC Detailed HAZOP/SIL Review

- Utilities and Offsite

1.2.1. Management of Changes

TECHNIP ITALY S.p.A. - 00148 ROMA - Viale Castello della Magliana, 68

KARBALA REFINERY FEED PROJECT

Safety Instrumented Function shall be implemented according to the SIL level

TECHNIP ITALY S.p.A. - 00148 ROMA - Viale Castello della Magliana, 68

KARBALA REFINERY FEED PROJECT

2.1. Reference Data and Documents

 Piping & Instrument Diagrams (P&IDs)

HAZOP Hazard and Operability

TECHNIP ITALY S.p.A. - 00148 ROMA - Viale Castello della Magliana, 68

KARBALA REFINERY FEED PROJECT

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The HAZOP and SIL Review Team shall include as a minimum:

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KARBALA REFINERY FEED PROJECT

4. HAZOP AND SIL REVIEW METHODOLOGY

Contractor shall, on the basis of the below guidelines:

- Develop a detailed procedure for the HAZOP and SIL Review

4.1. Guidelines for HAZOP and SIL Methodology

The HAZOP technique applies a combination of a Parameter and Guide Word to

4.1.3. HAZOP Recommendations

TECHNIP ITALY S.p.A. - 00148 ROMA - Viale Castello della Magliana, 68

KARBALA REFINERY FEED PROJECT

4.1.4. SIF Identification

4.1.5. SIL Classification

According to guidelines provided in IEC-61511, both semi-qualitative (risk graphs) or

The following aspects shall be investigated for SIL assignment:

 SAFETY: personnel injury;

TECHNIP ITALY S.p.A. - 00148 ROMA - Viale Castello della Magliana, 68

KARBALA REFINERY FEED PROJECT

E4: Large scale destruction of the soil, groundwater, water

P4: Catastrophic damage to equipment or very long interruption

E3: Large scale pollution of the soil, groundwater, water

P3: Very serious damage to expensive equipment or long term

E2: Local or minor pollution of the soil, groundwater or water

P2: Serious operational upset or damage to equipment

E1: Temporary emissions to air

P1: Minor operational upset or minor damage to equipment

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A demand on a SIF may be caused by instrument malfunction, operator error, etc.

Typical values for initiating events frequency is given in Appendix A.

Severity / frequencies classification and SIL assignment methodology shall be agreed

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KARBALA REFINERY FEED PROJECT