108 757 DC

108/757/DC
For IEC use only
2021-07-16
INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION
TECHNICAL COMMITTEE NO. 108: SAFETY OF ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT WITHIN THE

FIELD OF AUDIO/VIDEO, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND COMMUNICATION
TECHNOLOGY
TC 108/WG HBSDT proposed draft IEC 62368-2, Ed. 4.
_____________________________
Comments / proposals should be submitted using the IEC Electronic voting system by the
National Committees. (See AC/3/2011).
Comments/ proposals to be returned by 2021-09-24

–2– 108/757/DC
1 CONTENTS
2 0 Principles of this product safety standard ...................................................................... 14

3 0.5.1 General ......................................................................................................... 14
4 0.5.7 Equipment safeguards during skilled person service conditions ..................... 16
5 0.10 Thermally-caused injury (skin burn) ............................................................... 16
6 1 Scope ................................................................................................................................ 16
7 2 Normative references ......................................................................................................... 17
8 3 Terms, definitions and abbreviations .................................................................................. 17
9 4 General requirements ........................................................................................................ 20
10 4.1.1 Application of requirements and acceptance of materials, components
11 and subassemblies ........................................................................................ 21
12 4.1.5 Constructions and components not specifically covered ................................. 22
13 4.1.6 Orientation during transport and use .............................................................. 22
14 4.1.8 Liquids and liquid filled components (LFC) ............................................................ 22
15 4.2 Energy source classifications ................................................................................ 22
16 4.2.1 Class 1 energy source ................................................................................... 22
19 4.3.2 Safeguards for protection of an ordinary person ............................................ 23
20 4.3.3 Safeguards for protection of an instructed person .......................................... 24
21 4.3.4 Safeguards for protection of a skilled person ................................................. 24
22 4.4.2 Composition of a safeguard ........................................................................... 25
23 4.4.3 Safeguard robustness .................................................................................... 25
24 4.6 Fixing of conductors .............................................................................................. 26
25 4.7 Equipment for direct insertion into mains socket-outlets ........................................ 27
26 4.8 Equipment containing coin / button cell batteries ................................................... 27
27 4.9 Likelihood of fire or shock due to entry of conductive objects ................................ 27
28 4.10.3 Power supply cords .............................................................................................. 27
29 5 Electrically-caused injury ................................................................................................... 27
30 5.2.1 Electrical energy source classifications .......................................................... 29
31 5.3.2 Accessibility to electrical energy sources and safeguards .............................. 37
32 5.4 Insulation materials and requirements ................................................................... 38
33 5.4.2 Clearances .................................................................................................... 41
34 5.4.3 Creepage distances ....................................................................................... 53
35 5.4.4 Solid insulation .............................................................................................. 54
36 5.4.5 Antenna terminal insulation............................................................................ 57
37 5.4.6 Insulation of internal wire as a part of a supplementary safeguard ................. 57
38 5.4.7 Tests for semiconductor components and for cemented joints ....................... 58
39 5.4.8 Humidity conditioning .................................................................................... 58
40 5.4.9 Electric strength test ...................................................................................... 58
41 5.4.10 Safeguards against transient voltages from external circuits .......................... 59
42 5.4.11 Separation between external circuits and earth .............................................. 62
43 5.5 Components as safeguards ................................................................................... 62
44 5.5.6 Resistors ....................................................................................................... 65
45 5.5.7 SPDs ............................................................................................................. 65
46 5.5.8 Insulation between the mains and an external circuit consisting of a
47 coaxial cable ................................................................................................. 65
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48 5.6 Protective conductor ............................................................................................. 66

49 5.6.1 General ......................................................................................................... 66
50 5.6.3 Requirements for protective earthing conductors ........................................... 67
51 5.6.4 Requirements for protective bonding conductors ........................................... 67
52 5.6.5 Terminals for protective conductors ............................................................... 67
53 5.6.7 Reliable connection of a protective earthing conductor .................................. 67
54 5.7 Prospective touch voltage, touch current and protective conductor current............ 67
55 5.7.3 Equipment set-up, supply connections and earth connections ........................ 68
56 5.7.5 Earthed accessible conductive parts .............................................................. 68
57 5.7.6 Requirements when touch current exceeds ES2 limits ................................... 68
58 5.7.7 Prospective touch voltage and touch current associated with external
59 circuits ........................................................................................................... 69
60 5.7.8 Summation of touch currents from external circuits ........................................ 70
61 5.8 Backfeed safeguard in battery backed up supplies ................................................ 72
62 6 Electrically-caused fire ...................................................................................................... 74
63 6.2 Classification of power sources (PS) and potential ignition sources (PIS) ............. 74
64 6.2.2 Power source circuit classifications ............................................................... 74
65 6.2.3 Classification of potential ignition sources ..................................................... 77
66 6.3 Safeguards against fire under normal operating conditions and abnormal
67 operating conditions .............................................................................................. 78
68 6.3.1 Requirements ................................................................................................ 81
69 6.3.2 Compliance criteria ........................................................................................ 82
70 6.4 Safeguards against fire under single fault conditions............................................. 83
71 6.4.1 General ......................................................................................................... 83
72 6.4.2 Reduction of the likelihood of ignition under single fault conditions in
73 PS1 circuits ................................................................................................... 90
74 6.4.3 Reduction of the likelihood of ignition under single fault conditions in
75 PS2 circuits and PS3 circuits ......................................................................... 90
76 6.4.4 Control of fire spread in PS1 circuits .............................................................. 92
77 6.4.5 Control of fire spread in PS2 circuits .............................................................. 94
78 6.4.6 Control of fire spread in a PS3 circuit ............................................................ 96
79 6.4.7 Separation of combustible materials from a PIS ............................................. 97
80 6.4.8 Fire enclosures and fire barriers .................................................................... 99
81 6.5.1 General requirements .................................................................................. 105
82 6.5.2 Requirements for interconnection to building wiring ..................................... 106
83 6.6 Safeguards against fire due to the connection of additional equipment................ 106
84 7 Injury caused by hazardous substances ........................................................................... 107
85 8 Mechanically-caused injury .............................................................................................. 110
86 8.1 General ............................................................................................................... 110
87 8.2 Mechanical energy source classifications ............................................................ 110
88 8.2.1 General classification .................................................................................. 110
89 8.2.2 MS1 ............................................................................................................. 111
90 8.2.3 MS2 ............................................................................................................. 111
91 8.2.4 MS3 ............................................................................................................. 111
92 8.3 Safeguards against mechanical energy sources .................................................. 111
93 8.4 Safeguards against parts with sharp edges and corners ..................................... 112
94 8.5 Safeguards against moving parts ........................................................................ 112
95 8.5.1 Requirements .............................................................................................. 112
96 8.6 Stability of equipment ......................................................................................... 113
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97 8.6.3 Relocation stability ...................................................................................... 113

98 8.6.4 Glass slide test ............................................................................................ 113
99 8.6.5 Horizontal force test and compliance criteria................................................ 114
100 8.7 Equipment mounted to a wall, ceiling or other structure ...................................... 114
101 8.7.2 Test methods ............................................................................................... 114
102 8.8 Handle strength .................................................................................................. 115
103 8.8.2 Test method ................................................................................................ 115
104 8.9 Wheels or casters attachment requirements ........................................................ 115
105 8.10 Carts, stands, and similar carriers ....................................................................... 115
106 8.10.1 General ....................................................................................................... 115
107 8.10.2 Marking and instructions .............................................................................. 115
108 8.10.3 Cart, stand or carrier loading test and compliance criteria ............................ 116
109 8.10.4 Cart, stand or carrier impact test.................................................................. 116
110 8.10.5 Mechanical stability ..................................................................................... 116
111 8.10.6 Thermoplastic temperature stability ............................................................. 116
112 8.11 Mounting means for slide-rail mounted equipment (SRME) ................................. 116
113 8.11.1 General ....................................................................................................... 116
114 8.11.3 Mechanical strength test .............................................................................. 117
115 9 Thermal burn injury .......................................................................................................... 117
116 9.1 General ............................................................................................................... 117
117 9.2 Thermal energy source classifications ................................................................. 121
118 9.2.1 TS1 ............................................................................................................. 121
119 9.2.2 TS2 ............................................................................................................. 121
120 9.2.3 TS3 ............................................................................................................. 121
121 9.3 Touch temperature limits ..................................................................................... 122
122 9.3.1 Touch temperature limit requirements .......................................................... 125
123 9.3.2 Test method and compliance criteria ........................................................... 125
124 9.4 Safeguards against thermal energy sources ........................................................ 126
125 9.5.1 Equipment safeguard ................................................................................... 126
126 9.5.2 Instructional safeguard ................................................................................ 126
127 9.6 Requirements for wireless power transmitters ..................................................... 127
128 9.6.3 Test method and compliance criteria ........................................................... 127
129 10 Radiation ....................................................................................................................... 128
130 10.2 Radiation energy source classifications .............................................................. 128
131 10.2.1 General classification .................................................................................. 128
132 10.2.2 & 10.2.3 RS1 and RS2 ...................................................................................... 129
133 10.2.4 RS3 ............................................................................................................. 129
134 10.3 Safeguards against laser radiation ...................................................................... 130
135 10.4 Safeguards against optical radiation from lamps and lamp systems
136 (including LED types) .......................................................................................... 130
137 10.4.1 General Requirements ................................................................................. 130
138 10.5 Safeguards against X-radiation ........................................................................... 130
139 10.6 Safeguards against acoustic energy sources ...................................................... 130
140 10.6.3 Requirements for dose-based systems ........................................................ 131
141 Annex A Examples of equipment within the scope of this standard ............................ 134
142 Annex B Normal operating condition tests, abnormal operating condition tests
143 and single fault condition tests..................................................................................... 134
144 B.1.5 Temperature measurement conditions ......................................................... 135
145 B.1.6 Specific output conditions ............................................................................ 136
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146 B.2.3 Supply Voltage ............................................................................................ 136

147 B.2 – B.3 – B.4 Operating modes....................................................................... 137
148 B.4.4 Functional insulation .................................................................................... 137
149 B.4.8 Compliance criteria during and after single fault conditions .......................... 138
150 Annex C UV Radiation ............................................................................................... 138
151 C.1.1 General ....................................................................................................... 138
152 Annex D Test generators ........................................................................................... 138
153 Annex E Test conditions for equipment containing audio amplifiers ........................... 138
154 Annex F Equipment markings, instructions, and instructional safeguards ................... 139
155 F.3 Equipment markings .......................................................................................... 139
156 F.4 Instructions ......................................................................................................... 139
157 F.5 Instructional safeguards ...................................................................................... 139
158 Annex G Components ................................................................................................ 140
159 G.1 Switches ............................................................................................................. 140
160 G.2.1 Requirements .............................................................................................. 140
161 G.3.3 PTC thermistors ........................................................................................... 140
162 G.3.4 Overcurrent protective devices .................................................................... 141
163 G.3.5 Safeguard components not mentioned in G.3.1 to G.3.4 .............................. 141
164 G.5.1 Wire insulation in wound components .......................................................... 142
165 G.5.2 Endurance test ............................................................................................ 142
166 G.5.3 Transformers ............................................................................................... 142
167 G.5.4 Motors ......................................................................................................... 143
168 G.7 Mains supply cords ............................................................................................ 143
169 G.7.3 – G.7.5 Mains supply cord anchorage, cord entry, bend protection ........ 144
170 G.8 Varistors ............................................................................................................ 144
171 G.9 Integrated circuit (IC) current limiters ................................................................. 144
172 G.11 Capacitors and RC units ..................................................................................... 146
173 G.13 Printed boards .................................................................................................... 146
174 G.13.6 Tests on coated printed boards .................................................................... 146
175 G.14 Coatings on component terminals ....................................................................... 146
176 G.15 Pressurized liquid filled components ................................................................... 146
177 G.15.2 Test methods and compliance criteria for self-contained LFC ...................... 149
178 G.15.3 Test methods and compliance criteria for a Modular LFC ............................. 150
179 Annex H Criteria for telephone ringing signals ........................................................... 153
180 H.2 Method A ........................................................................................................... 153
181 H.3 Method B ........................................................................................................... 155
182 Annex J Insulated winding wires for use without interleaved insulation ...................... 155
183 Annex K Safety interlocks .......................................................................................... 155
184 K.7.1 Safety interlocks ................................................................................................. 155
185 Annex L Disconnect devices ...................................................................................... 156
186 Annex M Equipment containing batteries and their protection circuits ......................... 157
187 M.1 General requirements ......................................................................................... 157
188 M.2 Safety of batteries and their cells ........................................................................ 157
189 M.3 Protection circuits for batteries provided within the equipment ............................ 165
190 M.4 Additional safeguards for equipment containing a portable secondary lithium
191 battery ................................................................................................................ 165
192 M.4.3 Fire enclosure.............................................................................................. 166
193 M.4.4 Drop test of equipment containing a secondary lithium battery ..................... 166
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194 M.6.1 Requirements .............................................................................................. 167

195 M.7.1 Ventilation preventing an explosive gas concentration ................................. 167
196 M.7.2 Test method and compliance criteria ........................................................... 167
197 M.8.2.1 General ....................................................................................................... 167
198 Annex O Measurement of creepage distances and clearances ................................... 168
199 Annex P Safeguards against conductive objects ........................................................ 168
200 P.1 General ............................................................................................................... 168
201 P.2 Safeguards against entry or consequences of entry of a foreign object ............... 168
202 P.3 Safeguards against spillage of internal liquids..................................................... 169
203 P.4 Metalized coatings and adhesives securing parts ................................................ 169
204 Annex Q Circuits intended for interconnection with building wiring ............................. 169
205 Q.1.1 Requirements .............................................................................................. 169
206 Q.1.2 Test method and compliance criteria ........................................................... 169
207 Q.2 Test for external circuits – paired conductor cable ............................................. 170
208 Annex R Limited short-circuit test .............................................................................. 170
209 Annex S Tests for resistance to heat and fire ............................................................. 170
210 S.1 Flammability test for fire enclosure and fire barrier materials of equipment
211 where the steady-state power does not exceed 4 000 W ..................................... 170
212 S.2 Flammability test for fire enclosure and fire barrier integrity ............................... 170
213 S.3 Flammability tests for the bottom of a fire enclosure ........................................... 171
214 S.4 Flammability classification of materials ............................................................... 171
215 S.5 Flammability test for fire enclosure materials of equipment with a steady
216 state power exceeding 4 000 W .......................................................................... 171
217 Annex T Mechanical strength tests ............................................................................ 172
218 T.2 Steady force test, 10 N ....................................................................................... 172
219 T.3 Steady force test, 30 N ....................................................................................... 172
220 T.4 Steady force test, 100 N ..................................................................................... 172
221 T.5 Steady force test, 250 N ..................................................................................... 172
222 T.6 Enclosure impact test .......................................................................................... 172
223 T.7 Drop test ............................................................................................................. 172
224 T.8 Stress relief test .................................................................................................. 172
225 T.9 Glass impact test ............................................................................................... 172
226 T.10 Glass fragmentation test ..................................................................................... 173
227 Annex U Mechanical strength of CRTs and protection against the effects of
228 implosion 173
229 U.2 Test method and compliance criteria for non-intrinsically protected CRTs ........... 173
230 Annex V Determination of accessible parts ................................................................ 173
231 Figure V.3 Blunt probe ............................................................................... 173
232 Annex X Alternative method for determining clearances for insulation in circuits
233 connected to an AC mains not exceeding 420 V peak (300 V RMS) ............................. 173
234 Annex Y Construction requirements for outdoor enclosures ....................................... 174
235 Y.3 Resistance to corrosion ...................................................................................... 176
236 Y.4.6 Securing means .................................................................................................. 176
237
238 Figure 1 – Risk reduction as given in ISO/IEC Guide 51........................................................ 15

239 Figure 2 – HBSE Process Chart ............................................................................................ 16
240 Figure 3 – Protective bonding conductor as part of a safeguard ............................................ 19
241 Figure 4 – Safeguards for protecting an ordinary person ....................................................... 23
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242 Figure 5 – Safeguards for protecting an instructed person .................................................... 24

243 Figure 6 – Safeguards for protecting a skilled person ............................................................ 24
244 Figure 7 – Flow chart showing the intent of the glass requirements ....................................... 26
245 Figure 8 – Conventional time/current zones of effects of AC currents (15 Hz to 100 Hz)
246 on persons for a current path corresponding to left hand to feet (see IEC TS 60479-
247 1:2005, Figure 20) ................................................................................................................ 29
248 Figure 9 – Conventional time/current zones of effects of DC currents on persons for a
249 longitudinal upward current path (see IEC TS 60479-1:2005, Figure 22) ............................... 30
250 Figure 10 – Illustration that limits depend on both voltage and current .................................. 31
251 Figure 11 – Illustration of working voltage ............................................................................. 43
252 Figure 12 – Illustration of transient voltages on paired conductor external circuits ................ 45
253 Figure 13 – Illustration of transient voltages on coaxial-cable external circuits ...................... 46
254 Figure 14 – Basic and reinforced insulation in Table 14 of IEC 62368-1:2018; ratio
255 reinforced to basic ................................................................................................................ 48
256 Figure 15 – Reinforced clearances according to Rule 1, Rule 2, and Table 14 ...................... 50
257 Figure 16 – Example illustrating accessible internal wiring .................................................... 58
258 Figure 17 – Waveform on insulation without surge suppressors and no breakdown ............... 60
259 Figure 18 – Waveforms on insulation during breakdown without surge suppressors .............. 61
260 Figure 19 – Waveforms on insulation with surge suppressors in operation ............................ 61
261 Figure 20 – Waveform on short-circuited surge suppressor and insulation ............................ 61
262 Figure 21 – Example for an ES2 source ................................................................................ 63
263 Figure 22 – Example for an ES3 source ................................................................................ 63
264 Figure 23 – Overview of protective conductors ...................................................................... 66
265 Figure 24 – Example of a typical touch current measuring network ....................................... 68
266 Figure 25 – Touch current from a floating circuit ................................................................... 70
267 Figure 26 – Touch current from an earthed circuit ................................................................. 71
268 Figure 27 – Summation of touch currents in a PABX ............................................................. 71
269 Figure 28 – Possible safeguards against electrically-caused fire ........................................... 78
270 Figure 29 – Fire clause flow chart ......................................................................................... 81
271 Figure 30 – Prevent ignition flow chart .................................................................................. 86
272 Figure 31 – Control fire spread summary .............................................................................. 87
273 Figure 32 – Control fire spread PS2 ...................................................................................... 88
274 Figure 33 – Control fire spread PS3 ...................................................................................... 89
275 Figure 34 – Fire cone application to a large component ........................................................ 98
276 Figure 35 – Flowchart demonstrating the hierarchy of hazard management ........................ 109
277 Figure 36 – Model for chemical injury .................................................................................. 110
278 Figure 37 – Direction of forces to be applied ....................................................................... 114
279 Figure 38 – Model for a burn injury ..................................................................................... 118
280 Figure 39 – Model for safeguards against thermal burn injury ............................................. 120
281 Figure 40 – Model for absence of a thermal hazard ............................................................. 120
282 Figure 41 – Model for presence of a thermal hazard with a physical safeguard in place ...... 120
283 Figure 42 – Model for presence of a thermal hazard with behavioural safeguard in
284 place................................................................................................................................... 121
285 Figure 45 – Examples of symmetrical single coils ............................................................... 127
286 Figure 45 – Flowchart for evaluation of Image projectors (beamers) ................................... 129
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287 Figure 46 – Graphical representation of L Aeq ,T .................................................................. 131

288 Figure 47 – Overview of operating modes ........................................................................... 137
289 Figure 48 – Voltage-current characteristics (Typical data) ................................................... 141
290 Figure 49 – Example of IC current limiter circuit .................................................................. 145
291 Figure 51 – Decision flowchart ............................................................................................ 147
292 Figure 52 – Illustration of a self-contained LFC system ....................................................... 149
293 Figure 53 – Illustration of a modular LFC system ................................................................ 150
294 Figure 54 – Example illustration of a rack modular LFC subsystems with internal and
295 external connections. .......................................................................................................... 151
296 Figure 55 – CDU Liquid Cooling System within a Data Center (courtesy of ASHRAE
297 TC9.9) ................................................................................................................................ 152
298 Figure 50 – Current limit curves .......................................................................................... 154
299 Figure 51 – Example of a dummy battery circuit .................................................................. 166
300 Figure 52 – Example of a circuit with two power sources..................................................... 170
301 Figure A.1 – Installation has poor earthing and bonding; equipment damaged
302 (from ITU-T K.66) ................................................................................................................ 178
303 Figure A.2 – Installation has poor earthing and bonding; using main earth bar for
304 protection against lightning strike (from ITU-T K.66) ........................................................... 178
305 Figure A.3 – Installation with poor earthing and bonding, using a varistor ........................... 179
306 Figure A.4 – Typîcal example of a surge suppressor and a voltage fall ............................... 179
307 Figure A.5 – An example of surge voltage drop by a MOV and two GDTs (measured in
308 laboratory) .......................................................................................................................... 181
309 Figure A.6 – An example of ports of telecommunication equipment ..................................... 185
310 Figure A.7 – V-I properties of gas discharge tubes .............................................................. 186
311 Figure A.7 – Holdover ......................................................................................................... 187
312 Figure A.9 – Relation of the V-I characteristic of a gas discharge tube and the output
313 characteristic of the power supply ....................................................................................... 188
314 Figure A.10 – Characteristics .............................................................................................. 189
315 Figure A.11 – Follow on current pictures ............................................................................. 190
316 Figure B.1 – Typical EMC filter schematic ........................................................................... 191
317 Figure B.2 – 100 MΩ oscilloscope probes ........................................................................... 193
318 Figure B.3 – Combinations of EUT resistance and capacitance for 1 s time constant .......... 195
319 Figure B.4 – 240 V mains followed by capacitor discharge .................................................. 197
320 Figure B.5 – Time constant measurement schematic .......................................................... 198
321 Figure B.6 – Worst-case measured time constant values for 100 MΩ and 10 MΩ probes .... 202
322 Figure D.1 – Example of circuit configuration of a surge suppresser ................................... 204
323
324 Table 1 – General summary of required safeguards .............................................................. 24

325 Table 2 – Time/current zones for AC 15 Hz to 100 Hz for hand to feet pathway (see
326 IEC TS 60479-1:2005, Table 11) ........................................................................................... 30
327 Table 3 – Time/current zones for DC for hand to feet pathway (see IEC TS 60479-
328 1:2005, Table 13).................................................................................................................. 31
329 Table 4 – Limit values of accessible capacitance (threshold of pain) ..................................... 34
330 Table 5 – Total body resistances R T for a current path hand to hand, DC, for large
331 surface areas of contact in dry condition ............................................................................... 36
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332 Table 6 – Insulation requirements for external circuits .......................................................... 46

333 Table 7 – Voltage drop across clearance and solid insulation in series ................................. 52
334 Table 8 – Examples of application of various safeguards ...................................................... 80
335 Table 9 – Basic safeguards against fire under normal operating conditions and
336 abnormal operating conditions .............................................................................................. 82
337 Table 10 – Supplementary safeguards against fire under single fault conditions ................... 83
338 Table 11 – Method 1: Reduce the likelihood of ignition ......................................................... 85
339 Table 12 – Method 2: Control fire spread .............................................................................. 93
340 Table 13 – Fire barrier and fire enclosure flammability requirements ................................... 100
341 Table 14 – Summary – Fire enclosure and fire barrier material requirements ...................... 104
342 Table 15 – Control of chemical hazards .............................................................................. 108
343 Table 16 – Overview of requirements for dose-based systems ............................................ 133
344 Table 17 – Overview of supply voltage ................................................................................ 136
345 Table 17 – Safety of batteries and their cells – requirements (expanded information on
346 documents and scope) ........................................................................................................ 159
347 Table A.1 – Permissible power-frequency stress voltage (except for US and Japan) ........... 181
348 Table A.2 – TOV parameters for US systems quoted from IEC 61643-12:2020 ................... 182
349 Table A.3 – TOV test parameters for Japanese systems quoted from IEC 61643-
350 12:2020 .............................................................................................................................. 182
351 Table A.4 – Peak voltage of TOV in countries conforming IEC 60364-4-44 ......................... 183
352 Table A.5 – Peak voltage of TOV in US............................................................................... 183
353 Table A.6 – Peak voltage of TOV in Japan .......................................................................... 183
354 Table A.7 – The value of Upeak2 for major mains voltages ................................................. 184
355 Table B.1 – 100 MΩ oscilloscope probes ............................................................................ 193
356 Table B.2 – Capacitor discharge ......................................................................................... 194
357 Table B.3 – Maximum T measured values for combinations of R EUT and C EUT for
358 T EUT of 1 s ........................................................................................................................ 201
359
360
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361 INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION
362 ____________
363
364 AUDIO/VIDEO, INFORMATION AND
365 COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY EQUIPMENT –
366
367 Part 2: Explanatory information related to IEC 62368-1:202x
368
369 FOREWORD
370 1) The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) is a worldwide organization for standardization comprising
371 all national electrotechnical committees (IEC National Committees). The object of IEC is to promote international
372 co-operation on all questions concerning standardization in the electrical and electronic fields. To this end and
373 in addition to other activities, IEC publishes International Standards, Technical Specifications, Technical Reports,
374 Publicly Available Specifications (PAS) and Guides (hereafter referred to as “IEC Publication(s)”). Their
375 preparation is entrusted to technical committees; any IEC National Committee interested in the subject dealt with
376 may participate in this preparatory work. International, governmental and non-governmental organizations liaising
377 with the IEC also participate in this preparation. IEC collaborates closely with the International Organization for
378 Standardization (ISO) in accordance with conditions determined by agreement between the two organizations.
379 2) The formal decisions or agreements of IEC on technical matters express, as nearly as possible, an international
380 consensus of opinion on the relevant subjects since each technical committee has representation from all
381 interested IEC National Committees.
382 3) IEC Publications have the form of recommendations for international use and are accepted by IEC National
383 Committees in that sense. While all reasonable efforts are made to ensure that the technical content of IEC
384 Publications is accurate, IEC cannot be held responsible for the way in which they are used or for any
385 misinterpretation by any end user.
386 4) In order to promote international uniformity, IEC National Committees undertake to apply IEC Publications
387 transparently to the maximum extent possible in their national and regional publications. Any divergence between
388 any IEC Publication and the corresponding national or regional publication shall be clearly indicated in the latter.
389 5) IEC itself does not provide any attestation of conformity. Independent certification bodies provide conformity
390 assessment services and, in some areas, access to IEC marks of conformity. IEC is not responsible for any
391 services carried out by independent certification bodies.
392 6) All users should ensure that they have the latest edition of this publication.
393 7) No liability shall attach to IEC or its directors, employees, servants or agents including individual experts and
394 members of its technical committees and IEC National Committees for any personal injury, property damage or
395 other damage of any nature whatsoever, whether direct or indirect, or for costs (including legal fees) and
396 expenses arising out of the publication, use of, or reliance upon, this IEC Publication or any other IEC Publications.
397 8) Attention is drawn to the Normative references cited in this publication. Use of the referenced publications is
398 indispensable for the correct application of this publication.
399 9) Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this IEC Publication may be the subject of patent
400 rights. IEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.
401 The main task of IEC technical committees is to prepare International Standards. However, a
402 technical committee may propose the publication of a technical report when it has collected
403 data of a different kind from that which is normally published as an International Standard, for
404 example, "state of the art".
405 IEC 62368-2, which is a Technical Report, has been prepared by IEC technical committee
406 TC 108: Safety of electronic equipment within the field of audio/video, information technology
407 and communication technology.
408 This fourth edition updates the third edition of IEC 62368-2 published in 2018 to take into
409 account changes made to IEC 62368-1:202x as identified in the Foreword of IEC 62368-1:202x.
410 This Technical Report is informative only. In case of a conflict between IEC 62368-1 and IEC
411 TR 62368-2, the requirements in IEC 62368-1 prevail over this Technical Report.
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412 The text of this technical report is based on the following documents:
Enquiry draft Report on voting

108/xyz/DTR 108/xyz/RVDTR
413
414 Full information on the voting for the approval of this technical report can be found in the report
415 on voting indicated in the above table.
416 In this document, the following print types are used:
417 – notes/explanatory matter: in smaller roman type;

418 – tables and figures that are included in the rationale have linked fields (shaded in grey if
419 “field shading” is active);
420 – terms that are defined in IEC 62368-1: in bold type.
421 In this document, where the term (HBSDT) is used, it stands for Hazard Based Standard
422 Development Team, which is the Working Group of IEC TC 108 responsible for the development
423 and maintenance of IEC 62368-1.
424 This publication has been drafted in accordance with the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.
425 A list of all parts of the IEC 62368 series can be found, under the general title Audio/video,
426 information and communication technology equipment, on the IEC website.
427 In this document, only those subclauses from IEC 62368-1 considered to need further
428 background reference information or explanation to benefit the reader in applying the relevant
429 requirements are included. Therefore, not all numbered subclauses are cited. Unless otherwise
430 noted, all references are to clauses, subclauses, annexes, figures or tables located in
431 IEC 62368-1:202x.
432 The entries in the document may have one or two of the following subheadings in addition to
433 the Rationale statement:
434 Source – where the source is known and is a document that is accessible to the general public,
435 a reference is provided.
436 Purpose – where there is a need and when it may prove helpful to the understanding of the
437 Rationale, we have added a Purpose statement.
438
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439 The committee has decided that the contents of this publication will remain unchanged until the
440 stability date indicated on the IEC web site under "http://webstore.iec.ch" in the data related to
441 the specific publication. At this date, the publication will be
442 • reconfirmed,
443 • withdrawn,
444 • replaced by a revised edition, or
445 • amended.
446
IMPORTANT – The 'colour inside' logo on the cover page of this publication indicates
that it contains colours which are considered to be useful for the correct understanding
of its contents. Users should therefore print this document using a colour printer.
447
448
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449 INTRODUCTION
450 IEC 62368-1 is based on the principles of hazard-based safety engineering, which is a different
451 way of developing and specifying safety considerations than that of the current practice. While
452 this document is different from traditional IEC safety documents in its approach and while it is
453 believed that IEC 62368-1 provides a number of advantages, its introduction and evolution are
454 not intended to result in significant changes to the existing safety philosophy that led to the
455 development of the safety requirements contained in IEC 60065 and IEC 60950-1. The
456 predominant reason behind the creation of IEC 62368-1 is to simplify the problems created by
457 the merging of the technologies of ITE and CE. The techniques used are novel, so a learning
458 process is required and experience is needed in its application. Consequently, the committee
459 recommends that this edition of the document be considered as an alternative to IEC 60065 or
460 IEC 60950-1 at least over the recommended transition period.
461
462
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463 AUDIO/VIDEO, INFORMATION AND

464 COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY EQUIPMENT –
465
466 Part 2: Explanatory information related to IEC 62368-1:202x
467
468
469 0 Principles of this product safety standard
470 Clause 0 is informational and provides a rationale for the normative clauses
471 of the document.
472 0.5.1 General
473 ISO/IEC Guide 51:2014, 6.3.5 states:
474 “When reducing risks, the order of priority shall be as follows:
475 a) inherently safe design;
476 b) guards and protective devices;
477 c) information for end users.
478 Inherently safe design measures are the first and most important step in the
479 risk reduction process. This is because protective measures inherent to the
480 characteristics of the product or system are likely to remain effective,
481 whereas experience has shown that even well-designed guards and
482 protective devices can fail or be violated and information for use might not
483 be followed.
484 Guards and protective devices shall be used whenever an inherently safe
485 design measure does not reasonably make it possible either to remove
486 hazards or to sufficiently reduce risks. Complementary protective measures
487 involving additional equipment (for example, emergency stop equipment)
488 might have to be implemented.
489 The end user has a role to play in the risk reduction procedure by complying
490 with the information provided by the designer/supplier. However, information
491 for use shall not be a substitute for the correct application of inherently safe
492 design measures, guards or complementary protective measures.”
493 In general, this principle is used in IEC 62368-1. The table below shows a
494 comparison between the hierarchy required in ISO/IEC Guide 51 and the
495 hierarchy used in IEC 62368-1:
ISO/IEC Guide 51 IEC 62368-1

a) inherently safe design 1. inherently safe design by limiting all energy
hazards to class 1
b) guards and protective devices 2. equipment safeguards
3. installation safeguards
4. personal safeguards
c) information for end users 5. behavioral safeguards
6. instructional safeguards
496
497 Risk assessment has been considered as part of the development of
498 IEC 62368-1 as indicated in the following from ISO/IEC Guide 51 (Figure 1)
499 in this document. See also the Hazard Based Safety Engineering (HBSE)
500 Process Flow (Figure 2) in this document that also provides additional details
501 for the above comparison.
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502
503 Figure 1 – Risk reduction as given in ISO/IEC Guide 51

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504
505
506 Figure 2 – HBSE Process Chart
507 0.5.7 Equipment safeguards during skilled person service conditions

508 Purpose: To explain the intent of requirements for providing safeguards against
509 involuntary reaction.
510 Rationale: By definition, a skilled person has the education and experience to identify all
511 class 3 energy sources to which he may be exposed. However, while servicing
512 one class 3 energy source in one location, a skilled person may be exposed to
513 another class 3 energy source in a different location.
514 In such a situation, either of two events is possible. First, something may cause
515 an involuntary reaction of the skilled person with the consequences of contact
516 with the class 3 energy source in the different location. Second, the space in
517 which the skilled person is located may be small and cramped, and inadvertent
518 contact with a class 3 energy source in the different location may be likely.
519 In such situations, this document may require an equipment safeguard solely for
520 the protection of a skilled person while performing servicing activity.
521 0.10 Thermally-caused injury (skin burn)
522 Purpose: The requirements basically address safeguards against thermal energy transfer
523 by conduction. They do not specifically address safeguards against thermal
524 energy transfer by convection or radiation. However, as the temperatures from
525 hot surfaces due to conduction are always higher than the radiated or convected
526 temperatures, these are considered to be covered by the requirements against
527 conducted energy transfer.
528 ___________
529 1 Scope
530 Purpose: To identify the purpose and applicability of this document and the exclusions
531 from the scope.
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532 Rationale: The scope excludes requirements for functional safety. Functional safety is
533 addressed in IEC 61508-1. Because the scope includes computers that may
534 control safety systems, functional safety requirements would necessarily include
535 requirements for computer processes and software.
536 The requirements provided in IEC 60950-23 could be modified and added to
537 IEC 62368 as another –X document. However, because of the hazard-based
538 nature of IEC 62368-1, the requirements from IEC 60950-23 have been
539 incorporated into the body of IEC 62368-1 and made more generic.
540 The intent of the addition of the IEC 60950-23 requirements is to maintain the
541 overall intent of the technical requirements from IEC 60950-23, incorporate them
542 into IEC 62368-1 following the overall format of IEC 62368-1 and simplify and
543 facilitate the application of these requirements.
544 Robots traditionally are covered under the scopes of ISO documents, typically
545 maintained by ISO TC 299. ISO TC 299 has working groups for personal care
546 robots and service robots, and produces for example, ISO 13482, Robots and
547 robotic devices – Safety requirements for personal care robots.
548 ___________
549 2 Normative references
550 The list of normative references is a list of all documents that have a normative
551 reference to it in the body of the document. As such, referenced documents are
552 indispensable for the application of this document. For dated references, only
553 the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the
554 referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
555 Recently, there were some issues with test houses that wanted to use the latest
556 edition as soon as it was published. As this creates serious problems for
557 manufacturers, since they have no chance to prepare, it was felt that a
558 reasonable transition period should be taken into account. This is in line with
559 earlier decisions taken by the SMB that allow transition periods to be mentioned
560 in the foreword of the documents. Therefore IEC TC 108 decided to indicate this
561 in the introduction of the normative references clause, to instruct test houses to
562 take into account any transition period, effective date or date of withdrawal
563 established for the document.
564 These documents are referenced, in whole, in part, or as alternative
565 requirements to the requirements contained in this document. Their use is
566 specified, where necessary, for the application of the requirements of this
567 document. The fact that a standard is mentioned in the list does not mean that
568 compliance with the document or parts of it are required.
569 ___________
570 3 Terms, definitions and abbreviations
571 Rationale is provided for definitions that deviate from IEV definitions or from
572 Basic or Group Safety publication definitions.
573 3.3.2.1 electrical enclosure
574 Source: IEC 60050-195:1998, 195-06-13
575 Purpose: To support the concept of safeguards as used in this document.
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576 Rationale: The IEV definition is modified to use the term “safeguard” in place of the word
577 “protection”. The word “safeguard” identifies a physical “thing” whereas the word
578 “protection” identifies the act of protecting. This document sets forth
579 requirements for use of physical safeguards and requirements for those
580 safeguards. The safeguards provide “protection” against injury from the
581 equipment.
582 3.3.3.2 fixed equipment
583 Source: IEC 60050-826:2004, modified
584 Purpose: To support the concept of “Fixed Equipment” and ensure the stability of certified
585 products.
586 Rationale: The means of securement by the manufacturer must be in accordance with the
587 accepted definition of “fixed equipment” (IEC 60050-826:2004) and reasonably
588 sufficient to overcome the forces of instability.
589 3.3.5.1 basic insulation
590 Source: IEC 60050-195:1998, 195-06-06
592 Rationale: The IEV definition is modified to use the term “safeguard” in place of the word
593 “protection”. The word “safeguard” identifies a physical “thing” whereas the word
594 “protection” identifies the act of protecting. This document sets forth
595 requirements for use of physical safeguards and requirements for those
596 safeguards. The safeguards provide “protection” against injury from the
597 equipment.
598 3.3.5.2 double insulation
599 Source: IEC 60050-195:1998, 195-06-08
601 Rationale: See 3.3.5.1, basic insulation.
602 3.3.5.6 solid insulation
603 Source: IEC 60050-212:2015, 212-11-02
604 3.3.5.7 supplementary insulation
605 Source: IEC 60050-195:1998, 195-06-07
607 Rationale: See 3.3.5.1, basic insulation.
608 3.3.6.9 restricted access area
609 Source: IEC 60050-195:1998, 195-04-04
610 Purpose: To use the concept of “instructed persons” and “skilled persons” as used in
611 this document.
612 Rationale: The IEV definition is modified to use the terms “instructed persons” and
613 “skilled persons” rather than “electrically instructed persons” and “electrically
614 skilled persons.”
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615 3.3.7.7 reasonably foreseeable misuse

616 Source: ISO/IEC Guide 51:2014, 3.7
617 Rationale: Misuse depends on personal objectives, personal perception of the equipment,
618 and the possible use of the equipment (in a manner not intended by the
619 manufacturer) to accomplish those personal objectives. Equipment within the
620 scope of this document ranges from small handheld equipment to large,
621 permanently installed equipment. There is no commonality among the equipment
622 for readily predicting human behaviour leading to misuse of the equipment and
623 resultant injury. Where a possible reasonably foreseeable misuse that may
624 lead to an injury is not covered by the requirements of the document,
625 manufacturers are encouraged to consider reasonably foreseeable misuse of
626 equipment and provide safeguards, as applicable, to prevent injury in the event
627 of such misuse. (Not all reasonably foreseeable misuse of equipment results
628 in injury or potential for injury.)
629 3.3.8.1 instructed person
630 Source: IEC 60050-826:2004, 826-18-02
631 Rationale: The IEV definition is modified to use the terms “energy sources”, “skilled
632 persons”, and “precautionary safeguard”. The definition is made stronger by
633 using the term “instructed” rather than “advised”.
634 3.3.8.3 skilled person
635 Source: IEC 60050-826:2004, 826-18-01
636 Rationale: The IEV definition is modified to use the phrase “to reduce the likelihood of”.
637 IEC 62368-1, in general, tends not use the word “hazard”.
638 3.3.11.9 protective bonding conductor
639 Rationale: The protective bonding conductor, is not a complete safeguard, but a
640 component part of the earthing system safeguard. The protective bonding
641 conductor provides a fault current pathway from a part (insulated from ES3 by
642 basic insulation only) to the equipment protective earthing terminal, see
643 Figure 3 in this document.
644
645 Figure 3 – Protective bonding conductor as part of a safeguard
646 The parts required to be earthed via a protective bonding conductor are those
647 that have only basic insulation between the parts and ES3, and are connected
648 to accessible parts.
649 Only the fault current pathway is required to be a protective bonding
650 conductor. Other earthing connections of accessible conductive parts can be
651 by means of a functional earth conductor to the equipment PE terminal or to a
652 protective bonding conductor.
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653 3.3.14.3 prospective touch voltage

654 Source: IEC 60050-195:1998, 195-05-09
655 Purpose: To properly identify electric shock energy source voltages.
656 Rationale: The IEV definition is modified to delete “animal”. The word “person” is also
657 deleted as all of the requirements in the document are with respect to persons.
658 3.3.14.8 working voltage
659 Source: IEC 60664-1:2020, 3.1.7
660 Purpose: To distinguish between RMS. working voltage and the peak of the working
661 voltage.
662 Rationale: The IEC 60664-1 definition is modified to delete “RMS”. IEC 62368-1 uses both
663 RMS. working voltage and peak of the working voltage; each term is defined.
664 3.3.15.2 class II construction
665 Source: IEC 60335-1:2010, 3.3.11
666 Purpose: Although the term is not used in the document, for completeness, it was decided
667 to retain this definition.
668 Rationale: The word “appliance” is changed to “equipment”.
669 ____________
670 4 General requirements
671 Purpose: To explain how to investigate and determine whether or not safety is involved.
672 Rationale: In order to establish whether or not safety is involved, the circuits and
673 construction are investigated to determine whether the consequences of
674 possible fault conditions would lead to an injury. Safety is involved if, as a result
675 of a single fault condition, the consequences of the fault lead to a risk of injury.
676 If a fault condition should lead to a risk of injury, the part, material, or device
677 whose fault was simulated may comprise a safeguard.
678 Rationale is provided for questions regarding the omission of some traditional
679 requirements appearing in other safety documents. Rationale is also provided
680 for further explanation of new concepts and requirements in this document.
681 Reasonable foreseeable misuse

682 Rationale: Apart from Annex M, this document does not specifically mention foreseeable
683 misuse or abnormal operating conditions. Nevertheless, the requirements of
684 the document cover many kinds of foreseeable misuse, such as covering of
685 ventilation openings, paper jams, stalled motors, etc.
686 functional insulation

687 Rationale: This document does not include requirements for functional insulation. By its
688 nature, functional insulation does not provide a safeguard function against
689 electric shock or electrically-caused fire and therefore may be faulted. Obviously,
690 not all functional insulations are faulted as this would be prohibitively time-
691 consuming. Sites for functional insulation faults should be based upon physical
692 examination of the equipment, and upon the electrical schematic.
693 Note that basic insulation and reinforced insulation may also serve as
694 functional insulation, in which case the insulation is not faulted.
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695 functional components

696 Rationale: This document does not include requirements for functional components. By
697 their nature, individual functional components do not provide a safeguard
698 function against electric shock, electrically-caused fire, thermal injury, etc., and
699 therefore may be candidates for fault testing. Obviously, not all functional
700 components are faulted as this would be prohibitively time-consuming.
701 Candidate components for fault testing should be based upon physical
702 examination of the equipment, upon the electrical schematic diagrams, and
703 whether a fault of that component might result in conditions for electric shock,
704 conditions for ignition and propagation of fire, conditions for thermal injury, etc.
705 As with all single fault condition testing (Clause B.4), upon faulting of a
706 functional component, there shall not be any safety consequence (for example,
707 a benign consequence), or a basic safeguard, supplementary safeguard , or
708 reinforced safeguard shall remain effective.
709 In some cases, a pair of components may comprise a safeguard. If the fault of
710 one of the components in the pair is mitigated by the second component, then
711 the pair is designated as a double safeguard. For example, if two diodes are
712 employed in series to protect a battery from reverse charge, then the pair
713 comprises a double safeguard and the components should be limited to the
714 manufacturer and part number actually tested. A second example is that of an
715 X-capacitor and discharge resistor. If the discharge resistor should fail open,
716 then the X-capacitor will not be discharged. Therefore, the X-capacitor value is
717 not to exceed the ES2 limits specified for a charged capacitor. Again, the two
718 components comprise a double safeguard and the values of each component
719 are limited to values for ES1 under normal operating conditions and the values
720 for ES2 under single fault conditions.
721 4.1.1 Application of requirements and acceptance of materials, components and
722 subassemblies
723 Purpose: To accept components as safeguards.
724 Rationale: This document includes requirements for safeguard components. A safeguard
725 component is a component specifically designed and manufactured for both
726 functional and safeguard parameters. Examples of safeguard components are
727 capacitors complying with IEC 60384-14 and other components that comply with
728 their related IEC component document.
729 Acceptance of components and component requirements from IEC 60065

730 and 60950-1
731 Purpose: To accept both components and sub-assemblies investigated to the legacy
732 documents, IEC 60065 and IEC 60950-1, and components complying with
733 individual component requirements within these documents during the transition
734 period.
735 Rationale: To facilitate a smooth transition from the legacy documents IEC 60065 and
736 IEC 60950-1 to IEC 62368-1, including by the component supply chain, this
737 document allows for acceptance of both components and sub-assemblies
738 investigated to the legacy documents. Individual component requirements within
739 these documents may be used for compliance with IEC 62368-1 without further
740 investigation, other than to give consideration to the appropriate use of the
741 component or sub-assembly in the end-product.
742 This means, for example, if a switch mode power supply is certified to IEC 60065
743 or IEC 60950-1, this component can be used in equipment evaluated to
744 IEC 62368-1 without further investigation, other than to give consideration to the
745 appropriate use of the component, such as use within its electrical ratings.
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746 This also means, for example, since IEC 60950-1 allows for wiring and cables
747 insulated with PVC, TFE, PTFE, FEP, polychloroprene or polyimide to comply
748 with material requirements for parts within a fire enclosure without need for the
749 application of a flammability test, the same wire can be used to comply with the
750 requirements in 6.5.2 for insulation on wiring used in PS2 or PS3 circuits and
751 without the need for application of a flammability test per IEC 60332 series or
752 IEC TS 60695-11-21 as normally is required by 6.5.1.
753 4.1.5 Constructions and components not specifically covered
754 For constructions not covered, consideration should be given for the hierarchy
755 of safeguards in accordance with ISO/IEC Guide 51.
756 4.1.6 Orientation during transport and use
757 See also 4.1.4
758 In general, equipment is assumed to be installed and used in accordance with
759 the manufacturer’s instructions. However, in some cases where equipment may
760 be installed by an ordinary person, it is recognized that it is common practice
761 to mount equipment as desired if screw holes are provided, especially if they
762 allow mounting to readily available brackets. Hence, the exception that is added
763 to 4.1.6.
764 Examples of the above: a piece of equipment, such as a television set or a video
765 projector, that has embedded screw mounting holes that allow it to be attached
766 to a wall or other surface through the use of commercially available vertically or
767 tilt-mountable brackets, shall also take into account that the mounting surface
768 itself may not be vertical.
769 It is also recognized that transportable equipment, by its nature, may be
770 transported in any and all orientations.
771 4.1.8 Liquids and liquid filled components (LFC)
772 The one-litre (1 l) restriction was placed in 4.1.8 since the origin of some of the
773 requirements in Clause G.15 came from requirements in documents often
774 applied to smaller systems. Nevertheless, such a limitation does not always
775 negate the allowed application of 4.1.8 and Clause G.15 to systems with larger
776 volumes of liquid, but it could impact direct (automatic) applicability to the larger
777 systems.
778 4.2 Energy source classifications
779 Classification of energy sources may be done whether the source is accessible
780 or not. The requirements for parts may differ on whether the part is accessible
781 or not.
782 4.2.1 Class 1 energy source
783 A class 1 energy source is a source that is expected not to create any pain or
784 injury. Therefore, a class 1 energy source may be accessible by any person.
785 Under some specific conditions of abnormal operation or single fault
786 conditions, a class 1 energy source may reach class 2 limits. However, this
787 source still remains a class 1 energy source. In this case, an instructional
788 safeguard may be required.
789 Under normal operating conditions and abnormal operating conditions, the
790 energy in a class 1 source, in contact with a body part, may be detectable, but
791 is not painful nor is it likely to cause an injury. For fire, the energy in a class 1
792 source is not likely to cause ignition.
793 Under single fault conditions, a class 1 energy source, under contact with a
794 body part, may be painful, but is not likely to cause injury.
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796 A class 2 energy source is a source that may create pain, but which is unlikely
797 to create any serious injury. Therefore, a class 2 energy source may not be
798 accessible by an ordinary person. However, a class 2 energy source may be
799 accessible by:
800 – an instructed person; and
801 – a skilled person.
802 The energy in a class 2 source, under contact with a body part, may be painful,
803 but is not likely to cause an injury. For fire, the energy in a class 2 source can
804 cause ignition under some conditions.

806 A class 3 energy source is a source that is likely to create an injury. Therefore,
807 a class 3 energy source may not be accessible to an ordinary person or an
808 instructed person. A class 3 energy source may, in general, be accessible to
809 a skilled person.
810 Any source may be declared a class 3 energy source without measurement, in
811 which case all the safeguards applicable to class 3 are required.
812 The energy in a class 3 source, under contact with a body part, is capable of
813 causing injury. For fire, the energy in a class 3 source may cause ignition and
814 the spread of flame where fuel is available.
815 4.3.2 Safeguards for protection of an ordinary person
816 The required safeguards for the protection of an ordinary person are given in Figure 4.
817
818 Figure 4 – Safeguards for protecting an ordinary person

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819 4.3.3 Safeguards for protection of an instructed person
820 The required safeguards for the protection of an instructed person are given in Figure 5.
821
822 Figure 5 – Safeguards for protecting an instructed person
823 4.3.4 Safeguards for protection of a skilled person
824 The required safeguards for the protection of a skilled person are given in Figure 6.
825
826 Figure 6 – Safeguards for protecting a skilled person
827 Table 1 in this document gives a general overview of the required number of
828 safeguards depending on the energy source and the person to whom the energy
829 source is accessible. The different clauses have requirements that sometimes
830 deviate from the general principle as given above. These cases are clearly
831 defined in the requirements sections of the document.
832 Table 1 – General summary of required safeguards
Number of safeguards required to be interposed between an

energy source and a person
Person
Class 1 Class 2 Class3
Ordinary person 0 1 2
Instructed person 0 0 2
Skilled person 0 0 0 or 1
833
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834 For a skilled person, there is normally no safeguard required for a class 3
835 energy source. However, if there are multiple class 3 energy sources accessible
836 or if the energy source is not obvious, a safeguard may be required.
837 4.4.2 Composition of a safeguard
838 Purpose: To specify design and construction criteria for a single safeguard (basic,
839 supplementary, or reinforced) comprised of more than one element, for example,
840 a component or a device.
841 Rationale: Safeguards need not be a single, homogeneous component. Indeed, some parts
842 of this document require a single safeguard be comprised of two or more
843 elements. For example, for thin insulation, two or more layers are required to
844 qualify as supplementary insulation. Another example is protective bonding
845 and protective earthing, both of which are comprised of wires, terminals,
846 screws, etc.
847 If a safeguard is comprised of two or more elements, then the function of the
848 safeguard should not be compromised by a failure of any one element. For
849 example, if a screw attaching a protective earthing wire should loosen, then
850 the current-carrying capacity of the protective earthing circuit may be
851 compromised, making its reliability uncertain.
852 4.4.3 Safeguard robustness
853 Rationale: Safeguards should be sufficiently robust to withstand the rigors of expected use
854 throughout the equipment lifetime. Robustness requirements are specified in the
855 various clauses.
856 4.4.3.4 Impact test
857 Rationale: Stationary equipment can, in some cases, be developed for a specific
858 installation in which it is not possible for certain surfaces to be subjected to an
859 impact when installed as intended. In those cases, the impact test is not
860 necessary when the installation makes clear that the side cannot be impacted.
861 4.4.3.6 Glass impact tests
862 Source: IEC 60065
863 Purpose: Verify that any glass that breaks does not cause skin-lacerating injury, or expose
864 class 3 hazards behind the glass.
865 Rationale: When it comes to glass, two hazards can be present in case the glass breaks:
866 − access to sharp edges from the broken glass itself
867 − exposure of class 3 energy hazards in case the glass is used as (part of) the
868 enclosure.
869 Should the glass break during the impact test, T.9 is applied to ensure the
870 expelled fragments will be at MS2 level or less.
871 Platen glass has a long history of being exempted, because it is quite obvious
872 for people that, if broken, the broken glass is hazardous and contact should be
873 avoided. There is no known history of serious injuries with this application. Platen
874 glass is the glass that is typically used in scanners, copiers, etc. Accidents are
875 rare, probably also because they are protected by an additional cover most of
876 the time, which limits the probability that an impact will occur on the glass.
877 CRTs are exempted because they have separate requirements.
878 The test value for floor standing equipment is higher because it is more likely to
879 be impacted by persons or carts and dollies at a higher force while in normal
880 use.
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881 The exemption for glass below certain sizes is taken over from IEC 60065. There
882 is no good rationale to keep the exemption, other than that there are no serious
883 accidents known from the field. The HBSDT decided that they want to keep the
884 exemption in.
885 The flow chart in Figure 7 in this document shows the intent for the requirements.
886
887 Figure 7 – Flow chart showing the intent of the glass requirements
888 4.4.3.10 Compliance criteria

889 The value of 30 g for the weight limit is chosen based on the maximum dimension
890 of a side of 50 mm. A typical piece of glass with a size of 50 mm × 50 mm ×
891 4 mm (roughly 2,80 g/cm 3 ) would have a weight of around 30 g.
892 4.6 Fixing of conductors
893 Source: IEC 60950-1
894 Purpose: To reduce the likelihood that conductors could be displaced such that they
895 reduce the creepage distances and clearances.
896 Rationale: These requirements have been successfully used for products in the scope of
897 this document for many years.
898 For parts that are conductive but not intended to carry current, their displacement
899 should not defeat a safeguard, such as reducing a clearance or creepage
900 distance.
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901 For example, a conductive screw fixing a radiator on a transistor in a class II

902 power supply should be such that it will not easily detach, because it could
903 eventually bridge a safety insulation.
904 4.7 Equipment for direct insertion into mains socket-outlets
905 Source: IEC 60065:2014, 15.5 ; IEC 60950-1:2013, 4.3.6; IEC 60335-1:2010, 22.3 and
906 IEC 60884-1:2013, 14.23.2
907 Purpose: Determine that equipment incorporating integral pins for insertion into mains
908 socket-outlets does not impose undue torque on the socket-outlet due to the
909 mass and configuration of the equipment. This type of equipment often is known
910 as direct plug-in equipment or direct plug-in transformers.
911 Rationale: Socket outlets are required to comply with the safety requirements in IEC 60884-
912 1:2013, Plugs and socket-outlets for household and similar purposes – Part 1:
913 General requirements, including subclause 14.23.2. The requirements result in
914 socket designs with certain design limitations. Equipment incorporating integral
915 pins for insertion into mains socket-outlets is not allowed to exceed these design
916 limitations.
917 For direct plug-in equipment, including equipment for direct insertion into a
918 mains socket-outlet, normal use can be considered by representative testing.
919 The intent is not to require testing in all orientations. Subclause 4.1.6 is not
920 applicable unless the manufacturer specifically supplies instructions
921 representing multiple mounting positions or configurations.
922 4.8 Equipment containing coin / button cell batteries
923 Rationale: The determination whether the battery is unlikely to be removed by children due
924 to location within the equipment is an engineering judgment not requiring Annex
925 V. A coin / button cell battery located inside pluggable equipment without a
926 dedicated battery compartment is an example of a battery that would be
927 considered unlikely to be removed by children.
928 4.9 Likelihood of fire or shock due to entry of conductive objects
929 Purpose: The purpose of this subclause is to establish opening requirements that would
930 minimize the risk of foreign conductive objects falling into the equipment that
931 could bridge parts within class 2 or class 3 circuits, or between PS circuits that
932 could result in ignition or electric shock.
933 It is considered unlikely that a person would accidentally drop something that
934 could consequently fall into the equipment at a height greater than 1,8 m.
935 4.10.3 Power supply cords
936 Rationale: Power supply cords are neither internal nor external wiring. They are separately
937 covered in G.7.
938 _____________
939 5 Electrically-caused injury
940 Purpose: Clause 5 classifies electrical energy sources and provides criteria for
941 determining the energy source class of each conductive part. The criteria for
942 energy source class include the source current-voltage characteristics, duration,
943 and capacitance. Each conductive part, whether current-carrying or not, or
944 whether earthed or not, shall be classed ES1, ES2, or ES3 with respect to earth
945 and with respect to any other simultaneously accessible conductive part.
946 240 VA limit
947 IEC 62368-1 does not have requirements for a 240 VA energy hazard that was
948 previously located in 2.1.1.5 of IEC 60950-1:2013.
– 28 – 108/757/DC
949 The origin/justification of the 240 VA energy hazard requirement in the legacy
950 documents was never precisely determined, and it appears the VA limits may
951 have come from a manufacturer’s specifications originally applied to exposed
952 bus bars in mainframe computers back in the 1960’s and concerns at the time
953 service personnel inadvertently bridging them with a metal part.
954 However, when IEC TC 108 started the IEC 62368-1 project the intent was to
955 take a fresh look at product safety using HBSE and only carry over a legacy
956 requirement if the safety science and HBSE justified it. After considerable study
957 by IEC TC 108, there was no support for carrying over the 240 VA requirement
958 since:
959 − the requirements were not based on any proven science or sound technical
960 basis;
961 − the 240 VA value was relatively arbitrary; and
962 − in practice the requirement was difficult to apply consistently (for example, on
963 a populated printed board or inside a switch mode power supply).
964 In the meantime, there are energy limits for capacitors in Clause 5, which
965 remains a more realistic concern and which were the second set of the energy
966 hazard requirements in IEC 60950-1, the first being steady state 240 VA.
967 In addition, there are other requirements in IEC 62368-1 that will limit exposure
968 to high levels of power (VA), including a VA limit for LPS outputs when those are
969 required by Annex Q (for outputs connected to building wiring as required by
970 6.5.2).
971 Electric burn (eBurn)
972 Analysis of the body current generated by increasing frequency sinusoidal
973 waveforms shows that the current continues to increase with frequency. The
974 same analysis shows that the touch current, which is discounted with
975 frequency, stabilizes.
976 The following paper describes the analysis fully: ‘Touch Current Comparison,
977 Looking at IEC 60990 Measurement Circuit Performance – Part 1: Electric Burn';
978 Peter E Perkins; IEEE PSES Product Safety Engineering Newsletter, Vol 4, No
979 2, Nov 2008.
980 The crossover frequency is different for the startle-reaction circuit than for the
981 let go-immobilization circuit because of the separate Frequency Factor body
982 response curves related to current levels; analysis identifies the crossover
983 frequency where the eBurn current surpasses the touch current. Under these
984 conditions, a person touching the circuit will become immobilized and will not be
985 able to let go of the circuit. This crossover frequency is determined in the
986 analysis. The person contacting the circuit should always be able to let go.
987 The general conditions that apply to eBurn circuits are:
988 − the eBurn limit only applies to HF sinusoidal signals;
989 − the area of contact should be limited to a small, fingertip contact
990 (~ 1cm 2 );
991 − the contact time should be less than 1 s; at this short contact time, it is not
992 reasonable to define different levels for various persons;
993 − This requirement applies to accessible circuits that can be contacted at both
994 poles, including all grounded circuits isolated from the mains and any isolated
995 circuits where both contacts are easily available to touch.
996 A simplified application of these requirements in the documents limits the
997 accessibility of HF sinusoidal currents above a specified frequency. The 22 kHz
998 and 36 kHz frequency limits are where the eBurn current crosses the 5mA limit
999 for the ES1 and ES2 measurement circuits. This will ensure that the person
1000 contacting the circuit will be able to remove themselves from the circuit under
1001 these conditions.
– 29 – 108/757/DC
1002 1 MHz limit

1003 The effects of electric current on the human body are described in the IEC 60479
1004 series and the requirements in IEC 62368-1 are drawn from there. The effects
1005 versus frequency are well laid out and properly accounted for in these
1006 requirements. The body effects move from conducted effects to surface
1007 radiofrequency burns at higher frequencies approaching 100 kHz. By long-term
1008 agreement, IEC safety documents are responsible for outlining the effects of
1009 current to 1 MHz, which are properly measured by the techniques given herein.
1010 Above the 1 MHz level, it becomes an EMC issue. Unless the current is provided
1011 as a principal action of the equipment operation, electric shock evaluation should
1012 not be needed above the 1 MHz level. Where it is fundamental to the equipment's
1013 operation, the high-frequency current levels shall be specially measured using
1014 proper high-frequency techniques, including classifying the circuits and, if
1015 necessary, appropriately protected to avoid any bodily injury.
1016 5.2.1 Electrical energy source classifications
1017 Source: IEC TS 60479-1:2005 and IEC 61201
1018 Purpose: To define the line between hazardous and non-hazardous electrical energy
1019 sources for normal operating conditions and abnormal operating conditions.
1020 Rationale: The effect on persons from an electric source depends on the current through
1021 the human body. The effects are described in IEC TS 60479-1.
1022 IEC TS 60479-1 (see Figures 20 and 22, Tables 11 and 13); zone AC-1 and
1023 zone DC-1; usually no reaction (Figure 8 and Figure 9, Table 2 and Table 3 in
1024 this document) is taken as values for ES1.
1025 IEC TS 60479-1 (see Figures 20 and 22; Tables 11 and 13); zone AC-2 and
1026 zone DC-2; usually no harmful physiological effects (see Figure 8 and Figure 9,
1027 Table 2 in this document) is taken as values for ES2.
1028 IEC TS 60479-1; zone AC-3 and zone DC-3; harmful physiological effects may
1029 occur (see Figure 8 and Figure 9, Table 2 and Table 3 in this document) is the
1030 ES3 zone.
1031
1032
1033 Figure 8 – Conventional time/current zones of effects

1034 of AC currents (15 Hz to 100 Hz) on persons for a current path corresponding
1035 to left hand to feet (see IEC TS 60479-1:2005, Figure 20)
– 30 – 108/757/DC
1036 Table 2 – Time/current zones for AC 15 Hz to 100 Hz

1037 for hand to feet pathway (see IEC TS 60479-1:2005, Table 11)
Zones Boundaries Physiological effects

AC-1 up to 0,5 mA curve a Perception possible but usually no startle reaction
AC-2 0,5 mA up to curve b Perception and involuntary muscular contractions likely but usually
no harmful electrical physiological effects
AC-3 Curve b and above Strong involuntary muscular contractions. Difficulty in breathing.
Reversible disturbances of heart function. Immobilisation may
occur.
Effects increasing with current magnitude. Usually no organic
damage to be expected.
AC-4 a Above curve c 1 Pathophysiological effects may occur such as cardiac arrest,
breathing arrest, and burns or other cellular damage. Probability of
ventricular fibrillation increasing with current magnitude and time.
c1 – c2 AC-4.1 Probability of ventricular fibrillation increasing up to about
5 %.
c2 – c3 AC-4.2 Probability of ventricular fibrillation up to about 50 %.
Beyond curve c 3 AC-4.3 Probability of ventricular fibrillation above 50 %.
a For durations of current flow below 200 ms, ventricular fibrillation is only initiated within the vulnerable period
if the relevant thresholds are surpassed. As regards ventricular fibrillation, this figure relates to the effects of
current that flows in the path left hand to feet. For other current paths, the heart current factor has to be
considered.
1038
1039
1040 Figure 9 – Conventional time/current zones of effects of DC currents on persons for

1041 a longitudinal upward current path (see IEC TS 60479-1:2005, Figure 22)
– 31 – 108/757/DC
1042 Table 3 – Time/current zones for DC for hand to feet pathway

1043 (see IEC TS 60479-1:2005, Table 13)
Zones Boundaries Physiological effects

DC-1 Up to 2 mA curve a Slight pricking sensation possible when making, breaking or rapidly
altering current flow.
DC-2 2 mA up to curve b Involuntary muscular contractions likely, especially when making,
breaking or rapidly altering current flow, but usually no harmful
electrical physiological effects
DC-3 curve b and above Strong involuntary muscular reactions and reversible disturbances
of formation and conduction of impulses in the heart may occur,
increasing with current magnitude and time. Usually, no organic
damage to be expected.
DC-4 a Above curve c 1 Pathophysiological effects may occur such as cardiac arrest,
breathing arrest, and burns or other cellular damage. Probability of
ventricular fibrillation increasing with current magnitude and time.
c1 – c2 DC-4.1 Probability of ventricular fibrillation increasing up to about
5 %.
c2 – c3 DC-4.2 Probability of ventricular fibrillation up to about 50 %.
Beyond curve c 3 DC-4.3 Probability of ventricular fibrillation above 50 %.
a For durations of current flow below 200 ms, ventricular fibrillation is only initiated within the vulnerable period
if the relevant thresholds are surpassed. As regards ventricular fibrillation, this figure relates to the effects of
current which flows in the path left hand to feet and for upward current. For other current paths, the heart
current factor has to be considered.
1044
1045 The seriousness of an injury increases continuously with the energy

1046 transferred to the body. To demonstrate this principle Figure 8 and Figure 9
1047 in this document (see IEC TS 60479-1, Figures 20 and 22) are transferred
1048 into a graph: effects vs energy (see Figure 10 in this document).
1049
1050 Figure 10 – Illustration that limits depend on both voltage and current
1051 Within the document, only the limits for Zone 1 (green) and Zone 2 (yellow) will
1052 be specified.
1053 Curve “a” (limit of Zone 1) will be the limit for parts accessible by an ordinary
1054 person during normal use.
1055 Curve “b” (limit of Zone 2) will be the limit for parts accessible by an ordinary
1056 person during (or after) a single fault.
– 32 – 108/757/DC
1057 IEC TC 108 regarded it not to be acceptable to go to the limits of either Zone 3
1058 or 4.
1059 In the document three (3) zones are described as electrical energy sources.
1060 This classification is as follows:
1061 − electrical energy source 1 (ES1): levels are of such a value that they do not
1062 exceed curve “a” (threshold of perception) of Figure 8 and Figure 9 in this
1063 document (see IEC TS 60479-1:2005, Figures 20 and 22).
1064 − electrical energy source 2 (ES2): levels are of such a value that they exceed
1065 curve “a”, but do not exceed curve “b” (threshold of let go) of Figure 8 and
1066 Figure 9 in this document (see IEC TS 60479-1:2005, Figures 20 and 22).
1067 − electrical energy source 3 (ES3): levels are of such a value that they exceed
1068 curve “b” of Figure 8 and Figure 9 in this document (see IEC
1069 TS 60479-1:2005, Figures 20 and 22).
1070 5.2.2.1 General
1071 When classifying a circuit or part that is not accessible, that circuit or part shall
1072 be regarded as being accessible when measuring prospective touch voltage
1073 and touch current.
1074 Signals for communication or data circuits are generally low voltage, high
1075 impedance sources.
1076 When combining these communication or data signals with a possible normal
1077 operating voltage (for example, DC feeding voltage), the communication or data
1078 signal voltage itself is disregarded and is not used for the classification of the
1079 circuits. If there is no normal operating voltage present, the signals are also
1080 disregarded for purposes of circuit classification.
1081 Examples for communication or data signals
1082 − typically found on indoor ICT networks, like USB, HDMI, PoE, Ethernet,
1083 analog voice, digital phone systems, G.fast, G.now, G.hn, ISDN-S Bus, A/V,
1084 etc.
1085 − typically found on outdoor and/or indoor ICT networks, like analog voice,
1086 T1/E1, SHDSL, xDSL, G.fast, G.now, G.hn, PoE, Ethernet, ISDN U interface,
1087 Primary rate ISDN, etc.
1088 NOTE 1 In this context, the normal operating voltage is the powering voltage for the ICT line.
1089 NOTE 2 See 5.2.2.6 for information regarding telephone ringing signals.
1090 5.2.2.2 Steady-state voltage and current limits
1091 Table 4 Electrical energy source limits for steady-state ES1 and ES2
1092 Source: IEC TS 60479-1:2005, Dalziel, Effect of Wave Form on Let-Go Currents; AIEE
1093 Electrical Engineering Transactions, Dec 1943, Vol 62.
1094 Rationale: The current limits of Table 4 line 1 and 2 are derived from curve a and b, Figure 8
1095 and Figure 9 in this document (see IEC TS 60479-1:2005, Figures 20 and 22).
1096 The basis for setting limits for combined AC and DC touch current is from the
1097 work of Dalziel which provides clear data for men, women and children. In the
1098 current diagram (Figure 22), the AC current is always the peak value (per
1099 Dalziel). In the voltage diagram (Figure 23), the 30 V AC and 50 V AC points on
1100 the baseline are recognized as AC RMS values as stated in Table 4. Since IEC
1101 TC 108 is working with consumer appliances, there is a need to provide
1102 protection for children, who are generally considered the most vulnerable
1103 category of people. The formulas of Table 4 address the Dalziel investigations.
– 33 – 108/757/DC
1104 Under single fault conditions of a relevant basic safeguard or supplementary

1105 safeguard, touch current is measured according to 5.1.2 of IEC 60990:2016.
1106 However, this IEC 60990 subclause references both the IEC 60990
1107 perception/reaction network (Figure 4) and the let-go network (Figure 5),
1108 selection of which depends on several factors. Figure 5 applies to touch current
1109 limits above 2 mA RMS. IEC TC 108 has decided that parts under single fault
1110 conditions of relevant basic safeguards or supplementary safeguards should
1111 be measured per Figure 5 (let-go immobilization network). Therefore, since 5.1.2
1112 makes reference to both Figure 4 and Figure 5, for clarification Table 4 is
1113 mentioned directly in 5.2.2.2.
1114 Because there is usually no reaction of the human body when touching ES1,
1115 access is permitted by any person (IEC TS 60479-1; zone AC-1 and zone DC-1).
1116 Because there may be a reaction of the human body when touching ES2,
1117 protection is required for an ordinary person. One safeguard is sufficient
1118 because there are usually no harmful physiological effects when touching ES2
1119 (IEC TS 60479-1:2005; zone AC-2 and zone DC-2).
1120 Because harmful physiological effects may occur when touching ES3, (IEC
1121 TS 60479-1:2005; zone AC-3 and zone DC-3), protection is required for an
1122 ordinary person and an instructed person, including after a fault of one
1123 safeguard.
1124 During the application of the electrical energy source limits for “combined AC
1125 and DC” in Table 4, if the AC component of a superimposed AC and DC energy
1126 source does not exceed 10 % of the DC energy, then the AC component can be
1127 disregarded for purposes of application of Table 4. This consideration is valid
1128 based on the definition of DC voltage in 3.3.14.1, which allows peak-to-peak
1129 ripple not exceeding 10 % of the average value to integrated into DC voltage
1130 considerations. As a result, in such cases where AC does not exceed 10 % of
1131 DC, only the DC energy source limits in Table 4 need be applied.
1132 When measuring combined AC and DC voltages and currents, both AC and DC
1133 measurements shall be made between the same points of reference. Do not
1134 combine common-mode measurements with differential-mode measurements.
1135 They shall be assessed separately.
1136 In using Table 4, ES1 touch current measurement specifies the startle-reaction
1137 circuit ‘a’ intended for limits less than 2 mA RMS / 2,8 mA peak and ES2 touch
1138 current specifies the let-go-immobilization circuit ‘b’ intended for limits > 2 mA
1139 RMS / 2,8 mA peak. These circuits are adopted from IEC 60990:2016, Clause 5.
1140 Normal operating conditions of equipment for touch current testing are
1141 outlined in 5.7.2 and Clause B.2 and includes operation of all operator controls.
1142 Abnormal operating conditions are specified in Clause B.3. Single fault
1143 conditions (within the equipment), specified in Clause B.4, includes faults of a
1144 relevant basic safeguard or a supplementary safeguard.
1145 5.2.2.3 Capacitance limits
1146 Table 5 Electrical energy source limits for a charged capacitor
1147 Source: IEC TS 61201:2007 (Annex A)

1148 Rationale: Where the energy source is a capacitor, the energy source class is determined
1149 from both the charge voltage and the capacitance. The capacitance limits are
1150 derived from IEC TS 61201:2007, see Table 4 in this document.
1151 The values for ES2 are derived from Table A.2 of IEC TS 61201:2007.
1152 The values for ES1 are calculated by dividing the values from Table A.2 of
1153 IEC TS 61201:2007 by two (2).
– 34 – 108/757/DC
1154 Table 4 – Limit values of accessible capacitance (threshold of pain)
U C U C
V µF kV nF
70 42,4 1 8,0
78 10,0 2 4,0
80 3,8 5 1,6
90 1,2 10 0,8
100 0,58 20 0,4
150 0,17 40 0,2
200 0,091 60 0,133
250 0,061
300 0,041
400 0,028
500 0,018
700 0,012
1155
1156 5.2.2.4 Single pulse limits
1157 Table 6 Voltage limits for single pulses
1158 Rationale: The values are based on the DC current values of Table 4, assuming 25 mA
1159 gives a voltage of 120 V DC (body resistance of 4,8 kΩ). The lowest value is
1160 taken as 120 V because, under single fault conditions, the voltage of ES1 can
1161 be as high as 120 V DC without a time limit.
1162 The table allows linear interpolation because the difference is considered to be
1163 very small. However, the following formula may be used for a more exact
1164 interpolation of the log-log based values in this table. The variable t or V is the
1165 desired unknown "in between value" and either may be determined when one is
1166 known:
log t2 – log t
logV2 + logV1 ×
log t – log t1
1167 V = Antilog
log t2 – log t
1+
log t – log t1
1168 and
logV2 – logV
log t2 + log t1 ×
logV – logV1
1169 t = Antilog
logV2 – logV
1+
logV – logV1
1170 where:
1171 t is the time duration that is required to be determined if U peak voltage V
1172 is known (or t is known and V needs to be determined)
1173 t1 is the time duration adjacent to t corresponding to the U peak voltage V 1
1174 t2 is the time duration adjacent to t corresponding to the U peak voltage V 2
1175 V is the U peak voltage value that is known if time duration t is to be
1176 determined (or V is required to be determined if time duration t is known)
– 35 – 108/757/DC
1177 V1 is the value of the voltage U peak adjacent to V corresponding to time

1178 duration t 1
1179 V2 is the value of the voltage U peak adjacent to V corresponding to time
1180 duration t 2
1181 Table 7 Current limits for single pulses
1182 Source: IEC TS 60479-1:2005

1183 Rationale: For ES1, the limit of single pulse should not exceed the ES1 steady-state voltage
1184 limits for DC voltages.
1185 For ES2, the voltage limits have been calculated by using the DC current values
1186 of curve b Figure 9 in this document and the resistance values of Table 10 of
1187 IEC TS 60479-1:2005, column for 5 % of the population (see Table 5 in this
1188 document).
1189 The current limits of single pulses in Table 7 for ES1 levels are from curve a and
1190 for ES2 are from curve b of Figure 9 in this document.
1191 The table allows linear interpolation because the difference is considered to be
1192 very small. However, the following formula may be used for a more exact
1193 interpolation of the log-log based values in this table. The variable t or I is the
1194 desired unknown "in between value" and either may be determined when one is
1195 known:
1196
log t2 – log t
log I 2 + log I1 ×
log t – log t1
1197 I = Antilog
log t2 – log t
1+
log t – log t1
1198 and
log I 2 – log I
log t2 + log t1 ×
log I – log I1
1199 t = Antilog
log I 2 – log I
1+
log I – log I1
1200 where:
1201 t is the time duration that is required to be determined if the electric current
1202 I is known (or t is known and I needs to be determined)
1203 t 1 is the time duration adjacent to t corresponding to the electric current I 1
1204 t 2 is the time duration adjacent to t corresponding to the electric current I 2
1205 I is the value of the I peak current that is known if time duration t is to be
1206 determined (or I is required to be determined if time duration t is known)
1207 I 1 is the value of the I peak adjacent to I corresponding to time duration t 1
1208 I 2 is the value of the I peak adjacent to I corresponding to time duration t 2
– 36 – 108/757/DC
1209 Table 5 – Total body resistances R T for a current path hand to hand, DC,
1210 for large surface areas of contact in dry condition
Values for the total body resistance RT (Ω)

that are not exceeded for
Touch voltage
V
5 % of the 50 % of the 95 % of the
population population population
25 2 100 3 875 7 275

50 1 600 2 900 5 325
75 1 275 2 275 4 100
100 1 100 1 900 3 350
125 975 1 675 2 875
150 875 1 475 2 475
175 825 1 350 2 225
200 800 1 275 2 050
225 775 1 225 1 900
400 700 950 1 275
500 625 850 1 150
700 575 775 1 050
1 000 575 775 1 050
Asymptotic value 575 775 1 050
NOTE 1 Some measurements indicate that the total body resistance RT for the current path hand to foot
is somewhat lower than for a current path hand to hand (10 % to 30 %).
NOTE 2 For living persons the values of RT correspond to a duration of current flow of about 0,1 s.
For longer durations RT values may decrease (about 10 % to 20 %) and after complete rupture
of the skin RT approaches the initial body resistance Ro.
NOTE 3 Values of RT are rounded to 25 Ω.
1211
1212
1213 5.2.2.6 Ringing signals

1214 Source: EN 41003
1215 Purpose: To establish limits for analogue telephone network ringing signals.
1216 Rationale: For details see rationale for Annex H. Where the energy source is an analogue
1217 telephone network ringing signal as defined in Annex H, the energy source class
1218 is taken as ES2 (as in IEC 60950-1:2005, Annex M).
1219 5.2.2.7 Audio signals
1220 Source: IEC 60065:2014
1221 Purpose: To establish limits for touch voltages for audio signals.
1222 Rationale: The proposed limits for touch voltages at terminals involving audio signals that
1223 may be contacted by persons have been extracted without deviation from
1224 IEC 60065. Reference: IEC 60065:2014, 9.1.1.2 a). Under single fault
1225 conditions, 10.2 of IEC 60065:2014 does not permit an increase in acceptable
1226 touch voltage limits.
1227 The proposed limits are quantitatively larger than the accepted limits of Table 5
1228 and Table 6, but are not considered dangerous for the following reasons:
1229 − the output is measured with the load disconnected (worst case load);
– 37 – 108/757/DC
1230 − defining the contact area of connectors and wiring is very difficult due to
1231 complex shapes. The area of contact is considered small due to the
1232 construction of the connectors;
1233 − normally, it is recommended to the user, in the instruction manual provided
1234 with the equipment, that all connections be made with the equipment in the
1235 “off” condition;
1236 − in addition to being on, the equipment would have to be playing some program
1237 at a high output with the load disconnected to achieve the proposed limits
1238 (although possible, highly unlikely). Historically, no known cases of injury are
1239 known for amplifiers with non-clipped output less than 71 V RMS;
1240 − the National Electrical Code (USA) permits accessible terminals with
1241 maximum output voltage of 120 V RMS.
1242 5.3.2 Accessibility to electrical energy sources and safeguards
1243
1244 What are the requirements between the non-accessible sources?

1245 Answer: None. As the enclosure is double insulated, the sources are not
1246 accessible.
1247
1248 Now there is an accessible connection. What are the requirements between the
1249 sources in this case?
1250 Answer:
1251 – Basic insulation between ES1 and ES2
1252 – Double insulation or reinforced insulation between ES1 and ES3
1253 – The insulation between ES2 and ES3 depends on the insulation between the
1254 ES1 and ES2
– 38 – 108/757/DC
1255
1256 Now there are two accessible connections from independent sources. What are
1257 the requirements between the sources in this case?
1258 Answer:
1259 – According to Clause B.4, the insulation or any components between the
1260 sources need to be shorted
1261 – If one of the two ES1 sources would reach ES2 levels  basic safeguard
1262 – If both ES1 sources stay within ES1 limits  no safeguard (functional
1263 insulation)
1264 For outdoor equipment, lower voltage limits apply because the body impedance
1265 is reduced to half the value when subjected to wet conditions as described in
1266 IEC TS 60479-1 and IEC TS 61201.
1267 Where Class III equipment is acceptable in an indoor application, this outdoor
1268 application does not introduce additional safeguard requirements.
1269 5.3.2.2 Contact requirements
1270 Source: IEC 61140:2001, 8.1.1
1271 Purpose: Determination of accessible parts for adults and children. Tests are specified in
1272 Annex V.
1273 Rationale: According to Paschen’s Law, air breakdown does not occur below 323 V peak or
1274 DC (at sea level). IEC 62368-1 uses 420 V peak (300 V RMS) to add an
1275 additional safety margin.
1277 The reason for accepting different requirements for components is because you
1278 cannot expect your supplier to make different components for each end
1279 application.
1280 5.3.2.4 Terminals for connecting stripped wire
1282 Purpose: To prevent contact of ES2 or ES3 parts.
1283 Rationale: Accepted constructions used in the audio/video industry for many years.
1284 5.4 Insulation materials and requirements
1285 Rationale: The requirements, test methods and compliance criteria are taken from the
1286 actual outputs from IEC TC 108 MT2 (formerly WG6) as well as from IEC TC 108
1287 MT1.
– 39 – 108/757/DC
1288 − The choice and application of components shall take into account the needs
1289 for electrical, thermal and mechanical strength, frequency of the working
1290 voltage and working environment (temperature, pressure, humidity and
1291 pollution).
1292 − Components shall have the electric strength, thermal strength, mechanical
1293 strength, dimensions, and other properties as specified in the document.
1294 − Depending on the grade of safeguard (basic safeguard, supplementary
1295 safeguard, reinforced safeguard) the requirements differ.
1296 − Components complying with their component documents (for example,
1297 IEC 60384-14 for capacitances) have to be verified for their application.
1298 − The components listed in this subclause of the new document have a
1299 separation function.
1300 5.4.1.1 Insulation
1301 Source: IEC 60664-1
1302 Purpose: Provide a reliable safeguard
1303 Rationale: Solid basic insulation, supplementary insulation, and reinforced insulation
1304 shall be capable of durably withstanding electrical, mechanical, thermal, and
1305 environmental stress that may occur during the anticipated lifetime of the
1306 equipment.
1307 Clearances and creepage distances may be divided by intervening
1308 unconnected (floating) conductive parts, such as unused contacts of a
1309 connector, provided that the sum of the individual distances meets the specified
1310 minimum requirements (see Figure O.4).
1311 5.4.1.4 Maximum operating temperatures for materials, components and systems
1312 Source: IEC 60085, IEC 60364-4-43, ISO 306, IEC 60695-10-2
1313 Rationale: Temperature limits given in Table 9:
1314 − limits for insulation materials including electrical insulation systems, including
1315 winding insulation (Classes A, E, B, F, H, N, R and 250) are taken from
1316 IEC 60085;
1317 − limits for insulation of internal and external wiring, including power supply
1318 cords with temperature marking are those indicated by the marking or the
1319 rating assigned by the (component) manufacturer;
1320 − limits for insulation of internal and external wiring, including power supply
1321 cords without temperature marking of 70 °C, are referenced in
1322 IEC 60364-4-43 for an ambient temperature of 25 °C;
1323 − limits for thermoplastic insulation are based on:
1324 • data from Vicat test B50 of ISO 306;
1325 • ball pressure test according to IEC 60695-10-2;
1326 • when it is clear from the examination of the physical characteristics of the
1327 material that it will meet the requirements of the ball pressure test;
1328 • experience with 125 °C value for parts in a circuit supplied from the mains.
1329 5.4.1.4.3 Compliance criteria
1330 Table 9 Temperature limits for materials, components and systems

– 40 – 108/757/DC
1331 Rationale Regarding condition “a”, it has been assumed by the technical committee for
1332 many years that the thermal gradient between outer surface and inner windings
1333 will be limited to 10 °C differential as an average. As a result, the temperature
1334 limits for outer surface insulation measured via thermocouple is 10 °C lower than
1335 similar measurement with a thermocouple embedded in the winding(s), with both
1336 limits at least 5 °C less than the hot-spot temperature allowed per IEC 60085 as
1337 an additional safety factor. However, some modern transformer constructions
1338 with larger power densities may have larger thermal gradients, as may some
1339 outer surface transformer insulation thermal measurements in the
1340 equipment/system be influenced by forced cooling or similar effects. Therefore,
1341 if thermal imaging, computer modeling, or actual measurement shows a thermal
1342 gradient greater than 10 °C average between transformer surface temperature
1343 and transformer winding(s), the rise of resistance temperature measurement
1344 method and limits for an embedded thermocouple should be used (for example,
1345 100 °C maximum temperature for Class 105 (A)) for determining compliance of
1346 a transformer with Table 9 since the original assumptions do not hold true.
1347 As an example, a material rated for 124 °C using the rise of resistance method
1348 is considered suitable for classes whose temperature is lower (class with letter
1349 codes E and A) and not for classes whose temperature is higher (class with letter
1350 codes B, F, H, N, R and 250).
1351 5.4.1.5 Pollution degrees
1352 Source: IEC 60664-1
1353 Rationale: No values for PD 4 (pollution generates persistent conductivity) are included, as
1354 it is unlikely that such conditions are present when using products in the scope
1356 5.4.1.5.2 Test for pollution degree 1 environment and for an insulating compound
1357 The compliance check made by visual inspection applies both to single layer and
1358 multi-layer boards without the need for sectioning to check for voids, gaps, etc.
1359 5.4.1.6 Insulation in transformers with varying dimensions
1360 Source: IEC 60950-1
1361 Purpose: To consider actual working voltage along the winding of a transformer.
1362 Rationale: Description of a method to determine adequacy of solid insulation along the
1363 length of a transformer winding.
1364 5.4.1.7 Insulation in circuits generating starting pulses
1365 Source: IEC 60950-1, IEC 60664-1
1366 Purpose: To avoid insulation breakdown due to starting pulses.
1367 Rationale: This method has been successfully used for products in the scope of this
1368 document for many years.
1369 5.4.1.8 Determination of working voltage
1370 Source: IEC 60664-1:2020, 3.1.7; IEC 60950-1
1371 Rationale: The working voltage does not include short duration signals, such as transients.
1372 Recurring peak voltages are not included. Transient overvoltages are covered in
1373 the required withstand voltage. Ringing signals do not carry external
1374 transients.
1375 5.4.1.8.1 General
1376 Rationale: Functional insulation is not addressed in Clause 5, as it does not provide
1377 protection against electric shock. Requirements for functional insulation are
1378 covered in Clause 6, which addresses protection against electrically caused fire.
1379 Source: IEC 60664-1:2020, 3.1.14
– 41 – 108/757/DC
1380 Rationale: In IEC 62368-1, “Circuit supplied from the mains” is used for a “primary circuit”.
1381 “Circuit isolated from the mains” is used for a “secondary circuit”.
1382 “External circuit” is defined as external to the equipment. ES1 can be external
1383 to the equipment.
1384 For an external circuit operating at ES2 level and not exiting the building, the
1385 transient is 0 V. Therefore, in this case, ringing peak voltage needs to be taken
1386 into account.
1387 5.4.1.8.2 RMS working voltage
1388 Source: IEC 60664-1:2020, 3.1.7
1389 Rationale: RMS working voltage is used when determining minimum creepage distance.
1390 Unless otherwise specified, working voltage is the RMS value.
1391 5.4.1.10 Thermoplastic parts on which conductive metallic parts are directly mounted
1392 Source: ISO 306 and IEC 60695-2 series
1393 Rationale: The temperature of the thermoplastic parts under normal operating conditions
1394 shall be 15 K less than the softening temperature of a non-metallic part.
1395 Supporting parts in a circuit supplied from the mains shall not be less than
1396 125 °C.
1397 5.4.2 Clearances
1398 5.4.2.1 General requirements

1399 Source: IEC 60664-1:2020
1400 Rationale: The dimension for a clearance is determined from the required impulse
1401 withstand voltage for that clearance. This concept is taken from
1402 IEC 60664-1:2020, 5.2. In addition, clearances are affected by the largest of the
1403 determined transients. The likelihood of simultaneous occurrence of transients
1404 is very low and is not taken into account.
1405 Overvoltages and transients that may enter the equipment, and peak voltages
1406 that may be generated within the equipment, do not break down the clearance
1407 (see IEC 60664-1:2020, 5.2.4 and 5.2.5).
1408 Minimum clearances of safety components shall comply with the requirements
1409 of their applicable component safety document.
1410 Clearances between the outer insulating surface of a connector and conductive
1411 parts at ES3 voltage level shall comply with the requirements of basic insulation
1412 only, if the connectors are fixed to the equipment, located internal to the outer
1413 electrical enclosure of the equipment, and are accessible only after removal
1414 of a sub-assembly that is required to be in place during normal operation.
1415 It is assumed that the occurrence of both factors, the sub-assembly being
1416 removed and the occurrence of a transient overvoltage, have a reduced
1417 likelihood and hazard potential.
1418 Source: IEC 60664-2 series, Application guide
1419 Rationale: The method is derived from the IEC 60664-2 series, Application guide.
– 42 – 108/757/DC
Example:
Assuming:
– an SMPS power supply,
– connection to the AC mains,
– a peak of the working voltage (PWV) of 800 V,
– frequencies above and below 30 kHz,
– reinforced clearances required,
– temporary overvoltages: 2 000 V
Procedure 1: Procedure 2:
Table 10 requires 2,54 mm Transients (OVC 2): 2 500 V
Table 11 requires 0,44 mm RWV = 2 500 V
Result is 2,54 mm Table 14 requires 3,0 mm
NOTE All PWV below 1 200 V have clearance The required ES test voltage according to
requirements less than 3 mm for both Table 10 and Table 15 is 4,67 KV
Table 11 Result is 3,0 mm or ES test at 4,67 KV
Final result:
– 3,0 mm or
– ES test at 4,67 KV and 2,54 mm
ATTENTION:
For a product with connection to coax cable, different values are to be used since a
different transient and required withstand voltage is required.
1420
– 43 – 108/757/DC
1421 5.4.2.2 Procedure 1 for determining clearance

1422 Rationale: Related to the first dash of 5.4.2.2, it is noted that an example of a cause of
1423 determination of the peak value of steady state voltages that are below the peak
1424 voltage of the mains includes, for example, a determination in accordance with
1425 the 2nd and 3rd dash of 5.4.2.3.3 where filtering is in place to lower expected
1426 peak voltages.
1427 Similarly, related to the second dash of 5.4.2.2, an example of this case where
1428 the recurring peak voltage is limited to 1,1 times the mains voltage may be use
1429 of certain forms of surge protection devices that reduce overvoltage category.
1430 Peak of the working voltage versus recurring peak voltage.
1431 There has been some discussion between the two terms. The peak of the
1432 working voltage is the peak value of the waveform that occurs each cycle, and
1433 therefore is considered to be a part of the working voltage.
1434 A recurring peak voltage is a peak that does not occur at each cycle of the
1435 waveform, but that reoccurs at a certain interval, usually at a lower frequency
1436 than the waveform frequency.
1437 Figure 11 in this document gives an example of a waveform where the recurring
1438 peak voltage occurs every two cycles of the main waveform.
1439
1440 Figure 11 – Illustration of working voltage
1441 Table 10 Minimum clearances for voltages with frequencies up to 30 kHz
1442 Rationale: IEC TC 108 noted that, if the rules of IEC 60664-1 are followed, for reinforced
1443 clearance, some values were more than double the requirements for basic
1444 insulation. IEC TC 108 felt that this should not be the case and decided to limit
1445 the requirement for reinforced insulation to twice the value of basic insulation,
1446 thereby deviating from IEC 60664-1.
1447 In addition, normal rounding rules were applied to the values in the table.
1448 5.4.2.3.2.2 Determining AC mains transient voltages
1449 Source: IEC 60664-1:2020, 4.3.2
1450 Rationale: Table 12 is derived from Table F.1 of IEC 60664-1:2020.
1451 The term used in IEC 60664-1 is ‘rated impulse voltage’. Products covered by
1452 IEC 62368-1 are also exposed to transients from external circuits, and
1453 therefore another term is needed, to show the different source.
1454 Outdoor equipment that is part of the building installation, or that may be
1455 subject to transient overvoltages exceeding those for Overvoltage Category II,
1456 shall be designed for Overvoltage Category III or IV, unless additional protection
1457 is to be provided internally or externally to the equipment. In this case, the
1458 installation instructions shall state the need for such additional protection.
– 44 – 108/757/DC
1459 5.4.2.3.2.3 Determining DC mains transient voltages

1460 Rationale: Transient overvoltages are attenuated by the capacitive filtering.
1461 5.4.2.3.2.4 Determining external circuit transient voltages
1462 Source: ITU-T K.21
1463 Rationale: Transients have an influence on circuits and insulation, therefore transients on
1464 external circuits need to be taken into account. Transients are needed only for
1465 the dimensioning safeguards. Transients should not be used for the
1466 classification of energy sources (ES1, ES2, etc.).
1467 It is expected that external circuits receive a transient voltage of 1,5 kV peak
1468 with a waveform of 10/700µs from sources outside the building.
1469 The expected transient is independent from the application (telecom; LAN or
1470 other). Therefore, it is assumed that for all kinds of applications the same
1471 transient appears. The value 1,5 kV 10/700µs is taken from ITU-T K.21.
1472 It is expected that external circuits using earthed coaxial cable receive no
1473 transients that have to be taken into account from sources outside the building.
1474 Because of the earthed shield of the coaxial cable, a possible transient on the
1475 outside cable will be reduced at the earthed shield at the building entrance of
1476 the cable.
1477 It is expected that for external circuits within the same building no transients
1478 have to be taken into account.
1479 The transients for an interface are defined with respect to the terminals where
1480 the voltage is defined. For the majority of cases, the relevant voltages are
1481 common (U c ) and differential mode (U d ) voltages at the interface. For hand-held
1482 parts or other parts in extended contact with the human body, such as a
1483 telephone hand set, the voltage with respect to local earth (U ce ) may be relevant.
1484 Figure 12 in this document shows the definition of the various voltages for
1485 paired-conductor interface.
1486 The transients for coaxial cable interfaces are between the centre conductor and
1487 shield (U d ) of the cable if the shield is earthed at the equipment. If the shield is
1488 isolated from earth at the equipment, then the shield-to-earth voltage (U s ) is
1489 important. Earthing of the shield can consist of connection of the shield to the
1490 protective earthing, functional earth inside or immediately outside the
1491 equipment. It is assumed that all earths are bonded together. Figure 13 in this
1492 document shows the definition of the various voltages for coaxial-cable
1493 interfaces.
1494 An overview of insulation requirements is given in Table 6 in this document.
1495
– 45 – 108/757/DC
1496
1497
1498 Figure 12 – Illustration of transient voltages on paired conductor external circuits
– 46 – 108/757/DC
1499
1500
1501 Figure 13 – Illustration of transient voltages on coaxial-cable external circuits
1502 Table 6 – Insulation requirements for external circuits
External Circuit Insulation Requirement

under consideration
ES1 earthed None None
ES1 unearthed Separation (to floating metal Electric strength test (using Table 15)
parts and other floating ES1 between unearthed ES1 and other
circuits) unearthed ES1 and floating parts
ES2 Basic insulation (to ES1 and Clearances; creepage distance; and
metal parts) solid insulation and by electric strength
test (using Table 15) between ES2 and
ES1 and metal parts
ES3 Double insulation or reinforced Clearances; creepage distance; and
insulation (to ES1, ES2 and solid insulation requirements including
metal parts) electric strength test (using Table 15)
1503
– 47 – 108/757/DC
1504 Table 13 External circuit transient voltages
1505 Rationale: When the DC power distribution system is located outside the building, transient
1506 over-voltages can be expected. Transients are not present if the DC power
1507 system is connected to protective earthing and is located entirely within a
1508 single building.
1509 Sources: ID1a, ID1b and ID1c: IEC 61000-4-5, ITU K.21, K.44 and K.45 and IEC TR 62102
1510 ID2: IEC 62368-1:2022 (4th edition)
1511 ID3a: IEC 61000-4-5, ITU K.21, K.44 and K.45 and IEC TR 62102. See also IEC
1512 60728-11 for isolation devices and IEC TR 62101 for Network Environment
1513 definitions.
1514 ID3b: IEC 61000-4-5, ITU K.21, K.44 and K.45 and IEC TR 62102. It should be
1515 noted that these documents recommend 1000 V 1.2/50 (earthed applications),
1516 1000 V 10/700 (unearthed applications).
1517 Voltage is center conductor to shield/earth/conductive exposed parts and shield
1518 to earth/other conductive parts
1519 Based on historical precedence for safety, these transient exposure levels may
1520 be considered low enough that no special design criteria need to be evaluated
1521 or transients taken into account.
1522 ID3c: IEC 62368-1:202x. This aligns also with IEC 61000-4-5, where < 10 m
1523 ports and interconnect ports and network environment 0 definition.
1524 5.4.2.3.2.5 Determining transient voltage levels by measurement
1525 Source: Test method is taken from IEC 60950-1:2013, Annex G.
1526 5.4.2.3.4 Determining clearances using required withstand voltage
1527 Source: IEC 60664-1:2020, Table F.2 Case A (inhomogeneous field) and Case B
1528 (homogeneous field)
1529 Rationale: Values in Table 14 are taken from IEC 60664-1:2020 Table F.2 Case A
1530 (inhomogeneous field) and Case B (homogeneous field) and include explicit
1531 values for reinforced insulation. Clearances for reinforced insulation have
1532 been calculated in accordance with 5.2.5 of IEC 60664-1:2020. For reinforced
1533 insulation 5.2.5 states clearance shall be to the corresponding rated impulse
1534 voltage that is one step higher for voltages in the preferred series. For voltages
1535 that are not in the preferred series, the clearance should be based on 160 % of
1536 the required withstand voltage for basic insulation.
1537 When determining the required withstand voltage, interpolation should be
1538 allowed when the internal repetitive peak voltages are higher than the mains
1539 peak voltages, or if the required withstand voltage is above the mains transient
1540 voltage values.
1541 No values for PD 4 (pollution generates persistent conductivity) are included, as
1542 it is unlikely that such conditions are present when using products in the scope
1544 Table 14 Minimum clearances using required withstand voltage
1545 Rationale: IEC 62368-1 follows the rules and requirements of IEC basic safety publications,
1546 one of which is the IEC 60664 series. IEC 60664-1 specifies clearances for
1547 basic insulation and supplementary insulation. Clearances for reinforced
1548 insulation are not specified. Instead, 5.1.6 specifies the rules for determining
1549 the reinforced clearances.
1550 The reinforced clearances in Table 14 have a varying slope, and include a
1551 “discontinuity”. The values of Table 14 are shown in Figure 14 in this document.
– 48 – 108/757/DC
1552
1553 Figure 14 – Basic and reinforced insulation in Table 14;

1554 ratio reinforced to basic
1555 The brown line, reinforced clearance, is not a constant slope as is the yellow
1556 line, basic clearance. The ratio of reinforced to basic (blue line) varies from a
1557 maximum of 2:1 to a minimum of 1,49:1. Physically, this is not reasonable; the
1558 ratio should be nearly constant.
1559 In IEC 60664-1:2020, the values for basic insulation are given in Table F.2. No
1560 values are given for reinforced insulation. Table F.2 refers to 5.2.5 for
1561 reinforced insulation.
1562 Rule 1, preferred series impulse withstand voltages
1563 Subclause 5.2.5 of IEC 60664-1:2020 states:
1564 “With respect to impulse withstand voltages, clearances of reinforced
1565 insulation shall be dimensioned as specified in Table F.2 corresponding to the
1566 rated impulse withstand voltage but one step higher in the preferred series of
1567 values in 4.2.2.1 than that specified for basic insulation.”
1568 NOTE 1 IEC 62368-1 uses the term “required withstand voltage” instead of the IEC 60664-1
1569 term “required impulse withstand voltage.”
1570 NOTE 2 IEC 62368-1 uses the term “mains transient voltage” instead of the IEC 60664-1 term
1571 “rated impulse voltage.”
1572 The preferred series of values of rated impulse voltage according to 4.2.3 of
1573 IEC 60664-1:2007 is: 330 V, 500 V, 800 V, 1 500 V, 2 500 V, 4 000 V, 6 000 V,
1574 8 000 V, 12 000 V
1575 Applying Rule 1, the reinforced clearance (inhomogeneous field, pollution
1576 degree 2, Table F.2) for:
1577 – 330 V would be the basic insulation clearance for 500 V: 0,2 mm
1578 – 500 V would be the basic insulation clearance for 800 V: 0,2 mm
1579 – 800 V would be the basic insulation clearance for 1 500 V: 0,5 mm
– 49 – 108/757/DC
1580 – 1 500 V would be the basic insulation clearance for 2 500 V: 1,5 mm
1584 – 8 000 V would be the basic insulation clearance for 12 000 V: 14 mm
1585 – 12 000 V is indeterminate because there is no preferred voltage above
1586 12 000 volts.
1587 Rule 2, 160 % of impulse withstand voltages other than the preferred series
1588 With regard to non-mains circuits, subclause 5.2.5 of IEC 60664-1:2020 states:
1589 “If the impulse withstand voltage required for basic insulation according to
1590 4.2.2.1 is other than a value taken from the preferred series, reinforced
1591 insulation shall be dimensioned to withstand 160 % of the impulse withstand
1592 voltage required for basic insulation.”
1593 The impulse withstand voltages other than the preferred series (in IEC 60664-
1594 1:2020, Table F.2) are: 400 V, 600 V, 1 200 V, 2 000 V, 3 000 V, 10 000 V, and
1595 all voltages above 12 000 V.
1596 Applying Rule 2, the reinforced clearance (inhomogeneous field, pollution
1597 degree 2, Table F.2) for:
1598 400 V x 1,6 = 640 V interpolated to 0,20 mm.
1599 Since 640 V is not in the list, the reinforced insulation is determined by
1600 interpolation. Interpolation yields the reinforced clearance as 0,2 mm.
1601 Applying Rule 2 to the impulse withstand voltages in Table F.2 that are not in
1602 the preferred series:
1603 – 400 V × 1,6 = 640 V interpolated to 0,20 mm
1604 – 600 V × 1,6 = 960 V interpolated to 0,24 mm
1605 – 1 200 V × 1,6 = 1 920 V interpolated to 0,92 mm
1609 – 15 000 V to 100 000 V × 1,6 and interpolated according to the rule.
1610 Clearance differences for Rules 1 and 2
1611 The two rules, Rule 1 for impulse withstand voltages of the preferred series, and
1612 Rule 2 for impulse withstand voltages other than the preferred series, yield
1613 different clearances for the same voltages. These differences occur because
1614 the slope, mm/kV, of the two methods is slightly different. The slope for Rule 1
1615 is not constant. The slope for Rule 2 is nearly constant. Figure 15 in this
1616 document illustrates the differences between Rule 1, Rule 2 and Table 14 of
1617 IEC 62368-1.
– 50 – 108/757/DC
Rule 1
Rule 2
Basi c insulation
Table 15
1618
1619 Figure 15 – Reinforced clearances according to Rule 1, Rule 2, and Table 14
1620 If the two values for Rules 1 and 2 are combined into one set of values, the
1621 values are the same as in existing Table 14 (the brown line in Figure 14 and
1622 Figure 15 in this document). According to IEC 60664-1:2020, 5.2.5, only the
1623 impulse withstand voltages “other than a value taken from the preferred series…”
1624 are subject to the 160 % rule. Therefore, the clearances jump from Rule 1
1625 criteria to Rule 2 criteria and back again. This yields the radical slope changes
1626 of the Table 14 reinforced clearances (brown) line.
1627 Physically, the expected reinforced insulation clearances should be a constant
1628 proportion of the basic insulation clearances. However, the proportion between
1629 steps of Rule 1 (preferred series of impulse withstand voltages) are:
1630 – 330 V to 500 V: 1,52
1631 – 500 V to 800 V: 1,60
1632 – 800 V to 1 500 V: 1,88
1633 – 1 500 V to 2 500 V: 1,67
1634 – 2 500 V to 4 000 V: 1,60
1635 – 4 000 V to 6 000 V: 1,50
1636 – 6 000 V to 8 000 V: 1,33
1637 – 8 000 V to 12 000 V: 1,50
1638 Average proportion, 330 to 12 000: 1,57
1639 For Rule 2, all of the clearances for reinforced insulation are based on exactly
1640 1,6 times the non-preferred series impulse withstand voltage for basic
1641 insulation.
1642 The two rules applied in accordance with 5.2.5 of IEC 60664-1:2020 result in the
1643 variable slope of the clearance requirements for reinforced insulation of
1644 IEC 62368-1.
– 51 – 108/757/DC
1645 IEC TC 108 noted that, if the rules of IEC 60664-1 are followed, for clearances
1646 for reinforced insulation, some values were more than double the requirements
1647 for basic insulation. IEC TC 108 felt that this should not be the case and
1648 decided to limit the requirement for reinforced insulation to twice the value of
1649 basic insulation, thereby deviating from IEC 60664-1.
1650 In addition, normal rounding rules were applied to the values in the table.
1651 5.4.2.4 Determining the adequacy of a clearance using an electric strength test
1652 Source: IEC 60664-1:2020, Table F.6
1653 Purpose: Tests are carried out by either impulse voltage or AC voltage with the values of
1654 Table 15.
1655 Rationale: The impulse test voltages in Table 15 are taken from IEC 60664-1:2020,
1656 Table F.6. The calculation for the AC RMS. values as well as the DC values are
1657 based on the values given in Table A.1 of IEC 60664-1:2020 (see Table 7 in this
1658 document for further explanation).
1659 This test is not suited for homogenous fields. This is for an actual design that is
1660 within the limits of the homogenous and inhomogeneous field.
1661 Calculations for the voltage drop across an air gap during the electric strength
1662 test may be rounded up to the next higher 0,1 mm increment. In case the
1663 calculated value is higher than the value in the next row, the next row may be
1664 used.
1665 Enamel Material: Most commonly used material is polyester resin or polyester
1666 Dielectric constant for Polyester: 5 (can vary)
1667 Dielectric constant for air: 1
1668 Formula used for calculation (voltage divides inversely proportional to the
1669 dielectric constant)
1670 Transient = 2 500 V = 2 500 (thickness of enamel / 5 + air gap / 1) = 2 500 (0,04
1671 / 5 + 2 / 1 for 2 mm air gap) = 2 500 (0,008 + 2) = (10 V across enamel + 2 490 V
1672 across air gap)
1673 Related to condition a of Table 15, although U is any required withstand
1674 voltage higher than 12,0 kV, there is an exception when using Table F.6 of
1675 IEC 60664-1:2020.
– 52 – 108/757/DC
1676 Table 7 – Voltage drop across clearance and solid insulation in series
Enamel Air gap Transient Transient Transient Peak Test Test

thickness on 240 V voltage voltage impulse voltage voltage
system across air across test across air across
mm mm gap enamel voltage for gap enamel
2 500 V
peak
transient
from
Table 16
Material: Polyester, dielectric constant = 5
0,04 2 2 500 2 490 10 2 950 12 2 938
0,04 1 2 500 2 480 20 2 950 24 2 926
0,04 0,6 2 500 2 467 33 2 950 39 2 911
For 2 500 V peak impulse (transient for 230 V system), the homogenous field distance is 0,6 mm (from Table
A.1 of IEC 60664-1:2020). Our test voltage for 2 500 V peak is 2 950 V peak from Table 15. This means that a
minimum distance of 0,79 mm through homogenous field needs to be maintained to pass the 2 950 V impulse
test. This gives us a margin of (0,19/0,6) × 100 = 3,2 %. In actual practice, the distance will be higher as it is not
a true homogenous field. Therefore, we do not need to verify compliance with Table 14. We are always on the
conservative side.
Material: Polyamide, dielectric constant = 2,5
0,04 2 2 500 2 480 20 2 950 23 2 927
0,04 1 2 500 2 460 40 2 950 46 2 904
0,04 0,6 2 500 2 435 65 2 950 76 2 874
For 2 500 V peak impulse (transient for 230 V system), the homogenous field distance is 0,6 mm (from Table
A.1 of IEC 60664-1:2020). Our test voltage for 2 500 V peak is 2 950 V peak from Table 15. This means that a
minimum distance of 0,78 mm through homogenous field needs to be maintained to pass the 2 950 V impulse
test. This gives us a margin of (0,18/0,6) × 100 = 3,0 %. In actual practice, the distance will be higher, as it is
not a true homogenous field. Therefore, we do not need to verify compliance with Table 14. We are always on
the conservative side.
1677
1678 5.4.2.5 Multiplication factors for altitudes higher than 2 000 m above sea level
1679 Source: IEC 60664-1:2020, curve number 2 for case A using impulse test.
1680 Purpose: Test is carried out by either impulse voltage or AC voltage with the values of
1681 Table 16 and the multiplication factors for altitudes higher than 2 000 m.
1682 Rationale: Table 16 is developed using Figure A.1 of IEC 60664-1:2020, curve number 2
1683 for case A using impulse test.
1685 Source: IEC 60664-1:2020, 5.2
1686 Rationale: IEC 62368-1, Annex O figures are similar/identical to figures in
1687 IEC 60664-1:2020.
1688 Tests of Annex T simulate the occurrence of mechanical forces:
1689 − 10 N applied to components and parts that may be touched during operation
1690 or servicing. Simulates the accidental contact with a finger or part of the hand;
1691 − 30 N applied to internal enclosures and barriers that are accessible to
1692 ordinary persons. Simulates accidental contact of part of the hand;
1693 − 100 N applied to external enclosures of transportable equipment and
1694 handheld equipment. Simulates expected force applied during use or
1695 movement;
1696 − 250 N applied to external enclosures (except those covered in T.4).
1697 Simulates expected force applied by a body part to the surface of the
1698 equipment. It is not expected that such forces will be applied to the bottom
1699 surface of heavy equipment (> 18 kg).
– 53 – 108/757/DC
1700 During the force tests metal surfaces shall not come into contact with parts at
1701 ES2 or ES3 voltage.
1702 5.4.3 Creepage distances
1703 Source: IEC 60664-1:2020, 3.1.5
1704 Purpose: To prevent flashover along a surface or breakdown of the insulation.
1705 Rationale: Preserve safeguard integrity.
1706 In IEC 60664-1:2020, Table F.5 columns 2 and 3 for printed wiring boards are
1707 deleted, as there is no rationale for the very small creepage distances for
1708 printed wiring in columns 2 and 3 (the only rationale is that it is in the basic safety
1709 publication IEC 60664-1).
1710 However, there is no rationale why the creepage distances are different for
1711 printed wiring boards and other isolation material under the same condition
1712 (same PD and same CTI).
1713 Moreover the creepage distances for printed boards in columns 2 and 3 are in
1714 conflict with the requirements in G.13.3 (Coated printed boards). Consequently
1715 the values for voltages up to 455 V in Table G.16 were replaced.
1716 Creepage distances between the outer insulating surface of a connector and
1717 conductive parts at ES3 voltage level shall comply with the requirements of basic
1718 insulation only, if the connectors are fixed to the equipment, located internal to
1719 the outer electrical enclosure of the equipment, and are accessible only after
1720 removal of a sub-assembly which is required to be in place during normal
1721 operation.
1722 It is assumed that the occurrence of both factors, the sub-assembly being
1723 removed, and the occurrence of a transient overvoltage have a reduced
1724 likelihood and hazard potential.
1725 5.4.3.2 Test method
1726 Source: IEC 60664-1:2020, 3.1.4
1727 Purpose: Measurement of creepage distance.
1728 Rationale: To preserve safeguard integrity after mechanical tests.
1729 Annex O figures are similar/identical to figures in IEC 60950-1 and IEC 60664-1.
1730 Tests of Annex T simulate the occurrence of mechanical forces:
1731 − 10 N applied to components and parts that are likely to be touched by a
1732 skilled person during servicing, where displacement of the part reduces the
1733 creepage distance. Simulates the accidental contact with a finger or part of
1734 the hand.
1735 − 30 N applied to internal enclosures and barriers that are accessible to
1736 ordinary persons. Simulates accidental contact of part of the hand.
1737 − 100 N applied to external enclosures of transportable equipment and
1738 hand-held equipment. Simulates expected force applied during use or
1739 movement.
1740 − 250 N applied to external enclosures (except those covered in T.4).
1741 Simulates expected force when leaning against the equipment surface. It is
1742 not expected that such forces will be applied to the bottom surface of heavy
1743 equipment (> 18 kg).
1744 Creepage distances are measured after performing the force tests of Annex T.
1745 5.4.3.3 Material group and CTI
1747 Rationale: Classification as given in IEC 60112.
– 54 – 108/757/DC

1749 Source: IEC 60664-1:2020, Table F.5; IEC 60664-4 for frequencies above 30 kHz
1750 Rationale: Values in Table 17 are the same as in Table F.5 of IEC 60664-1:2020.
1751 Values in Table 18 are the same as in Table 2 of IEC 60664-4:2005 and are used
1752 for frequencies up to 400 kHz.
1753 5.4.4 Solid insulation
1754 Source: IEC 60950-1, IEC 60664-1
1755 Purpose: To prevent breakdown of the solid insulation.
1756 Rationale: To preserve safeguards integrity.
1757 Exclusion of solvent based enamel coatings for safety insulations are based on
1758 field experience. However, with the advent of newer insulation materials those
1759 materials may be acceptable in the future when passing the adequate tests.
1760 Except for printed boards (see G.13), the solid insulation shall meet the
1761 requirements of 5.4.4.4 to 5.4.4.7 as applicable.
1762 5.4.4.2 Minimum distance through insulation
1763 Source: IEC 60950-1:2005
1764 Purpose: Minimum distance through insulation of 0,4 mm for supplementary insulation
1765 and reinforced insulation.
1766 Rationale: Some (very) old documents required for single insulations 2 mm dti (distance
1767 through insulation) for reinforced insulation and 1 mm for supplementary
1768 insulation. If this insulation served also as outer enclosure for Class II
1769 equipment, it had to be mechanically robust, which was tested with a hammer
1770 blow of 0,5 Nm.
1771 The wire documents did not distinguish between grades of insulation, and
1772 required 0,4 mm for PVC insulation material. This value was considered
1773 adequate to protect against electric shock when touching the insulation if it was
1774 broken. This concept was also introduced in VDE 0860 (which evolved into
1775 IEC 60065), where the 0,4 mm value was discussed first. For IT products this
1776 value was first only accepted for in accessible insulations.
1777 The VDE document for telecom equipment (VDE 0804) did not include any
1778 thickness requirements, but the insulation had to be adequate for the application.
1779 The document VDE 0730 for household equipment with electric motors
1780 introduced in 1976 the requirement of an insulation thickness of 0,5 mm between
1781 input and output windings of a transformer. This was introduced by former
1782 colleagues from IBM and Siemens (against the position of the people from the
1783 transformer committee).
1784 Also VDE 0110 (Insulation Coordination, which evolved into the IEC 60664
1785 series) contained a minimum insulation thickness of 0,5 mm for 250 V supply
1786 voltage, to cover the effect of insulation breakage.
1787 These 0,5 mm then evolved into 0,4 mm (in IEC 60950-1), with the reference to
1788 VDE 0860 (IEC 60065), where this value was already in use.
1789 It is interesting to note that the 0,31 mm which is derived from Table 2A of
1790 IEC 60950-1, has also a relation to the 0,4 mm. 0,31 mm is the minimum value
1791 of the average insulation thickness of 0,4 mm, according to experts from the wire
1792 manufacturers.
– 55 – 108/757/DC
1793 5.4.4.3 Insulating compound forming solid insulation

1794 Source: IEC 60950-1
1795 Purpose: Minimum distance through insulation of 0,4 mm for supplementary insulation
1796 and reinforced insulation.
1797 Rationale: The same distance through insulation requirements as for solid insulation apply
1798 (see 5.4.4.2). Insulation is subjected to thermal cycling (see 5.4.1.5.3), humidity
1799 test (see 5.4.8) and electric strength test (see 5.4.9). Insulation is inspected for
1800 cracks and voids.
1801 5.4.4.4 Solid insulation in semiconductor devices
1802 Source: IEC 60950-1, UL 1577
1803 Purpose: No minimum thickness requirements for the solid insulation.
1804 Rationale: – type testing of 5.4.9.1 (electric strength testing at 160 % of the normal
1805 value after thermal cycling and humidity conditioning), and routine
1806 electric strength test of 5.4.9.2 has been used for many years, especially
1807 in North America.
1808 – refers to G.12, which references IEC 60747-5-5.
1809 5.4.4.5 Insulating compound forming cemented joints
1810 Source: IEC 60950-1
1811 Rationale: a) The distances along the path comply with PD 2 requirements irrespective of
1812 the joint;
1813 b) applies if protected to generate PD 1 environment;
1814 c) applies if treated like solid insulation environment, no clearances and
1815 creepage distances apply;
1816 d) is not applied to printed boards, when the board temperature is below 90 °C,
1817 as the risk for board delaminating at lower temperatures is considered low.
1818 Optocouplers are excluded from the requirements of this subclause, because the
1819 document requires optocouplers to comply with IEC 60747-5-5, which sufficiently
1820 covers cemented joints.
1821 5.4.4.6.1 General requirements
1822 Source: IEC 60950-1, IEC 61558-1:2005
1823 Rationale: No dimensional or constructional requirements for insulation in thin sheet
1824 material used as basic insulation, is aligned to the requirements of
1825 IEC 61558-1.
1826 Two or more layers with no minimum thickness are required for supplementary
1827 insulation or reinforced insulation, provided they are protected against
1828 external mechanical influences.
1829 Each layer is qualified for the full voltage for supplementary insulation or
1831 The requirements are based on extensive tests performed on thin sheet material
1832 by manufacturers and test houses involved in IEC TC 74 (now IEC TC 108) work.
1833 5.4.4.6.2 Separable thin sheet material
1834 Source: IEC 60950-1
1835 Rationale: For two layers, test each layer with the electric strength test of 5.4.9 for the
1836 applicable insulation grade. For three layers, test all combinations of two layers
1837 together with the electric strength test of 5.4.9 for the applicable insulation grade.
1838 Each layer is qualified for the full voltage for supplementary insulation or
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1840 The requirements are based on extensive tests performed on thin sheet material
1841 by manufacturers and test houses involved in IEC TC 74 (now IEC TC 108) work.
1842 5.4.4.6.3 Non-separable thin sheet material
1843 Source: IEC 60950-1
1844 Rationale: For testing non-separable layers, all the layers are to have the same material
1845 and thickness. If not, samples of different materials are tested as given in
1846 5.4.4.6.2 for separable layers. When testing non-separable layers, the principle
1847 used is the same as for separable layers.
1848 When testing two separable layers, each layer is tested for the required test
1849 voltage. Two layers get tested for two times the required test voltage as each
1850 layer is tested for the required test voltage. When testing two non-separable
1851 layers, the total test voltage remains the same, for example, two times the
1852 required test voltage. Therefore, two non-separable layers are tested at 200 %
1853 of the required test voltage.
1854 When testing three separable layers, every combination of two layers is tested
1855 for the required test voltage. Therefore, a single layer gets tested for half the
1856 required test voltage and three layers are tested for 150 % of the required test
1857 voltage.
1858 5.4.4.6.4 Standard test procedure for non-separable thin sheet material
1859 Source: IEC 60950-1
1860 Rationale: Test voltage 200 % of U test if two layers are used.
1861 Test voltage 150 % of U test if three or more layers are used.
1862 See the rationale in 5.4.4.6.3. The procedure can be applied to both separable
1863 and non-separable layers as long as the material and material thickness is same
1864 for all the layers.
1865 5.4.4.6.5 Mandrel test
1866 Source: IEC 61558-1:2005, 26.3.3; IEC 60950-1:2013; IEC 60065:2011
1867 Purpose: This test should detect a break of the inner layer of non-separated foils.
1868 Rationale: This test procedure is taken from IEC 61558-1, 26.3.3, and the test voltage is
1869 150 % U test , or 5 kV RMS., whatever is greater.
1870 5.4.4.7 Solid insulation in wound components

1871 Source: IEC 60950-1, IEC 61558-1
1872 Purpose: To identify constructional requirements of insulation of winding wires and
1873 insulation between windings.
1874 Rationale: Requirements have been used in IEC 60950-1 for many years and are aligned
1875 to IEC 61558-1.
1876 Planar transformers are not considered wound components and have to comply
1877 with G.13.
1878 5.4.4.9 Solid insulation requirements at frequencies higher than 30 kHz
1879 Source: IEC 60664-4:2005
1880 Purpose: To identify requirements for solid insulation that is exposed to voltages at
1881 frequencies above 30 kHz.
1882 Rationale: The requirements are taken from the data presented in Annex C of
1883 IEC 60664-4:2005. Testing of solid insulation can be performed at line
1884 frequency as detailed in 6.2 of IEC 60664-4:2005.
– 57 – 108/757/DC
1885 In general, the breakdown electric field strength of insulation can be determined
1886 according to IEC 60243-1 (Electrical strength of insulating materials−Test
1887 methods−Part 1) as referred from 5.3.2.2.1 of IEC 60664-1:2007 (see below).
1888 Note that this text is not repeated in IEC 60664-1:2020.
1889 5.3.2.2.1 Frequency of the voltage
1890 The electric strength is greatly influenced by the frequency of the applied
1891 voltage. Dielectric heating and the probability of thermal instability increase
1892 approximately in proportion to the frequency. The breakdown field strength of
1893 insulation having a thickness of 3 mm when measured at power frequency
1894 according to IEC 60243-1 is between 10 kV/mm and 40 kV/mm. Increasing the
1895 frequency will reduce the electric strength of most insulating materials.
1896 NOTE The influence of frequencies greater than 30 kHz on the electric strength is described in
1897 IEC 60664-4.
1898 Table 20 shows the electric field strength for some commonly used materials.
1899 These values are related to a frequency of 50/60 Hz.
1900 Table 21, which is based on Figure 6 of IEC 60664-4:2005, shows the reduction
1901 factor for the value of breakdown electric field strength at higher frequencies.
1902 The electric field strength of materials drops differently at higher frequencies.
1903 The reduction of the insulation property is to be considered when replacing the
1904 calculation method by the alternative ES test at mains frequency, as shown after
1905 the sixth paragraph of 5.4.4.9. Table 21 is for materials of 0,75 mm in thickness
1906 or more. Table 22 is for materials of less than 0,75 mm in thickness.
1907 The 1,2 times multiplier comes from IEC 60664-4:2005, subclause 7.5.1, where
1908 the partial discharge (PD) extinction voltage must include a safety margin of 1,2
1909 times the highest peak periodic voltage.
1910 5.4.5 Antenna terminal insulation
1912 Purpose: To prevent breakdown of the insulation safeguard.
1913 Rationale: The insulation shall be able to withstand surges due to overvoltages present at
1914 the antenna terminals. These overvoltages are caused by electrostatic charge
1915 build up, but not from lightning effects. A maximum voltage of 10 kV is assumed.
1916 The associated test of G.10.4 simulates this situation by using a 10 kV test
1917 voltage discharged over a 1 nF capacitor.
1918 5.4.6 Insulation of internal wire as a part of a supplementary safeguard
1919 Source: IEC 60950-1
1920 Purpose: To specify constructional requirements of accessible internal wiring
1921 Rationale: Accessible internal wiring isolated from ES3 by basic insulation only needs a
1922 supplementary insulation. If the wiring is reliably routed away so that it will not
1923 be subject to handling by the ordinary person, then smaller than 0,4 mm thick
1924 supplementary insulation has been accepted in IEC 60950-1. But the
1925 insulation still has to have a certain minimum thickness together with electric
1926 strength withstand capability. The given values have been successfully used in
1927 products covered by this document for many years (see Figure 16 in this
1928 document).
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1929
1930 Figure 16 – Example illustrating accessible internal wiring
1931 5.4.7 Tests for semiconductor components and for cemented joints
1932 Source: IEC 60950-1
1933 Purpose: To simulate lifetime stresses on adjoining materials.
1934 To detect defects by applying elevated test voltages after sample conditioning.
1935 To avoid voids, gaps or cracks in the insulating material and delaminating in the
1936 case of multilayer printed boards.
1939 5.4.8 Humidity conditioning
1940 Source: IEC 60950-1 and IEC 60065. Alternative according to IEC 60664-1:2020, 6.4.3
1941 Purpose: Material preparations for dielectric strength test. Prerequisite for further testing.
1942 A tropical climate is a location where it is expected to have high temperatures
1943 and high humidity during most of the year. The document does not indicate what
1944 levels of temperature or humidity constitute a tropical climate. National
1945 authorities define whether their country requires products to comply with tropical
1946 requirements. Only a few countries, such as Singapore and China, have
1947 indicated in the CB scheme that they require such testing.
1948 5.4.9 Electric strength test
1949 Source: IEC 60664-1: 2020
1950 Purpose: To test the insulation to avoid breakdown.
1951 Rationale: Values of test voltages are derived from Table F.6 of IEC 60664-1:2020, however
1952 the test duration is 60 s.
1953 This method has been successfully used for products in the scope of IEC 60065
1954 and IEC 60950-1 for many years.
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1955 The DC voltage test with a test voltage equal to the peak value of the AC voltage
1956 is not fully equivalent to the AC voltage test due to the different withstand
1957 characteristics of solid insulation for these types of voltages. However in case
1958 of a pure DC voltage stress, the DC voltage test is appropriate. To address this
1959 situation the DC test is made with both polarities.
1960 Table 25 Test voltages for electric strength tests based on transient voltages
1961 Source: IEC 60664-1:2020

1962 Rationale: To deal with withstand voltages and cover transients.
1963 The basic insulation and supplementary insulations are to withstand a test
1964 voltage that is equal to the transient peak voltage. The test voltage for the
1965 reinforced insulation shall be equal to the transient in the next in the preferred
1966 series. According to 5.2.5 of IEC 60664-1:2020, the use of 160 % test value for
1967 basic insulation as the test value for reinforced insulation is only applicable
1968 if other values than the preferred series are used.
1969 Functional insulation is not addressed, as is it presumed not to provide any
1970 protection against electric shock.
1971 Table 26 Test voltages for electric strength tests based on the peak of the working
1972 voltages and recurring peak voltages
1973 Source: IEC 60664-1:2020

1974 Rationale: Column B covers repetitive working voltages and requires higher test voltages
1975 due to the greater stress to the insulation.
1976 Recurring peak voltages (IEC 60664-1:2020, 5.4.3.2) need to be considered,
1977 when they are above the temporary overvoltage values, or in circuits separated
1978 from the mains.
1979 If the recurring peak voltages are above the temporary overvoltage values,
1980 these voltages have to be used, multiplied by the factor given in
1981 IEC 60664-1:2020, 5.4.3.2.
1982 Table 27 Test voltages for electric strength tests based on temporary overvoltages
1983 Source: IEC 60664-1:2020

1984 Rationale: Temporary overvoltages (IEC 60664-1:2020, 5.4.3.2) need to be considered as
1985 they may be present up to 5 s. The test voltage for reinforced insulation is
1986 twice the value of basic insulation.
1987 5.4.10 Safeguards against transient voltages from external circuits
1988 Source: IEC 62151:2000, Clause 6
1989 Purpose: To protect persons against contact with external circuits subjected to transients
1990 (for example, telecommunication networks).
1991 Rationale: External circuits are intended to connect the equipment to other equipment.
1992 Connections to remote equipment are made via communication networks, which
1993 could leave the building. Examples for such communication networks are
1994 telecommunication networks and Ethernet networks. The operating voltages of
1995 communication networks are usually within the limits of ES1 (for example,
1996 Ethernet) or within the limits of ES2 (for example, telecommunication networks).
1997 When leaving the buildings, communication networks may be subjected to
1998 transient overvoltages due to atmospheric discharges and faults in power
1999 distribution systems. These transients are depending on the infrastructure of the
2000 cables and are independent on the operating voltage of the communication
2001 network. The expected transients on telecommunication networks are specified
2002 in ITU-T recommendations. To avoid secondary hazards a separation between
2003 an external circuit connected to communication networks subjected transients
2004 is required.
– 60 – 108/757/DC
2005 Because the transient does not cause a hazardous electric shock the separation
2006 element needs not to be a reinforced safeguard nor a basic safeguard in the
2007 meaning of IEC 62368-1. It is sufficient to provide a separation complying with
2008 an electric strength test, only. Therefore for this separation no clearance, no
2009 creepage distances and no thickness requirements for solid insulation are
2010 required.
2011 The separation is required between the external circuit subjected to transients
2012 and all parts, which may accessible to ordinary persons or instructed
2013 persons.
2014 The likelihood a transient occurs and a body contact with an accessible part
2015 occurs at the same time increases with the contact time. Therefore non-
2016 conductive parts and unearthed parts of the equipment maintained in continuous
2017 contact with the body during normal use (for example, a telephone handset, head
2018 set, palm rest surfaces) the separation should withstand a higher test voltage.
2019 Two test procedures for the electric strength test are specified in 5.4.10.2.
2020 5.4.10.2.2 Impulse test
2021 The impulse test is performing an impulse test by using the impulse generator
2022 for the 10/700 µs impulse (see test generator D.1 of Annex D). With the recorded
2023 waveforms it could be judged whether a breakdown of insulation has occurred,
2024 or if the surge suppression device has worked properly.
2025 The examples in Figure 17, Figure 18, Figure 19 and Figure 20 in this document
2026 could be used to assist in judging whether or not a surge suppressor has
2027 operated or insulation has broken down.
2028
Consecutive impulses are identical in their waveforms.
2029
2030 Figure 17 – Waveform on insulation without surge suppressors and no breakdown

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Consecutive impulses are not identical in their waveforms. The pulse shape changes from pulse
to pulse until a stable resistance path through the insulation is established. Breakdown can be
seen clearly on the shape of the pulse voltage oscillogram.
2031
2032 Figure 18 – Waveforms on insulation during breakdown without surge suppressors
1 – gas discharge type

2 – semiconductor type
3 – metal oxide type
Consecutive impulses are identical in their waveforms.
2033 Figure 19 – Waveforms on insulation with surge suppressors in operation
2034
2035 Figure 20 – Waveform on short-circuited surge suppressor and insulation

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2036 5.4.10.2.3 Steady-state test

2037 The steady-state test is performing an electric strength test according to 5.4.9.1.
2038 This test is simple test with an RMS voltage. But if for example, surge
2039 suppressors are used to reduce the transients from the external circuits within
2040 the equipment this RMS test may by not adequate. In this case an impulse test
2041 is more applicable.
2042 5.4.11 Separation between external circuits and earth
2043 Source: IEC 62151:2000, 5.3
2044 Purpose: To protect persons working on communication networks, and users of other
2045 equipment connected to the network from hazards in the equipment.
2046 Rationale: Class I equipment provides basic insulation between mains and earthed
2047 conductive parts and requires the conductive parts to be connected to a PE
2048 conductor that has to be connected to the earthing terminal in the buildings
2049 installation to be safe to use. In an isolated environment such an earth terminal
2050 is not present in the building installation. Nevertheless the use of class I
2051 equipment in such an isolated environment is still safe to use, because in case
2052 of a breakdown of the insulation in the equipment (fault of basic insulation) the
2053 second barrier is provided by the isolated environment (similar to a
2054 supplementary insulation).
2055 With the connection of the equipment via an external circuit to a communication
2056 network from outside the building installation to a remote environment the
2057 situation will change. It is unknown whether the remote environment is an
2058 isolated or non-isolated environment. During and after a fault of the basic
2059 insulation in a class I equipment (from mains to conductive parts) installed in
2060 an isolated installation (non-earthed installation) the conductive parts will
2061 become live (mains potential). If now the conductive parts are not separated
2062 from the external circuit, the mains voltage will be transferred to the remote
2063 installation via the communication network. This is a hazardous situation in the
2064 remote environment and can be dangerous for persons in that remote
2065 environment.
2066 Also in old building installations socket outlets exist with no earth contact. This
2067 situation will not be changed in the near future.
2068 To provide protection for those situations, a separation between an external
2069 circuit intended to be connected to communication networks outside the building
2070 (for example, telecommunication networks) and a separation between the
2071 external circuit and earthed parts is required.
2072 For this separation, it is sufficient to comply with the requirements of 5.4.11.2
2073 tested in accordance with 5.4.11.3. For this separation, no clearance, no
2074 creepage distances and no thickness requirements for solid insulation is
2075 required.
2076 5.5 Components as safeguards
2077 Rationale: For failure of a safeguard and a component or device that is not a safeguard:
2078 Safeguard failure: A failure is considered to be a safeguard failure if the part
2079 itself or its function, during normal operating conditions, contributes to change
2080 an ES class to a lower ES class. In this case, the part is assessed for its reliability
2081 by applying the applicable safeguard component requirements in 5.5 and the
2082 associated requirements in Annex G. When establishing ES1, ES2 limits apply
2083 during single fault condition of these parts. In case no requirements for the
2084 component are provided in 5.5 or Annex G, the failure is regarded as a non-
2085 safeguard failure.
– 63 – 108/757/DC
2086 Non-safeguard failure: A failure is considered to be a non-safeguard failure if

2087 the part itself or its function, under normal operating conditions, does not
2088 contribute to change an ES class to a lower ES Class. In this case, there is no
2089 need to assess the reliability of the part. When establishing ES1, ES1 limits apply
2090 for the single fault condition of these parts. Where applicable, 5.3.1 applies.
2091 Figure 21 and Figure 22 in this document give practical examples of the
2092 requirements when ordinary components bridge insulation.
2093 Example 1
2094
2095 Figure 21 – Example for an ES2 source
2096 A single fault of any component or part may not result in the accessible part
2097 exceeding ES1 levels, unless the part complies with the requirements for a basic
2098 safeguard.
2099 The basic safeguard in parallel with the part(s) is to comply with:
2100 – the creepage distance requirements; and
2101 – the clearance requirements
2102 for basic insulation.
2103 There are no other requirements for the components or parts if the accessible
2104 part remains at ES1.
2105 Example 2
2106
2107 Figure 22 – Example for an ES3 source
2108 A single fault of any component or part may not result in the accessible part
2109 exceeding ES1 levels, unless the parts comply with the requirements for a
2110 double or reinforced safeguard.
– 64 – 108/757/DC
2111 The double safeguard or reinforced safeguard in parallel with the part(s) is to
2112 comply with:
2113 − the creepage distance requirements; and
2114 − the clearance requirements,
2115 for double insulation or reinforced insulation.
2116 There are no other requirements for the components or parts if the accessible
2117 part remains at ES1.
2118 5.5.2.1 General requirements
2119 Source: Relevant IEC component documents
2120 Purpose: The insulation of components has to be in compliance with the relevant insulation
2121 requirements of 5.4.1, or with the safety requirements of the relevant IEC
2122 document.
2123 Rationale: Safety requirements of a relevant document are accepted if they are adequate
2124 for their application, for example, Y2 capacitors of IEC 60384-14.
2125 5.5.2.2 Capacitor discharge after disconnection of a connector
2126 Source: IEC TS 61201:2007, Annex A
2127 Rationale: The 2 s delay time represents the typical access time after disconnecting a
2128 connector. When determining the accessible voltage 2 s after disconnecting a
2129 connector, the tolerance of the X capacitor is not considered.
2130 If a capacitor is discharged by a resistor (for example, a bleeder resistor), the
2131 correct value of the resistor can be calculated using the following formula:
2132 R = (2 / C) x [1 / l n (E / E max )] MΩ
2133 where:
2134 C is in microfarads
2135 E is 60 for an ordinary person or 120 for an instructed person
2136 E max is the maximum charge voltage or mains peak voltage
2137 ln is the natural logarithm function
2138 NOTE 1 When the mains is disconnected, the capacitance is comprised of both the X capacitors
2139 and the Y capacitors, and other possible capacitances. The circuit is analyzed to determine the
2140 total capacitance between the poles of the connector or plug.
2141 NOTE 2 If the equipment rated mains voltage is 125 V, the maximum value of the discharge
2142 resistor is given by:
2143 R = 1,85 / C MΩ
2144 NOTE 3 If the equipment rated mains voltage is 250 V, the maximum value of the discharge
2145 resistor is given by:
2146 R = 1,13 / C MΩ
2147 NOTE 4 The absolute value of the above calculations is used for the discharge resistor value.
2148 The test method includes a maximum time error of about 9% less than the
2149 calculated time for a capacitive discharge. This error was deemed acceptable for
2150 the sake of consistency with past practice.
2151 For measuring the worst case, care should be taken that the discharge is
2152 measured while at the peak of the input voltage. To ensure this, an automatic
2153 control system that switches off at the peak voltage can be used.
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2154 A method used by several other documents, such as IEC 60065 and IEC 60335-1
2155 is to repeat the measurement 10 times and record the maximum value. This
2156 assumes that one of the 10 measurements will be sufficiently close to the peak
2157 value.
2158 Another possibility might be to use an oscilloscope during the measurement, so
2159 one can see if the measurement was done near the maximum.
2160 Single fault conditions need not be considered if the component complies with
2161 the relevant component requirements of the document. For example, a resistor
2162 connected in parallel with a capacitor where a capacitor voltage becomes
2163 accessible upon disconnection of a connector, need not be faulted if the resistor
2164 complies with 5.5.6.
2165 When determining the accessible voltage 2 s after disconnection of the
2166 connector, the tolerance of the X-capacitor is not considered.
2167 5.5.6 Resistors
2168 Source: IEC 60950-1 and IEC 60065
2169 Rationale: When a group of resistors is used, the resistors are in series. The whole path
2170 consists of the metal lead and helical end (metal) and resistor body. The
2171 clearance and creepage distance is across the resistor body only. The total
2172 path then consists of conductive metal paths and resistor bodies (all in series).
2173 In this case, Figure O.4 becomes relevant when you want to determine the total
2174 clearance and creepage distance.
2175 5.5.7 SPDs
2176 Rationale: See Attachment A for background information on the use of SPD’s.
2177 It should be noted that the issue is still under discussion in IEC TC 108. The
2178 rationale will be adapted as soon as the discussion is finalized.
2179 A GDT is a gap, or a combination of gaps, in an enclosed discharge medium
2180 other than air at atmospheric pressure, and designed to protect apparatus or
2181 personnel, or both, from high transient voltages (from ITU-T K.12-
2182 Characteristics of gas discharge tubes for the protection of telecommunications
2183 installations). It shall be used to protect equipment from transient voltages.
2184 Even if a GDT operates during the occurrence of transient voltages, it is not
2185 hazardous according to 5.2.2.4, Electrical energy source ES1 and ES2 limits of
2186 Single pulses.
2187 NOTE These single pulses do not include transients.
2188 Because a transient does not cause a hazardous electric shock, the separation
2189 element does not need to be a reinforced safeguard nor a basic safeguard in
2190 the meaning of IEC 62368-1.
2191 If suitable components are connected in-series to the SPD (such as a VDR, etc.),
2192 a follow current will not occur, and there will be no harmful effect.
2193 5.5.8 Insulation between the mains and an external circuit consisting of a coaxial
2194 cable
2195 Source: IEC 60065:2014, 10.2 and IEC 60950-1:2005, 1.5.6.
2196 Rationale: The additional conditioning of G.10.2 comes from IEC 60950-1:2005, 1.5.6
2197 Capacitors bridging insulation.
2198 The 21-days of damp-heat conditioning of resistors serving as a safeguard
2199 between the mains and an external circuit consisting of a coaxial cable is
2200 necessary to ensure the reliability of such resistors.
2201 Except for components such as the resistors in parallel of the insulation between
2202 the mains and the connection to a coaxial cable, the 21-days of damp-heat
2203 conditioning is not necessary for this insulation in IEC 60065, IEC 60950-1 and
2204 IEC 62368-1.
– 66 – 108/757/DC
2205 5.6 Protective conductor

2206 See Figure 23 in this document for an overview of protective earthing and
2207 protective bonding conductors.
2208
2209 Figure 23 – Overview of protective conductors
2210 5.6.1 General

2211 Source: IEC 60364-5-54, IEC 61140, IEC 60950-1
2212 Purpose: The protective earthing should have no excessive resistance, sufficient
2213 current-carrying capacity and not be interrupted in all circumstances.
2214 5.6.2.2 Colour of insulation
2215 Source: IEC 60446 1
2216 Purpose: For clear identification of the earth connection.
2217 An earthing braid is a conductive material, usually copper, made up of three or
2218 more interlaced strands, typically in a diagonally overlapping pattern.
2219 It should be noted that IEC 60227-1:2007 has specific requirements for the use
2220 of the colour combination as follows:
2221
2222
___________
1 This publication was withdrawn.
– 67 – 108/757/DC
2223 5.6.3 Requirements for protective earthing conductors

2224 Source: IEC 60950-1
2225 Purpose: The reinforced protective conductor has to be robust enough so that the
2226 interruption of the protective conductor is prevented in any case (interruption
2227 is not to be assumed).
2228 Rationale: These requirements have been successfully used for products in the scope of
2230 Where a conduit is used, if a cord or conductor exits the conduit and is not
2231 protected, then the values of Table 30 cannot be used for the conductor that
2232 exits the conduit.
2233 For pluggable equipment type B and permanently connected equipment, an
2234 earthing connection is always expected to be present. The earthing conductor
2235 can therefore be considered as a reinforced safeguard.
2236 5.6.4 Requirements for protective bonding conductors
2237 Source: IEC 60950-1
2238 Purpose: To demonstrate the fault current capability and the capability of the termination.
2239 Rationale: These requirements and tests have been successfully used for products in the
2240 scope of this document for many years (see Figure 3 in this document).
2241 5.6.5 Terminals for protective conductors
2242 5.6.5.1 Requirements

2243 Source: IEC 60998-1, IEC 60999-1, IEC 60999-2, IEC 60950-1
2244 Purpose: To demonstrate the fault current capability and the capability of the termination.
2245 Rationale: Conductor terminations according to Table 32 have served as reliable
2246 connection means for products complying with IEC 60950-1 for many years.
2247 The value of 25 A is chosen to cover the minimum protective current rating in all
2248 countries of the world.
2250 Source: IEC 60950-1
2253 5.6.7 Reliable connection of a protective earthing conductor
2254 Source: IEC 60309 (plugs and socket outlets for industrial purpose)
2255 Purpose: To describe reliable earthing as provided by permanently connected
2256 equipment, pluggable equipment type B, and pluggable equipment type A.
2257 Rationale: Permanently connected equipment is considered to provide a reliable earth
2258 connection because it is wired by an electrician.
2259 Pluggable equipment type B is considered to provide a reliable earth
2260 connection because IEC 60309 type plugs are more reliable and earth is always
2261 present as it is wired by an electrician.
2262 For stationary pluggable equipment type A where a skilled person verifies
2263 the proper connection of the earth conductor.
2264 5.7 Prospective touch voltage, touch current and protective conductor current
– 68 – 108/757/DC
2266 5.7.3 Equipment set-up, supply connections and earth connections

2267 Rationale: Equipment that is designed for multiple connections to the mains, where more
2268 than one connection is required, shall be subjected to either of the tests below:
2269 – have each connection tested individually while the other connections are
2270 disconnected,
2271 – have each connection tested while the other connections are connected, with
2272 the protective earthing conductors connected together.
2273 For simultaneous multiple connections, the requirement in the document is that
2274 each connection shall be tested while the other connections are connected, with
2275 the protective earthing conductors connected together. If the touch current
2276 exceeds the limit in 5.2.2.2, the touch current shall be measured individually.
2277 This means that if the total touch current with all connections tested together
2278 does not exceed the limit, the equipment complies with the requirement, if not,
2279 and each of the individual conductor touch currents don’t exceed the limit, the
2280 equipment also complies with the requirement.
2281 5.7.5 Earthed accessible conductive parts

2282 Rationale: Figure 24 in this document is an example of a typical test configuration for touch
2283 current from single phase equipment on star TN or TT systems. Other
2284 distribution systems can be found in IEC 60990.
2285
2286 Figure 24 – Example of a typical touch current measuring network
2287 5.7.6 Requirements when touch current exceeds ES2 limits

2288 Source: IEC 61140:2001, IEC 60950-1
2289 Rationale: The 5 % value has been used in IEC 60950-1 for a long time and is considered
2290 acceptable. The 5 % value is also the maximum allowed protective conductor
2291 current (7.5.2.2 of IEC 61140:2001).
2292 In the case that the protective conductor current exceeds 10 mA, IEC 61140
2293 requires a reinforced protective earthing conductor with a conductor size of
2294 10 mm 2 copper or 16 mm 2 aluminium or a second terminal for a second
2295 protective earthing conductor. This paragraph of IEC 62368-1 takes that into
2296 account by requiring a reinforced or double protective earthing conductor as
2297 per 5.6.3.
– 69 – 108/757/DC
2298 IEC 61140:2001, 7.5.2.2 requires information about the value of the protective
2299 conductor current to be in the documentation and in the instruction manual, to
2300 facilitate the determination that the equipment with the high protective
2301 conductor current is compatible with the residual current device which may be
2302 in the building installation.
2303 The manufacturer shall indicate the value of the protective conductor current
2304 in the installation instructions if the current exceeds 10 mA, this to be in line with
2305 the requirements of IEC 61140:2001, 7.6.3.5.
2306 5.7.7 Prospective touch voltage and touch current associated with external circuits
2307 5.7.7.1 Touch current from coaxial cables

2308 Source: IEC 60728-11
2309 Purpose: To avoid having an unearthed screen of a coaxial network within a building.
2310 Rationale: An earthed screen of a coaxial network is reducing the risk to get an electric
2311 shock.
2312 Coaxial external interfaces very often are connected to antennas to receive TV
2313 and sound signals. Antennas installed outside the buildings are exposed to
2314 external atmospheric discharges (for example, indirect lightning). To protect the
2315 antenna system and the equipment connected to such antennas, a path to earth
2316 needs to be provided via the screen of the coaxial network.
2317 Each piece of mains-powered equipment delivers touch current to a coaxial
2318 external circuit via the stray capacitance and the capacitor (if provided)
2319 between mains and coaxial interface. This touch current is limited by the
2320 requirement for each individual equipment to comply with the touch current
2321 requirements (safe value) to be measured according IEC 60990. Within a
2322 building, much individual equipment (for example, TV’s receivers) may be
2323 connected to a coaxial network (for example, cable distribution system). In this
2324 case, the touch current from each individual equipment sums up in the shield
2325 of the coaxial cable. With an earthed shield of a coaxial cable, the touch current
2326 has a path back to the source and the shield of the coaxial cable remains safe
2327 to touch.
2328 5.7.7.2 Prospective touch voltage and touch current associated with paired
2329 conductor cables
2331 Purpose: To avoid excessive prospective touch voltage and excessive currents from
2332 equipment into communication networks (for example, telecommunication
2333 networks).
2334 Rationale: All touch current measurements according to IEC 60990 measure the current
2335 from the mains to accessible parts. ES1 circuits are permitted to be accessible
2336 by an ordinary person and therefore it is included in the measurement
2337 according to IEC 60990. Circuits of class ES2 are not accessible and therefore
2338 these classes of circuits are not covered in the measurements according to
2339 IEC 60990.
2340 Because ES2 circuits may be accessible to instructed persons and may
2341 become accessible during a single fault to an ordinary person, the touch
2342 current to external circuit has to be limited, to protect people working on
2343 networks or on other equipment, which are connected to the external circuit via
2344 a network.
2345 An example for an external interface ID 1 of Table 13 is the connection to a
2346 telecommunication network. It is common for service personal of
2347 telecommunication networks and telecommunication equipment to make
2348 servicing under live conditions. Therefore, the telecommunication networks are
2349 operating with a voltage not exceeding energy class ES2.
– 70 – 108/757/DC
2350 The rationale to limit the touch current value to 0,25 mA (lower than ES2) has
2351 a practical background. Telecommunication equipment very often have more
2352 than one external circuit ID 1 of Table 13 (for example, connection to a
2353 telecommunication network). In such configurations a summation of the touch
2354 current may occur (see 5.7.7). With the limitation to 0,25 mA per each individual
2355 external circuit up to 20 external circuits could be connected together without
2356 any additional requirement. In 5.7.7 this value of 0,25 mA is assumed to be the
2357 touch current from a network to the equipment.
2358 5.7.8 Summation of touch currents from external circuits
2359 Source: IEC 60950-1
2360 Purpose: To avoid excessive touch currents when several external circuits are
2361 connected.
2362 Rationale: When limiting the touch current value to each individual external circuit (as
2363 required in 5.7.6.2), more circuits can be connected together before reaching the
2364 touch current limit. This allows better utilization of resources.
2365 Detailed information about touch currents from external circuits is given in
2366 Annex W of IEC 60950-1:2005.
2367 a) Touch current from external circuits

2368 There are two quite different mechanisms that determine the current through a
2369 human body that touches an external circuit, depending on whether or not the
2370 circuit is earthed. This distinction between earthed and unearthed (floating)
2371 circuits is not the same as between class I equipment and class II equipment.
2372 Floating circuits can exist in class I equipment and earthed circuits in class II
2373 equipment. Floating circuits are commonly, but not exclusively, used in
2374 telecommunication equipment and earthed circuits in data processing
2375 equipment, also not exclusively.
2376 In order to consider the worst case, it will be assumed in this annex that
2377 telecommunication networks are floating and that the AC mains supply and
2378 human bodies (skilled persons, instructed persons or ordinary persons) are
2379 earthed. It should be noted that a skilled person and an instructed person can
2380 touch some parts that are not accessible by an ordinary person. An "earthed"
2381 circuit means that the circuit is either directly earthed or in some way referenced
2382 to earth so that its potential with respect to earth is fixed.
2383 a.1) Floating circuits

2384 If the circuit is not earthed, the current (I c ) through the human body is "leakage"
2385 through stray or added capacitance (C) across the insulation in the mains
2386 transformer (see Figure 25 in this document).
2387
2388 Figure 25 – Touch current from a floating circuit

– 71 – 108/757/DC
2389 This current comes from a relatively high voltage, high impedance source, and
2390 its value is largely unaffected by the operating voltage on the external circuit.
2391 In this document, the body current (I c ) is limited by applying a test using the
2392 measuring instrument in Annex D of IEC 60950-1:2005, which roughly simulates
2393 a human body.
2394 a.2) Earthed circuits

2395 If the external circuit is earthed, the current through the human body (I v ) is due
2396 to the operating voltage (V) of the circuit, which is a source of low impedance
2397 compared with the body (see Figure 26 in this document). Any leakage current
2398 from the mains transformer (see a.1), will be conducted to earth and will not
2399 pass through the body.
2400
2401 Figure 26 – Touch current from an earthed circuit
2402 In this document, the body current (I v ) is limited by specifying maximum voltage
2403 values for the accessible circuit, which shall be an ES1 circuit or (with restricted
2404 accessibility) an ES2 circuit.
2405 b) Interconnection of several pieces of equipment

2406 It is a characteristic of information technology equipment, in particular in
2407 telecommunication applications, that many pieces of equipment may be
2408 connected to a single central equipment in a "star" topology. An example is
2409 telephone extensions or data terminals connected to a PABX, which may have
2410 tens or hundreds of ports. This example is used in the following description (see
2411 Figure 27 in this document).
2412
2413 Figure 27 – Summation of touch currents in a PABX

– 72 – 108/757/DC
2414 Each terminal equipment can deliver current to a human body touching the
2415 interconnecting circuit (I 1 , I 2 , etc.), added to any current coming from the PABX
2416 port circuitry. If several circuits are connected to a common point, their individual
2417 touch currents will add together, and this represents a possible risk to an
2418 earthed human body that touches the interconnection circuit.
2419 Various ways of avoiding this risk are considered in the following subclauses.
2420 b.1) Isolation
2421 Isolate all interconnection circuits from each other and from earth, and limit I 1 ,
2422 I 2 , etc., as described in a.1. This implies either the use in the PABX of a separate
2423 power supply for each port, or the provision of an individual line (signal)
2424 transformer for each port. Such solutions may not be cost effective.
2425 b.2) Common return, isolated from earth

2426 Connect all interconnection circuits to a common return point that is isolated from
2427 earth. (Such connections to a common point may in any case be necessary for
2428 functional reasons.) In this case the total current from all interconnection circuits
2429 will pass through an earthed human body that touches either wire of any
2430 interconnection circuit. This current can only be limited by controlling the values
2431 I 1 , I 2 , .. I n . In relation to the number of ports on the PABX. However, the value
2432 of the total current will probably be less than I 1 + I 2 +... + I n due to harmonic and
2433 other effects.
2434 b.3) Common return, connected to protective earth

2435 Connect all interconnection circuits to a common return point and connect that
2436 point to protective earthing. The situation described in a.2) applies regardless
2437 of the number of ports. Since safety depends on the presence of the earth
2438 connection, it may be necessary to use high-integrity earthing arrangements,
2439 depending on the maximum value of the total current that could flow.
2440 5.8 Backfeed safeguard in battery backed up supplies
2441 Source: IEC 62040-1:2017, IEC 62368-1, UL 1778 5 th edition
2442 Purpose: To establish requirements for certain battery backed up power supply systems
2443 that are an integral part of the equipment and that have the capability to backfeed
2444 to the mains of the equipment during stored energy mode. Examples include
2445 CATV network distribution supplies and any other integral supply commonly
2446 evaluated under this document with a battery backed option.
2447 Rationale: Principles of backfeed safeguard
2448 Battery backed up supplies store and generate hazardous energy. These
2449 energies may be present at the input terminals of the unit.
2450 A backfeed safeguard is intended to prevent ordinary persons, instructed
2451 persons or skilled persons from unforeseeable or unnecessary exposure to
2452 such hazards.
2453 A mechanical backfeed safeguard should meet a minimum air gap requirement.
2454 If not, the mechanical device (contacts) may be forced closed, and this will not
2455 be counted as a fault. The backfeed safeguard operates with any and all
2456 semiconductor devices in any single phase of the mains power path failed.
2457 A backfeed safeguard works under any normal operating condition. This
2458 should include any output load or input source condition deemed normal by the
2459 manufacturer; however, it is common practice to only test at full- and no-load
2460 conditions, unless analysis of the circuitry proves other conditions would be less
2461 favourable. The circuitry that controls the backfeed safeguard is intended to be
2462 single-fault tolerant.
– 73 – 108/757/DC
2463 A backfeed safeguard can accomplish this by disconnecting the mains supply
2464 wiring from the internal energy source, by disabling the inverter and removing
2465 the hazardous source(s) of energy, reducing the source to a safe level, or by
2466 placing a suitable safeguard between the ordinary person, instructed person
2467 or skilled person and the hazardous energy. ES1 is defined in the body of this
2468 document. The method of measurement is as follows:
2469 – For pluggable equipment, it is determined by opening all phases, neutral and
2470 ground.
2471 – For permanently connected equipment, the neutral and ground are not
2472 removed during the backfeed safeguard tests.
2473 Measurements are taken at the unit input connections across the phases, from
2474 phase to neutral and phase and neutral to ground, using the body impedance
2475 model as the measurement device.
2476 Air gap requirements for mechanical disconnect:
2477 An air gap is only required when the backfeed safeguard is mechanical in
2478 nature. The air gap is defined as the clearance distance. There are several
2479 elements to consider when determining the clearance requirement:
2480 – Under normal operation, the space between poles of phases must meet the
2481 requirements for basic insulation (see 5.4.2).
2482 – If the unit is operating on inverter, the source is considered to be a secondary
2483 supply, which is transient free (see 5.4.2).
2484 For a unit with floating outputs, opening all phases and the neutral using the
2485 required clearance for basic insulation is considered acceptable. If the output
2486 is grounded to the chassis, reinforced insulation or equivalent is required.
2487 Fault testing
2488 All backfeed safeguard control circuits are subjected to failure analysis and
2489 testing.
2490 Relays
2491 Relays in the mains path that are required to open for mechanical protection
2492 should be normally open when not energized.
2493 If the relay does not meet the required clearances, the shorting of either
2494 pole/contact may be considered as a single fault to simulate the welding of the
2495 contacts. The failure of a single relay contact may be sensed and the inverter
2496 disabled to prevent feedback.
2497 A relay used for mechanical protection shall be horsepower-rated or pass a 50-
2498 cycle endurance test at 600 % of the normal switching current.
2499 Electronic protection
2500 Electronic protection for a backfeed safeguard is acceptable if the operation of
2501 the electronic protection device is sensed and the inverter is disabled if a fault
2502 is found. This is the same requirement as for a relay having less than the
2503 required air gap or clearance or is not relied upon entirely for mechanical
2504 protection.
2505 Mechanical protection
2506 Mechanical protection for a backfeed safeguard is acceptable if it prevents the
2507 user from accessing greater than ES1 and cannot be readily defeated without
2508 the use of tool. The voltage rating of the mechanical protection should be no
2509 less than the maximum out-of-phase voltage.
2510 Control circuitry
2511 The failure, open- or short-circuit, of any component of the backfeed safeguard
2512 circuitry may be analyzed to evaluate the effects on the proper operation of the
2513 backfeed safeguard. Testing may be done on all components where analysis
2514 of the results is arguable.
– 74 – 108/757/DC
2515 Components, such as resistors and inductors, are considered to fail open-circuit
2516 only. In general, capacitors may fail open or shorted. Solid-state devices
2517 typically fail short and then open.
2518 Microprocessor controls are considered to be acceptable if the circuit operates
2519 safely with any single control line open or shorted to control logic ground, or
2520 shorted to Vcc where such fault is likely to occur. Failure of the microprocessor
2521 can also be simulated by opening the Vcc pin or shorting the Vcc pin to ground.
2522 If the control circuitry is fully redundant, (for example, N + 1), failure analysis of
2523 individual components is not required if the failure of one circuit results in a fail-
2524 safe mode of operation.
2525 _____________
2526 6 Electrically-caused fire
2527 Rationale: Electrically-caused fire is due to conversion of electrical energy to thermal

2528 energy, where the thermal energy heats a fuel material to pyrolyze the solid into
2529 a flammable gas in the presence of oxygen. The resulting mixture is heated
2530 further to its ignition temperature which is followed by combustion of that fuel
2531 material. The resulting combustion, if exothermic or with additional thermal
2532 energy converted from the electrical source, can be sustained and subsequently
2533 ignite adjacent fuel materials that result in the spread of fire.
2534 The three-block model (see 0.7.2, Figure 6) for electrically (internally) caused
2535 fire addresses the separation of a potential ignition sources from combustible
2536 materials. In addition, it can also represent an ignited fuel and the safeguards
2537 interposed between ignited fuels and adjacent fuels or to fuels located outside
2538 the equipment.
2539 6.2 Classification of power sources (PS) and potential ignition sources (PIS)
2540 Rationale: The first step in the application of this clause is to determine which energy
2541 sources contain potential ignition sources requiring a safeguard. The power
2542 available to each circuit can first be evaluated to determine the energy available
2543 to a circuit. Then each point or component within a circuit can be tested to
2544 determine the power that would be available to a fault at that component. With
2545 this information each part of the component energy sources within the product
2546 can be classified as either a specific ignition source or a component within a
2547 power source.
2548 Throughout the clause, the term “reduce the likelihood of ignition” is used in
2549 place of the terms “prevent” or “eliminate”.
2550 6.2.2 Power source circuit classifications
2551 Source: IEC 60950-1, IEC 60065
2552 Rationale: These power source classifications begin with the lowest available energy
2553 necessary to initiate an electronic fire (PS1) and include an intermediate level
2554 (PS2) where ignition is possible but the spread of fire can be localized with
2555 effective material control or isolation safeguards. The highest energy level
2556 (PS3), assumes both ignition and a potential spread of fire beyond the ignition
2557 source. Criteria for safeguards will vary based on the type of power source that
2558 is providing power to the circuit.
2559 This power measurement and source classification are similar to LPS test
2560 requirements from IEC 60950-1 but are applied independently and the criteria
2561 limited to available power as opposed to in combination of criteria required in
2562 IEC 60950-1.
2563 All circuits and devices connected or intended to be connected as a load to each
2564 measured power source are classified as being part of that power source. This
2565 test method determines the maximum power available from a power source to
2566 any circuit connected to that power source.
– 75 – 108/757/DC
2567 The identification of test points for determination of power source is at the
2568 discretion of the manufacturer. The most obvious are outputs of internal power
2569 supply circuits, connectors, ports and board to board connections. However,
2570 these measurements can be made anywhere within a circuit.
2571 When evaluating equipment (peripherals) connected via cables to an equipment
2572 port or via cable, the impedance of any connecting cable may be taken into
2573 account in the determination of the PS classification of a connected peripheral.
2574 Therefore, it is acceptable to make the measurement at the supply connector or
2575 after the cable on the accessory side.
2576 The location of the wattmeter is critical, as the total power available from the
2577 power source (not the power available to the fault) is measured during each fault
2578 condition. As some fault currents may be limited by a protective device, the time
2579 and current breaking characteristics of the protective device used is considered
2580 where it has an effect on the value measured.
2581 This test method assumes a single fault in either the power source or the load
2582 circuits of the circuit being classified. It assumes both:
2583 a) a fault within the circuit being classified, and
2584 b) any fault within the power source supplying power to the circuit being
2585 classified,
2586 each condition a) or b) being applied independently.
2587 The higher of the power measured is considered the PS circuit classification
2588 value.
2589 6.2.2.2 Power measurement for worst-case fault
2590 Rationale: This test method determines the maximum power available from a power source
2591 that is operating under normal operating conditions to any circuit connected to
2592 that power source, assuming any single fault condition within the circuit being
2593 classified. This power measurement assumes normal operating conditions are
2594 established before applying the single fault to any device or insulation in the
2595 load circuit to determine the maximum power available to a circuit during a fault.
2596 This is different for potential ignition source power measurements where the
2597 measured power available is that at the fault location.
2598 A value of 125 % was chosen to have some degree of certainty that the fuse will
2599 open after a certain amount of time. As such, the measured situation will not be
2600 a continuous situation. It was impossible to use the interruption characteristics
2601 of a fuse, since different types of interrupting devices have completely different
2602 interrupting characteristics. The value of 125 % is a compromise that should
2603 cover the majority of the situations.
2604 6.2.2.3 Power measurement for worst-case power source fault
2605 Rationale: This test method determines the maximum power available to a normal load from
2606 a power source assuming any single fault within the power source. A power
2607 source fault could result in an increase in power drawn by a normal operating
2608 load circuit.
2609 6.2.2.4 PS1
2610 Source: IEC 60065, IEC 60695, IEC 60950-1
2611 Rationale: A PS1 source is considered to have too little energy to cause ignition in electronic
2612 circuits and components.
2613 The requirement is that the continuous available power be less than 15 W to
2614 achieve a very low possibility of ignition. The value of 15 W has been used as
2615 the lower threshold for ignition in electronic components in many documents,
2616 including IEC 60950-1 and IEC 60065. It has also routinely been demonstrated
2617 through limited power fault testing in electronic circuits.
– 76 – 108/757/DC
2618 – In order to address the ease of measurement, it was decided to make the
2619 15 W measurement after 3 s. The value of 3 s was chosen to permit ease of
2620 measurement. Values as short as 100 ms and as high as 5 s were also
2621 considered. Quickly establishing a 15 W limit (less than 1 s) is not practical
2622 for test purposes and not considered important for typical fuel ignition. It is
2623 recognized that it normally takes as long as 10 s for thermoplastics to ignite
2624 when impinged directly by a small flame (IEC 60695 small scale material
2625 testing methods).
2626 – In principle the measurements are to be made periodically (for example, each
2627 second) throughout the 3 s period with the expectation that after 3 s, the
2628 power would “never” exceed 15 W.
2629 – Historically telecommunication circuits (Table 13, ID 1) are power limited by
2630 the building network to values less than 15 W and the circuits connected to
2631 them are considered PS1 (from IEC 60950-1).
2632 It should be noted that the statement for external circuits is not intended to
2633 cover technologies such as USB and PoE. It is meant to relate to analogue
2634 ringing signals only.
2635 6.2.2.5 PS2
2636 Source: IEC 60695-11-10, IEC 60950-1
2637 Rationale: Power Source 2 assumes a level of energy that has the possibility of ignition and
2638 subsequently requires a safeguard. Propagation of the ignition beyond the
2639 initially ignited component is limited by the low energy contribution to the fault
2640 and subsequently by safeguards to control the ignition resistance of nearby
2641 fuels.
2642 The primary requirement is to limit power available to these circuits to no more
2643 than 100 W. This value includes both power available for normal operation and
2644 the power available for any single fault condition.
2645 − This value has been used in IEC 60950-1 for a similar purpose, where ignition
2646 of internal components is possible but fire enclosures are not required.
2647 − The value of 100 W is commonly used in some building or fire codes to identify
2648 where low power wiring can be used outside of a fire containing enclosure.
2649 − The value is also 2 × 50 W, which can be related to the energy of standard
2650 flaming ignition sources (IEC 60695-11-10 test flame) on which our small-
2651 scale V-rating material flammability classes are based. It is recognized that
2652 the conversion of electrical energy to thermal energy is far less than 100 %,
2653 so this value is compatible with the safeguards prescribed for PS2 circuits,
2654 which are generally isolation and V-rated fuels.
2655 The 5 s measurement for PS2 ensures the available power limits are both limited
2656 and practical for the purposes of measurement. The value is also used in
2657 IEC 60950 series as referenced above. No short-term limits are considered
2658 necessary, as possibility of ignition is presumed for components in these power
2659 limited circuits, recognizing that it generally takes 10 s or more for
2660 thermoplastics to pyrolyze and then ignite when impinged directly by a small
2661 50 W flame.
2662 Reliability of overcurrent devices (such as those found in IEC 60950 series) is
2663 not necessary as these circuits are used within or directly adjacent to the product
2664 (not widely distributed like IEC 60950-1 LPS circuits used for connection to
2665 building power). The reliability assessment for PS2 circuits that are intended to
2666 be distributed within the building wiring is addressed for external circuits later
2667 in this document.
– 77 – 108/757/DC
2668 6.2.2.6 PS3

2669 Rationale: PS3 circuits are circuits that are not otherwise classified as PS1 or PS2 circuits.
2670 No classification testing is required as these circuits can have unlimited power
2671 levels. If a circuit is not measured, it can be assumed to be PS3.
2672 6.2.3 Classification of potential ignition sources
2673 Rationale: With each power source, points and components within a circuit can be
2674 evaluated to determine if potential ignition sources are further identified.
2675 These ignition sources are classified as either an arcing PIS for arcing sources
2676 or a resistive PIS for resistance heating sources. Criteria for safeguards will
2677 vary based on the type of PIS being addressed.
2678 Ignition sources are classified on their ability to either arc or dissipate excessive
2679 heat (resistive). It is important to distinguish the type of ignition source as
2680 distances through air from arcing parts versus other resistive ignition sources
2681 vary due to a higher thermal loss in radiated energy as compared to conducted
2682 flame or resistive heat impinging directly on a combustible fuel material.
2683 6.2.3.1 Arcing PIS
2685 Rationale: Arcing PIS are considered to represent a thermal energy source that results
2686 from the conversion of electrical energy to an arc, which may impinge directly or
2687 indirectly on a fuel material.
2688 Power levels below 15 W (PS1) are considered to be too low to initiate an
2689 electrical fire in electronic circuits. This value is used in IEC 60065 (see also
2690 6.2.1).
2691 The minimum voltage (50 V) required to initiate arcing is also from IEC 60065
2692 and through experimentation.
2693 For low-voltages, the fault that causes arc-heating is generally a result of a loose
2694 connection such as a broken solder connection, a cold-solder connection, a
2695 weakened connector contact, an improperly crimped wire, an insufficiently
2696 tightened screw connection, etc. As air does not break down below 300 V RMS.
2697 (Paschen’s Law), most low voltage arc-heating occurs in direct contact with a
2698 fuel. For voltages greater than 300 V, arcing can occur through air.
2699 The measurement of voltage and current necessary to establish an arcing PIS is
2700 related the energy that is available to the fault (as opposed to energy available
2701 from a power source). The value (Vp × Irms) specified is neither a W or VA but
2702 rather a calculated number reflecting a peak voltage and RMS current. It is not
2703 directly measurable.
2704 Arcing below 300 V is generally the result of a disconnection of current-carrying
2705 connections rather than the mating or connection of potentially current-carrying
2706 connections.
2707 Once the basic parameters of voltage and power are met, there are three
2708 conditions for which safeguards are required:
2709 − separation that can be created during a single fault, those that can arc under
2710 normal operating conditions;
2711 − all terminations where electrical failure resulting in heating is more likely; and
2712 − any electrical condition (such as the opening of a trace).
2713 A reliable connection is a connection which is expected not to become
2714 disconnected within the lifetime of the equipment. The examples in the note give
2715 an idea as to what kinds of connections can be considered reliable.
2716 The manufacturer may declare any location to be an arcing PIS.
– 78 – 108/757/DC
2717 6.2.3.2 Resistive PIS

2719 Rationale: Resistive potential ignition sources can result from a fault that causes over-
2720 heating of any impedance in a low-resistance that does not otherwise cause an
2721 overcurrent protection to operate. This can happen in any circuit where the
2722 power to the resistive heating source is greater than 15 W (see above). A
2723 resistive PIS may ignite a part due to excessive power dissipation or ignite
2724 adjacent materials and components.
2725 Under single fault conditions, this clause requires that two conditions exist
2726 before determining that a part can be a resistive PIS. The first is that there is
2727 sufficient available fault energy to the component. The second is that ignition of
2728 the part or adjacent materials can occur.
2729 The requirement for a resistive PIS under normal operating conditions is not
2730 the available power but rather the power dissipation of the part under normal
2731 operating conditions.
2732 The value of 30 s was used in IEC 60065 and has historically proven to be
2733 sufficient. The value of 100 W was used in IEC 60065 and has historically proven
2734 to be adequate.
2735 The manufacturer may declare any location to be a resistive PIS.
2736 6.3 Safeguards against fire under normal operating conditions and abnormal
2737 operating conditions
2738 Rationale: The basic safeguard under normal operating conditions and abnormal
2739 operating conditions is to reduce the likelihood of ignition by limiting
2740 temperature of fuels. This can be done by assuring that any available electrical
2741 energy conversion to thermal energy does not raise the temperature of any part
2742 beyond its ignition temperature.
2743
2744 Figure 28 – Possible safeguards against electrically-caused fire

– 79 – 108/757/DC
2745 There are several basic safeguards and supplementary safeguards against
2746 electrically-caused fire under abnormal operating conditions and single fault
2747 conditions (see Figure 28, Table 8 and Table 9 in this document). These
2748 safeguards include, but are not limited to:
2749 S1) having insufficient power to raise a fuel material to ignition temperature;
2750 S2) limiting the maximum continuous fault current; limiting the maximum duration for
2751 fault currents exceeding the maximum continuous fault current (for example, a
2752 fuse or similar automatic-disconnecting overcurrent device);
2753 S3) selecting component rating based on single fault conditions rather than
2754 normal operating conditions (prevents the component from overheating);
2755 S4) ensuring high thermal resistance of the thermal energy transfer path from the
2756 thermal energy source to the fuel material (reduces the temperature and the rate
2757 of energy transfer to the fuel material so that the fuel material cannot attain
2758 ignition temperature); or a barrier made of non-combustible material;
2759 S5) using an initial fuel material located closest to an arcing PIS or resistive PIS
2760 having a temperature rating exceeding the temperature of the source (prevents
2761 fuel ignition); or a flame-retardant fuel material (prevents sustained fuel burning
2762 and spread of fire within the equipment); or a non-combustible material (for
2763 example, metal or ceramic);
2764 S6) ensuring high thermal resistance of the thermal energy transfer path from the
2765 initial fuel to more fuel material; or flame isolation of the burning initial fuel from
2766 more fuel material (prevents spread of fire within the equipment);
2767 S7) ensuring that subsequent material is either non-combustible material (for
2768 example, metal or ceramic); or is a flame-retardant material (prevents sustained
2769 fuel burning and spread of fire within the equipment);
2770 S8) use of a fire-containing enclosure (contains the fire within the equipment) or
2771 an oxygen-regulating enclosure (quenches a fire by suffocating it);
2772 S9) use of reliable electrical connections;
2773 S10) use of non-reversible components and battery connections;
2774 S11) use of mechanical protection (for example, barriers, mesh or the like) with limited
2775 openings;
2776 S12) use of clear operating instructions, instructional safeguards, cautions.
2777 Methods of protection
2778 A) Protection under normal operating conditions and abnormal

2779 operating conditions
2780 Materials and components shall not exceed their auto-ignition temperatures.
2781 B) Protection under single fault conditions

2782 There are two methods of providing protection. Either method may be applied to
2783 different circuits in the same equipment:
2784 − Prevent ignition: equipment is so designed that under abnormal operating
2785 conditions and single fault conditions no part will ignite;
2786 − Control fire spread: selection and application of components, wiring, materials
2787 and constructional measures that reduce the spread of flame and, where
2788 necessary, by the use of a fire enclosure.
2789 Thermoplastic softening values or relative thermal indices (RTI) were not
2790 considered appropriate as they do not relate specifically to ignition properties of
2791 fuel materials.
2792 Any device that operates as a safeguard during normal operation (when left in
2793 the circuit) shall be assessed for reliability. If a device is taken out of the circuit
2794 during the normal operation testing then it is not considered as being a
2795 safeguard.
– 80 – 108/757/DC
2796 Abnormal operating conditions that do not result in a single fault are
2797 considered in much the same way as normal operating conditions as the
2798 condition is corrected and normal operation is presumed to be restored.
2799 However, abnormal operating conditions that result in a single fault
2800 condition are to be treated in accordance with 6.4 rather than 6.3. See Figure 29
2801 in this document for a fire clause flow chart.
2802 Table 8 – Examples of application of various safeguards
Cause Prevention/protection methods Safeguard

Start of fire under normal operating Limit temperature of combustible material Basic
conditions
Start of fire under abnormal operating Select prevent ignition or control fire Supplementary
conditions and single fault spread method
conditions
PS1 circuit Low available power reduces the likelihood S1
of ignition
PS2 or PS3 circuit Reduce the likelihood of ignition S1, S2, S3, S5
Use of protection devices S2
Sufficient distance or solid barrier S4 (S6)
interposed between any combustible
material and each potential ignition
source
PS2 circuit Limit the available power S1, S2
Sufficient distance or solid barrier S4, S6
interposed between any combustible
material and each potential ignition
source
Use flame-retardant or non-combustible S5
material
PS3 circuit Use all PS2 options and:
− use fire containing enclosures S8
− use flame-retardant or similar materials S7

Internal and external wiring Reliable construction S9
Limit of wire temperature and use of fire
resistant insulation
Fire caused by entry of foreign objects Prevent entry of foreign objects S11
and subsequent bridging of electrical
terminals in PS2 circuits and PS3
circuits
Mains supply cords Reliable construction S9
Limit of wire temperature and use of fire
resistant insulation
Fire or explosion due to abnormal Limit charge/discharge currents S1
operating conditions of batteries
Limit short-circuit currents S2
Prevent use of wrong polarity S10
2803
– 81 – 108/757/DC
2804
2805 Figure 29 – Fire clause flow chart
2806 6.3.1 Requirements

2807 Source: IEC 60950-1, ISO 871
2808 Rationale: Spontaneous-ignition temperature as measured by ISO 871 for materials was
2809 chosen as the ignition point of fuels. The materials specific tables were deleted
2810 in favour of a simple requirement or completely referring to the ASTM standard
2811 for material auto-ignition temperatures.
– 82 – 108/757/DC
2812 The 300 °C value for thermoplastics is approximately 10 % less than the lowest
2813 ignition temperature of materials commonly used in ICT and CE equipment. This
2814 value has also been used in IEC 60950-1. The designer is permitted to use
2815 material data sheets for materials that exceed this value but the auto-ignition
2816 specification has to be reduced by 10 % to accommodate measurement
2817 variations and uncertainty.
2818 In the context of fire, abnormal operating conditions (blocked vents, connector
2819 overload, etc.) are to be considered just as a normal operating condition
2820 unless the abnormal operating condition results in a single fault condition.
2821 As part of the compliance check, first the datasheets of the materials used have
2822 to be checked to be able to evaluate the results of the temperature rise
2823 measurements.
2824 The glow-wire test is a fire test method of applying a heat source to the sample.
2825 The test provides a way to compare a material’s tendency to resist ignition, self-
2826 extinguish flames (if ignition occurs), and to not propagate fire. Manufacturers
2827 have been using this test method to determine a plastic’s flame resistance
2828 characteristics to IEC 60950-1 for many years without field issues identified with
2829 the suitability of the test. Hence, the glow-wire test should continue to be an
2830 option to the HB rating for plastics outside of the fire enclosure or mechanical
2831 enclosures and for electrical enclosures housing PS1 circuits. This
2832 precedence has been set in IEC 60950-1 and should be included in IEC 62368-
2833 1.
2834 Table 9 – Basic safeguards against fire under normal operating conditions
2835 and abnormal operating conditions
Normal operating conditions and abnormal operating conditions
The objective of this subclause is to define requirements to reduce the likelihood of ignition under normal
operating conditions and abnormal operating conditions.
Ignition is not allowed
T max ≤ 90 % auto ignition temperature according to ISO 871; or

T max ≤ 300 ºC
Combustible materials for components and other parts outside fire

enclosures (including electrical enclosures, mechanical enclosures and
decorative parts), shall have a material flammability class of at least:
PS1 – HB75 if the thinnest significant thickness of this material is < 3 mm, or
– HB40 if the thinnest significant thickness of this material is ≥ 3 mm, or
PS2 6.3.1 – HBF.
PS3 NOTE Where an enclosure also serves as a fire enclosure, the requirements
for fire enclosures apply.
These requirements do not apply to:

– parts with a size of less than 1 750 mm 3 ;
– supplies, consumable materials, media and recording materials;
– parts that are required to have particular properties in order to perform
intended functions, such as synthetic rubber rollers and ink tubes;
– gears, cams, belts, bearings and other parts that would contribute
negligible fuel to a fire, including labels, mounting feet, key caps, knobs
and the like.
2836
2837 6.3.2 Compliance criteria

2838 Rationale: Steady state for temperature measurements in excess of 300 °C requires more
2839 tolerance on the rise value due to the difficulty in achieving a stable reading.
2840 However, the value in B.1.6 was considered adequate, as these values typically
2841 do not continue to rise but rather cycle. The value of 3 °C over a 15 min period
2842 was also considered for measurement of these very high temperatures but was
2843 not used in favour of harmonization with other clauses.
– 83 – 108/757/DC
2844 The use of temperature-limiting safeguards under normal operating

2845 conditions and abnormal operating conditions is considered acceptable only
2846 where the safeguard or device has been deemed a reliable temperature control
2847 device.
2848 6.4 Safeguards against fire under single fault conditions
2849 6.4.1 General

2850 Source: IEC 60065, IEC 60950-1
2851 Rationale: The consideration in the prior clause is to limit the likelihood of
2852 ignition of fuels under normal operating conditions and abnormal operating
2853 conditions with a basic safeguard. All fuels should be used below their ignition
2854 temperatures and separated from arcing parts.
2855 The requirements in this clause are to limit the ignition or the spread of fire under
2856 single fault conditions by employing supplementary safeguards, see
2857 Table 10 in this document. There are two approaches that can be used either
2858 jointly or independently:
2859 − method 1 minimizes the possibility of ignition through the use of safeguards
2860 applied at each potential point of ignition;
2861 − method 2 assumes the ignition of limited fuels within the product and therefore
2862 requires safeguards that limit the spread of fire beyond the initial ignition
2863 point or for higher energy, beyond the equipment enclosure.
2864 Table 10 – Supplementary safeguards against fire under single fault conditions
Single fault conditions

There are two methods of providing protection. Either method may be applied to different circuits of the
same equipment (6.4.1)
Equipment is so designed that under single fault conditions no part shall

Method 1 ignite.
Reduce the This method can be used for any circuit in which the available steady state
likelihood of power to the circuit does not exceed 4 000 W.
ignition
The appropriate requirements and tests are detailed in 6.4.2 and 6.4.3.
Selection and application of supplementary safeguards for components,
wiring, materials and constructional measures that reduce the spread of fire
Method 2 and, where necessary, by the use of a second supplementary safeguard such
as a fire enclosure.
Control fire spread
This method can be used for any type of equipment.
The appropriate requirements are detailed in 6.4.4, 6.4.5 and 6.4.6.
2865
2866 The document’s user or product designer will select a method to apply to each
2867 circuit, (either prevent ignition method or control the spread of fire method). The
2868 selection of a method can be done for a complete product, a part of a product or
2869 a circuit.
2870 The power level of 4 000 W was chosen to ensure that products which are
2871 connected to low power mains (less than 240 V × 16 A), common in the office
2872 place or the home, could use the ignition protection methods, and to provide a
2873 reasonable and practical separation of product types. It is recognized that this is
2874 not representative of fault currents available but is a convenient and
2875 representative separation based on equipment connected to normal office and
2876 home mains circuits where experience with potential ignition sources
2877 safeguards is more common.
– 84 – 108/757/DC
2878 Limit values below 4 000 W create a problem for the AC mains of almost all
2879 equipment used in the home or office, which is not the intent. It would be much
2880 more practical to use an energy source power of 4 000 W based on mains
2881 voltage and overcurrent device rating which would effectively permit all
2882 pluggable type A equipment to use either method, and restrict very high-power
2883 energy sources to use only the method to control fire spread.
2884 The 4 000 W value can be tested for individual circuits; however, a note has
2885 been added to clarify which types of products are considered below without test.
2886 Calculation of the product of the mains nominal voltage and mains overcurrent
2887 device rating is not a normal engineering convention but rather the product of
2888 two numbers should not exceed 4 000 (see text below).
2889 NOTE All pluggable equipment type A are considered to be below the steady state value of
2890 4 000 W. Pluggable equipment type B and permanently connected equipment are considered
2891 to be below this steady state value if the product of nominal mains voltage and the current rating
2892 of the installation overcurrent protective device is less than 4 000.
2893 Prevent ignition method: Prescribes safeguard requirements that would prevent
2894 ignition and is predominantly based on fault testing and component selection and
2895 designs that reduce the likelihood of sustained flaming. Where a PIS is identified,
2896 additional safeguards are required to use barriers and the fire cone ‘keep out’
2897 areas for non-flame rated materials (see Table 11 and Figure 30 in this
2898 document).
2899 The prevent ignition method has been used in IEC 60065 where the predominant
2900 product connection is to low power (< 16 A) mains circuits. The use of this
2901 method was not considered adequate enough for larger mains circuits because
2902 the size of the fire cone does not adequately address large ignition sources
2903 common in higher power circuits.
2904 This approach limits the use of prevent ignition methods to those products where
2905 the ignition sources is characterized by the fire cones and single fault
2906 conditions described in 6.4.7.
– 85 – 108/757/DC
2907 Table 11 – Method 1: Reduce the likelihood of ignition
Method 1: Reduce the likelihood of ignition under single fault conditions
PS1 No supplementary safeguards are needed for protection against PS1.

(≤ 15 W after 3) 6.4.2 A PS1 is not considered to contain enough energy to result in materials
reaching ignition temperatures.
The objective of this subclause is to define the supplementary safeguards
needed to reduce the likelihood of ignition under single fault conditions in
PS2 circuits and PS3 circuits where the available power does not exceed
4 000 W. All identified supplementary safeguards need to be considered
based on the equipment configuration.
Sustained flaming > 10 s is not allowed and no surrounding parts shall have
ignited.
Separation from arcing PIS and resistive PIS according to 6.4.7
– Distances have to comply with Figures 37, 38, 39a and 39b; or
PS2
– In case the distance between a PIS and combustible material is less
( > PS1 and than specified in Figures 37, 38, 39a and 39b;
≤ 100 W after 5 s) • Mass of combustible material < 4 g, or
• Shielded from the PIS by a fire barrier, or
and 6.4.3 • Flammability requirements:
o V-1 class material; VTM-1 class material or HF-1 class
PS3 material, or needle flame in Clause S.2, or
o Relevant component IEC document
(> PS2 and
≤ 4 000 W) Using protective devices that comply with G.3.1, G.3.2, G.3.3 and G.3.4 or
the relevant IEC component documents for such devices;
Using components that comply with G.5.3, G.5.4 or the relevant IEC
component document;
Components associated with the mains shall comply with:

the relevant IEC component documents; and
the requirements of other clauses of IEC 62368-1
2908
2909
– 86 – 108/757/DC
2910
2911 Figure 30 – Prevent ignition flow chart

– 87 – 108/757/DC
2912 Control fire spread method: Prescribes safeguards that are related to the spread
2913 of fire from acknowledged ignition sources. This assumes very little performance
2914 testing (no single fault conditions) and the safeguards are designed to
2915 minimize the spread of flame both within the product and beyond the fire
2916 enclosure. The safeguards described are based on power level, with higher
2917 power sources requiring more substantial safeguards (see Figure 31, Figure 32
2918 and Table 12 in this document).
2919 This power (4 000 W) separation is also used in the control of fire spread method
2920 to delineate safeguard criteria for fire enclosure materials (V-1 versus 5 V).
2921 IEC 60950-1 has historically used weight to define fire enclosure criteria and it
2922 was felt that the use of available power was more appropriate and generally
2923 reflective of current practice.
2924
2925
2926
2927 Figure 31 – Control fire spread summary

– 88 – 108/757/DC
2928
2929 Figure 32 – Control fire spread PS2
2930
– 89 – 108/757/DC
2931
2932 Figure 33 – Control fire spread PS3

– 90 – 108/757/DC
2933 6.4.2 Reduction of the likelihood of ignition under single fault conditions in PS1
2934 circuits
2935 Rationale: Low available power prevents ignition – 15 W is recognized as the lower limit of
2936 ignition for electronic products. The limiting of power is not considered the basic
2937 safeguard but rather the characteristic of the circuit being considered. This
2938 determination is made as part of the classification of power sources.
2939 6.4.3 Reduction of the likelihood of ignition under single fault conditions in PS2
2940 circuits and PS3 circuits
2941 Rationale: To identify all potential ignition sources, all circuits and components within the
2942 PS2 and PS3 circuits should be evaluated for their propensity to ignite.
2943 The ignition source derived from either PS2 or a PS3 circuit is considered
2944 equivalent. The resulting flame size and burn time is identical in all PS2 and PS3
2945 circuits unless the power available is very large (for example, greater than
2946 4 000 W).
2947 For very large sources (greater than 4 000 W) the safeguards described for
2948 addressing potential ignition sources are not recognized as being adequate
2949 and the control fire spread method is used (see 6.4.1 for 4 000 W rationale).
2951 Source: IEC 60065, IEC 60695-2-13, IEC 60950-1
2952 Rationale: Flaming of a fuel under single fault conditions is only permitted if very small
2953 and quickly extinguished (for example, a fuse resistor). A length of time is
2954 necessary during single fault conditions to permit the characteristic “spark” or
2955 short term “combustion flash” common when performing single fault conditions
2956 in electronic circuits. The value of 10 s is used, which has been used by
2957 IEC 60065 for many years. The energy of this short-term event is considered too
2958 low to ignite other parts. This value corresponds with IEC 60695-2-13 and has
2959 been used in practice by IEC TC 89 for glow wire ignition times. The time period
2960 is necessary to accommodate the expected flash/short duration flames that often
2961 result as a consequence of faults. The value of 10 s is considered to be the
2962 minimum time needed for ignition of commonly used thermoplastics by direct
2963 flame impingement. It is recognized that times as short as 2 s are used by other
2964 documents.
2965 Protection is achieved by identifying each PIS and then limiting the temperature
2966 of parts below auto-ignition temperatures during single fault conditions,
2967 minimizing the amount of flammable material near a PIS, separating
2968 combustible materials from PIS by barriers, and by using reliable protection
2969 devices to limit temperature of combustible parts.
2970 Single fault testing, while not statistically significant, has been common practice
2971 in both IEC 60065 and IEC 60950-1.
2972 Temperatures limiting ignition are considered to be the material self-ignition
2973 points or flash temperatures for flammable liquids and vapours (this value should
2974 include a 10 % margin to take into account ambient, laboratory and equipment
2975 operating conditions). The spread to surrounding parts during and after the fault
2976 is also checked.
2977 Providing sufficient distance or solid barrier between any combustible material
2978 and a potential ignition source should minimize the potential for the spread of
2979 fire beyond the fuels directly in contact with the potential ignition source. The
2980 fire cone distances developed for IEC 60065 are used and considered adequate.
2981 Single fault testing is not completely representative; therefore, some material
2982 and construction requirements are necessary (fuel control area or keep out
2983 area).
2984 Use of reliable protection devices – This includes reliability requirements for the
2985 devices that are used to prevent ignition. This permits only the use of devices
2986 that have reliability requirements included in Annex G.
– 91 – 108/757/DC
2987 Components that comply with their relevant IEC component standards are also
2988 considered to comply given these standards also have ignition protection
2989 requirements. The components included are those that are almost always part
2990 of a potential ignition source as they are mains connected.
2991 Opening of a conductor: In general, opening of a conductor is not permitted
2992 during single fault conditions as it is not considered reliable protection device
2993 for limiting ignition. However for resistive PIS, it may be suitable provided the
2994 printed wiring board is adequately flame retardant and the opening does not
2995 create an arcing PIS. The V-1 printed circuit board is considered adequate to
2996 quench low voltage events and will not propagate the flame. It is not sufficient
2997 when the opening creates an arcing PIS (< 50 V).
2998 As a consequence of the test, any peeling of conductor during these tests shall
2999 not result in or create other hazards associated with the movement of conductive
3000 traces during or after the test provided they do so predictably. During a single
3001 fault the peeling could bridge a basic safeguard but should not result in the
3002 failure of a supplementary safeguard or reinforced safeguard.
3004 Source: IEC 60065, IEC 60127
3005 Rationale: The available power and the classification criteria for resistive and arcing
3006 potential ignition sources should be used to determine which components to
3007 fault.
3008 If the applied single fault condition causes another device or subsequent fault,
3009 then the consequential failure is proven reliable by repeating the single fault
3010 condition two more times (total of three times). This is a method used
3011 historically in IEC 60065.
3012 Steady state determination for single fault conditions is related to temperature
3013 rise and the requirement is the same as the steady state requirements of Annex
3014 B, even though material ignition temperatures (> 300 °C) are much higher than
3015 required temperatures of other clauses (~25 °C – 100 °C). Shorter time periods
3016 (such as 15 min) were considered but dropped in favour of harmonization of
3017 other parts. The term steady state should take into account temperatures
3018 experienced by a material throughout the test.
3019 Maximum attained temperature for surrounding material of heat source should
3020 be considered if further temperature increase is observed after interruption of
3021 the current.
3022 Limit by fusing: The reliability of protection devices is ensured where they act
3023 to limit temperatures and component failures. The criteria used by the
3024 component document applying to each are considered adequate provided the
3025 parts are used as intended. The requirements included assume an IEC 60127
3026 type fuse as the most common device.
3027 The test methodology is established to ensure that available energy through the
3028 fuse link based on its current hold and interrupt conditions the breaking time
3029 characteristics of specified in IEC 60127. IEC 60127 permits 2,1 times the
3030 breaking current rating for 1 min.
3031 In order to determine the impact of a fuse on the results of a single fault
3032 condition, if a fuse operates, it is replaced with a short circuit and the test
3033 repeated. There are three possible conditions when comparing the actual fault
3034 current through the fuse to the pre-arcing current and time data sheets provided
3035 by the fuse manufacturer.
3036 – Where the measured current is always below the fuse manufacturer's pre-
3037 arcing characteristics (measured current is less than 2,1 times the fuse
3038 rating), the fuse cannot be relied upon as a safeguard and the test is
3039 continued with the fuse short circuited until steady state where the maximum
3040 temperature is measured.
– 92 – 108/757/DC
3041 − Where the measured current quickly exceeds the fuse pre-arcing
3042 characteristics (measured current is well above 2,1 times the rating current of
3043 the fuse) then the test is repeated with the open circuit in place of the fuse
3044 (assumes fuse will open quickly and be an open circuit) and then the
3045 maximum temperature recorded.
3046 − Where the measured current does not initially exceed the fuse pre-arcing
3047 characteristics, but does at some time after introduction of the fault. The test
3048 is repeated with the short circuit in place and the temperature measured at
3049 the time where measured current exceeds the fuse pre-arcing characteristics.
3050 It is assumed the measured current through the short circuit can be graphed
3051 and compared with the fuse manufacturer’s pre-arcing curves provided on the
3052 fuse datasheet to determine the test time.
3053 6.4.4 Control of fire spread in PS1 circuits
3054 Rationale: Low available power reduces the likelihood for ignition – 15 W is recognized as
3055 the lower limit of ignition for electronic circuits. This lower power limit is
3056 considered as a circuit characteristic of the circuit, not a basic safeguard.
– 93 – 108/757/DC
3057 Table 12 – Method 2: Control fire spread
Method 2: Control fire spread
No supplementary safeguards are needed for protection against PS1.

PS1
6.4.4 A PS1 is not considered to contain enough energy to result in materials
(≤ 15 W)
reaching ignition temperatures.
The objective of this subclause is to describe the supplementary

safeguards needed to reduce the likelihood of fire spread from a PIS in
PS2 circuits to nearby combustible materials.
The limiting of power available to PS2 circuits is the basic safeguard
used to minimize the available energy of an ignition source.
A supplementary safeguard is required to control the spread of fire from
any possible PIS to other parts of the equipment
For conductors and devices with a PIS the following apply:

– Printed boards shall be at least V-1 class material
– Wire insulation shall comply with IEC 60332 series or
IEC 60695-11-21
Battery cells and battery packs shall comply with Annex M.
All other components:

– Mounted on V-1 class material, or
– Materials V-2 class material, VTM-2 class material, or HF-2 class
material, or
– Mass of combustible material < 4 g, provided that when the part is
PS2
6.4.5 ignited the fire does not spread to another part, or
(≤ 100 W after 5 s)
– Separated from PIS according to 6.4.7,
Distances have to comply with Figures 37; 38; 39 and 40, or
In case distances do not comply with Figures 37; 38; 39 and 40
– Mass of combustible material < 4 g, or
– Shielded from the PIS by a fire barrier, or
– Flammability requirements: V-1 class material; VTM-1 class material
or HF-1 class material, or comply with the needle flame test of
IEC 60695-11-5 as described in Clause S.2; or
– Comply with IEC component document flammability requirements, or
comply with G.5.3 and G.5.4
– Insulation materials used in transformers, bobbins, V-1 class material
– In a sealed enclosure ≤ 0,06 m3 made of non-combustible
material and having no ventilation openings
The following shall be separated from a PIS according to 6.4.7 or shall not
ignite due to fault conditional testing
– Supplies, consumables, media and recording materials
– Parts which are required to have particular properties in order to
perform intended functions, such as synthetic rubber rollers and ink
tubes
3058
– 94 – 108/757/DC
Method 2: Control fire spread
The objective of this subclause is to describe the supplementary safeguards needed to

reduce the likelihood of fire spread from a PIS in PS3 circuits to nearby combustible
materials.
Fire spread in PS3 circuit shall be controlled by;

– the use of a fire enclosure as specified in 6.4.8. and
– applying all requirements for PS2 circuits as specified in 6.4.5
Devices subject to arcing or changing contact resistance (for example,
pluggable connectors) shall comply with one of the following:
– Materials V-1 class material; or
– Comply with IEC component document flammability
requirements; or
– Mounted on V-1 class material and volume ≤ 1 750 mm 3
6.4.6
Exemptions:
– Wire and tubing insulation complying with IEC 60332 series or
IEC 60695-11-21
– Components, including connectors complying with 6.4.8.2.2 and
that fill an opening in a fire enclosure
– Plugs and connectors forming a part of a power supply cord or
complying with 6.5, G.4.1 and G.7
– Transformers complying with G.5.3
PS3 – Motors complying with G.5.4
(> PS2) 6.4.6
For PS2 or
a PS3
circuit See all requirements for PS2 (6.4.5)
within a
fire en-
closure
Combustible materials:
Needle flame test in Clause S.1 or V-2 class material or VTM-2 class
material or HF-2 class material
Exemptions:
– Parts with a size less than 1 750 mm 3
6.4.6 – Supplies, consumable materials, media and recording materials
For a PS1 – Parts that are required to have particular properties in order to
circuit perform intended functions such as synthetic rubber rollers and ink
within a tubes
fire
enclosure – Gears, cams, belts, bearings and other small parts that would
contribute negligible fuel to a fire, including, labels, mounting feet,
key caps, knobs and the like
– Tubing for air or any fluid systems, containers for powders or liquids
and foamed plastic parts, provided that they are of HB75 class
material if the thinnest significant thickness of the material is < 3
mm, or HB40 class material if the thinnest significant thickness of
the material is ≥ 3 mm, or HBF class foamed material
3059
3060 6.4.5 Control of fire spread in PS2 circuits

3061 Source: IEC 60950-1
3062 Rationale: In principle, limiting the available power to the circuit (100 W) in PS2 circuits and
3063 control of adjacent fuel materials will reduce the spread of fire, assuming that
3064 ignition of components can occur. This power level limit minimizes the size of
3065 the ignition source and its impingement on adjacent fuels that are in the PS2
3066 circuits.
– 95 – 108/757/DC
3067 The purpose of this clause is to establish control of fuels in or near circuits that
3068 have the possibility of ignition. As no fault testing is done for PS2 circuits, it is
3069 assumed that a fire ignition can occur anywhere within the circuits. These
3070 safeguards are to be based on component material flammability characteristics
3071 that keep the initial ignition source from spreading to surrounding internal
3072 materials.
3073 This clause assumes only construction safeguards in a manner consistent with
3074 the historically effective requirements of IEC 60950-1.
3075 Only fuels that would contribute significant fuel to a fire are considered.
3076 Acceptance of limited power sources in Annex Q.1 to be classified as PS2 has
3077 been added to allow continued use of the long existing practice in IEC 60950-1.
3079 Source: IEC 60065, IEC 60950-1
3080 Rationale: Requirements around conductors and devices subject to arcing parts and
3081 resistive heating have the most onerous requirements for sustained ignition and
3082 protection of wiring and wiring boards.
3083 − Mounting on a flame-retardant material to limit fire growth. V-1 mounting
3084 materials are considered important as they limit fuel to reduce sustained
3085 flaming and also would not contribute to large fires or pool fire. The spread of
3086 fire from ignited small parts can be managed by the larger printed wiring
3087 board. This provision is made to allow the use of a longstanding IEC 60950-1
3088 provision for small devices mounted directly on boards. The value 1 750 mm 3
3089 has been used in practice in IEC 60065.
3090 − Use of flame retardant wiring is identical to the internal and external wiring
3091 requirements of Clause 6.
3092 − Accepting existing component requirements for devices that have their own
3093 requirements (IEC or annexes of this document) are considered adequate.
3094 − Sufficient distance or solid flame-resistant barrier between any combustible
3095 material and potential ignition sources. (KEEP OUT ZONES or
3096 RESTRICTED AREA).
3097 All other components (those that are not directly associated with arcing or
3098 resistive heating components) have a reduced set of safeguards when
3099 compared to those parts more likely to ignite. Those safeguards include any of
3100 the following:
3101 − For parts not directly subject to arcing or resistive heating, V-2 ratings are
3102 considered adequate. This is also a historical requirement of IEC 60950-1 for
3103 parts used in limited power circuits. Sustained ignition of V-2 class materials
3104 is similar to that of V-1 class materials in the small-scale testing. The use of
3105 VTM-2 or HF-2 class materials were also considered adequate.
3106 − Limiting the combustible fuel mass within the area around PS2 circuit
3107 devices. The limit of 4 g is brought from the small parts definition used with
3108 PIS requirements of this clause and which were originally used in IEC 60065.
3109 − As an alternative, components and circuits can be separated from fuels per
3110 the requirements of the fire cone described for isolation of fuels from
3111 potential ignition sources.
3112 − Enclosing parts in small oxygen limiting, flame proof, housing. The 0,06 m 2
3113 value has been in practice in IEC 60950-1 and small enough to mitigate fire
3114 growth from a low power source.
– 96 – 108/757/DC
3115 The exceptions included are based on common constructions of material that do
3116 not routinely have flame retardants or that cannot contain flame retardants due
3117 to functional reasons. They are either isolated from any PIS or through single
3118 fault condition testing demonstrate that they will simply not ignite in their
3119 application.
3120 Supplies are quantities of materials such as paper, ink, toner, staples etc., and
3121 that are consumed by the equipment and replaced by the user when necessary.
3123 Rationale: Material flammability requirements are checked by the testing of Annex S, by
3124 compliance with the component document or through review of material data
3125 sheets.
3126 6.4.6 Control of fire spread in a PS3 circuit
3127 Source: IEC 60950-1
3128 Rationale: There are two basic requirements to control the spread of fire from PS3 circuits:
3129 a) use of materials within the fire enclosure that limit fire spread. This includes
3130 the same requirements as for components in PS2 circuits and includes a
3131 requirement from IEC 60950-1 to address all combustible materials that are
3132 found within the fire enclosure;
3133 b) use fire-containing enclosures – Product enclosures will have a design
3134 capable of preventing the spread of fire from PS3 circuits. The criteria for
3135 fire enclosures is based on the available power.
3136 Rationale: PS3 sourced circuits may contain a significant amount of energy. During single
3137 fault conditions, the available power may overwhelm the safeguard of material
3138 control of fuels adjacent to the fault or any consequential ignition source making
3139 a fire enclosure necessary as part of the supplementary safeguard. A fire
3140 enclosure and the material controls constitute the necessary supplementary
3141 safeguard required for a PS3 circuit.
3142 Use adequate materials, typically permitting material pre-selection of non-
3143 combustible or flame-resistant materials for printed wiring and components in
3144 or near PS3. Only fuels that would contribute significant fuel to a fire are
3145 considered. This implies compliance with all the requirements for PS2 circuits
3146 and in addition, application of a fire containing enclosure.
3147 Material flammability requirements for all materials inside a fire enclosure are
3148 included in this clause. This model has been used historically in IEC 60950-1 to
3149 control the amount and type of fuel that may become engaged in a significant
3150 fire. Because there is no single fault testing when applying this method, a
3151 significant ignition source may engage other fuels located inside the fire
3152 enclosure. PS3 circuits, particularly higher power PS3 circuits can create
3153 significant internal fires if adjacent combustible materials, not directly
3154 associated with a circuit, become involved in an internal fire. These fires, if
3155 unmitigated, can overwhelm the fire enclosures permitted in this document.
3156 Control of material flammability of fuels located within the enclosure should be
3157 sufficient based on historical experience with IEC 60950-1.
3158 The exceptions provided in this clause for small parts, consumable material,
3159 etc. that are inside of a fire enclosure, mechanical components that cannot
3160 have flame retardant properties are exempt from the material flammability
3161 requirements. This is the current practice in IEC 60950-1.
3162 Components filling openings in a fire enclosure that are also V-1 are considered
3163 adequate, as it is impractical to further enclose these devices. These
3164 constructions are commonly used today in IT and CE products.
3165 Wiring already has requirements in a separate part of this clause.
3166 Motors and transformers have their own flammability spread requirements and
3167 as such do not need a separate enclosure (see G.5.3 and G.5.4).
– 97 – 108/757/DC
3168 6.4.7 Separation of combustible materials from a PIS

3169 Rationale: Where potential ignition sources are identified through classification and
3170 single fault conditions, separation from the ignition source by distance
3171 (material controls) or separation by barriers are used to limit the spread of fire
3172 from the ignition source and are necessary to ensure the ignition is not
3173 sustained.
3174 6.4.7.2 Separation by distance
3176 Rationale: The safeguard for materials within the fire cone includes material size control
3177 (and including prohibition on co-location of flammable parts). Otherwise the
3178 parts close to the PIS shall be material flammability class V-1, which limits
3179 sustained ignition and spread.
3180 Small parts (less than 4 g) are considered too small to significantly propagate a
3181 fire. This value is also used for components used in PS2 and PS3 circuits. It has
3182 been used in IEC 60065 with good experience.
3183 Where these distances are not maintained, a needle flame test option is included
3184 with 60 s needle flame application based on previous requirements in
3185 IEC 60065. This alternative to these distance requirements (the needle flame
3186 test) can be performed on the barrier to ensure that any additional holes resulting
3187 from the test flame are still compliant (openings that will limit the spread of fire
3188 through the barrier).
3189 Redundant connections: An arcing PIS cannot exist where there are redundant
3190 or reliable connections as these connections are considered not to break or
3191 separate (thereby resulting in an arc).
3192 Redundant connections are any kind of two or more connections in parallel,
3193 where in the event of the failure of one connection, the remaining connections
3194 are still capable of handling the full power. Arcing is not considered to exist
3195 where the connections are redundant or otherwise deemed not likely to change
3196 contact resistance over time or through use. Some examples are given, but proof
3197 of reliable connections is left to the manufacturer and there is no specific criteria
3198 that can be given:
3199 − Tubular rivets or eyelets that are additionally soldered – this assumes that the
3200 riveting maintains adequate contact resistance and the soldering is done to
3201 create a separate conductive path.
3202 − Flexible terminals, such as flexible wiring or crimped device leads that
3203 remove mechanical stress (due to heating or use) from the solder joint
3204 between the lead and the printed wiring trace.
3205 − Machine or tool made crimp or wire wrap connections – well-formed
3206 mechanical crimps or wraps are not considered to loosen.
3207 − Printed boards soldered by auto-soldering machines and the auto-soldering
3208 machines have two solder baths, but they are not considered reliable without
3209 further evaluation. This means most printed boards have been subjected to a
3210 resoldering process. But there was no good connection of the lead of the
3211 component(s) and the trace of the printed board in some cases. In such cases,
3212 resoldering done by a worker by hand may be accepted.
3213 Combustible materials, other than V-1 printed wiring boards are to be
3214 separated from each PIS by a distance based on the size of resulting ignition of
3215 the PIS. The flame cone dimensions 50 mm and 13 mm dimensions were derived
3216 from IEC 60065, where they have been used for several years with good
3217 experience. The area inside the cone is considered the area in which an open
3218 flame can exist and where material controls should be applied.
– 98 – 108/757/DC
3219 Resistive potential ignition sources are never a point object as presented in
3220 Figure 37 of IEC 62368-1. They are more generally three-dimensional
3221 components, however only one dimension and two-dimension drawings are
3222 provided. The three-dimensional drawing is difficult to understand and difficult to
3223 make accurate.
3224 Figure 34 in this document shows how to cope with potential ignition sources
3225 that are 3D volumes. This drawing does not include the bottom part of the fire
3226 cone. The same approach should be used for the bottom side of the part.
Figure 34 – Fire cone application to a large component
3227 The fire cone is placed at each corner. The locus of the outside lines connecting
3228 each fire cone at both the top and the base defines the restricted volume.
3229 Figure 37 Minimum separation requirements from a PIS
3230 This drawing of a flame cone and its dimensions represents the one-dimension
3231 point ignition source drawn in two dimensions. The three-dimension envelope
3232 (inverted ice cream cone) of a flame from a potential ignition source. This PIS
3233 is represented as a point source in the drawing for clarity, however these PISs
3234 are more often three-dimensional components that include conductors and the
3235 device packaging.
3236 Figure 38 Extended separation requirements from a PIS
3237 A two-dimensional representation of an ignition source intended to provide more

3238 clarity.
3239 6.4.7.3 Separation by a fire barrier
3241 Rationale: The use of flame retardant printed wiring is considered necessary as the fuel
3242 and the electrical energy source are always in direct contact. V-1 has historically
3243 been adequate for this purpose.
3244 Printed wiring boards generally directly support arcing PIS and as such, cannot
3245 be used as a barrier. There is a potential that small openings or holes may
3246 develop, thus permitting the arc to cross through the board.
3247 A printed board can act as a barrier for an arcing PIS, provided the PIS is not
3248 directly mounted on the board acting as a barrier.
– 99 – 108/757/DC
3249 For resistive PIS, printed wiring boards can be used provided they are of V-1 or
3250 meet the test of Clause S.1. Any V-1 and less-flammable fuels are required to
3251 minimize the possibility flammable material falling onto the supporting surface
3252 or contact with combustible fuels (resulting in pool fires). If a PIS is located on
3253 a board and supplied by a PS2 or PS3 source, there should be no other PS2 or
3254 PS3 circuits near the PIS, as this could create faults due to PIS heating that was
3255 not otherwise considered.
3256 Figure 39 Deflected separation requirements from a PIS when a fire barrier is used
3257 This figure demonstrates the change on the fire cone when there is a fire barrier
3258 used to separate combustible material from a potential ignition source. This
3259 drawing was retained as an example application for only two angles. Recognizing
3260 that many examples are possible, only two are kept for practical reasons. History
3261 with multiple drawings of barriers in varying angles could be difficult to resolve.
3262 The fire team decided to keep only two drawings with an angle barrier as
3263 representative.
3264 6.4.8 Fire enclosures and fire barriers
3265 Rationale: The safeguard function of the fire enclosure and the fire barrier is to impede
3266 the spread of fire through the enclosure or barrier (see Table 13 in this
3267 document).
– 100 – 108/757/DC
3268 Table 13 – Fire barrier and fire enclosure flammability requirements
Flammability requirements
Fire barrier requirements

Non-combustible material or
6.4.8.2.1
Needle flame test Clause S.1 or ≥ V-1 class material or VTM-1 class
material
Separation of a PIS to a fire barrier

Fire barrier – Distance ≥ 13 mm to an arcing PIS and
– Distance ≥ 5 mm to a resistive PIS
6.4.8.4 Smaller distances are allowed provided that the part of the fire barrier
complies with one of the following:
– Needle flame Clause S.2; After the test no holes bigger than in 6.4.8.3.3
and 6.4.8.3.4 allowed or
– ≥ V-0 class material
Fire enclosure materials:

– Non-combustible, or
– For PS3 ≤ 4 000 W, needle flame test Clause S.1 or V-1 class material
– For PS3 > 4 000 W, needle flame test Clause S.5 or 5VB class material
6.4.8.2.2 Component materials which fill an opening in a fire enclosure or intended to

be mounted in such opening
– Comply with flammability requirements of relevant IEC component
document; or
– ≥ V-1 class material; or
Fire enclosure
– needle flame test Clause S.1
Separation of a PIS to a fire enclosure

– Distance ≥ 13 mm to an arcing PIS and
– Distance ≥ 5 mm to a resistive PIS
6.4.8.4 Smaller distances are allowed, provided that the part of the fire enclosure
complies with one of the following:
– Needle flame Clause S.2; After the test no holes bigger than in 6.4.8.3.3
and 6.4.8.3.4 allowed; or
– ≥ V-0 class material
3269
3270 6.4.8.2.1 Requirements for a fire barrier

3271 Source: IEC 60065, IEC 60950-1
3272 Rationale: Barriers used to separate PIS from flammable fuels reduce the ability of a
3273 resulting PIS flame from impinging on flammable materials. This can be achieved
3274 by using flame retardant materials that pass the performance test in Clause S.1
3275 or the pre-selection criteria of a minimum V-1 flame class.
3276 The test in Clause S.1 is based on the needle flame test which is currently an
3277 option for enclosure testing in both IEC 60950-1 and IEC 60065.
3278 6.4.8.2.2 Requirements for a fire enclosure
3279 Source: IEC 60065, IEC 60950-1
3280 Rationale: The material flammability class V-1 was chosen as the minimum value based
3281 on its historical adequacy, and recent testing done during the development of
3282 the requirements for externally caused fire.
3283 IEC 60950-1 – Prior requirements for 5 V class materials based on product
3284 weight lacked sufficient rationale. This has been improved and related to power
3285 available to a fault in this document.
– 101 – 108/757/DC
3286 IEC 60065 – V-2 class material performance during large scale test reviewed
3287 by the fire team indicated inconsistencies in performance over a range of
3288 different V-2 materials. The propensity for V-2 class materials to create ‘pool’
3289 fires is also detrimental to fire enclosure performance and therefore not
3290 accepted unless it passes the end-product testing.
3291 In addition to pre-selection requirements, an end-product test (material test) is
3292 also included by reference to Clauses S.1 (for < 4 000 W) and S.5 (for >
3293 4 000 W). This test is based on the needle flame test which is currently an option
3294 for enclosure testing in both IEC 60950-1 and IEC 60065.
3295 This power (4 000 W) separation is also used in the control of fire spread method
3296 to delineate safeguard criteria for fire enclosure materials (V-1 versus 5 V).
3297 IEC 60950-1 has historically used weight to define fire enclosure criteria and it
3298 was felt the use of available power was more appropriate and generally reflective
3299 of current practice.
3300 Both 5 VA and 5 VB class materials are considered acceptable for equipment
3301 with power above 4 000 W. This is consistent with current practice in IEC 60950-
3302 1.
3304 Rationale: In each case there is a performance test, and construction (pre-selection) criteria
3305 given. For material flammability, compliance of the material is checked at the
3306 minimum thickness used as a fire enclosure or fire barrier.
3307 6.4.8.3 Constructional requirements for a fire enclosure and a fire barrier
3308 Rationale: Opening requirements for barriers and fire enclosure should limit the spread of
3309 flame through any existing opening. A fire enclosure limits the spread of fire
3310 beyond the equipment and is permitted to have holes (within established limits).
3311 6.4.8.3.1 Fire enclosure and fire barrier openings
3312 Rationale: These requirements are intended to reduce the spread of an internal fuel ignition
3313 through a fire enclosure or barrier.
3314 Openings are restricted based on the location of each potential ignition source
3315 using the flame cones or in the case of control fire spread, above all PS3 circuits.
3316 Figure 40 Determination of top, bottom and side openings
3317 In the left figure, when the vertical surface has an inclination (angle) of less than
3318 5° from vertical, then only the side opening requirements of 6.4.8.3.5 apply.
3319 In the right figure, when the vertical surface has an inclination (angle) of more
3320 than 5° from the vertical, then the openings are subject to the requirements for
3321 top openings of 6.4.8.3.3 or bottom openings of 6.4.8.3.4.
3322 6.4.8.3.2 Fire barrier dimensions
3323 Rationale: Edges can be more easily ignited than a solid surface. Barrier dimensions shall
3324 also be sufficient to prevent ignition of the barrier edges.
3325 Barriers made of combustible materials shall have edges that extend beyond
3326 the limits of the fire cone associated with each potential ignition source. If the
3327 barrier edge does not extend beyond the cone, then it is assumed the edges
3328 may ignite.
3329 6.4.8.3.3 Top openings and top opening properties
3331 Rationale: Top opening drawings are restricted in the areas of likely flame propagation to
3332 the side and above an ignition source.
– 102 – 108/757/DC
3333 Top openings are also considered to cover what has historically been called side
3334 opening where the opening is above the horizontal plane containing the ignition
3335 source.
3336 The top/side openings that are subject to controls are only those within the fire
3337 cone drawing (Figure 37) plus a tolerance of 2 mm, as shown in Figure 41. The
3338 application of the fire cone dimensions has been used in IEC 60065 and proven
3339 historically adequate.
3340 Control of openings above the flame cone is also not necessary given that the
3341 heat transfer (convection) will follow the gases moving through those openings
3342 and is not sufficient to ignite adjacent materials. If the openings are directly
3343 blocked, the convection path will be blocked which would restrict any heat
3344 transfer to an object blocking the opening.
3345 Openings to the side of the fire cone dimensions were reviewed and ultimately
3346 not considered necessary as the radiant heat propagation through openings to
3347 the side of the ignition is very small. This radiant heat is not considered sufficient
3348 to ignite adjacent materials given the anticipated flame size and duration in AV
3349 and ICT products.
3350 In this aspect, the virtual flame cone deflection as per Figure 39 need not be
3351 considered since the actual needle flame application will cover that.
3352 The test method option proposed provides a test option for direct application of
3353 a needle flame. The test (S.2) referred to in this clause is intended to provide a
3354 test option where holes do not comply with the prescriptive measures. S.2 is
3355 originally intended to test the material flammability, but in this subclause the
3356 purpose of the test is to see the potential ignition of outer material covering the
3357 openings, so application of the needle flame is considered for that aspect rather
3358 than the burning property of the enclosure itself.
3359 Cheesecloth is used as a target material for the evaluation of flame spread due
3360 to its flexible nature (ease of use) and its quick propensity to ignite.
3361 The flame cone envelope is provided as a single point source. The applicable
3362 shape and any affecting airflow are taken into account for determining the whole
3363 shape of the PIS, not just a single point. The point is applied from the top edge
3364 of the component being considered and, in practice, it is rarely a single point.
3365 The opening dimensions for the 5 mm and 1 mm dimensions have been
3366 determined through test as being restrictive enough to cool combustible gases
3367 as they pass through the openings and those mitigate any flame from passing
3368 through the opening. Top openings properties are based on tests conducted by
3369 the fire team with open flames (alcohol in a Petri dish) that demonstrated these
3370 opening dimensions are adequate.
3371 6.4.8.3.4 Bottom openings and bottom opening properties
3372 Source: IEC 60065, IEC 60950-1
3373 Rationale: The location of openings is restricted for barriers inside the flame cone of
3374 Figure 37 and for enclosures, inside the cone and directly below to protect
3375 against flammable drips from burning thermoplastic as shown in Figure 42. The
3376 application of the fire cone dimensions has been used in IEC 60065 and proven
3377 historically adequate.
3378 There are several options for opening compliance (see Table 14 in this
3379 document). Flaming oils and varnishes are not common in ICT equipment today.
3380 The performance test based on the hot flaming oil test, in use for IEC 60950-1,
3381 have other opening options and are developed based on lower viscosity
3382 materials (when burning). They are more commonly found in ICT (that provide
3383 additional options).
3384 Clause S.3 (hot flaming oil test) is the base performance option and provides a
3385 test option (hot flaming oil test) that historically has been adequate for tests of
3386 bottom openings.
– 103 – 108/757/DC
3387 The values in items band c) come directly from IEC 60950-1 where they have
3388 been historically adequate and have demonstrated compliance with the S.3
3389 performance testing. These requirements, previously from IEC 60950-1, 4.6.2
3390 Bottoms of fire enclosures, have been updated in the third edition of
3391 IEC 62368-1. The IEC 60950-1 requirements are more stringent than the new
3392 IEC 62368-1 requirements and may still be used as an option without additional
3393 tests, which is likely since designs based on the IEC 60950-1 requirements have
3394 been in use for some time.
3395 The work done to validate top openings was also considered adequate for bottom
3396 openings under materials of any properties (3 mm and 1 mm slots). This
3397 requirement is less onerous than those found in IEC 60950-1 which permitted
3398 NO openings unless they complied with the other options.
3399 Openings under V-1 class materials (or those that comply with Clause S.1) are
3400 controlled in the same manner as done in IEC 60950-1 which was considered
3401 adequate however an additional option to use 2 mm slots of unlimited length is
3402 also considered adequate.
3403 The 6 mm maximum dimension relates to a maximum square opening dimension
3404 of 36 mm 2 and a round opening of 29 mm 2 . In IEC 60950-1 the requirement was
3405 40 mm 2 , which relates to a maximum 7 mm diameter if round or 6,3 mm
3406 maximum if not round.
3407 The only option where flammable liquids are used is to meet the requirements of
3408 the hot flaming oil test (Clause S.3).
3409 An option for equipment that is installed in special environments where a non-
3410 combustible flooring is used (environmental safeguard) may obviate the need
3411 for an equipment bottom safeguard. This is current practice in IEC 60950-1
3412 where equipment is used in “restricted access locations”.
3413 Baffle plate constructions were added, as they have been used in IEC 60950-1
3414 and have proven to be an acceptable solution.
3415 The intent of IEC 62368-1 is to apply hazard-based safety engineering principles.
3416 When the calculated enclosure side opening size (when the 5-degree trajectory
3417 is applied) meets the maximum opening size permitted in both subclause
3418 6.4.8.3.4 and Annex P.2, it technically meets the requirements. Additionally, the
3419 flaming oil and entry of foreign object experimental testing done by the TC108
3420 HBSDT fire enclosure team demonstrated such safeguards provide suitable
3421 protection. Refer to Appendix A below for more details on testing.
3422 For side openings, refer to Figures 44 and 45 for illustration examples of using
3423 enclosure wall thickness in relationship to the vertical height of an opening to
3424 help determine if opening sizes meet requirements of 1) subclause 6.4.8.3.4
3425 (bottom fire enclosure openings); and 2) Annex P.2 (side opening requirement
3426 limitations to prevent vertical falling objects).
– 104 – 108/757/DC
3427 Table 14 – Summary – Fire enclosure and fire barrier material requirements
Fire enclosure
Parameters Fire barrier
Input < 4 000 W Input > 4 000 W
13 mm or more from arcing PIS
Combustible material: Separation from
5 mm or more from resistive PIS
PIS
Note: exceptions may apply
Sufficient to prevent
Dimensions Not applicable
ignition of the edges
a) Test S.1; or a) Test S.1; or a) Test S.5; or

Flammability b) V-1; or b) V-1 b) 5 VA; or
c) VTM-1 c) 5 VB
Combustible
material:
Non-
Acceptable
Top openings See 6.4.8.3.3
Bottom openings See 6.4.8.3.4
3428
3429 6.4.8.3.5 Side opening and side opening properties

3430 Source: IEC 60950-1
3431 Rationale: For Edition 3, IEC TC 108/WG HBSDT agreed to adopt from IEC 60950-1:2005
3432 (4.6.1, 4.6.2 and Figure 4E) the principles and criteria for determination of
3433 suitable side openings using a five (5) degree projection. The primary rationale
3434 for adopting these principles was the demonstration of many years of a solid
3435 safety record of use for ITE with IEC 60950-1. However, one issue that had to
3436 be resolved was that in IEC 60950-1 the 5-degree projection of Figure 4E was
3437 always made from the outer surface of a combustible internal component or
3438 assembly rather than a defined potential ignition source (PIS), typically a
3439 metallic circuit inside the component. The PIS principle was not inherent to
3440 IEC 60950-1.
3441 For example, in a component or assembly, electrical or not, made of combustible
3442 material that might ignite within a fire enclosure, the 5-degree projection was
3443 made from the surface of the component or assembly closest to the side
3444 enclosure and not from a metallic circuit inside the component or subassembly
3445 that could be a potential source of ignition. Therefore, for example, if a printed
3446 board was considered the component/subassembly likely to ignite, the 5-degree
3447 projection was made from the edge of the printed board and not the current
3448 carrying trace, which in IEC 62368-1 is the PIS. In some cases throughout the
3449 history of IEC 60950-1, this distance from the metallic trace to component edge
3450 could have been up to several centimetres.
3451 However, when IEC TC 108/WG HBSDT considered the common construction
3452 of internal components and subassemblies likely to be associated with a PIS,
3453 including printed boards, it was determined that it was reasonable to assume
3454 that in modern AV/ICT equipment the distance between the PIS and the outer
3455 edge of a component or sub-assembly was likely to have negligible impact on
3456 the overall fire safety of the product, in particular in the application of the 5
3457 degree principle. Due to general miniaturization of products, material cost
3458 optimization, and modern design techniques (including CAD/CAM), printed
3459 boards and other electronic components and assemblies associated with a PIS
3460 typically do not use unnecessary amounts of combustible materials – modern
3461 printed boards more typically now have metallic traces very close to the board
3462 edge rather than many millimetres away.
– 105 – 108/757/DC
3463 As a result IEC TC 108/WG HBSDT considered that the IEC 60950-1 five (5)
3464 degree projection principle for side openings remained sound even if projected
3465 from the actual PIS rather than the edge of combustible material associated with
3466 the PIS. This view also is consistent with the Note to Figure 38, Extended
3467 separation requirements from a PIS, which states, for a resistive PIS
3468 “…measurements are made from the nearest power dissipating element of the
3469 component involved. If in practice it is not readily possible to define the power
3470 dissipating part, then the outer surface of the component is used.”
3471 6.4.8.3.6 Integrity of a fire enclosure
3472 Source: IEC 60950-1
3473 Rationale: The clause ensures that a fire enclosure where required, is assured to remain
3474 in place and with the product through either an equipment or behavioural
3475 safeguard. This requirement is a service condition safeguard for ordinary
3476 persons to ensure that a fire enclosure (if required) is replaced prior to placing
3477 the equipment back into use. This safeguard is also required in IEC 60950-1.
3479 Rationale: In each case, there is a performance test, and construction (pre-selection)
3480 criteria given.
3481 6.4.8.4 Separation of a PIS from a fire enclosure and a fire barrier
3482 Source: IEC 60065, IEC 60950-1
3483 Rationale: Non-metallic fire enclosures and fire barriers may not be sufficient to limit the
3484 spread of fire where an enclosure is close or in direct contact with a potential
3485 ignition source.
3486 The 13 mm and 5 mm distances were used in IEC 60065 to prevent an ignition
3487 source from transferring sufficient energy to adjacent flame-retardant V-1
3488 barriers. These distances are intended to reduce the likelihood of melting or
3489 burn-through of the barrier of fire enclosure.
3490 Where these distances are not maintained, a needle flame test option is included
3491 with 60 s needle flame application based on work in IEC 60065.
3492 Openings following the needle flame test were discussed with criteria being:
3493 a) no additional opening,
3494 b) no enlargement of existing holes,
3495 c) compliance with the fire enclosure opening requirements.
3496 Due to test repeatability, the criteria of a) are considered most readily
3497 reproduced.
3498 The option to use V-0 or 5 V class materials without distance or thickness
3499 requirements is based on historical practices in IEC 60065 and IEC 60950-1
3500 where no distance requirements were applied.
3501 The material thickness requirements where ignition sources are in close
3502 proximity to a barrier were not included based on discussions in IEC TC 108 and
3503 current practice for IEC 60950-1 enclosures. There is fire test data (barrier
3504 testing from IEC 60065) indicating that 2 mm thick (or greater) V-0 barriers and
3505 5 VA barriers have sufficient flame resistance to minimize a risk of creating
3506 openings when used in direct contact with PIS’s. Good HWI or HAI tests are not
3507 available internationally to address the distance from ignition sources to fire
3508 enclosure and barriers. The fire team has chosen to use the needle flame test
3509 as a surrogate test (similar to that done for barriers).
3510 6.5.1 General requirements
3511 Source: IEC 60332-1-2, IEC 60332-2-2
– 106 – 108/757/DC
3512 Rationale: Wiring flammability proposals have now been included for all wiring (external
3513 and internal).
3514 Compliance with IEC 60332-1-2 for large wires and IEC 60332-2-2 for small
3515 wires has historically proven adequate for mains wiring. These documents
3516 include their own material flammability requirements.
3517 The requirements of IEC TS 60695-11-21 are also considered adequate given
3518 that the flame spread requirements for vertical testing are more onerous than
3519 the IEC 60332 series of documents.
3520 The compliance criteria are based on application of the above test methods.
3521 These are consistent with international wiring standards. National standards
3522 may have more onerous requirements.
3523 6.5.2 Requirements for interconnection to building wiring
3524 Source: IEC 60950-1:2005
3525 Rationale: Externally interconnected circuits that are intended for connection to
3526 unprotected building wiring equipment can receive sufficient power from the
3527 product to cause ignition and spread of fire with the building wall, ceiling, or
3528 remotely interconnected equipment. These requirements limit the power
3529 available to connectors/circuits intended for interconnection to specific types of
3530 wiring where the product is responsible for protection of that wiring.
3531 Where a circuit is intended for connection to equipment that is directly adjacent
3532 to the equipment, 6.6 prescribes the appropriate safeguards and limits
3533 associated for PS2 and PS3 sources.
3534 Telecommunication wiring is designed based on the expected power from the
3535 network. The requirements of IEC 60950-1 were considered adequate and were
3536 included. Wiring in this application should be equivalent to 0,4 mm diameter
3537 wiring (26 AWG) and have a default 1,3 A current limit established. This value
3538 has been used in IEC 60950-1 for the smaller telecommunication wiring.
3539 For some building wiring, the PS2 and PS3 safeguards are not considered
3540 adequate in some countries for connection to building wiring where that wiring
3541 is run outside of the conduit or other fire protective enclosures. The
3542 requirements for this clause come directly from requirements in IEC 60950-1,
3543 2.5 for circuits identified as limited power circuits. These requirements have
3544 proven to be historically adequate for connection of IT equipment to building
3545 wiring in these jurisdictions.
3546 The values used and protection requirements included in IEC 60950-1 and
3547 included in Annex Q.1 came from the building and fire codes requiring this
3548 protection.
3549 These requirements do not apply to connectors/circuits intended for
3550 interconnection of peripheral equipment used adjacent to the equipment.
3551 This requirement is also important for the use of ICT equipment in environments
3552 subject to electrical codes such as National Fire Protection Association NFPA
3553 70, which permit the routing of low power wiring outside of a fire containment
3554 device.
3555 Annex Q.1 was based on requirements from IEC 60950-1 that are designed to
3556 comply with the external circuit power source requirements necessary for
3557 compliance with the electrical codes noted above.
3558 6.6 Safeguards against fire due to the connection of additional equipment
3559 Source: IEC 60950-1
3560 Rationale: This subclause addresses potential fire hazards due to the connection of
3561 accessories or other additional equipment to unknown power source
3562 classifications. Most common low-voltage peripherals are not evaluated for
3563 connection to PS3 and therefore power sources should be identified. This is a
3564 current requirement of IEC 60950-1.
– 107 – 108/757/DC
3565 Where the interconnected devices are known (device requirements are
3566 matched to the appropriate power source), this requirement for safeguard is not
3567 necessary.
3568 ___________
3569 7 Injury caused by hazardous substances
3570 Rationale: The majority of chemical injuries arise from inhalation or ingestion of chemical
3571 agents in the form of vapours, gases, dusts, fumes and mists, or by skin contact
3572 with these agents (see Table 15 in this document). The degree of risk of
3573 handling a given substance depends on the magnitude and duration of exposure.
3574 These injuries may be either acute or chronic.
3575 Many resins and polymers are relatively inert and non-toxic under normal
3576 conditions of use, but when heated or machined, they may decompose to
3577 produce toxic by-products.
3578 Toxicity is the capacity of a material to produce injury or harm when the chemical
3579 has reached a sufficient concentration at a certain site in the body.
3580 Potentially hazardous chemicals in the equipment are either:
3581 − as received in consumable material or items, such as printer cartridges,
3582 toners, paper, cleaning fluids, batteries;
3583 − produced under normal operating conditions as a by-product of the normal
3584 function of the device (for example, dust from paper handling systems, ozone
3585 from printing and photocopying operations, and condensate from air
3586 conditioning/de-humidifier systems); or
3587 − produced under abnormal operating conditions or as a result of a fault.
3588 It is essential to:
3589 − determine what substances are present in relative amounts in the equipment
3590 or could be generated under normal operating conditions; and
3591 − minimize the likelihood of injury to a person due to interaction with these
3592 substances.
3593 NOTE In addition to their potential toxicity, loss of containment of chemical materials may cause
3594 or contribute to failure of safeguards against fire, electric shock, or personal injury due to spillages.
3595 The number of different chemical materials that may be used in the wide variety
3596 of equipment covered by this document makes it impossible to identify specific
3597 hazards within the body of this document. Information needs to be sought by
3598 equipment manufacturers from the material suppliers on the hazards associated
3599 with their products and their compliance with any national and/or governmental
3600 regulations on the use and disposal of such materials.
3601 Energy source:
3602 The energy source for most chemically-caused injuries is ultimately the ability of
3603 a material to chemically react with human tissue, either directly or indirectly. The
3604 exception would be inert materials that can damage tissues by preventing them
3605 from functioning by limiting certain chemical reactions necessary for life. An
3606 example of this would be types of dust, which do not react with lung tissue, but
3607 prevent air from reaching the bloodstream. The reactions may be very energetic
3608 and damaging, such as acids on the skin, or can be very slow, such as the
3609 gradual build-up of substances in human tissues.
3610 Transfer mechanism:
3611 Transfer can only occur when chemical energy makes contact with human tissue.
3612 The routes for contact with human tissue are through the skin [or any outer
3613 membrane such as the eyes or nasal lining] (absorption), through the digestive
3614 tract (digestion), or through the lungs (inhalation). The route taken will depend
3615 largely on the physical form of the chemical: solid, liquid, or gas.
– 108 – 108/757/DC
3616 Injury:
3617 An injury can be either acute or chronic. Acute injuries are injuries with
3618 immediate and serious consequences (for example, a strong acid in the lungs)
3619 or the injury can be mild and result in irritation or headache. Chronic injuries are
3620 injuries with long term consequences and can be as serious as acute injuries
3621 (for example, consequences of long-term exposure to cleaning solvents).
3622 In most cases, the difference is the quantity and lethality of the toxic substance.
3623 A large amount of acetone can lead to death; a small amount may simply result
3624 in a headache. Many chemical compounds essential to life in small quantities
3625 (for example, zinc, potassium and nickel) can be lethal in larger amounts. The
3626 human body has different degrees of tolerance for different hazardous chemical
3627 substances. Exposure limits may be controlled by government bodies for many
3628 chemical substances. Where the use of hazardous chemical substances in
3629 equipment cannot be avoided, safeguards shall be provided to reduce the
3630 likelihood of exceeding the exposure limits.
3631 The different types of chemical hazards are identified in Table 15 and Figure 35
3632 in this document demonstrating the hierarchy of hazard management.
3633 Table 15 – Control of chemical hazards
Transfer mechanism Prevention / safeguards

Hierarchy of hazard management:
1. Eliminate the chemical hazard by avoiding the use of
the chemical.
2. Reduce the chemical hazard by substitution of a less
Ingestion, inhalation, hazardous chemical.
skin contact, or other
exposure to potentially 3. Minimize the exposure potential of the chemical by
hazardous chemicals containment, ventilation and/or reduced quantities of
the chemicals.
4. Use of personal protective equipment (PPE).
5. Provide use information and instructional
safeguards.
Exposure to excessive 1. Where possible, minimize the use of functions that
concentrations of ozone produce ozone.
during equipment
operation 2. Provide adequate room ventilation.
3. Provide filtration to remove ozone.
1. Eliminate the explosive charge.
Explosion caused by 2. Reduce the amount of explosive charge to the least
chemical reaction during amount possible.
use
3. Minimize hazard by the means of vents.
4. Provide use information and instructional
safeguards.
3634
3635
– 109 – 108/757/DC
3636
3637 Figure 35 – Flowchart demonstrating the hierarchy of hazard management
3638
– 110 – 108/757/DC
3639 Chemical hazards may also degrade or destroy the safeguards provided for
3640 other hazards such as fire and electric shock (for example, ozone attack on
3641 electrical insulation or corrosion of metallic parts). Chemical spillages or loss of
3642 containment can also lead to other hazards such as electric shock or fire
3643 depending on the location of any spillage and proximity to electric circuits. The
3644 same methods used for chemical health exposure control should also protect
3645 against such liquid spillages.
3646 Using a hazard-based engineering approach, Figure 36 in this document shows
3647 the main types of chemical health hazards and their transfer mechanisms.
3648
3649 Figure 36 – Model for chemical injury
3650 _____________
3651 8 Mechanically-caused injury
3652 8.1 General
3653 Rationale: Mechanically caused injury such as cuts, bruises, broken bones, etc., may be
3654 due to relative motion between the body and accessible parts of the equipment,
3655 or due to parts ejected from the equipment colliding with a body part.
3656 8.2 Mechanical energy source classifications
3657 Purpose: To differentiate between mechanical energy source levels for normal operating
3658 conditions, abnormal operating conditions and single fault conditions
3659 applicable to each type of person.
3660 8.2.1 General classification
3661 Table 35 Classification for various categories of mechanical energy sources
3662 Line 3 – Moving fan blades

3663 Rationale: The acceptance criteria is based upon any number of factors such as location,
3664 but the key factor for judging acceptance is based upon the K factor, the
3665 relationship between mass (m) in kg, radius (r) in mm and speed (N) in rpm. This
3666 relationship can be used to find the K factor for the fan. Fans with a low K factor
3667 and low speeds are considered safer. See Figure 47 and Figure 48 for MS1
3668 values. An MS2 fan requires an instructional safeguard in addition to the
3669 limitation on the K factor value and the speed of the fan. The need for the
3670 relevant safeguard is based on the classification of fans. The K factor formula
3671 is taken from the UL standard for fans, UL 507 (which is based on a University
3672 of Waterloo study of fan motors).
3673 Single fault condition on a fan includes, but is not limited to, inappropriate input
3674 voltage due to the fault of a voltage regulator located upstream.
3675 As plastic fan blades are regarded less hazardous than metal fan blades,
3676 different values are used to determine separation between energy class 2 and
3677 class 3.
– 111 – 108/757/DC
3678 Typical parameters for fans used in products covered by this document are as
3679 follows:
3680 − fan mass (m) = about 25 g or 0,025 kg;
3681 − fan diameter (r) = 33 mm;
3682 − fan speed (N) = 6 000 rpm (maximum speed when the system is hottest,
3683 slower if the system is cool).
3684 Line 4 – Loosening, exploding or imploding parts
3685 Rationale: IEC TC 108 has tried to come up with specific requirements for solid rotating
3686 media. However, the result became too complex to be useful at this time.
3687 Line 5 – Equipment mass
3688 Rationale: The values chosen align with some commonly used values today. However, it is
3689 noticed that these are not completely reflecting reality and not a very good
3690 hazard-based approach. IEC TC 108 plans to work on these values in the future.
3691 Line 6 – Wall/ceiling or other structure mount
3692 Rationale: The values chosen align with some commonly used values today. However, it is
3693 noticed that these are not completely reflecting reality and not a very good
3694 hazard-based approach. IEC TC 108 plans to work on these values in the future.
3695 Notes b and c
3696 Rationale: The current values are based on experience and basic safety publications.
3697 8.2.2 MS1
3698 Rationale: Safe to touch. No safeguard necessary.
3699 8.2.3 MS2
3700 Rationale: Contact with this energy source may be painful, but no injury necessitating
3701 professional medical assistance occurs, for example, a small cut, abrasion or
3702 bruise that does not normally require professional medical attention. A
3703 safeguard is required to protect an ordinary person.
3704 8.2.4 MS3
3705 Rationale: An injury may occur that is harmful, requiring professional medical assistance.
3706 For example, a cut requiring stitches, a broken bone or permanent eye damage.
3707 A double or reinforced safeguard is required to protect an ordinary person
3708 and an instructed person.
3709 8.3 Safeguards against mechanical energy sources
3710 Purpose: To determine the number of safeguards needed between the type of person and
3711 the relevant energy source classification.
3712 Rationale: An instructional safeguard describing hazard avoidance may be employed to
3713 circumvent the equipment safeguard permitting access to MS2 part locations
3714 to perform an ordinary person service function. The instructional safeguard
3715 indicates that the equipment safeguard be restored after the service activity
3716 and before power is reconnected. When an instructional safeguard is allowed,
3717 a warning is also required to identify insidious hazards.
3718 For an instructed person and a skilled person, an instructional safeguard,
3719 in the form of a warning marking, is necessary to supplement the instruction they
3720 have received to remind them of the location of hazards that are not obvious.
3721 However, for a skilled person, an equipment safeguard is required in the
3722 service area of large equipment with more than one level 3 energy sources,
3723 where the skilled person can insert their entire head, arm, leg or complete body.
3724 This safeguard is intended to protect the skilled person against unintentional
3725 contact with any other level 3 energy source due to an involuntary startle reaction
3726 to an event in the equipment while servicing intended parts.
– 112 – 108/757/DC
3727 The involuntary reaction may occur for a number of reasons, such as an
3728 unexpected loud noise, an arc flash or receipt of a shock, causing the person to
3729 recoil away from the energy source or part being serviced. Where more than one
3730 of the level 3 energy sources may require servicing at some time, removable
3731 equipment safeguards shall be designed such that any level 3 sources not
3732 being serviced can remain guarded. The equipment safeguards for this purpose
3733 only need to protect against larger body contact, since the potential involuntary
3734 recoil reaction will likely be full limb or body and not small body parts.
3735 8.4 Safeguards against parts with sharp edges and corners
3736 Rationale: Engineering judgment shall be used to class a mechanical energy source as
3737 MS1, MS2 or MS3 and an appropriate safeguard shall be provided. Where a
3738 MS2 or MS3 cannot be fully guarded without interfering with the intended
3739 function of the equipment, it shall be guarded as much as practical. Such an
3740 energy source shall not be accessible to children and be obvious to an adult.
3741 Instructional safeguards shall be provided to warn the person about potential
3742 contact with the energy source and what steps to take to avoid unintentional
3743 contact.
3744 We rely on engineering judgment as there are too many variables involved to
3745 define the type of edge or corner combined with the applied force and direction
3746 of contact or to provide specific values.
3747 8.5 Safeguards against moving parts
3748 Rationale: Enclosures and barriers protect against access to hazardous moving parts. See
3749 8.5.1 for the exception of requirements related to parts not fully guarded because
3750 of their function in the equipment.
3751 8.5.1 Requirements
3752 Rationale: The MS2 or MS3 energy sources need to be guarded against accidental access
3753 by a person's extremities, jewellery that may be worn, hair and clothing, etc.
3754 Access is determined by applying the appropriate tool from Annex V, and no
3755 further testing is necessary. We note that while it may be technically possible
3756 for some jewellery and hair to enter an opening smaller than the test finger, in
3757 such cases, the jewellery strands would have to be very thin and flexible enough
3758 to enter (as would a few strands of hair). As such while some pain may result if
3759 they happen to be caught in the mechanical device, it is deemed unlikely an
3760 injury would occur as described by this document. The residual risk can be
3761 considered a MS2 energy source at most.
3762 8.5.4.3 Equipment having an electromechanical device for destruction of media
3763 Source: UL/CSA 60950-1 second edition [national difference]
3764 Rationale: Recent large scale introduction of media shredders into the home environment
3765 resulted in an increase of children being injured when inserting their fingers
3766 through the shredder openings. These incidents were studied and a new probe
3767 was developed to assess potential access by children. The new probe/wedge
3768 has been designed for both application with force when inserted into the
3769 shredder openings and assessment of access to MS3 moving parts by a
3770 population consisting of both adults and children. This design differs from the
3771 existing UL and IEC accessibility probes since the UL Articulated Accessibility
3772 Probe is not intended to be used with a force applied to it, and the current IEC
3773 probes, while having an unjointed version for application under force, do not
3774 adequately represent the population for both adults and children.
3775 Because cross-cut shredders typically apply more force to the media than
3776 straight-cut shredders, the requirements include differentiated application forces
3777 for the two designs. The force values consider typical forces associated with
3778 straight-cut and cross-cut designs, taking into account data generated by the
3779 USA Consumer Product Safety Commission on typical pull forces associated
3780 with both strip type and crosscut type shredders.
– 113 – 108/757/DC
3781 The dimensions of the new probe/wedge are based on the data generated during
3782 the development of the UL Articulated Accessibility Probe. However, the
3783 dimensions of the UL Articulated Accessibility Probe were defined in
3784 consideration of causal handling of products. Because of this, the 95th percentile
3785 points from the data were used to define the UL Articulated Accessibility Probe.
3786 The thickness and length dimensions of the new proposed probe/wedge have
3787 been developed in consideration of all data points. Articulation points are
3788 identical to those for the UL Articulated Accessibility Probe.
3789 8.6 Stability of equipment
3791 Purpose: To align existing practice with the MS1, MS2 and MS3 energy.
3792 Rationale: Equipment weighing more than 25 kg is considered MS3. Regardless of weight,
3793 equipment mounted to the wall or ceiling is considered MS3 when it is to be
3794 mounted above 2 m height.
3795 Equipment weighing between 7 kg and not exceeding 25 kg is considered MS2.
3796 Equipment with a weight of 1 kg or more and that is mounted to the wall or ceiling
3797 to a maximum height of 2 m is also considered MS2.
3798 Equipment with weight not exceeding 7 kg is considered MS1 if floor standing,
3799 but can be either MS2 or MS3 if mounted to the wall or ceiling. Also see carts
3800 and stands, and wall or ceiling mounted equipment.
3801 Children are naturally attracted to moving images and may attempt to touch or
3802 hold the image by pulling or climbing up on to the equipment. The tests assess
3803 both the static stability and mounting grip when placed on a slippery surface
3804 such as glass. Children might also misuse controls that are readily available to
3805 them.
3806 8.6.2.2 Static stability test
3807 Rationale: Equipment is assessed for stability during expected use by applying force
3808 horizontally and downward on surfaces that could be used as a step or have
3809 other objects placed upon it.
3810 The value of 1,5 m was chosen as the maximum height where an average person
3811 could lean on or against the product.
3812 The 1,5 m is also used for table top equipment, since we do not know whether
3813 the product is going to be placed on a table or, if so, what the height of the table
3814 will be.
3815 8.6.2.3 Downwards force test
3816 Rationale: The height of 1 m represents the maximum height one could expect that people
3817 could try to use as a step to reach something.
3818 8.6.3 Relocation stability
3820 Rationale: The 10° tilt test simulates potential horizontal forces applied to the equipment
3821 either accidentally or when attempting to move the equipment. In addition it
3822 simulates moving the equipment up a ramp during transport.
3823 The test on the horizontal support may be necessary (for example, for equipment
3824 provided with small feet, casters or the like).
3825 8.6.4 Glass slide test
3826 Source: IEC 60065:2011
3827 Purpose: To address the hazard of equipment with moving images sliding off a smooth
3828 surface when a child attempts to climb onto the equipment.
– 114 – 108/757/DC
3829 Rationale: To ensure the display does not slide too easily along a smooth surface that could
3830 result in the display falling from an elevated height on to a child.
3831 8.6.5 Horizontal force test and compliance criteria
3832 Purpose: To simulate the force of a child climbing up on to equipment with front mounted
3833 user controls or with moving images.
3834 Rationale: Field data and studies in the US have shown that children 2-5 years of age were
3835 attracted to the images on the display that may result in the child climbing onto
3836 the display to touch/get close to the image. The equipment could then tip over
3837 and crush the child. Also, products with accessible controls or that are shorter
3838 than 1 m in height are considered likely to be handled by children.
3839 − Data was gathered in the 1986 to 1998 for CRT TV sets ranging from 48,26 cm
3840 to 68,58 cm (19 to 27 inches). The average horizontal force was 13 % of the
3841 equipment weight.
3842 − The 15° tilt test (an additional 5° over static stability test) provides an
3843 additional safety factor.
3844 8.7 Equipment mounted to a wall, ceiling or other structure
3845 Source: IEC 60065 and 60950 series
3846 Purpose: The objective of this subclause is to minimize the likelihood of injury caused by
3847 equipment falling due to failure of the mounting means.
3848 Rationale: Equipment intended to be mounted to a wall or ceiling should be tested to ensure
3849 adequacy for all possible mounting options and all possible failure modes. For
3850 typical equipment, such as flat panel televisions, mounting bosses are usually
3851 integrated into the equipment and used with an appropriate wall or ceiling
3852 mounting bracket to attach to a wall or ceiling. Typical mounting bosses are
3853 comprised of threaded inserts into the rear panel of the equipment.
3854 The appropriate load is divided by the number of mounting means (for example,
3855 mounting bosses) to determine the force applied to each individual mounting
3856 means.
3857 The horizontal force values of 50 N and 60 s have been successfully used for
3858 products in the scope of these documents for many years.
3859 8.7.2 Test methods
3860 Figure 37 in this document gives a graphical view of the different tests required by
3861 Test 2 and show the directions that the forces are applied.
3862
3863 Figure 37 – Direction of forces to be applied

– 115 – 108/757/DC
3864 Table 37 Torque to be applied to screws

3866 Rationale: These torque values have been successfully used for products in the scope of
3868 8.8 Handle strength
3869 Source: IEC 60065 and IEC 60950-1
3870 Rationale: A handle is a part of the equipment that is specifically designed to carry the
3871 equipment or subassembly around. A grip which is made for easy removal or
3872 placement of a subassembly in an equipment is not considered to be a handle.
3873 The 75 mm width simulates the hand width. The safety factors take into account
3874 the acceleration forces and additional stresses that could be applied due to extra
3875 weight on top of the equipment when being lifted. The safety factor is less at the
3876 higher weight (MS3) because the equipment would be lifted more slowly,
3877 reducing the acceleration force, and there is less probability that extra weight
3878 would be added before lifting, as this would exceed the normal weight to be lifted
3879 by one person without assistance of a tool. Equipment classed as MS1 with
3880 more than one handle could be used to support additional objects when being
3881 carried and should be tested.
3882 8.8.2 Test method
3883 Rationale: There is no test for MS1 with only one handle. Having 2 handles facilitates
3884 transporting the equipment while carrying additional objects adding stress to the
3885 handles.
3886 8.9 Wheels or casters attachment requirements
3887 Purpose: To verify that wheels or casters are securely fixed to the equipment.
3888 Source: UL 1667
3889 Purpose: For wheel size, reduce the likelihood of the equipment on the cart or stand
3890 tipping while being moved from room to room where the wheels may encounter
3891 a variety of obstacles, such as: friction of different surfaces (for example,
3892 transition from a hard surface over carpet edging), cables, and doorway sills.
3893 Rationale: The 100 mm min wheel size was found to be adequate to enable rolling over
3894 these obstacles without abruptly stopping that could cause the cart or stand to
3895 tip, or the equipment located on the cart or stand to slide off.
3896 8.10 Carts, stands, and similar carriers
3897 Source: UL 60065
3898 Rationale: To avoid tipping, the 20 N test simulates cart wheels being unintentionally
3899 blocked during movement.
3900 8.10.1 General
3902 Rationale: A wheel of at least 100 mm diameter can be expected to climb over usual
3903 obstacles such as electrical cords, door jambs, etc., and not be halted suddenly.
3904 8.10.2 Marking and instructions
3905 Rationale: Various means of marking may apply depending on the method of associating
3906 the equipment with a particular cart, stand of similar carrier.
– 116 – 108/757/DC
3907 8.10.3 Cart, stand or carrier loading test and compliance criteria
3909 Purpose: To verify that a cart or stand can withstand foreseeable overloading without
3910 creating a hazardous situation.
3911 Rationale: The 220 N force simulates the weight of a small child approximately 5 years of
3912 age, who may attempt to climb onto the cart or stand. The 30 mm circular
3913 cylinder simulates a child’s foot. The 750 mm height is the approximate access
3914 height of the 5-year-old child. The additional 440 N force test simulates potential
3915 additional materials or equipment being placed on the cart or stand. The
3916 additional 100 N simulates overloading by the user. Testing has been limited to
3917 1 min as experience has shown that the likelihood of a test failure will occur
3918 within that time.
3919 8.10.4 Cart, stand or carrier impact test
3920 Purpose: To verify that a cart or stand can withstand a foreseeable impact without creating
3921 a hazardous situation.
3922 Source: IEC 60065 and IEC 60950 series
3923 Rationale: The 7 joules simulate intentional and accidental contact with the equipment and
3924 come from the T.6 enclosure test.
3925 8.10.5 Mechanical stability
3926 Purpose: To verify that a cart or stand remains stable under specified loading. The
3927 equipment installed on the cart may come loose, but not fall off the cart.
3928 Rationale: The weight of the force test is reduced to 13 % should the equipment on the cart
3929 or stand move, as the equipment would then be considered separately from the
3930 cart or stand. When the equipment does not move during the force test, together
3931 they are considered a single unit.
3932 8.10.6 Thermoplastic temperature stability
3934 Rationale: Intended to prevent shrinkage, relaxation or warping of materials that could
3935 expose a hazard.
3936 8.11 Mounting means for slide-rail mounted equipment (SRME)
3937 8.11.1 General

3938 Source: UL/CSA 60950-1 second edition
3939 Rationale: The potential hazardous energy source is a product that contains significant
3940 mass, and which is mounted on slide-rails in a rack. A joint US/Canadian Adhoc
3941 researched and developed these requirements based on hazard-based
3942 assessment and tests.
3943 The center of gravity was chosen to apply the downward force because in
3944 general, when installing equipment in a rack, it is foreseeable that previously
3945 installed equipment of similar size/mass may be pulled out into the service
3946 position (fully extended) and used to set the new equipment on while positioning
3947 and installing the new slide/rails. In this scenario, it is not likely that the new
3948 equipment would be significantly off-centre from the installed equipment that it
3949 is being set on.
3950 Vertically mounted SRMEs are not addressed in this document.
– 117 – 108/757/DC
3951 8.11.3 Mechanical strength test

3952 Purpose: To simulate temporary placement of another server on top of an existing one
3953 during installation of the new one. So the test is the downward force.
3954 Rationale: 50 % of the equipment mass is derived from the mass of the equipment, and a
3955 50 % tolerance allowed for manufacturing differences in the rails which
3956 effectively adds a safety buffer.
3957 The 330 N to 530 N additional force accounts for equipment that is about to be
3958 installed in a rack being placed or set on a previously installed piece of
3959 equipment where the previously installed equipment is being used as a
3960 temporary shelf or work space. It is estimated that 530 N is the maximum mass
3961 of equipment allowed to be safely lifted by two persons without the use of
3962 mechanical lifting devices. Equipment having a mass greater than 530 N will
3963 have mechanical lifting devices and it is therefore unlikely that the equipment
3964 being installed will be set on any equipment previously installed in the rack.
3965 Taking the actual installation environment into consideration, an additional force
3966 is limited to maximum 800 N (average weight of an adult man) that is same value
3967 as the downward test force in 8.6.2.3. The 800 N value comes from
3968 IEC 60950-1:2005, 4.1 Stability.
3969 8.11.3.2 Lateral push foce test
3970 8.11.3.3 Integrity of slide rail end stops
3971 Source: UL/CSA 60950-1 second edition
3972 Purpose: To simulate maintenance on the server itself, by smaller applying forces
3973 equivalent to what is expected during subassembly and card replacement, etc.
3974 So this also tests the laterally stability of the slide rails. It is not necessary to
3975 retest the downward vertical force if it is already tested for 8.11.3, but that should
3976 be common sense when preparing a test plan.
3977 The cycling of the slide rail after the tests ensures they have not been bent in a
3978 way that could easily fly apart after the service operation.
3979 Rationale: The 250 N force is considered a force likely to be encountered during servicing
3980 of the equipment, and normal operations around equipment. The force is partially
3981 derived from the existing IEC 60950-1:2005, 4.1, and partially from research into
3982 normally encountered module plug forces seen on various manufacturers’
3983 equipment. The application of force at the most unfavourable position takes into
3984 account the servicing of a fully extended piece of equipment, leaning on or
3985 bumping into an extended piece of equipment and other reasonably foreseen
3986 circumstances which may be encountered.
3987 ___________
3988 9 Thermal burn injury
3989 9.1 General

3990 Source: ISO 13732-1:2006 and IEC Guide 117
3991 Rationale: A General
3992 A burn injury can occur when thermal energy is conducted to a body part to
3993 cause damage to the epidermis. Depending on the thermal mass of the object,
3994 duration of contact and exposure temperature, the body response can range
3995 from perception of warmth to a burn.
3996 The energy transfer mechanism for equipment typically covered by the document
3997 is via conduction of thermal energy through physical contact with a body part.
3998 The likelihood of thermal injury is a function of several thermal energy
3999 parameters including:
4000 − temperature difference between the part and the body;
– 118 – 108/757/DC
4001 − the thermal conductivity (or thermal resistance) between the hot part and the
4002 body;
4003 − the mass of the hot part;
4004 − the specific heat of the part material;
4005 − the area of contact;
4006 − the duration of contact.
4007 B Model for a burn injury

4008 A skin burn injury occurs when thermal energy impinges on the skin and raises its
4009 temperature to a level that causes cell damage. The occurrence of a burn will
4010 depend on several parameters. The hazard based three block model applied to the
4011 occurrence of a burn (see Figure 38 in this document) takes account of not just the
4012 temperature of the source, but its total thermal energy, which will depend on its
4013 temperature (relative to the skin), as well as its overall heat capacity. The model
4014 also takes account of the energy transfer mechanism, which will depend on the
4015 thermal conductivity between the body and the thermal source as well as the area
4016 and duration of contact. The occurrence and severity of a burn will depend on the
4017 amount of thermal energy transferred.
4018
4019 Figure 38 – Model for a burn injury
4020 Normally, the energy transfer mechanism from the energy source to a body part
4021 is through direct contact with the body part and sufficient contact duration to
4022 allow transfer of thermal energy causing a burn. The higher the temperature of
4023 the thermal source and the more efficient the transfer mechanism, the shorter
4024 the contact time becomes before the occurrence of a burn. This is not a linear
4025 function and it is dependent on the material, the temperature and the efficiency
4026 of the thermal transfer. The following examples demonstrate the impact of this
4027 non-linear relationship to short-term/high temperature and longer term/lower
4028 temperature contact burns.
4029 Example 1: An accessible metal heat sink at a temperature of 60 °C may have
4030 sufficient energy to cause a burn after contact duration of about 5 s. At a
4031 temperature of 65 °C, a burn may occur after contact duration of just 1,5 s (see
4032 IEC Guide 117:2017, Figure A.1). As the temperature of the metal surface
4033 increases, the contact time necessary to cause a burn decreases rapidly.
4034 Example 2: Consider a thermal source with low to moderate conductivity such
4035 as a plastic enclosure. At a temperature of 48 °C, it may take up to 10 min for
4036 the transfer of sufficient thermal energy to cause a burn. At 60 °C, a burn may
4037 occur after contact duration of just 1 min (see IEC Guide 117:2010, Table A.1).
4038 Although the temperature of the source has increased by just 25 %, the contact
4039 time necessary to cause a burn threshold has decreased by 90 %.
4040 In practice, the actual thermal energy and duration of exposure required to cause
4041 a burn will also depend on the area of contact and condition of the skin. For
4042 simplification of the model and based upon practice in the past, it is assumed
4043 that the contact area will be ≤ 10 % of the body and applied to healthy, adult
4044 skin.
– 119 – 108/757/DC
4045 As a general rule, low temperature devices are likely to cause a heating or pain
4046 sensation before causing a significant burn to which ordinary persons will
4047 normally respond (see ISO 13732-1:2009, Note of 5.7.3). Requirements for
4048 persons with impaired neurological systems are not considered in this document
4049 but may be considered in the future.
4050 NOTE 1 The impact of surface area contact is not being addressed in this paper at this time and
4051 is an opportunity for future work. Use and coverage of large contact areas as might occur in medical
4052 applications of heating pads covering more than 10 % of the body surface are outside the scope
4053 of this document, as this type of application is more appropriate to medical device publications.
4054 NOTE 2 The pressure of the contact between the thermal source and the body part can have an
4055 impact on the transfer of thermal energy. Studies have shown this effect to have appreciable impact
4056 at higher pressures. For typical pressures associated with casual contact up to a pressure of 20 N
4057 the effect has been shown to be negligible, and thus contact pressure is not considered in this
4058 document (Ref: ATSM C 1055, X1.2.3.4, ASTM C 1057,7, Note 10).
4059 NOTE 3 Considerations for burns generated by infrared (IR), visible, ultra violet light radiation
4060 and RF radiation sources are outside the scope of Clause 9 dealing with thermal burn injury.
4061 C Types of burn injuries

4062 Burn injuries are commonly classed as first degree, second degree or third
4063 degree in order of increasing severity:
4064 First degree burn: the reaction to an exposure where the intensity or duration
4065 is insufficient to cause complete necrosis of the epidermis. The normal response
4066 to this level of exposure is dilation of the superficial blood vessels (reddening of
4067 the skin). No blistering occurs. (Reference: ASTM C1057)
4068 Second degree burn: the reaction to an exposure where the intensity and
4069 duration is sufficient to cause complete necrosis of the epidermis but no
4070 significant damage to the dermis. The normal response to this exposure is
4071 blistering of the epidermis. (Reference: ASTM C1057)
4072 Third degree burn: the reaction to an exposure where significant dermal
4073 necrosis occurs. Significant dermal necrosis with 75 % destruction of the dermis
4074 is a result of the burn. The normal response to this exposure is open sores that
4075 leave permanent scar tissue upon healing. (Reference: ASTM C1057)
4076 ISO 13732-1, 3.5 classifies burns as follows:
4077 Superficial partial thickness burn – In all but the most superficial burns, the
4078 epidermis is completely destroyed but the hair follicles and sebaceous glands as
4079 well as the sweat glands are spared.
4080 Deep partial thickness burn: a substantial part of the dermis and all sebaceous
4081 glands are destroyed and only the deeper parts of the hair follicles or the sweat
4082 glands survive.
4083 Whole thickness burn: when the full thickness of the skin has been destroyed
4084 and there are no surviving epithelial elements.
4085 Although there is some overlap between the classifications in ASTM C1057 and
4086 those in IEC Guide 117, the individual classifications do not correspond exactly
4087 with each other. Further, it should be noted that the classifications of burns
4088 described here is not intended to correspond with the individual thermal source
4089 classifications (TS1, TS2, and TS3) described later in this document.
4090 D Model for safeguards against thermal burn injury

4091 To prevent thermally-caused injury, a safeguard is interposed between the body
4092 part and the energy source. More than one safeguard may be used to meet the
4093 requirements for thermal burn hazard protection.
– 120 – 108/757/DC
Figure 39 – Model for safeguards against thermal burn injury
4094 To prevent thermally-caused injury, a safeguard is interposed between the body

4095 part and the energy source (see Figure 39 in this document). More than one
4096 safeguard may be used to meet the requirements for thermal burn hazard
4097 protection.
4098 Safeguards overview
4099 This section shows examples of the different types of safeguards that may be
4100 applied:
4101 a) Thermal hazard not present

4102 The first model, see Figure 40 in this document, presumes contact to a surface
4103 by an ordinary person where a thermal hazard is not present. In this case, no
4104 safeguard is required.
4105
4106 Figure 40 – Model for absence of a thermal hazard
4107 b) Thermal hazard is present with a physical safeguard in place

4108 The second model, see Figure 41 in this document, presumes some contact with
4109 a surface by an ordinary person. The thermal energy source is above the
4110 threshold limit value for burns (Table 38), but there are safeguards interposed
4111 to reduce the rate of thermal energy transferred such that the surface
4112 temperature will not exceed the threshold limit values for the expected contact
4113 durations. Thermal insulation is an example of a physical safeguard.
4114
4115 Figure 41 – Model for presence of a thermal hazard

4116 with a physical safeguard in place
4117 c) Thermal hazard is present with a behavioural safeguard in place

4118 The third model, see Figure 42 in this document, presumes the possibility of
4119 some contact to the thermal source or part by an ordinary person. The
4120 temperature is above the threshold limit value but the exposure time is limited
4121 by the expected usage conditions or through instructions to the user to avoid or
4122 limit contact to a safe exposure time. The contact time and exposure will not
4123 exceed the threshold limit value. An additional safeguard may not be required.
– 121 – 108/757/DC
4124
4125 Figure 42 – Model for presence of a thermal hazard

4126 with behavioural safeguard in place
4127 9.2 Thermal energy source classifications

4128 Rationale: Surfaces that may be touched are classified as thermal energy sources TS1,
4129 TS2 or TS3 with TS1 representing the lowest energy level and TS3 the highest.
4130 The classification of each surface will determine the type of safeguards
4131 required.
4132 The assessment of thermal burn hazards is complex and, as discussed in the
4133 model for a burn injury above, involves several factors. Important aspects
4134 include the overall heat capacity of the source, its temperature relative to the
4135 body, thermal conductivity of the contact and others. To present a simple model
4136 for assessment of a given surface, it is assumed that the overall heat capacity
4137 and the thermal conductivity will remain constant.
4138 Thus, thermal energy sources are classified in terms of the material of the
4139 surface, its relative temperature and duration of contact only. Usually, for a given
4140 material the temperature and duration of contact are likely to be the only
4141 significant variables when assessing the risk of a burn injury.
4142 9.2.1 TS1
4143 Rationale: The lowest thermal energy source is TS1. TS1 represents a level of thermal
4144 energy that generally will not cause a burn injury.
4145 9.2.2 TS2
4146 Rationale: A TS2 thermal energy source has sufficient energy to cause a burn injury in
4147 some circumstances. The occurrence of a burn from a TS2 source will largely
4148 depend on the duration of contact. Depending on the contact time, and contact
4149 area, contact material, and other factors, a TS2 source is not likely to cause an
4150 injury requiring professional medical attention. Table 38 defines the upper limits
4151 for TS2 surfaces.
4152 A TS2 circuit is an example of a class 2 energy source where the basic
4153 safeguard may, in some cases, be replaced by an instructional safeguard.
4154 Details are given in Table 38, footnote e.
4155 9.2.3 TS3
4156 Rationale: A TS3 thermal energy source has sufficient energy to cause a burn injury
4157 immediately on contact with the surface. There is no table defining the limits for
4158 a TS3 surface because any surface that is in excess of TS2 limits is considered
4159 to be TS3. Within the specified contact time, as well as contact area, contact
4160 material and other factors, a TS3 source may cause an injury requiring
4161 professional medical attention. As TS3 surfaces require that maximum level of
4162 safeguard defined in the document. All surfaces may be treated as TS3 if not
4163 otherwise classified.
– 122 – 108/757/DC
4164 Source: IEC Guide 117.

4165 Rationale: When doing the temperature measurements, an ambient temperature is used as
4166 described in 9.2.5 to measure the temperatures without taking into account the
4167 maximum ambient specified by the manufacturer.
4168 9.3 Touch temperature limits
4169 Table 38 Touch temperature limits for accessible parts
4170 Source: The limits in Table 38 are primarily derived from data in IEC Guide 117.
4171 Rationale: The temperature of the skin and the duration of raised temperature are the
4172 primary parameters in the occurrence of a skin burn injury. In practice, it is
4173 difficult to measure the temperature of the skin accurately while it is in contact
4174 with a hot surface. Thus the limits in Table 38 do not represent skin
4175 temperatures. These limits do represent the surface temperatures that are
4176 known to cause a skin burn injury when contacted for greater than the specified
4177 time limit.
4178 The thermal energy source criterion takes account of the temperature of the
4179 source, its thermal capacity and conductivity as well as the likely duration and
4180 area of contact. As the thermal capacity and conductivity will normally remain
4181 constant for a given surface, the limits here are expressed in degrees C for
4182 typical material types and contact durations.
4183 Contact time duration > 8 h
4184 For devices worn on the body (in direct contact with the skin) in normal use (>
4185 8 h), examples include portable, lightweight devices such watches, headsets,
4186 music players and sports monitoring equipment. Since the values in the table do
4187 not represent skin temperature as indicated above, measurements should not be
4188 done while wearing the devices.
4189 The value of 43 °C for all materials for a contact period of 8 h and longer assumes
4190 that only a minor part of the body (less than 10 % of the entire skin surface of
4191 the body) or a minor part of the head (less than 10 % of the skin surface of the
4192 head) touches the hot surface. If the touching area is not local or if the hot
4193 surface is touched by vital areas of the face (for example, the airways), severe
4194 injuries may occur even if the surface temperature does not exceed 43 °C (see
4195 IEC Guide 117).
4196 NOTE Prolonged exposure to 43 °C may result in erythema (temporary redness of the skin
4197 causing dilation of the blood capillaries) which will typically go away within a few hours after
4198 removal of the heat source. For some users, this may be misperceived as a burn.
4199 Contact time durations > 1 min

4200 For very long-term contact (> 10 min), the temperature below which a burn will
4201 not occur converges towards 43 °C for most materials (see IEC Guide 117:2010,
4202 Figure A.1). Studies carried out on portable IT Equipment have shown that for
4203 long term contact, a surface temperature will drop by between 5 °C and 12 °C
4204 when in contact with the body due to the cooling effect of the blood circulation.
4205 On this basis, and taking account of the probability that long-term contact will
4206 normally be insulated by clothing or some other form of insulation, the TS1
4207 temperature limit for contact periods greater than 1 min in Table 39 are
4208 conservatively chosen as 48 °C for all materials.
4209 Examples of products with surfaces where expected continuous contact
4210 durations greater than 1 min include joysticks, mice, mobile telephones, and
4211 PDAs. Any handles, knobs or grips on the equipment that are likely, under normal
4212 usage, to be touched or held for greater than 1 min are also included.
– 123 – 108/757/DC
4213 Contact time durations between 10 s and 1 min

4214 For surfaces that are touched for shorter contact durations (up to 1 min), the
4215 temperature below which a burn will not occur is influenced by the material type
4216 as well as other factors. Because the contact time is shorter, there is insufficient
4217 time for heat transfer to cause the cooling effect described above, so it is not
4218 considered in the limits. The TS1 temperature limits in Table 38 for contact
4219 durations up to 1 min are taken directly from IEC Guide 117:2010, Table A.1.
4220 Examples of surfaces with contact durations up to 1 min include handles or grips
4221 used primarily for moving or adjusting the equipment. Also tuning dials or other
4222 controls where contact for up to 1 min may be expected.
4223 Contact time durations up to 10 s
4224 Even shorter-term contact may occur for surfaces such as push button/switch,
4225 volume control; computer or telephone keys. In this case, the surfaces will not
4226 normally be touched for a duration greater than 10 s. The TS1 temperature limits
4227 in Table 38 for these surfaces are based on the burn threshold limits in IEC
4228 Guide 117 for contact durations of up to 10 s.
4229 For surfaces that are accessible but need not be touched to operate the
4230 equipment, contact duration of up to 1 s is assumed. For healthy adults, a
4231 minimum reaction time of 0,5 s can be assumed. For more general applications,
4232 the reaction time increases to 1 s IEC Guide 117, Table 2. The TS1 temperature
4233 limits in Table 38 for these surfaces are based on the burn threshold limits in
4234 Guide 117 for contact durations of 1 s (see IEC Guide 117:2010, Figures A.1 –
4235 A.6). More conservative values than those in IEC Guide 117 are chosen for metal
4236 and glass to provide some margin against a reduced reaction time while in
4237 contact with a high thermal energy surface of high thermal conductivity.
4238 Examples of such parts include general enclosure surfaces, accessible print
4239 heads of dot matrix printers or any internal surfaces that may be accessible
4240 during routine maintenance. Accidental contact, with no intention to hold or
4241 contact the surface is also included.
4242 For contact durations between 1 s and 10 s, IEC Guide 117 provides temperature
4243 ranges over which a burn may occur rather than precise limits. This takes
4244 account of the uncertainty that applies to the occurrence of burn injury over
4245 shorter periods. The texture of the surface can also be a factor in the occurrence
4246 of a burn and this is not taken into account in the limits in IEC Guide 117. As
4247 most surfaces in IT equipment will have some texturing, values at the higher end
4248 of the spreads have been chosen.
4249 Contact time durations up to 1 s
4250 For accessible surfaces that are not normally intended or expected to be
4251 touched while operating or disconnecting the equipment, a contact time duration
4252 of up to 1 second is appropriate. This would apply to any surface of the
4253 equipment that does not have functionality when touched or is unlikely to be
4254 inadvertently contacted when accessing functional surfaces such as keyboards
4255 or handles. Typical and readily expected usage should be considered when
4256 assessing likely contact duration with such a surface.
4257 For example, it is not necessary to touch a direct plug-in external power supply
4258 adapter (Figure 43) during normal use of the equipment, but it will likely be
4259 touched or briefly held for disconnection from the mains. Thus, this type of
4260 equipment is expected to be contacted for more than one second.
4261
– 124 – 108/757/DC
Figure 43 – Direct plug in Figure 44 – External power supply

4262
4263 Other external power supplies, such as those often supplied with notebook
4264 computers and other equipment (Figure 44), with a connected power cord will
4265 not normally be touched either during usage or for disconnection. For external
4266 power supplies with power cord, to disconnect from mains, the user will grip the
4267 power cord plug. The contact time with the plug would be more than 1 second
4268 and the contact time of the power supply would be less than 1 second.
4269 Other considerations
4270 In the event of a fault condition arising, the user is less likely to touch the
4271 equipment and any contact with accessible surfaces is likely to be very brief.
4272 Thus higher limits than those allowed under IEC Guide 117 are permitted. For
4273 metal, glass and plastic surfaces, the limit is 100 °C (IEC 60065:2010, Table 3).
4274 For wood, a temperature of 150 °C was chosen because 100 °C would be lower
4275 than the normal temperature of 140 °C.
4276 When contact with a TS1 surface is unlikely due to its limited size or accessibility,
4277 a temperature up to 100 °C is acceptable if an instructional safeguard is
4278 provided on the equipment (see IEC 60950-1:2005, Table 4C, IEC 60065:2001,
4279 Table 3).
4280 In the case where a surface is hot in order to carry out its function, the occurrence
4281 of contact with the surface or a subsequent burn injury is unlikely if the user is
4282 made aware that the surface is hot. Thus, a temperature up to 100 °C or higher
4283 is acceptable if there is an effective instructional safeguard on the body of the
4284 equipment indicating that the surface is hot (see IEC 60950-1:2005, Table 4C
4285 and IEC 60065:2001, Table 3).
4286 Factors for consideration in determining test conditions
4287 For consistency with other parts of the document and to reflect typical user
4288 conditions, the ambient conditions described in B.1.6 apply.
4289 Assessment of safeguards should be carried out under normal operating
4290 conditions of the product that will result in elevated surface temperatures. The
4291 chosen normal operating conditions should be typical of the manufacturer’s
4292 intended use of the product while precluding deliberate misuse or unauthorized
4293 modifications to the product or its operating parameters by the user. For some
4294 simple equipment, this will be straightforward. For more complex equipment,
4295 there may be several variables to be considered including the typical usage
4296 model. The manufacturer of the equipment should perform an assessment to
4297 determine the appropriate configuration.
4298 Example: Factors that may be considered in determining the test conditions for
4299 a notebook computer:
4300 − Mode of operation
4301 • Variable CPU speed
4302 • LCD brightness
4303 − Accessories installed:
4304 • Number of disk drives
4305 • USB devices
4306 • External HDD
4307 − Software installed:
4308 • Gaming applications
4309 • Duration of continuous use
4310 • Long term contact likely?
– 125 – 108/757/DC
4311 • Other specialist applications

4312 − Battery status:
4313 • Fully charged/ Discharged
4314 • AC connected
4315 9.3.1 Touch temperature limit requirements
4316 Rationale: Table 38 provides touch temperature limits for accessible parts, assuming
4317 steady state. IEC Guide 117 provides the methodology to assess products with
4318 changing temperatures or small parts which are likely to drop in temperature
4319 upon touch. Using a thermesthesiometer for a specified time interval, the
4320 thermesthesiometer simulates the skin temperature of human finger and heating
4321 effects caused by contact with the product surface under test. Once contact is
4322 made, the thermesthesiometer and product under test will eventually reach
4323 thermal equilibrium at which point finger skin temperature can be determined.
4324 Background: The touch limits from Table 38 for > 1 s and < 10 s may be used for small hand-
4325 held equipment with localized hotspots, given a small thermal energy source
4326 and touching can be easily avoided by changing holding position of the device.
4327 This same rationale would also apply to small multi-media peripherals which are
4328 removed from a host device (for example, USB memory stick, PCMCIA cards,
4329 SD card, Compact Flash card, ejectable media, etc.). In many cases, these
4330 peripherals may be removed from their host (for example, power source)
4331 exposing higher thermally conductive materials (for example, metals), but are in
4332 thermal decay (i.e. no longer powered).
4333 In cases of doubt, the method in IEC Guide 117 may be used for steady-state
4334 conditions. An example of a simplified method for thermally decaying parts is
4335 provided as a reference:
4336 Touch temperature limits in IEC Guide 117 are based on time-weighted exposure
4337 for burn (for example, thermal energy). As long as integrated thermal energy
4338 calculations (for example, area of temp vs. time) of the part at specified time
4339 intervals is less than the associated integrated thermal energy calculated limits
4340 over that duration, the measured temperatures should be acceptable.
4341 The most significant time internals to consider for decaying thermal energy is
4342 between 1 s to 10 min (using 10 s, 1 min, 10 min intervals).
4343 − For exposure times < 1 s, the 1 s temperature limits of the IEC Guide 117
4344 should be used for 2 reasons: 1) Reaction times – under general applications
4345 reaction times of < 1 s are not probable and greatest risk of burn. 2)
4346 Repeatability – temperature measurement capability < 1 s intervals is less
4347 common and more difficult to accurately calculate the part energy.
4348 − For exposure times > 10 min, the temperature limits of IEC Guide 117 should
4349 be used: after 10 min parts should either have cooled or reach sufficient
4350 equilibrium to utilize the temperature limits without the need for assessing
4351 thermal energy.
4352 This simplified method requires the part under test to be mounted using
4353 thermally insulating clamp. Clamp to the part’s least thermally conductive
4354 material and smallest contact needed to hold the part. Measured in still-air room
4355 ambient.
4356 NOTE Parts that are hand-held will decay faster than open-air measurements (for example,
4357 radiation and convection) owing to direct conduction of heat to skin.
4358 9.3.2 Test method and compliance criteria

4359 Rationale: The general intent of the requirements are to use an ambient temperature as
4360 follows without taking into account the maximum ambient specified by the
4361 manufacturer:
4362 − The test may be performed between 20 °C and 30 °C.
– 126 – 108/757/DC
4363 − If the test is performed below 25 °C, the results are normalized to
4364 25 °C.
4365 − If the test is performed above 25 °C, the results are not normalized to 25 °C
4366 and the limits (Table 38) are not adjusted. In case the product fails the
4367 requirements, the test may be repeated at 25 °C.
4368 9.4 Safeguards against thermal energy sources
4369 Rationale: TS1 represents non-hazardous energy and thus, no safeguard is required.
4370 Because the energy is non-hazardous, and there is no possibility of an injury, it
4371 may be accessible by ordinary persons and there is no restriction on duration
4372 of contact under normal operating conditions.
4373 TS2 represents hazardous energy that could cause a burn injury if the contact
4374 duration is sufficient. Therefore, a safeguard is required to protect an ordinary
4375 person. A TS2 surface will not cause a burn immediately on contact. Because
4376 the burn injury from a TS2 surface is likely to be minor and pain or discomfort is
4377 likely to precede the occurrence of a burn injury, a physical safeguard may not
4378 be required if there is an effective means to inform the ordinary person about
4379 the risks of touching the hot surface.
4380 Thus, a TS2 safeguard may be one of the following:
4381 − a physical barrier to prevent access; or
4382 − an instructional safeguard to limit contact time below the threshold limit
4383 value versus time.
4384 TS3 represents hazardous energy that is likely to cause a burn injury
4385 immediately on contact. Because a TS3 surface is always likely to cause a burn
4386 immediately or before the expected reaction time due to pain or discomfort, an
4387 equipment safeguard is required.
4388 Unless otherwise specified in the document, ordinary persons need to be
4389 protected against all TS2 and TS3 energy sources.
4390 Instructed persons are protected by the supervision of a skilled person and
4391 can effectively employ instructional safeguards. Thus, equipment
4392 safeguards are not required for TS2 energy sources. An instructional
4393 safeguard may be required.
4394 TS3 energy sources can cause severe burns after very short contact duration.
4395 Thus, an instructional safeguard alone is not sufficient to protect an instructed
4396 person and an equipment safeguard is required.
4397 Skilled persons are protected by their education and experience and are
4398 capable of avoiding injury from TS3 sources. Thus, an equipment safeguard is
4399 not required to protect against TS3 energy sources. As a pain response may
4400 cause an unintentional reflex action even in skilled persons, an equipment or
4401 instructional safeguard may be required to protect against other class 3 energy
4402 sources adjacent to the TS3 energy source.
4403 9.5.1 Equipment safeguard
4404 Rationale: The function of the equipment safeguard is to limit the transfer of hazardous
4405 thermal energy. An equipment safeguard may be thermal insulation or other
4406 physical barrier.
4407 9.5.2 Instructional safeguard
4408 Rationale: An instructional safeguard will inform any person of the presence of hazardous
4409 thermal energy. Instructional safeguards may be in a text or graphical format
4410 and may be placed on the product or in the user documentation. In determining
4411 the format and location of the safeguard, consideration will be given to the
4412 expected user group, the likelihood of contact and the likely nature of the injury
4413 arising.
– 127 – 108/757/DC
4414 9.6 Requirements for wireless power transmitters

4415 Rationale: Transmitters for near-field wireless power transfer can warm up foreign
4416 metallic objects that may be placed close to or on such a transmitter. To avoid
4417 burn due to high temperatures of the foreign metallic objects, the transmitter is
4418 tested as specified in 9.6.3.
4419 Far-field transmitters are generally called "power-beaming" and are not covered
4420 by these requirements.
4421 9.6.3 Test method and compliance criteria
4422 Rationale: While 9.6.3 specifies a maximum temperature of 70 °C, aluminum foil that
4423 reaches 80 °C is considered to comply with the requirement. The foil described
4424 in Figure 51 complies with the method allowed in in 9.3.1 based on the foil
4425 dimensions and low mass.
4426 This requirement is expected to align with the current Qi standard.
4427 Rationale: While many devices (servers, laptops, etc.) may be evaluated accurately for
4428 thermal burn injury using Table 38, foreign objects (FO’s) and other similar
4429 devices with low thermal mass and finite heat flux cannot be evaluated for
4430 thermal burn injury accurately.
4431 Both the experimental (thermesthesiometer method) and the computational (bio-
4432 heat equation model) in conjunction with the thermal burn thresholds from ASTM
4433 C 1055 provide for a greater level of accuracy than IEC Guide 117 in assessing
4434 the potential risk for thermal burn injury from foreign objects by:
4435 − representing temperatures of the skin;
4436 − being material and geometry agnostic and;
4437 − considering quality of contact.
4438 Both methods take into account conservative assumptions that build in a margin
4439 of safety:
4440 − single finger (typically, finger and thumb would be used to pick up object);
4441 − no perfusion;
4442 − children/elderly reaction times; and
4443 − full thickness burn thresholds (vs +10˚C to obtain TS2).
4444 However, the findings from the experimental thermesthesiometer testing are
4445 being recommended due to the simplicity of the test method and to further
4446 promote future hazard-based testing using the thermesthesiometer.
4447 Generally, for a transmitter with a symmetrical single coil, the typical position
4448 (location) are the center, the edge and the midpoint of the coil of the transmitter.
4449 For a transmitter with an irregular shape coil or multiple coils, the typical position
4450 (location) where foreign objects should be placed can be determined by checking
4451 the structure or accompanying documents. See Figure 45 for some examples of
4452 single coils.
4453
4454 Figure 45 – Examples of symmetrical single coils
– 128 – 108/757/DC
4455 ____________
4456 10 Radiation
4457 10.2 Radiation energy source classifications

4458 Rationale: The first step in application is determining which energy sources represent
4459 potential radiation energy sources. Each energy source within the product can
4460 be classified as a radiation source based on the available energy within a circuit
4461 that can be used to determine the type of and number of safeguards required.
4462 The radiation energy source classifications include electromagnetic radiation
4463 energy sources.
4464 10.2.1 General classification
4465 Rationale: Radiation energy source classifications for X-rays and acoustics are given in
4466 Table 39. For optical radiation (“Lasers” and “Lamps and lamp systems”), the
4467 classification is defined by the IEC 60825 series or the IEC 62471 series as
4468 applicable.
4469 The general classification scheme specified in IEC 60825-1 is for laser products
4470 and is not a classification scheme for energy sources. It is not practical to classify
4471 laser radiation as RS. The classification according to IEC 60825-1 is used
4472 without modification.
4473 The classification schemes given in IEC 62471 and IEC 62471-5 specify a
4474 measurement distance (200 mm other than lamps intended for general lighting
4475 service and 1m for Image projectors) for the determination of the Risk Group.
4476 The Risk Group classification is not the actual source of the light. It is not
4477 practical to classify the radiation from lamps and lamp systems as RS. The
4478 classification according to IEC 62471 is used without modification.
4479 Abnormal operating conditions (see Clause B.3) and single fault conditions
4480 (see Clause B.4) need to be taken into account. If it becomes higher risk group
4481 when abnormal operating condition or single fault condition is applied, the
4482 higher risk group is applied for classification.
4483 Laser equipment classified as Class 1C is generally not within the scope of this
4484 document as it mainly applies to medical related applications.
4485
– 129 – 108/757/DC
4486 Source: IEC 60825-1:2014 and IEC 62471-5

4487 Rationale: Image Projectors are evaluated using the process in Figure 46 in this
4488 document (see IEC 60825-1:2014 and IEC 62471-5).
4489
4490 Figure 46 – Flowchart for evaluation of Image projectors (beamers)
4491 10.2.2 & 10.2.3 RS1 and RS2

4492 Rationale: The output circuits of personal music players are not subject to single fault
4493 conditions, since the outputs will not increase to a level exceeding RS2 by
4494 nature of their highly integrated hardware designs. Typically, when component
4495 faults are introduced during testing (by bypassing or shorting of the audio related
4496 ICs), the outputs are either shut down, reduced in level or muted.
4497 10.2.4 RS3
4498 Rationale: RS3 energy sources are those that are not otherwise classified as RS1 or RS2.
4499 No classification testing is required as these energy sources can have unlimited
4500 levels. If an energy source is not measured, it assumed to be RS3 for application
4501 of the document. A skilled person uses personal protective equipment or
4502 measures to reduce the exposure to safe limits when working where RS3 may
4503 be present.
– 130 – 108/757/DC
4504 10.3 Safeguards against laser radiation

4505 Source: IEC 60825-1:2014, Annex A
4506 Rationale: IEC 60825-1:2014, Annex A provides an explanation of the different classes of
4507 products. Accessible emission limits (AELs) are generally derived from the
4508 maximum permissible exposures (MPEs). MPEs have been included in this
4509 informative annex to provide manufacturers with additional information that can
4510 assist in evaluating the safety aspects related to the intended use of their
4511 product, such as the determination of the nominal ocular hazard distance
4512 (NOHD).
4513 10.4 Safeguards against optical radiation from lamps and lamp systems (including
4514 LED types)
4515 Source: IEC 62471 and IEC TR 62471-2
4516 Rationale: Excessive optical radiation may damage the retina and cause vision impairment
4517 or blindness. The limits in the referenced documents are designed to reduce the
4518 likelihood of vision impairment due to optical radiation sources.
4519 For the Instructional safeguard for lamps and lamp systems, see IEC
4520 TR 62471-2.
4521 10.4.1 General Requirements
4523 Rationale: The term ‘Electronic light effect equipment’ has been used in IEC 60065 (see
4524 1.1) and is a commonly understood term for entertainment/stage effect lighting.
4525 10.5 Safeguards against X-radiation
4526 Source: IEC 60950-1; IEC 60065
4527 Rationale: Exposure to X-radiation will cause injury with excessive exposure over time. The
4528 limits in this document have been selected from IEC 60950-1 and IEC 60065 in
4529 order to limit exposure to that which is below harmful levels.
4530 10.6 Safeguards against acoustic energy sources
4531 Source: EN 60065:2002/A11:2008
4532 Rationale: The requirements of this subclause are made to protect against hearing loss due
4533 to long term exposure to high sound pressure levels. Therefore, the
4534 requirements are currently restricted to those kinds of products that are
4535 designed to be body-worn (of a size suitable to be carried in a clothing pocket)
4536 such that a user can take it with them all day long to listen to music (for example,
4537 on a street, in a subway, at an airport, etc.).
4538 At this moment, the clause does not contain requirements against the hazard of
4539 short term exposure to very high sound pressure levels.
4540 Rationale: Significance of L Aeq ,T in EN 50332-1 and additional information
4541 L Aeq ,T is derived from the general formula for equivalent sound pressure:
4542
– 131 – 108/757/DC
4543 This can be represented graphically as given in Figure 47 in this document.
4544
4545 Figure 47 – Graphical representation of L Aeq ,T
4546 In EN 50332-1 the measurement time interval (t2 – t1) is 30 s.

4547 In practice, and for the purposes of listening to personal music player content,
4548 L Aeq ,T has a time interval T (t2 – t1) in the order of minutes / hours and not
4549 seconds.
4550 Subclause 6.5 (Limitation value) of EN 50332-1:2000 acknowledges this fact and
4551 states that the 100-dB limit equates to a long time average of 90 dB L Aeq ,T. By
4552 using the IEC 60268-1 “programme simulation noise” test signal, this also takes
4553 the spectral content into account.
4554 The SCENHIR report states that 80 dB(A) is considered safe for an exposure
4555 time of 40 h/week. Most persons do not listen to 40 h/week to their personal
4556 music player. In addition, not all music tracks are at the same level of the
4557 simulated noise signal. Whilst modern music tends to be at around the same
4558 level, most of the available music is at a lower average level. Therefore, CLC TC
4559 108/WG03 considered a value of 85 dB(A) to be safe for an overwhelming
4560 majority of the users of personal music players.
4561 10.6.3 Requirements for dose-based systems
4562 Rationale: The requirements on dose measurement have been developed to replace the
4563 requirements on maximum exposure as this better protects against hearing
4564 damage, which results from the combination of exposure and time (dose). For
4565 now, both systems can be used. See Table 16 in this document for a
4566 comparison.
– 132 – 108/757/DC
4567 The dose-based system mainly uses the expression CSD, meaning "calculated
4568 sound dose". The value is based on the values mentioned in the EU Commission
4569 Decision 2009/490/EC, which stipulated that sound is safe when below 80 dB(A)
4570 for a maximum of 40 h per week. Therefore, the value of 100 % CSD corresponds
4571 to 80 dB(A) for 40 h. This also means that the safe limit in the dose measurement
4572 system is chosen to be lower than the safe limit in the maximum exposure
4573 system, as this specifies the safe limit at 85 dB(A). Consequently, a user will
4574 normally receive warnings earlier with the dose measurement system compared
4575 to the maximum exposure limit. In the maximum exposure system, the warning
4576 only had to be given once every 20 h of listening when exceeding 85 dB(A). In
4577 the dose measurement system, the warning and acknowledgement has to be
4578 repeated at least at every 100 % increase of the dose. In practice, this means
4579 that the warning is repeated at a comparable level of 83 dB(A), meaning a dose
4580 that corresponds to listening to 83 dB(A) for 40 h. At each next 100 % increase
4581 of dose level, the increase in corresponding dB’s is halved. Manufacturers have
4582 the freedom to give warnings earlier or ask for acknowledgement more
4583 frequently, but it has to be no later than at the next 100 % CSD increase since
4584 the last acknowledgement. For example, a device has provided the warning and
4585 acknowledgement at 100 % CSD. The manufacturer may choose to provide the
4586 next warning before 200 % CSD, for example, at 175 % CSD. If that is done, the
4587 next warning and acknowledgement may not be later than at
4588 275 % CSD. While there are no requirements for manufacturers to warn users
4589 before the 100 % CSD is reached, it is allowed to do so. Even more, it was felt
4590 by the document writers that it would be responsible behaviour if manufacturers
4591 warn consumers about the risks before the 100 % CSD level is reached. With
4592 the maximum exposure measurement, the maximum allowable sound output is
4593 100 dB(A). With the dosage system, only a momentary exposure limit (MEL) is
4594 required when exceeding 100 dB(A) if a visual or audible warning is provided.
4595 Where a visual or audible MEL is not provided the maximum exposure
4596 measurement of 100 dB(A) is required.
4597 An essential element to educating the user and promoting safe listening habits
4598 is appropriate and useful guidance. This can be accomplished with informative
4599 CSD and MEL warnings that allow the user to understand the hazard, risks, and
4600 recommended action. Appropriate warnings about using the device and user
4601 instructions shall be provided. It should be noted that the CSD warning can be
4602 provided in various forms not limited to visual or audio. However, the MEL can
4603 only be provided visually or audibly. Consideration should be given to not over-
4604 message and annoy the user to the point where the message is neglected or
4605 evasive attempts (software hacks) to defeat the safe guards are taken. Extreme
4606 care should be given when implementing the MEL warning and shall be at the
4607 discretion of the manufacturer.
4608 Manufacturers should be aware that digital sensitivity between PMP and
4609 unknown listening devices may result in excessive false positives. It is
4610 recommended industry to promote sharing of sensitivity data through a
4611 standardized means.
– 133 – 108/757/DC
4612 Table 16 – Overview of requirements for dose-based systems
Devices with Visual or Audible MEL EN 50332-

3
SPL SPL Dose Dose
before transition 3 after requirements test

transition 3 method
Analog > 85 dB(A) if ack, <80 dB(A) CSD warn at every 100 % cl 5.2
known 1 max
< 100 dB(A) max MEL warn at >100 dB(A)
Analog > 27 mV r.m.s. if < 15 mV rms CSD warn at every 100 % (= cl 5.3
unknown 2 ack, max integrate. rms level 15 mV)
< 150 mV r.m.s. MEL warn at > 150 mV r.m.s.
max
Digital > 85 dB(A) if ack, < 80 dB(A) CSD warn at every 100 % cl 5.2
known 1 max
< 100 dB(A) max MEL warn at > 100 dB(A)
Digital > -25 dBFS if ack, < -30 dBFS CSD warn at every 100 % (= integrate TBD 5
unknown 2 max level -30 dBFS)

< 100 dB(A) 4 max
< 100 dB(A) max or MEL warn at >
100 dB(A) 4
Devices without MEL EN 50332-

3
SPL SPL Dose Dose
before transition 3 after requirements test

transition 3 method
Analog > 85 dB(A) if ack, < 80 dB(A) CSD warn at every 100 % cl 5.2
known 1 max
< 100 dB(A) max < 100 dB(A) max
Analog > 27 mV r.m.s. if < 15 mV CSD warn at every 100 % (= integrate cl 5.3
unknown 2 ack, r.m.s. max rms level 15 mV)
< 150 mV r.m.s. < 150 mV r.m.s. max
max
Digital > 85 dB(A) if ack, < 80 dB(A) CSD warn at every 100 % cl. 5.2
known 1 max
< 100 dB(A) max < 100 dB(A) max
Digital > -25 dBFS if ack, < -30 dBFS CSD warn at every 100 % (= integrate TBD 5
unknown 2 max level -30 dBFS)

< 100 dB(A) 4 max
< 100 dB(A) 4 max
1 PMP includes or can detect listening device

2 PMP cannot detect listening device
3 Transition period allows migration to CSD before becoming mandatory
4 Defaults to 100 dB(A) gain cap from digital listening device. Need to develop industry wide protocol
for digital (wired/wireless) listening device for PMPs to learn sensitivity lookup table.
5 Need to create test requirements with EN 50332-3. Otherwise, SPL requirements (30 dBFS gain
cap) will be only feasible option.
4613
– 134 – 108/757/DC
4614 10.6.6.1 Corded listening devices with analogue input

4615 Rationale: The value of 94 dB(A) was chosen to align with current practice in EN 50332. In
4616 addition, some equipment may already start clipping at 100 dB(A). The value
4617 used does not influence the result of the measurement.
4618 _____________
4619 Annex A Examples of equipment within the scope of this standard
4620 Rationale: A variety of personal electronic entertainment products/systems can be covered

4621 by this document, including self-propelling types sometimes known as
4622 entertainment robots, which typically contain electronic components and circuits
4623 that power the device's motion, a battery system and charger, the electric
4624 motor(s) and control systems, together with wireless communications and audio.
4625 When no other IEC or ISO document explicitly covers these products, they can
4626 be accommodated by IEC 62368-1.
4627 Examples of Entertainment-type Robots:
4628
4629 ____________
4630 Annex B Normal operating condition tests, abnormal operating condition

4631 tests and single fault condition tests
4632 General Equipment safeguards during various operating conditions

4633 Purpose: To identify the various operating and use conditions of equipment that are taken into
4634 account in the document. This clause was proposed to be added to the document as
4635 a Clause 0.12, but was agreed to be added to the Rationale instead.
4636 Rationale: Operating conditions
4637 Normal operating condition – A normal operating condition is a state with
4638 intended functionality of the equipment. All equipment basic safeguards,
4639 supplementary safeguards, and reinforced safeguards remain effective and
4640 comply with all required safeguard parameters.
4641 Abnormal operating condition – An abnormal operating condition is a temporary
4642 state. The equipment may have full, limited, or no functionality. The equipment
4643 generally requires operator intervention for restoration to normal operating
4644 condition. All equipment basic safeguards remain effective but may not need to
4645 comply with the required safeguard parameters. All equipment supplementary
4646 safeguards and reinforced safeguards remain effective and comply with the
4647 required safeguard parameters.
– 135 – 108/757/DC
4648 Upon restoration of normal operating conditions, all basic safeguards comply
4649 with the required parameters unless the abnormal operating condition leads to a
4650 single fault condition, in which case the requirements for single fault condition
4651 apply.
4652 Reasonably foreseeable misuse condition – Reasonably foreseeable misuse is
4653 a form of an abnormal operating condition but may be either a temporary or a
4654 permanent state. The equipment may have full, limited, or no functionality. The
4655 equipment may not be capable of restoration to a normal operating condition.
4656 Reasonably foreseeable misuse may lead to a single fault condition, in which
4657 case equipment basic safeguards are not required to remain effective. All
4658 equipment supplementary safeguards and reinforced safeguards remain
4659 effective and comply with the required safeguard parameters.
4660 Other misuse condition – Other misuse (unreasonable or unforeseeable) may lead
4661 to a single or multiple fault condition, in which basic safeguards, supplementary
4662 safeguards and reinforced safeguards may not remain effective. The equipment
4663 may not be repairable to a normal operating condition. Safeguards against
4664 unreasonable or unforeseeable misuse are not covered by this document.
4665 Single fault condition – A single fault condition is a component or safeguard
4666 fault. The equipment may have full, limited or no functionality. The equipment
4667 requires repair to return to a normal operating condition. Equipment basic
4668 safeguards are not required to be functional, in this case the supplementary
4669 safeguards are functional and comply with the required safeguard parameters; or
4670 equipment supplementary safeguards are not required to be functional, in this case
4671 the basic safeguards are functional and comply with the required safeguard
4672 parameters.
4673 NOTE As a basic safeguard and a supplementary safeguard may be interchangeable, the concept
4674 of which safeguard is not required to remain effective can be reversed.
4675 B.1.5 Temperature measurement conditions

4676 Source: IEC 60950-1
4677 Purpose: To determine whether the steady state temperature of a part or material does or
4678 does not exceed the temperature limit for that part or material.
4679 Rationale: Steady state is considered to exist if the temperature rise does not exceed 3 K in 30
4680 min. If the measured temperature is less than the required temperature limit minus
4681 10 %, steady state is considered to exist if the temperature rise does not exceed
4682 1 K in 5 min.
4683 Temperature rise follows an exponential curve and asymptotically approaches
4684 thermal equilibrium. The rate of temperature rise can be plotted as a function of time
4685 and used to guess the value at steady state. The actual steady state value needs to
4686 be accurate only to the extent to prove whether the value will exceed the limit or not.
4687 Steady-state conditions of typical electronic devices have many different
4688 temperatures, so thermal equilibrium does not exist.
4689 The resistance method may be used to measure temperature rises of windings
4690 unless the windings are non-uniform or if it is difficult to make the necessary
4691 connections, in which case the temperature rise is determined by other means.
4692 When the resistance method is used, the temperature rise of a winding is calculated
4693 from the formula:
R2 − R1
4694 Δt = (k + t 1 ) – (t 2 – t 1 )
R1
4695 where:
4696 Δt is the temperature rise of the winding;
4697 R1 is the resistance at the beginning of the test;
4698 R2 is the resistance at the end of the test;
– 136 – 108/757/DC
4699 k is equal to:

4700 • 225 for aluminium windings and copper/aluminium windings with an
4701 aluminium content ≥ 85 %,
4702 • 229,75 for copper/aluminium windings with a copper content > 15 % to <
4703 85 %,
4704 • 234,5 for copper windings and copper/aluminium windings with an
4705 copper content ≥ 85 %;
4706 t1 is the room temperature at the beginning of the test;

4707 t2 is the room temperature at the end of the test.
4708 NOTE It is recommended that the resistance of windings at the end of the test be determined by taking
4709 resistance measurements as soon as possible after switching off and then at short intervals so that a
4710 curve of resistance against time can be plotted for ascertaining the resistance at the instant of switching
4711 off.
4712 B.1.6 Specific output conditions

4713 Examples For example, connecting the intended representative worst-case load or external
4714 powered devices, and repeating with the appropriate resistive load and/or fault
4715 conditions. This is critical for determining characteristics such as output voltage and
4716 current for ES and PS classifications, use on building and other wiring, Annex Q, as
4717 well as proper loading for heating tests. These examples are not necessarily all
4718 inclusive.
4719 B.2.3 Supply Voltage
4720 Rationale: Where a test subclause does not require the most unfavourable supply voltage, the
4721 supply voltage is the value of the rated voltage or any value in the rated voltage
4722 range. This is applicable to the tests in abnormal operation condition and single
4723 fault condition as well.
4724
4725 Table 17 – Overview of supply voltage
Requirement of IEC 62368-1:2020 Supply Voltage B.2.3

Normal operating Abnormal operating
conditions conditions and single
fault condition
5.2.2.2 Steady state voltage and current limits Applies Applies

5.7 Prospective touch voltage, touch current and
protective conductor current
Including
5.2.2.3 Capacitance limits Does not apply Does not apply
5.5.2.2 Capacitor discharge after disconnection of
a connector
5.2.2.4 Single pulse limits Applies Applies
5.2.2.5 Limits for repetitive pulses Applies Applies
5.2.2.7 Audio signals Does not apply Does not apply
E.1 Electrical energy source classification for audio
signals
5.4.1.8 Determination of working voltage Does not apply Does not apply
(short-circuit across the
basic or supplementary
insulation)
5.7.4 Unearthed accessible parts Applies Applies
5.7.5 Earthed accessible conductive parts Applies Applies
5.7.6 Requirements when touch current exceeds Applies Applies
ES2 limits
– 137 – 108/757/DC
6.2.2 Power source circuit classifications Does not apply Does not apply
6.2.3 Classification of potential ignition sources Does not apply Does not apply
6.4 Safeguards against fire under single fault - Does not apply
conditions
8.2 Mechanical energy source classifications Does not apply Does not apply
9.2 Thermal energy source classifications Apply Does not apply
9.6 Requirements for wireless power transmitters Does not apply Does not apply
10.2 Radiation energy source classifications Does not apply Does not apply
Q.1 Limited power source Applies Applies
Q.2 Test for external circuits – paired conductor Does not apply Does not apply
cable
4726
4727 B.2 – B.3 – B.4 Operating modes

4728 See Figure 48 in this document for an overview of operating modes.
4729
4730 Figure 48 – Overview of operating modes
4731 B.4.4 Functional insulation

4732 Rationale: The use of a functional insulation is only acceptable when the circuit does not
4733 exceed its limits of its class under normal operating conditions and abnormal
4734 operation conditions and single fault conditions of a component not serving as
4735 a safeguard (see 5.2.1.1 and 5.2.1.2). Otherwise a basic insulation/safeguard
4736 would be required.
4737 If the functional insulation possesses a certain quality (clearance, creepage
4738 distances, electric strength) comparable to a basic safeguard, it is acceptable to
4739 omit short-circuit.
4740 This cannot be compared to the short-circuiting of a basic safeguard as required in
4741 B.4.1, because this basic safeguard is a required one, while the added quality of
4742 the functional insulation is not required.
4743 If the short-circuiting of this functional insulation with added quality would lead to
4744 a changing of the class, the functional insulation was wrongly chosen, and a basic
4745 safeguard would have been required.
– 138 – 108/757/DC
4746 B.4.8 Compliance criteria during and after single fault conditions
4748 Rationale: During single fault conditions, short term power is delivered in components which
4749 might be outside the specifications for that component. As a result, the component
4750 might interrupt. During the interruption, sometimes a small flame escapes for a short
4751 period of time. The current practice in IEC 60065 allows these short term flames for
4752 a maximum period of 10 s. This method has been successfully used for products in
4753 the scope of this document for many years.
4754 ____________
4755 Annex C UV Radiation
4756 C.1.1 General

4757 Rationale: UV radiation can affect the physical properties of thermoplastic materials and so it
4758 can have a consequential effect on components protecting body parts from a range
4759 of injurious energy sources.
4760 ____________
4761 Annex D Test generators
4762 Source: ITU-T Recommendation K.44

4763 Rationale: The circuit 1 surge in Table D.1 is typical of voltages induced into telephone wires
4764 and coaxial cables in long outdoor cable runs due to lightning strikes to their earthing
4765 shield.
4766 The circuit 2 surge is typical of earth potential rises due to either lightning strikes to
4767 power lines or power line faults.
4768 The circuit 3 surge is typical of voltages induced into antenna system wiring due to
4769 nearby lightning strikes to earth.
4770 Figure D.3 provides a circuit diagram for high energy impulse to test the high-
4771 pressure lamps.
4772 ____________
4773 Annex E Test conditions for equipment containing audio amplifiers
4774 Source: IEC 60065:2011

4775 Rationale: The proposed limits for touch voltages at terminals involving audio signals that
4776 may be contacted by persons have been extracted without deviation from
4777 IEC 60065:2011, 9.1.1.2 a). Under single fault conditions, 11.1 of
4778 IEC 60065:2011 does not permit an increase in acceptable touch voltage limits.
4779 The proposed limits are quantitatively larger than the accepted limits of Table 4,
4780 but are not considered dangerous for the following reasons:
4781 − the output is measured with the load disconnected (worst-case load);
4782 − defining the contact area of connectors and wiring is very difficult due to
4783 complex shapes. The area of contact is considered small due to the
4784 construction of the connectors;
4785 − normally, it is recommended to the user, in the instruction manual provided
4786 with the equipment, that all connections be made with the equipment in the
4787 “off” condition.
– 139 – 108/757/DC
4788 − in addition to being on, the equipment would have to be playing some program
4789 at a high output with the load disconnected to achieve the proposed limits.
4790 Although possible, it is highly unlikely. Historically, no known cases of injury
4791 have been recorded for amplifiers with a non-clipped output less than 71 V
4792 RMS.
4793 − the National Electrical Code (USA) permits accessible terminals with a
4794 maximum output voltage of 120 V RMS.
4795 It seems that the current normal condition specified in IEC 60065 is appropriate
4796 and a load of 1/8 of the non-clipped output power should be applied to the
4797 multichannel by adjusting the individual channels.
4798 ___________
4799 Annex F Equipment markings, instructions, and instructional safeguards
4800 F.3 Equipment markings

4801 Source: EC Directives such as 98/37/EC Machinery Directive, Annex I, clause 1.7.3 marking;
4802 NFPA 79:2002, clause 17.4 nameplate data; CSA C22.1 Canadian Electric Code,
4803 clause 2-100 marking of equipment give organized requirements. The requirements
4804 here are principally taken from IEC 60065 and IEC 60950 series.
4805 F.3.3.2 Equipment without direct connection to mains
4806 Source: IEC 60950-1
4807 Purpose: To clarify that equipment powered by mains circuits, but not directly connected to
4808 the mains using standard plugs and connectors, need not have an electrical rating.
4809 Rationale: Only equipment that is directly connected to the mains supplied from the building
4810 installation needs to have an electrical rating that takes into account the full load
4811 that may be connected to the building supply outlet. For equipment that is daisy-
4812 chained or involves a master-slave configuration, only the master unit or the first
4813 unit in the daisy chain needs to be marked.
4814 F.3.6.2 Equipment class marking
4815 Rationale: For compliance with EMC standards and regulations, more and more class II
4816 products are equipped with a functional earth connection. The latest version of the
4817 basic safety publication IEC 61140 allows this construction. On request of IEC TC
4818 108, IEC SC3C has developed a new symbol, which is now used in IEC 62368-1.
4819 Rationale: Equipment having a class II construction, but that is provided with a class I input
4820 connector with the internal earthing pin not connected is also considered to be a
4821 class II equipment with functional earth. The class I connector is used to provide a
4822 more robust connection means, which is considered to be a functional reason for the
4823 earth connection.
4824 F.4 Instructions
4825 Rationale: The dash requiring graphical symbols placed on the equipment and used as an
4826 instructional safeguard to be explained does not apply to symbols used for
4827 equipment classification (see F.3.6).
4828 Markings on the equipment are reproduced in the instruction manual. Any translation
4829 of the wording on the marking is suggested to be provided in the manual.
4830 F.5 Instructional safeguards
4831 Rationale: When a symbol is used, the triangle represents the words “Warning” or “Caution”.
4832 Therefore, when the symbol is used, there is no need to also use the words
4833 “Warning” or “Caution”. However, when only element 2 is used, the text needs to be
4834 preceded with the words.
4835 ___________
– 140 – 108/757/DC
4836 Annex G Components
4837 G.1 Switches

4838 Source: IEC 61058-1
4839 Rationale: A contact should not draw an arc that will cause pitting and damage to the contacts
4840 when switching off and should not weld when switching on if located in PS2 or PS3
4841 energy sources. A PS1 energy source is not considered to have enough energy to
4842 cause pitting and damage to the contacts. Both these actions (pitting and damage)
4843 may result in a lot of heating that may result in fire. There should be sufficient gap
4844 between the two contact points in the off position which should be equal to the
4845 reinforced clearance if the circuit is ES3 and basic clearance if the circuit is ES2 or
4846 ES1 (we may have an arcing PIS or resistive PIS in an ES1 circuit) in order to avoid
4847 shock and fire hazards. The contacts should not show wear and tear and pitting after
4848 tests simulating lifetime endurance; and overload tests and operate normally after
4849 such tests.
4850 G.2.1 Requirements
4851 Source: IEC 61810-1, for electromechanical relays controlling currents exceeding 0,2 A AC
4852 or DC, if the voltage across the open relay contacts exceeds 35 V peak AC or 24 V
4853 DC
4854 Rationale: A contact should not draw an arc that will cause pitting and damage to the contacts
4855 when switching off and should not weld when switching on if located in PS2 or PS3
4856 energy sources. A PS1 energy source is not considered to have enough energy to
4857 cause pitting and damage to the contacts. Both these actions (pitting and damage)
4858 may result in lot of heating that may result in fire. There should be sufficient gap
4859 between the two contact points in the off position which should be equal to the
4860 reinforced clearance if the circuit is ES3 and basic clearance if the circuit is ES2 or
4861 ES1 (we may have an arcing PIS or resistive PIS in an ES1 circuit) in order to avoid
4862 shock and fire hazards. The contacts should not show wear and tear and pitting after
4863 tests simulating lifetime endurance, and overload tests and operate normally after
4864 such tests.
4865 G.3.3 PTC thermistors
4866 Source: IEC 60730-1:2006
4867 Rationale: PTC thermistor for current limitation is always connected in series with the load to
4868 be protected.
4869 In a non-tripping stage, the source voltage is shared by the load impedance and the
4870 resistance of PTC thermistor (which is close to the zero-power resistance at 25 °C).
4871 In order to define the power dissipation of the PTC thermistor in this stage, the
4872 source voltage and the load impedance are also important parameters.
4873 In a tripping stage, the PTC thermistor heats up by itself and increases the resistance
4874 value to protect the circuit. The zero-power resistance at 25 °C is no longer related
4875 to the power dissipation of PTC thermistors in this stage. The power dissipation of
4876 PTC thermistor in this stage depends on factors such as mounting condition and
4877 ambient temperature.
4878 In either stage, some parameters other than the rated zero-power resistance at an
4879 ambient temperature of 25 °C are required to calculate the power dissipation of PTC
4880 thermistor.
4881 The tripping stage is more hazardous than the non-tripping stage because the
4882 temperature of the PTC thermistor in the tripping stage becomes much higher than
4883 in the non-tripping stage.
4884 Figure 49 in this document shows “Voltage-Current Characteristics”. The blue dotted
4885 lines show the constant power dissipation line. It shows that the power at the
4886 operation point, during the tripping stage, is the highest power dissipation. This
4887 point is calculable with “I res x U max ” of IEC 60738-1:2006, 3.38.
– 141 – 108/757/DC
4888 (U max = maximum voltage, I res = residual current, measured by the PTC
4889 manufacturers.)
4890
4891
4892 Figure 49 – Voltage-current characteristics (Typical data)
4893 If the PTC is installed in a PS1 circuit, the power dissipation of the PTC will be
4894 15W or less. In this state, the PTC is not considered to be a resistive PIS,
4895 regardless of its I res x U max .
4896 A PTC with a size of less than 1 750 mm 3 is not considered to be a resistive
4897 PIS, described in 6.3.1, 6.4.5.2 and 6.4.6.
4898 G.3.4 Overcurrent protective devices
4899 Rationale: Just like any other safety critical component, protective devices are not allowed
4900 to be used outside their specifications, to guarantee safe and controlled
4901 interruption (no fire and explosion phenomena’s) during single fault
4902 conditions (short circuits and overload conditions) in the end products. This
4903 should include having a breaking capacity capable of interrupting the maximum
4904 fault current (including short-circuit current and earth fault current) that can
4905 occur.
4906 G.3.5 Safeguard components not mentioned in G.3.1 to G.3.4
4907 Rationale: Protective devices shall have adequate ratings, including breaking capacity.
– 142 – 108/757/DC
4908 G.5.1 Wire insulation in wound components

4909 Source: IEC 60317 series, IEC 60950-1
4910 Purpose: Enamel winding wire is acceptable as basic insulation between external circuit
4911 at ES2 voltage level and an ES1.
4912 Rationale: ES1 becomes ES2 under single fault conditions. The enamel winding wires
4913 have been used in telecom transformers for the past 25 years to provide basic
4914 insulation between TNV and SELV. The winding wire is type tested for electric
4915 strength for basic insulation in addition to compliance with IEC 60317 series of
4916 standards. Enamel is present on both input and output winding wires and
4917 therefore, the possibility of having pinholes aligned is minimized. The finished
4918 component is tested for routine test for the applicable electric strength test
4919 voltage.
4920 G.5.2 Endurance test
4921 Source: IEC 60065:2011, 8.18
4922 Rationale: This test is meant to determine if insulated winding wires without additional
4923 interleaved insulation will isolate for their expected lifetime. The endurance test
4924 comprises a heat run test, a vibration test and a humidity test. After those tests,
4925 the component still has to be able to pass the electric strength test.
4926 G.5.2.2 Heat run test
4927 Rationale: In Table G.2, the tolerance is ± 5 °C. It is proposed that the above tolerance be
4928 the same.
4929 G.5.3 Transformers
4930 Source: IEC 61558-1, IEC 60950-1
4931 Rationale: Alternative requirements have been successfully used with products in the scope
4932 of this document for many years.
4933 G.5.3.3 Transformer overload tests
4934 G.5.3.3.2 Compliance criteria

4935 Source: IEC 61558-1, IEC 60950-1
4936 Rationale: The transformer overload test is conducted mainly to check the deterioration by
4937 thermal stress due to overload conditions, and the compliance criteria is to check
4938 whether the temperature of the windings are within the allowable limits specified
4939 in Table G.3. For that purpose, the maximum temperature of windings is
4940 measured.
4941 However, in the actual testing condition, the windings or other current carrying
4942 parts of the transformer under testing may pose temperature higher than the
4943 measured value due to uneven temperature, such as a windings isolated from
4944 the mains (see third paragraph of G.5.3.3.2), so that such spot exposed to higher
4945 temperature may have thermal damage.
4946 In order to evaluate such potential damage, electric strength test after the
4947 overload condition is considered necessary.
4948 Both of the source documents require the electric strength test after the overload
4949 test.
4950 Table G.3 Temperature limits for transformer windings and for motor windings (except
4951 for the motor running overload test)
4952 Although the document does not clearly state it, the first row should also be used
4953 in cases where no protective device is used or the component is inherently
4954 protected by impedance.
– 143 – 108/757/DC
4955 For example, in the test practice of a switch mode power supply, a transformer
4956 is to be intentionally loaded to the maximum current without a protection
4957 operating. In this case, the method of protection is NOT ‘inherently’ or
4958 ‘impedance’, but other sets of limits are specified with the time of protection to
4959 operate. In reality, a switch mode transformer tested with a maximum load
4960 attempting the protection not to operate, but the limits in first row have been
4961 considered appropriate, because the thermal stress in that loading condition
4962 continues for a long time (no ending). Thus, the lowest limit should be applied.
4963 In this context, the application of the first row limit shall be chosen according to
4964 the situation of long lasting overloading rather than the type of protection.
4965 G.5.3.4 Transformers using fully insulated winding wire (FIW)
4966 Source: IEC 60317-56, IEC 60317-0-7
4967 Rationale: In 2012, IEC TC 55 published IEC 60317-56 and IEC 60317-0-7, Specification
4968 for Particular Types of Winding Wires – Part 0-7: General requirements – Fully
4969 insulated (FIW) zero-defect enamelled round copper wire with nominal conductor
4970 diameter of 0,040 mm to 1,600 mm.
4971 This wire is more robust enameled-coated wire used with minimal amounts of
4972 interleaved insulation. It is another step in the advancement of technology to
4973 allow manufacturers to design smaller products safely.
4974 IEC TC 96 was the first TC to incorporate the use of FIW in their safety
4975 documents for switch mode power supply units, IEC 61558-2-16. Since G.5.3.1
4976 references IEC 61558-1-16 as one of the acceptable documents for transformers
4977 used in switch mode power supplies, FIW already is acceptable in equipment
4978 investigated to IEC 62368-1 that use an IEC 61558-1-16 compliant transformer.
4979 FIW may not be accessible, whether it has basic insulation, double insulation
4980 or reinforced insulation. Note that this differs from other parts of the document
4981 that permit supplementary insulation and reinforced insulation to be
4982 accessible to an ordinary person. The reason is that this kind of wire is fragile
4983 and the insulation could easily be damaged when it is accessible to an ordinary
4984 person.
4985 G.5.4 Motors
4986 Source: IEC 60950-1
4987 Rationale: Requirements have been successfully used with products in the scope of this
4989 G.7 Mains supply cords
4990 Source: IEC 60245 (rubber insulation), IEC 60227 (PVC insulation), IEC 60364-5-54
4991 Rationale: Mains connections generally have large normal and fault energy available from
4992 the mains circuits. It is also necessary to ensure compatibility with installation
4993 requirements.
4994 Stress on mains terminal that can result in an ignition source owing to lose or
4995 broken connections shall be minimized.
4996 Terminal size and construction requirements are necessary to ensure adequate
4997 current-carrying capacity and reliable connection such that the possibility of
4998 ignition is reduced.
4999 Wiring flammability is necessary to reduce flame propagation potential should
5000 ignition take place.
5001 Conductor size requirements are necessary to ensure adequate current-carrying
5002 capacity and reliable connection such that the possibility of ignition is reduced.
– 144 – 108/757/DC
5003 Alternative cords to rubber and PVC are accepted to allow for PVC free
5004 alternatives to be used. At the time of development of the document, IEC TC20
5005 had no published documents available for these alternatives. However, several
5006 countries do have established requirements. Therefore, it was felt that these
5007 alternatives should be allowed.
5008 G.7.3 – G.7.5 Mains supply cord anchorage, cord entry, bend protection
5009 Source: IEC 60065:2011 and IEC 60950-1:2013
5010 Purpose: Robustness requirements for cord anchorages
5011 Rationale: The requirements for cord anchorages, cord entry, bend protection and cord
5012 replacement are primarily based on 16.5 and 16.6 of IEC 60065:2011 and 3.2.6
5013 and 3.2.7 of IEC 60950-1:2013.
5014 Experience shows that 2 mm displacement is the requirement and if an
5015 appropriate strain relief is used there is no damage to the cord and therefore, no
5016 need to conduct an electric strength test in most cases. This method has been
5017 successfully used for products in the scope of these documents for many years.
5018 G.8 Varistors
5019 Source: IEC 61051-1 and IEC 61051-2
5020 Rationale: The magnitude of external transient overvoltage (mainly attributed to lightning),
5021 to which the equipment is exposed, depends on the location of the equipment.
5022 This idea is described in Table 14 of IEC 62368-1 and also specified in
5023 IEC 60664-1.
5024 In response to this idea, IEC 61051-2 has been revised taking into account the
5025 location of the equipment, which also influences the requirement for the varistors
5026 used in the equipment.
5027 The combination pulse test performed according to G.8.2 of IEC 62368-1 can
5028 now refer to the new IEC 61051-2 with Amendment 1.
5029 G.9 Integrated circuit (IC) current limiters
5030 Source: IEC 60730-1, IEC 60950-1
5031 Rationale: Integrated circuits (containing numerous integral components) are frequently
5032 used for class 1 and class 2 energy source isolation and, more frequently (for
5033 example, USB or PoE), for functions such as current limiting.
5034 IEC 60335 series already has requirements for “electronic protection devices,”
5035 where conditioning tests such as EMF impulses are applied to such ICs, and the
5036 energy source isolation or current limiting function is evaluated after conditioning
5037 tests. When such energy isolation or current limitation has been proven reliable
5038 via performance, pins on the IC associated with this energy isolation or limitation
5039 are not shorted.
5040 For ICs used for current limitation, two test programs were used in
5041 IEC 60950-1:2009. An additional program was developed in IEC 62368-1:2010.
5042 It was felt that all three programs were considered adequate. Therefore, the
5043 three methods were kept.
5044 An Ad Hoc formed at the March 2015, Northbrook HBSDT meeting revised this
5045 test program with the following guiding principles:
5046 a) Streamline the number of tests in overall test program to concentrate on
5047 those tests and conditions that most likely will identify deficiencies in IC
5048 Current Limiter design from a safety perspective, such as allowing more
5049 current to flow than designed for. Some of the existing conditions are
5050 redundant or have questionable value identifying such deficiencies.
5051 b) Focus on test conditions that are applicable for semiconductor devices
5052 rather than test conditions more suited for traditional electro-mechanical
– 145 – 108/757/DC
5053 devices. For example, 10 000-cycle testing has more applicability to

5054 electro-mechanical devices (in relation to parts wearing out) versus
5055 semiconductor devices (such as IC current limiters).
5056 c) Combine test conditions when justified to increase efficiency when

5057 conducting individual tests, also trying to make the testing more compatible
5058 with automated testing processes (for example, combine individual
5059 temperature tests as individual sub-conditions of other required tests).
5060 Table G.10 provides the specific performance test program for IC current
5061 limiters.
5062 − Input loading to the device should be representative of the manufacturer’s IC
5063 specification (as typically communicated in the IC application notes for the
5064 particular device).
5065 − Output loading is intended to represent a short circuit condition (0 Ω shunt),
5066 with parallel capacitive loading (470 µF +/- 20 %) to better accommodate
5067 on/off cycling.
5068 See Figure 50 in this document for additional detail.
5069
5070 Figure 50 – Example of IC current limiter circuit
5071 Regarding the 250 VA provision, this provision is intended to mean that the usual
5072 test power source has 250 VA capability as long as the IC is designed for
5073 installation in a system with a source of 250 VA or larger. If the power source
5074 capability is intended to be less than 250 VA, then the manufacturer must specify
5075 so, or test in the end product. Testing at 250 VA is intended to include 250 VA
5076 or larger sources because the test program is covering relatively small and low-
5077 voltage silicon devices – if these devices pass at 250 VA they likely would pass
5078 at higher VA too since they are not electro-mechanical. Also, this allows for more
5079 practical associated certification test programs.
5080 Also, to avoid recertification of existing components, IC current limiters that met
5081 a previous legacy test program (G.9.2, G.9.3 or G.9.4) are an equivalent level of
5082 safety as the proposed rewritten Clause G.9, primarily because Clause G.9 is
5083 derivation of the legacy requirements. Therefore, IC current limiters that comply
5084 with the legacy test program should not need to be reinvestigated to the latest
5085 document that includes this revised Clause G.9. However, this is a certification
5086 consideration outside the scope of this technical committee.
– 146 – 108/757/DC
5087 G.11 Capacitors and RC units

5088 Source: IEC 60384-14:2005
5089 Rationale: Table G.11: Test voltage values aligned with those used in IEC 60384-14 (Tables
5090 1, 2 and 10 of IEC 60384-14:2005).
5091 Table G.12: Minimum number of Y capacitors based on required withstand
5092 voltage of Table 25.
5093 Table G.13: Maximum voltage that can appear across a Y capacitor based on
5094 the peak value of the working voltage of Table 26.
5095 Table G.14: Minimum number of Y capacitors based on the test voltages (due to
5096 temporary overvoltages) of Table 27.
5097 Table G.15: Minimum number of X capacitors (line to line or line to neutral) based
5098 on the mains transient withstand voltage of Table 13.
5099 All of the above are aligned with the requirements of IEC 60384-14.
5100 G.13 Printed boards
5101 Source: IEC 60950-1 or IEC 60664-3:2003.
5102 Purpose: To provide details for reliable construction of PCBs.
5103 Rationale: This proposal is based on IEC 60664-3 and the work of IBM and UL in testing
5104 coatings on printed boards when using coatings to achieve insulation
5105 coordination of printed board assemblies. Breakdown voltages of more than
5106 8 000 V for 0,025 mm were routinely achieved in this program.
5107 These parts have multiple stresses on the materials with limited separation
5108 between conductors. This section is taken from IEC 60950-1, where these
5109 requirements have been used for many years.
5110 G.13.6 Tests on coated printed boards
5111 Purpose: Prevent breakdown of the insulation safeguard.
5112 Rationale: Avoid pinholes or bubbles in the coating or breakthrough of conductive tracks at
5113 corners.
5114 G.14 Coatings on component terminals
5115 Source: IEC 60950-1 and IEC 60664-3
5116 Purpose: The mechanical arrangement and rigidity of the terminations are adequate to
5117 ensure that, during normal handling, assembly into equipment and subsequent
5118 use, the terminations will not be subject to deformation which would crack the
5119 coating or reduce the separation distances between conductive parts.
5120 Rationale: The terminations are treated like coated printed boards (see G.13.3) and the
5121 same separation distances apply.
5122 This section is taken from IEC 60950-1 where these requirements have been
5123 used for many years.
5124 G.15 Pressurized liquid filled components
5125 Source: IEC 60065, IEC 60950-1, IEC 61010-1, UL 1995, UL 2178, ASHRAE TC9.9 &
5126 ASME B31 series and EU PED
5127 Purpose: Avoid spillage of liquids resulting in electric shock hazard
5128 Rationale: The requirements apply to products that use water cooling technologies. Section
5129 G.15.2 provides the requirements for self-contained devices, containing less
5130 than 1 l of liquid, and G.15.3 provides the requirements for modular. A leak in
5131 the system near a hazardous voltage, may result in a shock hazard and
5132 therefore, needs to be properly addressed. A leak is not desirable and therefore,
5133 a strict performance criterion is proposed.
– 147 – 108/757/DC
5134 The decision flowchart illustrates and helps to explain demarcation points
5135 between self-contained and modular LFC systems and which requirements to
5136 apply.
LFC Test
Requirements
YES
System contains Test According to G.15.3
Modular LFC?
NO
Test According to G.15.2
5137
5138 Figure 51 – Decision flowchart
5139
5140 Rationale: Additional considerations must be taken into account when incorporating 2-
5141 phase refrigerants. Refrigerants are classified based on toxicity (first letter) and
5142 flammability (second/third number/letter). Refrigerant’s toxicity classification “A”
5143 is less hazardous than “B”. Likewise, Refrigerant flammability classifications “1”,
5144 “2L”, “2” and “3”, ranging from no flame propagation potential to higher
5145 flammability potential. For example, a refrigerant classified as “A1” is lower risk
5146 for toxicity and flammability than a “B2” refrigerant.
5147 European Union (EU) Pressure Equipment Directive (PED), 2014/68/EU,
5148 includes caveats for applicability of smaller systems that are low risk.
5149 Refrigeration systems having a pressure greater than 0.05 MPa (72.5 PSI) are
5150 considered to be assemblies falling within the scope of the PED. However,
5151 according to Article 1, item 2(f) of the directive, equipment classified no higher
5152 than Category I and covered by the low voltage directive is excluded from its
5153 scope.
5154 According to guidelines of the PED, this exclusion applies to both components
5155 and assemblies (refrigerant filled components). This applies to equipment
5156 containing vessels (for example, compressors, receivers) or piping with limits in
5157 accordance with the following (i.e. Category I limits for gases):
5158 − Vessels
5159 • dangerous refrigerants (Annex II, Table 1):
5160 − volume not exceeding 1 l, or
5161 − pressure x volume not exceeding 5 MPa
5162 • non-dangerous refrigerants (Annex II, Table 2):
5163 − volume not exceeding 1 l, or
5164 − pressure x volume not exceeding 20 MPa
5165 − Piping
5166 • dangerous refrigerants (Annex II, Table 6):
5167 − numerical designation not exceeding 25, or
5168 − pressure not exceeding 1 MPa and numerical designation not exceeding 100,
5169 or
– 148 – 108/757/DC
5170 − pressure exceeding 1 MPa and pressure x numerical designation not

5171 exceeding 100 MPa
5172 • non-dangerous refrigerants (Annex II, Table 7):
5173 − numerical designation not exceeding 100, or
5174 − pressure x numerical designation not exceeding 350 MPa.
5175 For other components, the most onerous limit of the two applies. The volume
5176 is the internal volume of the vessel and includes the volume of pipework up to
5177 the first connection. It excludes the volume of fixed internal parts. The pressure
5178 is the maximum pressure the vessel or piping system is exposed to, as specified
5179 by the manufacturer of the equipment.
5180 NOTE 1 The numerical designation (ND) designates the size common to all components in the
5181 piping system
5182 If any component exceeds the limits given above, the equipment has to also
5183 comply with the PED. The PED technical requirements are given in Annex I and
5184 the conformity assessment tables and procedures in Annexes II and III
5185 respectively. Other refrigeration standards may need to be consulted for large-
5186 scale refrigeration systems (see below).
5187 NOTE 2 Large-scale refrigeration systems would include systems exceeding PED Category 1.
5188 Additional Refrigeration Standard References (not fully exhaustive):

5189 − IEC 60335-2-40:2018, Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety –
5190 Part 2-40: Particular requirements for electrical heat pumps, air-conditioners,
5191 and dehumidifiers
5192 − IEC 61010-011:2019, Safety requirements for electrical equipment for
5193 measurement, control, and laboratory use - Part 2-011: Particular
5194 requirements for refrigerating equipment
5195 − ASHRAE 15, Safety Standard for Refrigeration Systems
5196 − ASHRAE 34, Designation and Safety Classification of Refrigerants
5197 − IEC 60335-2-89, Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part
5198 2-89: Particular requirements for commercial refrigerating appliances and ice-
5199 makers with an incorporated or remote refrigerant unit or motor-compressor
5200 − ISO 5149 series, Refrigerating systems and heat pumps — Safety and
5201 environmental
5202 − requirements
5203 − ISO 817, Refrigerants - Designation and safety classification
5204 − UL 1995, Heating and Cooling Equipment (safety)
5205 − EN 378 series, Refrigerating systems and heat pumps. Safety and
5206 environmental requirements.
5207 − EN 13445 series, Unfired pressure vessels
5208 − EN 13480 series, Metallic industrial piping
5209 IEC 60335-2-40:2018, Annex EE specify pressure tests for refrigeration systems.
5210 The pressure tests value shall be at least 3x maximum allowable pressure
5211 developed during all of the following conditions:
5212 − Normal operation (Clause 11, Heating),
5213 − Abnormal operation (Clause 19),
5214 − Standstill Conditions (Annex EE.4)
5215 NOTE 3 Components that comply with the fatigue test in EE.5 can reduce pressure test to 2x
5216 maximum allowable pressure (67% of original test pressure).
– 149 – 108/757/DC
5217 The test is carried out on 3 samples of each component. Pressure is raised
5218 gradually until test pressure is reached and then maintained for at least 1 minute.
5219 During the test, the samples shall not leak.
5220 NOTE 4 Where gaskets are employed for sealing samples, leakage in gaskets are acceptable,
5221 assuming the leakage occurs at a pressure greater than 120% of the maximum allowable pressure
5222 and test pressure is still reached for the specified time.
5223 G.15.2 Test methods and compliance criteria for self-contained LFC
Self-Contained LFC System
Equipment enclosure
Heat Exchanger
Pump Cold Plate
(Radiator)
CPU
FAN
Motherboard
5224
5225 Figure 52 – Illustration of a self-contained LFC system
5226 The requirements were developed based on the following description of a typical
5227 system using liquid filled heat sinks. If a different type of system is used, then
5228 the requirements need to be re-evaluated.
5229 Liquid filled heat-sink system (LFHS): a typical system consists of a heat
5230 exchanger, fan, pump, tubing, fittings and cold plate or radiator type heat
5231 exchanger. The liquid filled heat sink comes from the vendor already charged,
5232 sealed; and is installed and used inside the equipment (small type, typically
5233 found in cell stations and computing devices or other types of systems). The
5234 proposed requirements are based on a LFHS being internal to a unit,
5235 used/installed adjacent/over ES1 circuits, in proximity to an enclosed power
5236 supply (not open frame).
5237 The liquid-filled heat components are used in desktop units or stationary
5238 equipment and in printers. These are not used in any portable equipment where
5239 orientation may change (unless the product is tested in all such orientations. If
5240 the liquid heat sink system is of a sealed type construction, then the system is
5241 orientation proof (this should not be a concern but a good engineering practice
5242 is that the pump does not become the high point in the system).
5243 Following assumptions are used:
5244 – The tubing is a single-layered metal (copper or aluminium) or non-metallic
5245 construction. If it is non-metallic, flammability requirements will apply.
5246 – The fittings are metal. If it is non-metallic, flammability requirements will
5247 apply.
5248 – Working pressure is determined under normal operating conditions and
5249 abnormal operating conditions and construction (tubing, fitting, heat
5250 exchanger, any joints, etc.) is suitable for this working pressure;
5251 – The volume of the liquid is reasonable (less than 1 000 ml).
5252 – The fluid does not cause corrosion and is not flammable (for example,
5253 corrosion resistant and non-flammable liquid).
5254 – The liquid is non-toxic as specified for the fluid material.
– 150 – 108/757/DC
5255 G.15.3 Test methods and compliance criteria for a Modular LFC
Modular LFC System
Server
Server Node
Cold Plate
CPU
Motherboard Chiller
Manifold Distribution
Server Node Unit
Cold Plate
CPU
Motherboard
5256
5257 Figure 53 – Illustration of a modular LFC system
5258 G.15.3.1 Hydrostatic pressure test

5259 Rationale: Based on input from ASHRAE TC9.9, Data Center Networking Equipment use
5260 single-phase cooling systems (typically water/glycol mix or facility water) which
5261 should align with facility piping standards used in facility water systems.
5262 ASHRAE & ASME B31 Series standards: According to ASME B31.5 piping
5263 standard, the hydrostatic Pressure test for water-based coolants is 1.5x max
5264 design pressure or 50 psig whichever is greater. The test levels are based on
5265 maximum design pressure for the respective fluid loop.
5266 EU PED: According to the European pressure directive essential requirements,
5267 the hydrostatic test pressure for pressure vessels must be no less than
5268 corresponding to the maximum loading to which the pressure equipment may be
5269 subject in service taking into account its maximum allowable pressure and its
5270 maximum allowable temperature, multiplied by the coefficient 1,25, or the
5271 maximum allowable pressure multiplied by the coefficient 1,43, whichever is the
5272 greater.
5273 Hydrostatic test multipliers should be applied to maximum operating pressure
5274 under normal, abnormal, and single-fault conditions. This could be:
5275 − max rated pressure (from external source)
5276 − max pressure setting of overpressure safety device
5277 − max pressure generated within the device or assembly that is not relying on
5278 overpressure safety device
5279 NOTE For flammable, toxic, or corrosive liquids additional requirements may apply (e.g. other
5280 standards, local codes for HazLoc, etc.).
5281 Applicable standards that specify hydrostatic pressure strength type testing
5282 require a 1 min duration (e.g. IEC 61010-1, UL 1995, UL 2178,). These are
5283 proven/tested standards that the industry/test labs commonly use.
– 151 – 108/757/DC
Example of Complete
Self-Contained LFC < 1 liter Modular Subsystem
(G.15)
Supplementary Safeguard
(to protect downstream
CDU* (Max Pressure 100 LFC components)
PSI)
Server Rail (Max Pressure Pressure

NOTE: During system level hydrostatic
100 PSI) testing, PRV(s) are removed and piping
Relief Valve blocked for testing upstream system
(PRV) Set @ elements. Depending on LFC’s max
80 PSI pressure ratings, hydrostatic pressure
Server Rail (Max Pressure
tests may need to be done in stages.
80 PSI)
Rack System Facility

Facility Water System (Max
Water Pressure 120PSI)
Pressure
100 PSI) Supplementary Safeguard
Relief Valve
(to protect downstream
(PRV) Set @
LFC components)
80 PSI
80 PSI)
Manifold
Pressure
Server Rail (Max Pressure Relief Valve
150 PSI) (PRV) Set @
100 PSI

150 PSI)
Manifold
100 PSI)
* NOTE: CDU’s may be rack mounted or free-standing. Smaller CDU’s (as shown) tend to be
rackmounted, while larger CDU’s are free-standing equipment and tend to be outside the rack.
5284
5285 Figure 54 – Example illustration of a rack modular LFC subsystems with internal and
5286 external connections.
5287 Common ASHRAE TC 9.9 Acronym and Terms:

5288 − CDU – Coolant Distribution Unit
5289 − FWS – Facilities Water System
5290 − TCS – Technology Cooling System
5291 − RFU – Rack Filtration Unit
5292 − FFU – Facility Filtration Unit
5293 − Wetted materials/equipment – components/assemblies within the cooling
5294 system that may directly contact the coolant.
– 152 – 108/757/DC
5295
5296 Figure 55 – CDU Liquid Cooling System within a Data Center (courtesy of ASHRAE
5297 TC9.9)
Building
Datacom Equipment Center
Cooling Facilities Water

Tower System Rack Rack
(FWS)
ITE ITE
RFU
Chiller
FFU
Condenser Water
System
5298 (CWS)
5299 Figure 56 – Non-CDU Liquid Cooling System within Data Center (courtesy of ASHRAE
5300 TC9.9)
5301
– 153 – 108/757/DC
5302 Explanation to why Vibration testing was not included for Modular LFC
5303 Vibration testing is not included in the requirements for large liquid cooled
5304 systems. Such testing is intended to simulate vibration occurring in
5305 transportation and during use. Generally, its use as a test discipline is more
5306 closely associated with the reliability and quality of the equipment/system than
5307 product safety. Furthermore, because such large liquid cooled systems will be
5308 subjected to hydrostatic pressure testing at 1.5 times maximum rated working
5309 pressure, it is expected that such hydrostatic pressure testing encompasses any
5310 deficiencies that might be discovered via vibration testing, and thus such large
5311 liquid cooled systems will not be further compromised due to vibration to a
5312 degree that equipment safeguards would be defeated. Finally, it is assumed that
5313 such large liquid cooled systems, by nature of being part of professional
5314 equipment, will be subject to onsite inspections during the equipment
5315 commissioning process to ensure that all systems and components, including
5316 liquid cooling, are functioning per the manufacturer’s operational requirements
5317 before use.
5318 G.15.3.6 Compliance Criteria
5319 Rationale: Final installation of the product if up to the final integrator. 100% leak free
5320 inspection is expected, no spill near hazardous voltage should happen.
5321 ___________
5322 Annex H Criteria for telephone ringing signals
5323 H.2 Method A

5324 Source: IEC 62949:2016.
5325 Rationale: Certain voltages within telecommunication networks often exceed the steady
5326 state, safe-to-touch limits set within general safety documents. Years of practical
5327 experience by world-wide network operators have found ringing and other
5328 operating voltages to be electrically safe. Records of accident statistics indicate
5329 that electrical injuries are not caused by operating voltages.
5330 Access to connectors carrying such signals with the standard test finger is
5331 permitted, provided that inadvertent access is unlikely. The likelihood of
5332 inadvertent access is limited by forbidding access with the test probe Figure 2C
5333 of IEC 60950-1:2013 that has a 6 mm radius tip.
5334 This requirement ensures that:
5335 – contact by a large part of the human body, such as the back of the hand, is
5336 impossible;
5337 – contact is possible only by deliberately inserting a small part of the body,
5338 less than 12 mm across, such as a fingertip, which presents a high
5339 impedance;
5340 – the possibility of being unable to let-go the part in contact does not arise.
5341 This applies both to contact with signals arriving from the network and to signals
5342 generated internally in the equipment, for example, ringing signals for extension
5343 telephones. By normal standards, these internally generated signals would
5344 exceed the voltage limits for accessible parts, but the first exemption in
5345 IEC 60950-1 states that limited access should be permitted under the above
5346 conditions.
5347 Ventricular fibrillation of the heart is considered to be the main cause of death
5348 by electric shock. The threshold of ventricular fibrillation (Curve A) is shown in
5349 Figure 57 in this document and is equivalent to curve c1 of IEC TS 60479-1:2005,
5350 Figure 14. The point 500 mA/100 ms has been found to correspond to a
5351 fibrillation probability of the order of 0,14 %. The let go limit (Curve B) is
5352 equivalent to curve 2 of IEC TS 60479-1:2005, Figure 14. Some experts consider
– 154 – 108/757/DC
5353 curve A to be the appropriate limit for safe design, but use of this curve is
5354 considered as an absolute limit.
5355
5356 Figure 57 – Current limit curves
5357 Contact with telecommunication operating voltages (EN 41003)

5358 Total body impedance consists of two parts, the internal body resistance of blood
5359 and tissue and the skin impedance. Telecommunication voltages hardly reach
5360 the level where skin impedance begins to rapidly decrease due to breakdown.
5361 The skin impedance is high at low voltages, its value varying widely. The effects
5362 of skin capacitance are negligible at ringing frequencies.
5363 IEC TS 60479-1 body impedance figures are based upon a relatively large
5364 contact area of 50 cm 2 to 100 cm 2 , which is a realistic value for mains operated
5365 domestic appliances. Practical telecommunication contact is likely to be much
5366 less than this, typically 10 cm 2 to 15 cm 2 for uninsulated wiring pliers or similar
5367 tools and less than 1 cm 2 for finger contact with pins of a telephone wall socket.
5368 For contact with thin wires, wiring tags or contact with tools where fingers move
5369 beyond insulated handles, the area of contact will again be of the order of 1 cm 2
5370 or less. These much smaller areas of contact with the body produce significantly
5371 higher values of body impedance than the IEC TS 60479 figures.
5372 In IEC 60950-1, a body model value of 5 kΩ is used to provide a margin of safety
5373 compared with the higher practical values of body impedance for typical
5374 telecommunication contact areas.
5375 The curve B' [curve C 1 of IEC TS 60479-1:2005, Figure 22 (curve A in this
5376 document)] used within the hazardous voltage definition is a version of curve B
5377 modified to cover practical situations, where the current limit is maintained
5378 constant at 16 mA above 1 667 ms. This 16 mA limit is still well within the
5379 minimum current value of curve A.
5380 The difficulties of defining conditions that will avoid circumstances that prevent
5381 let-go have led to a very restricted contact area being allowed.
5382 Contact with areas up to 10 cm 2 can be justified and means of specifying this
5383 and still ensuring let-go are for further study.
– 155 – 108/757/DC
5384 H.3 Method B

5385 Source: This method is based on USA CFR 47 ("FCC Rules") Part 68, Sub part D, with
5386 additional requirements that apply under fault conditions.
5387 ___________
5388 Annex J Insulated winding wires for use without interleaved insulation
5389 Source: IEC 60851-3:2009, IEC 60851-5:2008, IEC 60851-6:1996

5390 Purpose: Winding wires shall withstand mechanical, thermal and electrical stress during
5391 use and manufacturing.
5392 Rationale: Test data indicates that there is not a major difference between rectangular wires
5393 and round wires for electric strength after the bend tests. Therefore, there is no
5394 reason to not include them.
5395 Subclause 4.4.1 of IEC 60851-5:2008 covers only solid circular or stranded
5396 winding wires as a twisted pair can easily be formed from round wires. It is
5397 difficult to form a twisted pair from square or rectangular winding wires.
5398 IEC 60851-5:2008, 4.7 addresses a test method that can be used for square and
5399 rectangular wires. A separate test method for square and rectangular wires has
5400 been added. The test voltage is chosen to be half of the twisted pair as a single
5401 conductor is used for the testing.
5402 In addition, the edgewise bend test is not required by IEC 60851-5 and
5403 IEC 60851-6 for the rectangular and square winding wires.
5404 The reference to trichloroethane is being deleted as trichloroethane is an
5405 environmentally hazardous substance.
5406 For J.2.3 (Flexibility and adherence) and J.2.4 (Heat shock), 5.1.2 in Test 8 of
5407 IEC 60851-3:2009 and 3.2.1 of IEC 60851-6:1996 are not used for solid square
5408 and solid rectangular winding wires.
5409 ___________
5410 Annex K Safety interlocks
5411 Source: IEC 60950-1

5412 Purpose: To provide reliable means of safety interlock devices.
5413 Rationale: Safety interlock constructions have been used for many years in products within
5414 the scope of this document. Safety interlocks should not be associated with
5415 electro-mechanical components only.
5416 K.7.1 Safety interlocks
5417 Source: IEC 60950-1

5418 Purpose: To provide reliable means of safety interlock devices.
5419 Rationale: Clearance values specified in 5.4.2 are based on IEC 60664-1 and are specified
5420 for protection against electric shock. The values are the shortest distance
5421 through air between two different conductive parts. In that context, one conductor
5422 is at hazardous voltage (energy source) and another conductor is accessible to
5423 a person (body part). The required clearance is the minimum distance required
5424 to protect the person from being exposed to current causing electric shock. The
5425 distance acts as a safeguard against the hazardous energy source (ES2/ES3).
– 156 – 108/757/DC
5426 Contact gaps of interlock relays or switches are most likely not directly serving
5427 as the safeguard as explained above. Instead, the gap is meant to interrupt the
5428 electrical power to the energy sources, for example, motors generating MS2/3
5429 energy or laser units generating Class IIIb or larger energy. In this situation, the
5430 distance of the gap is required to interrupt the power supply to the device so
5431 that the device is shut down. Again, it is not for the purpose of blocking current
5432 to a body part.
5433 Although the purpose of the clearance is different, the required values based on
5434 IEC 60664-1 are used because there is no other data available addressing the
5435 minimum values required to establish circuit interruption to shut off the power to
5436 a load device. It is believed that the distance required to protect a person from
5437 shock hazard is sufficient to have a circuit interruption as part of proper circuit
5438 operation. The specified voltage in clause 5.4 is from 330 Vpeak or Vdc, and the
5439 contacts for interlock relays/switches most likely operate in DC low voltage such
5440 as 5 or 24 V, so much lower than 330 V. Mains operated contacts are required
5441 to have a gap for disconnect device that is much larger than the distance for
5442 insulation.
5443 Due to the above considerations, slight adjustment by altitude multiplication
5444 factor is not considered necessary for contact gaps of interlock relays/switches.
5445 ___________
5446 Annex L Disconnect devices
5447 Source: IEC 60065, IEC 60950-1

5448 Purpose: Primarily to provide a means to disconnect equipment from the mains for
5449 servicing, and secondarily to have available, if needed, a means to readily
5450 disconnect power for other reasons requiring power off.
5451 Rationale: Both IEC 60065 and IEC 60950 had a principle / requirement that a disconnect
5452 device was required for mains connected equipment for servicing. This also is
5453 the primary intent of the disconnect requirements in IEC 62368-1 although not
5454 stated in the Annex L requirement like it was in IEC 60065 and IEC 60950-1.
5455 For IEC 60950-1, since a significant portion of the equipment was permanently
5456 connected, or cord connected but large, sometimes with multiple cords (for
5457 example, in Data Centers), the need for a disconnect device for servicing was
5458 critical (via 3.4.2). When the purpose of the switch was not for servicing, like for
5459 paper shredders, another term was used like Isolating Switch (a form of a
5460 Disconnect Device), which is more aligned with the IEC defined term for
5461 “Isolation Device” (395-07-121), “a device in a circuit that prevents malfunction
5462 in one section of a circuit from causing unacceptable influences in other Sections
5463 of the circuit or other circuits.”
5464 IEC 60065 (via 5.5.3) also considered the need for a disconnect device to be
5465 readily operable (available) to turn off the equipment in case of an unexpected
5466 event, such as to prevent injury due to a defective safeguard, or for any other
5467 reason requiring power off.
5468 In IEC 62368-1, a disconnect device is used primarily as a means to disconnect
5469 power for servicing, whether permanent connected or cord-connected.
5470 Secondarily, it is available for use as means to disconnect power in an
5471 unexpected event or any other reason requiring power off.
5472 The technical requirements for disconnect devices in Annex L are based on the
5473 requirements for disconnect devices in both IEC 60065 (8.18) and IEC 60950-1
5474 (3.4.2).
– 157 – 108/757/DC
5475 For example, the 3 mm separation distance requirement has its origin with
5476 permanently connected equipment to provide additional assurance on integrity
5477 of the safeguard as skilled persons may be servicing circuits on the load side of
5478 the disconnect. Additionally, a clearance of 3 mm can withstand peak impulse
5479 voltages of 4 000 V, which corresponds to a transient overvoltage present in
5480 overvoltage category III environment (equipment as part of the building
5481 installation).
5482 ___________
5483 Annex M Equipment containing batteries and their protection circuits
5484 M.1 General requirements

5485 Rationale: Stand-alone battery chargers for general purpose batteries shall be evaluated
5486 using their relevant safety document, and not IEC 62368-1. If the battery and
5487 the charger are designed specifically for AV or ICT equipment and not to be used
5488 for other purposes, the provisions of IEC 62368-1, including Annex M may be
5489 applied.
5490 M.2 Safety of batteries and their cells
5491 Rationale: Equipment containing batteries shall be designed to reduce the risk of fire,
5492 explosion and chemical leaks under normal operating conditions and after a
5493 single fault condition in the equipment, including a fault in circuitry within the
5494 equipment battery pack. For batteries replaceable by an ordinary person or
5495 an instructed person, the design shall provide safeguards against reverse
5496 polarity installation or replacement of a battery pack from different component
5497 manufacturers if this would otherwise defeat a safeguard.
5498 Other clauses in this document address in generic terms safeguards associated
5499 with the use of batteries. This annex does not specifically address those
5500 safeguards, but it is expected that batteries and associated circuits conform to
5501 the relevant requirements in this document.
5502 This annex addresses safeguards that are unique to batteries and that are not
5503 addressed in other parts of the document. Energy sources that arise from the
5504 use of batteries are addressed in this annex and include the following:
5505 − situations where the battery is in a state that exceeds its specifications or
5506 ratings (for example, by overcharging, rapid-charge, rapid-discharge,
5507 overcurrent or overvoltage conditions);
5508 − thermal runaway due to overcharge or short circuits within battery cells;
5509 − reverse-charging of the battery;
5510 − leakage or spillage of electrolyte;
5511 − emission of explosive gases; and
5512 − location of safeguards where battery packs may be replaceable by an
5513 ordinary person or an instructed person.
5514 Thermal runaway in the cell can result in explosion or fire, when the
5515 temperature rise in the cell caused by the heat emission raises the internal cell
5516 pressure faster than can be released by the cell pressure release device.
5517 Thermal runaway can be initiated by several causes:
5518 − defects introduced into the cell during cell construction. These defects are
5519 often not detected during the manufacturing process and may bridge an
5520 internal insulation layer or block a vent;
5521 − over-charge and rapid-charge or rapid-discharge;
5522 − high operational temperature or high battery environment temperature;
– 158 – 108/757/DC
5523 − other cells in a pack feeding energy to a fault in a single cell; and
5524 − crushing of the enclosure.
5525 NOTE Batteries may contain multiple cells.
5526 During charging operation, gases are emitted from secondary cells and
5527 batteries excluding gastight sealed (secondary) cells, as the result of the
5528 electrolysis of water by electric current. Gases produced are hydrogen and
5529 oxygen.
5530 Table 18 in this document gives an overview of the referenced battery
5531 documents.
5532
– 159 – 108/757/DC
5533 Table 18 – Safety of batteries and their cells – requirements (expanded information on documents and scope)
Chemistry Category Movability
aqueous electrolyte
Alkaline; non-acid
Nickel; alkaline
Document Scope (details)
Various, with
NiCd/NiMH
Secondary
electrolyte
Stationary
Lead Acid
Portable
Primary
Various
Lithium
All
IEC 60086-4 (2014); Primary X X X Specifies tests and requirements for primary lithium
Batteries – Part 4 – Safety of batteries to ensure their safe operation under intended use
Lithium Batteries and reasonably foreseeable misuse (including coin /
button cell batteries).
IEC 60086-5 (2016): Primary X X X Specifies tests and requirements for primary batteries with
Batteries – Part 5 – Safety of aqueous electrolyte to ensure their safe operation under
batteries with aqueous electrolyte intended use and reasonably foreseeable misuse
(includes coin/button cell batteries).
IEC 60896-11 (2002): Stationary X X X X Applicable to lead-acid cells and batteries that are
Lead Acid Batteries – Part 11 – designed for service in fixed locations (for example, not
Vented type habitually to be moved from place to place) and which are
permanently connected to the load and to the DC power
supply. Batteries operating in such applications are called
"stationary batteries". Any type or construction of lead-acid
battery may be used for stationary battery applications.
Part 11 is applicable to vented types only.
IEC 60896-21 (2004): Stationary X X X X Applies to all stationary lead-acid cells and monobloc
Lead Acid Batteries – Part 21 – batteries of the valve regulated type for float charge
Valve regulated type – method of applications, (for example, permanently connected to a load
test and to a DC power supply), in a static location (for example,
not generally intended to be moved from place to place) and
incorporated into stationary equipment or installed in
battery rooms for use in telecom, uninterruptible power
supply (UPS), utility switching, emergency power or similar
applications. The objective is to specify the methods of test
for all types and construction of valve regulated stationary
lead acid cells and monobloc batteries used in standby
power applications.
– 160 – 108/757/DC
aqueous electrolyte
Alkaline; non-acid
Nickel; alkaline
Various, with
NiCd/NiMH
Secondary
electrolyte
Stationary
Lead Acid
Portable
Primary
Various
Lithium
All
IEC 60896-22 (2004): Stationary X X X X Applies to all stationary lead-acid cells and monobloc
Lead Acid Batteries – Part 22 – batteries of the valve regulated type for float charge
Valve regulated type – applications, (for example, permanently connected to a load
requirements and to a DC power supply), in a static location (for example,
not generally intended to be moved from place to place) and
incorporated into stationary equipment or installed in
battery rooms for use in telecom, uninterruptible power
supply (UPS), utility switching, emergency power or similar
applications. The objective is to assist the specifier in the
understanding of the purpose of each test contained within
IEC 60896-21 and provide guidance on a suitable
requirement that will result in the battery meeting the needs
of a particular industry application and operational
condition. This document is used in conjunction with the
common test methods described in IEC 60896-21 and is
associated with all types and construction of valve
regulated stationary lead-acid cells and monobloc batteries
used in standby power applications.
IEC 61056-1 (2012): General X X X X Specifies the general requirements, functional
purpose lead-acid batteries characteristics and methods of test for all general-purpose
(valve-regulated types) – Part 1: lead-acid cells and batteries of the valve-regulated type:
General requirements, functional
characteristics – Methods of test – for either cyclic or float charge application;
– in portable equipment, for instance, incorporated in
tools, toys, or in static emergency, or uninterruptible
power supply and general power supplies.
(For stationary applications, the battery will need to meet
IEC 60896-21/-22 or subject to additional evaluation).
– 161 – 108/757/DC
aqueous electrolyte
Alkaline; non-acid
Nickel; alkaline
Various, with
NiCd/NiMH
Secondary
electrolyte
Stationary
Lead Acid
Portable
Primary
Various
Lithium
All
IEC 61056-2 (2012): General X X X X Specifies the dimensions, terminals and marking for all
purpose lead-acid batteries general-purpose lead-acid cells and batteries of the valve
(valve-regulated types) – Part 2: regulated type:
Dimensions, terminals and
marking – for either cyclic or float charge application;
– in portable equipment, for instance, incorporated in
tools, toys, or in static emergency, or uninterruptible
power supply and general power supplies.
(For stationary applications, the battery will need to meet
IEC 60896-21/-22 or subject to additional evaluation).
IEC 61427 (all parts) (2013): X X X Part of a series that gives general information relating to
Secondary cells and batteries for the requirements for the secondary batteries used in
renewable energy storage – photovoltaic energy systems (PVES) and to the typical
General requirements and methods of test used for the verification of battery
methods of test – Part 1: performances. This part deals with cells and batteries used
Photovoltaic off-grid application in photovoltaic off-grid applications. This document is
applicable to all types of secondary batteries.
IEC TS 61430 (1997): Secondary X X X Specification gives guidance on procedures for testing the
Cells and Batteries – Test effectiveness of devices which are used to reduce the
Methods for Checking the hazards of an explosion, together with the protective
Performance of Devices Designed measures to be taken.
for Reducing Explosion Hazards –
Lead-Acid Starter Batteries
IEC 61434 (1996): Secondary X X X Applies to secondary cells and batteries containing
cells and batteries containing alkaline or other non-acid electrolytes. It proposes a
alkaline or other non-acid mathematically correct method of current designation which
electrolytes Guide to the shall be used in future secondary cell and battery
designation of current in alkaline documents.
secondary cell and battery
standards
– 162 – 108/757/DC
aqueous electrolyte
Alkaline; non-acid
Nickel; alkaline
Various, with
NiCd/NiMH
Secondary
electrolyte
Stationary
Lead Acid
Portable
Primary
Various
Lithium
All
IEC 61959 (2004): Secondary X X X Specifies tests and requirements for verifying the
cells and batteries containing mechanical behavior of sealed portable secondary cells
alkaline or other non-acid and batteries during handling and normal use.
electrolytes Mechanical tests for
sealed portable secondary cells
and batteries
IEC 62133 (all parts) (2012 – X X X X* Specifies requirements and tests for the safe operation of
superseded by IEC 62133-1 and portable sealed secondary cells and batteries (other than
IEC 62133-2); Secondary cells coin / button cell batteries) containing alkaline or other
and batteries containing alkaline non-acid electrolyte, under intended use and reasonably
or other non-acid electrolytes – foreseeable misuse.
Safety requirements for portable
sealed secondary cells, and for
batteries made from them, for use
in portable applications
IEC 62133-1 (2017): Secondary X X X Specifies requirements and tests for the safe operation of
cells and batteries containing portable sealed secondary nickel cells and batteries
alkaline or other non-acid containing alkaline electrolyte, under intended use and
electrolytes – Safety reasonably foreseeable misuse.
requirements for portable sealed
secondary cells, and for batteries
made from them, for use in
portable applications – Part 1:
Nickel systems
– 163 – 108/757/DC
aqueous electrolyte
Alkaline; non-acid
Nickel; alkaline
Various, with
NiCd/NiMH
Secondary
electrolyte
Stationary
Lead Acid
Portable
Primary
Various
Lithium
All
IEC 62133-2 (2017): Secondary X X X X* Specifies requirements and tests for the safe operation of
cells and batteries containing portable sealed secondary lithium cells and batteries
alkaline or other non-acid containing non-acid electrolyte, under intended use and
electrolytes – Safety reasonably foreseeable misuse.
requirements for portable sealed
secondary lithium cells, and for
batteries made from them, for use
in portable applications – Part 2:
Lithium systems
IEC 62281 (2016): Safety of X X X X Specifies test methods and requirements for primary and
primary and secondary lithium secondary (rechargeable) lithium cells and batteries to
cells and batteries during ensure their safety during transport other than for recycling
transport or disposal (similar to UN 38.3).
IEC 62485-2 X X X X Applies to stationary secondary batteries and battery
installations with a maximum voltage of 1 500 V DC
(2010): Safety requirements for (nominal) and describes the principal measures for
secondary batteries and battery protections against hazards generated from:
installations – Part 2: Stationary
batteries – electricity,
– gas emission,
– electrolyte.
Provides requirements on safety aspects associated with
the erection, use, inspection, maintenance and disposal. It
covers lead-acid and NiCd/NiMH batteries (IEC 62485-2
requires the valve regulated batteries to meet safety
requirements from IEC 60896).
– 164 – 108/757/DC
aqueous electrolyte
Alkaline; non-acid
Nickel; alkaline
Various, with
NiCd/NiMH
Secondary
electrolyte
Stationary
Lead Acid
Portable
Primary
Various
Lithium
All
IEC 62619 (2017): Secondary X X X Specifies requirements and tests for the safe operation of
cells and batteries containing secondary lithium cells and batteries used in industrial
alkaline or other non-acid applications including stationary applications.
electrolytes – Safety
requirements for secondary
lithium cells and batteries, for use
in industrial applications
* IEC 62133-2 (2017) may be used with stationary equipment for sub-system powering. Such batteries/packs typically are a similar format as batteries and battery packs used
in portable equipment and only provide sub-system powering of part(s) of the equipment for orderly shutdown and similar functional purposes in the event of power loss (compared
to storage batteries for full system powering).
5534
– 165 – 108/757/DC
5535 M.3 Protection circuits for batteries provided within the equipment
5536 Rationale: Equipment containing batteries is categorized into two types;
5537 1. Equipment containing batteries which are embedded in the equipment and
5538 cannot be separated from the equipment.
5539 2. Equipment containing batteries which can be separated from the equipment.
5540 The requirements in IEC 62368-1 cover only the battery circuits that are not an
5541 integral part of the battery itself, and as such form a part of the equipment.
5542 M.4 Additional safeguards for equipment containing a portable secondary lithium
5543 battery
5544 Rationale: M.4 applies to all equipment with lithium batteries. M.4.4 applies only to
5545 equipment as specified in M.4.4 (typically portable equipment).
5546 Secondary lithium batteries (often called lithium-ion or li-ion batteries) are
5547 expected to have high performance, such as light-weight and high energy
5548 capability. The use of li-ion batteries has been continuously expanding in the
5549 area of high-tech electronic equipment. However, it is said that this technology
5550 involves risks because the safety margin (distance between safe-operation zone
5551 and unsafe-operation zone) is relatively small compared to other battery
5552 technologies.
5553 IEC TC 108 noted that for designing equipment containing or using li-ion battery,
5554 it is imperative to give careful consideration to selecting highly reliable battery
5555 cells, providing high performance battery management systems for operating
5556 batteries within their specified operating environment and parameter range (for
5557 example, battery surrounding temperature or battery charging/discharging
5558 voltage and current). It is also imperative to introduce safeguards against
5559 abnormal operating conditions, such as vibration during the use of devices,
5560 mechanical shock due to equipment drop, surge signals caused internally or
5561 externally, and a mechanism to reduce the likelihood of catastrophic failure such
5562 as battery explosion or fire.
5563 It is suggested that suppliers of equipment and batteries should take into
5564 account possible abnormal operating conditions that may occur during use,
5565 transport, stock, and disposal, so that the equipment is well prepared for such
5566 conditions.
5567 It is important that the key parameters (highest/lowest charging temperatures,
5568 maximum charging current, and upper limit charging voltage) during charging
5569 and discharging of the battery are not exceeded.
5570 IEC TC 108 noted that, when designing battery compartments, the battery
5571 compartment dimensions should allow sufficient space for cells to expand
5572 normally under full operating temperature range or be flexible to prevent
5573 unnecessary compression of the cells. Given the wide range of battery
5574 constructions, corresponding battery compartment dimensional requirements
5575 will differ. When necessary, coordinate with the battery manufacturer to
5576 determine change in battery dimensions over full operating range during
5577 charging and discharging.
5578 M.4.1 General
5579 Rationale: Sub-clause M.2.1 contains a list of IEC standard for batteries that are normative
5580 for batteries and cells that are relevant based on their intended use. Included in
5581 the list is IEC 62619, which mentions in its scope, “… specifies requirements and
5582 tests for the safe operation of secondary lithium cells and batteries used in
5583 industrial applications including stationary applications.” “Telecommunication”
5584 equipment is one of the stationary equipment applications given as an example
5585 under its scope.
5586
– 166 – 108/757/DC
5587 Included in IEC 62619 in Clause 8 are requirements for battery system safety
5588 (considering functional safety, Clause 8.1), which also includes specific
5589 requirements for the battery management system, BMS (8.2.1). While the BMS
5590 requirements in 8.2.1 are relatively similar in nature to IEC 62133-2 and Annex M
5591 of IEC 62368-1, the provision for additional investigation of electric, electronic
5592 and software controls and systems used for critical safety is not something
5593 covered by IEC 62133-2 and Annex M to the degree as it is covered in
5594 IEC 62619.
5595 Therefore, if batteries (including battery packs) intended for transportable
5596 equipment are used in stationary equipment it is appropriate to consider the
5597 requirements of 8.1 of IEC 62619 if electric, electronic and software controls and
5598 systems are relied upon as the primary safeguard for safety of the battery,
5599 provided the battery is not provided with a supplementary safeguard.
5600 M.4.2.2 Compliance criteria
5601 The highest temperature point in the battery may not always exist at the center
5602 of the battery. The battery supplier should specify the point where the highest
5603 temperature in the battery occurs.
5604 To test the charging circuit, instead of using a real battery (which is a chemical
5605 system), an electrical circuit emulating the battery behavior (dummy battery
5606 circuit) may make the test easier by eliminating a possible battery defect.
5607 An example of a dummy battery circuit is given in Figure 58 in this document.
Figure 58 – Example of a dummy battery circuit
5608 M.4.3 Fire enclosure

5609 Lithium-ion batteries with an energy more than PS1 (15 W) must be provided
5610 with a fire enclosure (either at the battery or at the equipment containing the
5611 battery) because even though measurements of output voltage and current may
5612 not necessarily show them to be a PIS, however they contain flammable
5613 electrolyte that can be easily ignited by the enormous amount of heat developed
5614 by internal shorts as a result of possible contaminants in the electrolyte.
5615 M.4.4 Drop test of equipment containing a secondary lithium battery
5616 Annex M.4.4 applies only to batteries used in portable applications.
5617 This includes batteries in the scope of IEC 62133 and IEC 62133-2 which are
5618 typically used in hand-held equipment or transportable equipment.
5619 Batteries or sub-assemblies containing batteries used in other types of
5620 equipment, that are not routinely held or carried but may be occasionally
5621 removed for service or replacement, are not considered to be portable batteries
5622 and are not in scope of Annex M.4.4.
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5623 Monitoring of lithium-ion battery output voltage and surface temperature during
5624 or after the drop test may not help. The concern is that if a minor dent occurs,
5625 nothing may happen to the battery. Temperature may go up slightly and then
5626 drop down without any significant failure. If the battery is damaged, the damage
5627 may only show up if the battery is then subjected to few charging and
5628 discharging cycles. Therefore, the surface temperature measurement was
5629 deleted and replaced with charging and discharging cycles after the drop test.
5630 The charging and discharging of the battery shall not result in any fire or
5631 explosion.
5632 It is important that the equipment containing a secondary lithium battery
5633 needs to have a drop impact resistance. Equipment containing a secondary
5634 lithium battery should avoid further damage to the control circuit and the
5635 batteries.
5636 As M.4.4 requires the equipment to be tested, the relevant equipment heights
5637 need to be used instead of the height for testing parts that act as a fire
5638 enclosure.
5639 After the drop test:
5640 − Initially, the control functions should be checked to determine if they continue
5641 to operate and all safeguards are effective. A dummy battery or appropriate
5642 measurement tool can be used for checking the function of the equipment.
5643 − Then, the batteries are checked whether or not a slight internal short circuit
5644 occurs.
5645 Discharge and charge cycles under normal operating conditions test hinder
5646 detection of the slight internal short circuit because the current to discharge and
5647 charge is higher than the current caused by a slight internal short circuit.
5648 Thus, it is very important to conduct a voltage observation of the battery
5649 immediately after the drop test without any discharge and charge.
5650 To detect a slight internal short circuit of the battery, IEC TC 108 adopts a no-
5651 load test, which can detect a battery open voltage drop caused by an internal
5652 short circuit leak current in a 24 h period.
5653 Equipment containing an embedded type of battery has internal power
5654 dissipation (internal consumption current). Therefore, two samples of the
5655 equipment are prepared, one for the drop test and the other for reference in a
5656 standby mode. In this way, the effect of internal power dissipation can be
5657 detected by measuring a difference between voltage drops in the 24 h period.
5658 M.6.1 Requirements
5659 Examples: Examples of battery documents containing an internal short test are IEC 62133,
5660 IEC 62133-2 and IEC 62619.
5661 Another example of compliance to internal fault requirements is a battery using
5662 cells that have passed the impact test as specified in IEC 62281.
5663 M.7.1 Ventilation preventing an explosive gas concentration
5664 Rationale: During charging, float charging, and overcharging operation, gases are emitted
5665 from secondary cells and batteries excluding gastight sealed (secondary) cells,
5666 as the result of the electrolysis of water by electric current. Gases produced are
5667 hydrogen and oxygen.
5668 M.7.2 Test method and compliance criteria
5669 Source: The formula comes from IEC 62485-2:2010, 7.2.
5670 M.8.2.1 General
5671 Source: The formula comes from IEC 60079-10-1:2015, Clause B.4.
5672 ___________
– 168 – 108/757/DC
5673 Annex O Measurement of creepage distances and clearances
5674 Source: IEC 60664-1, IEC 60950-1

5675 Purpose: Clearances are measured from the X-points in the figure
5676 Rationale: Figure O.4. At an IEC/TC 109 meeting in Paris, a draft CTL interpretation was
5677 discussed regarding example 11 of IEC 60664-1:2007. The question was if
5678 distances smaller than X should be counted as zero. There was a quite lengthy
5679 debate, but the conclusion was that, based on the other examples in the standard
5680 (and especially example 1), there is no reason why in this example the distance
5681 should be counted as zero. If this should be done, many other examples should
5682 be changed where it is shown that the distance is measured across X rather than
5683 to disregard X. TC 109 has decided to modify the example 11 to remove the X
5684 from the figure to avoid this confusion in future. This is now represented in
5685 Figure 14 of IEC 60664-1:2020. As a result, the statement that distances smaller
5686 than X are disregarded is deleted from Figure O.4.
5687 Figure O.13. The clearance determination is made from the X-points in the
5688 figure, as those are the first contact points when the test finger enters the
5689 enclosure opening. It is assumed that the enclosure is covered by conductive
5690 foil, which simulates conductive pollution.
5691 ___________
5692 Annex P Safeguards against conductive objects
5693 P.1 General

5694 Rationale: The basic safeguard against entry of a foreign object is that persons are not
5695 expected to insert a foreign object into the equipment. Where the equipment is
5696 used in locations where children may be present, it is expected that there will be
5697 adult supervision to address the issue of reasonably foreseeable misuse by
5698 children, such as inserting foreign objects. Therefore, the safeguards specified
5699 in this annex are supplementary safeguards.
5700 P.2 Safeguards against entry or consequences of entry of a foreign object
5701 Source: IEC 60950-1
5702 Purpose: Protect against the entry of foreign objects
5703 Rationale: There are two alternative methods that may be used.
5704 P.2.2 specifies maximum size limits and construction of openings. The relatively
5705 small foreign conductive objects or amounts of liquids that may pass through
5706 these openings are not likely to defeat any equipment safeguards. This option
5707 prevents entry of objects that may defeat a safeguard.
5708 Alternatively, if the openings are larger than those specified in P.2.2, P.2.3
5709 assumes that a foreign conductive object or liquid passing through these
5710 openings is likely to defeat an equipment basic safeguard, and requires that the
5711 foreign conductive object or liquid shall not defeat an equipment supplementary
5712 safeguard or an equipment reinforced safeguard.
5713 P.2.3.1 Safeguard requirements
5714 Rationale: Conformal coating material is applied to electronic circuitry to act as protection
5715 against moisture, dust, chemicals, and temperature extremes that, if uncoated
5716 (non-protected), could result in damage or failure of the electronics to function.
5717 When electronics are subject to harsh environments and added protection is
5718 necessary, most circuit board assembly houses coat assemblies with a layer of
5719 transparent conformal coating rather than potting.
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5720 The coating material can be applied by various methods, from brushing, spraying
5721 and dipping, or, due to the increasing complexities of the electronic boards being
5722 designed and with the 'process window' becoming smaller and smaller, by
5723 selectively coating via robot.
5724 P.3 Safeguards against spillage of internal liquids
5725 Source: IEC 60950-1
5726 Rationale: If the liquid is conductive, flammable, toxic, or corrosive, then the liquid shall not
5727 be accessible if it spills out. The container of the liquid provides a basic
5728 safeguard. After the liquid spills out, then barrier, guard or enclosure that
5729 prevents access to the liquid acts as a supplementary safeguard. Another
5730 choice is to provide a container that does not leak or permit spillage for example,
5731 provide a reinforced safeguard.
5732 P.4 Metalized coatings and adhesives securing parts
5733 Source: IEC 60950-1
5734 Rationale: Equipment having internal barriers secured by adhesive are subject to
5735 mechanical tests after an aging test. If the barrier does not dislodge as a whole
5736 or partially or fall off, securement by adhesive is considered acceptable.
5737 The temperature for conditioning should be based on the actual temperature of
5738 the adhesive secured part.
5739 The test program for metalized coatings is the same as for aging of adhesives.
5740 In addition, the abrasion resistance test is done to see if particles fall off from
5741 the metalized coating. Alternatively, clearance and creepage distances for PD3
5742 shall be provided.
5743 ___________
5744 Annex Q Circuits intended for interconnection with building wiring
5745 Source: IEC 60950-1:2013

5746 Rationale: For the countries that have electrical and fire codes based on NFPA 70, this
5747 annex is applied to ports or circuits for external circuits that are interconnected
5748 to building wiring for limited power circuits. Annex Q was based on requirements
5749 from IEC 60950-1 that are designed to comply with the external circuit power
5750 source requirements necessary for compliance with the electrical codes noted
5751 above.
5752 Q.1.1 Requirements
5753 Rationale: Tables Q.1 and Q.2 have their origins through association with “Class 2” circuit
5754 requirements in NFPA 70, National Electrical Code (NEC). As 60 Vdc is inherent
5755 to the Class 2 definition, to maintain consistency and allow for adequate
5756 safeguarding of building wiring, any device, including IC Current Limiters, used
5757 to supply a Limited Power Source is required to have similar characteristics,
5758 including the 60 Vdc voltage limitation. Current Limiters used for purposes other
5759 than LPS do not have such a voltage limitation, although other Clauses, such as
5760 Clause 5, may place additional restrictions on their ratings and acceptable use.
5761 Q.1.2 Test method and compliance criteria
5762 In determining if a circuit is a limited power source, all conditions of use should
5763 be considered. For example, for circuits that may be connected to a battery
5764 source as well as a mains source, determination whether the available output
5765 from the circuit is a limited power source is made with each of the sources
5766 connected independently or simultaneously (see Figure 59 in this document).
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5767 Q.2 Test for external circuits – paired conductor cable

5768 Time/current characteristics of type gD and type gN fuses specified in
5769 IEC 60269-2-1 comply with the limit. Type gD or type gN fuses rated 1 A, would
5770 meet the 1,3 A current limit.
5771
5772 Figure 59 – Example of a circuit with two power sources
5773 ___________
5774 Annex R Limited short-circuit test
5775 Source: IEC SC22E

5776 Rationale: The value of 1 500 A is aligned with the normal breaking capacity of a high
5777 breaking fuse. In Japan the prospective short circuit current is considered less
5778 than 1 000 A.
5779 ___________
5780 Annex S Tests for resistance to heat and fire
5781 S.1 Flammability test for fire enclosure and fire barrier materials of equipment where
5782 the steady-state power does not exceed 4 000 W
5783 Rationale: This test is intended to test the ability of an end-product enclosure to adequately
5784 limit the spread of flame from a potential ignition source to the outside of the
5785 product.
5786 − Included the text from IEC 60065 using the needle flame as the ignition source
5787 for all material testing. The reapplication of the flame after the first flaming
5788 was added to clarify that the test flame is immediately re-applied based on
5789 current practices.
5790 − This conditioning requirement of 125 °C for printed wiring boards is derived
5791 from laminate and PCB documents.
5792 S.2 Flammability test for fire enclosure and fire barrier integrity
5793 Rationale: This test method is used to test the integrity of a fire barrier or fire enclosure
5794 where a potential ignition source is in very close proximity to an enclosure or
5795 a barrier.
5796 The criteria of “no additional holes” is considered important as flammable
5797 materials may be located immediately on the other side of the barrier or fire
5798 enclosure.
5799 Rationale: Application of needle flame
– 171 – 108/757/DC
5800 The flame cone and the 50 mm distance is a new requirement that was not
5801 applied in IEC 60950 to top openings. This new requirement does impact already
5802 certified IEC 60950 ITE products, and it was found that some manufacturers’
5803 current designs were not able to comply with the 50-mm distance prescribed
5804 ventilation opening requirements and will not be able to pass the needle flame
5805 test as per IEC 60695-11. An HBSDT’s fire enclosure adhoc team performed
5806 some experimental flame testing with the needle flame located at various
5807 distances from various size ventilation openings. This test approach was found
5808 to align more with hazard-based safety engineering principles and deemed to be
5809 a more realistic representation of when a thermal event may occur.
5810 A PIS can be in the form of any size/shape, so it was determined not reasonable
5811 to directly apply the needle flame to top surface openings when realistically a
5812 thermal event from smaller components is unlikely to touch the top surface
5813 openings. Additionally, typically it is common for such components to be
5814 mounted on V-0 rated boards that further help reduce the spread of fire.
5815 The test data from the fire experimental testing demonstrated clearly that, when
5816 the flame is at distances well within 50 mm, significantly larger openings can be
5817 used beyond the pre-specified sizes by 6.4.8.3.3 (for example less than 5 mm in
5818 any dimension and/or less than 1 mm regardless of length).
5819 Therefore, for the purpose of this standard and to align more with hazard-based
5820 safety engineering principles, the needle flame is to be applied at a distance
5821 measured from the closest assessed point of a PIS to the closest surface point
5822 of the test specimen. The application of the flame is measured from the top of
5823 the needle flame burner to the closest surface point. See Figure S.1 in Clause
5824 S.2.
5825 S.3 Flammability tests for the bottom of a fire enclosure
5826 Source: IEC 60950-1:2013
5827 Rationale: This text was not changed from the original ECMA document which was originally
5828 in IEC 60950-1. This test is intended to determine the acceptability of holes or
5829 hole patterns in bottom enclosures to prevent flaming material from falling onto
5830 the supporting surface. It has been used principally for testing metal bottom
5831 enclosures.
5832 This test is being proposed to test all bottom enclosures. Research is ongoing
5833 to develop a similar test based on the use of flammable (molten) thermoplastic
5834 rather than oil.
5835 S.4 Flammability classification of materials
5836 Rationale: The tables were considered helpful to explain the hierarchy of material
5837 flammability class requirements used in this document.
5838 Whenever a certain flammability class is required, a better classification is
5839 allowed to be used.
5840 S.5 Flammability test for fire enclosure materials of equipment with a steady state
5841 power exceeding 4 000 W
5842 Source: IEC 60950-1:2013
5843 Rationale: The annex for flammability test for high voltage cables was withdrawn and
5844 replaced by flammability test for fire enclosure materials of equipment having
5845 greater than 4 000 W faults.
5846 ___________
– 172 – 108/757/DC
5847 Annex T Mechanical strength tests
5848 T.2 Steady force test, 10 N

5849 Source: IEC 60950-1
5850 Rationale: 10 N applied to components and parts that may be touched during operation or
5851 servicing. This test simulates the accidental contact with a finger or part of a
5852 hand.
5855 Rationale: This test simulates accidental contact with a part of the hand.
5858 Rationale: This test simulates an expected force applied during use or movement.
5861 Rationale: 250 N applied to external enclosures (except those covered in Clause T.4). This
5862 test simulates an expected force when leaning against the equipment surface to
5863 ensure clearances are not bridged to introduce a hazard such as shock. The
5864 30 mm diameter surface simulates a small part of hand or foot. It is not expected
5865 that such forces will be applied to the bottom surface of heavy equipment
5866 (> 18 kg).
5867 T.6 Enclosure impact test
5869 Rationale: To check integrity of the enclosure, to ensure that no hazard is created by an
5870 impact.
5871 The values in T.6 are taken over from existing requirements in IEC 60065 and
5872 IEC 60950-1.
5873 The impact is applied once for each test point on the enclosure.
5874 T.7 Drop test
5876 Rationale: This test addresses potential exposure to a hazard after the impact and not
5877 impact directly on a body part. The test is applied to desk top equipment under
5878 7 kg as it is more likely these products could be accidentally knocked off the
5879 desk. The drop height was chosen based on intended use of the product.
5880 The term “table-top” has been used in IEC 60065, while the term “desk-top” has
5881 been used in IEC 60950-1. Both terms had been taken over in IEC 62368-1
5882 without the intention to make the different requirements for these types of
5883 equipment. Therefore, the requirements are applicable to both type of equipment
5884 even if only either one is referred to. From edition 3 onwards, the term “table-
5885 top” has been replaced by “desk-top”.
5886 T.8 Stress relief test
5888 Rationale: To ensure that the mechanical integrity of moulded plastic parts is not affected
5889 by their relaxation or warping following thermal stress.
5890 T.9 Glass impact test
– 173 – 108/757/DC
5892 Rationale: Test applied to test the strength of the glass.

5893 The value of 7 J is a value that has been used for CRT in the past. Except for
5894 that, the value has also been used in commercial applications, but not in
5895 households, where the forces expected on the glass are much lower. CRT’s have
5896 separate requirements in Annex W. Therefore, a value of 3,5 J is considered
5897 sufficient.
5898 The centre of a piece of glass can be determined via the intersection of two
5899 diagonals for a rectangular piece or any other appropriate means for pieces of
5900 other geometries.
5901 T.10 Glass fragmentation test
5903 Rationale: Test applied to ensure the fragments are small enough to be considered at MS2
5904 level or less.
5905 ___________
5906 Annex U Mechanical strength of CRTs and protection against the effects of
5907 implosion
5908 U.2 Test method and compliance criteria for non-intrinsically protected CRTs
5909 Source: IEC 61965, IEC 60065
5910 Rationale: The 750 mm simulates the height of a typical supporting surface such as a table
5911 or counter top. Test applied to ensure any expelled fragments are small enough
5912 to be considered at MS2 level or less. The fragment size represents a grain of
5913 sand. The test distances selected ensure fragments do not travel far enough to
5914 strike a person and cause injury.
5915 ___________
5916 Annex V Determination of accessible parts
5917 Figure V.3 Blunt probe

5918 Source: This test probe is taken from Figure 2c, IEC 60950-1:2013
5919 ___________
5920 Annex X Alternative method for determining clearances for insulation in

5921 circuits connected to an AC mains not exceeding 420 V peak (300 V
5922 RMS)
5923 Rationale: IEC TC 108 made a responsible decision to harmonize the requirements for
5924 clearances and creepage distances with the horizontal IEC 60664-x series
5925 documents produced by IEC TC 109. This decision is aligned with IEC
5926 harmonization directives and allows manufacturers the design benefits afforded
5927 by the IEC 60664-x series documents when minimization of spacings is a primary
5928 consideration of the product design.
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5929 However, because of the complexity of determining clearances as per 5.4.2,

5930 sometimes the more state-of-art theory is not practical to implement for designs
5931 not requiring minimized spacings. For example, there are a very large number of
5932 existing designs and constructions qualified to IEC 60950-1 that are associated
5933 with products, mainly switch mode power supplies, connected to AC mains
5934 (overvoltage category II) not exceeding 300 V RMS. These constructions have
5935 successfully used the clearance requirements in IEC 60950-1 without any
5936 evidence of field issues, and even at switching frequencies well above 30 kHz.
5937 In fact, almost every switch mode power supply (SMPS) used today with IT &
5938 ICT equipment intended to be connected to mains less than 300 V RMS,
5939 including external power supplies, direct plug-in type, and internal power
5940 supplies, have clearances based on the base requirements in Subclause
5941 2.10.3.3 and Tables 2K and 2L of IEC 60950-1. Although the requirements do
5942 not incorporate the latest research on clearances used in circuits operating
5943 above 30 kHz, they are considered to be suitable for the application because
5944 they are a conservative implementation of IEC 60664-1 without minimization.
5945 As a result, and in particular based on their proven history of acceptability in the
5946 broad variety of power supplies used today, IEC TC 108 should support
5947 continued limited application of a prescribed set of clearances as an alternative
5948 to the more state-of-art IEC 60664-based requirements in IEC 62368-1 today.
5949 However, because of the valid concern with circuits operating above 30 kHz as
5950 clearances are further minimized, the IEC 60950-1 option in Tables 2K and 2L
5951 for reduced clearances in products with manufacturing subjected to a quality
5952 control programme (values in parenthesis in Tables 2K/2L) are not included in
5953 this proposal since the reduced clearances associated with the quality control
5954 option has not been used frequently under IEC 60950-1, and therefore there is
5955 not the same proven track record of successful implementation in a very large
5956 number of products. Similarly, there is not the same large quantity of qualified
5957 designs/construction associated with equipment connected to mains voltages
5958 exceeding 300 V RMS, or for equipment connected to DC mains, so these
5959 constructions should comply with the existing IEC 60664-based requirements in
5960 IEC 62368-1.
5961 ___________
5962 Annex Y Construction requirements for outdoor enclosures
5963 Rationale: General

5964 In preparing the requirements for outdoor enclosures, it has been assumed
5965 that:
5966 – exterior to the outdoor equipment there should be no hazards, just as is the
5967 case with other information technology equipment;
5968 – protection against vandalism and other purposeful acts will be treated as a
5969 product quality issue (for example, IEC 62368-1 does not contain
5970 requirements for the security of locks, types of acceptable screw head, forced
5971 entry tests, etc.).
5972 Electric shock
5973 It is believed that most aspects relating to protection against the risk of electric
5974 shock are adequately covered by IEC 62368-1 including current proposals, and
5975 in some cases, quoted safety documents (in particular, the IEC 60364 series),
5976 and with the exception of the following, do not require modification. Specific
5977 requirements not already suitably addressed in IEC 60950-1 were considered as
5978 follows:
5979 – clearing of earth faults for remotely located (exposed) information technology
5980 equipment;
5981 – the degree of protection provided by the enclosure to rain, dust, etc.;
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5982 – the effect of moisture and pollution degree on the insulation of the enclosed
5983 parts;
5984 – the possible consequences of ingress by plants and animals (since these
5985 could bridge or damage insulation);
5986 – the maximum permissible touch voltage and body contact impedance for wet
5987 conditions.
5988 It is noted that the voltage limits of user-accessible circuits and parts in outdoor
5989 locations only are applicable to circuits and parts that are actually “user-
5990 accessible”. If the circuits and parts are not user accessible (determined via
5991 application of accessibility probes) and are enclosed in electrical enclosures,
5992 connectors and cable suitable for the outdoor application, including being subject
5993 to all relevant outdoor enclosure testing, voltage limits for indoor locations may
5994 be acceptable based on the application. For example, a power-over-ethernet
5995 (PoE) surveillance camera mounted outdoors supplied by 48 V DC from PoE
5996 would be in compliance with Clause 5 if the electrical enclosure met the
5997 applicable requirements for outdoor enclosures.
5998 Fire
5999 It is believed that most aspects relating to protection against fire emanating from
6000 within the equipment are adequately covered by IEC 62368-1. However, certain
6001 measures that may be acceptable for equipment located inside a building would
6002 not be acceptable outdoors because they would permit the entry of rain, etc.
6003 For certain types of outdoor equipment, it could be appropriate to allow the ‘no
6004 bottom fire enclosure required if mounted on a concrete base’ exemption that
6005 presently can be used for equipment for use within a restricted access location.
6006 Mechanical hazards
6007 It is believed that all aspects relating to protection against mechanical hazards
6008 emanating from the equipment are adequately covered by IEC 62368-1.
6009 Heat-related hazards
6010 It is believed that most aspects relating to protection against direct heat hazards
6011 are adequately covered by IEC 62368-1. However, it may be appropriate to
6012 permit higher limits for equipment that is unlikely to be touched by passersby (for
6013 example, equipment that is only intended to be pole mounted out of reach). A
6014 default nominal ambient temperature range for outdoor equipment has been
6015 proposed. The effects of solar heating have not been addressed.
6016 In addition to direct thermal hazards, there is a need to consider consequential
6017 hazards. For instance, some plastics become brittle as they become cold. An
6018 enclosure made from such brittle plastic could expose users to other hazards
6019 (for example, electrical or mechanical) if it were to break.
6020 Radiation
6021 It is believed that most aspects relating to direct protection against radiation
6022 hazards are adequately covered by IEC 62368-1. However, there may be
6023 consequential hazards to consider. Just as polymeric materials can be affected
6024 by low temperatures, they can also become embrittled owing to the effect of UV
6025 radiation. An enclosure made from such brittle plastic could expose users to
6026 other hazards (for example, electrical or mechanical) if it were to break.
6027 Chemical hazards
6028 It is believed that certain types of outdoor equipment need to have measures
6029 relating to chemical hazards originating within, or external to, the equipment.
6030 Exposure to chemicals in the environment (for example, salt used to clear roads
6031 in the winter) can also cause problems.
– 176 – 108/757/DC
6032 Biological hazards

6033 These are not presently addressed in IEC 62368-1. As with radiation hazards
6034 and chemical hazards, it is thought that there is not likely to be any direct
6035 biological hazard. However, plastics and some metals can be attacked by fungi
6036 or bacteria and this could result in weakening of protective enclosures. As
6037 stated under 'electric shock', the ingress of plants and animals could result in
6038 damage to insulation.
6039 Explosion hazards
6040 Outdoor equipment may need to be weather-tight, in such cases there is an
6041 increased probability that an explosive atmosphere can build up as a result of:
6042 – hydrogen being produced as a result of charging lead-acid batteries within
6043 the equipment and;
6044 – methane and other ‘duct gasses’ entering the equipment from the outdoors.
6045 Y.3 Resistance to corrosion
6046 Rationale: Enclosures made of the following materials are considered to comply with XX.1
6047 without test:
6048 (a) Copper, aluminum, or stainless steel; and
6049 (b) Bronze or brass containing at least 80 % copper.
6050 Y.4.6 Securing means
6051 Rationale: Gaskets associated with doors, panels or similar parts subject to periodic
6052 opening is an example of a gasket needing either mechanical securement or
6053 adhesive testing.
6054 ___________
6055
– 177 – 108/757/DC
6056 Annex A
6057 (informative)
6058
6059 Background information related to the use of surge suppressors
6060 NOTE The content of this Annex is provided for information only. This Annex does not in any way override the
6061 requirements in IEC standards, nor does it provide examples of universally accepted constructions.
6062 A.1 Industry demand for incorporating surge suppressors in the equipment
6063 The industry has the demand of providing protection of communication equipment from
6064 overvoltage that may be caused by lightning strike surge effect. There are reports in Japan that
6065 hundreds of products are damaged by lightening surges every year, including the risk of fire
6066 and/or electrical shock according to the damage to the equipment, especially in the regions
6067 where many thunderstorms are observed. We believe it will be the same in many other countries
6068 by the reason described in the next paragraph where the voltage of the surge is much higher
6069 than expected value for overvoltage category II equipment (1 500 V peak or 2 500 V peak). For
6070 the surge protection purpose, the manufacturers have need to introduce the surge protection
6071 devices in the equipment, not only for class I equipment but also for class II equipment or
6072 class III equipment, but facing to the difficulty of designing equipment because of the limited
6073 acceptance in IEC 62368-1.
6074 If the point of bonding for mains to the equipment is not adjacent to the point of bonding of
6075 telecommunication line that is connected to the external circuit of the same equipment, the
6076 surge entered from the power line or from the telecommunication line causes the high potential
6077 difference on the insulation in the equipment, and causes the insulation/component breakdown
6078 which may cause product unuseable.
6079 In some cases, the damage on the insulation or safeguard can cause hazardous voltage on
6080 ES1 or an accessible metal part, or an insulation material heating up or catching fire (see
6081 Figure A.1 in this document, with the example of class II equipment.)
6082 The most effective way to protect equipment from a lightning surge is, as commonly understood
6083 internationally, to have an equipotential bonding system in the building/facility with a very low
6084 in-circuit impedance by the use of main-earth bar concept (see Figure A.2 in this document).
6085 This kind of high-quality earthing provision can be introduced in the building/facility in the
6086 business area, such as computer rooms, or in modern buildings.
6087 This kind of high quality earthing provision may not always be possible in the residential area,
6088 in already-existing buildings and in some countries where the reliable low impedance earth
6089 connection may not be easily obtained from technical (according to the characteristics of land)
6090 or even by practical reasons (because very expensive construction change to the building is
6091 required, or according to the lack of regulatory co-work it is difficult to get the relevant
6092 permission for cabling). We should not disregard the fact that many ICT equipment (including
6093 PCs, fax machines, TVs and printers) are brought to home, school and small business offices
6094 in the existing buildings (see Figure A.3 in this document).
6095 If the use of surge suppressors configured by an MOV, such as a varistor in series with a GDT,
6096 is allowed in the equipment to bridge safeguards, it is effective to avoid the possibility that the
6097 lightening surge breaks the circuit or the insulation within the equipment (see Figure A.4 in this
6098 document).
6099 Thus, there is industry demand for using surge protecting devices (SPDs) in the equipment
6100 independent of whether the product is class I equipment, class II equipment or class III
6101 equipment.
– 178 – 108/757/DC
6102
6103 Figure A.1 – Installation has poor earthing and bonding;

6104 equipment damaged (from ITU-T K.66)
6105
6106 Figure A.2 – Installation has poor earthing and bonding; using main earth bar
6107 for protection against lightning strike (from ITU-T K.66)
6108
– 179 – 108/757/DC
6109
6110 Figure A.3 – Installation with poor earthing and bonding, using a varistor
6111
6112 Figure A.4 – Typîcal example of a surge suppressor and a voltage fall
6113 –
6114 A.2 Considerations on surge suppressors bridging both sides of a safeguard
6115 For a surge suppressor that bridges both sides of the insulation safeguard, the followings need
6116 to be considered in order to prevent hazards due to the bridging.
6117 The surge suppressor with a group of SPCs bridging between the mains and an external circuit
6118 shall not operate during a single fault condition at the power distribution system or in a surge
6119 suppressor to make sure that any hazardous voltage shall not appear at an accessible part of
6120 the equipment.
6121 Following situations shall not create a leak to the ES1 and ES2 circuits:
6122 – follow-on current triggered by a surge voltage (caused by lightning and power system
6123 switching);
6124 – temporary overvoltage (TOV) caused by a failure in the power distribution system, and
6125 – fluctuation of the mains voltage.
– 180 – 108/757/DC
6126 Surge voltages on an external circuit cable do not cause a hazard and it are allowed to appear
6127 on an external circuit. (see 5.4.2.3.2.4 of IEC 62368-1:2021).
6128 It is commonly known that surge voltages often appear on external circuit of ID1 in Table 13 of
6129 IEC 62368-1. Also, the surge voltages do not change even if a surge suppressor bridges the
6130 mains and the external circuit operates.
6131 The follow-on current does not appear if a surge suppressor is configured by a series
6132 combination of a GDT and a varistor. In this case, the varistor shall have an operating voltage
6133 higher than the peak voltage of the AC mains.
6134 TOV is caused by a fault in the power distribution system and occurs rarely. Moreover, the
6135 chance of an SPD fault occurring simultaneously with a TOV is negligible for determination of
6136 SPC specification. Therefore, it is required that the surge suppressor shall not operate during
6137 the TOV under normal operating conditions.
6138 The surge suppressor with any single fault condition shall not operate by a voltage fluctuation
6139 of the mains, since the voltage fluctuation occurs during normal operation of the power
6140 distribution system.
6141 A.3 Considerations on a surge suppresser used for ID1 external circuit in
6142 class II equipment
6143 Details of the three conditions for specification of a surge suppressor bridging an external
6144 circuit ID1 and the mains are described below.
6145 A.3.1 Lightning surges flow from mains circuit to external circuit
6146 It is not necessary to prevent the flow of lightning surges from the mains to an external circuit
6147 ID1 since it does not affect the safety of the external circuit.
6148 Surge voltages often appear at telecommunication lines classified as ID 1 in Table 13
6149 electromagnetically induce or conductively flow from lightning stroke near by the line. The
6150 lightning surge voltage can be higher than 10 kV at telecommunication lines; details are
6151 described in Chapter 10 of CCITT Handbook (CCITT Handbook, “The Protection of
6152 Telecommunication Lines and Equipment Against Lightning Discharges - Chapters 9 and 10”).
6153 Even if a surge suppresser bridging the mains and an external circuit ID1 operates by a surge,
6154 it does not change the safety condition of the external circuit since the AC mains current does
6155 not flow and the surge from the mains to the external circuit is reduced by a varistor in the
6156 surge suppressor.
6157 The details of operation and surge flow in an example of surge suppressor is described below.
6158 The surge voltage through a MOV decreases as much as the voltage between the terminals of
6159 the MOV (V MOV ) when the surge flows through the MOV. Therefore, even if the 2 500 V
6160 maximum surge appears on the power line, the surge voltage at the telecommunication port
6161 (V tel ) is expected to decrease by V MOV and becomes less than 1 500 V, provided a typical value
6162 MOV is incorporated in the circuit (see Figure A.4 and Figure A.5). The MOV stops the current
6163 when the mains voltage is lower than V MOV , so an AC current does not flow through the MOV
6164 even if it operates by a surge voltage. Therefore, it does not cause an ES1/ES2 external circuit
6165 to become ES3. This means any degradations of safety are not caused by the surge flow
6166 through the surge suppressor.
– 181 – 108/757/DC
6167
6168 Figure A.5 – An example of surge voltage drop by a MOV and two GDTs (measured in
6169 laboratory)
6170 A.3.2 TOV on power distribution system failure
6171 A.3.2.1 General

6172 When a fault occurs at a power distribution transformer at a power substation, a TOV appears
6173 on the mains. The surge suppressor under normal operating conditions shall not operate
6174 under the TOV condition. However, it is not reasonable to consider the condition that other
6175 faults occur simultaneously in the surge suppressor and the power distribution system since the
6176 TOV occurs very rarely. If the operation voltage of the surge suppressor is determined not to
6177 operate under the condition that faults are occurring in both the power system and the surge
6178 suppressor, the operation voltage of the surge suppressor has to be too high to protect
6179 equipment efficiently.
6180 A.3.2.2 TOV in countries

6181 The stress for equipment in low voltage installations conditions are described as TOV in
6182 IEC 60364-4-44. The maximum voltage of the TOV is shown in Table A.1.
6183 In TN system, TOV is the nominal mains voltage U 0 , if the surge suppresser is bridging the
6184 mains and PEN, but it shall be noted that TOV reaches U 0 + 1 200 V between the mains and
6185 an external circuit on the worst case if PEN is not connected to the equipment.
6186 Table A.1 – Permissible power-frequency stress voltage (except for US and Japan)
Duration of the earth fault in the Permissible power-frequency stress voltage on

high-voltage system equipment in low-voltage installations
t (second) U (Vrms)
>5 U 0 + 250
≤5 U 0 + 1200
6187
6188 U0 in TN and TT system: nominal AC r.m.s. line voltage to earth

6189 in IT-systems: nominal AC voltage between line conductor and neutral conductor or mid point
6190 conductor, as appropriate
6191 In systems without a neutral conductor, U 0 shall be the line to line voltage.
6192 Additional information of TOV parameters in USA and Japan are provided in IEC 61643-12:2020.
6193 The TOV values are provided in Table A.2 and Table A.3.
– 182 – 108/757/DC
6194 Table A.2 – TOV parameters for US systems quoted from IEC 61643-12:2020
Clause # and Category of Table Typical max Typical max rms- Typical peak SPD TOV
2 of IEEE 1159-2009 duration voltage (V) voltage (V)
Withstand
(s)
-+ 5 %
2.0 Short duration variation - 1,8 x U 0 2,55 x U 0

2.1 Instantaneous- 2.1.2 Swell 0,5 (207 Vrms) (294 Vpeak) 1,89
2.0 Short duration variation- 1,4 x U 0 1,98 x U 0

2.2 Momentary-2.2.2 Swell 3,0 (161 Vrms) (223 Vpeak) 1,47
2.0 Short duration variation- 1,2 x U 0 1,70 x U 0

2.3 Tempory-2.3.3 Swell 60,0 (138 Vrms) (196 Vpeak) 1,26
6195 Table A.3 – TOV test parameters for Japanese systems quoted from IEC 61643-12:2020
Application TOV test parameters
For t T = 120 min For t T = 1 s

SPDs connected to (LV-system faults in distribution (HV-system faults)
system and loss of neutral)
Withstand or safe end of life Withstand or safe end of life

acceptable acceptable
Prospective Prospective
TOV test TOV test
short-circuit short-circuit
values U T values U T
current current
V V
A A
Nominal AC system voltage
100V
Connected L-PE 330 20 710 30
Connected L-N 330 20
Connected N-PE 600 30
Connected L-L
200V
Connected L-L
400V

Connected L-L
NOTE These values are required by ministerial ordinance of technical standards for electrical facilities.
6196
6197 A.3.2.3 TOV for mains nominal voltages
6198 A.3.2.3.1 Countries conforming to IEC 60364-4-44 other than US and Japan
6199 For setting the requirement for a surge suppressor, the TOV for a duration shorter than or equal
6200 to 5 s shall be considered since it is higher than for longer duration. Table A.4 shows the
6201 calculated peak voltages in countries conforming IEC 60364-4-44.
– 183 – 108/757/DC
6202
6203 Table A.4 – Peak voltage of TOV in countries conforming IEC 60364-4-44
U0 U 0 + 1 200 (U 0 + 1 200) x 1,414

(Round up)
100 1300 1839
115 1315 1860
120 1320 1867
200 1400 1980
220 1420 2008
230 1430 2023
240 1440 2037
400 1600 2263
6204
6205 A.3.2.3.2 Peak voltage of TOV in US and Japan

6206 For setting the requirement for a surge suppressor, the TOV for a duration shorter than or equal
6207 to 0,5 s in Table A.2 is considered. Table A.5 shows the calculated peak voltage in the US.
6208 Table A.5 – Peak voltage of TOV in US
U0 TOV (r.m.s) Peak voltage of TOV

U 0 x 1,8 U 0 1.8 x 1,414
115 207 293
230 414 586
400 720 1019
6209
6210 For setting the requirement for surge suppresser, the TOV for duration of shorter or equal to 1
6211 second in Table A.3 is considered. Table A.6 show calculated peak voltage in Japan.
6212
6213 Table A.6 – Peak voltage of TOV in Japan
U0 TOV Peak voltage of TOV

(RMS) TOV (RMS) x 1,414
100 710 1004
200 820 1160
400 855 1209
6214
6215 A.3.2.4 Requirement for a surge suppressor relating to TOV
6216 A surge suppressor bridging the mains and an external circuit shall not operate when a DC
6217 voltage of U TOV2 is applied between the primary circuit and an external circuit within the
6218 equipment.
6219 For power systems complying with the IEC 60364 series (countries other than USA and
6220 Japan), U TOV2 is derived as follows from the peak voltages in Table A.4
6221 – for a nominal voltage of the mains lower than or equal to 120 V, U Tov2 = 2 000 V
6222 – for a nominal voltage of the mains lower than or equal to 230 V, U Tov2 = 2 500 V
– 184 – 108/757/DC
6223 For power systems in USA and Japan, U TOV2 is derived as follows from the peak voltages in
6224 Table A.5 and Table A.6.
6225 - for a nominal voltage of the mains lower than or equal to 400 V, U Tov2 = 1 500 V
6226 A.3.3 Voltage fluctuation
6227 A.3.3.1 Voltage fluctuation value

6228 The voltage fluctuation of the mains voltage is in many countries less than 10 % of the nominal
6229 mains voltage. For safety reasons it is assumed that maximum fluctuation of the mains voltage
6230 is set to 120 % of the nominal mains voltage for the calculation of the operation voltage of
6231 surge suppressor under single fault condition of the surge suppresser.
6232 The value 120 % of the nominal mains voltage is the same as the test voltage for ICX in G.16
6233 of IEC 62368-1.
6234 The peak voltage of the AC mains voltage at the maximum of the fluctuation U peak2 is calculated
6235 as U peak2 = U 0 x 1,2 x 1,414.
6236 The calculated values for major mains voltages in the world are listed in Table A.7.
6237 Table A.7 – The value of Upeak2 for major mains voltages
U0 U 0 x 1,2 U pea2 = U 0 x 1,2 x 1,414

(Round up)
100 120 170
115 138 196
120 144 204
200 240 340
220 264 374
230 276 391
240 288 408
400 480 679
6238
6239 A.3.3.2 Requirement on surge suppressor when it has a single fault
6240 A surge suppressor usually consists of combination of SPCs including MOVs and GDTs. The
6241 surge suppressor bridging between the mains and an external circuit shall not operate when
6242 a DC voltage of U peak2 as shown in Table A.7 is applied between the mains and an external
6243 circuit, even if anyone of the SPCs constituting the surge suppresser is short-circuited.
6244 The operation voltage of the SPC shall be specified not to operate at U peak2 , considering the
6245 variations in SPC production (ΔU sp ) and change of the rated operating voltage due to the SPC
6246 ageing over the expected lie of the equipment (ΔU sa ). The lower limit of the operation voltage
6247 is U op = U peak + ∆ U sp + ∆ U sa . (see 5.4.11.2 of IEC 62368-1:2022).
6248 A.3.4 A note on leakage of hazardous voltage to the other external ports
6249 Figure A.6 shows an example of ports configured to telecommunication equipment that do not
6250 have an earthing connection. The TOV will not go to the external circuits A, B and C if any
6251 part of the surge suppresser is not connected to the circuit in the equipment. This means the
6252 safety condition does not differ from the equipment that does not have bridging by surge
6253 suppresser. The surge voltage at the external circuit does not remarkably change by bridging.
6254 The ES1 or ES2 circuits driving and receiving external ports is separated from the
6255 telecommunication cable (ID 1 of Table 13) for safeguards against transient voltages from
6256 external circuits. Impulse test of 1.5 kV 10/700 or steady state test of 1.0 kV is required for this
6257 purpose.
– 185 – 108/757/DC
6258 Hazardous voltage is stopped by the isolation described above, and safety is kept at the
6259 external ports such as A, B and C.
6260 By the reasons above, the bridging of the mains and the telecommunication port does not cause
6261 an increase of hazardous voltage leak to the other ports.
6262
6263 Figure A.6 – An example of ports of telecommunication equipment
6264 A.4 Information about follow current (or follow-on current)
6265 A.4.1 General
6266 The information was taken from “MITSUBISHI Materials home page”
6267 A.4.2 What is follow-on-current?
6268 Follow-on-current is an electric current that will continue to flow. In this case it is a phenomenon
6269 where the current in a discharge tube continues to flow.
6270 Normally surge absorbers are in a state of high impedance. When a surge enters the absorber
6271 it will drop to a low impedance, allowing the surge to bypass the electronic circuit it is protecting.
6272 After the surge has passed, the absorber should return to a high impedance.
6273 However, when the absorber is in a low impedance state and there is sufficient voltage on the
6274 line to keep the current flowing when the surge ends, and the absorber remains in a discharge
6275 state and does not return to a high impedance state, the current will continue to flow. This is a
6276 phenomenon known as follow-on-current.
6277 Surge absorbers that display this follow-on-current are of the discharge type and semiconductor
6278 switching type. A characteristic of these absorbers is that during surge absorption (bypass) the
6279 operating voltage (remaining voltage) is lower than the starting voltage.
– 186 – 108/757/DC
6280 The advantage of these surge absorbers is that during suppression the voltage is held very low,
6281 so it reduces stress on the equipment. However, a problem arises when the line current of the
6282 equipment is high enough to continue to drive the absorber even when the voltage is low.
6283 Follow-on current mechanisms are explained further in the following sub-clauses.
6284 A.4.3 What are the V-I properties of discharge tubes?
6285 The micro-gap type surge absorber is a type of a discharge tube. The discharge in the tube
6286 changes from pre-discharge to glow discharge and then to arc discharge as shown in Figure A.7
6287 in this document.
6288 Figure A.7 in this document shows the V-I characteristics between voltage and current for the
6289 discharge tube. When the tube is discharging, electric current flows and moves to a glow
6290 discharge and then to an arc discharge as the discharge voltage decreases. On the other hand,
6291 when the discharge decreases, the voltage increases as it moves from an arc discharge to a
6292 glow discharge.
6293
6294 Figure A.7 – V-I properties of gas discharge tubes
6295 Pre-glow discharge
6296 The voltage to maintain the discharge is approximately equal to the DC breakdown voltage. A
6297 faint light can be seen at this point.
6298 Glow discharge
6299 The constant voltage rate remains as the current changes. The voltage to maintain the
6300 discharge depends on the electrode material and the gas in the tube. The discharge light covers
6301 a portion of the electrodes.
6302 Arc discharge
6303 At this discharge, a large current flows through the part and it puts out a bright light. The
6304 maintaining voltage at this point (voltage between the discharge tube terminals) is in the 10’s
6305 of volts range.
– 187 – 108/757/DC
6306 A.4.4 What is holdover?
6307 When a discharge tube is used on a circuit that has a DC voltage component, a phenomenon
6308 occurs, called holdover, where the discharge in the tube continues to be driven by the current
6309 from the power supply even after the surge voltage has subsided (see Figure A.8 in this
6310 document).
6311 When a holdover occurs, for example, in the drive circuit of a CRT, the screen darkens and
6312 discharge in the absorber continues, which can lead to the glass tube melting, smoking or
6313 burning.
(a) No holdover occurring (b) Holdover occurring
6314 Figure A.8 – Holdover
6315 Holdover can occur when the current is supplied to the discharge tube due to varying conditions
6316 of output voltage and output resistance of the DC power supply. What are the conditions that
6317 allow current to continue to flow to the discharge tube?
6318 The relation between the power supply voltage (V0), serial resistance (R), discharge current (I)
6319 and the terminal voltage (v) are shown in the linear relation below:
6320 v = V0 – I x R
6321 If the voltage V0 is fixed, the slope of the power supply output characteristic line increases or
6322 decreases according to the resistance and may or may not intersect with the V-I characteristics
6323 of the discharge tube.
6324 The characteristic linear line of a power supply shows the relation between the output voltage
6325 and current of the power supply. Likewise, the V-I curve of a discharge tube shows the relation
6326 between the voltage and the current.
6327 When static surge electricity is applied to the discharge tube, the shape of the curve shows that
6328 the surge is being absorbed during arc discharge.
6329 As the surge ends, the discharge goes from arc discharge to glow discharge and then to a state
6330 just prior to glow discharge. At this time the relationship between the discharge tubes V-I curve
6331 and the power supply’s output characteristics are very important.
6332 (a) As shown in At low resistance
6333 , with a high resistance in the power supply, the output characteristic line (pink) and the
6334 discharge tubes V-I characteristic curve (black) never intersect. Therefore, current will not flow
6335 from the power supply and follow-on-current will not occur.
– 188 – 108/757/DC
6336 However, when the output characteristic line of the power supply (red) intersects with the V-I
6337 curve of the discharge tube (black), it is possible for the current from the power supply to flow
6338 into the discharge tube. When the surge ends, the current should decrease from arc discharge
6339 to the pre-glow state, but instead the current will continue to flow where it intersects in the glow
6340 or arc discharge region. This condition where the power supply continues to allow current into
6341 the discharge tube is called holdover.
6342 Figure A.9 in this document shows how the power supply continues to supply current to the
6343 discharge tube when its characteristic line intersects the discharge tubes V-I line in the glow or
6344 arc discharge sections.
6345 Figure A.9 – Relation of the V-I characteristic of a gas discharge tube and the output
6346 characteristic of the power supply
6347 To prevent holdover from occurring, it is important to keep the V-I characteristic line of the
6348 power supply from intersecting with the V-I curve of the discharge tube.
6349 A.4.5 Follow-on-current from AC sources
6350 In Figure A.11, the only difference is that the power supply voltage (V0) changes with time.
6351 As shown in A.4.4, when the power supply voltage is shown as V0(t), the output power
6352 characteristics are displayed as follows:
6353 v = V0(t) – R x I
6354 where
6355 v is the the voltage at the power out terminal
6356 I is the current of the circuit
6357 V0(t) will vary with time, so when displaying the above equation on a graph, it will appear
6358 as in Figure A.10 in this document. Then when V0 (t) is shown as:
6359 V0(t) = V0 sin wt
6360 When the power supply voltage becomes 0 (zero cross), there is a short time when the voltage
6361 range and time range of the power supply output and discharge tube V-I curve do not intersect.
6362 For an AC power supply, because there is always a zero crossing of the supply’s voltage, it is
6363 easier to stop the discharge than in the case of a DC power supply . In the vicinity of the zero
6364 crossing, it is impossible to maintain the discharge since the current to the discharge is cut off.
6365 The discharge is then halted by ionized gas molecules returning to their normal state.
– 189 – 108/757/DC
6366 Because the terminal voltage does not exceed the direct current break down voltage, if the
6367 discharge is halted it will not be able to start again.
6368 However, if the gas molecules remain ionized during this period and voltage is again applied to
6369 both terminals of the discharge tube (enters the cycle of opposite voltage), this newly applied
6370 voltage will not allow the discharge to end and it will continue in the discharge mode. This is
6371 follow-on-current for alternating current.
6372 When this type of follow-on-current occurs, the tube stays in a discharge mode and the glass
6373 of the tube will begin to smoke, melt and possibly ignite.
6374
6375 (b) At high resistance
6376
6377 (c) At low resistance
6378 Figure A.10 – Characteristics
6379 It is important to utilize a resistance in series that is sufficiently large enough to prevent follow-
6380 on-current from occurring according to the conditions of the alternating current.
– 190 – 108/757/DC
Picture 1: with 0 Ω
(follow-on current occuring)
Picture 2: with 0,5 Ω

(follow-on current is stopped within half a wave)
6381 Figure A.11 – Follow on current pictures
6382 With 1 Ω and 3 Ω resistance, results are the same as those in picture 2, follow-on-current is
6383 interrupted and discharge is stopped (see Figure A.11 in this document).
6384 For AC power sources, the resistance value that is connected in series with the discharge tube
6385 is small in comparison to DC sources.
6386 If the series resistance is 0,5 Ω or greater it should be sufficient, however for safety a value of
6387 3 Ω (for 100 V) or greater is recommended.
6388 In addition, there is a method to use a varistor in series that acts as a resistor. In this case the
6389 varistor should have an operating voltage greater than the AC voltage and be placed in series
6390 with the discharge tube. Unlike the resistor, discharge will be stopped without follow-on-current
6391 occurring during the first half of the wave.
6392 Recommended varistor values are:
6393 – a varistor voltage of 220 V minimum for 100 VAC;

6394 – a varistor voltage of 470 V minimum for 200 VAC.
6395
– 191 – 108/757/DC
6396 Annex B
6397 (informative)
6398
6399 Background information related to measurement of discharges –
6400 Determining the R-C discharge time constant for X- and Y-capacitors
6401 B.1 General
6402 Since the introduction of 2.1.1.7, “Discharge of capacitors in equipment,” in IEC 60950-1:2013,
6403 questions continually arise as to how to measure the R-C discharge time constant. The objective
6404 of this article is to describe how to measure and determine the discharge time constant.
6405 B.2 EMC filters
6406 EMC filters in equipment are circuits comprised of inductors and capacitors arranged so as to
6407 limit the emission of RF energy from the equipment into the mains supply line. In EMC filters,
6408 capacitors connected between the supply conductors (for example, between L1 and L2) of the
6409 mains are designated as X capacitors. Capacitors connected between a supply conductor and
6410 the PE (protective earthing or grounding) conductor are designated as Y capacitors (Safety
6411 requirements for X and Y capacitors are specified in IEC 60384-14 and similar national
6412 standards). The circuit of a typical EMC filter is shown in Figure B.1. C X is the X capacitor, and
6413 C Y are the Y capacitors.
6414
6415 Figure B.1 – Typical EMC filter schematic
6416 B.3 The safety issue and solution
6417 When an EMC filter is disconnected from the mains supply line, both the X (C x ) and the Y (C Ya
6418 and C Yb ) capacitors remain charged to the value of the mains supply voltage at the instant of
6419 disconnection.
6420 Due to the nature of sinusoidal waveforms, more than 66 % of the time (30° to 150° and 210°
6421 to 330° of each cycle) the voltage is more than 50 % of the peak voltage. For 230 V mains (325
6422 V peak ), the voltage is more than 162 V for more than 66 % of the time of each cycle. So, the
– 192 – 108/757/DC
6423 probability of the voltage exceeding 162 V at the time of disconnection is 0,66. This probability
6424 represents a good chance that the charge on the X and Y capacitors will exceed 162 V.
6425 If a hand or other body part should touch both pins (L1 and L2) of the mains supply plug at the
6426 same time, the capacitors will discharge through that body part. If the total capacitance exceeds
6427 about 0,1 µF, the discharge will be quite painful.
6428 To safeguard against such a painful experience, safety documents require that the capacitors
6429 be discharged to a non-painful voltage in a short period of time. The short period of time is
6430 taken as the time from the disconnection from the mains to the time when contact with both
6431 pins is likely. Usually, this time is in the range of 1 s to 10 s, depending on the documents and
6432 the type of attachment plug cap installed.
6433 B.4 The requirement
6434 The time constant is measured with an oscilloscope. The time constant and its parameters are
6435 defined elsewhere.
6436 The significant parameters specified in the requirement are the capacitance exceeding 0,1 µF
6437 and the time constant of 1 s or less (for pluggable equipment type A) or 10 s or less (for
6438 pluggable equipment type B). These values bound the measurement. This attachment
6439 addresses pluggable equipment type A and the 1 s time constant requirement. The
6440 attachment applies to pluggable equipment type B and the time constant is changed to 10 s.
6441 Pluggable equipment type A is intended for connection to a mains supply via a non-industrial
6442 plug and socket-outlet. Pluggable equipment type B is intended for connection to a mains
6443 supply via an industrial plug and socket-outlet.
6444 The document presumes that measurements made with an instrument having an input
6445 resistance of 95 MΩ to 105 MΩ and up to 25 pF in parallel with the impedance and capacitance
6446 of the equipment under test (EUT) will have negligible effect on the measured time constant.
6447 The effect of probe parameters on the determination of the time constant is discussed
6448 elsewhere in this document.
6449 The requirement specifies a time constant rather than a discharge down to a specified voltage
6450 within a specified time interval. If the document required a discharge to a specific voltage, then
6451 the start of the measurement would need to be at the peak of the voltage. This would mean that
6452 the switch (see Figure B.5) would need to be opened almost exactly at the peak of the voltage
6453 waveform. This would require special switching equipment. The time constant is specified
6454 because it can be measured from any point on the waveform (except zero), see Figure B.4 b).
6455 B.5 100 MΩ probes
6456 Table B.1 in this document is a list of readily available oscilloscope probes with 100 MΩ input
6457 resistance and their rated input capacitances (the list is not exhaustive). Also included is a
6458 400 MΩ input resistance probe and a 50 MΩ input resistance probe.
– 193 – 108/757/DC
6459 Table B.1 – 100 MΩ oscilloscope probes
Input resistance Input capacitance

Manufacturer
MΩ pF
A 100 1
B 100 6,5
C 100 3
D 400 10 – 13
E 100 2,5
F 50 5,5
6460
6461 Note that the input capacitances of the 100 MΩ probe input capacitances are very much less
6462 than the maximum capacitance of 25 pF. This attachment will discuss the effect of the probe
6463 capacitance and the maximum capacitance elsewhere.
6464 100 MΩ probes are meant for measuring high voltages, typically 15 kV and more. These probes
6465 are quite large and are awkward to connect to the pins of a power plug.
6466
Figure B.2 – 100 MΩ oscilloscope probes
6467 General purpose oscilloscope probes have 10 MΩ input resistance and 10 pF to 15 pF input
6468 capacitance. General-purpose probes are easier to connect to the pins of the power plug. This
6469 attachment shows that a 10 MΩ, 15 pF probe can be used in place of a 100 MΩ probe.
6470 B.6 The R-C time constant and its parameters
6471 Capacitor charge or discharge time can be expressed by the R-C time constant parameter. One
6472 time constant is the time duration for the voltage on the capacitor to change 63 %. In five time
6473 constants, the capacitor is discharged to almost zero.
– 194 – 108/757/DC
6474 Table B.2 – Capacitor discharge
Capacitor voltage
Percent capacitor voltage (or
Time constant
charge) (230 V rms , 331 V peak )
0 100 325
1 37 120
2 14 45
3 5 16
4 2 6
5 0,7 2
6475
6476 The values in Table B.2 in this document are given by:
t
−( )
6477 Vt = V0 e RC
6478 where:
6479 Vt is the voltage at time t
6480 V0 is the voltage at time 0
6481 R is the resistance, in Ω

6482 C is the capacitance, in F (Farads)
6483 t is the time, in s
6484
6485 The time constant is given by the formula:
6486 TEUT = REUT × C EUT
6487 where:
6488 TEUT is the time, in seconds, for the voltage to change by 63 %
6489 R EUT is the EUT resistance, in Ω
6490 C EUT is the EUT capacitance, in F (Farads)
6491 In the equipment under test (EUT), the EUT capacitance, C EUT , in the line filter (Figure B.1)
6492 includes both the X-capacitor and the Y-capacitors.
6493 The two Y-capacitors, C Ya and C Yb , are in series. The resultant value of two capacitors in series,
6494 C Y , is:
CYa × CYb
6495 CY =
CYa + CYb
6496 Assuming the two Y-capacitors have the same value, their L1-L2 value is one-half of the value
6497 of one of the capacitors.
– 195 – 108/757/DC
6498 The X-capacitor is in parallel with the two Y-capacitors. The EUT capacitance is:
6499 C EUT = C X + CY
6500 The EUT resistance is the resistance, R EUT , in the EUT that is used for discharging the
6501 capacitance.
6502 The time constant, T EUT , in s, is the product of the EUT capacitance in farads and the EUT
6503 resistance in Ω. More useful units are capacitance in µF and resistance in MΩ.
6504 Two parameters of the time constant formula are given by the requirement: EUT capacitance is
6505 0,1 µF or larger and the EUT time constant does not exceed 1 s. Solving the time constant
6506 formula for EUT resistance:
6507 REUT = TEUT C EUT
6508 Substituting the values:
6509 REUT = 1s / 0,1µ F
6510 REUT = 10MΩ
6511 This means that the EUT resistance is no greater than 10 MΩ if the EUT capacitance is 0,1 µF
6512 or greater. The combinations of EUT resistance and EUT capacitance for EUT time constant of
6513 1 s are shown in Figure B.3 in this document.
Figure B.3 – Combinations of EUT resistance and capacitance for 1 s time constant
– 196 – 108/757/DC
6514 B.7 Time constant measurement.
6515 The objective is to measure and determine the EUT time constant.
6516 Measurement of the time constant is done with an oscilloscope connected to the mains input
6517 terminals of the equipment under test (EUT). Mains is applied to the EUT, the EUT is turned
6518 off, and then the mains is disconnected from the EUT. The EUT is turned off because the load
6519 circuits of the EUT may serve to discharge the EUT capacitance. The resulting oscilloscope
6520 waveform, the AC mains voltage followed by the discharge of the total capacitance, is shown
6521 in Figure B.4 in this document.
– 197 – 108/757/DC
a) 240 V mains followed by capacitor discharge

V = 50 V/div, H = 1 s/div
6522
b) 240 V mains followed by capacitor discharge

V = 50 V/div, H = 0,2 s/div
6523 Figure B.4 – 240 V mains followed by capacitor discharge
6524 The time constant is the time duration measured from the instant of disconnection to a point
6525 that is 37 % of the voltage at the instant of disconnection.
6526 The problem is that the process of measurement affects the measured time constant. This is
6527 because the oscilloscope probe has a finite resistance and capacitance, see Figure B.5 in this
6528 document.
– 198 – 108/757/DC
6529 Figure B.5 – Time constant measurement schematic
6530 The probe resistance, R probe , is in parallel to the EUT resistance, R EUT . And, the probe
6531 capacitance, C probe , is in parallel with the EUT capacitance, C EUT .
6532 The measured time constant, T measured , is a function of the Thevenin equivalent circuit
6533 comprised of R total and C total . The measured time constant is given by:
6534 Tmeasured = Rtotal × C total
6535 where:
6536 Tmeasured is the measured time for the voltage to change by 63 %
6537 Rtotal is the total resistance, both the probe and the EUT
6538 C total is the total capacitance, both the probe and the EUT
6539 R total is:
R probe × R EUT
6540 Rtotal =
R probe + R EUT
6541 C total is:
6542 Combining terms, the measured time constant is:
R probe × R EUT
6543 Tmeasured = ( ) × (C probe + C EUT )
R probe + R EUT
– 199 – 108/757/DC
6544 In this formula, T measured , R probe , and C probe are known. T measured is measured with a given
6545 probe. R probe and C probe are determined from the probe specifications (see examples in
6546 Table B.1 in this document). Elsewhere, we shall see that C probe is very small and can be
6547 ignored.
6548 C total = C EUT
6549 The measured time constant can now be expressed as:
R probe × R EUT
6550 Tmeasured = ( ) × C total
R probe + R EUT
6551 B.8 Effect of probe resistance
6552 As has been shown, the EUT discharge resistance, R EUT , is 10 MΩ or less in order to achieve
6553 a 1 s time constant with a 0,1 µF capacitor or larger.
6554 R total is comprised of both the EUT discharge resistance R EUT , and the probe resistance, R probe .
6555 If R EUT is 10 MΩ and C EUT is 0,1 µF, then we know that T EUT is 1 s. If we measure the time
6556 constant with a 100 MΩ probe, the parallel combination of R EUT and R probe is about 9,1 MΩ and
6557 the measured time constant, T measured , will be:
6559 Tmeasured = 9,1MΩ × 0,1µF
6560 Tmeasured = 0,91s
6561 So, for a C EUT of 0,1 µF capacitance and a R EUT of 10 MΩ, a measured time constant (using a
6562 100 MΩ probe), T measured , of 0,91 s would indicate a EUT time constant, T EUT , of 1 s.
6563 If we substitute a 10 MΩ probe for the same measurement, then R total , the parallel combination
6564 of R EUT (10 MΩ) and R probe (10 MΩ), is 5 MΩ. The measured time constant, T measured , will be:
6566 Tmeasured = 5MΩ × 0,1µF
6567 Tmeasured = 0,5s
6568 So, for a C EUT of 0,1 µF capacitance and a R EUT of 10 MΩ, the measured time constant (using
6569 a 10 MΩ probe), T measured , is 0,5 s and would indicate a EUT time constant, T EUT , of 1 s.
– 200 – 108/757/DC
6570 B.9 Effect of probe capacitance
6571 According to the document, C EUT is 0,1 µF or more. Also, according to the document, C probe is
6572 25 pF or less. Assuming the worst case for C probe , the total capacitance is:
6573 C total = C probe + C EUT
6574 Ctotal = 0,000025uF + 0,1uF
6575 Ctotal = 0,100025uF
6576 The worst-case probe capacitance is extremely small (0,025 %) compared to the smallest C EUT
6577 capacitance (0,1 µF) and can be ignored. We can say that:
6578 C total = C EUT
6579 B.10 Determining the time constant
6580 According to the document, T EUT may not exceed 1 s.
6581 TEUT = 1
6582 1 = REUT × C EUT
6583 where:
6584 R EUT is 10 MΩ or less
6585 C EUT is 0,1 µF or more
6586 The problem is to determine the values for R EUT and C EUT . Once these values are known, the
6587 equipment time constant, T EUT , can be determined by calculation.
6588 As shown in Figure B.1 in this document, R EUT can be measured directly with an ohmmeter
6589 applied to the mains input terminals, for example, between L1 and L2. Care is taken that the
6590 capacitances are fully discharged when the resistance measurement is made. Any residual
6591 charge will affect the ohmmeter and its reading. Of course, if the circuit is provided with a
6592 discharge resistor, then the capacitances will be fully discharged. If the circuit does not have a
6593 discharge resistor, then the ohmmeter will provide the discharge path, and the reading will
6594 continuously increase.
6595 C EUT can also be measured directly with a capacitance meter. Depending on the particular
6596 capacitance meter, R EUT may prevent accurate measurement of C EUT . For the purposes of this
6597 paper, we assume that the capacitance meter cannot measure the C EUT . In this case, we
6598 measure the time constant and compensate for the probe resistance.
6599 So, the time constant is measured, and the probe resistance is accounted for.
6600 Since probe resistance is more or less standardized, we can calculate curves for 100 MΩ and
6601 10 MΩ probes for all maximum values of R EUT and C EUT . The maximum values for combinations
– 201 – 108/757/DC
6602 of R EUT , C EUT (C total ), R probe , R total and T measured are given in Table B.3 in this document.
6603 (R probe and R total values are rounded to 2 significant digits.)
6604 Table B.3 – Maximum T measured values for combinations of R EUT

6605 and C EUT for T EUT of 1 s
T EUT C EUT (C total ) R EUT R probe R total T measured
s µF MΩ MΩ MΩ s
1 0,1 10 100 9,1 0,91

1 0,2 5 100 4,8 0,95
1 0,3 3,3 100 3,2 0,97
1 0,4 2,5 100 2,4 0,97
1 0,5 2 100 2,0 0,98
1 0,6 1,7 100 1,6 0,98
1 0,7 1,4 100 1,4 0,99
1 0,8 1,25 100 1,2 0,99
1 0,9 1,1 100 1,1 0,99
1 1,0 1 100 1,0 0,99
1 0,1 10 10 5,0 0,50
1 0,2 5 10 3,3 0,67
1 0,3 3,3 10 2,5 0,75
1 0,4 2,5 10 2,0 0,80
1 0,5 2 10 1,7 0,83
1 0,6 1,7 10 1,4 0,86
1 0,7 1,4 10 1,25 0,88
1 0,8 1,25 10 1,1 0,89
1 0,9 1,1 10 1,0 0,90
1 1,0 1 10 0,91 0,91
6606
6607 For each value of R EUT and R probe we can calculate the worst-case measured time constants,
6608 T measured for a T EUT of 1 s. These are shown in Figure B.6 in this document.
6609 The process is:
6610 – With the unit disconnected from the mains and the power switch “off,” measure the
6611 resistance between the poles of the EUT. Repeat with the power switch “on” as the filter
6612 may be on the load side of the power switch. Select the higher value as R EUT .
6613 – Connect the oscilloscope probe between L1 and L2 as shown in Figure B.5 in this document.
6614 For safety during this test, use a 1:1 isolating transformer between the mains and the EUT.
6615 Set the scope sweep speed to 0,2 ms per division (2 s full screen).
6616 – When the display is about 1 or 2 divisions from the start, turn the test switch off, and measure
6617 the time constant as shown in Figure B.4 in this document. This step may need to be
6618 repeated several times to get a suitable waveform on the oscilloscope. This step should be
6619 performed twice, once with the EUT power switch “off” and once with the EUT power switch
6620 “on.” Select the maximum value. This value is T measured .
6621 – Plot R EUT and T measured on the chart, Figure B.6 in this document.
– 202 – 108/757/DC
6622 If the point is below the curve of the probe that is used to measure the time constant, then the
6623 EUT time constant, T EUT , is less than 1 s.
6624
6625 Figure B.6 – Worst-case measured time constant values for 100 MΩ and 10 MΩ probes
6626 B.11 Conclusion
6627 Measurement of the time constant can be made with any probe, not just a 100 MΩ probe. Ideally,
6628 the probe input resistance should be at least equal to the worst-case EUT discharge resistance
6629 (10 MΩ for pluggable equipment type A) or higher. The effect of the probe input resistance is
6630 given by the equation for R total . 100 MΩ probes, while approaching ideal in terms of the effect
6631 on the measured time constant, are bulky and expensive and not necessary.
6632 The document is a bit misleading by ignoring a 9 % error when a 100 MΩ probe is used to
6633 measure the time constant associated with a 10 MΩ discharge resistor (see Figure B.5 in this
6634 document).
6635
– 203 – 108/757/DC
6636 Annex C
6637 (informative)
6638
6639 Background information related to resistance to candle flame ignition
6640 In line with SMB decision 135/20, endorsing the ACOS/ACEA JTF recommendations, the former
6641 Clause 11 was added to the document up to CDV stage. However, the CDV was rejected and
6642 several national committees indicated that they wanted to have the requirements removed from
6643 the document. At the same time, several countries indicated that they wanted the requirements
6644 to stay, while others commented that they should be limited to CRT televisions only.
6645 IEC TC 108 decided to publish the requirements as a separate document so that the different
6646 issues can be given appropriate consideration.
6647
– 204 – 108/757/DC
6648 Annex D
6649 (informative)
6650
6651 Surge suppressers used between mains and an external circuit ID1 as
6652 specified in Table 13
6653 In countries where a surge suppresser with a group of surge protective components
6654 (SPCs) is used between mains and an external circuit classified as ID1 in Table 13 in
6655 class II equipment without earthing; the following need to be taken into consideration.
6656 The separation between ES1 or ES2 circuits and the external circuit provided in the
6657 equipment shall withstand either the impulse test of 1,5 kV 10/700 or the steady state
6658 test of 1,0 kV in accordance with 5.4.10.
6659 An example of a circuit configuration of a surge suppressor in this condition is shown

6660 in Figure D.1 .
6661
6662 Figure D.1 – Example of circuit configuration of a surge suppresser
6663 The blunt probe of Figure V.3 is used to check the accessibility of the circuit in which
6664 the SPCs are connected.
6665 A surge suppressor with a group of SPCs consisting of one or more varistors and one
6666 or more GDTs connected in series; shall comply with the following:
6667 – The surge suppressor does not operate when U TOV2 is applied between mains and
6668 the external circuit in the equipment, where U TOV2 is defined as a peak voltage
6669 simulating TOV (temporary overvoltage) condition that is determined depending on
6670 the nature of the AC voltage supply system in the country.
6671 – The surge suppressor does not operate when the peak voltage of the AC mains
6672 voltage at maximum of the fluctuation Upeak2 is applied between the mains and the
6673 external circuit in the equipment, even if any of the SPCs that is part of the surge
6674 suppressor is short-circuited.
6675 – The rated operating voltage U op of a SPC that is part of the surge suppressor is
6676 designed in order to avoid operation under the condition of U TOV2 and U peak2. The
6677 rated operating voltage of the SPC is determined taking into consideration variations
6678 in production and ageing effects.
6679
6680
– 205 – 108/757/DC
6681 Bibliography
6682 IEC 60065:2014, Audio, video and similar electronic apparatus – Safety requirements
6683 IEC 60215, Safety requirements for radio transmitting equipment – General requirements and
6684 terminology
6685 IEC 60364-4-43, Low-voltage electrical installations – Part 4-43: Protection for safety –
6686 Protection against overcurrent
6687 IEC 60364-5-52, Low-voltage electrical installations – Part 5-52: Selection and erection of
6688 electrical equipment – Wiring systems
6689 IEC 60364-5-54, Low-voltage electrical installations – Part 5-54: Selection and erection of
6690 electrical equipment – Earthing arrangements and protective conductors
6691 IEC 60446, Identification by colours or numerals 2
6692 IEC TS 60479-2, Effects of current on human beings and livestock – Part 2: Special aspects
6693 IEC 60664-2 (all parts), Insulation coordination for equipment within low-voltage systems – Part
6694 2: Application guide
6695 IEC 60664-4:2005, Insulation coordination for equipment within low-voltage systems – Part 4:
6696 Consideration of high-frequency voltage stress
6697 IEC 60695-2 (all parts), Fire hazard testing – Part 2: Glowing/hot-wire based test methods
6698 IEC 60695-2-13, Fire hazard testing – Part 2-13: Glowing/hot-wire based test methods – Glow-
6699 wire ignition temperature (GWIT) test method for materials
6700 IEC 60695-11-2, Fire hazard testing – Part 11-2: Test flames – 1 kW nominal pre-mixed flame
6701 – Apparatus, confirmatory test arrangement and guidance
6702 IEC 60950-1:2005, Information technology equipment – Safety – Part 1: General requirements
6703 IEC 60950-1:2005/AMD1:2009
6704 IEC 60950-1:2005/AMD2:2013
6705 IEC 61010-1, Safety requirements for electrical equipment for measurement, control, and
6706 laboratory use – Part 1: General requirements
6707 IEC 61051-1, Varistors for use in electronic equipment – Part 1: Generic specification
6708 ISO/IEC Guide 51:1999, Safety aspects — Guidelines for their inclusion in standards
6709 ITU-T K.21:2008, Resistibility of telecommunication equipment installed in customer premises

6710 to overvoltages and overcurrents
6711 EN 41003:2008, Particular safety requirements for equipment to be connected to

6712 telecommunication networks and/or a cable distribution system
6713 EN 60065:2002, Audio, video and similar electronic apparatus – Safety requirements
___________
2 This publication was withdrawn.
– 206 – 108/757/DC
6714 NFPA 70, National Electrical Code
6715 NFPA 79:2002, Electrical Standard for Industrial Machinery
6716 UL 1667, UL Standard for Safety Tall Institutional Carts for Use with Audio-, Video-, and
6717 Television-Type Equipment
6718 UL 1995, UL Standard for Safety for Heating and Cooling Equipment
6719 UL 2178, Outline for Marking and Coding Equipment
6720 UL 60065, Audio, Video and Similar Electronic Apparatus – Safety Requirements
6721 UL/CSA 60950-1, Information Technology Equipment – Safety – Part 1: General Requirements
6722 CAN/CSA C22.1, Information Technology Equipment – Safety – Part 1: General Requirements
6723 CSA C22.1-09, Canadian Electrical Code – Part I: Safety Standard for Electrical Installations –
6724 Twenty-first Edition
6725 ASTM C1057, Standard Practice for Determination of Skin Contact Temperature from Heated
6726 Surfaces Using A Mathematical Model and Thermesthesiometer
6727 EC 98/37/EC Machinery Directive
6728
6729 _____________
6730

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INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION

TECHNICAL COMMITTEE NO. 108: SAFETY OF ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT WITHIN THE

TC 108/WG HBSDT proposed draft IEC 62368-2, Ed. 4.

Comments/ proposals to be returned by 2021-09-24

2 0 Principles of this product safety standard ...................................................................... 14

48 5.6 Protective conductor ............................................................................................. 66

97 8.6.3 Relocation stability ...................................................................................... 113

146 B.2.3 Supply Voltage ............................................................................................ 136

194 M.6.1 Requirements .............................................................................................. 167

238 Figure 1 – Risk reduction as given in ISO/IEC Guide 51........................................................ 15

242 Figure 5 – Safeguards for protecting an instructed person .................................................... 24

287 Figure 46 – Graphical representation of L Aeq ,T .................................................................. 131

324 Table 1 – General summary of required safeguards .............................................................. 24

332 Table 6 – Insulation requirements for external circuits .......................................................... 46

361 INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION

Enquiry draft Report on voting

416 In this document, the following print types are used:

417 – notes/explanatory matter: in smaller roman type;

463 AUDIO/VIDEO, INFORMATION AND

469 0 Principles of this product safety standard

ISO/IEC Guide 51 IEC 62368-1

503 Figure 1 – Risk reduction as given in ISO/IEC Guide 51

506 Figure 2 – HBSE Process Chart

507 0.5.7 Equipment safeguards during skilled person service conditions

549 2 Normative references

570 3 Terms, definitions and abbreviations

615 3.3.7.7 reasonably foreseeable misuse

645 Figure 3 – Protective bonding conductor as part of a safeguard

653 3.3.14.3 prospective touch voltage

670 4 General requirements

681 Reasonable foreseeable misuse

686 functional insulation

695 functional components

729 Acceptance of components and component requirements from IEC 60065

795 4.2.2 Class 2 energy source

805 4.2.3 Class 3 energy source

818 Figure 4 – Safeguards for protecting an ordinary person

819 4.3.3 Safeguards for protection of an instructed person

822 Figure 5 – Safeguards for protecting an instructed person

823 4.3.4 Safeguards for protection of a skilled person

826 Figure 6 – Safeguards for protecting a skilled person

Number of safeguards required to be interposed between an

888 4.4.3.10 Compliance criteria

901 For example, a conductive screw fixing a radiator on a transistor in a class II

939 5 Electrically-caused injury

1002 1 MHz limit

1033 Figure 8 – Conventional time/current zones of effects

1036 Table 2 – Time/current zones for AC 15 Hz to 100 Hz

Zones Boundaries Physiological effects

Beyond curve c 3 AC-4.3 Probability of ventricular fibrillation above 50 %.

1040 Figure 9 – Conventional time/current zones of effects of DC currents on persons for

1042 Table 3 – Time/current zones for DC for hand to feet pathway

Zones Boundaries Physiological effects

Beyond curve c 3 DC-4.3 Probability of ventricular fibrillation above 50 %.

1045 The seriousness of an injury increases continuously with the energy

1090 5.2.2.2 Steady-state voltage and current limits

1104 Under single fault conditions of a relevant basic safeguard or supplementary

1146 Table 5 Electrical energy source limits for a charged capacitor

1147 Source: IEC TS 61201:2007 (Annex A)

1154 Table 4 – Limit values of accessible capacitance (threshold of pain)

1156 5.2.2.4 Single pulse limits